Client-centred counselling — An interdisciplinary examination

Client-centred counsell ing - An interdisciplinary examinat ion

MICHAEL M ILLINGTON

University of Leeds

Summary

In this paper I want to explore some of the preconceptions that underpin what is frequently called "client-centred counselling'.

My aim has been to discuss its theoretical foundations by referring to one of the most widely used current positions, i.e. the client-centred theory of Carl R. Rogers.

Taking Rogers' theoretical position as a starting point I criticise this for certain inconsistencies and omissions. Then proceeding to his conception of interpretation I claim this also to be lacking.

In attempting to reconstruct a more viable position the phenomenological foundation of his theory is examined. This, in turn, is shown to be problematical and an attempt is made to rectify it. I then return to the theory of interpretation to replace the one criticised earlier in Rogers' work.

Introduction

One of the aims of this journal is to promote original articles on counselling dealing with new concepts. This essay is an attempt to promote new concepts in counselling theory by confronting one of the popular present-day counselling positions.

In the English-speaking world divisions have arisen between various human sciences which in some of the Continental thinking traditions would be less marked. Counselling, in the English-speaking world, because of its interdisciplinary nature (i.e. often drawing simultaneously on psychology and sociology) has suffered less than some of its components. But as long as its theoretical basis is drawn from psychology and sociology, and as long as these remain relatively autonomous disciplines, then counselling will suffer also by implication. Ideas spread slowly, if at all, through autonomous disciplines. One of the prominent areas where ideas having counselling relevance may be found is in philosophy. Yet there is little contact between philosophy and counselling. This is unfortunate not only because certain philosophical tradi-

IntJ Adv Couns 3:107-118 (1980) 0165-0653/80/0032-0107 $01.80. © Martinus NijhoffPublishers, The Hague. Printed in the Netherlands.

108 M I C H A E L M I L L I N G T O N

tions contain ideas directly relevant to counselling theory, but also because some of the concepts discussed by philosophers are the very ones counsellors use in counselling situations. I aim therefore to adjust the isolationism of couselling by examining one particular counselling theory, namely, the client- centred theory of Carl R. Rogers. Rogers himself has acknowledged the need for counselling theories to have sound philosophical foundations. So, his theory is, from a methodological point of view, a good place to begin.

Although I have avoided as much technical philosophical jargon as possible it is inevitable that some must remain, if only because philosophers are frequently forced to employ jargon or change the meaning of an existent word to express a new or novel concept. I hope that the limited jargon remaining will discourage no-one.

My task will be approached from two directions - (i) by examining Rogers' conceptual model of personality and counselling from within; (ii) by taking up one stand of thought in his theoretical perspective (that of the phenomenological perspective) and examining its usefulness as a foundation for counselling theory and pratice.

Alternative approaches to counselling will be raised in the light of provid- ing solutions to problems raised on Rogers' approach.

II

A brief summary of his views will provide a foundation for our critique when working within his own terms. (Our comments here will be limited to Rogers, 1951, Chapter 11.) (It is not possible to provide a straight phenomenological critique of Rogers'work as his version of phenomenology is ideosyncratic to say the least. We must, if we are to take it seriously, look at his theory of personality and behaviour in its own terms.)

By isolating the individual subject of thought and action he is working with a dualist conception of individuality, and, although much is said of experience, little is said of behaviour as such. Behaviour is relegated to the priority of experience. This leaves two areas of concern - (i) his theory of personality or experience; (ii) the connection between experience and behaviour.

(i) His theory of personality or experience can be sub-divided into three sections - (a) the nature of experience, (b) the development of this experience, and, (c) how this experience may be modified.

(a) His theory of experience centres on the individual in conscious, emotive and perceptual modes of being; together with behaviour these constitute the organism. As this conception of experience will be criticised for its omissions rather than its inconsistencies we need not provide a wider summary than this.

CLIENT-CENTRED COUNSELLING 109

It can be criticised by scrutinising his conception of 'reality'. 'Reality' is said (Proposition (P) 2) to be my perceptual field. He dismisses any notion of 'absolute reality' (on a psychological level) on the grounds that reality is a product of perceptual relation between subject and object. 1 He is therefore using an empiricist version of reality, basing it on a correspondence theory of truth. One of the unfortunate consequences of adopting this position alone is that he is incapable of accounting for the reality of consciousness. Further- more, parts of consciousness, for example the fictive-constructing parts, are ignored.

It is also a passive theory of the subject. Possibilities of changing the external object by the subject into a more acceptable form are neglected. It is self-evident that we all, everyday, change the world about us merely by acting within it. Similarly, we change other people in this world simply by being with them, by talking to them to give one instance.

Rogers' theory of the nature of experience is, then, inadequate as a compre- hensive theory. It can be shown to be both !ncomplete and relativistic (even solipsistic in its extreme form).

(b) As his theory of the nature of experience has been criticised, on one hand, as inadequate, his theory of personality development is, logically, subject to the same criticism. There is no need to dwell on it.

(c) As Rogers is concerned primarily with counselling, the factor of personality modification is an important one. Although he fails to provide for the reality of consciousness, he does indirectly provide for a coherency theory of the psychical through the concept of 'psychological adjustment'. The problem now becomes a pragmatic one. A 'consistent relationship' on a symbolic level 'with the concept of the sell" (P 15) is a position very difficult to achieve. Here two criticisms are impor tant - credit must be given to Hegel for inspiring each.

Firstly; self-consciousness, Hegel thinks, is limited only by itself, it is self- determined and therefore infinite: Consciousness, on the other hand, is limited by its object and is therefore finite. 2 Rogers' analysis of experience does not account in a convincing way for self-consciousness. He is allowed to use a concept of self-consistency precisely because his conception of self-consciousness is limiting. If self-consciousness is infinite (in Hegel's special sense of being 'self-determined') then self-consistency is an absurd proposition in anything short of what he would term the 'Absolute Idea' (i.e. the consistency of all reality), and on the level of the individual this position would be difficult to achieve to say the least.

Secondly; on the level of consciousness, your conception of me (as seen by me) can be the object of my consciousness. As I may have no immediate possibility of changing your conception of me (and this may be contrary to the

110 MICHAEL MILLINGTON

way I see myself) then the criterion of consistency is again put into doubt. So, to render as theatening experiences which are inconsistent with the

organisation or structure of the self just isn't a very useful position. I f the self

is given a sufficiently wide definition then inconsistencies will inevitably be present. In a world rich with inconsistencies only some would seem to become threatening and it is these that are of interest to the counsellor of psychological (real)adjustment.

This discussion of consistency has, until now, assumed that, as a concept, it is unproblematic. This is not the case. We shall proceed by showing how any approach to counselling that places consistent relationships at the centre of its concerns will flounder in difficulties.

The notion of (in)consistency itself needs careful examination. A precedent can be drawn from the anthropological literature. 3 Two famous examples will illustrate our case. The Australian Aborigines, according to Levy-Bruhl, assert that 'the sun is a white cockatoo' . The Sundanese Nuer, according to Evans-Pritchard, assert that ~a twin is a bird'. Much discussion has centred on these apparent contradictions, if they are contradictions (and this is one of the central issues). 4 The implications for the philosophy of logic and hence indirectly for our purposes here are immense. Rogers appears to use an a priori conception of consistency to which he is clearly not entitled if he is working only with internal frames of reference. Furthermore, if the criterion of consistency is removed from his methodology the problems encountered are compounded, as now no point of contact between counsellor and client is left.

It is, furthermore, not at all clear that a contradiction needs to be understood in context of beliefs alone. In certain cases a contradiction on the level of belief may be homologous to a contradiction on the level of social situation. Goldmann 's (1964) interpretation of Pascal 's 'tragic vision' in Pensees places this paradoxical vision in relation to the paradoxical situation of the noblesse de robe in seventeenth-century France. The 'tragic vision' is defined as: ' I t is nevertheless a fact that all forms of tragic vision have one feature in common: they all express a deep crisis in the relationship between man and his social and spiritual world' (Goldmann, 1964: 41). This thesis contains simila- rities to Laing and Esterson's (1970) study of the relation between schizoph- renia and family life.

• .. (D)ilemmas, conflicts, and sometimes contradictions, [between beliefs and behaviour] are the common denominator of many such families who, like the Jones, are the first to testify that it is beyond their unassistend capacity to live through these issues• They, in fact, expressly define their spiritual-carnal human condition as a double-bind. They are unjustified by anything except faith. They are saved by nothing else than Divine Mercy and Grace (Laing and Esterson, 1970:180).

CL I E N T - C E N T R E D C O U N S E L L I N G 111

Two consequences follow from this comparison. Firstly, Laing and Esterson's study is too narrow in looking at the double-bind exclusively in terms of family life and not in the wider social structure more generally. Secondly, that contradiction/paradox/dilemma/conflict/tragic vision in the structure of ideology as homologous to contradiction/paradox/dilemma/ conflict/tragic vision in the social structure applies in non-schizophrenic cases also, in this particular case Pascal's.

The striking similarity between the two theses however is religious faith as salvation from the 'tragic vision'/ 'double-bind'. It seems feasible that lack of commitment may account, to a certain extent, for mental 'ill'-health. Though commitment need not be only religious commitment.

(ii) This discussion of consistency leads nicely into the problem of the connection between experience and behaviour. Here, again, Rogers thinks that the connection between self-conception and behaviour should be given in terms of consistency. We need only ask 'whose definition of consistency?'. Although it may appear that we are taking criticism to extreme as living in a common culture we possess similar notions of consistency, we should also remember that the people we are to counsel are the very ones who may not share that definition. They may be presented for therapy because they are no longer capable of taking part in shared 'rational' processes. Madness in its many historical forms has been associated with irrationality (see, for example, Foucault, 1973). Furthermore, this same connection can be criticised on another level. Although, for example, I hold certain views and beliefs I do not always act on them; I may feel too tired or just at that moment cannot be bothered to act on an idea, yet all the time I feel that I should. Or alternatively, I may do something I would rather not do simply to please someone else. Rogers' connection between self-conceptions and behaviour, although he claims that there are exceptions, is still, I think, too strong. I, for one, find it difficult to live up to.

III

So far we have been concerned with showing that Rogers" concept of experience and the connection between this experience and behaviour falls victim to certain theoretical and pragmatic difficulties. The centrality that he grants to the internal frame of reference in counselling approach can also be shown to be problematic ('The best vantage point for understanding behaviour is from the internal frame of reference of the individual himself', P 7). This will be achieved by scrutinising the conception of interpretation that it presupposes.


Gellner (1970) raises a dilemma in the practice of interpretation by analys- ing the problem of the impact of theological doctrines on the emergence of economic rationality:

Is one merely to take what the recorded theological text says and explicitly recommends? In that case, the connection seems very tenuous. Or is one to take what the text says and interpret its meaning, for the people influenced by it, in the light of what they actually did? In that case, the explanation of behaviour in terms of doctrine risk becoming vacuous and circular (Gellner, 1970: 19).

This is parallel to problems involved in Rogerian counselling. Does the counsellor take what the client says and explicitly recommends (if anything)

literally? I f this is the case the task of the counsellor is empty. Or does he or she take what the client actually says and interpret its meaning in the light of what they actually do? In this case the explanation of behaviour in terms of beliefs, ideas, etc. risks becoming circular.

Any attempt to find a middle way between the two sides of this dilemma will flounder for Rogers. He would need a point of contact between the internal frames of reference of the counsellor and the client and this, I have already argued, his theory lacks. This dilemma throws doubt on the internal frame of reference as a mode of departure in counselling technique. It may, of course, be worth holding onto as a counselling technique in the absence of success with others, there are serious doubts about it being the counselling technique.

IV

Until now we have been looking at Rogers' theory in terms of itself, that is, by taking up his own central concepts - experience, consistency, reality - and showing how they are inadequate in terms of the internal frame of reference. We then looked at the internal frame of reference and found that it too was inadequate by resting on an unfortunate dilemma. We are now in a position to take up his general epistemological stance in an at tempt to scrutinise this in the light of the theoretical position it led him to. In Client-centred therapy (Chapter 11) his general epistemological position is unclear. It is, however, closest to a phenomenological one on the basis on his own comment: 'This theory is basically phenomenological in character, and relies heavily on the concept of the self as an explanatory construct ' (Rogers, 1951: 532). In the later essay 'Toward a science o f the person' (1964) he provides no less than three epistemologies: 'objective knowing', 'subjective knowing' and 'interpersonal knowing or phenomenological knowledge'. As the internal frame of

CLIENT-CENTRED COUNSELLING l 13

reference is placed at the centre of the third of these, as it was in his earlier theory of understanding, we appear to be at liberty to assume that the two phenomenological approaches are compatible; and that the later essay does indeed provide the missing epistemological stance of the former essay. Fur- ther comments can, therefore, be limited to the later essay.

I now intend to show that Rogers' conceptions of'objective knowing' and 'subjective knowing' are incompatible with his third position of 'interpersonal knowing or phenomenological knowledge' if this is amended into a serious phenomenological position. (By 'serious phenomenological position' I mean going back to the roots of phenomenology to Husserl's conception, at least in so far as using it for a point of departure.) Their compatibility, as they stand, rests on the possibility of incorporating the third position into the two former positions without relevant residue. From the resultant position we will attempt to show that Rogers' dichotomous 'objective knowing' and 'subjective knowing' is a non-phenomenological position. In doing this we will, in the same movement, show that when theories become separated from their philosophical root they all too easily fall victim to unnoticed, and sometimes unacceptable, presuppositions.

'Interpersonal knowing.. . ' falls, Rogers thinks, somewhere between the other two types of knowledge in a logical continuum. This epistemological position is 'phenomenological' because it is concerned with understanding the phenomenological field of the Other. Its procedure consists in my forming hypotheses about you and using whatever skills and empathic understanding are available in attempting to get to your 'private world of meanings' in order to check the correctness of my hypotheses. This procedure presupposes a rigid distinction between subjects, and reflects the rigid distinction drawn between subject and object with one important difference - the subject can confirm or deny the hypothesis constructed by the Counsellor him or herself. This exception can still nonetheless be subsumed under the subject/object dichotomy. For a reason best known to himself, Rogers places the members of a reference group under the 'objective' form of knowing for the purposes of hypothesis testing. If they fall under the category of 'objective knowing' then surely the client in the counselling situation can also; they are, after all, all people.

Now that the three theories of epistemology have been shown to be compatible because they are in fact only two (a dichotomy), we are in a position to explain how, if he had adopted a serious phenomenological stance, the compatibility of the three positions would have been at least questionable.


V

Husserl, who is entitled to be called the father of modern philosophical phenomenology, had the idea that all knowledge should be grounded on inscrutable foundations. He was looking for presuppositionless knowledge. 5 This led him to develop a rigorous methodology. One of the aims of this method was the search for presuppositions in any theoretical position. If we apply this method to Rogers' theoretical stance we find the subject/object dichotomy and the stress placed on the individual subject as the location for knowledge.

Presuppositions are not of course criticisms, but in this case they limit the scope of enquiry by hiding other positions.

Husserl himself was criticised by his pupil Heidegger for making presuppositions in his own epistemological position. Certain aspects of Heidegger's philosophy have found use already in other disciplines, in particular, the concept of 'Angst' (which has been translated, in different places, as both 'anxiety' and 'dread') has been employed in existential psychiatry. There is no need to enter into that here except in a special sense.

Moods, or states-of mind, have a special significance for Heidegger. They reveal aspects of being human that cannot be reached through consciousness alone. States-of-mind are an essential feature of being human. He thinks that we, as individuals, are never without a mood.

We have merely established that consciousness and emotive states are aspects of being human. This in no way goes against Rogers' theory of experience. If, however, the theory of states-of-mind is taken to its logical conclusion it poses problems for the epistemological practice of understanding internal frames of reference. If I am never without a mood then this mood becomes part of my construction of your internal frame of reference. A positivist would try to eradicate the mood seeing it as a problematic; but if Heidegger is right that we are never without a mood then this would be ridiculous. Any attempt by me, in my current state-of-mind, to construct your internal frame of reference is going to say as much about me as it does about you. Furthermore, the state-of-mind will not distort the way things 'really' are, it will reveal the way things are in that particular state-of-mind. I can never do better than approximate to your internal frame of reference, and the closeness of this approximation will depend on how I understand it in a particular state-of-mind.

Even if Rogers could provide a point of contact between the internal frames of reference of the counsellor and the client (which we argued earlier he would find it difficult) andavoid Gellner's dilemma, the notion of an epistemological practice (that of understanding internal frames of reference) becomes con-

CLIENT-CENTRED COUNSELLING 1 15

siderably more complicated when emotive states are added. The internal frame of reference can, however, be shown to be unessential in counselling practice.

The brief outline provided here of the importance of states-of-mind in Being and time raises problems for the concepts of truth and reality. If we cannot be in a position to discover 'objective' truth how does the theory of moods have validity? The problem posed like this is difficult to answer. We might provide a solution by amending our conception of 'objective' truth. In fact, by adopting Heidegger's conception of truth. The theory of states-of-mind is true in so far as it has been 'brought to light'. 6

The following discussion of truth will hopefully make things clearer. This will not be simply an academic exercise as it will be shown how Heidegger's theory of truth can be utilised in counselling situations. Language is granted a centrality in the establishment of truth, and this reflects the importance of the medium of language in counselling situations.

Heidegger's conception of truth cannot be understood in the same way that we think of something as true in everyday circumstances. It does not work in the same way. In everyday situations we tend to think of something as true if it is not in contradiction to something else. A table is truly a table because I perceive it as a table; this perception is reinforced through other people agreeing with me that it is truly a table. (This is the position Rogers adopts.) Being true, for Heidegger, has little to do with correspondence, or with agreement, it is essentially to make something 'unhidden', that is to reveal its existence. It is, therefore, an activity which we carry out in everyday life. As an activity it should not be thought of as a peculiar way of looking at the world which we have to go about learning. We are, in everyday life, responsible for revealing and obscuring dimensions of the world about us and of the dimensions of the people we encounter simply by using language. The uncovering of the truth of one existent can, however, obscure not only the truth of another existent but also of a whole universe of existents in one and the same movement. This may be clarified with an example: the traditional title 'chairman' might hide the possibility of the chairman being a woman, or that the job of chairman is even open to women. Truth and falsity are not opposites in this theory of truth, the genuine opposites are the~ revealed and the hidden. Through talking to each other we reveal and hide possibilities of our own existence and of the existence of the people we address or discuss.

This version of truth has a double significance in counselling situations. Firstly, it acknowledges that a person is not a simple entity with a clearly defined identity that can be manipulated into a consistent relationship with itself by a counsellor. A person may have dimensions (i.e. possible ways of existing) that have never been revealed, either to him or herself or to anyone


else. This leads to its second significance. A counsellor may become aware o f

how interaction, th rough the medium o f language, reveals and obscures. He or she may deliberately a t tempt to bring to light dimensions o f the client o f

which he or she m a y be only dimly aware. Whilst the counsellor is deliberately at tempting to do this we need to remember that the movement o f revealing

and obscuring is still cont inuing th rough the language used by the client. The

process o f revealing and hiding will always be working f rom both directions

(in a two-person situation). A ground of meaning will thus be intersubjec- tively constructed in a client-centred situation th rough the medium of language. Both parties take par t in the establishment o f horizons o f meaning and unders tanding in that part icular situation. Sense is no longer produced by

the individual alone, ( though o f course sense as a product o f perceptual

relation between subject and material object must, to some extent, be re- tained). Sense is also a social activity that is established th rough talking to

each other. The implications for the concept o f reality o f the preceding notes can now

be taken up. We have come some distance f rom the not ion o f reality being

exclusively the relationship between subject and object, Our adopt ion o f

Heidegger 's theory o f t ruth and the implications that followed f rom this make any not ion o f reality difficult to defend. I f possibilities o f existence are hidden from view but are always available for uncovering, then it is difficult to decide

how the horizons o f 'reality ' may be defined. The crucial question is - do we need to define them? The simple answer to this is - no.

To have faith in the Reality of the 'external world', whether rightly or wrongly; to 'prove' this Reality'for it, whether adequately or inadequately; to presuppose it, whether explicity or not - attempts such as these which have not mastered their own basis with full transparency, presuppose a subject which is proximally worldless or unsure of its world, and which must, at bottom, first assure itself of a world (Heidegger, 1962: 250).

Reality, as Heidegger notes, only comes to be seen as a problem if it is looked at in certain ways. The problem of reality arises by presupposing two fundamental distinctions, the subject/object dichotomy and the separation of one individual from another. If the subject is taken to be worldless then the problem of reality can arise. If the subject is already in a world it does not; and if the subject is already in a world along with other people then neither distinction is presupposed. The traditional problem of reality has been by- passed. We therefore propose no model for it. 7

'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?' - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life (O241) (Wittgenstein, 1972).

CLIENT-CENTRED COUNSELLING 1 17

VI

In conclusion: We aimed at a critique of Rogers' theories of experience and counselling. This took us in various directions. In the process we established how certain positions would also fall foul of the criticisms fired at him. This has not, however, been a completely nihilistic enterprise as we found two

approaches that do not flounder under the same difficulties. On the one hand, by showing how Goldmann's and Laing and Esterson's theses relate structure

of beliefs to social situations, thus avoiding Gellner's dilemma. On the other hand, we tried to show that strands of thought from Heidegger may provide a useful counselling approach. (Heidegger's understanding of understanding allows him also to bypass Gellner's dilemma.)

Neither approach is claimed to be a final solution. Both - I think - deserve attention. This outline has been a sketch of two possible approaches rather than a positive directive for action.

We may leave the final word but one to Rogers:

Whatever approximations to the truth we are able to achieve in the behavioral sciences will not come automatically through following one approach to knowledge (Rogers, 1964: 117).

But some approximations are closer to the truth than others.

NOTES

1. In dismissing 'absolute reality' he would seem, by implication, to deny also the possibility of objective truth. If this is the case he reduces his own theory to absurdity - it is only by keeping a concept of objective truth that this can avoid the problems of relativism.

I fully realise that relativism still has many disciples, and of course the question of what type of relativism is left open, but if we are to understand each other at all it appears necessary to hold onto certain concepts as universal, e.g. the concept of negation and the concept of contradiction that follows from this. I am not arguing for a given apriori reality to which we must all subscribe; merely that the problem of reality is more problematic than Rogers acknowledges. The difference between 'absolute reality' and my reality as the perceptual relations between subject and object is not the simple either~or that Rogers seem to presuppose.

2. Hegel is concerned in this instance with self-consciousness in a universal sense. I am claiming, nonetheless, that this argument can be transposed to the level of the individual self-consciousness.

3. The approach adopted by Rogers in attempting to understand the internal frame of reference of the client raises similar problems to those of the anthropologist in attempting to understand the workings of an alien culture without bringing his/her own presuppositions to bear on the situation. In fact, Rogers, by placing the internal frame of reference at the centre of his counselling position allows us to point the problems encountered in cross-cultural understanding directly at the practice involved in understanding the internal frame of reference of another


person by simply translating the collectivity of the alien society (as a set of beliefs, ideas, etc.) into the you of the client (as a set of beliefs, ideas, etc.).

4. See, for example, Maclntyre (1970) for a discussion of the problems involved in understanding these apparent contradicitions. Cf. Levi-Strauss (1969).

5. Presuppositionlessness has been called the greatest presupposition. We are not insisting on presuppositionlessness as a fundamental premise here, merely the weaker thesis that it is important to know where~ and in what form, presuppositions are located.

6. This can be checked on the level of the individual knowing subject. Through a process of reflection I can reeognise and sometimes change my own mood of the moment. Heidegger's theory of states-of-mind accords with my own reflexive experience.

7. It is not being suggested that the term 'reality' is eradicated from the English language, merely that we should not waste time looking for a solution to theproblem of reality. 'Ordinary reality' and 'non-ordinary reality' differ in ways of understanding (in the setting up of horizons in which understanding takes place) rather than on the level of 'reality' itself. The later Wittgenstein holds a similar position.

REFERENCES

Foucault, M. (1973). Madness and civilization: A historv of insanity in the age of reason. New York: Vintage Books.

Gellner, E. (1970). Concepts and society. In B.R. Wilson (Ed.), Rationality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Goldmann, L. (1964). The hidden God. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967). Thephenomenology of mind. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Husserl, E. (1962). Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. New York: Collier Books. Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Evanston:

Northwestern University Press. Laing, R.D., and Esterson, A. (1970). Sanity, madness and the family. Harmondsworth: Pelican. Levi-Strauss, C. (1969). Totemism. Harmondsworth: Pelican. Maclntyre, A. (1970). Is understanding religion compatible with believing? In B.R. Wilson (Ed.),

Rationality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Rogers, C.R. ( 1951). Client-centred therapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Rogers, C.R. (1964).Toward a science of the person. In W.T., Wann (Ed.), Behaviourism and

phenomenology: Contrasting bases for modern psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wilson, B.R. (Ed.) (1970). Rationality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1972). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

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Client-centred counselling — An interdisciplinary examination