Civpro Conso Digests

7/28/2019 Civpro Conso Digests

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G.R. No. 108119 January 19, 1994FORTUNE CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

An action for breach of contract was filed by Fortune Corporation against

Inter-Merchants Corporation, before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. Afterrespondent corporation had filed its Answer, petitioner served the former with writteninterrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories wereanswered by respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope.

The pre-trial conference was thereafter scheduled. However, petitioner thenserved upon private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examinationof Juanito A. Teope, in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24

Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/VehementOpposition to Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleginginter alia that : (a) herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery,that is, the written interrogatories which practically covered all the claims,counterclaims and defenses in the case; (b) there is absolutely no sound reason or

justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition; (c) such taking wouldcause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent,

Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr. Teope has no intention of leaving the country; and(e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during thetrial on the merits.

The trial court thereafter issued an order that the requested deposition shallnot be taken. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed anoriginal action for certiorari before the Supreme Court which was referred to theCourt of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits. Ca affirmed theorder of the Regional Trial Court disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of

Juanito S. Teope. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, absent the requisite element of "good cause", a trial court hasunbridled discretion to forbid the taking of deposition upon oral

HELD:

No. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking adeposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by theperson to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in whichthe action is pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition shall notbe taken.

This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that thedeposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the authority to exercisediscretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretionconferred by law is not unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily,capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with thespirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.

Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for goodcause that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of


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good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion.Good cause means a substantial reason - one that affords a legal excuse. Whether ornot substantial reasons exist is for the court to determine, as there is no hard andfast rule for determining the question as to what is meant by the term "for goodcause shown."

The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute good

cause to justify the courts order that his deposition shall not be taken. That thewitness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of awitness may be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot besuccessfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have beenkept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions;restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widestpossible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the facts before the trial.Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a substitute for viva voceexamination may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of the testimony, havingserved its purpose in revealing the facts to the parties before trial, drops out of the

judicial picture.

x x x [U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves thedouble function of a method of discovery - with use on trial not necessarilycontemplated - and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitationsother than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions,while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oraltestimony wherever practicable.

The petition was granted and judgment was rendered ordering the trial courtto allow Fortune Corporation to take the deposition upon oral examination of JuanitoS. Teope.

REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO. 90478)

FACTS:

Private respondents are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of theSandiganbayan. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "forreconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages, "and was avowedlyfiled pursuant to Executive Order No. 14. Tantoco Jr and Santiago filed a MOTION

TOSTRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARSOF OTHER PORTIONS. PCGG filed an opposition thereto and an order bySandiganbayan in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants,gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specificcertain allegations.

Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to fileinterrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. PCGG filed a motion to strike outsaid motion and interrogatories but filed an expanded complaint. Still Tantoco andSantiago reiterated their motion for bill of particulars through a manifestation. SBdenied the motion to strike out for bill of particulars (PCGG) and for leave to fileinterrogatories (Tantoco) holding them to be without legal and factual basis. Itdeclared inter alia the complaint to be sufficiently definite and clear enough, thereare adequate allegations which portray the supposed involvement and/or allegedparticipation of defendant-movants in the transactions described in detail in said


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complaint.

PCGG submitted to pre trial and was subsequently required to file a pre trialbriefs. Tantoco & Santiago filed with SB a pleading for Interrogatories to Plaintiffand Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff as well as Motion for Production andInspection of Documents. SB admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted

Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents .

Motion for Reconsideration by the PCGG, denied. Petition for Certiorari,claiming that SB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of

jurisdiction in granting the two pleadings of Tantoco.

ISSUE:

Is the granting of amended interrogatories and motion for production andinspection of documents allowed?

HELD:

Yes. Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discoveryprovided in the Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties, and production andinspection of documents and things. The ascertainment of all the material andrelevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, andsecond, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the applicationof the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively,definitely and finally. Contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the factsin issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections ofform and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits. It is theduty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue-fully andfairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him,suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit

manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting allthe facts within his knowledge.

Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barestoutline of the factual basis of a party's claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings.

The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, aplain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleadingrelies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mereevidentiary facts.

"The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned bythe parties before the trial. Civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and theRules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism

set forth in Rules 24 to 29. It not only eliminates unessential issue from trials therebyshortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with thecards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurablyincreased.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as adevice, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basicissues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative tothose issues, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before


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trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.

The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimateor evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. discovery of everybit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identityand location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts

themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and locationof any books, documents, or other tangible things. Either party may compel the otherto disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.

Liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the mattersinquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made ingood faith and within the bounds of the law.

Petitioner's first contention that the interrogatories in question aredefective because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they arepropounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the samematters . . (private respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motionfor Bill of Particulars" are untenable and quickly disposed of.

Petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance withRule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained. If the party served withinterrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private corporation or apartnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereofcompetent to testify in its behalf. Interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG,without naming any specific commissioner or officer thereof, is utterly of noconsequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rulestates, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent totestify in its behalf. Bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-calledevidentiary facts.

Interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG'sproof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. A party may . . . call anadverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or privatecorporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, andinterrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects.

G.R. No. 156605 August 28, 2007EDWARD T. MARCELO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCCG) filed a suit ofrecovery of ill-gotten wealth with damages against Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation,represented by its president, Mr. Edward T. Marcelo, in the Sandiganbayan. PCCGclaimed that Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation unlawfully acquired their contract withthe Philippine Navy by taking advantage of their relationship with the Marcoses. Thecontract covered the construction of 55units of 16.46 fiberglass high-speed boats.

PCCGs complaint to the Sandiganbayan was amended thrice, wherein in theirthird amended complaint, PCCG impleaded 2 additional defendants and other 16corporations claiming that said corporations were dummies of the individualdefendants.


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Petitioners filed three separate Motions for Summary Judgement.

Marcelos motion was based on two major arguments that there is no genuineissue of fact or cause of action against him, and Republics failure and continuedrefusal to answer the written interrogatories and reply to the request for admission of

certain facts set forth in its pre-trial brief.

Other petitioner corporations submit their entitlement to a summary judgmenton the same grounds invoked by Marcelo in their own pre-trial brief and they furtherargue that the matters set forth in their written interrogatories are deemedestablished, more particularly the following: that they are not parties or signatoriesto the contract and neither involved in obtaining the PN-MFC contract in question;were not involved in and did not do any act in securing the approval of directpayment for the subject boats, in violation of the stipulation in the contract thatpayment should be made by Confirmed Irrevocable and Divisible Letter of Credit ;did not receive or collect anything from the Republic of the Philippines and there isno document showing they ever received anything; and were not involved in theprocurement of the alleged aforementioned foreign loan.

Sandiganbayan denied the separate Motions for Summary Judgment filed byMarcelo and MFC, as well as the collective motion for summary judgment interposedby the other defending corporations. Subsequently, petitioners motion forreconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion indenying the separate motion for summary judgment filed by the petitioners?

RULING:

Republic of the Philippines through PCCG cannot plausibly evade theconsequences of its failure to answer interrogatories and requests for admission.Failure to answer interrogatories is a good basis for the dismissal of a complaintunless he can justify such failure or refusal.

To ensure the availment of the modes of discovery, the law imposes serioussanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery such as: dismissing the actionor proceeding or part thereof; taking the matters inquired into as established inaccordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow disobedientparty to support or to oppose designated claims of defenses.

Republic of the Philippines through PCCGs failure to respond to MFCsinterrogatories, the Republic veritable conceded the regularity of the PN-MFC

contract, that no wrongdoing was committed and that the separate personality ofMFC was not used for unlawful means to activate the piercing of corporate veilprinciple.

WHEREFORE, Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion indismissing the motion for summary judgment and its decision was reversed and setaside.

G. R. N0. 102390. February 1, 2002REY LAADA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


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FACTS:

The family of the deceased Dr. Hermedez filed a civil case against Nestle,Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, Pacifico Galasao, and PC/Capt. Rey Laada, whereinthey prayed for the award of indemnity, loss of earnings for the deceased , actual

compensation for the destruction of the deceaseds car, moral and exemplarydamages, and attorneys fees. Dr. Hermedez died due to intra-thoraic hemorrhagemassive, which is due to the severe impact of a vehicular accident. The 16-wheelertruck that hit Dr. Hermedez was owned by Jesus Alimango and was driven by PacificoGalasco. The truck was loaded with Nestle products.

The family of the deceased served the defendants a request for admission oftruth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of thedocuments appended thereto through their respective counsel.

Nestle and Santos in their answer to the request of admission, denied liabilityfor the death of Dr. Hermedez by interposing special and affirmative defences thatBelltown Transport Services, their independent trucking and hauling contractor,

should assumed liability since they have an agreement stipulating that. They furtherclaimed that the accident happened in the course of an illegal strike and hence, theproximate cause of Hemedez death was the violent assault by the strikers againstthe truck. They averred that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to impleadUFE, its officers and striking members, as indispensable parties. They alleged furtherthat the incident happened outside of Nestles premises and that when they came toknow about it, they ordered the lifting of the truck by Nestles own forklift. Thedelayed unloading of the cargo from the truck thus rested upon Belltowns sole

judgment. They set up a cross-claim against Galasao in order that he couldreimburse them should they be adjudged liable, and a counterclaim for attorneysfees for what they called an unfounded suit.

The family of the deceased then questioned the validity of the answer to their

request for admission since it was not the parties themselves that answered theirrequest and they further moved to strike the answer. But the trial court denied theirmotion and pushed for the full blown trial on the merit where parties could amplysupport their respective claim.

The family sought for reconsideration on that order and seek for permission toamend the complaint to implead other defendants as indispensable parties. Thelower court denied the omnibus motion except the prayer to amend the complaint. Itstressed that in that particular stage of the proceedings, the court could not make acategorical ruling as to the veracity of the denials made by defendants of certainfacts based on immateriality, irrelevancy or for lack of information until after it hasconsidered in a full blown trial all the evidence presented and pertinent to the issueof the case.

The Hermedez family sought the review of both Orders of the lower court via apetition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals annulled the lowercourts orders and granted the motion to strike the answers in the request foradmission and declared each of the matters to be implied admitted and thusremanded the case to the court a quo for proper proceedings. Hence, thisconsolidated petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:


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Do the parties themselves and not their counsel should personally answer therequest for admission?

Does the answer filed by their counsel in their behalf be considered ashearsay and has to be strike?

RULING:

It was unfair and unreasonable for Hermedez Family to expect that Nestle andSantos to answer the requests for admission that they in fact did not personallyreceived. The failure to serve copies of the request for admission directly upon Nestleand Santos themselves suffices to warrant denial of the motion to strike theresponses made to the request for admission. Moreover, neither there was ashowing that Nestle and Santos did not authorize their respective counsel to file theirrespective answers in their behalf.

Moreover, a party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact alreadyadmitted in his pleading and concerning which there was no issue nor should be

required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to thecomplaint.

A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate theallegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevantevidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with therequest, whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Therule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended to expedite trial and to relieveparties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truthof which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Thus, if the request foradmission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in thepleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.

Hermedez familys unwittingly caused the delay of the disposition of the caseby moving into a request for admission that only achieved nothing but further delayin the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari areGRANTED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1991 is SETASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of Laguna is ordered to proceed with dispatch inthe resolution of Civil Case.

G.R. No. 153667, August 11, 2005AYALA LAND, INC. vs. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE

FACTS:

ASB Reality Corporation alleged that E.M. Ramos and Sons (EMRASON)entered into a Letter Agreement with ASB for the conditional sale of sixty-fivepercent (65%) of the land located in Dasmarias, Cavite City, for a consideration ofPhp 400,000,000.00 payable in five installments. ASB, received a letter from thechildren of Emerito Ramos, Sr., informing them that, they entered into a Contract toSell said real estate properties with Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI). ASB confirmed the contractof the Ramos children with ALI when it found out that the same was annotated on the

Transfer Certificates of Title of the real estate properties in dispute. ASB filed a


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complaint before the trial court. ALI, filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaimand Cross-claim.

Plaintiff ASB subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to take the testimony bydeposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., ASB then obtained thedeposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., on six different occasions.

ALI filed a "Motion to Resolve Objections (In deposition proceedings with OmnibusMotion)" on the propriety, admissibility and conformity of the deposition proceedingsto the Rules. The trial court, cancelled the cross-examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr.

The trial court again directed that the cross-examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., bescheduled. ALI filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the date set becancelled and re-scheduled to another date. The trial court reset the hearing.

Emerito Ramos, Sr. died at the age of 92 years old. Plaintiff then filed beforethe trial court a motion to introduce in evidence his deposition. The motion wasopposed by ALI. ASB filed its Reply. ALI thereafter filed its Rejoinder and ASB its Sur-rejoinder. The trial court issued its Order setting aside the opposition of ALI andadmitting in evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos, Sr. ALI again elevated thecase to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of

Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. ALI filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwhich was opposed by private respondents ASB and EMRASON. The motion wasdenied in a resolution, hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not, the alleged deposition of the witness Emerito M. Ramos, Sr. isadmissible under the Rules.

RULING:

It must be noted that the depositions of Emerito Ramos, Sr., taken on thedates earlier mentioned, were substantially made in accordance with therequirements of the Rules. In fact, in its Petition before the Court of Appeals, ALIconfirmed the taking of deposition on said dates and that it was duly represented byits counsel during the proceedings. As to whether the manner by which thedeposition was taken faithfully complied with the requirements under the Rules ofCourt, it is not disputed that the deposition was taken inside the courtroom of thetrial court, before the clerk of court. A stenographer was present, tape recorders anda video camera were even utilized to record the proceedings, in the presence of allthe opposing counsels of record including ALIs.

Thus, the requirements that the deposition has to be sealed, examined andsigned by the deponent, and also certified, sealed and signed by the depositionofficer would be, to the mind of the court, already superfluous. Strict compliance withthe formal requirements of Rule 23 would hold true in cases of depositions takenoutside the Court. As intimated earlier, the rules on discovery should not be undulyrestricted; otherwise, the perceived advantage of a liberal discovery procedure inascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.


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It has been repeatedly held that the deposition discovery rules are to beaccorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discoveryis well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and notprivileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law, asin the case at bar.

G.R. No. 145542, June 4, 2004ELENA S. ONG vs. HON. FRANCISCO V. MAZO

FACTS:

Respondents Elvira C. Lanuevo (Lanuevo) and Charito A. Tomilloso (Tomilloso)filed a complaint for damages against petitioner along with Iluminado J. Caramoan(Caramoan) before the Regional Trial Court. The complaint which arose from avehicular accident whereby a bus owned by petitioner and driven by Caramoanallegedly bumped a jeep owned and driven by respondent Lanuevo, with respondent

Tomilloso as her passenger at the time.

After petitioner filed her Answer with Counterclaim, and later a motion to

dismiss the complaint, respondents filed a motion for leave of court to file anamended complaint which was granted. Subsequently, petitioner served writteninterrogatories upon respondents and then she filed a "Manifestation and OmnibusMotion" seeking, among other things, an order from the trial court directingrespondents to answer the interrogatories. Respondents filed their objection to themotion bearing on the written interrogatories.

The trial court denied the motion to compel respondents to answer theinterrogatories upon the ground that it constituted a "fishing expedition" which wouldbe more properly ventilated in a pre-trial conference.

Following petitioners receipt of said Order, she filed a motion for

reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration was denied. After her receipt of theaforesaid Order, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition captioned as"Petition for Certiorari" assailing the above twin orders of the trial court as havingbeen issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.

By the now assailed Resolution, the appellate court dismissed petitionersPetition for Certiorari on the ground that it was belatedly filed. Petitioner moved toreconsider the appellate courts dismissal of her petition, arguing that what was filedwas a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not anappeal, which special civil action was timely brought within the 60-day reglementaryperiod. By Resolution, the appellate court denied petitioners motion forreconsideration.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the availment of written interrogatories was proper.

RULING:


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The appeal is impressed with merit.

This Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availment of thevarious modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of theRevised Rules of Court. Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, it held:

. . . Indeed it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before thetrial if not indeed even before the pre-trial should discover or informthemselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known tothem individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words,the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; andthe Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discoverymechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.

The thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes ofdiscovery depositions, interrogatories and requests for admissions without muchcourt intervention since leave of court is not necessary to put into motion suchmodes after an answer to the complaint has been served. The rationale behind therecognition accorded the modes of discovery is that they enable a party to discover

the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitate an amicable settlement orexpedite the trial of the case.

Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories answeredby his opponent, as what the trial court did, on the premise that the interrogatorieswere a "fishing expedition," is to disregard the categorical pronouncement inaforementioned case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry offishing expedition can no longer provide a reason to prevent a party from inquiringinto the facts underlying the opposing partys case through the discovery procedures.

Rule 23

G.R. No. 155010, August 16, 2004JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC.vs.Spouses SUHARTO MANGUDADATU and MIRIAM SANGKI MANGUDADATU

FACTS:

Respondents-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with theRegional Trial Court a Complaint for damages against Petioner Jonathan Landoil

International Co., Inc. (JLI). The petitioner had countered with a Motion to Dismiss;but when this was denied, it filed its Answer. The parties submitted their respectivePre-trial Briefs. Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner, this led thetrial court to declare it in default. Petitioner received a copy of the RTCs Decision. Itthen filed an Omnibus Motion for a New Trial and Change of Venue. This Motion wasdeemed submitted for resolution but was eventually denied by the trial court.Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motionfor New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.

Its counsels, Attys. Jaime L. Mario, Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro, submitted


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separate withdrawals of appearance. On the same date, the law firm of Ong AbadSantos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplemental to Motion toQuash/Recall Writ of Execution. Petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario andPeligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving theOmnibus Motion for New Trial. On the same day, petitioner received a SheriffsNotice, regarding the public auction sale of its properties. By reason of the immediate

threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA a Petition forProhibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the Resolution of theMotion to Quash. The RTC issued an Order directing respondents to file their writtencomment on the Motion to Quash and scheduled the hearing.

Respondents Vigorous Opposition was served to Petitioner. Then, petitionerpersonally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon OralExamination of Attys. Mario and Peligro. The Deposition was intended to prove thatpetitioner had not received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New

Trial. The deposition-taking proceeded as scheduled before Atty. Ana Peralta-Nazareno, a notary public acting as deposition officer.

Separate Notices were sent by Atty. Nazareno to Attys. Mario and Peligro, aswitnesses, for them to examine the transcript of their testimonies. On the same date,Atty. Nazareno filed via registered mail a Submission to the RTC attaching (1) aCertification that the witnesses had been present and duly sworn to by her; (2) atranscript bearing their signatures, attesting that it was a true record of theirtestimonies; (3) a copy of the Notice to Take Deposition delivered to her; and (4) acopy of the Notice signed by respondents counsel.

During the hearing on the Motion to Quash, petitioner submitted its (1) FormalOffer of Exhibits, together with the documentary exhibits marked during thedeposition-taking; (2) Reply to respondents Vigorous Opposition to the Motion toQuash; and (3) Opposition ad Cautelam to respondents Motion to Strike the Notice to

Take Deposition.

Petitioner received a copy of the RTCs Resolution, denying the Motion toQuash. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari andProhibition, seeking to hold in abeyance the Resolution. Petitioner alleged that sinceit had not received the Order denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to appealhad not yet lapsed. It thus concluded that the judgment, not being final, could not bethe subject of a writ of execution.

The CA issued the assailed Decision denying JLIs Petition. It ruled thatpetitioner could no longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court,since trial had already been terminated. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the taking of the Oral Depositions was proper under the

circumstances.

RULING:

Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or aninterlocutory proceeding, under the circumstances specified hereunder:

Section 4. Use of Depositions. -- At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion oran interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under


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the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present orrepresented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, inaccordance with any one of the following provisions:

(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting orimpeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness;

(b) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the depositionwas an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation,partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for anypurpose;

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any partyfor any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witnessresides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trialor hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence wasprocured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable toattend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that theparty offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of thewitness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptionalcircumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with dueregard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in opencourt, to allow the deposition to be used; and

(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse partymay require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, andany party may introduce any other parts.

The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-citedSection 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila residedbeyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offeredthe depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for thepurpose of proving that the trial courts Decision was not yet final. As previouslyexplained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition canstill be properly taken.

The RTC did not totally disregard petitioners depositions. The trial courtconsidered and weighed -- against all other evidence -- that its Order denying theMotion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latterscounsels. Despite their depositions, petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denialof receipt.

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP. vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION ANDDEVELOPMENT CORP.(G.R. No. 147143; March 10, 2006)

FACTS:

Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint forspecific performance and damages with the RTC of Makati against Hyatt IndustrialManufacturing Corporation (Hyatt) claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation totransfer 40% of the pro indiviso share of a real property in Makati in favor of LCDCdespite LCDCs full payment of the purchase price of P2,634,000.00; and that Hyattfailed to develop the said property in a joint venture, despite LCDCs payment of 40%


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of the pre-construction cost. LCDC filed amended complaints impleading PrincetonDevelopment Corporation (Princeton) and Yu He Ching (Yu) President of Hyatt asadditional defendants claiming that Hyatt sold the subject property to Princeton infraud of LCDC and alleging that LCDC paid the purchase price of P2, 634,000.00 toHyatt through Yu.

LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, AccountOfficer of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy, FinanceOfficer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of Manuel Ley, President ofLCDC, while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of Manuel and Janet Ley.

The RTC ordered the deposition-taking to proceed.

However, at the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy, Hyatt and Yu prayed thatall settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set instead, contendingthat the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case. The RTC agreedand on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place.

LCDC moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied due to the followingreasons 1) said depositions will only delay the early termination of the case; 2) hadthe Court set the case for pre-trial conference and trial thereafter, the case wouldhave been terminated earlier; 3) what the parties would like to elicit from theirdeponents would probably be elicited at the pre-trial conference; 4) no substantialrights of the parties would be prejudiced, if pre-trial conference is held, instead ofdeposition.

On the scheduled date of the pre-trial, LCDC filed an Urgent Motion toSuspend Proceedings Due to Pendency of Petition for Certiorari in the Court ofAppeals (12th Division), which sought to annul the order regarding the cancellation ofthe deposition-taking. RTC denied plaintiffs motion to suspend proceedings and gaveLCDC two (2) options: enter into a pre-trial conference, advising plaintiff that what itwould like to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial conference;and, terminate the pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on.

The pre-trial proceeded as scheduled and with the refusal of LCDC to enterinto pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton moved to declare LCDC non-suited which theRTC granted.

For LCDCs failure to enter into pre-trial conference without any valid reasonthe complaint and the counterclaims were dismissed by the RTC.

LCDC filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied compelling itfile an appeal with CA (7th Division).

CAs 12th Division denied LCDCs petition for certiorari declaring that thegranting of the petition and setting aside of the RTC Orders are manifestly pointlessconsidering that the complaint itself had already been dismissed.

Meanwhile CAs 7th Division finds the appeal meritorious and remanded thecase to the RTC for further hearing and to proceed with the deposition taking.

Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration whichthe CA denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:


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Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and orderthe deposition-taking to proceed.RULING:

No. A deposition should be allowed; absent any showing that taking it would

prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of aparty to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into areotherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith andwithin the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual

judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanorcould be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just,speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it istaken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of courtif summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has beensubmitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists(Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The rules on discovery should not be undulyrestricted; otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertainingthe truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.

Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.--- By leave ofcourt after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or overproperty which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after ananswer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party ornot, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oralexamination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses maybe compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. Thedeposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave ofcourt on such terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied).

LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take

depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served, thus, erred incanceling the previously scheduled depositions.

While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if theexamination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass,or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry, or when the inquiry touchesupon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege, suchcircumstances, however are absent in the case at bar.

The taking of depositions would not cause unnecessary duplicity even thoughthe intended deponents shall also be called as witnesses during trial, as explained inFortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals:

The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does notconstitute good cause to justify the courts order that his deposition shallnot be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of thegrounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during thetrial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit thetaking of his deposition.

x x x Under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the


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double function of a method of discovery - with use on trial not necessarilycontemplated - and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, nolimitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the takingof depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions lookingtoward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court held:

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information whichmay be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location ofpersons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves;and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of anybooks, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, the deposition-discoveryrules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can thetime-honored cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude a party frominquiring into the facts underlying his opponents case. Mutual knowledge ofall the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.

To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts hehas in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advancesthe stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial tothe period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.

The trial court erred in forcing LCDC to choose only from the options given by

the trial court and in dismissing the complaint upon LCDCs refusal to choose eitherof the two.

The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions, may not beobtained at the pre-trial conference, as the said deponents are not parties tothe pre-trial conference.

As also pointed out by the CA:x x x To unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial, would defeat the verypurpose for which it is intended, as a pre-trial device. By then, the issues would havebeen confined only on matters defined during pre-trial. The importance of the modesof discovery cannot be gainsaid in this case in view of the nature of the controversyinvolved and the conflicting interest claimed by the parties.

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is tosupplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of disputebetween the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparationfor trial.

Further, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court explained that:

The truth is that evidentiary matters may be inquired into and learned by

the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law thatthe parties - before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial - shoulddiscover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not onlythose known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries;in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on inthe dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through thedeposition- discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experiencein other jurisdictions has been the ample discovery before trial, under properregulation, accomplished one of the most necessary ends of modern


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procedure; it not only eliminates unessential issues from trials therebyshortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game withthe cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial ismeasurably increased.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a

device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify thebasic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the factsrelative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties,consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge ofthe issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carriedon in the dark.

In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of

Elena and Pacita are necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will bedefined at the pre-trial. Without such information before pre-trial, LCDC will beforced to prosecute its case in the dark --- the very situation which the rules ofdiscovery seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less agame of blind mans bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and factsdisclosed to the fullest practicable extent.

Petition is denied for lack of merit.

SALES vs. SABINO

FACTS:

Respondent Cyril A. Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against,among others, herein petitioner Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in theaccident which ultimately caused the death of respondents son. Before anyresponsive pleading could be filed, respondent, as plaintiff a quo, notified thedefendants that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk ofCourt, RTC- Pasig City.

On December 27, 1995 and resumed on January 3, 1996, the deposition onoral examination of Buaneres Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court of Pasig, inthe presence and with the active participation of petitioners counsel, who evenlengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course of trial, respondent had thedeposition of Buaneres Corral marked as her Exhibits DD and EE.

Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, respondent made a FormalOffer of Exhibits, among which are Exhibits DD and EE. Likewise offered inevidence as Exhibit BB is a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting tothe May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral.

Petitioner opposed the admission of Exhs. DD and EE and even asked

that they be expunged from the records on the ground that the jurisdictionalrequirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, werenot complied with.

However, the trial court admitted, among other evidence, respondentsExhibits DD, EE and BB. With his motion for reconsideration having beendenied by the court in its subsequent order, petitioner went on certiorari to the Courtof Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court inadmitting in evidence the deposition in question (Exhibits DD and EE). The


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appellate court upheld the findings of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ARGUMENTS:

It is petitioners posture that none of the above conditions exists in this caseto justify the admission in evidence of respondents Exhibits DD and EE. Hence, it

was error for the appellate court to have upheld the admission thereof by the trialcourt. Petitioner argues that certification from the Bureau of Immigration merelyproves the fact of Corral having left the country on the date therein mentioned. Itdoes not, however, establishes that he has not returned since then and is unavailableto be present in court to personally testify.

Thus, petitioner contends that, while depositions may be used as evidence incourt proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the actualtestimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition isnot to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered duringa trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of thedeponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the requirements of Section 4, Rule 24 (now Section 3) of theRevised Rules of Court were satisfied by the respondent when it presented acertification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent as towhether or not at the time his deposition was offered in evidence is in the Philippines.

Whether or not the petitioner in cross-examining the deponent during thetaking of his deposition waived any and all objections in connection therewith.

RULING:

The petition lacks merit. With regard to the first issue, depositions may beused without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent,provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5)exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23 (nowSection 3), of the Rules of Court. Among these is when the witness is out of thePhilippines.

The trial court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroadwhen the offer of his deposition was made. This factual finding of absence orunavailability of witness to testify deserves respect, having been adequatelysubstantiated. As it were, the certification by the Bureau of Immigration Exh. BB-provides that evidentiary support. It has been said to be customary for courts toaccept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a witness as a predicate to theuse of depositions. Had deponent Buaneres Corral indeed returned to the Philippinessubsequent to his departure, petitioner could have presented evidence to show that

such was the case. As it is, however, the petitioner does not even assert the return asa fact, only offering it as a possibility since no contrary proof had been adduced.

As to the second issue of whether or not petitioner is estopped from objectingto the use of Corrals deposition as part of respondents evidence is really no longerdeterminative of the outcome of the case. Suffice it to state that, as a rule, theinadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the ground that suchtestimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity tocross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. However, the act of


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cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, withoutmore, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence inthe trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition, butobjecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assumeinconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility ofthe deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.

Moreover, Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides that, while errorsand irregularities in depositions as to notice, qualifications of the officer conductingthe deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if notobjected to before or during the taking of the deposition, objections to thecompetency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimonymay be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of thetaking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated at that point.

Lastly, certiorari will not lie against an order admitting or rejecting adeposition in evidence, the remedy being an appeal from the final judgment. For thissingular reason alone, the appellate court could have had already dismissed hereinpetitioners invocation of its certiorari jurisdiction.

JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT and POWER CO., respondents.

FACTS :

JONATHAN CARIAGA was convicted of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT in the

Trial Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

One of the witnesses of prosecution, Ricardo Cariaga did not appear on open court

and presented only sworn statement. The Court of Appeals reasoned out that that

the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in open court during the

criminal proceedings against petitioner is admissible in evidence and properly

considered by the trial court as this was annexed as part of DLPCs position paper

submitted to the National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. RAB-11-05-00308-89, a complaint filed by the accused for illegal dismissal, as an exception to the

hearsay rule under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in admitting in evidence

the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it

violates the fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face

to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariagas sworn statement is not admissible under Section

1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court for failure of the prosecution to comply

with the strict requirements of said rule, to wit:

a] Ricardo Cariaga did not orally testify in the labor case;

b] Inability to testify must be for a grave cause almost amounting to death and the

prosecution must exhaust all available remedies to secure the presence of its

witnesses at the trial;

c] That the former proceeding must also be criminal in nature.

ISSUE :


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WHETHER OR NOT, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga which was

attached to DLPCs position paper in the labor case filed by him against it for illegal

dismissal should be admitted as evidence ?

RULING :

NO. In Toledo, Jr. vs. People, this Court emphasized that the preconditionsset forth in Section 47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by a witness

out of court must be strictly complied with and that there is more reason to adopt

such a strict rule in the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of

evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by Section 47, more

importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right

of an accused person to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face. In Tan vs.

Court of Appeals,[8] it was ruled that unable to testify or for that matter

unavailability, does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did

not appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost

amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It

does not refer to tampering of witnesses.

The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once

and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this

witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private prosecutor

informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, and previously, his wife informed the

sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive

from Davao City. Against this backdrop, can this witness be categorized as one that

cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable or unable to testify. We are

inclined to rule in the negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this point.

It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases,

hence, mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove

inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest. In the

instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy

available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed

fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should

not have been admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer

delve into the other aspects of this rule.

DULAY VS. DULAYG.R. No. 158857November 11, 2005

FACTS:

The instant petition seeks the review of the Decision dated 30 May 2002 andResolution dated 28 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66993entitled Pfeger R. Dulay v. Hon. Alicia B. Gonzales-Decano, etc. and Rodrigo S.Dulay.

In a complaint for recovery of his bank deposit with prayer for a writ ofattachment and damages, Rodrigo S. Dulay, a naturalized American citizen, allegedthat upon his petition sometime in October of 1996, his brother Godofredo S. Dulay,Sr. and nephew Pfeger R. Dulay immigrated to the United States of America. Having


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nurtured affection, love and trust for his nephew Pfeger, Rodrigo opened a trustaccount with the Bank of Boston on 27 January 1997 with a deposit of Two Hundred

Thirty Thousand U.S. Dollars ($230,000.00), naming Pfeger as trustee thereof. Fivemonths later, Pfeger left Rodrigos house allegedly to join his girlfriend in California.Rodrigo learned only later that Pfeger actually went back to the Philippines. Uponknowing this, Rodrigo verified the status of his account with the Bank of Boston, and

to his shock and dismay discovered that Pfeger had already emptied the account.Rodrigo additionally claimed that Pfeger used the money from said account to buyseveral vehicles, loan money to several people, open bank accounts for his siblings,and buy a house and lot and jewelry for his wife. Whatever was left of the accountwas allegedly transferred to Pfegers father, Godofredo

Respondent claimed that the money deposited in the name of Pfeger was hisown money and not Rodrigos.

Rodrigo filed a petition for the issuance of letters rogatory in order to get thedepositions of several witnesses residing abroad. Petitioners, on the other hand,moved to be allowed to file cross-examination questions to respondents writteninterrogatories, which the trial court granted.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the groundof failure to prosecute. This was however denied by the trial court, which insteadallowed Rodrigo to complete his depositions. As it turned out, however, thedepositions could not be taken before the Clerk of Court of Massachusetts, but weretaken instead before a notary public in New York.

Thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion Reiterating Motion to Dismiss DatedJuly 10, 2000, which the trial court denied in its 28 September 2000 Order. In thesame Order, the trial court directed respondent to have the written and crossinterrogatories taken by the notary public authenticated by the consulate. Thus,respondent filed a motion to withdraw the answers so that he could have themauthenticated by a Philippine consul in the United States.

On 10 January 2001, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion, praying that thewritten interrogatories be declared inadmissible and reiterating their prayer for thedismissal of the complaint, which the lower court denied. Anent the objection to theadmission of the answers to the written interrogatories, the trial court stated that thedeposition taken before the Notary Public from New York, whose authority was dulycertified by the Philippine Consul in New York, substantially complied with the Rulesof Court. Thus, on 31 August 2001, the trial court ordered the admission of theassailed documents. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order but themotion was denied.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it refused to dismiss the caseat the trial court level despite respondents failure to prosecute his case with

reasonable diligence

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the documentswere taken in substantial compliance with the directive of the trial court and whetherit is in violation of Sections 11,12, and 14 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

RULING:

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to


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supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of disputebetween the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparationfor trial. It may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained overany defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without suchleave, after an answer has been served. A partys right to avail itself of thisprocedure is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise

relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within thebounds of the law. Nevertheless, the use of discovery procedures is directed to thesound discretion of the trial courts, which, in general, are given wide latitude ingranting motions for discovery in order to enable the parties to prepare for trial orotherwise to settle the controversy prior thereto

Respondent cannot be faulted for the resultant delay brought about by thiscircumstance. Neither can the trial court be faulted for allowing the admission of thedepositions taken not in strict adherence to its original directive, nor for directing thepetitioner to have the depositions authenticated. After all, while a court had theauthority to entertain a discovery request, it is not required to provide judicialassistance thereto. This reality was recognized by the trial court when it orderedrespondent to have the questioned depositions authenticated by the Philippineconsulate. Indeed, refusing the allowance of the depositions in issue would be goingdirectly against the purpose of taking the depositions in the first place, that is, thedisclosure of facts, which are relevant to the proceedings in court.More importantly, the Court finds that respondent substantially complied with therequirements for depositions taken in foreign countries.

In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken: (a) on noticebefore a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, orconsular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer asmay be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) before any personauthorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties. While lettersrogatory are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to officials ofthe issuing jurisdiction.

Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before asecretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consularagent of the Republic of the Philippines and the defendants answer has already beenserved. However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where thePhilippines has no secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent, it may be taken only before such person or officer as maybe appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.

In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification ofthe authority of the notary public who took the questioned depositions. Thedeposition was, in effect, obtained through a commission, and no longer throughletters rogatory. It must be noted that this move was even sanctioned by the trialcourt by virtue of its Order dated 28 September 2000. With the ratification of the

depositions in issue, there is no more impediment to their admissibility.The ends of justice are reached not only through the speedy disposal of cases,

but more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of themerits of the case. The parties right to be given full opportunity to ventilate theircases should not be hindered by a strict adherence to technicalities. After all, as thisCourt has so often enunciated, rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed tohinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. A strictand rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate ratherthan promote substantial justice, must be avoided.


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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Costs againstpetitioners.

SO ORDERED.

American Airlines vs. CA (GR 116044-45, 9 March 2000)

FACTS:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated December 24, 1993rendered by the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases docketed as CA-G.R. SPnos. 30946 and 31452.

Democrito Mendoza purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila conjunctiontickets for ManilaSingapore-Athens-Larnaca-Rome-Turin-Zurich-Geneva-Copenhagen-New York. American Airlines was not a participating airline in any of the segments inthe itinerary under the said conjunction tickets. In Geneva, Mendoza decided toforego his trip to Copenhagen and to go straight to New York and in the absence of adirect flight under his conjunction tickets from Geneva to New York, Mendoza on 7

June 1989 exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a one-wayticket from Geneva to New York from American Airlines. American Airlines issued itsown ticket to Mendoza in Geneva and claimed the value of the unused portion of theconjunction ticket from the IATA clearing house in Geneva.

In September 1989, Mendoza filed an action for damages before the RTC Cebufor the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva Airportwhen American Airlines s security officers prevented him from boarding the plane,detained him for about an hour and allowed him to board the plane only after all theother passengers have boarded. American Airlines filed a motion to dismiss for lackof jurisdiction of Philippine courts to entertain the said proceedings under Art. 28 (1)of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the suitmay be brought in the Philippines under the pool partnership agreement amongthe IATA members, which include Singapore Airlines and American Airlines, whereinthe members act as agents of each other in the issuance of tickets to those who mayneed their services; and that the contract of carriage perfected in Manilabetween Mendoza and Singapore Airlines binds American Airlines as an agent ofSingapore Airlines and considering that American Airlines has a place of business inManila, the third option of the plaintiff under the Warsaw Convention.

The order of denial was elevated to the Court of Appeals which affirmed theruling of the trial court. Hence the petition for review.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the trial court lack jurisdiction under Section 28(1) of theWarsaw Convention in SP no. 30946

Whether or not the trial court is correct in ordering to strike off from therecord the deposition of its security officer taken in Geneva, Switzerland for failure ofthe said security officer to answer the cross interrogatories propounded by Mendoza I


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S.P. no. 31452

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court in CA-GR SP30946, and ordered the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

The Warsaw Convention to which the Republic of the Philippines is a party andwhich has the force and effect of law in this country applies to all internationaltransportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by an aircraft gratuitously orfor hire.[5] As enumerated in the Preamble of the Convention, one of the objectives is"to regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation byair".

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the appellate court in CA-GR SP31452. The deposition of American Airlines security officer is reinstated as part ofthe evidence.

HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG VS. SPOUSES LORENZO AND FLORENTINAPAROCHA ET. ALGR NO. 155483 April 27, 2007

FACTS:

An action for Declaration of Nullity of Document and Title and Recovery ofPossession and Ownership was filed by Petitioners against Spouses Lorenzo andFlorentina Parocha.

Petitioners alleged a share over three (3) properties owned by respondents,which formed part of the estate of petitioners deceased grandparents, Benito andFlorentina Pasag Petitioners averred that their grandparents died intestate, thusleaving behind all their properties to their eight (8) children.

However, Severino, the predecessor of the respondents, claimed and affidavitof self-adjudication that he is the sole, legal, and compulsory heir of Benito andFlorentina Pasag. Thereafter, Severino executed deed of absolute sale over the saidproperties in favor of his daughter.

Petitioners during trial were given ten (10) days to submit their formal offer ofdocumentary exhibits. However, petitioners failed to submit the said pleading withinthe required period. The trial court considered such as a waiver of their right to makea formal offer of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trialcourt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was waiver of the right to make a formal offer ofevidence.

RULING:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Rules of Court provides that thecourt shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. A formal offeris necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their

judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its


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function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which theproponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand it allows opposing parties toexamine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Failure to submit within theconsiderable period of time is considered a waiver.

Parties should obtain, gather, collate, and list all their respective pieces of

evidence-whether testimonial, documentary, or object-even prior to the preliminaryconference before the clerk of court or at the latest before the scheduled pre-trialconference. Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified or marked during the pre-trial proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile. The parties should strictlyadhere to the principle of laying ones cards on the table.

Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidencepresented and exclude the documents not offered. Documents which may have beenidentified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formallyoffered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can suchunrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must bestressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentaryevidence and its formal offer.

Rule 26

[G.R. No. 125383. July 2, 2002.]FORTUNATA N. DUQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Duque filed a complaint before the RTC of Valenzuela alleging that:respondents spouses Enrico and Edna Bonifacio negotiated with her certain checks inexchange for cash in the total amount of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos(P270,000.00); however, upon presentation of the checks on their respective dates ofmaturity, the same were dishonored.

In their Answers, the respondents spouses specifically denied the allegations.Respondents dispute the true amount of their total liability to the respectivepetitioners as alleged in their separate complaints, claiming that "they do not owethat much" to either of them.

The RTC issued a pre-trial order and petitioners filed a Request for Admissionand furnished to counsel for private respondents, specifically requesting that theyadmit that:

1) they negotiated with plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks annexedto the respective complaints;

2) defendant Edna M. Bonifacio signed separate promissory notes dated

November 23, 1987, acknowledging that she is indebted to plaintiff Duque in the sumof Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and to plaintiff ValenzuelaFour Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00), respectively; and

3) the plaintiffs in the two cases sent letters of demand to the defendants bothdated November 28, 1987 which the latter received on December 5, 1987.

Respondents fail to answer to the aforementioned request. The RTC held that"For failure of the defendants to make/submit sworn statement either denying


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specifically the matters of which admission is requested or the reasons why theycannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters as required in Sections 1 and 2of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, upon motion of plaintiffs through counsel, thematters of which admission is requested are considered admitted and ruled in favorof plaintiff.

Dissatisfied, the private respondents went to the Court of Appeals which ruledin favor of respondents on the grounds that, the matters of which admission by theappellants is being sought in the appellees' separate requests for admission are, orpertain to those already denied by the former in their respective Answers to the twoComplaints filed against them; the lower court failed to appreciate the fact that therequests for admission in question were filed in court and not served directly on theappellants, as required in Section 1 of Rule 26; appellant's counsel were servedcopies of said requests.

Hence the petition for review.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the failure of the private respondents to respond to therequest for admission by the petitioners is tantamount to an implied admission underSections 1 and 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court;

Whether or not there was personal service of the request on privaterespondents.

RULING:

The SC upheld the decision of the CA.

Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks to obtain admissions from theadverse party regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant mattersof fact through requests for admission to enable a party to discover the evidence ofthe adverse side thereby facilitating an amicable settlement of the case or expeditingthe trial of the same. However, if the request for admission only serves to delay theproceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for therule will certainly be defeated. In this case, the Supreme Court held that to require anadmission of matters even though they were already denied by the respondentspouses in their Answers would be superfluous. As expounded by this Court in Po vs.Court of Appeals: "A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact alreadyadmitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71A2d, 752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make asecond denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for

admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of therequesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact,or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is toestablish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is,as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, 'pointless, useless' and 'a mereredundancy.'

The Supreme Court further held that the summary judgment rendered by the RTChas no legal basis to support it. The general rule that all notices must be served upon


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counsel and not upon the party cannot apply where the law expressly provides thatnotice must be served upon a definite person. In such cases, service made directlyupon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice bevalid. Consequently, the requests for admission made by petitioners were not validlyserved and therefore, respondent spouses cannot deemed to have admitted the truthof the matters upon which admission were requested.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court ofAppeals.

DBP VS CA

FACTS:

On January 1977, Irene Canadalla obtained a loan on the amount of P 100,

000.00 from DBP. On January 19, 1977, a deed of real estate mortgage over two

parcels of land was executed, covered with TCT no. T- 7609 and OCT n0. P- 4226. On

August 10, 1979, another loan was obtained on the amount of P 150, 000.00 and

secured by the same parcels of land plus a third one covered by OCT no.P-6679.Cadalla, however failed to pay her obligation which prompted DBP to extrajudicially

foreclosed the properties, and sold to them at public auction, evidence with

Certificate of Sale and registered on January 7, 1990.

She redeemed the property covered by TCT no. T- 7609 within one year.

However, the two others which can be redeemed six years from Jan. 17, 1990, were

only subjected for redemption on October 5, 1995 for the amount of P1.5M, but DBP

countered that the redemption price was P 1, 927,729.50. Irene Canadalla assigned

her right to redeem to her daughter Rosalinda Canadalla- Go. Go failed to redeem,

and DBP consolidated its titles to other properties and a new certificates of title wereissued in its name. On July 8, 1996, Go filed before RTC a Supplemental Complaint,to

redeem the foreclosed properties and further filed a Request for Admission by

Adverse Party, after DBP filed its answer but before trial.

During the hearing Go objected to DBPs comment, reasoning that it was not

under oath as required by Sec. 2, Rule 26 of RC, and that it failed to state the reasons

for the admission or denial of the matters.

DBP manifested that:

o The statements, allegations and documents contained in the Request

for Admission as substantially the same as those in the Supplemental

Compliant.


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o They had already been either specifically denied or admitted by the

DBP in its answer

o The reasons for the denial or admission had been specifically stated

therein.

RTC , granted Gos motion. DBP, filed before CA a petition for Certiorari afterits MR was denied, but the same was dismissed by CA for lack of merit. DBPs MRagain was dismissed. Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of RC- which are

mere reiterations of the allegations in the compliant and are specifically denied in the

answer- may be deemed impliedly admitted on the ground that the response thereto

is not under oath.

RULING:

NO.

In the case of Concrete Aggregates Co. vs. CA, where Po Doctrine was

reiterated, SC ruled that where the factual allegations in the complaint are thevery same allegation set forth in the request for admission and havealready been specifically denied or otherwise dealt with in the answer, a

response to the request is no longer required. It becomes, thereforeunnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an unsworn response to the

request for admission. The reason is obvious, a request for admission that merely

reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the

RC which, as a mode of discovery, contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify

and tend to shed light on the truth and falsify of the allegations in the pleading. Rule

26 does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the

pleadings.

Even assuming that a reply to the request is needed, it is undisputed that DBPfiled its Comment either admitting or specifically denying again the matters sought tobe admitted and stating the reasons therefore. That the Comment was not under

oath is not a substantive, but merely a formal, defect which can be excusedin the interest of justice conformably to the well- entrenched doctrine thatall pleadings should be liberally construed as to the substantial justice.Consequently, the DBP cannot be deemed to have impliedly admitted thematters set forth in the Request for Admission for the reason that itsComment was not under oath.

BAY VIEW HOTEL, INC VS. KER & CO. LTD., AND PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO.,LTD


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FACTS:On January, 1958 Bay View Hotel( Bay), the lessee and operator of Manila

Hotel, secured a fidelity guarantee bond for its accountable employees against act

of fraud and dishonesty from Ker & Co, Ltd (Ker). Ker is the Philippine general agent

of Phoenix Assurance Co., ltd (Phoenix) a foreign corporation duly license to do

insurance business in the Philippines. Bays bonded employee, Tomas E. Ablaza,acting his capacity as cashier, incurred a cash shortage and unremitted collections in

the amount of P42, 490.95. Bay then claimed for payment from Ker for the fidelity

guarantee bond however, the latter denied and refused indemnification and

payment. In consequence, on August 30, 1965, Bay filed a complaint against Ker.

In its answer, Ker raised the ff. reasons as its justification for denying the saidclaim:

o Non- compliance with the conditions stipulated in the insurance policy.

o Non- presentation of evidence regarding the various charges of

dishonesty and misrepresentation against Ablaza.

o Non- production of the documents to prove the alleged loss.

o That Ker was merely an agent and as such it was not liable under the

policy.

On June 22, 1966, Ker Request for Admission of the ff. facts:

o On Feb. 14, 1967, the Bay applied to the Phoenix, for a fidelityguarantee bond through a proposal form, true copy of which is

annexed

o Such a policy was actually issued on January 22, 1958, by Phoenix, in

favor of Bay and was renewed from time to time with amendments. A

true copy of the policy as it finally stood at the time of the alleged

defalcation

o This claim was file by Bay, under this policy was denied on behalf of

the Phoenix, by letter dated 8th June, 1965 sent to x C hereof.

Bay failed to answer the Request for Admission within the period prescribed

by the rules. Ker filed a Motion to Dismiss on affirmative Defense- insisting that

under Sec 2 of Rule 26 of RC, Bay was deemed to have impliedly admitted each of

the matters enumerated in the Request for Admission, it followed that the proper

party in interest against whom Bay have a claim was the Phoenix (principal) and not

the agent. Bay then filed an opposition, arguing that the proper remedy is to amend


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and not to dismiss.

On August 1, 1966, Bay then filed a Motion for Leave to Admit AmendedComplaint, impleading therewith Phoenix as party- defendant and in said date, Ker

and Phoenix filed their joint answer to amend the complaint. Ker then filed a Motionfor Summary Judgment on August 4, 1966, which was granted thereby, the courtordered the dismissal of the case on its order November 4, 1966.

ISSUE:

Whether lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion inextending the legal effects, if any, of the Request for Admission filed by Ker toPhoenix which was not a party- defendant at the time said Request was filed and forwhom no similar request was never filed.

RULING:

NO.

Admission is in the nature of evidence and its legal effects were alreadypart of the records of the case and therefore could be availed of by anyparty even by one subsequently impleaded.

The amendment of the complaint per se cannot set aside the legal effects ofthe request for admission since its materiality has not been affected by theamendment. If a fact is admitted to be true at any stage of the proceedings, it is notstricken out through the amendment of the complaint.

To allow a party to alter the legal effects of the request for admission by themere amendment of a pleading would constitute a dangerous and undesirableprecedent.

Rule 27

G.R. No. 164805

SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, NOW KNOWN AS METROPOLITAN BANK ANDTRUST COMPANY

- versus -

GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION

FACTS:

In May and June 1997, Gateway Electronics Corporation (Gateway) obtainedfrom Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) four foreign currency denominated loans tobe used as working capital for its manufacturing operations. The loans were coveredby promissory notes (PNs). Two (out of four) PNs were secured by assignment ofproceeds of Gateways Back-end Services Agreement dated June 25, 2000 withAlliance Semiconductor Corporation (Alliance).


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Gateway failed to comply with its loan obligations, which already amounted toUS$1,975,835.58 by January 31, 2000. After Solidbanks numerous demands to pay,which were not heeded by Gateway, Solidbank filed a Complaint for collection of sumof money against Gateway on February 21, 2000.

On October 11, 2000, on the basis of an information received fr