CHAPTER TWO

AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTIONS

2.1 Accepting the Ministry: Hazards For Congress

The post-election scenario opened up new prospects and possibilities of

alignments .. The two most important questions of the day were: Will Congress accept

office?' Will there be any understanding and cooperation between Congress and

Muslim League?2 Of these, the second question, although resolved along with the first

by July 1937,3 has developed into a major debate among the historians4 which has

survived till today. The absence of a coalition government of Congress and Muslim

League has been generally held responsible for the worsening communal situation

leading to the partition of India. The historical significance of the coalition issue has

found, among the historians, staunch supporters on the one hand and vehement

opponents on the other. 5

1 Abhyuday,1 March 1937; The Leader, 18 February 1937; The Bombay Chronicle, 25 February 1937; and The Daily Telegraph (quoted in The Leader,19 February 1937) among others.

2 The Leader, giving details of a meeting being held in Lucknow between Congress and Muslim League leaders in July 1937, wrote: "Special significance is attached to the discussion between Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman,leader of the Muslim League party, Pt. Govind Vallabh Pant and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad on the eve of the formation of the Congress cabinet in UP and none should be surprised if two Muslim leaders, most likely Nawab Mohammad Ismail, president of the Musiim League Parliamentary Board, and Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman are taken in the Congress fold." The Leader, 18 July 1937.

3 ''Negotiations with the Muslim League fail", declared the Leader, 21 July 1937. Soon afterwards Congress formed a government in UP.

4 The latest contribution to the debate is by Mushirul Hasan in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), India's Partition: Process. Strate~ and Mobilization, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 9-12.

5 Among the believers in the coalition theory, Beni Prasad, Hindu-Muslim Questions, (Allahabad, 1941), pp. 61-62; R. Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India, part two, (Oxford, 1944), pp. 110-112; R.C.Mazumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. III, (Calcutta, 1963), p. 563; Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, (London, 1964), p.15; V.Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain. India. Pakistan, (London, 1967), pp.66-67; B.B.Misra, The Indian Political Parties: An Historical Analysis of Political Behaviour upto 1947, (Delhi, 1976), pp.420-25; Mukul Kesavan, "1937 as a Landmark in the Course of Communal Politics in UP",

77

The two questions were also interrelated. The possibility of Congress-League

alliance was dependent upon Congress deciding to accept office. Although office

acceptance may have seemed, to many, almost inherent in the very decision to contest

elections, yet the Congress propaganda of 'wanting to wreck the constitution' created

doubts. And so, while Haig was quite certain that the local Congress leaders were

desirous of taking office,6 it was quite clear that there were many in UP Congress who

were against Congress taking up office. Nehru's firm opposition to office acceptance

was well known. 7 Purushottam Das Tandon, a prominent Congress leader in UP, had

already expressed himself against Congress accepting ministries on the ground that it

Occasional Paper, Second Series no. XI, 1988, NMML, New Delhi; B.B.Misra, The Unification and Division of India, (Oxford, 1990), pp.318-22; Deepak Pandey, The Role of the Muslim Lea~e in National Politics, (Delhi, 1991), p. 48; Sharif-al-Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation, (Delhi, 1993), p.167; and Mushirul Hasan, India's Partition, pp.9-12 among others.

Among those historians who do not attach a causative value to the coalition theory in the partition of India, S.R.Mehrotra, "The Congress and the Partition of India", and B.R.Nanda, "Nehru, Indian National Congress and the Partition of India, 1937-47" in C.H.Philips and M.D.Wainwright (ed), The Partition of India: Policies and Pers.pectives.l935-47, (London,. 1970), pp. 193-98 and 156-57; S.Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. I, (Oxford, 1976), pp. 223-24; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, (New Delhi, 1977), pp. 114-16; Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, (London, 1959), pp. 231-32; and Bimal Prasad, "Congress Versus the Muslim League", in Sisson and Wolpert (ed), Congress and Indian Nationalism: The Pre-Independence Phase, (New Delhi, 1988) among others.

6 "It is generally assumed here that the local leaders of the Congress will desire to take office .... Everybody assures me that Pt. Govind Vallabh Pant is believed to favor this course." Haig to Linlithgow, 13 February 1937, in P.N.Chopra (ed), Towards Freedom. 1937, (henceforth I.E), (New Delhi, 1985), p. 126, alsop. 144.

7 As a result of office acceptance, Nehru warned, "the big things for which we stand, will fade into the background and petty issues will absorb our attention and we shall lose ourselves in compromises and communal tangles and disillusion with us will spread over the land." In B.R.Nanda, "Nehru, the Indian National Congress and the Partition of India, 1935-47", in Philips and Wainwright (ed), The Partition oflndia, p. 149; also, "We are not out for the spoils of office, but for bigger and vaster things affecting our millions." s:wJN, Vol. 8, p. 57; and "What happens in our villages is of greater significance than what happens inside the legislatures .... Our strength should be increased more by work outside than inside the legislatures." Ibid, p. 59; and, "Acceptance of office under conditions which would tie the hands of the ministers and give them more responsibility than power is futile." .Ibid, p. 73.

78

would necessarily involve cooperation with the British govemment;8 and Madan

Mohan Malaviya considered it a 'sin' to accept office.9 Congress Socialist Party, of

which there were many representatives in UP Congress, had earlier imposed a ban on

its members entering legislatures. 10 And so, in spite of thirty one DCCs having sent

their recommendations in favour of office acceptance (nine against), 11 the UPPCC

opted, in its meeting held at Lucknow on 7 March 1937, for non-acceptance through a

majority ofvotes, with seventy one against office acceptance and forty nine for. 12

From the end of February onwards, the general opinion outside Congress started

veering towards office acceptance. 13 This took many forms ranging from pressure to

persuasion· to ridicule to a fond hope that eventually good sense would prevail on the

Congress leadership and they would enter the legislatures. The Bombay Chronicle

prophesied that the meeting of CWC, to be held in Wardha in early March, would

decide in favor of office acceptance. 14 A letter in the Leader implored Congress to

utilize the new opportunities to the advantage of the country even though the new

constitution was much less liberal than was expected:

... but on the other hand it is equally incorrect to say that under the new reforms the Congress cannot render useful service to the country. It can, by accepting office, stabilize economic equilibrium, spread education, reduce the level of mortality to a lower level, foster industries, multiply the avenues of employment and improve the condition, economic, social and intellectual, of the masses. There is no doubt that all these tasks can

8 Abhyuday, 8 March 1937.

9 1.bid, 22 March 1937.

10 The Pioneer, 17 December 1936.

· 11 The Leader, 14 March 1937.

12 Abhyuday, 15 March 1937.

13 The Leader, 20 February 1937.

14 Editorial in ibid, 26 February 1937.

79

-

be achieved under the new reforms if only the Congress cares to give up its negative politics. 15

Anothe~ letter, a few days later, considered the decision of the UPPCC unfortunate. 16

The Daily Telegraph warned that as a result of the Congressmen refusing office "there

will be spectacle of provinces only Islamic with orderly and proper governments and

others in which the Hindus predominate, wherein there will be obstruction and refusal to

cooperate .... Insistence on absolute non-cooperation is more likely to split the Congress

into its diverse elements than to convince the world that a constitution which proves a

practicable instrument in half the provinces cannot be worked elsewhere."17 The Leader

added the next day, agreeing with Daily Telegraph: " ... as the vast majority of the

supporters of the Congress are Hindus, it may be said with some justification that the

Hindus are lacking in the sense of practical politics and are mere theorists." 18 Haig also

expressed his desire that Congress should form a ministry and offered his support. 19

The number of people interested in Congress accepting office kept on increasing. It

included the British government, the liberals, those interested in constitutional advance20

and presumably most of those who had voted for Congress. Yet at this stage Congress

leadership under left-wing influence appeared determined not to enter office. This

attitude baffled many who wanted to see a Congress government. Between March and

April two developments proved to be of crucial significance in the ultimate decision of

15 Letter to the editor, iliid, 14 February 1937.

16 .Dllil, 15 March 1937.

17 Ibid, 19 February 1937.

18 .lliid, 20 February 1937.

__________ 1_9 L=ett=e=r-"to"'--""-'th=e'-V,_,i=c=er=oy:, 24 M~chJ9..3J_, Haj~ Papers,..RoJl..no._3,~---------------1

20 Sapru had declared that the Congress refusal to form the ministries would be tantamount to shirking responsibility . .IAR, 1937, part I, p. 10.

80

Congress to accept office. First was the resolution of AICC held in New Delhi on 17 and

18 March, authorizing the acceptance of office by Congress, but only on the condition

that "the leader of the Congress party in the legislature is satisfied and is able to state

publicly that the Governor will not use his special power of interference or set aside the

advice of the ministers in regard to constitutional activities."21 This amounted to

asking the Governor to give up or refrain from using his special powers granted to him

by the Constitution. Whether the AICC ·decisio~ was motivated by a real fear of

intervention and misuse of power by the Governor, or it was just a ploy to gain time till

internal differences were resolved, it is difficult to say. But the AICC decision did

effectively throw the ball in the government's court.

Para VIII of the Instrument of Instructions of the Government of India Act, 1935

provided the Governor with the power to "act otherwise than in accordance with the

advice of his ministers."22 The Congress demand was that the Governor should not,

under any circumstances, use this power. Haig felt that it was not possible to give this

assurance: ''Never have the safeguards been more important than now, and in my

opinion we must not even appear to be abandoning them.'m Linlithgow agreed:

" ... there can, of course, be no question of any assurance, formal or informal, whether

written or oral by Governors as to the use of their special powers."24 Congress

responded by refusing to accept office if the assurance was not given by the Governor.

21 A.M.Zaidi and S.G.Zaidi (ed), The Encyclopedia of the Indian National Congress (henceforth the Encyclopedia), Vol. 11, 1936-38, p. 254.

22 Secret note by Haig, 2 Apri11937, Hai~ Papers, Roll No.2.

23 Telegram to Linlithgow, 18 March 1937, .ihi.d.

24 Letter to Haig, 18 March 1937, fui.d.

81

Nehru was now convinced that office acceptance had finally been ruled out.25 It meant

both relief and triumph for Nehru. In an interview, on the eventuality of the assurance

not being given by the Governor, Patel said: "If such a contingency arises, we go our

own way and the Government will go their own way. There is nothing to confuse."26

The final refusal was given on 29 March. "No Congress ministries"27 stated the

headlines of the newspapers the next day.

This led to the second major development which was the formation of interim

governments. The Government of India Act was to come into operation from 1 April

1937. After the Congress refusal, the Governor invited Nawab of Chhatari to form the

government. Led by Chhatari and his team, the provisional government in UP set about

attempting the impossible task of working the constitution and running the

administration without the support of the party in majority. Although Chhatari had all

the reservations about being able to effectively run the government, he went ahead with

the plan hoping, along with the Governor, that this would compel Congress to rethink

their earlier decision of non-acceptance. 28 Chhatari was personally not very convinced

that this move would pay off. In a personal letter to Sapru he expressed his inability to

carry more than fifty people with him in a house of 228:

.. This is a very hopeless position and to me this is a real torture . . . . If the intention was to show to the Congress people that the minority ministries could put forward programmes without let or hindrance from the Governor, that purpose has been served .... I think it is high time

that a second offer was made to the Congress to accept office, and if

25 "It is now clear that there is going to be no Congress ministry anywhere." Nehru to Rajendra Prasad, 29 March 1937, Valmiki Choudhary (ed), Dr. fu\jendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. I, 1934-38, (New Delhi, 1984), p. 33.

