MAGALLONA V. ERMITA

G.R. No. 187167 July 16, 2011

FACTS: In March 2009, the Congress enacted Republic Act 9522 in compliance with the terms of United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and

contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of

application for the extended continental shelf. In compliance, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the

location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the

Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners seek for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No.

9522 on the following grounds:

(1) RA 9522 disregarded the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties that

resulted in the reduction of Philippine maritime territory and logically, the reduction of the reach

of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution. (2) RA 9522 converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, allowing maritime passage by all

vessels and aircrafts, which undermines Philippine sovereignty and national security,

contravenes the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damages marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.

Petitioners further contend RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of fishermen.

Respondents defend RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG and Scarborough Shoal. Respondents also claim that RA 9522 does not

undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of the petitioners are tenable.

HELD: Petition dismissed. SC declares RA 9522 as not unconstitutional. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines

laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or diminution of territory. UNCLOS III is a multilateral

treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a

statutory tool to demarcate with precision the extent of the countrys maritime zones and continental shelf. On the other hand, the petitioners assertion of reduction of Philippine maritime territory proves to be contrary to both the fact and the law. RA 9552 by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the total maritime space of the Philippines by 145,216 nautical miles.

While UNCLOS III may term what we consider our internal waters as archipelagic waters, UNCLOS III recognize the exercise of our countrys sovereignty over these waters. However, due to our observance of international law, we must observe the right of innocent passage of others. This right of innocent passage

clearly does not undermine our sovereignty and national security and does not violate any constitutional

provision.

Lastly, with regard to petitioners contention that KIG is discarded as part of the Philippine territory is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law provides for the continued claim of sovereignty and

jurisdiction over the KIG and Scarborough Shoal. The said islands being qualified under the category of

regime of islands generate their own applicable maritime zone.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

(G.R. NO. 183591, OCT. 14, 2008)

FACTS:

This case refers to the nations quest for true and lasting peace in Muslim Mindanao. This started when the 1987 Constitution included authority for the creation of the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) under Art. X, Sec. 18 of 1987 Phil. Constitution which was catalyzed by

the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in Libya between the GRP and the MNLF in 1976.

On August 1, 1989, the Congress passed and approved Republic Act 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Only four (4) provinces out of thirteen (13) voted for their inclusion in the ARMM in a plebiscite, namely: Provinces of Maguindanao,

Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.

Then, on September 2, 1996, the GRP and the MNLF entered into and signed a total and final

peace agreement implementing the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, where peace negotiations began. On July

18, 1997, the GRP and the MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on the General Cessation of

Hostilities, due to the fact that the latter rejected the final peace agreement between the GRP and the

MNLF. Next, on August 27, 1998, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent in Sultan

Kudarat, Mindanao.

All these agreements, notwithstanding, at the end of 1999 to 2000, the MILF attacked a number

of municipalities in Central Mindanao and took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del

Norte. Government responded twice declaring an all-out-war against the MILF. On April 30, 2000, the MILF unilaterally suspended the GRP-MILF Peace Talks and declare an all-out-war against the

GRP.

On February 28, 2001, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 3 defining the policy and

administrative structure for the government comprehensive peace effort. In addition thereto, the

President issued Memorandum of Instructions to the GRP Peace Panel providing the General

Guidelines on the Peace Talks with the MILF.

Then, on April 3, 2001, as a consequence of the signing of the Agreement on the General

Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF on March 24, 2001, in

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia , the MILF suspended all its military actions in their areas of operation.

Subsequently, two (2) formal peace talks between the parties were held on June 20-22, 2001

and August 5-7, 2001 in Tripoli, Libya and Cyberjaya, Malaysia, respectively. These peace talks

resulted to the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli

Agreement on Peace of 2001. This agreement contains the basic principles and agenda on the

following aspects of negotiation: (1) Security Aspect, (2) Rehabilitation Aspect, and (3) Ancestral

Domain Aspect.

Yet, incidences of violence and violation of cease-fire pact by the MILF continued to occur from

2002 to 2003. Therefrom, the continuation of several rounds of exploratory talks was held on June

20-21, 2005 in Kuala Lumpur and resulted in the forging of clear parameters and principles to be

pursued on the Governance Aspect of the Ancestral Domain. This was followed by another

exploratory talk on September 15-16, where both panels adopted the points on the same aspect of

Ancestral Domain provided in the Peace Agreement of 2001 between the GRP and the MILF.

