COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH KOREA: …unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/... · collaborative governance in south korea: citizen participation in policy making and

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH KOREA:

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING AND WELFARE

SERVICE PROVISION*

Sunhyuk Kim

This article considers the theoretical significance of collabo-rative governance and analyzes its empirical examples in SouthKorea. In most industrialized democracies, collaborative gover-nance is considered crucial to strengthening democracy andaugmenting welfare. South Korean governments since 1987have emphasized collaboration by implementing citizen partic-ipation in policy making and the provision of welfare services.As examples of citizen participation in policy making, the articleexamines direct democracy devices, participatory budgeting,the citizen jury system, and honorary auditors. As examples ofcollaborative welfare, the article reviews the Food Bank andHope Start programs and the Local Councils on Social Welfare.The author concludes that the current government’s relativeinattention to collaborative governance should be rectified.

Key words: South Korea, civil society, collaborative governance,welfare state

* The author would like to thank Joel Aberbach for his comments on anearlier draft of this article, as well as Chang-soo Heo, Jeongwon Kim, andJae Min Shim for their research assistance.

ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2010, pp. 165-190.

Introduction

More than two decades have passed since South Korea accom-plished its transition to democracy. Since 1987, South Korea hashad five successive democratic governments: the Roh Tae Woo(1988-93), Kim Young Sam (1993-98), Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003),Roh Moo Hyun (2003-08), and Lee Myung Bak (2008-present)administrations. All five governments, albeit with varying degreesof enthusiasm, have placed emphasis on “collaborative gover-nance,” defined as “a governing arrangement where one or morepublic agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collec-tive decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented,and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policyor manage public programs or assets.”1 In particular, the Roh MooHyun government officially named itself a “participatory govern-ment” (chamyeo jeongbu) and introduced numerous collaborativeinstitutions and participatory measures.

Participation—both political participation via elections andcivic participation via associational activities—is integral to thesurvival and prosperity of democracy. Participation has assumedadded significance in democratized South Korea, primarily becauseof the exceptionally poor status of citizen participation underthe earlier authoritarian regimes.

During 1972-1987, citizen participation in South Korea waseither absent or coerced. Elections, the most representative form ofpolitical participation in an ordinary democracy, were meaning-less due to their complete predictability. The authoritarian leaders,either unopposed or competing with state-sponsored puppetopponents, were elected by an “electoral college” whose memberswere under the government’s tight control and surveillance.

In terms of civic participation, only selected social groupswere mobilized in a range of pro-government activities—forexample, to increase industrial and agricultural productivity, fight

166 Sunhyuk Kim

1. Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, “Collaborative Governance in Theoryand Practice,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, vol. 18,No. 4 (2008), p. 544.

corruption, “purify” South Korean society, and promote citizens’compliance with the laws. But these activities by social groups didnot represent genuine civic participation, because South Koreancivil society at the time lacked one of its cardinal characteristics,i.e., autonomy from state control or influence. Social organizationsduring the pre-democratic authoritarian period merely served as aone-sided “transmission belt,” relaying the government’s policiesto the citizenry at large and facilitating efficient implementation ofthose policies made and imposed from the top.

When the democratic transition occurred in 1987, South Kore-ans naturally equated “democracy” with “participation.” Intro-duction of a direct popular presidential election system, whichhad been at the top of the wish list of the pro-democracy coali-tion of the opposition parties and civil society groups, was givenpriority. As a result, elections in South Korea since 1987 havebecome much cleaner, freer, and fairer.

Meanwhile, an “associational revolution”2 followed on theheels of the democratic transition, resulting in the emergence ofhundreds, if not thousands, of new civil society associations everyyear. Unlike the pre-democracy period when social groups hadbeen systematically monitored and controlled by the governmentvia authoritarian measures and policies, civil society groups sincethe democratic transition have been able to forge and nurture new,autonomous types of relationship with the ruling government.

Two schools of thought that became popular and influentialduring the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments havecontributed to the evolution of collaborative relations betweencivil society and government in South Korea’s post-transitionalperiod. During the Kim presidency, the New Public Managementparadigm, with its emphasis on efficiency, responsiveness, andtransparency, prompted governmental actors to explore newopportunities for collaborating with civil society to reform andimprove public administration and policy making. The govern-mental agencies were encouraged and even pressured to delegate

Collaborative Governance in South Korea 167

2. See Lester Salamon, “The Rise of the Non-Profit Sector,” Foreign Affairs,vol. 73, No. 4 (1994), pp. 109-22.

and devolve as much work as possible to market sector and vol-untary sector actors, such as firms and civil society organizations.

Collaborative governance received even greater attentionduring the Roh Moo Hyun administration. The Roh government,professing to be a “participatory government,” adhered to theNew Governance paradigm, with its emphasis on collaborationbetween the state, market, and civil society. Decentralization,governmental innovation, and civic participation were highlight-ed as important policy goals of the government. With the contin-uing influence of the New Public Management and New Gover-nance paradigms,3 academic interest in and practical applicationsof civic participation and collaborative governance have steadilyincreased in South Korea.

Against this backdrop, this article examines two representa-tive forms of collaborative governance in South Korea duringthe Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments: citizen par-ticipation in local policy making and the civil society-governmentpartnership in welfare service delivery. I argue that these twoforms of collaborative governance in South Korea, despite theirapparent similarities in form, developed from different factors.Specifically, citizen participation in local policy making was pri-marily driven by the popular demand for participation—a legacyof the previous pro-democracy movement. Meanwhile, the civilsociety-government partnership in welfare service delivery result-ed from the underdevelopment of the welfare state during thedevelopmental era of the 1960s-1980s. Because the two types ofcivil society-government collaboration have different causes, theprospects for their survival and durability differ.

In the next section, I first review the existing literature oncitizen participation and collaborative governance, especially inlight of the two purposes they are expected to serve, i.e., revital-izing democracy and complementing the welfare state. Next, Iexamine in detail the origins and contents of diverse participato-

168 Sunhyuk Kim

3. See Eran Vigoda, “From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance,Citizens, and the Next Generation of Public Administration,” PublicAdministration Review, vol. 62, No. 5 (2002), pp. 527-40.

ry and collaborative mechanisms and devices introduced andimplemented during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyungovernments in South Korea. Then, I reflect on the current statusof collaborative governance, focusing on their limitations andimplications. I conclude with a few thoughts on the future ofSouth Korea’s democratic governance.

Collaborative Governance, Democracy, and Welfare

In the existing literature, collaborative governance is consid-ered crucial for two main reasons. First, civic engagement andcitizen participation perform critical functions in consolidating afledgling democracy and rejuvenating a decaying democracy.Second, civil society-government collaboration eases the burdenof the welfare state by providing and delivering welfare goodsand services to citizens.

Civic participation complements the role of the existing insti-tutions of representation conventionally available in democracy—most notably political parties, sectoral movements, and interestgroups. In most democracies, civic participation—whether it takesthe form of voluntary associational activities, formal or informalparticipation in public policy forums, social movements, or “directaction,”4 including popular protests—performs important func-tions of interest collection, articulation, and representation.

In particular, civic engagement and participation make vitalcontributions to the consolidation and deepening of nascentdemocracies in multiple ways.5 First, civic participation helps todetect and identify new issues and interests that have so far beenignored, underestimated, or underrepresented by the previousauthoritarian regimes or/and the existing political parties. Sec-


4. April Carter, Direct Action and Democracy Today (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).5. Philippe C. Schmitter, “Civil Society East and West,” in Larry Diamond

et al., eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 247; MuthiahAlagappa, ed., Civil Society and Political Change in Asia (Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 2004).

ond, it provides channels for self-expression and identificationthat are more proximate to individual citizens, thereby allayingcitizens’ sense of alienation and political apathy. Third, citizenparticipation stabilizes expectations within social groups andthereby supplies the state with more aggregated, reliable, andactionable information with which to govern. Fourth, it incul-cates democratic norms of behavior, hence augmenting democ-ratic legitimacy and habituating democracy as the “only game intown.” Fifth, civic participation provides important reservoirsand sources of potential resistance to arbitrary or tyrannical actionby rulers.6

Most established democracies have long suffered fromplummeting voter turnout and political indifference among thecitizenry. In this context, civic engagement and citizen participa-tion can serve as an effective antidote to political apathy and aninstrument to rekindle citizens’ interest in politics and policymaking. A vibrant civic community, civic participation, andcivic engagement are all regarded as important instruments ofenhancing the performance and quality of democracy.7 In sum,the existing literature concludes that collaborative governance

170 Sunhyuk Kim

6. Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of CivilSociety (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); MeredithL. Weiss, Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for PoliticalChange in Malaysia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006).

7. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert D. Putnam,Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina,eds., Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Brook-ings Institution Press, 1999); Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy:From Membership to Management in American Civic Life (Norman, Okla.:University of Oklahoma Press, 2003); Robert K. Fullinwider, ed., CivilSociety, Democracy, and Civic Renewal (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Little-field, 1999); John J. Kirlin and Mary K. Kirlin, “Strengthening EffectiveGovernment-Citizen Connections through Greater Civic Engagement,”Public Administration Review, vol. 62 (2002), pp. 80-85; Kim Quaile Hilland Tetsuya Matsubayashi, “Civic Engagement and Mass-Elite PolicyAgenda Agreement in American Communities,” American Political ScienceReview, vol. 99, No. 2 (2005), pp. 215-24.

through civic engagement and citizen participation effectivelycomplements and reinforces electoral politics in democracies.

Meanwhile, collaborative governance also contributes to theproduction and delivery of welfare goods and services, thus less-ening the burden of the state. Since the early 1990s, increasing col-laboration between civil society and the state in providing welfaregoods and services to citizens has prompted public administra-tion and policy specialists to appreciate the importance of thenonprofit sector.8

The existing literature underlines either “government failure”and/or “market failure” as a prominent cause of civil society-government partnerships.9 In the advanced market economies ofWestern Europe and the United States, the welfare state model,which had been in force for decades after World War II, was chal-lenged during the 1980s primarily due to its budgetary unsustain-ability. As a result, the welfare state delegated various functionsto the private sector either through institutional measures (e.g.,privatization of state-owned institutions) or concrete policies andprograms (e.g., deregulation and civil society-state collaboration).

“Government failure” takes a different form in developingand underdeveloped countries. There, the government, due to alack of resources, infrastructural base, corruption, and the preda-tory nature of the state, has failed to respond to the people’sneeds and deliver what the public wants. Furthermore, govern-mental failure in developing and underdeveloped countries isoften complicated and aggravated by concomitant “market fail-ure.” While advanced economies could involve market entities,such as private firms, in producing sought-after public goods,most developing and underdeveloped countries do not have astrong enough market sector to perform that function. Underthese circumstances, civil society organizations emerge to per-


8. Salamon, “The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector”; Michael Edwards, CivilSociety (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

9. Henry Hansmann, “Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations,” inWalter W. Powell, ed., The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (NewHaven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987); Estelle James, “The Non-profit Sector in Comparative Perspective,” ibid.

form the roles that the state or the market ordinarily performs indeveloped countries, i.e., satisfying the needs of the populace.

In summary, there exists a growing literature on the benefitof collaborative governance for deepening nascent democracies,rejuvenating old democracies, complementing welfare states,and assisting underperforming states. For South Korea, a fledg-ling democracy with an infant welfare state, collaborative gover-nance has proven highly relevant and crucial. In the next twosections, I analyze how collaborative governance has emerged tobecome an influential policy paradigm in South Korea’s democ-ratic consolidation by discussing recent examples of citizen par-ticipation and civil society-government collaboration.

Citizen Participation in Policy Making

Roh Moo Hyun’s election in December 2002 considerablybenefited from the high tide of civic mobilization in the sameyear. In June 2002, a U.S. armored vehicle killed two SouthKorean middle school girls. When the driver and the navigatorof the vehicle were both acquitted despite their conflicting state-ments during a U.S. court marshal, hundreds of thousands ofSouth Koreans demonstrated in the streets. Ordinary citizensjoined candlelight vigils to protest the verdict; some studentseven burned American flags to express their outrage. Roh, whohad not visited the United States prior to his election to theSouth Korean presidency, looked far more independent than theother presidential candidate.

From the very beginning, the Roh government identifieditself as a “participatory government” and emphasized that itwould encourage citizen participation in the process of policymaking. Even before the president formally took office, his tran-sition team made a surprise announcement that it would acceptonline recommendations and suggestions from ordinary citizensfor selecting and appointing cabinet ministers. Citizen input wasnot the decisive factor in selecting ministers, but this unprece-dented policy measure pleasantly surprised many South Korean

172 Sunhyuk Kim

citizens, who considered participation to be a crucial ingredientof democracy.

Later, the Roh administration introduced and enforced aseries of participatory mechanisms and policies that can be bro-ken down into three broad categories. The first category is “directdemocracy”; these measures included referenda, initiatives, andrecalls.10 Although there had been academic and journalistic dis-cussions within South Korea on the benefits of these directdemocracy devices, they were only introduced and enforced inearnest after the inauguration of the Roh administration. The sec-ond category is local administration and governance. Examplesinclude participatory budgeting, the citizen jury, and “honoraryauditors.” These devices were first introduced in selected localtowns and were later expanded to other cities and towns at asteady pace. The last category is online and offline citizen partic-ipation; these included initiatives designed and carried out by theministries of the central government. Successful implementationof these online and offline citizen participation initiatives is partof the annual performance evaluation process for governmentagencies, which has prompted ministries to adopt and operatethem competitively.

During the Roh government, the use of referenda on policyissues and recalls for political leaders were put into force. Thereferendum as a democratic tool was first included in the LocalAutonomy Act introduced in 1994. Yet, it was not used until2004 when the Referendum Act was passed and promulgated.Since then, a number of cities and towns have held referenda todecide critical local issues. For example, a referendum was heldby the cities of Pohang, Yeongdeok, Gunsan, and Gyeongju toselect a site for a nuclear waste disposal center. (See the casestudy by Lee and Lim, “Governance and Policy Performance inKorea,” in this issue.) The recall system has been in force since


10. Seung Su Ha, “Characteristics of the Recall System and Its Implicationsfor Civil Society” (in Korean), Civil Society and NGOs, vol. 4, No. 2 (2006),pp. 77-103; Seung U Ha, “Government’s Abuse of Referendum and theRoles of Civil Society” (in Korean), Civil Society and NGOs, vol. 4, No. 2(2006), pp. 37-75.

May 2006. Some citizens’ associations have used the device torecall their leaders who, against the will of the majority of theresidents, abused their authority and made questionable deci-sions on policy issues.11

Second, the Roh government strongly encouraged local gov-ernments to adopt and use greater citizen participation in theirpolicy-making process. Citizens’ participation in the budgetingprocess increased civilian control of local governments’ budgetspending and enhanced the soundness and transparency of theoverall process. Buk Ward in Gwangju City enacted legislationin 2003—the Regulation for Implementing Residents’ Participa-tion in Budgeting—to enforce the participatory budgeting sys-tem. The ward office has also run several citizens-led researchand consultative committees to support the system.12

Another institution that was introduced by the Roh govern-ment was the citizen jury system, where ordinary citizensreviewed policy-related issues. This was first introduced inSuseong Ward in Daegu City in 2000 and has rapidly spread toother local governments. In Buk Ward, Ulsan City, the citizenjury played a crucial role in resolving conflicts between the localgovernment and residents on whether to accommodate a foodwaste management facility local residents did not welcome. Thecitizen jury held meetings, hearings, and on-site visits to thefacility and eventually arrived at an agreement with the govern-ment on the location of the proposed facility in the city.

The “honorary auditors” system appoints experts knowl-edgeable about and experienced in local public administrationas “honorary auditors” so that they can observe and monitorlocal governance. The ministry of government administrationand home affairs introduced the system nationwide in 2003.13

Responsibilities of honorary auditors include identifying andreporting citizens’ complaints and grievances concerning publicadministration, detecting and reporting public servants’ corrup-

174 Sunhyuk Kim

11. Hangyoreh Daily (Seoul), July 7, 2007.12. Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), January 3, 2007.13. Maeil Ilbo (Seoul), February 15, 2007.

tion cases, participating in auditory and investigative efforts bytheir city governments, monitoring major construction projects,and making suggestions for city development.14

Lastly, at the central government level, the Roh Moo Hyungovernment pressured ministries to adopt and operate participato-ry public administration and policy making through online andoffline methods. The Blue House (presidential office) took theinitiative to revamp and restructure its home page and opened thecitizen participation forum (gungmin chamyeo madang) threemonths after Roh’s official inauguration. The website providedinformation on governmental agendas, policies, and goals of thegovernment; received citizen suggestions for improving adminis-trative structures and processes, increasing efficiency of adminis-trative management, and saving money in the budget; facilitateddebates and discussions on policy issues; and ran online “commu-nities” to provide experts’ answers to citizens’ questions.15

Other central governmental ministries followed suit, estab-lishing and actively running similar institutions and mecha-nisms for citizen participation. For example, the Ombudsman ofKorea has enabled citizens to participate in policy discussionsand debates, make suggestions for improving the policy-makingprocess, and fill out questionnaires about the office’s policy mak-ing and public administration. Other ministries, such as those fornational unification, national defense, and foreign affairs andinternational trade, all use similar citizen participation forums ontheir home pages. These citizen forums typically provide informa-tion on policy making, conduct public surveys, collect citizen opin-ions on policies, and offer forums for suggestions and opinions.They also help citizens monitor and evaluate existing policies andmake suggestions for improvement. Online participation is sup-plemented by offline activities such as minister-citizen dialoguesand committees composed of experts in the relevant policy areas.


14. Yonhap News (Seoul), October 28, 2005.15. Hyeong Guk O, “E-Government and Citizen Participation: Citizen Sug-

gestions System” (in Korean), Welfare Administration Review, vol. 21 (2005),pp. 382-99.

Civil Society-Government Partnership in the Provision of Welfare Service

The Early Neglect of Public Welfare

In the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea presented a disconcert-ing anomaly to the supporters of the then popular “world sys-tems” and dependency theories. The case of South Korea seemedto defy the theories’ predictions that a country could not movefrom the economic “periphery” to the “core.” South Korea notonly recovered from the devastations of the Korean War (1950-1953) but also rapidly soared to become one of the most dynamicmarket economies in the world, often recording double-digitgrowth rates from the 1960s to the 1980s. As a result, scholarsoverseas competitively included South Korea in the honorableroster of East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs). Oneeminent sociologist acclaimed South Korea as one of the “four lit-tle dragons” in East Asia.16

However, what was clearly absent in South Korea’s “mirac-ulous” industrialization during the 1960s-1980s was due atten-tion to welfare. Throughout the rapid economic development,South Korea’s developmental state consistently adhered to theofficial policy of “growth-first, distribution/welfare later.” Wel-fare was neglected, suppressed, and procrastinated; it was large-ly left to individual citizens and their family networks.

In the 1950s, the South Korean government concentrated itsefforts on recovering from war damages and accelerating postwarreconstruction. Public welfare was not one of its main concerns.Instead, the welfare of the South Korean population was left toforeign philanthropic and humanitarian organizations. Duringthe Korean War, in July 1952, representatives of seven major for-eign organizations created the Korean Association of VoluntaryAgencies to coordinate aid projects and promote informationsharing. Foreign organizations built and operated facilities such

176 Sunhyuk Kim

16. Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization inEast Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

as homes for orphans, the aged, and the disabled; distributedrelief goods; provided medical services; established schools andhospitals; and advised agricultural development plans.17

After the military coup in 1961, Park Chung Hee’s militaryand later pseudo-civilian governments legislated a number ofwelfare-related bills. Examples include the Civil Servants Pen-sion Law (1961), the Public Livelihood Protection Law (1961), theKorean Social Security Law (1963), the Industrial Accident Insur-ance Law (1963), the Health Insurance Law (1963), the MilitaryPension Law (1963), and the Medical Assistance Law (1963).Selected elements of the South Korean population—for example,those employed by large firms—benefited from those newlyintroduced welfare programs. However, most of these acts wereintended to mollify political opposition and augment electoralsupport for the legitimacy-deficient military regime. In essence,welfare legislation at the time was used as a political instrumentof the authoritarian regime to increase its popularity and weakendissidence.18

In response to the increased popular demand for distribu-tion and welfare in the wake of the democratic transition in1987, the South Korean state built numerous social welfare insti-tutions and facilities during the late 1980s. However, the gov-ernment focused on funding, monitoring, and supervising pri-vate sector actors—such as religious groups, nonprofit organiza-tions (NPOs), and social organizations—that were in charge ofoperating the newly built institutions and facilities. “Built by thestate, but run by social groups” was the main mode of operationfor most welfare organizations during the 1980s.19 In this respect,


17. Sang Yeol Ryu, The History of Social Welfare (in Korean) (Seoul: Hakjisa,2002).

18. Antonio Fiori, “Civil Society and Welfare State Development in Korea,”paper presented at the World Congress for Korean Studies, Busan, Korea,August 23-25, 2007.

19. Hyeon Ju Lee, et al., “An Analysis of the Management of Local Councilson Social Welfare and Exploration into Better Models” (in Korean),report published by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs,2003.

the South Korean government’s social policy during the 1980s didnot represent any noticeable break with past decades in whichwelfare had been handled by private citizens, families, firms,voluntary groups, and international aid organizations.

South Korea’s economic crisis in 1997-1998 provided a strongpush for increased attention to welfare. During the crisis, a num-ber of major companies in the country filed for bankruptcy, for-eign investors withdrew their investment, and the level of for-eign reserves fell dangerously low. South Korea was forced torequest a rescue loan package from the International MonetaryFund (IMF), which required rigorous and continuous restructur-ing of the economy.

The Kim Dae Jung government designed and carried outreforms in four major sectors of the economy—corporate, finan-cial, labor, and public sectors. The consequences of the Kim gov-ernment’s neoliberal “flexibilization” of the labor market—e.g.,increased unemployment and reduced job security—promptedthe state to realize how weak South Korea’s welfare system andsocial safety net had been during the developmentalist era of thepast decades. Thus, it was during the Kim Dae Jung governmentthat a welfare state finally emerged in earnest in South Korea.Although the economic crisis officially ended with the repay-ment of the IMF loan in 1999-2000, emphasis on welfare hasbecome an enduring feature of the South Korean economy.

The Introduction of “Productive Welfare”

The 1997-1998 crisis drastically changed the South Koreanstate’s traditional reluctance to provide for social welfare. Theeconomic crisis entailed extensive restructuring of the economy,which resulted in massive layoffs, a higher level of unemploy-ment, disintegration of the middle class, worsening incomeinequality, and serious social polarization. The welfare system,which relied on the private sector, was simply inadequate to sup-port the South Korean population in crisis. The government couldno longer turn a blind eye to the public’s demand for better wel-fare and economic distribution. As a result, the Kim Dae Jung gov-

178 Sunhyuk Kim

ernment developed and advocated “productive welfare,” expand-ing welfare services and revamping health/medical policies. Themodifier “productive” was used to rebut neoliberal critics whoargued that the “anachronistic” emphasis on welfare was contraryto the global trend of reducing the welfare state and would nega-tively affect national productivity and competitiveness.

Under the slogan “productive welfare,” a series of welfarereforms were implemented. For example, the National BasicLivelihood Security (NBLS) Act, an unprecedented extension ofthe social assistance program, was passed in October 2000.National health insurance reform was accomplished throughconsolidating all health funds into a global national fund. Inaddition, the national pension system was significantly extend-ed to include the urban self-unemployed, the last group exclud-ed from the pension program in South Korea at the time.20

However, in comparison, South Korea’s newly emergingwelfare state still lagged far behind its counterparts in otherregions. According to a report by the Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD), South Korea’s publicsocial expenditure as of 2005 was merely 6.9 percent of grossdomestic product (GDP), which is the lowest among the thirtyOECD countries compared.21 It was lower than not only those ofEuropean and Asian welfare and post-welfare states such asSweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, France,Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan but also those of EastEuropean “transition economies” such as Hungary, Poland, theCzech Republic, and the Slovak Republic. South Korea was alsobehind Japan, the United States, Australia, Canada, Turkey, andMexico. This clearly demonstrates how distant South Korea’sembryonic “welfare state” stands in comparison to the old andemerging welfare states.

On the other hand, South Korea’s private social expenditure


20. Fiori, “Civil Society and Welfare State Development.”21. Willem Adema and Maxime Ladaique, “How Expensive is the Welfare

State?: Gross and Net Indicators in the OECD Social Expenditure Data-base (SOCX),” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers,No. 92 (OECD Publishing, 2009), p. 26.

as of 2005 was 2.5 percent of GDP, which was fourteenth amongOECD countries. It was higher than private social expenditure inNorway, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Finland, Lux-embourg, the Slovak Republic, Spain, New Zealand, the CzechRepublic, Mexico, and Hungary. This shows that South Korea’ssocial welfare still heavily depends on the private sector. Despitethe efforts by the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administra-tions, the state does not yet play a dominant role in providingand delivering welfare services to South Korean citizens. Theprivate sector-based welfare system of South Korea has not yetbeen absorbed into the state-run welfare system, and many wel-fare services are still handled by private sector entities.

The Roh Moo Hyun government continued building a wel-fare state in South Korea under the slogan “participatory wel-fare,” which emphasized increasing the participation and involve-ment of citizens and NPOs in the production and delivery ofsocial welfare services. In September 2005, the Roh governmentannounced the Hope Korea 21: Collaborative Welfare program,which aimed at building an integrative and customized welfareservice delivery system based on public-private partnerships. Thetragic death of a four-year old disabled boy in Daegu in Decem-ber 2004, which graphically illustrated the weaknesses and inade-quacies of the welfare system in South Korea, greatly shocked theSouth Korean society and compelled the government to strength-en its commitment to build a welfare state to protect poor andvulnerable families.22 The Roh government’s emphasis on “partic-ipatory welfare” led to diverse forms of state-third sector collabo-ration. Civic participation in the production and delivery of wel-fare goods and services substantially increased the incidences ofco-management, co-production, and co-governance.23 Examples

180 Sunhyuk Kim

22. Yonhap News, December 18, 2004; Kyunghyang Daily, December 19, 2004.23. See Taco Brandsen and Victor Pestoff, “Co-Production, the Third Sector

and the Delivery of Public Services: An Introduction,” Public Manage-ment Review, vol. 8, No. 4 (2006), pp. 493-501; Victor Pestoff, Stephen P.Osborne, and Taco Brandsen, “Patterns of Co-Production in Public Ser-vices: Some Concluding Thoughts,” Public Management Review, vol. 8,No. 4 (2006), pp. 591-95.

of civic participation in welfare production and delivery includethe Food Bank and Hope Start programs and Local Councils onSocial Welfare (LCSWs).

The Food Bank is a program that delivers surplus food tolow-income families. In South Korea, the program started as apilot program in January 1998 and was expanded to fifty-eightareas in July 1998. As of December 2006, 278 Food Bank facilitieswere active in South Korea. The program was originally initiatedby private organizations, such as the Anglican Church of Korea,as a way to share food with the poor. But beginning in 1998, thegovernment helped the program by providing facilities andequipment and funding operating costs. The government begansupporting the Food Bank program primarily for two reasons.First, as previously mentioned, South Korea was in the middle ofan unprecedented economic crisis. The public demand for stateintervention to ameliorate social problems was immense andintense. Welfare could no longer be left to the private sector.

Second, the previous Food Bank program had been sporadicand limited, primarily operated by religious groups, such as theAnglican Church of Korea and YMCA. The program needed tobe broadened and institutionalized.24 The Welfare ResourcesTeam in the ministry of health and welfare (MoHW) took chargeof the new Food Bank program. The Korea National Council onSocial Welfare, City and Provincial Social Welfare Councils, andother local welfare facilities carried it out. The main beneficiariesof the Food Bank program included orphans, the handicapped,the aged, homeless, unemployed, and those affected by naturaldisaster. In 2006, the Act to Promote Food Donations, containingthe basic principles and establishment criteria of the Food Bankprogram, was passed.

The basic assumption of the Hope Start program is that director indirect financial assistance from the state alone cannot resolvethe problem of child poverty. The MoHW in 2007 launched Hope


24. Seoul Council on Social Welfare, Analysis and Evaluation of Local FoodBank in Seoul, 2006 (in Korean) (Seoul: Seoul Council on Social Welfare,2006).

Start as a pilot program in sixteen areas and incrementally expand-ed it. Previously, a number of private organizations, such as theJoongang Daily, the Korea Welfare Foundation, and the Commu-nity Chest of Korea, collaborated to launch the We Start move-ment to help the children of poor families. The We Start move-ment aimed to ease the intergenerational perpetuation of poverty.In particular, the movement built We Start Villages in numerouscities and towns of South Korea. These special villages were fund-ed by local firms, citizen donations, and support from local gov-ernments. In these villages, local governments, schools, welfarefacilities, hospitals, NGOs, and ordinary residents cooperate tohelp alleviate poverty of young children.

The government-run Hope Start program incorporates andexpands on the existing We Start movement. The principal pur-pose is to provide educational and welfare services to the childrenof poor families so that they enjoy a “fair start line” comparedwith the children from higher-income families. The MoHW is incharge of implementing Hope Start. The Support Team for Plan-ning and Educational Programs include specialists in welfareissues who advise in selecting locations and developing variousspecific programs. In selected locations, the Hope Start teamsdevelop and provide an integrative welfare service program,making a package of health, welfare, and education available tochildren from poor families. The Hope Start teams can alsorequest the use of social welfare facilities, nurseries, hospitalsand health clinics, and NGOs in the region. The beneficiaries ofthe Hope Start program include pregnant women of low-incomehouseholds and children under the age of twelve in vulnerableareas. Teams of social welfare specialists and nurses regularlyvisit families and provide services such as medical checkups andeducational programs. The program provides children with ser-vices integrating health, welfare, and nurture and provides theirparents with job training and employment opportunities. In con-trast to the existing private-sector programs focused on solvingproblems after they occur, this program emphasizes preventionof problems in nutrition, emotional development, and socialskills of the children from poor families using an integrated

182 Sunhyuk Kim

package of methods.In the past, local governments, NPOs, and hospitals have

provided welfare services individually in South Korea, withoutmuch coordination or cooperation. There existed no linking orcollaborative mechanisms between the public and private sectors.There was a lot of overlap and omission in terms of providingnecessary welfare services. There were state-created and state-sponsored committees on social welfare, but they did not functionvery well. LCSWs are a response to the traditional absence ofcoordination between the government and NPOs. Experts hadrepeatedly pointed to the importance of establishing and develop-ing a collaborative forum in which NPO and governmental repre-sentatives, welfare experts, and practitioners could all participateand discuss welfare matters to provide better and more integrat-ed services to residents.

In 2001-2002, LCSWs were established as a pilot program infifteen cities and towns. Based on the success of these pilot coun-cils, in July 2003, the existing Social Welfare Program Act wasrevised: The existing state-dominant Social Welfare Committeeswere replaced by LCSWs. By March 2006, all cities and towns inSouth Korea established LCSWs. These councils are composed ofexperts who are knowledgeable about welfare and health issues,representatives from voluntary organizations and institutionsengaged in social service provision, and relevant public officials,thus ensuring broad representation and diversity of participants.In thirty-four cities and towns, local councils employ executivesecretaries from the private sector, who are actively nurturingand reinforcing collaboration between the local government andNPOs to explore welfare-related resources in the area. More andmore councils are expected to hire staff from the private sector.25

The main functions of LCSWs are to discuss and deliberateon major welfare-related issues and plans pertaining to the regionand promote linkage and integration between social welfare andmedical service, with a view to enhancing overall welfare in the


25. Ministry of Health and Welfare, White Paper on Health and Welfare (inKorean) (Seoul: MoHW, 2007).

local region and building a workable “new governance” systembetween the public and the private sectors. LCSWs in SouthKorea, by actively involving and incorporating local NPOs in thepolicy-making process related to the provision of social welfareservices, facilitate and enrich communication channels betweenNPOs (providers) and residents (users). Citizens and NPOs areinvolved in multiple stages of the decision-making process—notonly the implementation stage but also the agenda-setting andevaluation stages. LCSWs are expected to contribute to the estab-lishment and evolution of a “new governance” system and theaugmentation of social capital in South Korea.

Reflections on Collaborative Governance in South Korea

As was discussed above, the “participatory government” ofRoh Moo Hyun introduced a number of participatory mecha-nisms and devices in the political and economic realms to deependemocratic institutions and to promote the development of aninfant welfare state. However, there are several problems withthe existing participatory mechanisms and devices.

First, most of the participatory institutions and programs,both in the political (democracy-promotion) and economic (wel-fare-promotion) realms, have largely been initiated, led, and man-aged by the state. The process, most of the time, was top-down innature. The Roh government, constantly frustrated by the opposi-tion party and its allies in the National Assembly, often used pop-ular participation mechanisms to broaden its support basis, bol-ster its legitimacy, and facilitate policy implementation. Becausethe emphasis on civic participation was essentially propelled bysuch political motives and because participation was promotedthrough state-led campaigns, it remains to be seen how many ofthe newly introduced participatory measures will survive theconservative Lee Myung Bak government.

Second, most of the participatory programs are limited to acertain stage of the policy-making process. In terms of the par-ticipatory mechanisms in the political field, most of the new

184 Sunhyuk Kim

devices are concentrated in the agenda-setting stage. What thegovernment tries to do is collect citizen suggestions and opin-ions that cannot be adequately expressed through regular elec-tions and incorporate them into the policy-making process. Bycontrast, in terms of welfare-promoting participatory mecha-nisms, most of the initiatives are focused on the implementationstage. Although the latest examples like the LCSWs attempt toenhance co-governance between policy makers and citizens inthe area of public welfare matters, most of the civic participationmeasures introduced so far have concentrated on the productionand delivery of welfare goods and services, without due atten-tion to citizen empowerment and access to the policy-makingprocess. As a result, in both democracy-promoting and welfare-providing participatory programs, the other stages of policymaking, such as policy evaluation, do not yet involve significantcivic participation.

Moreover, most of the participatory mechanisms and devicesintroduced so far in South Korea are limited to basic functionssuch as information sharing and consultation. The “participato-ry” mechanisms and forums have been used by the governmentto provide relevant information to citizens and for citizens tosuggest opinions and concerns to the government. But it isdoubtful whether these informational and consultative forumswill lead to active citizen participation. In this regard, it is essen-tial to institutionalize the existing participatory mechanisms.Because some of the mechanisms introduced remain ad hoc innature, it is possible for future governments to dispense withthose mechanisms and devices. For civic participation to per-form many crucial democracy-promoting and welfare-providingfunctions, it is essential to reorganize the existing governmentalministries so as to accommodate citizen input and civic partic-ipation more effectively and on a more regular basis. In addi-tion, the degree, scope, quality, and efficacy of the incorporationof civic participation must be seriously considered when evalu-ating the performance of governmental ministries and publicofficials.


Conclusion and Prospects

This article examined two primary areas in which the SouthKorean governments’ emphasis on “collaborative governance”has played out in the post-transitional period, i.e., democracy pro-motion and welfare improvement. In both areas, there have beencritical changes and developments over the past two decades,particularly during the Kim Dae Jung and the Roh Moo Hyunadministrations. How enduring will these changes and develop-ments be?

Since its inauguration in February 2008, Lee Myung Bak’s con-servative government in South Korea has implemented severalcritical policy changes. In terms of economic policy, a high priorityhas been accorded to economic growth through privatization,deregulation, and “business-friendly” measures. The stress onstate welfarism, which was the hallmark of the previous two gov-ernments, has been significantly abated. The Lee government’sfundamental approach to the economy is guided by the “tricklingdown” of an “enlarged pie” resulting from overall economicgrowth. Big business has been encouraged to lead the nation’seconomy as the main engine of the national drive for growth andglobal competitiveness.

Under Lee’s government, the previous Roh government’s ini-tiatives on collaborative governance and civic engagement havebeen scaled back substantially. Lee’s slogans of economic growthand industrial competitiveness have largely eclipsed the emphasison democracy and welfare. Civic participation, which had beenpivotal in promoting democracy and improving welfare duringthe previous governments, has been deemphasized accordingly. Inthis regard, serious skepticism and concern about continued insti-tutionalization and stabilization of the previously introduced par-ticipatory measures seem justified.

Undervaluing civic participation and scrapping participatorymechanisms and devices, however, will probably invite a strongpopular backlash. The main drive for the formidable tide of“collaborative governance” originated from the two great trans-formations in South Korean politics and economy: One was the

186 Sunhyuk Kim

democratic transition in the 1980s and the other was the economiccrisis in the 1990s. The need to deepen democracy and develop awelfare state compelled the South Korean government to under-score participation and institutionalize participatory mechanismsand devices. The historically rooted emphasis on participationwill not easily disappear. This is particularly so because SouthKorea’s democratization was enabled by the persistent struggle ofcivil society groups and citizens’ active participation in pro-democracy campaigns. A grand coalition of civil society groups,such as student organizations, labor unions, and religious associa-tions, played crucial roles in expelling the authoritarian regimeand facilitating democratization in South Korea. If the rulinggovernment fails to provide an adequate “participatory outlet”for the traditionally strong and contentious civil society in SouthKorea, the participatory impulse will likely erupt into directaction and possibly violent protests.26 Popular protests engulfedthe entire nation just a few months after Lee’s inauguration, dur-ing the summer of 2008, over the safety of U.S. imported beef.Strong popular demand for civic participation can erupt at anytime, especially as Lee’s administration obstinately pursues eco-nomic growth and competitiveness at the cost of economic distri-bution and welfare.

Increasing instances of civic participation and civil society-state collaboration in both democracy promotion and welfare pro-vision in major industrialized democracies clearly demonstratethat, in the rapidly globalizing world today, it is difficult for thegovernment to deal with all policy issues alone. It is imperativeto involve civil society and engage citizens in the policy-makingprocess, facilitating and deepening collaboration between the stateand other sectors. Civil society-state collaboration is important formaking democracy work better, resolving socioeconomic prob-lems more effectively, and increasing national competitiveness.


26. Sunhyuk Kim, Byung-Kook Kim, and Grzegorz Ekiert, “DemocraticConsolidation and Civil Society in Korea: Continuities and Changes inthe Politics of Protest” (in Korean), Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 50, No. 3(2007), pp. 128-48.

In conclusion, competent management and utilization ofcivic participation and civil society-state collaboration will proveto be the key to effective governance in the years to come. Civicparticipation and civil society-state collaboration in South Koreawill also serve as an important mechanism of “normalizing” theSouth Korean state. Shedding the past (economically) develop-mental and (politically) authoritarian legacies, the South Koreanstate is gradually learning to collaborate and cooperate withcivil society organizations and ordinary citizens to strengthenthe new democracy and the weak welfare system. By participat-ing in an increasingly tighter web of state-civil society interac-tion and cooperation, citizens and voluntary organizations willcontribute to increasing the transparency, responsiveness, andaccountability of their government and improving the quality ofthe policy-making process. The resulting South Korean democ-racy, with extensive and effective civic participation in crucialpolicy areas, will be far stronger.27 A serious backslide intoauthoritarian decision making and growth-first developmental-ism, if it is indeed taking place under the current government ofLee Myung Bak, will most likely rekindle intense populardemand for civic participation in South Korea.

Principal References

Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. Civil Society and Political Change in Asia.Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Ansell, Chris and Alison Gash. “Collaborative Governance in The-ory and Practice,” Journal of Public Administration Researchand Theory, vol. 18, No. 4 (2008), pp. 543-71.

Brandsen, Taco and Victor Pestoff. “Co-Production, the Third Sec-tor and the Delivery of Public Services: An Introduction,”Public Management Review, vol. 8, No. 4 (2006), pp. 493-501.

188 Sunhyuk Kim

27. Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age,20th Anniversary Edition (Berkeley, Calif.: University of CaliforniaPress, 2003).

Carter, April. Direct Action and Democracy Today. Cambridge: Poli-ty, 2005.

Edwards, Michael. Civil Society. Cambridge: Polity, 2004.Fiori, Antonio. “Civil Society and Welfare State Development in

Korea.” Paper presented at the World Congress for KoreanStudies, Busan, Korea, August 23-25, 2007.

Fullinwider, Robert K., ed. Civil Society, Democracy, and CivicRenewal. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Ha, Seung Su. “Characteristics of the Recall System and Its Impli-cations for Civil Society” (in Korean), Civil Society andNGOs, vol. 4, No. 2 (2006), pp. 77-103.

________. “Government’s Abuse of Referendum and the Rolesof Civil Society” (in Korean), Civil Society and NGOs, vol. 4(2006), pp. 37-75.

Hill, Kim Quaile and Tetsuya Matsubayashi. “Civic Engagementand Mass-Elite Policy Agenda Agreement in AmericanCommunities,” American Political Science Review, vol. 99,No. 2 (2005), pp. 215-24.

James, Estelle. “The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective,”in Walter W. Powell, ed., The Nonprofit Sector: A ResearchHandbook. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987.

Kim, Sunhyuk. The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role ofCivil Society. Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of PittsburghPress, 2000.

Kim, Sunhyuk, Byung-Kook Kim, and Grzegorz Ekiert. “Democ-ratic Consolidation and Civil Society in Korea: Continu-ities and Changes in the Politics of Protest” (in Korean),Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 50, No. 3 (2007), pp. 128-48.

Kirlin, John J. and Mary K. Kirlin. “Strengthening Effective Government-Citizen Connections through Greater CivicEngagement.” Public Administration Review, vol. 62 (2002),pp. 80-85.

O Hyeong Guk. “E-Government and Citizen Participation: CitizenSuggestions System” (in Korean), Welfare AdministrationReview, vol. 21 (2005), pp. 382-99.

Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival ofAmerican Community. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.


Salamon, Lester. “The Rise of the Non-Profit Sector,” Foreign Affairs,vol. 73, No. 4 (1994), pp. 109-22.

Schmitter, Philippe C. “Civil Society East and West,” in LarryDiamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-maoTien, eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themesand Perspectives. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1997.

Skocpol, Theda and Morris P. Fiorina, eds. Civic Engagement inAmerican Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-tion Press, 1999.

Vigoda, Eran. “From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Gover-nance, Citizens, and the Next Generation of Public Admin-istration,” Public Administration Review, vol. 62, No. 5 (2002),pp. 527-40.

Vogel, Ezra F. The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrializa-tion in East Asia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1991.

190 Sunhyuk Kim

Documents

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH KOREA: …unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/... · collaborative governance in south korea: citizen participation in policy making and