26 The Leader, 27 March 1937.

27 Ibid, 30 March 1937.

28 See Chhatari's letter to Haig, 23 June 1937, Hai~ Papers, Roll no. 2, and Chhatari's letter to Pant, 4 May 1937, .IE, p.463.

82

they do not accept even now, I see no other alternative to suspension of the constitution.29 (emphasi's added)

In spite ofChhatari's defeatism the formation of interim government did create

ripples and took Congress leadership by surprise. It tended to undermine their power of

veto granted to them by their overwhelming success at the polls. It also challenged

. their indispensability to the existing constitutional issues and provided an alternative

which did not seem feasible earlier. This appeared to be a shrewd move by the

government, though not a trump card. It offered a way out of the impasse, at least in

the short run, without having to rely on Congress. The minority government could

now run the administration and successfully ''work" the constitution at least for some

time without convening the Assembly to prove their majority. Pant admitted that they

were all in a situation of political deadlock, and he blamed the Governor for it. In a

letter to Chhatari he made no bones about his displeasure at latter's decision to form a

minority government:

It is a strange irony that ... you should have yourself contributed towards its (constitutional deadlock's) prolongation by accepting office, in spite of your knowledge and realization of the facts that the party led by you had been badly routed in the election and the candidates set up by you had been almost uniformly defeated by those who now constitute the majority of the Assembly. Do you not think that .. matters would have been settled satisfactorily long before if you and others had not accepted the position you are occupying in utter disregard of the declared wishes of the electorate and had allowed the majority their inherent right to function in the manner they considered best?30

Pant criticized the Governor and Chhatari for not convening a meeting of the

Assembly. Chhatari explained· that the delay in summoning the legislatures was

mainly to give another opportunity "to the majority party to reconsider its decision and

~91::etter to Sapru, 171Vfay 1"937:-ima, pp. 5T9~U.

30 Letter to Chhatari, 7 May 1937, ibid, p. 484.

83

to explore all possible avenues of ending the deadlock", and invited Pant once again,

"to take up the burden of office."31

The Congress response to this combined move was to take the initiative and hold a

meeting ofthe members of the UP Legislative Assembly in Lucknow on 9 May 1937.

The meeting was attended by 103 Congressmen with a fair amount of representation by

non-Congress legislators under the leadership of Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman.32 Earlier,

in April, in a significant development, Khaliqlizzaman had turned down the offer of

Chhatari to join his minority government, both on the grounds of NAPs being a

'non-progressive' group and a party in minority.33 Subsequently 20 Muslim League

legislators had condemned the Chhatari ministry,34 the Raja of Salempur, President UP

Muslim League Parliamentary Committee, being the only exception, and he joined the

Chhatari ministry.35 Purushottam Das Tandon was elected the president of the meeting.

Two resolutions were passed unanimously and sent to the Governor. The first

resolution considered the interim ministry unrepresentative and its continuation in

office "in direct defiance of the elected majority" as "repugnant to all notions of

constitutional propriety." The second resolution regarded ''the refusal of the

Government to summon the Legislative Assembly in order to prolong the life of the

present ministry as unconstitutional."36 It called upon the Governor to convene the

Assembly immediately.

31 Letter to Pant, 4 May 1937, illlil, p. 463.

32 The Leader, 11 May 193 7.

33 .Ibid, 2 April1937.

34 I.hid, 10 April 1937.

35 .Ibid, 5 April 193 7.

36 P.D.Tandon's letter to the secretary to the Governor, 10 May 1937, IE, pp. 494-95.

84

This, then, was the situation with neither side emerging as the winner. Congress

found itself being cornered and its power of keeping various options open being taken

away by the government decision to create puppet ministries. The Governor, on the

other hand, realized that the temporary advantage gained by the installation of

ministries would not last very long and that the joy of 'working' the constitution (or of

preventing the constitution from being 'wrecked') was purely symbolic and short

lived. Haig confessed to the Viceroy that Chhatari was "greatly attracted" to the idea

of his ministry resigning even before facing the Assembly: "I am afraid he (Chhatari)

has little belief in what he is doing and little heart in it and his attitude is not

encouraging to the Cabinet.'m Chhatari could not be trusted to continue for long and the

possibility of another minority ministry taking office did not seem practical to the

Governor because he felt that, quite apart from this being "constitutionally

unjustifiable", "I do not think we could find people to face such a situation."38 This was

the real deadlock, both the parties found themselves in. They had, so far, played their

cards well enough to make sure that the other party did not win. In the process, both

came closer to the dead-end and realized that office acceptance by Congress was a

viable option for both of them. What followed, from May onwards, was a toning down

of the hard stands taken earlier, leading eventually to the acceptance of office by

Congress in July.

Quite understandably, the third phase of the duel was one of conciliation and

compromise. The initiative was taken by the British government. 39 R.A. Butler, the

37 Letter to Linlithgow, 16 May 1937, ibid, p. 509.

38 Ihid. 11--------~~----------------------------~

39 B.R. Tomlinson would not agree with this formulation. He feels that the initiative for office acceptance came from Congress leaders. "The British were determined not to give way on what they saw as an attempt by the Congress drastically to revise the 1935 Act by political blackmail.

85

Under Secretary of State, issued a statement making it clear that it was not the desire of

the British Government that the Governor should take away the powers which the

British Parliament had placed in the hands of the elected ministers.40 This was followed

by another conciliatory statement by Zetland, the Secretary of State.41 Sapru, a keen

advocate of office acceptance, felt that the statements of Zetl~d and Butler amounted

to assurances.42 CWC thought that these statements substituting assurances were

"utterly inadequate" and "misleading".43 Finally, Linlithgow, going a step further,

issued a long statement on 21 June referring to the "spirit and purpose" of the

constitution and emphasized that it was mandatory for the Governor to accept the

advice of his ministers.44 This, then, was the assurance, though not from the Governors

themselves. The CWC meeting in Wardha in the first week of July felt that although

the government pronouncements fell short of the assurances demanded by the AICC

resolution, still "it will not be easy for the Governors to use their special powers." It

was, therefore, resolved that the Congressmen should accept office where they were in

a majority.45 This cleared the atmosphere. Haig invited Pant to form a ministry.

Chhatari was relieved to tender the resignation of his ministry. Towards the end of July,

Pant formed his ministry and submitted the names of Kidwai, K.N.Katju and Vijaya

The weakening came, in fact, from the Congress." And so, " ... Working committee bowed to the inevitable." Indian National Con2fess and the Raj. 1929-42, (London, 1976), p. 63. (emphasis added).

40 .IAR, 1937, part I, p. 46.

41 .Ibid, pp. 46-47.

42 .Ibid, p. 14.

43 The Encyclopedia, Vol. 11, p. 278.

44 .IAR, 1937, part I. pp. 64-70.

45 The Encyclopedia, Vol. 11, p. 284.

86

Lakshmi Pandit.46 P.L.Shanna and Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim joined to make it a

ministry of six.

What led to office acceptance by Congress? The assurance by the Viceroy along

with the conciliatory statements of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State? The

formation of Chhatari ministry? The increasing support for office acceptance by

Congress both inside and outside the organization? The pressure from below on the

AlCC and CWC? Or the package of contesting elections and government formation,

where it was not possible to opt for one and reject the other after such an overwhelming

mandate? Perhaps all of them in varying proportions of importance. In the ultimate

analysis, within Congress and particularly among the various centres of decision

making, there were more people for office acceptance, than there, perhaps, were against

it, and the ewe, while taking a decision, would have had to reckon with this simple

fact. All the PCCs except of UP and Maharashtra had voted for office acceptance, and

even in UP 31 DCCs had sent their recommendation for office acceptance. No doubt,

there were grave risks in office acceptance and Nehru was acutely aware of them. It

might have amounted to working the constitution and working with British imperialism

and cooperating with it, and, worse still, it might have 'provincialised' Congress politics

by developing provincial centres of authority within Congress.47 It was the last risk

which CWC set about eliminating in its various meetings from February onwards. At

its Wardha meeting in February, CWC passed a resolution that any decision by

Congress parties in provincial legislatures, pertaining to any alliance with any group,

46 Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, The Scope of Happiness: A Personal Memoir, (New York, 1979), p. 133.

47 For the argument that the new reforms threatened to unleash forces of provincialisation, see the introduction by Ravinder Kumar in A.K.Gupta ( ed), Myth and Reality, (New Delhi, 1987), p. xxii.

87

could not be taken without the permission ofthe CWC.48 There was absolute unanimity

that the acceptance or rejection of office had to be an all India decision, i.e., either the

office will be accepted in all the provinces where Congress was in a position to do so, or

in none. Under no circumstances could a decision of such importance be taken at a

provincial level. All the possibilities of provincialisation of the all India structure of the

Congress politics were to be discouraged and avoided. Once the pivotal position of the

CWC had been ensured, office acceptance seemed feasible. In other words, once ir was

made sure that certain crucial risks involved in office acceptance could be neutralized

by asserting the supremacy of the CWC and AICC, the scales certainly tilted in favour

of office acceptance.

Lastly, whereas there were grave risks emanating from the decision to accept

office, there were equally, if not more, grave risks involved in not accepting office. This

may not have been realized by Nehru, who articulated, with his characteristic sharpness,

the disadvantage of ministry making. One such risk was letting the 'reactionaries' run

the government. The other risk was the possibility of letting down the electorates.

People had voted for Congress with certain expectations. Families of political prisoners,

those whose land had been confiscated during the no-rent campaign and people who had

earlier resigned their jobs were hoping that the installation of Congress ministries would

bring back their happy days and also compensate for the losses incurred. Moreover, the

peasants in the rural areas where Congress had a spectacular success were hoping for

radical agrarian reforms. They would not have voted simply to assert the popularity of

Congress but to see Congressmen in office. They could not but feel let down by their

leaders deciding against office acceptance. If Congress contested the elections with a

definite programme, it natuFally implied-that it should go ahead with the implementation

48 The Encyclopedia, Vol. 11, p. 267. 88

of the programme, which had received the mandate of the electorates. Also, the

decision not to accept office could not stand on its own, it would have had to be

accompanied by another decision, of agitation against the existing ministries, if not a

full fledged movement against the British. It is doubtful whether many in Congress

were prepared for a phase of agitational politics at this stage.49

2.2 Congress-League Coalition: Myth and Reality

The second question, that of a possible alliance between Congress and Muslim

League, has been viewed very differently by contemporary politicians and many of the

historians of Modem India. It has been generally argued by many historians that the

partition of the sub-continent was the product of a process which was unleashed in 193 7

in UP. If there had been a coalition government between Congress and Muslim League,

the argument goes, the partition might possibly have been averted. Muslim League

might have been co-opted into constitutional politics; Jinnah might not have been

pushed, towards extremism from where he had no choice but to ask for Pakistan;

Muslims might not have rallied behind League and it might not have been

communalized to the extent that it was. And so, it has been argued, 193 7 was a

"landmark in the course of communal politics in UP ,"50 because it was this year,

particularly the period after the break down of Congress-League negotiations, that

witnessed the "sudden growth of Muslim opinion, in favour of the League, as opposed

to the Congress. The evidence places the immediate responsibility on the Congress

49 It would be interesting to make a comparison between Congress decision to accept office I

with the_similar decisions of the Commuois!_!'arty of India in 1957 and the _COroJ11unist Pa ~ n 1a arx1st in 1977 under broadly similar circumstance.s. I

50 Mukul Kesavan, "1937 as a Landmark". I

89

alone,"51 because "if the Congress party had adhered to its pre-election intention of

forming a coalition ministry, the Hindu-Muslim problem might not have assumed

formidable proportions. "52 (emphasis added)

These, a.."ld more, are attempts to comprehend and explain the reality of 194 7 by

focusing on the developments of the preceding years, and UP in 1937 offers a

convenient beginning. The argument that the failure of a coalition to materialize let

loose an onslaught of communalism has exercised such an influence on many of the

historians that it needs to be examined in detail.

2.2.1 The Argument

Briefly put, the argument runs like this: there was an informal electoral

understanding between UP Congress and UP Muslim League Parliamentary Board.53

Congress had virtually agreed to a coalition with Muslim League before the elections.

Their election manifestos had much in common and only minor differences. 54 During

the elections, they avoided a confrontation with each other and the task of winning the

Muslim seats was delegated by Congress to Muslim League. 55 A proof of cooperation

51 B.B.Misra, The Indian Political Parties, p. 421.

52 B.Shiva Rao, "India, 1935-47"in Philips and Wainwright (ed), The Partition of India, p. 419.

53 Mukul Kesavan, "1937 as a Landmark", p. 5.

54 "Between the League and the Congress, the only two organised political parties in U.P., there was hardly any difference in ideas and programs save on the communal representation. The electoral programmes of the two were also very nearly the same in all essential matters and the leaders of the two organisations fought the elections on more or less common platform." R.C.Mazumdar, Histor:y of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. III, p. 465. Also see, Mushirul Hasan, India's Partition, p.9.

55 Kesavan, "1937 as a Landmark", p. 7.

90

between the two was that Muslim League did not put up a candidate against Rafi

Ahmad Kidwai in Bahraich bye-election and he was returned unopposed. 56

After the elections the attitude of Congressmen changed. "Its leaders, jubilant

<?Ver the recent success, assumed a dictatorial attitude.57 Although Jinnah "pleaded" for

cooperation to form a '-united front', Nehru ridiculed the suggestion because in Nehru's

intention "no party other than the Congress was to be tolerated."58 And so, when the

League leadership in UP approached Congress leaders for a coalition in the Legislative

Assembly, the latter spurned the offer. This infuriated Jinnah. He thus launched a

massive campaign against Congress. Muslims rallied behind Muslim League because in

their perception the Congress government, without any participation by Muslim League,

meant a 'Hindu Raj'. What logically followed was an increase in communalism, Hindu-

Muslim conflict and bitterness, Congress-League hostility, increasing popularity of

Muslim League, partition of the sub-continent....

This briefly is the coalition story - the historians' favourite. Constructed

logically, it sounds convincing and appears credible, but leaves a lot to be desired as far

as empirical backing and political reality are concerned. Certain factual inaccuracies are

glaringly obvious. There is, for instance, no direct evidence anY;Where - in the

newspapers, Congress records and prominent leaders' correspondence - of any prior

agreement amounting to an alliance between Congress and League. 59 In fact as early as 9

56 Lance Brennan, "The Illusion of Security: The Background to Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces", in Modem Asian Studies. 18, 2, 1984, p. 260.

57 Z.H.Zaidi, "Aspects of the Development of the Muslim League Policy, 1934-47", m Philips and Wain wright ( ed), The Partition oflndia, p. 256.

58 Ibid.

59 The evidence that comes closest to suggesting an alliance is an interview with Sampurnanand held in 1968 by Dr. Hari Dev Sharma for the Oral History Section, NMML, New Delhi. Sampurnanand, who joined the Congress ministry as the minister for education in 1938, recalled that "There was an alliance certainly (which) ... broke off. The Muslim League

91

January 1937, the Leader quoting Tribune made this point absolutely clear: "In the

absence of an understanding between the Congress and the League, is not the Congress

fully entitled to put up its candidates for Muslims as for general territorial seats? As a

matter of fact, if the Congress is to blame at all, it is not because it has put up a few

candidates for Muslim seats-but because it has not put up at least as many candidates for

Muslim and other communal seats as it has put up for general territorial seats.'>6°

(emphasis added).

Also, Congress did not leave the Muslim seats to be won by Muslim League.

Congress contested eleven Muslim seats as against thirty seven contested by League.61

Should it, therefore, be assumed that both of them, put together, left the remaining

eighteen Muslim seats for some other party, presumably the NAP? What is more, for as

many as three constituencies, Sitapur rural, Sultanpur rural and Lucknow urban,

Congress and League actually clashed with each other.62 The important thing to

remember is that Congress actually contested very few Muslim seats all over the

country - 58 out of 482, thereby necessarily leaving most of the Muslim seats for other

parties. It might have been Unionist party in the Punjab and Praja Krishak party .in

Bengal. Moreover, Jinnah could not possibly be "pleading" with Nehru. They had

could say with some show of reason that they did not receive a fair deal." Oral History Transcript, NMML. But interestingly he speaks with a lot less certainty about the supposed alliance in his autobiography: "It has been asserted that their was some kind of tinderstanding between the Congress and the League. In any case, the two did not oppose each other's candidates." (Sampurnanand, Memories and Reflections, Bombay, 1962, p. 95.) It is also interesting to note that the Socialist party, of which he was an active member, was completely against having anything to do with Muslim League. "Congress-League pact in UP-- Socialist' strong opposition", noted the l&rukr of 20 July 1937. "Congress socialists strongly reject the intended pact between the Congress and the League. It is understood that representation has been made to Mr. Pant strongly urging him to drop the idea." .Thi.d.