The peace process finally concluded in the drafting of the subject Memorandum of Agreement

on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) intended to be signed in Kuala Lumpur on August 25, 2008. MOA-AD

included, among others, a stipulation that creates Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP

grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro- defined as the

present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,

Basilan and Marawi City., as well as the municipalities of Lanao Del Norte which voted for inclusion

in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power the power to build, develop,

and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE

as associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility. However, with such schedule of signing, news report began to appear on the contents of the MOA-AD, with the petitioners procuring

copies of the draft of the memorandum. Inability to disclose and secure complete and official copies

thereof, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon and a categorical response from GRP, the

petitioners then filed these petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and

183962. Lastly, by Resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order

directing the respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) is

unconstitutional as to its concepts with regard to:

1. Associated State

2. Self-determination of Indigenous People

HELD:

1. Yes, the MOA-AD between the MILF and GRP is unconstitutional with regard to the associative

relationship granted by the said agreement to BJE and GRP. Under paragraph 4 on Governance (4th

section of the MOA-AD), it expressly states that The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and

responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and

administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. Association is formed when 2 states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links (Keitner

and Resman) and in international practice, the concept of being an associated state has usually been

used as a transitional device of former colonies to independence. In relation to this, several provisions

of the MOA-AD are consistent with the international concept of association specifically: (1) the

capacity of BJE to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries; (2) the commitment

of the Central Government ensuring the BJEs participation in meetings and events by the ASEAN and UN agencies; and (3) continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense.

The aforementioned provisions indicate that the parties aimed to vest in the BJE status of an

associated state or a status close to it. Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the concept of being an

associated state is not recognized. There is no province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM is

recognized to have an associative relationship with the national government. Association implies

powers which go beyond anything granted by the Constitution to any local or national government

recognizing such associated entity as a state. The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this

jurisdiction other than the Philippine State. In addition to this, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets

the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention namely, a permanent population, a

defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Moreover, the said MOA-AD would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution. The premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would

require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision.

Therefore, the MOA-AD MILF and GRP is unconstitutional with regard to the concept of BJE as an

associated state.

2. Yes, because although the petitioners argued that the International Law recognized the right of self-

determination of Indigenous People and that Article II Sec 2 of the Philippines states that the

Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land

it would not suffice the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws

unnecessary. Right to self-determination is classified into namely internal and external. The former

is the peoples pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing state while the latter to which this case refers to is the establishment of a

sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the

emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitutes modes of

implementing the right of self-determination by that people.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) clearly recognized the

right of indigenous peoples to self-discrimination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-

government. Assuming the UN DRIP is now regarded as embodying customary international law, the

obligations enumerated in such Declaration do not strictly require the Republic to grant the

Bangsamoro people the particular rights and powers provided in the MOA-AD.

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous people to autonomy, does not

obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. It is,

therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the

Constitution, specifically the amendments to the existing legal framework. While the word

Constitution is not mentioned in that specific provision or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term legal framework is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution.

Hence, this MOA-AD is considered unconstitutional with regard to the concept of self-determination

of Indigenous People.

Holy See v Rosario

SCRA December 1994

Ponente: Quiason, J.

Facts:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6, 000 square meters (Lot

5-A, 5-B, 5-D) located in the municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila and is registered under the Ph

Realty Corp. The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup at the price of P1,240.00 per sq/m through

Msgr. Cirilos as the seller, a representative of Holy See. This is due to the refusal of the squatters to

vacate the area which consequently led to the non-utilization of the said properties. Later on, Licup

assigned his rights to the sale to Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. due to the same reason.

Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by PRC of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and

Devt Corp. Starbright demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots against the petitioners, but to no avail. On June 8, 1990, the parties moved to dismiss the

complaint; the Holy See on the basis of its claim on its sovereign immunity from suit.

Issue/s:

WON the Holy See is able to claim its immunity from suit on the grounds that it acted on behalf of its

governmental function in its transactions regarding the selling of properties to a private entity.

Held/Ruling:

Yes, the Holy See is immune from the suit for the act of selling the properties because:

It is a sovereign state under the Lateran Treaty which recognizes the right of the Holy See to receive and to send foreign diplomats to foreign countries and to enter into treaties.

This treaty also established the statehood of the Vatican City for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing indisputable

sovereignty

As expressed in Sec 2 of Art II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. In Article 31 (a) of the Vienna Convention by

which the Ph was a party, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity over any real action relating to private immovable property in the territory of the receiving state for the

purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided in a diplomatic envoy, immunity

should also be recognized as regards the sovereign Holy See itself.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity: the classical or absolute theory which states that a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the

courts of another sovereign; the other is restrictive theory wherein the immunity of the

sovereign is recognized only with regard to public act or act jure imperii (governmental

purpose) of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis (commercial or

proprietary purpose). Although the Holy See has bought and sold lands in the ordinary

course of a real estate business, the real purpose of which was to establish an official

place of residence of the Papal Nuncio for its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the

Ph; it was not for profit or gain. Thus, exercising jure imperii.

IBP v. Zamora

G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts :

On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition praying for the issuance of temporary

restraining order (TRO) to nullify the command of President Estrada, as Commander-in-Chief, of the

deployment of Philippine Marines to join the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless

violence. This joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted through the

manner indicated in the Letter of Instruction (LOI) made by the Police Chief Superintendent Edgar

B. Aglipay. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are

merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation

shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine

Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issue:

1. WON petitioner has legal standing

2. WON the presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is

subject to judicial review

3. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the

constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy, over the military and the civilian character

of the PNP.

Held:

The petitioner has no legal standing in this case because they do not complied with requisites

of standing in this case. The mere invocation of IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and

nothing more is not sufficient to cover it with standing in this case. Moreover, its responsibility to

uphold the rule of law and the Constitution is too general shared by the whole citizenry and there is

no specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case.

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18,

Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual

basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review

of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in

a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped

together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the

President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is

considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the

curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus

necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the

necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the

Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such

heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for

calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law

enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the

Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines

constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces

are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character

of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian

institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or

enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence,

the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of

the PNP.

OPOSA V. FACTORAN

Facts:

Civil case no. 90-77 was filed before the Makati RTC branch 66. The principal petitioners are all

minors represented and joined by their parents. And the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI),

a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of engaging in the

protection of our environment and natural resources. Originally, the defendant was Hon. Fulgencio S.

Factoran Jr., then secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He was

substituted in this substitution by the new secretary, Hon. Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered

upon proper motion by the petitioners.

An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cancel existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in

the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and

damage to the environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology

and to health (Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they

represented others of their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Finding for the petitioners,

the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the

Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does

not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: [it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be

said to predate all governments and constitutions.

The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is fundamental, constitutionalized, self-executing, and judicially enforceable. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their

generation and for succeeding generations as the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure

the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The case case is unique in the sense that it is a class suit brought by 44 minors, through their parents,

claiming that they bring the case in the name of their generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements

(TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license

agreements. The minors invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by

the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal

to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the

natural lawand violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was

dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to

the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Issue(s):

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action; (2) Whether or not the complaint raises a

political issue.

Ruling:

Respondents assert that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated

by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this.

The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which is incorporated in Section 16, Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty

to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious

management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the

DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the

exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy

declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code

of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives, which will serve as

the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of

the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's

duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or

protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of

the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance

and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be

renewed or granted. After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be

adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Furthermore, in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the

expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the

wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or

excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET

ASIDE.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL

Facts:

The Government Service Insurance System decided to sell through public bidding 30-51% of the shares

of the Manila Hotel Corporation, pursuant to the privatization program of the government under Proclamation

No. 50. According to the provisions of the bidding rules, the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder

or strategic partner. The petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino Corporation, offered to buy 50% or P15, 300,

000 shares at P41.58 per share while the other qualified bidder- Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, bid for the

same number of shares at P44.00 per share or P2.42 more than the bid of the petitioner. While the declaration

of the winner was pending, the petitioner, in a letter to respondent GSIS dated September 28, 1995, matched

the bid price of P44 per share and subsequently on October 10, 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has

disregarded the tender of the matching bid, petitioner sent a managers check of P33, 000, 000 as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad. However, GSIS refused to accept. On October 17, 1995 petitioner filed

prohibition and mandamus against respondent GSIS.

Issue:

Whether or not Par 2, Section 10, Article XII or the Filipino First Policy is self-executing.

Other issues:

Whether or not Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony.

Whether or not the respondent has the personality of the State.

Whether or not the shares of MHC should be awarded to the petitioner.

Ruling:

The contested provision, paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII (In the grant of rights, privileges,

and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to

qualified Filipinos) was deemed self-executing because of its mandatory, positive command which is

complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its

enforcement. The provision per se is not merely a statement of principle but is judicially enforceable.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,

the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. The rule is that a self-

executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,

but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional

right and make it more available. The legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of

powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a

practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights

secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.

But the mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of

a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of

such legislation. Albeit par 1 and 3 are deemed non-self-executing, the court ruled that constitutional

provisions may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony for it had been a living testimony

of the Philippine heritage for more than 8 decades as venue of various significant events and political activities.

Hence, the sale of 51% of the equity is covered by the constitutional provision, since it comprises the majority

and controlling stock of the corporation.

The act of market sale which required prior approval of the State, acting through respondent Committee on Privatization is considered a state action. It falls under the second and third categories of state

action covered by the constitution 2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action and 3) when the government has approved or authorized

the action. Therefore, respondent GSIS does not have a separate and distinct personality. The transaction,

although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the

constitutional command.

The constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the

foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of the highest bid. The foreign bidder may only be awarded the

sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign

entity. In the case at bench, the petitioner has already matched the bid price leaving the respondent no

alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC.

Wherefore, respondents GSIS, MHC, Committee on Privatization and Office of the Government Corporate

Counsel are directed to cease and desist from selling 51% of the shares of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to

accept the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation to purchase the subject 51% of the shares

of the MHC at P44.00 per share and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale,

to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts as may be necessary for the purpose.

Tanada vs. Angara (May 2, 1997)

Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity.

Historical Background

The World Trade Organization was established upon the signing of the final Act and the ratification of the WTO agreement by its members. This organization was established to hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War. Like many developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal of improving the Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. President Fidel V. Ramos saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs and uncertainty associated with exporting and the attraction of more investments into the country.

Facts

On April 15, 1994, then secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, Rizalino Navarro, representing the Government of the Philippines, signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. By signing the Final Act, the Republic of the Philippines agreed:\

a. To submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures.

b. To adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

On December 14, 1994, the Philippine senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one, two and three of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.

On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement and the Annexes but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions1 and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services2.

1 Ministerial Declarations and Decisions are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters, such

as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the

International Monetary fund, and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement. 2 Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and

qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and

definitions of non-resident supplier financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.

Issues

a. Whether or not the provisions of the agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art. II3 and Sec. 104 and 125, Article XII, of the Philippine Constitution.

Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic nationalism are violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino first policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements. Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

On the other hand, the respondents claim that the charter provisions are not self executing and merely set out general policies; these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Sec. 1 and 13 thereof and that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the constitution and that the WTO Agreements contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.

b. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement establishing the WTO unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty.

Petitioners claim that the WTO Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods but also to the flow of investments and money as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters.

Held

a. The provisions of the agreement do not contravene the constitution.

The principles in Article II of the Constitution are not intended to be self executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of article XII are not self-executing provisions, the

3 Sec. 19, Art. II The state shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. 4 Sec. 10, Art. XII The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering

the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. 5 Sec. 12, Art. XII The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.

disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislations.

On the other hand, Sec. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Sec. 16 and 137 thereof.

In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. While the constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy: does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

b. The Agreement does not unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.

In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as a part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange fro greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.

The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact, and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter int o the picture: 1 limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and 2 limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.

***the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.***

6 Sec. 1, Art. XII The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the

people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The state shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian

reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are

competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against

unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum

opportunity to develop. 7 Sec. 13, Art. XII The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC 270 SCRA 106

FACTS:

On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative. The COMELEC then, upon its approval: a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said

petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and

volunteers in establishing signing stations.

On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.

Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been

untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those

in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative.

The respondents also argued that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence the

Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin

petition. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution

No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC.

The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions

or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did

not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning,

undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified

by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the

oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions.

In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and

merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. Being so, the Supreme Court can then take cognizance of the

petition for prohibition filed by Santiago notwithstanding Rocos petition. COMELEC did not even act on Rocos petition. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of

man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the

ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no

ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing

on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or

oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 Dec 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin

Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for

Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing.