5
Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona Author(s): Stephen J. Wayne Source: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 558-561 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/420645 . Accessed: 16/06/2014 07:23 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to PS: Political Science and Politics. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 195.34.79.223 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 07:23:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona

Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton PersonaAuthor(s): Stephen J. WayneSource: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 558-561Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/420645 .

Accessed: 16/06/2014 07:23

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toPS: Political Science and Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.223 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 07:23:38 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona

Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona When historians look back on the

Clinton presidency, I think they will be more fascinated by Clin-

ton himself than by the accomplishments and failures of his administration, the im- pact of his foreign and domestic policy on the country, or even his impeachment and its implications for the presidency. In other words, the most endearing legacy of the Clinton years may very well be Clin- ton himself: a president whose persona became the overriding issue of his admin- istration, a complex individual but also one who has been easily stereotyped by late-night humorists and political oppo- nents, a magnet that both attracts and re- pels, a focus of adulation and condemna- tion, a larger-than-life Baby Boomer.

What factors have enabled Clinton to so captivate public attention and approba- tion and media scrutiny? Has it been the prosperity of the economy, the triumph of his politics, or the dominance of his per- sonality? Obviously, economic and social

conditions created a fa- vorable environment that worked to Clinton's po- litical advantage, but I believe that it is Clin- ton's persona that is the

by Stephen J. Wayne Georgetown University

primary explanatory vari- able. How else can anyone explain the continuing approval of such a consum- mate politician in an antipolitical age? How else could a president whose integ- rity, candor, and moral rectitude has been so extensively criticized and ultimately questioned by a majority of the public maintain such high job ratings throughout most of his last 5 years in office? How else could a scandal-plagued president, in a scandal-plagued administration, survive? 1

The personal dimension of Clinton's presidency arises from his political charac- ter, his seductive style, and his survivor mentality. That character, in turn, has been formed by his limitless ambition, boundless energy, and intellectual prowess.

Bill Clinton is goal oriented. The goals represent steps on a political ladder that led, in his own mind, toward the presi- dency and whose first rung may have been climbed when a teenaged Clinton, as a member of Boys' Nation, shook hands with President John F. Kennedy at the White House in 1963. Look at the pro-

gression: band major in high school, presi- dent of his freshman and sophomore classes at Georgetown University, Rhodes scholar, Yale law graduate, Arkansas at- torney general at 30 and governor at 32, the youngest governor in the country since Harold Stassen of Minnesota. Defeated once, Clinton was reelected five times and achieved national prominence as leader of the National Governors' Association and head of the Democratic Leadership Con- ference prior to his election as president in 1992.

Clinton explains his nonstop pursuit of a political career as a kind of reaction to his biological father's death in 1946, six months before the young Clinton was born, and to the sense of the precarious- ness of life that his father's early passing imbued in him:

For a long time I thought I would have to live for both of us in some ways.... I think that's one reason I was in such a hurry when I was younger. I used to be criticized by people who said, "Well, he's too ambitious," but to me, because I grew up sort of subconsciously on his timetable, I never knew how much time I would have.... It gave me an urgent sense to do everything I could in life as quickly as I could. (Maraniss 1992, Al, A17)

The investment Clinton has put into his work has been substantial. He seems to be in a state of perpetual motion. Up early in the morning, jogging regularly before breakfast, meeting round-the-clock, con- stantly talking and making telephone calls, keeping numerous appointments, and at- tending events, concluding with ceremo- nies and/or political and policy discussions late into the night, and reading three or four books in his spare time, Clinton's life is a constant whirlwind. It is almost as if he were afraid to rest.

Dick Morris, the political guru who planned Clinton's reelection strategy, de- scribed the president's regular schedule as so full that "he often had no time to think or to act on his own and, unfortunately, very little time for sleep." Trips away from the White House would begin at 6 A.M. and last throughout the day and evening, with little or no break. The president would get back in the early hours of the next morning exhausted, "a basket case," in the words of Nancy Hernreich, deputy

558 PS September 1999

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.223 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 07:23:38 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 3: Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona

assistant to the president and director of Oval Office op- erations (Morris 1997, 100).

Stanley Renshon, a psychoanalyst and political scien- tist, argued in High Hopes that Clinton's frantic manner is motivated by a desire for constant stimulation. "Clin- ton's behavioral pattern suggests that he frantically pur- sues not just work activity, but activity itself," that he has a fear of being alone (1996, 58). Journalist David Ma- raniss comes to much the same conclusion. In describing Clinton's intense activity in high school, his public speak- ing, his playing of the saxophone, his position as band major, Maraniss wrote, "he had always hated to be alone, and playing the sax was one of the few ways he could tolerate it" (1995, 45). Both of these psychologi- cally oriented biographers further argued that Clinton's fear of being alone stemmed from his unconscious desire to avoid dealing with feelings and experiences that he had growing up in a troubled home (Maraniss 1995, 30- 45; Renshon 1996, 58-59).

Whatever its source, Clinton's energy level has been a driving force throughout his life. He outlasts others, be they campaign aides, White House advisers, or his politi- cal opponents. And when that energy is combined with his very considerable cognitive talents and political in- stincts, Clinton has proven able to outsmart, outmaneu- ver, and outwit his adversaries.

Clinton relishes policy analysis. He likes nothing better than to conduct a public policy seminar in government. But intellectuality is also a tool for him, a device in his seductive arsenal of political weapons he taps when ap- propriate to impress and test others (Stephanopoulos 1999, 335).2

Despite his considerable problem-solving skills, his agile mind and questioning manner, Clinton's intellectual prowess can also be dysfunctional. In the words of his advisers: "Clinton never stops thinking"; "He makes a decision when he absolutely has to" (Drew 1994, 67). The presence of a mind attuned to nuance that con- stantly searches for new information to put into the cal- culus of deciding has contrib- uted to what George Stephanopoulos referred to as "chronic bouts of indeci- sion" (1999, 335).

And so has Clinton's over- whelming desire to please, a desire associated with his need for approval, being liked, being appreciated, and being validated (Renshon 1996, 50, 100).3 If approval is the bottom line, then the right solution for Clinton is the one with which most peo- ple will agree. Using polls to determine the bounds of pub- lic consensus is a reality check for him, an empirical substantiation for a psycho- logical need.4

For his whole life, getting along for Bill Clinton has meant trying to please as

many diverse and often conflicting interests as possible. Journalist Peter Applebome defined this as a "compul- sive need to please, to bring people together at some hazily defined, accommodating center-as if [Clinton] were still reenacting in politics the role he played at home" (1992, 60). In the words of Dick Morris, "he needed the crowds, the cheers, the mirror" (1997, 16). David Maraniss viewed the crowd-pleasing behavior as a need for "happy and nonconfrontational associations," which would stand in contrast to the unpleasantness and anger he experienced at home with an alcoholic stepfa- ther (1995, 47).

According to John Brummett, the editor of Arkansas Times Magazine, Clinton "tries not to say no to anyone. He has an obsession to please. For years, I've seen legis- lators from different sides of the same question come out of his office, all thinking he's on their side" (1992, A16). This assessment was echoed by Dick Morris: "Typically, much of Bill Clinton's self-image comes from the feel- ings reflected by others around him. In a room, he will instinctively, as if by a canine sense of smell, find anyone who shows reserve toward him, and he will work full time on winning his or her approval and, if possible, af- fection" (1997, 11).

Journalist Bob Woodward observed, "Clinton was a master of sustained eye contact, hunting reaction in the eyes of an audience of one or a thousand" (1994, 21). George Stephanopoulos made a similar observation:

When he was "on" before a live audience, Clinton was like a jazz genius jamming with his pals. He poured his whole body into the speech, swaying to the rhythms of his words, losing himself in a wonky melody, soaring from the texts with riffs synthesized from a lifetime of hard study and sympathetic listening. If he sensed a pocket of resistance in the crowd, he leaned its way, de- termined to move them with raw will if sweet reason didn't work (1999, 202-03). Supporters tend to see Clinton's seductive style as a

desirable trait, responsible for his political successes. Noted Betsey Wright, his chief of staff for six years when

01999 CP tRS VWICAE MC

1. ' WELL, IT ALL , DEFINnTION OF THE

Bo G

?Bob Gorrell

PSOnline www.apsanet.org 559

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.223 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 07:23:38 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 4: Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona

Clinton was governor of Arkansas, "Part of what at- tracted me to Bill is he's always been secure enough as a person to be able to listen, to be able to negotiate, to hear other points of view" (quoted in McAllister and Maraniss 1992, A12).

Critics, however, tend to see Clinton as manip- ulative, as a person who tries to please others to further his own political ambitions and provide salve for his ego. The appellation "Slick Willie," coined by Ar- kansas newspaper colum- nist Paul Greenberg (1992), was intended to put such a spin on the motivation behind Clin- ton's tendency to tell people whatever it was they wanted to hear (Brummett 1992, A16).

Because he craves accommodation and consensus, Clinton is uncomfortable with conflict, particularly among members of his inner circle. The most precarious decision-making situations for him are those in which his advisers are divided.5 Not only is internal disagreement unpleasant for Clinton, it can and has been disabling, as the president's vacillation on the economic proposals he submitted to Congress in the first year of his administra- tion demonstrated.6

His need for agreement, particularly in the absence of a well-defined ideological perspective, is one reason why having advisers with strong personalities and well-defined policy and political goals, such as treasury secretary Rob- ert Rubin, budget chief and later White House staff director Leon Pan- etta, and political consultant Dick Morris, has been so important for Clinton. It is also why these advisers have exercised so much influence on him. George Stephanopoulos de- scribed the chemistry of one of these relationships-the Morris-Clinton connection-in his confessional, All Too Human: "Watching Dick, I began to see what attracted Clinton to him.... Dick's mind was color blind. He thought in black and white, a use- ful complement to Clinton's kaleido- scopic worldview.... He offered clear prescriptions and promised measur- able results. His certainty helped cure Clinton's chronic bouts of indecision" (1999, 335).

Robert Reich, cabinet secretary and long-time friend of Clinton, saw Clin- ton's overwhelming desire to please as a character flaw and predicted that

Because he craves accommodation and consensus, Clinton is uncomfortable with conflict, partic- ularly among mem- bers of his inner circle. The most precarious decision- making situations for him are those in which his advisers are divided.

it could become a disabler: "Faced with genuine evil or a national crisis of undisputed dimensions, Bill will rise to it. But in the more common situation where the public is uncertain about the choices it faces and what's at stake in those choices, I worry that his leadership may fail. He'll become unfocused and too eager to please" (1997, 7).

Numerous examples from Clinton's presidency confirm Reich's insight-from the failed attempts to find a suit- able attorney general and assistant attorney general for civil rights to his uncertainty whether to approve or to veto for the third time the Republicans' welfare reform proposal in 1996 and through the middle-of-the-road military solution he fashioned in the Kosovo crisis.

Clinton's ambitious nature and his desire to avoid con- flictual situations also accounts for his tendency to prom- ise more than he can deliver. This was evident as early as his first campaign for the governorship of Arkansas and has repeated itself since then in his subsequent cam- paigns as well as in the State of the Union addresses he has given as president. The political and institutional en- vironment, of course, often prevents him from achieving many of his policy goals and force him to compromise if he is to obtain at least some of his original objectives. So he does, lending support to the accusations that he is inconsistent and unprincipled. The latter charge often sends him "up the wall" (Drew 1996, 19).7

Situations in which ambition is thwarted by the real- politik have regularly given rise to Clinton's emotional outbursts, "the purple fits" or "earthquakes" as his staff refers to them (Woodward 1994, 255). These fits occur in those situations in which Clinton's goals are frustrated by others, by events that go wrong, by leaks, or by being blind-sided.

In such situations, Clinton frequently sees himself as a victim. His style is to criticize his staff and demonize his opponents, shifting blame from himself and providing explanations for his failure. Of course, Clinton is not the first president to have an enemies list, but he has used

A Head Above. Clinton emerged from the impeachment proceedings with a higher job approval rating than before the Lewinsky scandal broke. File photo 1994. Jim Levitt/Impact Visuals.

560 PS September 1999

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.223 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 07:23:38 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 5: Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona

that list to great political advantage (see Wayne 1999). Needless to add, Clinton also finds it difficult to be contrite.8

Camouflaging his inability to acknowledge mistakes and admit wrongdoing, Clinton has relied on raw charm and dogged perseverance. Those who stand in his way are chastised; the rest are wooed. Those who he wishes to win over get his undivided attention, empathy, and promises to help them and do good. The enemies get his wrath.

Throughout his public life, Clinton has repeated the cycle of overpromising, underdelivering, facing public rejection, persevering in the face of the inevitable public admonishment, and ultimately, rejuvenating himself. Driven by limitless ambition and desires, he says more

than he should, promises more than he can deliver, or behaves in an excessive manner. Stymied by political de- feat, legal constraints, and/or public criticism to the point of ridicule, he recovers by moderating his words and ac- tions, making compromises when necessary, and carefully and consciously orchestrating his public persona to more closely accord with mainstream opinion in an effort to regain political viability and public approbation. But the correction is short-lived and comes undone when ambi- tion once again leads to the deployment of his significant instrumental talents to achieve yet another personal or political objective. This is the William Jefferson Clinton political life-cycle. His has been a personal presidency, one that we are not likely to forget or witness again for some time.

Notes

1. Gallup Poll trends indicate that Clinton's job approval ratings have stayed within the 60% range for most of his second term. His fa- vorability ratings have been in the 50% range, but a majority of people question his honesty and trustworthiness, his values, and his judgment (Gallup 1999).

2. George Stephanopoulos described his first meeting with then gov- ernor and presidential candidate Clinton in the following way:

Clinton started to putter around the office, picking up books, poll questionnaires, photos, anything that caught his eye.... For the next half hour, I joined him on the first of countless stream-of-consciousness tours across the political landscape of his mind. He seemed to know something about everything-- from the party rules for picking superdelegates to turnout in black precincts on Super Tuesday, from how the credit crunch was bankrupting small businesses in New Hampshire to how microenterprise loans could help farmers in the Mississippi Delta-and he swooped from issue to issue without losing his thread, punctuating his soliloquy with questions for me. By the time he closed with the prediction that the nomination would be decided on the day of the Illinois primary, I was blown away. (1999, 29-30)

3. A detailed, insightful analysis of Clinton's character in the first section appears in Stanley Renshon's High Hopes, especially in chapters 2-6.

4. Dick Morris put the best spin on Clinton's affinity for poll data when he wrote, "Clinton used polling ... as a tool for governing, as a technique to facilitate progress in a democracy. Polling for him was not a onetime test of opinion. It was a way of conducting an extensive dia- logue with the public" (1997, 338). Morris went on to claim that Clin- ton never used polls to determine what position he should take on an issue.

5. He also has a tendency "to wing it" on occasions, using his intellec- tual capacities to substitute for careful preparation (Renshon 1996, 63).

6. Bob Woodward (1994) described three groups with three differing perspectives which competed for the president's attention in shaping his economic policy: the populists who had worked on his campaign, the pragmatists who worked with the Democratic Congress, and the economic advisers who were attuned to the needs of the business and investment communities. Trying to meet the competing priorities, poli- cies, and interests of these groups conflicted the president, causing him to delay decisions, reverse some he previously made, and finally com- promise again and again to achieve some kind of legislative outcome.

7. Elizabeth Drew described such a reaction when an aide at a White House meeting criticized the president for not taking enough strong stands. Clinton responded: "Don't ever say that to me again! ... The problem isn't that I haven't taken strong stands, ... it's that I don't have any help around here." He then exploded at his staff: "They treat me like a f-ing pack mule around here. They use my time poorly. They schedule me to make calls to individual members of Congress, not un- derstanding that the role of the president of the United States is mes- sage" (Drew 1996, 19).

8. Clinton's August 1998 response to the allegations that he had had a sexual encounter with a White House intern, a charge that he had previously denied, were circumspect, to say the least. Only before a prayer breakfast of religious leaders did he acknowledge himself to be a sinner, a caricature that he did not often repeat.

Stanley Renshon suggested that Clinton's difficulties with contrition stems from his inability to engage in self-examination and his propen- sity to believe only the best about himself, his motives, his intent, and his desires. For Clinton, being caught is being victimized; being caught makes Clinton, in his own eyes, the object of a political witchhunt by his enemies.

Clinton's mother responded in a similar way to criticisms about her own life style, blaming them on "various forces which tried for thirty years to destroy my career." (quoted in Sheehy 1999, 143).

References

Applebome, Peter. 1992. "Bill Clinton's Uncertain Journey." The New York Times, March 31.

Brummett, John. 1992. "As Governor, Clinton Remade Arkansas in His Own Image." The New York Times, March 31, A16.

Drew, Elizabeth. 1994. On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency. New York: Simon & Schuster.

-. 1996. Showdown: The Struggle between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House. New York: Simon & Schuster.

The Gallup Organization. 1999. Poll Trends <http://www.gallup.com/ poll/trends/>. June 1, 1999.

Greenberg, Paul. 1992. "Clinton Remade Home State in Own Image." The New York Times, March 16, A16.

Maraniss, David. 1992. "Clinton's Life Shaped by Early Turmoil." The Washington Post, January 26, Al, A17.

-. 1995. First in His Class: A Biography of Bill Clinton. New York: Simon & Schuster.

McAllister, Bill, and David Maraniss. 1992. "Clinton: An Instinctive Dealmaker." The Washington Post, March 28, A12.

Morris, Dick. 1997. Behind the Oval Office: Winning the Presidency in the Nineties. New York: Random House.

Reich, Robert B. 1997. Locked in the Cabinet. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Renshon, Stanley. 1996. High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition. New York: New York University Press.

Sheehy, Gail. 1999. "Hillary's Choice." Vanity Fair, February, 136-44, 168-79.

Stephanopoulos, George. 1999. All Too Human: A Political Education. Boston: Little, Brown.

Wayne, Stephen J. 1999. "With Enemies Like This, Who Needs Friends?" Presidential Studies Quarterly 29(June): 773-79.

Woodward, Bob. 1994. The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House. New York: Simon & Schuster.

PSOnline www.apsanet.org 561

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.223 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 07:23:38 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions