-
8/9/2019 Clausewitz Condensed
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T
he
w
ritin
g
s of
arl
v
on
C
lause
w
it
z
continue to attract con
si
d
era
b
le a
tt
e
nt
io
n
from
th
ose
w
i
th
a
n
i
nt
eres
t
i
n th
e
p
rofess io
n
of
arms. Thi
e
arti
c
l
e
la
y
s
o
ut th
e f
ram
e
w
o
rk
fo
r an und
e
rstand
i
ng
of t
h
e importa
n
ce of O
n ar
.
Th
e a
u
t
h
or ex tracts from t
h
at
w
or
k th
e
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
th
o
ughts
of
C
la
us
e
w
i
tz th
a
t
are
st
ill rele
v
a
nt
t
o co
n
t
e
mp
o
r
a
r
y
s
t
r
a
t
e
gi
s
t
s
,
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
t
h
e
m
wi
t
h
e
di
t
o
r
i
a
l
co
m
m
e
nt
a
nd
li
sts
a fe
w
ca
v
ea
ts
co
n
cer
n
i
ng
i
nt
er
p
re
t
a
t
io
n.
on ense
-
8/9/2019 Clausewitz Condensed
2/10
SE
Z O ESE
I
L
I
TAR st
r
ategy may be clas~
si
f
i
e
d as l
y
in
g be twee
n
two oD
p
o
si
t
e endp
o
in
t
s r ~epe
ct
rum
.
On
o
~e
e
n
d fies tbe st
r
ategy w
h
ic
h
idolizee i
n
di
vi
du
al
hum
a
n
co
ur
age a
nd
skill
p
e
rh
a
p
s
be
s
t exe
mpli
f
i
e
d
by
m
e
di
ev
a
f
o
us
t
in
g.
On
the
o
ther end lies the strategy whi
c
h seeks
to
r
ed
u
ce t
h
e elem e
n
ts of wa
r
to
nu
mbe
r
s
rmd
q
uan
tifie
d ana
lysis.
Th
e se
ar
c
h
fo
r a
s
o
phisti
c
ated military strategy sh
o
uld
co
n
fi
n
e itself to t
h
e middle g
r
o
un
d to a
p
e
r
s
p
ective w
h
ic
h r
ecog
n
izes t
h
e esse
n
t
iall
y
human na
t
ur
e of
war and
yet
is s
o
b
er en
o
ugh t
o c
al
c
ulate the hard
co
ld
facts.
T
h
e e
x
t
e
n
t t
o
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e ide
a
s
of
K
ar
l
v
o
n Clausewi
t
z endure
to
day
in an era
of
s
u
pe
r
comp
u
te
r
s
adva
n
ced
nu
clea
r
wea
p
o
ur
y a
nd
Sta
r
a
r
s
d
efe
n
ee
pr
o
ect
s
a
ttee
ls
tot
h
e
su
cce
ss
o
r his s
y
s
te
m
ati
c
attem pt t
o
des
c
ri
b
e war
s universal
dy
n
amics. T
h
e impo
r
ta
n
ce of Cla
u
sewitz
to t
h
e co
n
te
mp
o
r
a
r
y US
d
efe
n
se
d
ebate is
his adm
o
ni
t
i
o
n agains
t t
he perni
c
i
o
us
tendency to tilt towa
r
d the pu
r
ely quan
tifiable e
nd
of t
h
e st
r
ategic e
p
ect
ru
m.
C
l
au
eewit
z
i
an
st
ra
tegy
d
oes
n
ot
d
isc
r
e
d
it
high te
c
hn
o
l
o
gy
b
ut stresees
bo
w little
t
h
e scie
n
tific a
u
d tec
hn
ological
r
evol
u
tio
n
of t
h
e
p
ast 200 yea
r
s
h
as alte
r
e
d
t
h
e
humarr asp
ect of
war
f
ar
e.
It is this
f
undamentallytimeless aspe
c
t
of wa
r
t
h
at most st
r
ikes t
h
e mode
rn
r
ea
d
e
r
of Cla
u
sewitzs O
n
War
.
Cla
u
se
wi
t
z views warm
o
re as an ar
t t
hmr ae
c
i
en
c
e. One
c
an n
o
m
o
re establish a rigid
m
a
nu
a
f fo
r
co
mb
a
t
C
l
a
us
e
w
i
t
z
t
h
i
nks
.
t
han
o
n
e c
an d
efi
n
e st
r
ict
pr
i
n
ci
p
les fo
r
great painting
. V
ar
like nrt
is
c
reative
n
ot im itative. A so
un
d t
h
eo
r
y of wa
r
t
h
e
r
efo
r
e
h
as to acco
mm
o
d
ate c
h
a
n
ge
and
f
l
ex
i
b
ili
ty.
Clau
eew
i
t
z a
tte
mp
t
s
to
d
o
this
b
y distilling
b
asi
c
elements and
b
r
o
ad
patte
rn
s of wa
r
f
r
om t
h
e
r
eco
r
d of g
r
eat
Na
p
oleo
n
ic battles a
nd
co
mm
a
nd
e
r
s i
n
wa
ye t
ha
t
will
be
app li
c
a
b
l
e
d
e
spi
te f
u
t
ur
e
changes in the political economic social
legaf a
ud
tec
hn
ological la
nd
sca
p
e.
WARCONTINUESPOLICYBY VIOLENTMEANS
Cla
u
setitz defi
n
ee wa
r
as a
u
act of fo
r
ce
to com
p
el o
ur
e
n
em y to
d
o o
ur
will. O
n
e
et
il
e
n
t
p
o
irr
te
m
e
r
g
irr
g f
r
o
m On arii
t
h
e
p
o
liti
c
al purp
o
se
of f
ighting
. A
rmed
co
m
bat Cla
u
sewitz a
r
g
u
es i s o
n
ly t
h
e mea
n
e
to
a p
olitic
a
l e
nd
wit
h
o
u
t w
h
ic
h
w
ar
be
co
mes
p
o
in
t
less and dev
o
id
of
sense
.
Cla
u
sewitz
r
epeatedly statee t
h
at wa
r
is
n
o
t
t
in
g b
u
t t
h
e co
n
t
inu
a
t
i
o
n
of
p
o
li
cy
wi
th
o
th
er
m
ea
ns. Th
e
r
efo
r
e w
ar
sh
o
uld n
o
t
b
e rem
o
ved
f
r
o
m its p
o
liti
c
al
co
n
text
we
a
lso wa
nt t
o
m
a
k
e i
t
clear
th
a
t
war
in it
s
e
l
f
d
oe
s
n
o
t
s
u
s
p
e
nd p
o
liti
ca
l in
te
r
cou
r
s
e o
r
chan
g
e it into
s
o
m
ethin
g
en
tirely
d
iffere
n
t
. n
e
ss
e
n
tial
s
t
h
at i
n
ter
co
u
r
s
e co
nt
i
nu
e
s,
irre
sp
ec
t
ive of
th
e
m
ean
s
it e
m
ploy
s
. The
m
ain line
s
r+
lon
g
which
m
ilitary event
s
progre
ss
, and to
w
h
ic
h th
ey are re
stn
c
t
e
d
are poli
t
ical
lin
e
s
th
a
t
co
ntinu
e
th
ro
u
g
h
o
ut th
e war
in
to the
s
ub
s
equent peace . How could it be
ot
h
erwi
s
e?Do political relatio
ns b
etwee
n
p
eo
p
le
s
a
nd b
e
t
wee
n th
eir gover
nm
e
nts
s
top
w
hen diplo
m
a
tic note
s
ar
e no lon
g
e
r
exchanged?
s
not war
u
s
t another ex
pre
ss
io
n
of
th
eir
th
o
u
g
hts,
a
n
o
th
er for
m
of
s
p
ee c
h
or wr
itin
g?
t
s
gra
mm
ar
, ind
ee
d,
m
ay be it
s
oun, but not it
s
logic.
TRIADOFGOVERNMENT ARMEO
SERVICESANDPEOPLE
T
h
e close i
n
te
r
play be twee
n
politics a
n
d
milita
r
y affai
r
s s
u
ggests a seco
nd
co
n
cl
u
sio
nr
e
a
c
h
e
d
by
C
l
au
sewit
z
nam
ely t
ha
t
war is waged
b
y a
rem arka
b
le trinity
of
41
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Y
EVE
th
e g
o
ve
rn
me
nt
a
r
me
d
se
r
vi
c
es s
nd p
e
op
le
.
A t
heory
t
ha
t
ignores anyone of
t
hem
o
r
see
k
s
t
o fix
an arb
i
trar
y
r
el
at
io
n
s
h
ip
be
t
ween
t
hem would conflic
t
wi
t
h reali
t
y
t
o
s
u
c
h
a
n
ex
t
e
n
t t
h
at
fo
r
t
h
i
s
r
e
as
o
n
alone i
t
would be
t
o
t
ally useless .
T
h
e g
o
ve
rn
me
n
t esta
b
lis
h
es t
h
e
po
lit
icaf purpose the rnifitary provides the
mea
n
s
for
a
ch
ievi
n
g t
h
e
pof
iti
c
e
f
e
nd
a
nd
thepeople provide the will the engines
of .
we
r.
AH
t
hr
ee a
r
e i
nd
is
p
e
n
sa
b
le legs
of
Clausewitz
s strategic triad.
C
I
a
u
sewi
t
z
t
akes s
p
e
c
is
f not
e
of th
e
symbiotic relationship be tween strategy
a
nd
state
cr
a
f
t
.
N
o
t
on
ly m
u
st milita
r
y
le
a
d
e
r
s
pr
o
s
e
c
u
t
e
t
h
e
wa
r
b
u
t t
h
e
y
m
u
s
t
rd
s
o r
emem
b
e
r th
e
po
li
t
i
c
a
f
e
nd for
w
h
i
ch
it is be ing waged the difference be tween
e
nd
s a
nd
mea
n
s a
nd b
etwee
n
ta
c
ti
c
e a
nd
strategy
f
w
e
d
o
n
o
t
le
arn t
o
r
e
gard a war, and
t
he separa
t
e campaigns of which i
t
is com
pose
d a
s
a
c
ha
i
n
of li
nk
e
d
e
ngag
eme
nt
s
each leading to the next, but instead suc
c
u
m
b t
o
th
e i
d
ea
th
a
t th
e cap
tur
e of ce
r
tain geographical points or the seizure of
und
efe
nd
e
d
p
r
o
vi
n
ce
s a
r
e
of
va
l
u
e i
n
the
m
selves we are liable to regard them
as
w
i
nd
fall p
r
of i
t
s
. n
so
d
oi
ng,
a
nd
i
n,
i
~
non
ng
t
he fac
t t
ha
t t
hey are links in a con
t
i
nu
o
u
s c
h
ai
n
of e
u
e
nt
s
,
we also i
gn
o
r
e
th
e
poss ibility that their poss ess ion may later
lea
d t
o
d
ef i
n
i
t
e
d
isa
d
va
nt
a
g
es
. Th
is m is
take is illustrated again and again in m ili
t
a
r
y
h
is
t
o
r
y
.
Hence
a
t the
s
u
mmi
t of power the d
is
tin
c
ti
o
n be tween strategy an
d
statesman
s
h
i
p c
a
n no
l
onger be d
is
cerned . U
l
t
ima
te
ly what the strategist has wrought must
be udged on po
li
t
i
c
sl
not
mili
t
a
ry ter
ms
.
The telling criterion of Clausewitz
s work
ho
w
e
v
er
is
ho
w
effect
iv
e
ly
he h
as
u
s
ed
available means to accom
p
lish
d
esire
d
e
nd
s
A pr
i
nc
e
or
a ge
n
e
r
al
c
a
n b
es
t
dem onstrate his genius by managing a
c
am
p
aig
n
exa
ct
ly
to
s
u
i
t h
is
ob
e
ct
ives
a
nd h
is
r
es
ourc
es
do
i
n
g
n
ei
th
e
r too
m
uch
nor too little .
ROLEOFPOLITICALLEAOEiS
Policymakers Shape Military Strategy
Clausewitz illustrates how political
lea
d
e
r
s a
nd
t
h
ei
r po
li
c
ies
c
a
n h
ave a
pro
found i
m
pact on the operational conduct
of
a wa
r. H
e s
u
ms
up
t
h
e
proc
ess as
foflows
N
o on
e s
tart
s
a war
o
rrath
e
r, n
o o
n
e i
n
h
i
s s
e
n
s
e
s
o
ugh
t t
o
d
o
s
o
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
f
i
r
st
b
ei
ng
cle
ar
i
n h
is m i
nd what h
e i
nt
e
nd
s
t
o
achieve by
t
ha
t
war and how he in
t
ends
t
o
co
ndu
c
t
i
t. Th
e fo
r
m e
r
is i
t
s poli
t
ic
a
l p
ur
pose;
t
he la
tt
er i
t
s opera
t
ional obec
t
iue.
Th
is is
th
e
g
ove
rn
i
ng
p
r
i
n
ciple
wh
ic
h w
ill
se
t
i
t
s course, prescnbe
t
he scale of means
and
effo
rt wh
ic
h
is
r
e
qu
i
r
e
d, and
m
ak
e i
t
s
influence fel
t t
hroughou
t
dou~n
t
o
t
he
sm
a
lles
t
ope
rat
io
na
l
d
e
ta
il
.
Policymakers Should Grasp Military Affairs
Give
n
t
h
e im
p
a
c
t
of po
li
c
y
on
st
r
ategy
pofiticef le
a
ders
m
ust co
m
bine st
a
tes
ma
n
shi
p
with st
r
ategy ust as milita
r
y
le
a
ders need to possess
a
n underst
a
nding
of
nati
o
nal
po
li
c
y.
et hist
or
y is
r
e
p
lete
with ex
am
ples Cl
a
usewitz showe us of
po
liti
c
ians making e
rro
ne
o
us milit~y
deci
s
ion
s
pri
ma
rily bec
a
u
s
e they l
a
cked
a
s
o
li
d
gr
o
un
d
ing in the military means at
their disposef
Only if s
t
a
t
esm e
n
loo
k t
o ce
rt
ai
n
m ilitary moves and actions to produce ef
fec
t
s
th
a
t
a
r
e fo
r
ei
gn t
o
th
ei
r n
a
tur
e
d
o
political dec
isi
on
s
inffuence operations for
th
e wo
r
se
. n th
e same way as a ma
n
w
h
o
has not fully mastered a foreign language
some
t
imes fails
t
o exp
r
ess
h
imself co
r
rectly, so statesm en of ten issue orders
42
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SE Z O ESE
th
a
t defe
a
t thepu
r
po
s
e they
ar
e
m
e
a
nt to
s
e
r
ve. Ti
m
e and again that ha
s
happened
w
h
ic
h d
e
m
o
ns
trate
s
t
h
at a certai
n
gra
s
p
of
m
ili
t
ary affair
s
i
s
vi
t
al for
th
o
s
e i
n
cha
rg
e of
g
ene
r
al policy .
Amo
n
g ot
h
e
r
t
h
i
n
gs Cla
u
sewitz s
u
g
gests
p
olicy
m
ake
r
s
m
si
n
tsi
n d
ilige
n
t co
n
sul
t
a
t
i
o
n wi
t
h
c
hie
f
mili
t
ary
off
i
c
ials
.
ROLEOF MILITARY LEADERS
Political Leaders Are Paramount
Be
c
ause p
o
li
c
y is the guiding in
tellige
n
ce a
n
d wa
r
o
n
ly t
h
e i
n
st
ru
me
n
t
Cla
u
sewitz a
r
g
u
es t
h
at
n
o ot
h
e
r
p
o
ssi
b
ili
t
y exis
t
s
t
hen
t
han
to
su
bo
r
dinatekhe milita
r
y p
o
int
of
view t
o
the
p
olitical. 10
th
e a
ss
er
t
io
n th
a
t
a
m
aor
m
ili
t
ary
develop
m
ent, o
r
the pl
a
n fo
r
one,
s
hould
be a
m
atter for p
ur
ely milita
r
y opinion i
s
un
accep
t
a
b
le a
nd
ca
n b
e
d
a
m
agi
n
g
. N
or
ind
ee
d i
s
it
s
e
n
s
ibl
e
t
o
s
u
mm
o
n
s
o
ldi
er
s
,
a
s m
any
g
ove
r
n
m
ent
s
do when they a
r
e
pla
nn
i
n
g a war
,
a
nd
a
sk
t
h
e
m
for purely
mili
t
ary advi
c
e
.
In
f
a
c
t
Clausewitz writes
N
o
ma
o
r
pr
o
p
osal
r
eq
u
i
r
e
d
fo
r
wa
r
ca
n
be wo
r
ke
d
o
u
t
in i
g
n
o
ran
ce of
p
o
li
t
i
c
al
f
a
cto
rs
. .2
M
o
re
o
ver
the p
o
liti
c
al purp
o
se
and
h
e
n
ce t
h
e political leade
r
s
h
ip m
u
st dete
r
m
i
n
e t
h
e i
n
te
n
sity
and
le
n
gt
h
of
an
y co
n
f
li
ct
Sin
ce
w
a
r
i
s
n
o
t
a
n
a
c
t
of
s
e
n
s
e
l
e
ss
pa
s
s
io
n bu
t i
s
co
n
trolle
d b
y it
s
political o
b
ec
t, th
e v
alu
e of
th
i
s
o
b
ec
t must d
e
t
er
m
ine the
s
a
c
r
ifice
s
to be
m
a
de f it ii
mag
n
it
u
de and al
s
o in d
ur
atio
n
. Once the
expe
nd
i
tu
re of effor
t
excee
ds th
e v
a
l
u
e of
th
e
p
o
liti
ca
l
o
b
ec
t, th
e o
b
ec
t
m
u
s
t b
e re
naunced and peace
m
u
s
t follow
Military Leaders Should Help Shape Policy
h
ile t
h
e t
hru
st of O
n
r
is di
r
ected
pr
i
m
a
r
ily at t
h
e
pr
i
m
acy of
p
olicy C
I
a
u
se
wi
t
z
n
o
ne
t
heless
co
n
t
ends
t
ha
t
mili
ta
r
y leade
r
s s
h
o
u
ld
n
ot be s
u
bect to t
h
e
ca
pr
icio
u
s
n
ess of some gove
r
m
n
e
n
t
p
Oli
c
i
e
s
f
w
e keep in
m
ind th
a
t.
war
s
p
r
in
g
s
fro
m s
o
m
e political purpo
s
e, it i
s
natural
t
h
at t
h
e pri
m
e ca
us
e of it
s
ex i
s
te
n
ce will
re
m
a
in th
e
s
up
re
m
e co
n
s
id
era
ti
o
n in
co
n
du
c
t
in
g
i
t. T
h
a
t,
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
d
oe
s
n
o
t
i
m
p
l
y
that the political ai
m
i
s
a tyrant.
t
m
u
s
t
a
d
ap
t
i
ts
elf
t
o i
ts
c
h
o
s
e
n m
ea
ns,
a proce
ss
w
hich c
a
n
ra
dic
a
lly ch
a
n
g
e it; yet the
politicalim re
m
ain
s
the fir
s
t con
s
ider
s
tion.4
H
e
n
ce w
h
ile t
h
e st
a
tes
m
~
mu
st
r
et
a
i
n
au
t
h
o
ri
t
y
o
ver
t
he general
o
r admiral
t
he
latte
r
s
h
o
u
ld i
n
Cla
u
sewitzs mi
n
d be i
n
a
p
ositio
n
to i
n
fl
u
e
n
ce tbe fo
r
me
r
.
1985 43
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CONOUCTOFWAR
Theory ISa Guide
In the the
o
ry
of
war
Clausewitz says
t
h
e
r
e ca
n
be
n
o p
r
esc
r
iptive fo
r
m
u
latio
n
un
ive
r
sal e
n
o
u
g
h
to
d
ese
r
ve t
h
e
n
a
m
e of
law
. . . .5
He
c
i
t
es
t
hree reas
o
ns why a
the
o
r
y
of
wa
r
c
ann
o
t be sube
c
ted to rigid
scie
n
tific p
r
i
n
ciples
e
In
fo
rma
t
i
o
n is su
b
ect
i
ve
and n
ot
f
ixed in war
.
e
M
o
r
el a
n
d psyc
h
ological fo
r
ces a
r
e
i
n
te
r
twi
n
e
d
wit
h ph
ysical fo
r
ces.
.
ar
co
nsis
t
s n
ot of
unila
t
eral
b
u
t
re
c
ipr
oc
al a
c
ti
o
n and thus
o
ne
c
an never
be s
ur
e of w
h
at t
h
e e
n
em y will do.
M
o
r
eove
r
m
ost t
h
eo
r
ists
u
s
ua
fly
ar
e
guil
t
y
of
a
t
leas
t o
ne
of t
he
fo
ll
o
wing three
flaw
s
, acco
r
di
n
g to Cla
u
sewitx
e A
n
impe
r
missible
u
se of ce
r
tai
n
narr
ow syste
m
s
a
s fo
rmal
bo
di
es of
la
w.
This pseud
o
s
c
ienti
f
i
c
appr
o
a
c
h
of
ten at
t
em p
t
s
to use
el
a
b
o
r
a
t
e
s
c
ie
n
t
i
f
i
c
g
u
i
d
el i
n
es as if t
h
ey we
r
e a ki
nd
of t
ru
t
h
ma
c
hin
e e
d
e
spi
te tbe f
a
ct t
ha
t c
harr
ce
c
ann
o
t
b
e
q
uanti
f
ied
.
e Ove
ru
se of a
r
go
n
tec
hn
icalities a
nd
m
eta
ph
o
r
s w
h
e
r
e
at
ti
m
es t
h
e a
nrd
yst
n
o
l
o
nger krr
o
we us
t
wha
t
he is
t
hinking and
s
oo
thes him sel
f
with
o
bs
c
u
r
e ideas whi
c
h
wo
u
l
d n
ot eatisfy
h
im if ex
pr
esse
d
i
n p
lai
n
s
p
eec
h
.
e M isuee and a
b
use
of
hist
o
ri
c
al ex
amples. He
r
e t
h
e a
n
alyst d
r
ags i
n
a
n
alogies f
r
o
m r
e
m
ote ti
m
es a
nd p
laces
us
t to
sh
o
w
off
his
e
rudi
t
i
o
n
p
e
rhaps
with
o
ut re
co
gnizing the dissimilarities
.
T
h
e effect is to dist
r
act smd co
n
f
u
se
o
n
es
ud
g
m
e
n
t wit
h
o
u
t
pr
ovi
n
g a
n
y
t
hin
g.18
n sum the
o
ry eb
o
uld adhere t
o
simple
te
r
ms a
n
d st
r
aig
h
tfo
r
wa
r
d obse
r
vatio
n
s
of t
h
e co
ndu
ct of w
ar
i t
mu
st
a
voi
d
44
ap
oc
r
yphal
c
laim s based
o
n pseud
o
s
c
ien
tific fo
r
m
u
las a
nd h
isto
r
ical com
p
e
n
dium
s
and i
t
mu
st
a
bove
all
n
eve
r
fo
r
get
the hum rm element
the m
o
ra
f fo
r
c
ee
of
wa
r.
P
i
t
y
t
h
e
t
h
e
o
r
y
w
ri
t
e
s
C
l
a
us
witz t
h
at co
n
flcts wit
h r
easo
n
Friction of War
ve
r
yt
h
i
n
g i
n
w
ar
is ve
r
y si
mp
le
Clausewitz n
o
tes
b
ut the simplest thing
is diffic
u
lt. 2
In
wa
r
mo
r
e t
h
a
n
a
n
yw
h
e
r
e else tbi
n
ge
d
o
n
ot t
urn
o
u
t as
w
e ex
p
ect.
N
e
ar
by t
h
ey
d
o
n
ot
app
e
ar as
they did
f
r
o
m a distan
c
e.
M
o
re
o
ver
eve
r
y fa
u
lt a
n
d exagge
r
atio
n
of [a]
t
h
eo
r
y ie i
n
st
an
tly ex
p
ose
d
i
n
w
ar
.
Clausewi
t
z
t
erms
f
ri
ct
i
o
n
t
he
o
nly
co
n
cept t
h
at mo
r
e o
r
less co
rr
espo
n
ds to
t
h
e facto
r
s t
h
at
d
isti
n
g
u
is
h r
eal wa
r
f
r
om
war
o
n pap
e
r
. 2
ri
c
ti
o
n is
c
aused mainly
b
y the danger
of wa
r
b y wa
r
s dem a
n
di
n
g pbysicaf ef
fo
r
ts
and
by t
h
e
pr
eee
n
ce of
un
cle
ar
i
n
fo
r
ma
t
i
o
n
o
r
t
he
fo
g
of
war
.
irs
t t
he in
t
rin
s
i
c
a
ll
y
d
a
n
g
er
o
us n
a
t
u
re
of
wa
r me
a
ns
t
h
at i
n
a
n
atmos
ph
e
r
e of bloo
d
b
u
lle ts
ad
bo
m
b
s
t
h
e
li
g
h
t of
r
e
as
o
n is
re
f
ra
c
ted in a marmer
q
uite di
ff
erent
f
r
o
m
t
h
at w
h
ic
h
ie
n
o
r
mal i
n
academ ic spec
u
l~
tio
n
. O
n
ly t
h
e exce
p
tio
n
al sol
d
ie
r
kee
p
s
his in
c
isive udgmen
t
in
t
a
ct
during
t
he
beat
of
battle. Se
co
nd physi
c
al e
ffo
rt in
wa
r
aleo
pr
o
du
cee f
r
ictio
n
f
n
o o
n
e
h
a
d th
e rig
ht t
o give
h
i
s
view
s
o
n
m
ilit
ary o
p
era
ti
o
n
s
exce
pt
w
h
e
n h
e
i
s
frozen, or faint fro
m
heat and thir
s
t, or
d
epre
ss
e
d
fro
m
privatio
n
a
nd
fatig
u
e
,
o
b
ec
t
ive a
nd
acc
u
ra
t
e view
s
wo
u
l
d b
e eve
n
r
a
r
e
r
than they a
r
e.4
Cla
u
sewitz
h
e
n
ce
r
em i
n
ds st
r
ategists
n
ot to fo
r
get t
h
e i
mm
e
n
se effect of
physi
c
al e
ffo
r
t
up
o
n
t
he s
o
ldiers engaging
in
co
m
b
at
.
Ambig
u
o
u
s i
n
fo
r
matio
n
i
n
wa
r
is yet a
t
h
i
rd
ele
m
e
n
t w
h
ic
h
Cl
au
sewitz s
a
ys
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SE Z OOESEO
distingnishee rea
f
war
f
r
o
m war in the
o
ry
.
Alt
h
o
u
g
h
st
r
ategist s
h
o
u
ld ga
u
ge pla
n
s
by
pr
obabilities i t is so
m
eti
m
ee i
mp
os
si
b
le
to
d
o
s
o
during war when m
o
s
t
in
telligen
c
e is indeterminate
. . . a ge
n
e
r
al in ti
m
e of u,ar i
s
con
s
tantly
b
o
mb
ar
d
e
d b
y repor
ts b
o
th t
r
u
e a
nd
fal
s
e;
b
y error
s
ar
i
s
in
g fro
m
fear or
n
eg
li
ge
n
ce
o
r
ha
s
tine
ss
; by di
s
obedience bo
r
n of n
ght
or wro
n
g i
n
terpretatio
ns,
of ill will
,
of a
p
ro
p
er or
m
i
s
t
a
k
e
n
s
e
n
s
e of
dut
y
,
of
lazine
ss
, o
r
of exhau
s
tio
r
q and by ac-
cident
s
that nobody could haue fore
s
een.
n sh
or
t, h
e i
s
expo
s
e
d t
o co
unt
le
ss
i
m
p
r
e
ss
ion
s
,
m
o
s
t of the
m
di
s
tu
r
bin
g
, fe
r
u of
t
h
e
m
e
n
co
u
r
a
g
in
g.
6
T
o offset t
h
e f
r
ictio
n
of wa
r
w
h
ic
h
r
e
sul
t
s in
ev
i
t
a
b
l
y f
r
o
m human
f
rail
ty
Clausewitz adv
oc
ates pushing ahead with
all o
n
es
rn
ig
hh
P
e
r
seve
r
a
n
ce i
n th
e c
h
o
s
e
n
co
u
r
s
e i
s th
e
e
ss
e
nt
ial co
unt
erweig
ht, p
rovi
d
e
d th
a
t n
o
co
m
pellin
g r
ea
s
on
s
inte
r
uene to the con
trary. Moreouer, there i
s
hardly a u]orth
w
h
ile e
nt
erpri
s
e i
n
war w
h
o
s
e exec
ut
io
n
doe
s
not c
a
ll fo
r
infinite effo
r
t, t
r
ouble,
andpn
vatiow and a
s m
an under pre
ss
r
s
re
te
nds
to gi
u
e i
n
to p
h
y
s
ical a
nd
i
n
teliec
tu
alw
,
ea
kn
e
ss ,
o
n
lygrea
t st
re
n
g
th
of will
c
a
n le
a
d to the ob
ective. t i
s s
te
a
d
fa
s
tne
ss
that uill earn the ad
m
iration of
th
e worl
d
a
nd
of po
st
eri
t
y
.
Proper Focus for Armed Farce
Th
e
r
e
i
e
n
o b
i
g
h
e
r and simpl
e
r law
of
s
t
r
a
t
e
gy
2
C
l
a
us
e
w
i
t
z
s
ay
s
t
h
a
n
t
o co
n
ce
n
t
r
ate fo
r
ce o
n
t
h
ee
n
em y s weak li
n
k
h
is st
r
ategic ce
n
te
r
of g
r
avity
.
o
n
e
m
ust k
ee
p th
e
d
o
m
i
n
a
nt
c
h
arac
ten
s
tie
s
of both belli
g
e
r
ent
s
in
m
ind.
O
ut
of the
s
e characteri
s
tic
s
a certain center of
gravi
t
y
d
evelop
s, th
e
hub
ofall po
u,
era
nd
m
ove
m
e
nt,
o
n
w
hi
c
h
every
thin
g
d
e
p
e
nd
s
.
That i
s
the point a
g
ain
s
t which all ou
r
energie
s s
hould bedirected.a
Thus
t
h
e t
a
ck
is
to
l
oc
a
te t
h
e
ad
ve
r
sary
s
c
enter
of
gravity whi
c
h might
b
e
h
is capit
r
d
M
S key ally o
r h
is a
r
med
fo
r
ces.
Economy of Force
Cl
o
s
e
l
y co
nn
ecte
d
to t
h
e
id
e
a
of co
n
ce
n
trati
o
n
of fo
r
c
e is the
co
n
c
ept
of
e
co
n
o
my
of fo
r
ce. Cla
u
sewitz
un
de
r
li
n
e t
h
e
n
eed to
e
n
s
ur
e t
ha
t
n
o
p
a
r
t of t
h
e w
h
ole
[
mili
t
ary
] fo
r
c
e is idle
.
S
o
me wri
t
ers
h
ave misi
n
te
r
p
r
eted
h
is
u
se of t
h
e wo
r
d
eco
n
o
m
y to
m
ea
n
eco
n
o
m
izi
n
g
r
at
h
e
r
t
han
t
h
e effect
i
ve
us
e of fo
r
ce.
Claus
e
wi
t
z
m
a
k
e
s
i
t
c
le
a
r
h
o
w
e
v
er
t
h
a
t
em p
h
a
s
i
s
s
h
o
u
ld be placed o
n
t
h
e effective
u
se of
arm
e
d
fo
r
ce
and
t
ha
t
u
lti
ma
tely fo
r
ce
sh
o
uld
co
n
t
inu
o
usly adhere and
co
n
t
ri
b
u
te to t
h
e pofitical p
ur
pose A
n
y
un
n
ecesswy ex
p
e
nd
it
ur
e of ti
m
e eve
r
y
un
n
ece
ssar
y
d
eto
ur
is a was
te of
s
t
r
e
n
gt
h
rmd thus abh
o
rrent t
o
strategi
c
th
o
ught.0
Defense
Defe
n
se is a st
r
o
n
ge
r
fo
r
m of wa
r
fa
r
e
t
h
a
n
offe
n
se Cla
u
sewitz s
r
g
u
es. beca
u
se
i
t
is
e
asi
e
r
to
h
o
ld
g
r
o
und
t
han
t
a
ke
i
t.
I
t
fo
ll
o
ws that de
f
ense is easie
r
than atta
c
k
ass
u
mi
n
g bot
h
sides
h
ave eq
u
al mea
n
s.
In
ot
h
e
r
wo
rd
s
d
efe
n
s
e
h
a
s
a
p
a
ss
i
ve
pu
r
p
o
s
e
p
r
ese
r
vatio
r
x and attack a po
s
itive one
co
n
q
u
est.
Th
e latter i
n
crea
s
e
s
o
n
e
s
ow
n
ca
p
aci
t
y
t
o wage war;
th
e for
m
er
d
oe
s n
o
t.
S
o
. w
e
m
u
st s
a
y
t
h
a
t
t
h
e de
f
e
ns
i
v
e
fo
rm
of wa
r
fa
r
e is i
n
t
r
i
n
sically st
r
o
n
ge
r
t
h
a
n
t
h
e offe
n
sive.
Clausewi
t
z pi
ct
ures de
f
ense n
ot
merely
es passive
b
ut ae
co
nsisting
of
tw
o
parts
t
h
e fi
r
st waiti
n
g fo
r
t
h
e attack a
nd
t
h
e
s
eco
nd
p
e
rr
y
in
g
i
t t
h
e co
un
te
ra
tt
a
ck
S
o
the defen
s
ive fo
r
m
of u,
ar
i
s
not
a
s
i
m
ple
s
hield buta
s
hield
m
ade upofwell
d
irec te
d b
low
s.
Eu
e
n uh
e
n
t
h
e o
n
ly
1985
45
-
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7/10
-
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8/10
SE Z O ESE
general and then at the de
c
isive p
o
int
.
Like ot
h
e
r
s
u
cci
n
ct p
r
i
n
ciples
h
oweve
r
Cla
u
sewitz ca
r
ef
u
lly q
u
alifies t
h
is o
n
e
fo
r
t
o
r
e
du
ce
t
h
e
u
,
h
o
l
e
s
ec
r
e
t
of
t
h
e
a
r
t
of war to t
h
e for
mu
la of
num
erical
.s
rr
p
eriori
t
y at
a
ce
r
t
ain
t
im
e
in a
ce
r
t
ain
pla
c
e
[
is
]
an ove
r
s
i
m
plific
a
tion th
a
t [uill
not
s
tand up fo
r
a
m
o
m
ent again
s
t the
realitie
s
of life
.
[
nd
ee
d
]
. sup
eriori
t
yy of
numb
er
s
i
n
a
g
iven en
g
a
g
e
m
ent L
s
only one of the fac
tor
s
that deter
m
ine
s
victory. Superior
numb
er
s,
far fro
m
co
nt
ri
but
i
n
g every
thin
g
, o
r
euen
a
s
ub
s
t
a
nti
a
l p
ar
t, to vic
to
r
y,
m
ay actually be cont
r
ibuting ve
r
y
little
, d
epe
nd
i
n
g o
n
t
h
e circ
ums
ta
n
ce
s.
Bu
t
sup
e
ri
o
ri
ty v
ari
e
s in d
eg
r
ee .
Thus a signi
f
i
c
ant superi
o
rity in num
be
r
s. will s
u
ffice to ass
ur
e victo
r
y
h
ow
eve
r ad
ve
r
se t
h
e ot
h
e
r
ci
r
c
um
st
an
ces.g
Irrsum
q
uan
t
i
t
a
t
ive superi
o
ri
t
y
m
u
s
t be
r
e
g
a
r
ded a
s
funda
m
en
talto be ac
h
ieve
d
i
n
every ca
s
e a
nd
to
th
e f
u
lle
st
po
ss
i
b
le ex
t
e
nt.
B
u
t
i
t
u
o
uld
b
e
s
e
r
i
o
u
s
l
y
m
i
s
und
e
r
st
a
nd
ing our argu
m
ent, to con
s
ider nu
m
erical
su
perio
n
ty a
s
i
nd
i
s
pe
ns
a
b
le to victory
. . . .4
Surprise
Cl
au
sewitz co
n
te
nd
e t
ha
t s
urpr
ise is of
m
o
re use
to t
a
ct
i
c
s
t
han s
t
ra
t
egy
t i
s s
till
m
o
r
e i
m
po
r
tant to
r
e
m
e
m
be
r
t
h
at al
m
o
s
t t
h
eo
n
lya
du
a
n
tageof t
h
e at
t
ac
k
re
sts
o
n
i
ts
i
n
i
t
ial
su
r
p
ri
s
e
.
S
p
ee
d
a
nd i
m
petu
s
ar
e it
s s
t
r
on
g
e
s
t ele
m
ent
s
and are u
s
ually indi
s
pen
s
able if u,e are to
d
efea
t th
e e
n
e
m
y
.
hile surprise
is m
o
re
o
r less
b
asi
c to
all ope
r
atio
n
s it is also somew
h
at ove
r
r
ate
d
i f o
n
ly beca
u
se it is
d
iffic
u
lt to
a
c
h
ieve i
n pra
ctice
B
ut
w
hile the
w
i
s
h to
a
chieue
s
u
r
p
r
i
s
e i
s
co
mm
on and, indeed, indi
s
pen
s
able, and
w
h
ile it i
s
tr
u
e t
h
at it will
n
ever
h
e co
m
p
le
t
ely i
n
effec
t
ive
,
i
t
i
s
e
qu
ally
t
r
u
e
th
a
t
by it
s
ve
r
y natu
r
e
s
u
r
pn
s
e can
r
a
r
ely be
o
u
tsta
nd
i
n
gly
su
cce
ss
f
u
l. it wo
u
l
d
be a
m
i
st
a
k
e
, th
erefore
, t
o regar
d su
rpri
s
e a
s
a
k
ey e
l
e
m
e
n
t
of
s
u
cce
ss
in
w
a
r
. T
h
e
p
r
in
c
i
ple i
s
highly attractive in theory, but in
prac
t
ice i
t
i
s
of
t
e
n h
el
d u
p
b
y
th
e fric
t
io
n
of
th
e w
h
ole
m
ac
h
i
n
e
.
g
Morale and Will
Clausewitz sees war as an insepara
b
le
ma
rr
iage of p
h
ysicaf a
n
d immate
r
ial o
r
m
o
r
al fo
r
ces s
u
c
h
as will b
u
t fo
r h
i
m
t
he m
o
ral
fo
r
c
es are m
o
re
f
undamen
t
al
to
wa
r
.
I
n his w
o
r
ds ighting. . . is a t
r
ial
of mo
r
el a
nd ph
ysical fo
r
ces t
hr
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
m
e
dium
of t
h
e
la
tte
r
.
Th
e
ph
y
si
c
al
f
a
c
t
o
rs eeem little m
o
re then the w
oo
den
h
ilt w
h
ile t
h
e mo
r
al facto
r
s a
r
e t
h
e
pr
ecio
u
s
m
etef t
h
e
r
ee l wea
p
o
n
t
h
e
f
inely
h
o
ned
b
lade
. 51
ur
t
herm
o
re
i
f
mo
r
ef fo
r
ces a
r
e the ultimate dete
r
min
a
n
t of wa
r
i t t
h
e
n
follows t
h
at t
h
e
d
est
ru
ctio
n
of t
h
e e
n
e
m
ys will to
r
esist
sh
o
u
ld be
t
h
e prim
a
r
y
t
a
r
g
e
t
i
n
a
n
y
co
n
flict. Battle is t
h
e bloodiest sol
u
tio
n
obse
r
ves Cla
u
sewitz b
u
t it s
h
o
u
l
d
be co
n
sid
e
r
e
d an a
ct
aim
e
d a
t
killin
g . . t
h
e
enem ys spirit
[
rather
]
than his
me
n
.
e
Imp
o
r
t
an
ce of
M ili
t
ar
y
M
o
ral
e.
Claueewi
t
z s
t
resses
t
he im p
o
r
t
an
c
e
of
mo
r
ale a
n
d wilf fo
r
bot
h
t
h
e soldie
r
a
n
d
t
h
e comma
nd
e
r
.
Th
e sol
d
le
r
s fi
r
st
r
e
q
uir
e
m
e
n
t
is m
o
r
ef
and ph
y
si
c
al
co
ura
ge
bo
th the a
cc
eptan
c
e
of
resp
o
nsi
b
ility and
t
h
e s
u
pp
r
essio
n
of fea
r
.
In
o
r
de
r
to s
ur
vive t
h
e
h
o
rr
o
r
of co
m
b
a
t
h
e
mu
st
ha
ve
en invin
c
i
b
le mar
t
ia
f
spiri
t
whi
c
h
c
an
b
e
attai
n
ed o
n
ly t
hr
o
u
g
h rn
ilit a
r
y victo
r
y
a
nd h
a
rd
s
h
i
p
. T
h
e sol
d
ie
r h
as b
u
t o
n
e
pur
p
o
s
e
The end fo
r w
hich
a
s
oldie
r
i
s
r
ec
r
uited,
clothed a
r
m
ed, and t
r
ained the whole ob
ec t of
h
i
s s
leepi
n
g
,
eati
n
g
, d
ri
nk
i
n
g
,
a
nd
1985
47
-
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9/10
ma
rching i
s s
impl
y th
a
t h
e
sh
o
u
ld fi
ght
a
t
t
he ri
g
h
t
pla
c
e and
t
he ri
g
h
t t
ime.
In
o
rder t
o
penetrate the
p
sy
c
h
o
l
o
g
i
c
al
fo
g
of
w
ar th
e co
mmand
e
r
fo
r
e
m
o
s
t r
e
q
u
i
r
e
s s
o
un
d
u
d
g
me
nt
. C
l
aus
e
w
i
t
z
de
s
c
r
i
b
e
s th
i
s
a
s
a
n
i
ntu
i
t
io
n r
oo
t
e
d
i
n
e
x
p
e
r
ie
n
ce a
nd s
o
b
e
r
calc
u
la
t
io
n
a
nd d
e
t
e
r
mi
n
a
t
io
n s
o
th
a
t h
e
n
o
t w
a
v
e
r
f
r
om
h
i
s
deci
s
io
ns
n the dre
a
dful
p
re
s
ence of
s
uffering
and da~ger, e
m
otion can ea
s
ily ouer
wh
el
m
i
nt
ellec
tua
l co
nu
ic
t
io
a, and
i
n th
i
s
p
s
yc
h
olo
g
ic
a
l fo
g
i
t
i
s s
o
hard t
o fo
rm
cle
ar and
co
mp
le
t
e i
ns
i
ghts that
c
hang
e
s
of
u
ie
w b
eco
m
e
m
o
r
e
und
e
rs
t
andab
le
and
exc
u
sab
l
e
.
A
c
t
i
o
n
c
a
n n
e
w
e
r
b
e
bas
e
d
o
n
a
nythin
g
fi
rm
e
r
th
a
n in
s
tinct,
a s
en
s
in
g
of
the truth.
T
o
be
s
ure
t
he
co
mmander ale
o
need
s t
o
be b
o
ld b ut
Th
e
h
i
gh
e
r u
p
th
e c
ha
i
n
of co
mmand
th
e
gr
e
at
e
r
i
s th
e
n
ee
d
fo
r b
ol
dn
e
ss t
o
b
e
supp
o
r
te
d b
y
a r
eflec ti
v
e
m
i
nd, s
o t
ha
t
boldne
ss
doe
s
not de
g
ene
ra
te into
p
u
r
p
o
s
ele
ss
bu
rs
t
s
of blind
pass
ion.
T
h
e
s
e a
ttr
i
but
e
s
fo
r
m mili
t
a
ry g
e
niu
s
w
hi
c
h i
s
th
e
inquin
ng rath
e
r than th
e c
r
e
ativ
e
m
i
nd, th
e co
m
p
r
e
h
e
ns
i
v
e
rath
e
r than th
e
sp
ec i
a
li
z
e
d app r
o
a
c
h, th
e c
a
l
m rath
e
r than
t
h
e excit
ab
le
h
e
ad
to
wh
ic
h
i
n war w
e
w
ould choo
s
e to ent
r
u
s
t the f
a
te of ou
r
b
r
othe
rs a
nd child
r
en,
a
nd the
sa
fety
a
nd
honor of our country. 5
e Imp
o
r
t
an
c
e
of
P
o
li
t
i
c
al ill . ill
al
s
o
pla
ys
a
k
e
y
p
o
liti
c
al r
o
le in
C
l
a
u
s
e
w
i
t
z
s
c
a
l
c
u
l
u
s
of
w
a
r
.
A
s
t
h
e
arm
e
d s
e
rv
ice
s pr
o
v
i
d
e
th
e
m
e
ans
fo
r war
th
o
s
e mea
ns
m
ust n
o
t b
e
d
i
v
e
rt
e
d
f
r
om
th
ei
r pr
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d p
oli
t
ical
purp
o
s
e
O
nce it h
as
been dete
rm
ined, f
r
o
m
the
p
olitic
a
l condition
s
, wh
a
t
a
w
a
r i
s m
e
a
nt
to achieue and what it can achie
v
e, it i
s
e
a
s
y
t
o c
hart th
e co
ur
s
e
. But gr
e
at
str
e
ngth
of c
hara
c
t
e
r, as w
ell
as gr
e
at
l
u
ci
d
i
t
y
and
fi
rmn
e
ss
of
m
i
nd,
i
s r
e
qu
i
r
e
d
in order to follo
w
through
s
te
a
dily, to
carry out the
p
lan, and not to be thrown
O
ff
CO
U
rSQ b
y
th
o
usands
of
d
i
v
e
rs
io
ns. 57
Th
e co
mpl
e
t
e e
x
ec
uti
o
n
of
arm
e
d
fo
r
ce
fo
r
p
o
li
t
i
c
a
l e
n
d
s
i
s
f
ar
m
o
r
e
ar
d
u
o
us than
th
e
m
e
r
e e
st
a
b
li
shm
e
nt
of
th
o
s
e
p
oli
t
icaf
g
oal
s
i
n th
e a
bstr
ac
t.
Cla
u
ee
w
i
t
z
thus
ad
mo
n
i
sh
e
s th
o
s
e
w
i
th
m
u
ddled poli
t
ical
g
oal
s
The fir
s
t, the
s
u
p
re
m
e, the
m
o
s
t ar
reaching act of udg
m
ent that the
s
tate
s
man and
co
mmand
e
r hav
e
t
o
mak
e i
s t
o
e
stab
li
sh . . . th
e
k
i
nd
of
war
o
n wh
ic
h th
ey
ar
e e
mbark
i
ng
;
n
ei
th
e
r m
i
stak
i
ng
i
t
fo
r,
n
o
r
t
r
yi
ng
to t
urn
it i
n
to
, s
o
m
et
h
i
ng
t
ha
t
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CAUTIONARYNOTES
Cla
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w
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ap
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o a
gr
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r
de~ee
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a
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r wr
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s
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n
o
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ting C1au
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rd th
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phys
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n
d i
s st
eeped i
n 18th
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n
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ce
ntury G
e
r
ma
n
p
h
ilo
s
op
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T
h
i
r
d
s
ome
of
On War ha
s
been
o
v
er
t
a
k
en b
y
e
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en
ts
s
u
c
h a
s
the ri
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o i
gn
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ee
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ps b
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i
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ome
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ofe
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d d
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ci
p
le
s
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Cla
us
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w
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z
su
c
h
a
s
Vladimi
r 1.
Le
n
i
n
Leo
n
T
r
o
tsky
a
n
d
th
e P
russ
ia
n G
e
n
e
r
al
S
t
a
ff
ha
v
e
t
ain
t
ed On War
w
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t
h
s
ini
st
er
co
nn
o
tati
o
n
s
.
D
e
s
pit
e
th
e
s
e
pr
o
bl
e
m
s
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
s
o
mu
c
h
of
On War s
ee
ms as t
i
m
el
y t
o
day as
48
August
-
8/9/2019 Clausewitz Condensed
10/10
SE Z O ESE
when it was
f
irst written
.
The
c
hallenge is
t
i
ve
arm
e
d
fo
r
ce
s
t
ha
t
ar
e
a
b
l
e to
win
t
h
e
ir
to
u
se C
I
a
u
sewitze ideas ae ag
u
ide a
n
d
assigned
b
attles with
o
ut l
o
sing sight
. of
n
ot as a b
Iu
e
pr
i
n
t i
n
o
rd
e
r
to co
n
sta
n
tly
t
h
e political p
ur
pose fo
r
w
h
ic
h
t
h
e battles
s
t
ri
ve fo
r
t
h
e ve
rsa
t
il
e eff
i
c
i
e
n
t
and
effec
ar
e bei
n
g w
a
ge
d
.
NOTES
1 Karl 0 C a,ewttz, On War ,d,led and translated by
Mrchael Hmvard and Pete, Pare Pr,nceton Untver, l Pm,,
P,,..,,. NJ ?976 cr75
2 ib o P605
3 IBM ,96 3
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