9
MIND, BRAIN, AND EDUCATION Communication in Mind, Brain, and Education: Making Disciplinary Differences Explicit Priya Kalra 1 and Jamie K. O’Keeffe 2 ABSTRACT—Difficulties in communication within Mind, Brain, and Education (MBE) can arise from several sources. One source is differences in orientation among the areas of research, policy, and practice. Another source is lack of understanding of the entrenched and unspoken differences across research disciplines in MBE—that is, recognition that research in MBE comes from many diverse disciplines, rather than some monolithic entity. A third challenge to communication in MBE arises from the nature of studying the mind and brain; we address the different levels of analysis in mind–brain research. Throughout our article, we emphasize that recognizing these differences—across areas (research, practice, and policy), disciplines, and levels of analysis—and making them explicit can facilitate effective communication in MBE. We illustrate these concepts with examples from the study of reading disorders across several disciplines. A major challenge to progress in Mind, Brain, and Education (MBE) is effective communication. Why is effective commu- nication in MBE so difficult? We believe there are several reasons, some intrinsic to any interdisciplinary endeavor, and others specific to the disciplines and fields involved in MBE. In this article, we attempt to identify some of these obstacles, and, wherever possible, to suggest solutions. As the field of education spans the realms of research, prac- tice, and policy, we first address how communication problems may arise from misunderstandings among these three areas, each of which has its own goals, constraints, rules for use of evidence, and role for values and ideologies. 1 Harvard University Graduate School of Education 2 Stanford University School of Education Address correspondence to Priya Kalra, Harvard Graduate School of Education, Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138; e-mail: priya_kalra@ mail.harvard.edu. We then focus on the broad area of research, which is arguably central to MBE. Although the goal of much MBE research is to inform policy and practice, in order for this goal to be achieved, practitioners and policymakers must be able to understand the context of MBE research. How- ever, understanding and communicating about research (both among researchers and across the areas of research, policy, and practice) in MBE is complicated by the intrinsically interdis- ciplinary nature of research in MBE. Therefore, we present a framework using Repko’s (2008) defining elements of disciplines for identifying and describing key differences among research disciplines. We then emphasize the importance of developing a metalanguage for interdisciplinary work by highlighting some known pitfalls to interdisciplinary communication that can occur if metalanguage issues are neglected. Additionally, disciplines that seek to investigate phenom- ena of mind and brain present some unique challenges to understanding and communication because they span multi- ple levels of analysis; we discuss these specific challenges in the third section of this article. Finally, to illustrate the principles we have presented, we discuss examples of miscommuni- cations from the study of reading disorders, a well-studied phenomenon in MBE. ‘‘THREE CULTURES’’ IN MBE—RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE Within MBE, there are distinctions among the larger areas of research, policy, and practice. As the ultimate goals of MBE are to apply research to education policy and practice and for practice and policy to inform research, this problem merits discussion before we assess divisions among relevant research disciplines. Why might there be disagreement or lack of communica- tion among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners? One important reason may be the basic differences in perspective among these three groups of professionals. While most of this © 2011 the Authors Volume 5—Number 4 Journal Compilation © 2011 International Mind, Brain, and Education Society and Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 163

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Page 1: Communication in Mind, Brain, and Education: Making Disciplinary Differences Explicit

MIND, BRAIN, AND EDUCATION

Communication in Mind, Brain,and Education: MakingDisciplinary Differences ExplicitPriya Kalra1 and Jamie K. O’Keeffe2

ABSTRACT—Difficulties in communication within Mind,Brain, and Education (MBE) can arise from several sources.One source is differences in orientation among the areasof research, policy, and practice. Another source is lack ofunderstanding of the entrenched and unspoken differencesacross research disciplines in MBE—that is, recognitionthat research in MBE comes from many diverse disciplines,rather than some monolithic entity. A third challenge tocommunication in MBE arises from the nature of studying themind and brain; we address the different levels of analysis inmind–brain research. Throughout our article, we emphasizethat recognizing these differences—across areas (research,practice, and policy), disciplines, and levels of analysis—andmaking them explicit can facilitate effective communicationin MBE. We illustrate these concepts with examples from thestudy of reading disorders across several disciplines.

A major challenge to progress in Mind, Brain, and Education(MBE) is effective communication. Why is effective commu-nication in MBE so difficult? We believe there are severalreasons, some intrinsic to any interdisciplinary endeavor, andothers specific to the disciplines and fields involved in MBE.In this article, we attempt to identify some of these obstacles,and, wherever possible, to suggest solutions.

As the field of education spans the realms of research, prac-tice, and policy, we first address how communication problemsmay arise from misunderstandings among these three areas,each of which has its own goals, constraints, rules for use ofevidence, and role for values and ideologies.

