G. R. Nos. 102009-10,July 6, 1994People vs. Rolando De Gracia

FACTS:The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of thecoup d' etatstaged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their"tora-tora"planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila.That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and control, the following to wit:Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamitesSix (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 eachOne hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombswithout first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from the proper authorities, and armed with said dynamites, ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by common designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of rebellion, by then and there participating therein and publicly taking arms against the duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof.In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide.As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and"molotov"bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of the building. He denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives in his possession. He testified that when the military raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and made to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up, the explosives were already there.Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the 1987coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no job. Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant worked for Matillano.De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because"bata raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin."ISSUES:I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition.

II. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

RULING:The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management.This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is amalum prohibitumpunished by a special law,in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there wasanimus possidendior an intent to possess on the part of the accused.11Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon,such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as theanimus possidendiis absent, there is no offense committed.Coming now to the case before the court, there is no doubt in its mind that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4.At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.Animus possidendiis a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going on absence without leave(AWOL).We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites,"molotov"bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. Afortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, the SC hold, that appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles confiscated from his person.

G.R. No. 125754, December 22, 1999People vs. Bolasa

FACTS:An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away.They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer.When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and x x x saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana."[1]They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia.They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused Zenaida BolasayNakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes.Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana.

ISSUE:Whether vor not the arrest of Zenaida Bolasa and the search preceeded by it was illegal.

RULING:The Supreme Court sustained the appeal.This case clearly illustrates how constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and seizures can be violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of suspected drug offenders.Thus, after a meticulous evaluation of the evidence at hand, this Court finds itself with no other recourse but to strike down the process adopted by the prosecution and acquit accused-appellants for insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt.Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides -The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects.The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable. Thus, arrests and seizures in the following instances are not deemed unreasonable and are thus allowed even in the absence of a warrant -1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest(Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);2.Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are:(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.3.Search of a moving vehicle.Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4.Consented warrantless search;5.Customs search;6.Stop and Frisk; and7.Exigent and emergency circumstances.[6]An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant:(a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.[7]A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.[8]The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories.Perforce, their arrest is illegal.First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime.Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it.Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view.First, there was no valid intrusion.As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested.Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered.The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room.In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained.After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure.The arrest being illegalab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal.Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants;[9]hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.

Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications Commission,G.R. No. 168338,February 15, 2008

FACTS:As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretappedmobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warnedin a press release all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority.It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and theKapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas(KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1.Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?

2.Did themere press statementsof respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

RULING:

[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalezs press statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTCs press statement was concerned.]

1.NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the pressbased on contentis given thestrictest scrutiny,with thegovernmenthavingtheburdenof overcoming the presumedunconstitutionality by theclear and present danger rule.This rule applies equally toallkinds of media,includingbroadcast media.

Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test.[T]hegreat evilwhich government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording.Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version.Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule thatnot every violation of a law will justify straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Ourlaws are of different kindsand doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation,by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press.In fine,violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press.Thetotality of the injurious effectsof the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test,the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluingviolationsof law.By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecutedbythe State for they breed their own evil consequence.But to repeat,the need to prevent their violation cannot per setrump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils.For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers thenational security of the State.

2.YES, themere press statementsof respondents DOJSecretaryand the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.

[I]tisnotdecisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media.Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an officialcapacityis covered by the rule on prior restraint.The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circularwill result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. vs.HON. CEASAR G. DYG.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411April 2, 2009FACTS:Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a commercial area. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayors permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayors permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but both courts denied the petition.A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayors permit to submit either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.

In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property as commercial without objections raised by therespondents.

Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.

ISSUE:Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the grounds that the state is immune against suits.

RULING:

No.While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or agents, there is an exception.Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individualsThus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latters voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

KMU vs. ERMITAGR NO. 17855October 5, 2010

FACTS:In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the countrys id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power by the president.ISSUE:Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.HELD:No.Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of FinanceG.R. No. 115455August 25, 1994

FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

RULING:

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of CebuGR NO. 95770December 29, 1995

FACTS:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

RULING:YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive SecretaryG.R. No. 153888July 9, 2003

FACTS:Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

ISSUE:Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

RULING:No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.