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MIND, BRAIN, AND EDUCATION
Communication in Mind, Brain,and Education: MakingDisciplinary Differences ExplicitPriya Kalra1 and Jamie K. O’Keeffe2
ABSTRACT—Difficulties in communication within Mind,Brain, and Education (MBE) can arise from several sources.One source is differences in orientation among the areasof research, policy, and practice. Another source is lack ofunderstanding of the entrenched and unspoken differencesacross research disciplines in MBE—that is, recognitionthat research in MBE comes from many diverse disciplines,rather than some monolithic entity. A third challenge tocommunication in MBE arises from the nature of studying themind and brain; we address the different levels of analysis inmind–brain research. Throughout our article, we emphasizethat recognizing these differences—across areas (research,practice, and policy), disciplines, and levels of analysis—andmaking them explicit can facilitate effective communicationin MBE. We illustrate these concepts with examples from thestudy of reading disorders across several disciplines.
A major challenge to progress in Mind, Brain, and Education(MBE) is effective communication. Why is effective commu-nication in MBE so difficult? We believe there are severalreasons, some intrinsic to any interdisciplinary endeavor, andothers specific to the disciplines and fields involved in MBE.In this article, we attempt to identify some of these obstacles,and, wherever possible, to suggest solutions.
As the field of education spans the realms of research, prac-tice, and policy, we first address how communication problemsmay arise from misunderstandings among these three areas,each of which has its own goals, constraints, rules for use ofevidence, and role for values and ideologies.
1Harvard University Graduate School of Education2Stanford University School of Education
Address correspondence to Priya Kalra, Harvard Graduate School ofEducation, Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138; e-mail: [email protected].
We then focus on the broad area of research, which isarguably central to MBE. Although the goal of much MBEresearch is to inform policy and practice, in order for thisgoal to be achieved, practitioners and policymakers mustbe able to understand the context of MBE research. How-ever, understanding and communicating about research (bothamong researchers and across the areas of research, policy, andpractice) in MBE is complicated by the intrinsically interdis-ciplinary nature of research in MBE. Therefore, we present aframework using Repko’s (2008) defining elements of disciplinesfor identifying and describing key differences among researchdisciplines. We then emphasize the importance of developinga metalanguage for interdisciplinary work by highlighting someknown pitfalls to interdisciplinary communication that canoccur if metalanguage issues are neglected.
Additionally, disciplines that seek to investigate phenom-ena of mind and brain present some unique challenges tounderstanding and communication because they span multi-ple levels of analysis; we discuss these specific challenges in thethird section of this article. Finally, to illustrate the principleswe have presented, we discuss examples of miscommuni-cations from the study of reading disorders, a well-studiedphenomenon in MBE.
‘‘THREE CULTURES’’ IN MBE—RESEARCH, POLICY,AND PRACTICE
Within MBE, there are distinctions among the larger areas ofresearch, policy, and practice. As the ultimate goals of MBEare to apply research to education policy and practice and forpractice and policy to inform research, this problem meritsdiscussion before we assess divisions among relevant researchdisciplines.
Why might there be disagreement or lack of communica-tion among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners? Oneimportant reason may be the basic differences in perspectiveamong these three groups of professionals. While most of this
© 2011 the AuthorsVolume 5—Number 4 Journal Compilation © 2011 International Mind, Brain, and Education Society and Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 163
Communication in MBE
article focuses on the world of research and differences amongdisciplines within that world, it is important to recognizedifferences among these three areas (Shonkoff, 2007) becauseall three must collaborate and communicate for MBE venturesto be successful.1
We stress here that none of these three areas is intrinsicallysuperior—rather, they have different goals, orientations, andways of evaluating and using evidence. Shonkoff (2007) hascharacterized these as three ‘‘cultures’’ which differ not onlyin goals, but also in their attitudes toward certainty of knowl-edge, evaluation of evidence, and use of values and ideology.He writes:
Tensions among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners areinevitable. Science is focused on what we do not know. Social policyand the delivery of health and human services are focused on what weshould do. Scientists are interested in questions. Policymakers andpractitionersareinterestedinanswers.Scholarsembracecomplexity.Policymakers demand simplicity. Scientists suggest that we stop andreflect. Service providers are expected to act. Few researchers havethe temperamental fortitude for the messy, action-oriented world ofsocial and political activism. It is a rare practitioner who has thepatience or the caution of a meticulous scientist. The intersectionsamongthesethreedomainsrepresentatruecross-culturalexperience.(Shonkoff, 2007, p. 182)
Research may inform policy and practice, and practicemay be viewed as the implementation of policy, although inreality these divisions and relationships can be much morecomplex. Strengthening and understanding the relationshipsamong research, practice, and policy perspectives can bebeneficial. When a researcher understands the circumstancesand challenges a teacher faces every day, she can make moreeasily implemented recommendations; when a policymakerunderstands the limits of generalizability of certain kindsof research, he can make more informed policy decisions; ateacher who understands the research behind a policy is morelikely to implement it willingly and accurately.
However, to navigate communication across these per-spectives, as Shonkoff (2007) so eloquently puts it, ‘‘requiresrespect for their differences as well as a commitment to theirshared mission’’ (p. 182)—and, we would add, an understand-ing of what those differences are (e.g., goals, constraints, useof evidence). For example, a researcher’s ‘‘descriptive andexplanatory’’ view of dyslexia might offer what is the case(e.g., according to neuroscientific explanations); whereas apractitioner’s ‘‘evaluative and normative’’ view would surmisewhat ought to be the case (e.g., according to educational norms)(Stein, Connell, & Gardner, 2008, p. 18).
While all research in education shares an emphasis onstudious inquiry and the creation of knowledge, it is heteroge-neous with regard to discipline—that is, following Shulman(1981), we emphasize that education itself is not a discipline,
but rather a field or set of problems which researchers ofdifferent disciplines attempt to solve or answer. Similarly, thestudy of mind and brain is not restricted to any one discipline,but is approached by several disciplines, each with its ownparticular perspective. Thus, because both research in educa-tion and research in mind and brain span multiple disciplines,an understanding of what differentiates research disciplinesfrom each other may be helpful. Before we can build bridgesacross disciplines, we need to know where each discipline issituated.
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES IN MBE
Why is communication across disciplinary boundaries2 dif-ficult? Interdisciplinary scholars (e.g., Klein, 1990; Repko,2008), as well as academics writing in the field of MBE (e.g.,della Chiesa, Christoph, & Hinton, 2009; Hinton & Fischer,2008), have already charted the challenges inherent to cross-ing disciplinary boundaries. Hinton and Fischer (2008) havehighlighted the reality of different ‘‘disciplinary cultures withfield-specific language and methods’’ (p. 158).
As a result, seemingly simple terms, such as learning, are con-ceptualized in highly variable ways (Hinton & Fischer, 2008).These differences are not only deep and real, but they are oftenlatent, buried within the tacit knowledge of the field. As dellaChiesa et al. (2009) discuss, just as ‘‘a fish does not know whatwater is’’ (p. 22), an expert, swimming in the tacit knowledgeof her field, finds it difficult to explain that knowledge. Weface a complex problem: trying to communicate across disci-plinary perspectives despite differences that lie dormant andunspoken. As members of other interdisciplinary projects havediscovered, bringing these differences to the surface may be keyto unlocking more effective communication among membersof interdisciplinary teams (Klein, 1990). However, as Samuels(2009) notes, dialogue in MBE often lacks explicit recognitionof disciplinary differences. Building on Samuels’ descriptionof differences in histories, philosophies, and epistemologiesfound within MBE, we offer an application of Repko’s (2008)framework to MBE disciplines for making sense of disciplinarydifferences.
Defining Elements of DisciplinesDisciplinary differences emerge from an underlying struc-ture, which has been described in a number of differentways (e.g., Abbott, 2001; Becher & Trowler, 2001; Kagan,2009; Szostak, 2004). The current discussion will use Repko’s(2008) framework of five defining elements of disciplines:phenomena of interest, epistemology, methods, theories,and assumptions. These categories do not capture the truecomplexity of disciplines, which are dynamic systems theboundaries of which overlap (Abbott); however, they do pro-vide a useful heuristic for characterizing each discipline’s
164 Volume 5—Number 4
Priya Kalra and Jamie K. O’Keeffe
unique ‘‘intellectual ‘center of gravity’’’ (Repko, 2008, p. 57).Below, we describe and illustrate each of these definingelements.
A discipline’s phenomena of interest represent the part of theworld it is interested in. Phenomena are ‘‘enduring aspectsof human existence’’ (Repko, 2008, p. 83) that can be stud-ied, described, and explained. For example, an educationalpsychologist may be interested in aspects of learning andteaching, while a cognitive neuroscientist might focus on theneural correlates of certain cognitive functions. Phenomenacan be viewed from different basic perspectives (e.g., research,practice) with distinct goals, thereby producing supplementalaccounts that cannot be deduced from one another (Steinet al., 2008). Phenomena can also be viewed at different levelsof analysis via distinct methods, thereby producing poten-tially competing accounts and the temptation of reductionism(Stein et al., 2008).
The discipline’s phenomena also reflect its epistemology,or how it conceptualizes the nature, validity, and limits ofknowledge (Repko, 2008). For example, positivists, roughlyspeaking, believe that the world exists independent of ourinterpretations of it, and so objective analysis is feasible(Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Interpretivists, on the other hand,see the world as socially constructed, thereby renderingobjective analysis impossible (Marsh & Furlong, 2002).Although disciplines in the natural sciences tend to sharea largely positivistic view, the social sciences embrace aplurality of epistemologies, including realism, rational choice,and post-modernism (Repko, 2008). Thus, interdisciplinarycommunication, particularly among disciplines in the socialsciences, must be mindful of this ‘‘epistemological polytheism’’(Klein, 1990, p. 107). Quite often, team members assume thatthey are speaking the same language when, in fact, thereare very different epistemological assumptions beneath theirassertions (Klein, 1990).
Another defining element of a discipline is its represen-tative methods (Repko, 2008). Methods are the means bywhich researchers gather and evaluate evidence.3 For example,cognitive psychologists typically use quantitative behavioralmethods, such as measuring infants’ looking times, in carefullycontrolled laboratory tasks. Cell and molecular neuroscien-tists, on the other hand, typically conduct non-human animalstudies using methods such as single cell recording or geneticmanipulation. Such difference in methods can lead to diffi-culty understanding research outside one’s own discipline orthe disciplines with which one is familiar. Furthermore, ifresearchers communicating to an audience unfamiliar withtheir methods do not provide some explanation of how thedata and conclusions were gathered, the audience may notunderstand the limitations of the research.
The fourth defining element of a discipline is its represen-tative theories (Repko, 2008). A theory is an explanation ofobserved phenomena that (in an empirical discipline) can be
tested. Researchers within a discipline share an understandingof that discipline’s theories. For example, developmental psy-chologists share a knowledge of Piaget’s (1952) theory ofcognitive development. Similarly, cell and molecular neuro-scientists share an understanding of Hebbian principles (e.g.,Hebb’s 1949 Rule that what fires together, wires together).Terms are theory-laden: they often represent specific meaningsin the context of a certain discipline (Klein, 1990). In otherwords, individuals may use the same word in decidedly dif-ferent ways as a consequence of theoretical orientations. Forexample, the term ‘‘efficiency’’ has related, but distinct mean-ings for biologists, physicists, and economists (Repko, 2008).Although this same phenomenon can be observed within adiscipline, such as a behaviorist’s and a cognitivist’s differentinterpretation of the term ‘‘learning’’ in psychology, it is moreoften seen across disciplinary boundaries. Thus, an appreci-ation for the methodological and theoretical foundations ofdifferent disciplines may foster more effective communicationamong interdisciplinary team members.
Finally, assumptions are suppositions underlying a disci-pline’s concepts, theories, and methods (Repko, 2008). Theseassumptions, or tacit knowledge, are often the most difficult forexperts to explicate. For example, a cognitive psychologist mayassume that much of the mind’s information processing is auto-matic and unavailable to consciousness, such as early visualperception (e.g., see Fodor, 1982; Marr, 1982/2010). In con-trast, a cell/molecular neuroscientist using rodents as researchsubjects may not have reason to consider the availability ofcognitive processes to consciousness. Unstated disciplinaryassumptions are a hidden minefield in communication acrossMBE.
Defining Elements of Disciplines Relevant to MBEAcknowledging differences in the defining elements of dis-ciplines may facilitate communication and comprehensiveunderstanding among researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers in MBE. General communication skills may not besufficient; other necessary ingredients may include knowl-edge of disciplinary differences and skills in bringing tacitdisciplinary knowledge to the surface. As discussed above,communication issues arise among the broad cultures ofresearch, practice, and policy. The issues from policy and prac-tice for communication in MBE are somewhat general to anycommunication across research, policy, and practice in educa-tion. However, some of the challenges posed by MBE-relevantresearch disciplines are specific to those disciplines, whichmay be more unfamiliar to policymakers and practitionersthan research disciplines that are more traditionally applied toeducation (e.g., sociology). For this reason, we have focused onthe differences among MBE research disciplines. Here, we willfocus on the communication challenges within the culture ofresearch.
Volume 5—Number 4 165
Communication in MBE
In Tables 1 and 2, we present two charts based on Repko’s(2008) defining elements, which summarize several disciplinesrelated to psychology and neuroscience, respectively. Thetables represent the sort of cognitive work that may be requiredfor more effective communication among disciplinary special-ists. The disciplines outlined share the broad perspective ofresearch-oriented fields: they are concerned with creatinggeneralizable knowledge based on observable data (Shulman,1981).4 We include three psychology sub-disciplines (Table 1)and two disciplines related to neuroscience (Table 2) thatare relevant to the study of reading disorders, which is aprominent research topic in MBE (e.g., see Fischer, Bern-stein, & Immordino-Yang, 2007). In addition to the rows foreach discipline’s defining elements, we have included a rowfor examples of each discipline’s contributions or perspectivein the study of reading disorders. We chose these examplesbecause the study of reading disorders may be familiar to manyreaders across the three areas of research, policy, and practice inMBE; we will discuss our examples in the third section of thisarticle.
The charts do not capture the full complexity of any ofthe disciplines represented, nor do they represent the fullrange of disciplines that offer useful insights into readingdisorders. They are merely intended to illustrate a corecompetency in interdisciplinary work: making disciplinarydifferences explicit (Klein, 1990; Repko, 2008). This capacitymay provide a strategic improvement in communicationamong researchers of different disciplinary backgrounds andfacilitate productive research in interdisciplinary areas suchas educational neuroscience. Furthermore, an understandingof differences in defining elements of MBE disciplines can helppractitioners and policymakers better navigate the sometimes-disorienting landscape of MBE research.
Tables 1 and 2 highlight a few potential sources of interdis-ciplinary communication issues. For example, an educationalpsychologist and a neuroscientist may discuss learning, assum-ing that they have a shared understanding of this term.However, it may be the case that they are conceptualizinglearning quite differently—each from the distinct theoreticaland methodological approaches of their respective disciplines.The educational psychologist (Table 1) may conceptualizelearning as a complex classroom process, involving individual(e.g., motivation), group (e.g., scaffolding), and environmental(e.g., task demands) factors, which are best measured in situ.The neuroscientist (Table 2), on the other hand, may considerlearning to be best measured at the neural level, via highlycontrolled laboratory studies, removed from the complexity ofthe classroom.
Developing a MetalanguageMaking disciplinary differences explicit (as in Tables 1 and 2)is part of the necessary process of developing common
language among interdisciplinary team members (COSEP,2004; Klein, 1990). According to Klein, ‘‘developing ametalanguage is integral to any interdisciplinary endeavor. . . no matter what overall strategy is employed’’ (p. 117).In striving to bring tacit assumptions to the surface anddevelop common language, it is useful to know three typesof conflicts that may emerge among concepts from differentdisciplines.
The first type of conflict arises when the same term isused to represent different phenomena (Klein, 1990; Repko,2008). Seemingly simple terms, such as development, may meanvery different things to different disciplines (Miller & Boix-Mansilla, 2004). This conflict may cause an ‘‘illusion ofconsensus’’ (Klein, p. 127) in which ‘‘team members thinkthey are speaking the same language’’ (p. 127) when, in fact,they are not. Accordingly, asking clarifying questions aboutseemingly obvious terms, such as development, will fostermore productive communication by bringing disciplinaryassumptions to light (Miller & Boix-Mansilla, 2004).
The second type of conflict among concepts arises whendifferent terms are used to describe essentially the samephenomenon (Repko, 2008). This less frequent type of conflictis basically a semantic disagreement that can be resolved byclarifying terms (Repko, 2008). Essentially, this is an ‘‘illusionof disagreement.’’ For example, Vygotsky (1978) described theupper and lower limits of the Zone of Proximal Developmentas the level of potential development and the level of actual development,respectively. Dynamic skill theory includes an elaboration ofthis concept, using the terms optimal and functional levels,respectively (Fischer & Bidell, 2006). This second type ofcommunication conflict may arise if team members mistakenlyassume that their different terminology referred to decidedlydifferent phenomena.
The third type of conflict is among the very ways in whichthe disciplines conceptualize the phenomena at hand. In thiscase, consensus cannot be reached by semantic agreement.Deeper examination of underlying assumptions is necessary,and common ground may or may not be possible (Repko,2008). This conflict would arise if the team members in theprevious example, after extensive discussion, realized thatthey do indeed conceptualize the notion of a developmentalrange in conflicting ways.
To summarize briefly, communication challenges arise bothamong and within the broad cultures of research, practice,and policy. We have focused on communication challengesamong research-oriented disciplines, using Repko’s (2008)framework of defining elements (i.e., phenomena of interest,epistemology, methods, theories, assumptions) as a usefulheuristic for bringing disciplinary differences to light. Wehave modeled this process by summarizing the defining ele-ments of several sub-disciplines of psychology (Table 1) andneuroscience (Table 2) that are relevant to the study of readingdisorders.
166 Volume 5—Number 4
Priya Kalra and Jamie K. O’Keeffe
SPECIAL CHALLENGES FOR INTERDISCIPLINARYUNDERSTANDING OF MIND AND BRAIN: LEVELS
OF ANALYSIS
Heuristically, disciplines in the physical and biological sci-ences can be arranged from the smallest level of analysis (e.g.,sub-atomic particles in physics) to the largest (e.g., wholeorganisms, ecosystems, or populations in biology). Althoughwe emphasize that we attach no greater value to either end ofthe spectrum (i.e. we do not consider smaller level-of-analysisdisciplines superior to other disciplines), we allow that certainphenomena are necessarily and de facto best studied at certainlevels (e.g., formation of synapses is and must be studied ata smaller level-of-analysis than that at which memory as awhole is studied). Some of these level-of-analysis limitationsare methodological (e.g., we do not have a way to study mem-ory as a whole at the synaptic level) and some are theoreticalor philosophical (e.g., memory as a whole is not theoreticallyunderstood to exist at the level of a single synapse, but ratherin the interconnections among many neurons, involving manysynapses). See Willingham (2009) and Willingham and Lloyd(2007) for further discussion of levels of analysis specific toMBE.
Ideally, we will someday be able to connect our insightsand findings into continuous, multilevel mechanism explana-tions,5 and we will be able to describe a phenomenon at alllevels, from overt behavior, to covert information processing,to the neural implementation in the brain. This will allowus to more accurately discover and offer remedies or alter-natives for students’ problems. However, until then anyoneworking to communicate in MBE must exercise caution whenconstructing explanations that relate different disciplines anddifferent levels of analysis—explicitly acknowledging the dis-ciplines and levels is a first step. Failure to do so often resultsin the ‘‘illusion of agreement’’ described above. Such illusoryagreement in mind–brain research may be vexing, but when itextends to education policy and practice the implications canbe at best unhelpful and at worst devastating to the progressand prospects of individual students.
In the next section, we will discuss and describe someexamples of difficulty communicating across levels, disci-plines, and ‘‘cultures’’ with regard to reading difficulties.
DISCUSSION: EXAMPLES FROM THE STUDYOF READING DISORDERS
Dyslexia is an example of a phenomenon that is studied byresearchers in different disciplines and that is also importantto practitioners and policymakers. Research in dyslexia poten-tially represents the most established (to date) area of studythat can be described as spanning ‘‘mind, brain, and education.’’As such, it provides fertile ground for examples of the difficultyin communicating across disciplines, among levels, and among
the ‘‘cultures’’ of research, policy, and practice. For this reason,we chose to illustrate our explanation of some MBE-relevantdisciplines by highlighting their contributions or perspectivesto the study of reading disorders (see Tables 1 and 2).
Illusory agreement is possible any time when two people arediscussing dyslexia, simply because of the lack of an agreed-upon definition of what dyslexia is. Although there is somegeneral consensus that dyslexia is a specific reading disability,defining who is and who is not dyslexic for research purposespresents a veritable quagmire of disciplinary and theoreticalassumptions. In some studies, a discrepancy model of dyslexia(which requires a discrepancy between an individual’s IQ andreading ability, as measured by a standardized reading test)is used, whereas in others the criterion is based on an indi-vidual’s phonological processing6 abilities as measured by astandardized test, such as the Comprehensive Test of Phono-logical Processing (Wagner, Torgesen, & Rashotte, 1999).Comparing the results of two studies without acknowledgingthe different criteria used for dyslexia classification can leadto confusion and misunderstanding. While many psychologyresearchers (especially in cognitive and educational psychol-ogy) have moved away from the discrepancy model, it remainsprevalent in the work of many7 researchers using neuroimagingmethods (these are mostly cognitive neuroscientists).
This example demonstrates the importance of acknowl-edging theoretical differences in MBE research; to the extentthat the construct operationalization is an aspect of method-ology, it is also an example of different methods being used.In this example, communication about reading disorders wasstymied not by a simple matter of unfamiliar terminology,but rather by deep rooted and unacknowledged differences intheory and methodology. Similar examples could be found forthe other defining elements of disciplines (i.e., assumptions,epistemology, and phenomena).
The issue of discrepancy versus phonological processingdefinitions of dyslexia is not restricted to researchers, but alsohas implications for policy and practice. Until the most recentre-authorization of the Individuals with Disabilities EducationAct (IDEA), the law and associated regulations called for theuse of a discrepancy model, which arguably biases diagnosisof dyslexia in certain populations.
In another example, unacknowledged differences in level-of-analysis provide a barrier to effective interdisciplinarycommunication. One theory of the cause of dyslexia tracesit to atypicalities in the ‘‘magnocellular pathway’’ of the brain(Livingstone, Rosen, Drislane, & Galaburda, 1991, p. 7943;Stein, 2001, p. 12). However, another theoretical perspectiveclaims that deficits in phonological processing are the causeof dyslexia. According to the scientific method, the appro-priate way to resolve the dispute is to perform experimentsthat can provide evidence in support of or allow the rejectionof one theory. Such an approach has proved all, but fruit-less in adjudicating between magnocellular and phonological
Volume 5—Number 4 167
Communication in MBE
Tab
le1
The
Defi
ning
Ele
men
ts(e
.g.,
Met
hods
)of
Thr
eeSu
b-D
isci
plin
esof
Psy
chol
ogy
Rel
evan
tto
Min
d,B
rain
,and
Edu
cati
on(M
BE
),an
dE
xam
ples
ofT
heir
Res
pect
ive
Insi
ghts
into
the
Stud
yof
Rea
ding
Dis
orde
rs
Dev
elop
men
talp
sych
olog
y(F
isch
er&
Bide
ll,20
06;W
erne
r,19
57)
Cog
niti
veps
ycho
logy
(Tha
gard
,199
6)E
duca
tion
alps
ycho
logy
(Woo
lfolk
,200
7)
Ove
rall
pers
pect
ive
Thr
ough
out
the
lifes
pan,
hum
ans
grow
and
chan
geac
ross
mul
tipl
edi
men
sion
s(e
.g.,
men
tal,
emot
iona
l)
Con
side
rsth
em
ind
asan
info
rmat
ion-
proc
essi
ngde
vice
,pos
sibl
yco
nsis
ting
ofdi
ssoc
iabl
eco
mpo
nent
s
Seek
sto
appl
yps
ycho
logy
toed
ucat
ion,
anal
ogou
sto
the
rela
tion
ship
betw
een
biol
ogy
and
med
icin
eor
betw
een
phys
ics
and
engi
neer
ing
Illu
stra
tive
phen
omen
a• D
evel
opm
enta
lsta
ges,
web
s,or
path
s(e
.g.,
cogn
itiv
e,in
terp
erso
nal)
• Int
erna
land
exte
rnal
fact
ors
affe
ctin
gde
velo
pmen
talo
utco
mes
• Per
cept
ion
• Mem
ory
• Lan
guag
e• N
atur
eof
men
talr
epre
sent
atio
ns• E
xecu
tive
func
tion
s
• Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
inst
ruct
iona
lmat
eria
lsan
dm
etho
ds• R
elat
ions
hip
betw
een
inst
ruct
ion
and
psyc
holo
gica
lthe
orie
s• S
tude
nts’
mot
ivat
ion
Rep
rese
ntat
ive
rese
arch
met
hods
• Qua
ntit
ativ
ean
dqu
alit
ativ
eps
ycho
logy
met
hods
• Lon
gitu
dina
lstu
dies
• Cro
ss-s
ecti
onal
stud
ies
Qua
ntit
ativ
ebe
havi
oral
stud
ies
(e.g
.,m
easu
ring
adul
ts’r
espo
nse
tim
e,in
fant
s’lo
okin
gti
me
inca
refu
llyco
ntro
lled
labo
rato
ryta
sks)
Qua
litat
ive
and
quan
tita
tive
psyc
holo
gym
etho
ds,i
nclu
ding
use
ofst
anda
rdiz
edas
sess
men
tsof
cogn
itiv
efu
ncti
onan
dac
adem
icac
hiev
emen
t
Ass
umpt
ions
• Dev
elop
men
tca
nbe
nonl
inea
ran
ddi
scon
tinu
ous,
resu
ltin
gin
qual
itat
ive
chan
ges
acro
ssth
elif
espa
n• D
evel
opm
ent
tend
sto
war
din
crea
sing
diff
eren
tiat
ion
Muc
hof
the
min
d’s
info
rmat
ion-
proc
essi
ngis
auto
mat
ican
dun
avai
labl
eto
cons
ciou
snes
s(e
.g.,
earl
yvi
sual
perc
epti
on)
• Edu
cati
onca
nbe
info
rmed
byth
eory
from
psyc
holo
gy• E
mph
asis
onin
divi
dual
diff
eren
ces
and
prac
tica
lapp
licat
ions
(rat
her
than
the
abst
ract
univ
ersa
lsof
‘‘bas
icsc
ienc
e’’)
Rep
rese
ntat
ive
theo
ries
• Cog
niti
vede
velo
pmen
t(P
iage
t)• E
colo
gica
lpsy
chol
ogy
(Bro
nfen
bren
ner)
• Dyn
amic
deve
lopm
ent
(Fis
cher
)
• Pro
toty
peth
eory
(Ros
ch)
• Fea
ture
-int
egra
tion
theo
ry(T
ries
man
)• F
ilter
mod
elof
atte
ntio
n(B
road
bent
)
• The
ory
ofm
ulti
ple
inte
llige
nces
(Gar
dner
)• T
each
ing
for
unde
rsta
ndin
g(P
erki
ns,
Gro
tzer
)• M
otiv
atio
nth
eori
es(D
wec
k,F
ord)
Exa
mpl
eof
disc
iplin
ary
insi
ght
into
read
ing
diso
rder
s• E
arly
read
ers’
stra
tegi
esar
edi
ffer
ent
from
skill
edre
ader
s’(A
shby
&R
ayne
r,20
06)
• Alt
erna
tede
velo
pmen
talp
athw
ays
tore
adin
g(F
isch
er,R
ose,
&R
ose,
2007
)
• Dua
l-ro
ute
casc
aded
mod
elof
read
ing
(Col
thea
rt,R
astl
e,P
erry
,Lan
gdon
,&Z
iegl
er,2
001)
• Pho
nolo
gica
lpro
cess
ing
may
bedi
srup
ted
inre
adin
gdi
sabi
lity
(Tor
geso
n,20
07)
• Voc
abul
ary
and
phon
olog
ical
awar
enes
sin
pre-
read
ers
can
pred
ict
late
rre
adin
gab
ility
(Sca
rbor
ough
,200
3)• E
xplic
itin
stru
ctio
nin
phon
ics-
base
dre
adin
gis
effe
ctiv
efo
rm
any
stud
ents
(Nat
iona
lRea
ding
Pan
elR
epor
t)
168 Volume 5—Number 4
Priya Kalra and Jamie K. O’Keeffe
Tab
le2
The
Defi
ning
Ele
men
ts(e
.g.,
The
orie
s)of
Tw
oD
isci
plin
esR
elat
edto
Neu
rosc
ienc
ean
dM
ind,
Bra
in,a
ndE
duca
tion
(MB
E),
and
Exa
mpl
esof
The
irR
espe
ctiv
eIn
sigh
tsin
toth
eSt
udy
ofR
eadi
ngD
isor
ders
Cog
niti
vene
uros
cien
ce(W
ard,
2006
)C
ell/m
olec
ular
neur
osci
ence
(Kan
del,
Schw
artz
,&Je
ssel
,200
0)
Ove
rall
pers
pect
ive
Em
piri
cali
nfor
mat
ion
abou
tth
ebr
ain
can
cons
trai
nan
din
form
info
rmat
ion-
proc
essi
ngac
coun
tsof
men
tal
func
tion
s(i
.e.,
thos
efo
und
inco
gnit
ive
psyc
holo
gyan
dco
mpu
tati
onal
mod
elin
g)
Neu
rons
have
prop
erti
esin
com
mon
wit
hot
her
cells
inth
ebo
dy,a
ndal
soha
veun
ique
prop
erti
esre
late
dto
info
rmat
ion-
proc
essi
ng
Illu
stra
tive
phen
omen
a• N
eura
lcor
rela
tes
ofco
gnit
ive
func
tion
s• C
ogni
tive
func
tion
s(e
.g.,
perc
epti
on)
repr
esen
ted
byin
form
atio
n-pr
oces
sing
mod
els
and
info
rmed
byne
ural
corr
elat
es
• Sig
nalt
rans
duct
ion
atth
esy
naps
e• S
ynap
tic
plas
tici
ty• C
ell-
wid
ech
ange
sfo
llow
ing
syna
ptic
acti
vity
Rep
rese
ntat
ive
rese
arch
met
hods
• Fun
ctio
naln
euro
imag
ing
(fM
RI,
PE
T,N
IRS)
;hum
anel
ectr
ophy
siol
ogy
(EE
G/E
RP
,int
racr
ania
lrec
ordi
ngs)
;T
rans
cran
ialm
agne
tic
stim
ulat
ion
(TM
S)• B
rain
inju
ryin
form
atio
n• S
ingl
ean
dm
ulti
-cel
lrec
ordi
ngs
inno
n-hu
man
anim
al
Non
-hum
anan
imal
stud
ies,
such
as:
• Sin
gle
cell
reco
rdin
g• G
enet
icm
anip
ulat
ion
• Exp
erim
enta
lpha
rmac
olog
y
Ass
umpt
ions
• The
reis
som
ede
gree
oflo
caliz
atio
nin
the
brai
n,(i
.e.,
som
epr
oces
ses
are
carr
ied
out
insp
ecifi
car
eas
orby
spec
ific
netw
orks
ofar
eas)
• The
reis
som
eco
nsis
tenc
yin
the
orga
niza
tion
ofth
ese
area
sac
ross
indi
vidu
als
• Beh
avio
rsca
nbe
rela
ted
tobi
olog
ical
phen
omen
a• H
ebbi
anhy
poth
eses
,e.g
.,‘‘w
hat
fire
sto
geth
er,w
ires
toge
ther
’’• N
eura
lmec
hani
sms
obse
rved
inon
eco
ntex
tor
orga
nism
are
plau
sibl
ein
othe
rsR
epre
sent
ativ
eth
eori
es• P
rosp
ecti
vem
emor
y(B
uckn
er,S
chac
ter)
• Spe
cial
izat
ion
for
expe
rtis
e(T
arr,
Gau
thie
r)• H
ebbi
anth
eory
(Heb
b)• C
ompu
tati
onal
mod
els
(Sej
now
ski)
Exa
mpl
eof
disc
iplin
ary
insi
ght
into
read
ing
diso
rder
s
• Neu
ralc
orre
late
sof
read
ing
deve
lopm
ent
(Sch
lagg
ar&
McC
andl
iss,
2007
)• U
niqu
eel
ectr
ophy
siol
ogy
for
read
ing
subs
kills
(Tho
mso
n,G
osw
ami,
&B
alde
weg
,200
8)• B
rain
dam
age
can
sele
ctiv
ely
affe
ctdi
ffer
ent
aspe
cts
ofre
adin
g(C
aram
azza
,198
8)
• Lin
kbe
twee
nre
adin
gab
ility
and
abno
rmal
anat
omy
inth
em
agno
cellu
lar
path
way
(Ste
in,2
001)
Volume 5—Number 4 169
Communication in MBE
theories of dyslexia. As Frith (1999) adeptly pointed out, thereason for this is because they are actually theories at differentlevels of analysis.8 A magnocellular explanation is at the levelof biological explanation (best studied with neuroscience),while in contrast a phonological processing explanation is atthe level of cognitive construct (best studied with psychology).In this case, appropriate links between the levels do not yetexist. This could be considered a case of illusory disagreement;however, in this example it is not the case that different termsare being applied to the same phenomenon, but rather thatexplanations of a phenomenon9 at different (and currentlyincompatible) levels of analysis have been falsely placed inopposition to each other.
CONCLUSION
As scholars (e.g., Klein, 1990; Repko, 2008) writing about inter-disciplinarity have noted, interdisciplinary collaboration ben-efits from the explicit and respectful acknowledgment of disci-plinary differences. In this spirit, we have offered a preliminarysketch of some key differences that warrant further acknowl-edgement in MBE: differences among (1) the broad perspec-tives of research, practice, and policy; (2) research-orienteddisciplines, in general; and (3) disciplines investigating phe-nomena of mind and brain, in particular. We used Repko’s(2008) framework of defining elements (e.g., assumptions, meth-ods) as a useful heuristic for identifying and discussingdisciplinary differences. Finally, we provided several examplesfrom the study of reading disorders to illustrate these concepts.
Interdisciplinary communication is rife with challenges,particularly when dealing with phenomena of MBE. As shouldbe clear, the problem does not lie in disciplinary differencesthemselves but, rather, in our failure to acknowledge them.Disciplinary differences are the very grounds from which fertileinterdisciplinary work grows (Klein, 1990; Repko, 2008).Distinct perspectives are necessary for a more complete viewof complex phenomena, such as reading disorders. However,as individuals, we may be less effective in leveraging theseperspectives to provide insight into a problem when we areunaware of key differences among them. As team members,we may struggle to communicate with colleagues when weare unaware of their disciplinary perspective. The currentapproach, by bringing disciplinary differences to the surface,may strategically improve interdisciplinary communication aswe continue to work toward solving problems of MBE.
NOTES
1 This distinction among ‘‘cultures’’ may be compared toStein, Connell, and Gardner’s (2008) description of basicperspectives, such as description and evaluation.
2 Our discussion includes any communication among dis-ciplinary perspectives, regardless of whether the collab-oration is multi-disciplinary, cross-disciplinary, interdis-ciplinary, or transdisciplinary. Following Repko (2008),we consider a disciplinary perspective to be a discipline’scharacteristic way of viewing the ‘‘portion of reality thatit is interested in’’ (p. 53). For a more complete review ofdifferent types of collaboration between disciplines, seeRepko (2008) and Stein (2007).
3 That is, for disciplines which share an empirical epistemol-ogy. For disciplines with other epistemologies, methodsmay be more broadly defined.
4 As such, Repko (2008)’s category of epistemology was notincluded.
5 See Craver (2007) for more on this point. Also, Hackman(2003) suggests a strategy of ‘‘bookending’’ one’s researchwith context from the levels of analysis immediately‘‘above’’ and ‘‘below.’’
6 The definition and operationalization of ‘‘phonologicalprocessing’’ is also not without some controversy (seeRamus & Szenkovitz, 2008).
7 But not all! Fumiko Hoeft and John Gabrieli are notableexceptions.
8 Frith’s delineation of three levels—biological, cognitive,and behavioral—maps very well onto Marr’s (1982/2010)well-known three level model for relating mental andneural phenomena.
9 It could be argued that the same phenomenon at a different(currently incompatible) level of analysis is in effect adifferent phenomenon.
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