1Harvard University Graduate School of Education2Stanford University School of Education

Address correspondence to Priya Kalra, Harvard Graduate School ofEducation, Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138; e-mail: [email protected].

We then focus on the broad area of research, which isarguably central to MBE. Although the goal of much MBEresearch is to inform policy and practice, in order for thisgoal to be achieved, practitioners and policymakers mustbe able to understand the context of MBE research. How-ever, understanding and communicating about research (bothamong researchers and across the areas of research, policy, andpractice) in MBE is complicated by the intrinsically interdis-ciplinary nature of research in MBE. Therefore, we present aframework using Repko’s (2008) defining elements of disciplinesfor identifying and describing key differences among researchdisciplines. We then emphasize the importance of developinga metalanguage for interdisciplinary work by highlighting someknown pitfalls to interdisciplinary communication that canoccur if metalanguage issues are neglected.

Additionally, disciplines that seek to investigate phenom-ena of mind and brain present some unique challenges tounderstanding and communication because they span multi-ple levels of analysis; we discuss these specific challenges in thethird section of this article. Finally, to illustrate the principleswe have presented, we discuss examples of miscommuni-cations from the study of reading disorders, a well-studiedphenomenon in MBE.

‘‘THREE CULTURES’’ IN MBE—RESEARCH, POLICY,AND PRACTICE

Within MBE, there are distinctions among the larger areas ofresearch, policy, and practice. As the ultimate goals of MBEare to apply research to education policy and practice and forpractice and policy to inform research, this problem meritsdiscussion before we assess divisions among relevant researchdisciplines.

Why might there be disagreement or lack of communica-tion among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners? Oneimportant reason may be the basic differences in perspectiveamong these three groups of professionals. While most of this

© 2011 the AuthorsVolume 5—Number 4 Journal Compilation © 2011 International Mind, Brain, and Education Society and Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 163

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Communication in MBE

article focuses on the world of research and differences amongdisciplines within that world, it is important to recognizedifferences among these three areas (Shonkoff, 2007) becauseall three must collaborate and communicate for MBE venturesto be successful.1

We stress here that none of these three areas is intrinsicallysuperior—rather, they have different goals, orientations, andways of evaluating and using evidence. Shonkoff (2007) hascharacterized these as three ‘‘cultures’’ which differ not onlyin goals, but also in their attitudes toward certainty of knowl-edge, evaluation of evidence, and use of values and ideology.He writes:

Tensions among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners areinevitable. Science is focused on what we do not know. Social policyand the delivery of health and human services are focused on what weshould do. Scientists are interested in questions. Policymakers andpractitionersareinterestedinanswers.Scholarsembracecomplexity.Policymakers demand simplicity. Scientists suggest that we stop andreflect. Service providers are expected to act. Few researchers havethe temperamental fortitude for the messy, action-oriented world ofsocial and political activism. It is a rare practitioner who has thepatience or the caution of a meticulous scientist. The intersectionsamongthesethreedomainsrepresentatruecross-culturalexperience.(Shonkoff, 2007, p. 182)

Research may inform policy and practice, and practicemay be viewed as the implementation of policy, although inreality these divisions and relationships can be much morecomplex. Strengthening and understanding the relationshipsamong research, practice, and policy perspectives can bebeneficial. When a researcher understands the circumstancesand challenges a teacher faces every day, she can make moreeasily implemented recommendations; when a policymakerunderstands the limits of generalizability of certain kindsof research, he can make more informed policy decisions; ateacher who understands the research behind a policy is morelikely to implement it willingly and accurately.

However, to navigate communication across these per-spectives, as Shonkoff (2007) so eloquently puts it, ‘‘requiresrespect for their differences as well as a commitment to theirshared mission’’ (p. 182)—and, we would add, an understand-ing of what those differences are (e.g., goals, constraints, useof evidence). For example, a researcher’s ‘‘descriptive andexplanatory’’ view of dyslexia might offer what is the case(e.g., according to neuroscientific explanations); whereas apractitioner’s ‘‘evaluative and normative’’ view would surmisewhat ought to be the case (e.g., according to educational norms)(Stein, Connell, & Gardner, 2008, p. 18).

While all research in education shares an emphasis onstudious inquiry and the creation of knowledge, it is heteroge-neous with regard to discipline—that is, following Shulman(1981), we emphasize that education itself is not a discipline,

but rather a field or set of problems which researchers ofdifferent disciplines attempt to solve or answer. Similarly, thestudy of mind and brain is not restricted to any one discipline,but is approached by several disciplines, each with its ownparticular perspective. Thus, because both research in educa-tion and research in mind and brain span multiple disciplines,an understanding of what differentiates research disciplinesfrom each other may be helpful. Before we can build bridgesacross disciplines, we need to know where each discipline issituated.

DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES IN MBE

Why is communication across disciplinary boundaries2 dif-ficult? Interdisciplinary scholars (e.g., Klein, 1990; Repko,2008), as well as academics writing in the field of MBE (e.g.,della Chiesa, Christoph, & Hinton, 2009; Hinton & Fischer,2008), have already charted the challenges inherent to cross-ing disciplinary boundaries. Hinton and Fischer (2008) havehighlighted the reality of different ‘‘disciplinary cultures withfield-specific language and methods’’ (p. 158).

As a result, seemingly simple terms, such as learning, are con-ceptualized in highly variable ways (Hinton & Fischer, 2008).These differences are not only deep and real, but they are oftenlatent, buried within the tacit knowledge of the field. As dellaChiesa et al. (2009) discuss, just as ‘‘a fish does not know whatwater is’’ (p. 22), an expert, swimming in the tacit knowledgeof her field, finds it difficult to explain that knowledge. Weface a complex problem: trying to communicate across disci-plinary perspectives despite differences that lie dormant andunspoken. As members of other interdisciplinary projects havediscovered, bringing these differences to the surface may be keyto unlocking more effective communication among membersof interdisciplinary teams (Klein, 1990). However, as Samuels(2009) notes, dialogue in MBE often lacks explicit recognitionof disciplinary differences. Building on Samuels’ descriptionof differences in histories, philosophies, and epistemologiesfound within MBE, we offer an application of Repko’s (2008)framework to MBE disciplines for making sense of disciplinarydifferences.

Defining Elements of DisciplinesDisciplinary differences emerge from an underlying struc-ture, which has been described in a number of differentways (e.g., Abbott, 2001; Becher & Trowler, 2001; Kagan,2009; Szostak, 2004). The current discussion will use Repko’s(2008) framework of five defining elements of disciplines:phenomena of interest, epistemology, methods, theories,and assumptions. These categories do not capture the truecomplexity of disciplines, which are dynamic systems theboundaries of which overlap (Abbott); however, they do pro-vide a useful heuristic for characterizing each discipline’s

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Priya Kalra and Jamie K. O’Keeffe

unique ‘‘intellectual ‘center of gravity’’’ (Repko, 2008, p. 57).Below, we describe and illustrate each of these definingelements.

A discipline’s phenomena of interest represent the part of theworld it is interested in. Phenomena are ‘‘enduring aspectsof human existence’’ (Repko, 2008, p. 83) that can be stud-ied, described, and explained. For example, an educationalpsychologist may be interested in aspects of learning andteaching, while a cognitive neuroscientist might focus on theneural correlates of certain cognitive functions. Phenomenacan be viewed from different basic perspectives (e.g., research,practice) with distinct goals, thereby producing supplementalaccounts that cannot be deduced from one another (Steinet al., 2008). Phenomena can also be viewed at different levelsof analysis via distinct methods, thereby producing poten-tially competing accounts and the temptation of reductionism(Stein et al., 2008).

The discipline’s phenomena also reflect its epistemology,or how it conceptualizes the nature, validity, and limits ofknowledge (Repko, 2008). For example, positivists, roughlyspeaking, believe that the world exists independent of ourinterpretations of it, and so objective analysis is feasible(Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Interpretivists, on the other hand,see the world as socially constructed, thereby renderingobjective analysis impossible (Marsh & Furlong, 2002).Although disciplines in the natural sciences tend to sharea largely positivistic view, the social sciences embrace aplurality of epistemologies, including realism, rational choice,and post-modernism (Repko, 2008). Thus, interdisciplinarycommunication, particularly among disciplines in the socialsciences, must be mindful of this ‘‘epistemological polytheism’’(Klein, 1990, p. 107). Quite often, team members assume thatthey are speaking the same language when, in fact, thereare very different epistemological assumptions beneath theirassertions (Klein, 1990).

Another defining element of a discipline is its represen-tative methods (Repko, 2008). Methods are the means bywhich researchers gather and evaluate evidence.3 For example,cognitive psychologists typically use quantitative behavioralmethods, such as measuring infants’ looking times, in carefullycontrolled laboratory tasks. Cell and molecular neuroscien-tists, on the other hand, typically conduct non-human animalstudies using methods such as single cell recording or geneticmanipulation. Such difference in methods can lead to diffi-culty understanding research outside one’s own discipline orthe disciplines with which one is familiar. Furthermore, ifresearchers communicating to an audience unfamiliar withtheir methods do not provide some explanation of how thedata and conclusions were gathered, the audience may notunderstand the limitations of the research.

The fourth defining element of a discipline is its represen-tative theories (Repko, 2008). A theory is an explanation ofobserved phenomena that (in an empirical discipline) can be

tested. Researchers within a discipline share an understandingof that discipline’s theories. For example, developmental psy-chologists share a knowledge of Piaget’s (1952) theory ofcognitive development. Similarly, cell and molecular neuro-scientists share an understanding of Hebbian principles (e.g.,Hebb’s 1949 Rule that what fires together, wires together).Terms are theory-laden: they often represent specific meaningsin the context of a certain discipline (Klein, 1990). In otherwords, individuals may use the same word in decidedly dif-ferent ways as a consequence of theoretical orientations. Forexample, the term ‘‘efficiency’’ has related, but distinct mean-ings for biologists, physicists, and economists (Repko, 2008).Although this same phenomenon can be observed within adiscipline, such as a behaviorist’s and a cognitivist’s differentinterpretation of the term ‘‘learning’’ in psychology, it is moreoften seen across disciplinary boundaries. Thus, an appreci-ation for the methodological and theoretical foundations ofdifferent disciplines may foster more effective communicationamong interdisciplinary team members.

Finally, assumptions are suppositions underlying a disci-pline’s concepts, theories, and methods (Repko, 2008). Theseassumptions, or tacit knowledge, are often the most difficult forexperts to explicate. For example, a cognitive psychologist mayassume that much of the mind’s information processing is auto-matic and unavailable to consciousness, such as early visualperception (e.g., see Fodor, 1982; Marr, 1982/2010). In con-trast, a cell/molecular neuroscientist using rodents as researchsubjects may not have reason to consider the availability ofcognitive processes to consciousness. Unstated disciplinaryassumptions are a hidden minefield in communication acrossMBE.

Defining Elements of Disciplines Relevant to MBEAcknowledging differences in the defining elements of dis-ciplines may facilitate communication and comprehensiveunderstanding among researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers in MBE. General communication skills may not besufficient; other necessary ingredients may include knowl-edge of disciplinary differences and skills in bringing tacitdisciplinary knowledge to the surface. As discussed above,communication issues arise among the broad cultures ofresearch, practice, and policy. The issues from policy and prac-tice for communication in MBE are somewhat general to anycommunication across research, policy, and practice in educa-tion. However, some of the challenges posed by MBE-relevantresearch disciplines are specific to those disciplines, whichmay be more unfamiliar to policymakers and practitionersthan research disciplines that are more traditionally applied toeducation (e.g., sociology). For this reason, we have focused onthe differences among MBE research disciplines. Here, we willfocus on the communication challenges within the culture ofresearch.

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In Tables 1 and 2, we present two charts based on Repko’s(2008) defining elements, which summarize several disciplinesrelated to psychology and neuroscience, respectively. Thetables represent the sort of cognitive work that may be requiredfor more effective communication among disciplinary special-ists. The disciplines outlined share the broad perspective ofresearch-oriented fields: they are concerned with creatinggeneralizable knowledge based on observable data (Shulman,1981).4 We include three psychology sub-disciplines (Table 1)and two disciplines related to neuroscience (Table 2) thatare relevant to the study of reading disorders, which is aprominent research topic in MBE (e.g., see Fischer, Bern-stein, & Immordino-Yang, 2007). In addition to the rows foreach discipline’s defining elements, we have included a rowfor examples of each discipline’s contributions or perspectivein the study of reading disorders. We chose these examplesbecause the study of reading disorders may be familiar to manyreaders across the three areas of research, policy, and practice inMBE; we will discuss our examples in the third section of thisarticle.

The charts do not capture the full complexity of any ofthe disciplines represented, nor do they represent the fullrange of disciplines that offer useful insights into readingdisorders. They are merely intended to illustrate a corecompetency in interdisciplinary work: making disciplinarydifferences explicit (Klein, 1990; Repko, 2008). This capacitymay provide a strategic improvement in communicationamong researchers of different disciplinary backgrounds andfacilitate productive research in interdisciplinary areas suchas educational neuroscience. Furthermore, an understandingof differences in defining elements of MBE disciplines can helppractitioners and policymakers better navigate the sometimes-disorienting landscape of MBE research.

Tables 1 and 2 highlight a few potential sources of interdis-ciplinary communication issues. For example, an educationalpsychologist and a neuroscientist may discuss learning, assum-ing that they have a shared understanding of this term.However, it may be the case that they are conceptualizinglearning quite differently—each from the distinct theoreticaland methodological approaches of their respective disciplines.The educational psychologist (Table 1) may conceptualizelearning as a complex classroom process, involving individual(e.g., motivation), group (e.g., scaffolding), and environmental(e.g., task demands) factors, which are best measured in situ.The neuroscientist (Table 2), on the other hand, may considerlearning to be best measured at the neural level, via highlycontrolled laboratory studies, removed from the complexity ofthe classroom.

Developing a MetalanguageMaking disciplinary differences explicit (as in Tables 1 and 2)is part of the necessary process of developing common

language among interdisciplinary team members (COSEP,2004; Klein, 1990). According to Klein, ‘‘developing ametalanguage is integral to any interdisciplinary endeavor. . . no matter what overall strategy is employed’’ (p. 117).In striving to bring tacit assumptions to the surface anddevelop common language, it is useful to know three typesof conflicts that may emerge among concepts from differentdisciplines.

The first type of conflict arises when the same term isused to represent different phenomena (Klein, 1990; Repko,2008). Seemingly simple terms, such as development, may meanvery different things to different disciplines (Miller & Boix-Mansilla, 2004). This conflict may cause an ‘‘illusion ofconsensus’’ (Klein, p. 127) in which ‘‘team members thinkthey are speaking the same language’’ (p. 127) when, in fact,they are not. Accordingly, asking clarifying questions aboutseemingly obvious terms, such as development, will fostermore productive communication by bringing disciplinaryassumptions to light (Miller & Boix-Mansilla, 2004).

The second type of conflict among concepts arises whendifferent terms are used to describe essentially the samephenomenon (Repko, 2008). This less frequent type of conflictis basically a semantic disagreement that can be resolved byclarifying terms (Repko, 2008). Essentially, this is an ‘‘illusionof disagreement.’’ For example, Vygotsky (1978) described theupper and lower limits of the Zone of Proximal Developmentas the level of potential development and the level of actual development,respectively. Dynamic skill theory includes an elaboration ofthis concept, using the terms optimal and functional levels,respectively (Fischer & Bidell, 2006). This second type ofcommunication conflict may arise if team members mistakenlyassume that their different terminology referred to decidedlydifferent phenomena.

The third type of conflict is among the very ways in whichthe disciplines conceptualize the phenomena at hand. In thiscase, consensus cannot be reached by semantic agreement.Deeper examination of underlying assumptions is necessary,and common ground may or may not be possible (Repko,2008). This conflict would arise if the team members in theprevious example, after extensive discussion, realized thatthey do indeed conceptualize the notion of a developmentalrange in conflicting ways.

To summarize briefly, communication challenges arise bothamong and within the broad cultures of research, practice,and policy. We have focused on communication challengesamong research-oriented disciplines, using Repko’s (2008)framework of defining elements (i.e., phenomena of interest,epistemology, methods, theories, assumptions) as a usefulheuristic for bringing disciplinary differences to light. Wehave modeled this process by summarizing the defining ele-ments of several sub-disciplines of psychology (Table 1) andneuroscience (Table 2) that are relevant to the study of readingdisorders.

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Priya Kalra and Jamie K. O’Keeffe

SPECIAL CHALLENGES FOR INTERDISCIPLINARYUNDERSTANDING OF MIND AND BRAIN: LEVELS

OF ANALYSIS

Heuristically, disciplines in the physical and biological sci-ences can be arranged from the smallest level of analysis (e.g.,sub-atomic particles in physics) to the largest (e.g., wholeorganisms, ecosystems, or populations in biology). Althoughwe emphasize that we attach no greater value to either end ofthe spectrum (i.e. we do not consider smaller level-of-analysisdisciplines superior to other disciplines), we allow that certainphenomena are necessarily and de facto best studied at certainlevels (e.g., formation of synapses is and must be studied ata smaller level-of-analysis than that at which memory as awhole is studied). Some of these level-of-analysis limitationsare methodological (e.g., we do not have a way to study mem-ory as a whole at the synaptic level) and some are theoreticalor philosophical (e.g., memory as a whole is not theoreticallyunderstood to exist at the level of a single synapse, but ratherin the interconnections among many neurons, involving manysynapses). See Willingham (2009) and Willingham and Lloyd(2007) for further discussion of levels of analysis specific toMBE.

Ideally, we will someday be able to connect our insightsand findings into continuous, multilevel mechanism explana-tions,5 and we will be able to describe a phenomenon at alllevels, from overt behavior, to covert information processing,to the neural implementation in the brain. This will allowus to more accurately discover and offer remedies or alter-natives for students’ problems. However, until then anyoneworking to communicate in MBE must exercise caution whenconstructing explanations that relate different disciplines anddifferent levels of analysis—explicitly acknowledging the dis-ciplines and levels is a first step. Failure to do so often resultsin the ‘‘illusion of agreement’’ described above. Such illusoryagreement in mind–brain research may be vexing, but when itextends to education policy and practice the implications canbe at best unhelpful and at worst devastating to the progressand prospects of individual students.

In the next section, we will discuss and describe someexamples of difficulty communicating across levels, disci-plines, and ‘‘cultures’’ with regard to reading difficulties.

DISCUSSION: EXAMPLES FROM THE STUDYOF READING DISORDERS

Dyslexia is an example of a phenomenon that is studied byresearchers in different disciplines and that is also importantto practitioners and policymakers. Research in dyslexia poten-tially represents the most established (to date) area of studythat can be described as spanning ‘‘mind, brain, and education.’’As such, it provides fertile ground for examples of the difficultyin communicating across disciplines, among levels, and among

the ‘‘cultures’’ of research, policy, and practice. For this reason,we chose to illustrate our explanation of some MBE-relevantdisciplines by highlighting their contributions or perspectivesto the study of reading disorders (see Tables 1 and 2).

Illusory agreement is possible any time when two people arediscussing dyslexia, simply because of the lack of an agreed-upon definition of what dyslexia is. Although there is somegeneral consensus that dyslexia is a specific reading disability,defining who is and who is not dyslexic for research purposespresents a veritable quagmire of disciplinary and theoreticalassumptions. In some studies, a discrepancy model of dyslexia(which requires a discrepancy between an individual’s IQ andreading ability, as measured by a standardized reading test)is used, whereas in others the criterion is based on an indi-vidual’s phonological processing6 abilities as measured by astandardized test, such as the Comprehensive Test of Phono-logical Processing (Wagner, Torgesen, & Rashotte, 1999).Comparing the results of two studies without acknowledgingthe different criteria used for dyslexia classification can leadto confusion and misunderstanding. While many psychologyresearchers (especially in cognitive and educational psychol-ogy) have moved away from the discrepancy model, it remainsprevalent in the work of many7 researchers using neuroimagingmethods (these are mostly cognitive neuroscientists).

This example demonstrates the importance of acknowl-edging theoretical differences in MBE research; to the extentthat the construct operationalization is an aspect of method-ology, it is also an example of different methods being used.In this example, communication about reading disorders wasstymied not by a simple matter of unfamiliar terminology,but rather by deep rooted and unacknowledged differences intheory and methodology. Similar examples could be found forthe other defining elements of disciplines (i.e., assumptions,epistemology, and phenomena).

The issue of discrepancy versus phonological processingdefinitions of dyslexia is not restricted to researchers, but alsohas implications for policy and practice. Until the most recentre-authorization of the Individuals with Disabilities EducationAct (IDEA), the law and associated regulations called for theuse of a discrepancy model, which arguably biases diagnosisof dyslexia in certain populations.

In another example, unacknowledged differences in level-of-analysis provide a barrier to effective interdisciplinarycommunication. One theory of the cause of dyslexia tracesit to atypicalities in the ‘‘magnocellular pathway’’ of the brain(Livingstone, Rosen, Drislane, & Galaburda, 1991, p. 7943;Stein, 2001, p. 12). However, another theoretical perspectiveclaims that deficits in phonological processing are the causeof dyslexia. According to the scientific method, the appro-priate way to resolve the dispute is to perform experimentsthat can provide evidence in support of or allow the rejectionof one theory. Such an approach has proved all, but fruit-less in adjudicating between magnocellular and phonological

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Communication in MBE

Tab

le1

The

Defi

ning

Ele

men

ts(e

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ding

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57)

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logy

(Tha

gard

,199

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(Woo

lfolk

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7)

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pers

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grow

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men

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side

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anda

rdiz

edas

sess

men

tsof

cogn

itiv

efu

ncti

onan

dac

adem

icac

hiev

emen

t

Ass

umpt

ions

• Dev

elop

men

tca

nbe

nonl

inea

ran

ddi

scon

tinu

ous,

resu

ltin

gin

qual

itat

ive

chan

ges

acro

ssth

elif

espa

n• D

evel

opm

ent

tend

sto

war

din

crea

sing

diff

eren

tiat

ion

Muc

hof

the

min

d’s

info

rmat

ion-

proc

essi

ngis

auto

mat

ican

dun

avai

labl

eto

cons

ciou

snes

s(e

.g.,

earl

yvi

sual

perc

epti

on)

• Edu

cati

onca

nbe

info

rmed

byth

eory

from

psyc

holo

gy• E

mph

asis

onin

divi

dual

diff

eren

ces

and

prac

tica

lapp

licat

ions

(rat

her

than

the

abst

ract

univ

ersa

lsof

‘‘bas

icsc

ienc

e’’)

Rep

rese

ntat

ive

theo

ries

• Cog

niti

vede

velo

pmen

t(P

iage

t)• E

colo

gica

lpsy

chol

ogy

(Bro

nfen

bren

ner)

• Dyn

amic

deve

lopm

ent

(Fis

cher

)

• Pro

toty

peth

eory

(Ros

ch)

• Fea

ture

-int

egra

tion

theo

ry(T

ries

man

)• F

ilter

mod

elof

atte

ntio

n(B

road

bent

)

• The

ory

ofm

ulti

ple

inte

llige

nces

(Gar

dner

)• T

each

ing

for

unde

rsta

ndin

g(P

erki

ns,

Gro

tzer

)• M

otiv

atio

nth

eori

es(D

wec

k,F

ord)

Exa

mpl

eof

disc

iplin

ary

insi

ght

into

read

ing

diso

rder

s• E

arly

read

ers’

stra

tegi

esar

edi

ffer

ent

from

skill

edre

ader

s’(A

shby

&R

ayne

r,20

06)

• Alt

erna

tede

velo

pmen

talp

athw

ays

tore

adin

g(F

isch

er,R

ose,

&R

ose,

2007

)

• Dua

l-ro

ute

casc

aded

mod

elof

read

ing

(Col

thea

rt,R

astl

e,P

erry

,Lan

gdon

,&Z

iegl

er,2

001)

• Pho

nolo

gica

lpro

cess

ing

may

bedi

srup

ted

inre

adin

gdi

sabi

lity

(Tor

geso

n,20

07)

• Voc

abul

ary

and

phon

olog

ical

awar

enes

sin

pre-

read

ers

can

pred

ict

late

rre

adin

gab

ility

(Sca

rbor

ough

,200

3)• E

xplic

itin

stru

ctio

nin

phon

ics-

base

dre

adin

gis

effe

ctiv

efo

rm

any

stud

ents

(Nat

iona

lRea

ding

Pan

elR

epor

t)

168 Volume 5—Number 4

Page 7: Communication in Mind, Brain, and Education: Making Disciplinary Differences Explicit

Priya Kalra and Jamie K. O’Keeffe

Tab

le2

The

Defi

ning

Ele

men

ts(e

.g.,

The

orie

s)of

Tw

oD

isci

plin

esR

elat

edto

Neu

rosc

ienc

ean

dM

ind,

Bra

in,a

ndE

duca

tion

(MB

E),

and

Exa

mpl

esof

The

irR

espe

ctiv

eIn

sigh

tsin

toth

eSt

udy

ofR

eadi

ngD

isor

ders

Cog

niti

vene

uros

cien

ce(W

ard,

2006

)C

ell/m

olec

ular

neur

osci

ence

(Kan

del,

Schw

artz

,&Je

ssel

,200

0)

Ove

rall

pers

pect

ive

Em

piri

cali

nfor

mat

ion

abou

tth

ebr

ain

can

cons

trai

nan

din

form

info

rmat

ion-

proc

essi

ngac

coun

tsof

men

tal

func

tion

s(i

.e.,

thos

efo

und

inco

gnit

ive

psyc

holo

gyan

dco

mpu

tati

onal

mod

elin

g)

Neu

rons

have

prop

erti

esin

com

mon

wit

hot

her

cells

inth

ebo

dy,a

ndal

soha

veun

ique

prop

erti

esre

late

dto

info

rmat

ion-

proc

essi

ng

Illu

stra

tive

phen

omen

a• N

eura

lcor

rela

tes

ofco

gnit

ive

func

tion

s• C

ogni

tive

func

tion

s(e

.g.,

perc

epti

on)

repr

esen

ted

byin

form

atio

n-pr

oces

sing

mod

els

and

info

rmed

byne

ural

corr

elat

es

• Sig

nalt

rans

duct

ion

atth

esy

naps

e• S

ynap

tic

plas

tici

ty• C

ell-

wid

ech

ange

sfo

llow

ing

syna

ptic

acti

vity

Rep

rese

ntat

ive

rese

arch

met

hods

• Fun

ctio

naln

euro

imag

ing

(fM

RI,

PE

T,N

IRS)

;hum

anel

ectr

ophy

siol

ogy

(EE

G/E

RP

,int

racr

ania

lrec

ordi

ngs)

;T

rans

cran

ialm

agne

tic

stim

ulat

ion

(TM

S)• B

rain

inju

ryin

form

atio

n• S

ingl

ean

dm

ulti

-cel

lrec

ordi

ngs

inno

n-hu

man

anim

al

Non

-hum

anan

imal

stud

ies,

such

as:

• Sin

gle

cell

reco

rdin

g• G

enet

icm

anip

ulat

ion

• Exp

erim

enta

lpha

rmac

olog

y

Ass

umpt

ions

• The

reis

som

ede

gree

oflo

caliz

atio

nin

the

brai

n,(i

.e.,

som

epr

oces

ses

are

carr

ied

out

insp

ecifi

car

eas

orby

spec

ific

netw

orks

ofar

eas)

• The

reis

som

eco

nsis

tenc

yin

the

orga

niza

tion

ofth

ese

area

sac

ross

indi

vidu

als

• Beh

avio

rsca

nbe

rela

ted

tobi

olog

ical

phen

omen

a• H

ebbi

anhy

poth

eses

,e.g

.,‘‘w

hat

fire

sto

geth

er,w

ires

toge

ther

’’• N

eura

lmec

hani

sms

obse

rved

inon

eco

ntex

tor

orga

nism

are

plau

sibl

ein

othe

rsR

epre

sent

ativ

eth

eori

es• P

rosp

ecti

vem

emor

y(B

uckn

er,S

chac

ter)

• Spe

cial

izat

ion

for

expe

rtis

e(T

arr,

Gau

thie

r)• H

ebbi

anth

eory

(Heb

b)• C

ompu

tati

onal

mod

els

(Sej

now

ski)

Exa

mpl

eof

disc

iplin

ary

insi

ght

into

read

ing

diso

rder

s

• Neu

ralc

orre

late

sof

read

ing

deve

lopm

ent

(Sch

lagg

ar&

McC

andl

iss,

2007

)• U

niqu

eel

ectr

ophy

siol

ogy

for

read

ing

subs

kills

(Tho

mso

n,G

osw

ami,

&B

alde

weg

,200

8)• B

rain

dam

age

can

sele

ctiv

ely

affe

ctdi

ffer

ent

aspe

cts

ofre

adin

g(C

aram

azza

,198

8)

• Lin

kbe

twee

nre

adin

gab

ility

and

abno

rmal

anat

omy

inth

em

agno

cellu

lar

path

way

(Ste

in,2

001)

Volume 5—Number 4 169

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Communication in MBE

theories of dyslexia. As Frith (1999) adeptly pointed out, thereason for this is because they are actually theories at differentlevels of analysis.8 A magnocellular explanation is at the levelof biological explanation (best studied with neuroscience),while in contrast a phonological processing explanation is atthe level of cognitive construct (best studied with psychology).In this case, appropriate links between the levels do not yetexist. This could be considered a case of illusory disagreement;however, in this example it is not the case that different termsare being applied to the same phenomenon, but rather thatexplanations of a phenomenon9 at different (and currentlyincompatible) levels of analysis have been falsely placed inopposition to each other.

CONCLUSION

As scholars (e.g., Klein, 1990; Repko, 2008) writing about inter-disciplinarity have noted, interdisciplinary collaboration ben-efits from the explicit and respectful acknowledgment of disci-plinary differences. In this spirit, we have offered a preliminarysketch of some key differences that warrant further acknowl-edgement in MBE: differences among (1) the broad perspec-tives of research, practice, and policy; (2) research-orienteddisciplines, in general; and (3) disciplines investigating phe-nomena of mind and brain, in particular. We used Repko’s(2008) framework of defining elements (e.g., assumptions, meth-ods) as a useful heuristic for identifying and discussingdisciplinary differences. Finally, we provided several examplesfrom the study of reading disorders to illustrate these concepts.

Interdisciplinary communication is rife with challenges,particularly when dealing with phenomena of MBE. As shouldbe clear, the problem does not lie in disciplinary differencesthemselves but, rather, in our failure to acknowledge them.Disciplinary differences are the very grounds from which fertileinterdisciplinary work grows (Klein, 1990; Repko, 2008).Distinct perspectives are necessary for a more complete viewof complex phenomena, such as reading disorders. However,as individuals, we may be less effective in leveraging theseperspectives to provide insight into a problem when we areunaware of key differences among them. As team members,we may struggle to communicate with colleagues when weare unaware of their disciplinary perspective. The currentapproach, by bringing disciplinary differences to the surface,may strategically improve interdisciplinary communication aswe continue to work toward solving problems of MBE.

NOTES

1 This distinction among ‘‘cultures’’ may be compared toStein, Connell, and Gardner’s (2008) description of basicperspectives, such as description and evaluation.

2 Our discussion includes any communication among dis-ciplinary perspectives, regardless of whether the collab-oration is multi-disciplinary, cross-disciplinary, interdis-ciplinary, or transdisciplinary. Following Repko (2008),we consider a disciplinary perspective to be a discipline’scharacteristic way of viewing the ‘‘portion of reality thatit is interested in’’ (p. 53). For a more complete review ofdifferent types of collaboration between disciplines, seeRepko (2008) and Stein (2007).

3 That is, for disciplines which share an empirical epistemol-ogy. For disciplines with other epistemologies, methodsmay be more broadly defined.

4 As such, Repko (2008)’s category of epistemology was notincluded.

5 See Craver (2007) for more on this point. Also, Hackman(2003) suggests a strategy of ‘‘bookending’’ one’s researchwith context from the levels of analysis immediately‘‘above’’ and ‘‘below.’’

6 The definition and operationalization of ‘‘phonologicalprocessing’’ is also not without some controversy (seeRamus & Szenkovitz, 2008).

7 But not all! Fumiko Hoeft and John Gabrieli are notableexceptions.

8 Frith’s delineation of three levels—biological, cognitive,and behavioral—maps very well onto Marr’s (1982/2010)well-known three level model for relating mental andneural phenomena.

9 It could be argued that the same phenomenon at a different(currently incompatible) level of analysis is in effect adifferent phenomenon.

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