60 Ibid, 9 January 1937.

61 Reeves, Elections in Uttar Pradesh, pp. 246-47.

62 Ibid, pp. 303-306.

92

already clashed with each other during their election campaigns. Nehru had ;'nade his

famous and controversial statement - about there being only two parties in India -

Congress and British Government63 and Jinnah had retaliated with his· equally famous

reference to the third party- Muslim India. And this was again as early as January 1937.

The verbal fight between the two leaders had already started. Jinnah asked Nehru to

leave the Muslims alone, and Nehru though this was communalism raised to the nth

power.64

Commenting on what had already come to be known as Nehru-Jinnah

controversy, Shaukat Ali informed Nehru, through a statement to the press in January

1937, that Nehru was not in touch with Muslims of India as Jinnah was. Shaukat Ali

called Congress a "great Hindu organization" and League as the "representative of the

overwhelming majority and better minds of Muslims." "Muslims had no confidence in

the Congress." Shaukat Ali appealed to Nehru to end this controversy as "the Nehru

Report controversy was bad enough and it will only aggravate things. •>6s So much for

the cooperation between the leaders of the two organizations during the elections!

Even Kidwai's unopposed election cannot be taken to be an indication of

cooperation between the two organization for many reasons. Muslim League had

· originally planned to put up a candidate against him for Bahraich bye-election. 66 Jinnah

issued a statement: "We have decided to contest the seat which was won by the Muslim

League at Bahraich .... The Congress, I believe, is going to contest this seat. It will be a

63 Statement to the press, 18 September 1936, s.w.IN, Vol. 7, p. 468.

64 For an elaboration of this argument, see Bimal Prasad, "Congress Versus the Muslim League, 1935-3 7", in Sisson and Wolpert ( ed), Con~ess and Indian Nationalism, p. 310.

65 The Leader, 27 January 1937; The Pioneer, 24 January 1937.

66 The Leader, 7 March 1937.

93

great mistake on the part of the Congress to do so ... .'>67 The working committee of

Muslim League Parliamentary Board was to meet in the third week of March to decide

the choice of a candidate against Kidwai and applications were invited from the

candidates wanting to contest Bahraich seat on a Muslim League ticket.68 No one

applied. S.Ali Zaheer, a possible League candidate, backed out, two other independents

withdrew and Kidwai was returned unopposed.69

The reasons for this total lack of enthusiasm in contesting elections have been

discussed earlier in this chapter. This was the time when Congress had decided not to

form the ministries and the constitutional deadlock created thus had made the

dissolution of· the legislatures imminent. Completely baffled by this attitude of

Congress, the prospective aspirants for a seat in the Assembly would certainly have

wondered if there was any point in contesting an election, when, in all probability, the

provincial assemblies with a Congress majority were not going to function at all! It was

particularly for this reason that all the bye-elections during those weeks of uncertainty

were being decided uncontested in Congress's favour. Apart from Kidwai's election,

Congressmen were also returned unopposed from NWFP, Assam and the Madras

presidency.70 Interestingly, once the ambiguity regarding office acceptance cleared up in

favour of acceptance by Congress, Muslim League did put up a candidate against

Congress for the Jhansi-Jalon-Hamirpur bye-election and Khaliquzzaman, supposedly

the architect of Congress-League unity in UP and a likely minister in the hypothetical

67 Quoted in M.A.Ispahani, Qaid-i-Azam as I Knew Him (Karachi, 1976) , p.31.

68 The Leader, 22 March 193 7.

69 Ibid, 10 April 193 7.

70 AICC Newsletter in IE. pp. 47-48.

94

coalition ministry, campaigned vigorously against the Congress candidate and made

appeals "in the name of Allah":

By electing the League nominee, you will serve the country and the cause ofislam. Allah has placed the key of success in your hands. You must not lose this opportunity by sheer mistake or misunderstanding. You will combat successfully the organization having a dual policy and will thus keep the dignity and prestige of Islam intact.71

And this was seven days before the official coalition talks were to begin!

In fact, the rumour about a possible coalition between the Congress and Muslim

League had started spreading after· the declaration of the election results in which

Congress had not won a single Muslim seat. The only Muslim elected on the Congress

ticket was Husain Zaheer from the university seat.72 It was thus felt that the Muslim

component of the ministry would have to be provided by Muslim League. Kidwai's

election on the Congress ticket was important in so far as it put to rest all such

speculations.

The historiographic· assertion of similar manifestos with common programmes

and demands also needs to be put to rest. The Congress manifesto, drafted by Nehru,

bore his stamp all the way.73 Being Nehru's brainchild, it was not likely to resemble

League's manifesto in any essential details.74

The Congress manifesto, quite characteristically, spoke of "the nationalist urge

of the Indian people ... to put an end to exploitation by British Imperialism" by attaining

independence; Muslim League wanted "full responsible Government for India" which

71 The Leader, 10 July 1937.

72 Reeves, Elections in Uttar Pradesh, p. 309. B.B.Misra is factually inaccurate when he says that Kidwai entered the legislature through the graduate constituency. Misra, The Unification and Division oflndia, p. 319.

73 For the Congress manifesto, see .s.w.IN, Vol. 7, pp. 459-64.

74 For Muslim League's manifesto, see Sharif-Al-Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, pp. 482-87. 95

it had been wanting ever since 1912. Congress rejected "in its entirety the new

constitution" and was contesting the elections "to combat and end" the new Act. The

League manifesto advocated the utilizing of the provincial scheme "for what it was

worth." Muslim League accepted the Communal Award till a substitute was agreed

upon. Congress denunciation of the Communal Award in the manifesto was

undoubtedly the strongest ever made before by Congress- "the rejection, in its entirety

of the new Act by the Congress inevitably involves the rejection of the communal

decision." The Congress manifesto advocated "a reform of the systems of land tenure

and revenue and rent and an equitable adjustment of the burden on agricultural land,

giving immediate relief to the smaller peasantry by a substantial reduction of

agricultural rent and revenue now paid by them and exempting uneconomic holdings

from payment of rent and revenue." The League manifesto, on the other hand, was

"opposed to any movement that aims at expropriation of private property." On the

question of indebtedness, the Congress manifesto recommended "scaling down of

debt", debt relief and "cheap credit facilities by the state." The League manifesto

would not go further than to "sponsor measures for the relief of rural indebtedness."

Congress .laid down a policy for industrial workers, removal of sex disabilities by

providing equal opportunities for women and the release of political prisoners. The

League manifesto did not mention a word about any of them.

It is surprising that with dissimilarities as stark and obvious as these, many

historians should look for, and also find, commonalities between the two programmes. 75

In fact Anita Inder Singh rightly points out that the "election manifesto of the League

75 R.C.Mazumdar, p.465; Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India, (Cambridge, 1972), p. 224; Mushirul Hasan, India's Partition, p. 9; S.Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 1, p. 223; Deepak Pandey, Muslim League in National Politics, pp. 37-38; Kesavan? "1937 as a Landmark", p. 8.

96

resembled not the Congress manifesto, but the manifestos of the National Agriculturist

Parties of Agra and Oudh. "76

2.2.2 The Coalition Theory: The Original Proponents

How was it that, with an empirical base as fragile as that, the coalition theory came

to be so popular with the historians? What were its origins? How could it have come

about?

(i) Harry Haig, the Governor of UP, was convinced, before the elections were held,

that there would be an alliance between Congress and a group which he called the 'left

wing' of Muslim League. This prediction was based not on the existence of any prior

understanding between Congress and League (because there was none) but on Haig's

reading of the possible election results. He was sure that Congress would not be able to

form the government on its own and would need. the support of Muslim League. His

own estimate was that Congress would get about seventy to eighty seats with about

fifteen sympathizers. 77 This estimate was partly based on talks with Sapru and

Chintamani, the editor of the Leader. The total number of Congress seats, thought

Haig, might increase a little, "but still no one seems to anticipate an actual majority for

Congress. "78

A fortnight later, he admitted that Congress prospects were improving, but not to

the extent of getting a majority and that the margin between Congress and its opponents

"may be so narrow so as to cause a good deal of embarrassment."79 In Haig's perception,

thus, there was a certain inevitability about a coalition. The government could be

76 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition oflndia. 1936-47, p. 8.

77 Letter to Linlithgow, 6 January 1937, IE, p. 21.

78 lhid, p. 18.

79 Letter to Linlithgow, 26 January 1937, ibid, p. 78.

97

fonned by Congress only in an alliance. Such an alliance, Haig imagined, would only be

with some, .section of Muslim League, ruling out the liberals and the NAPs.

Khaliquzzaman, representing a trend in Muslim League that was sympathetic to

Congress, seemed to Haig the obvious choice for such an alliance. He called this the

'left wing' of Muslim League and estimated its possible strength in the Assembly to be

about fifteen.

There was also a certain constitutional obligation. Section 52.l(A) of the GO!

Act, 1935 stated that it was the Governor's special responsibility to safeguard the

"legitimate interests of the minorities."80 This was generally taken to mean that the

minorities (read Muslims) should form one third of the ministers in the cabinet, and it

was the Governor's job to see to that.

The election results did not live up to, or rather more than lived up to, Haig's

expectations. He now admitted that Congress would have a clear majority: "In addition,

they will presumably have some understanding with the left wing of the Muslim

League, from which no doubt they will take two ministers, and they might have in this

way some 15 Muslim supporters."81 That Haig had ruled out even the theoretical

probability of all the Muslim League legislators joining the Congress even after the

coalition, becomes clear from his composition of the opposition:

The opposition, so far as I can judge at present, will consist of about 50 Muslims, some of them returned as National Agriculturist candidates, some as Independents, some as Muslim League, but I think likely to coalesce into a definite Muslim party, very vigilant about Muslim interests. In addition, there will be perhaps 20 Hindus, five or six scheduled castes and about six Indian christians, Europeans and Anglo-Indians. 82

80 The Government of India Act. 1935, (Delhi, 193 7), p.36.

81 Letter to Linlithgow, 13 February 1937, Hai2 Papers, Roll no. 2.

82 Thid.

98

Haig made it quite clear in his analysis that UP Muslim League was far from

being a monolithic organization. This seems a fairly obvious point, but has somehow

not been taken seriously by those historians who have argued about Congress-League

cooperation during the election. There were obviously diverse elements within Muslim

League with only one section having pro-Congress leanings. S.R. Mehrotra has pointed

out that there were three dominant strands within Muslim League Parliamentary Board.

One, which favoured im alliance with the NAP, one which consisted of Jinnah's

followers pursuing a policy of non-alliance with any other political group, and the third

favoured cooperation with Congress. The last strand consisted of men like

Khaliquzzaman, Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim, Ali Zaheer, Saiduddin Khan and Suleman

Ansari.83 These were the people who, Haig thought, would join Congress, and it was

with these people that coalition talks were to be held. Others in Muslim League were

clearly against it, and were trying to push League in other directions. And all these

people, with the exception of Khaliquzzaman, ended up joining Congress, coalition or

no coalition. But this aspect will be discussed slightly later in this chapter.

To return to Haig, he had been proved both wrong and right. The 'left wing' of

Muslim League did join Congress and one of them, Hafiz Ibrahim, was taken into the

ministry. But all this happened without any coalition. The absence of a coalition

became Haig's favourite reason to explain subsequent political developments in the

Assembly. He witnessed the deteriorating Congress-League relations, growing hostility

of Muslim League towards Congress and series of accusations hurled against the

Congress ministry by Muslim League both inside and outside the Assembly. He

examined these accusations, and concluded that there was "very little substance in

83 S.R.Mehrotra in Philips and Wainwright (ed), The Partition oflndia, p. 195.

99

them", that they did not "really merit any elaborate answer" and that League's criticism

of the Congress ministry "was a stock in the trade of opposition" which was being

"made freely by the communalists on both the sides."84 Haig could see clearly that

Muslim League's charges, devoid of any basis, were politically motivated, and would

not have been made "if the Muslim League had a share in the go'vernment."85 This, to

Haig, was a case of 'opportunity lost'. A coalition made in 1937 would have led to

cooperation between the arch enemies. Questions like coalition on whose terms, at what

cost and with what long term implications, did not occur to Haig. He was only trying to

account for the growing hostility of Muslim League towards Congress and the absence

of a coalition seemed a ready made explanation. Tracing the history of Congress-League

relations, Haig wrote to the Viceroy:

The Congress had, since the general elections, been flirting with the. Muslim League and suggesting some form of coalition. These conversations, resulted in the Muslim League holding aloof from my minority ministry. But when the Congress took office, they decided to reject the idea of a coalition with the Muslim League and to pursue instead a policy of direct approach to the Muslim masses. Had they entered into a coalition, I cannot help feeling that the Muslim solidarity would soon have been undermined. There are bound to be differences between the Muslims on the main agrarian and economic issues. The Muslims in office would have to make themselves responsible for definite policies in regard to these matters, they would have received the support of some Muslims and aroused the opposition of others. Nothing seems to be so effective in disintegrating a party as the taking of office.86

Haig's point was clear: Muslim League being in opposition could easily ''work up

strong Muslim communal feelings."

84 Letter to Linlithgow, 10 May 1939, Haig Papers, Roll no.2.

85 Ibid.

86 Draft letter, undated, 1939, ibid.

100

Haig's retrospection, though perfectly logical, misses out a central point. A

coalition between Congress and the whole of Muslim League was just not possible. It

could take place only with a section of Muslim League and, as has already been pointed

out, this section (except Khaliquzzaman, of course) had joined Congress. Haig himself

had estimated in 1937 that the Congress would be joined only by a section of Muslim

League with the rest in opposition. 87

It should have been clear to Haig that Jinnah's influence on UP Muslim League

would ensure the impossibility of a coalition. In fact, as early as August 1936, he had

narrated an incident to Linlithgow, hinting at a possible League-NAP connection.88

There is, of course, -no reference to any Congress-League coalition in Haig's

pre-election analysis. Strangely enough, his obsession with the coalition as a solution to

the communal problems continued till as late as October 1939, hardly three weeks

before the Congress ministries resigned. Perhaps not fully aware of the direction in

which Muslim League had rapidly developed and continued to develop, Haig suggested

to Kidwai, the acting Premier, to expand the ministry and take two of Muslim League's

representatives "for I am convinced that we shall have no prospect of communal peace

until this is done. "89 Kidwai, while agreeing with Haig, pointed out to him "the

opposition of Jinnah who was not prepared to allow Muslim League to take office in

Congress provinces unless it was done on an all India basis."90 Tending to

87 Letter to Linlithgow,l3 February 1937, ibid.

88 Jinnah had a long meeting with the Raja of Jahangirabad, "a thorough going conservative and always ready to support Government." Jinnah persuaded him to stand as an independent candidate in retwn for the League not fielding a candidate against him, Haig to Linlithgow, 24 August 1937, ibid. Interestingly, out of the thirty seven seats that Muslim League contested, it was pitched against the candidates of NAPs for only ten seats.

89 Letter to Linlithgow, 8 October 1939, ibid, Roll no. l.

90 Ibid.

101

underestimate Jinnah's influence in UP Muslim League, Haig also seemed attracted to

the wisdom of an untried option. After all, he had hinted at a possibility which did not

materialize and subsequently the situation deteriorated. Thus three different situations -

of Haig's prediction before the elections, there being no coalition and the worsening

communal situation - were being tied together in a cause-effect relationship.

(ii) Reginald Coupland, the unofficial British historian writing his report on the

constitutional problems in India believed that for the purposes of the elections an

understanding had developed between Muslim League and Congress, particularly in UP

where a "common platform" had been agreed upon. And so "the subsequent course of

Hindu-Muslim relations and of the whole constitutional controversy would have been

different if the Congress leaders had accepted the offer" made by Muslim League.91

Such an understanding by Coupland seems to have been prompted by two

considerations. Firstly, writing at an all India level, Coupland might have been

unfamiliar with the complex nature of Muslim League in UP as discussed above.

Secondly, as part of his general approach, he would have equated a Congress-League

unity with Hindu-Muslim unity, with the two organizations representing the two

religious communities. He understood the Indian society as representing a "deep rooted

antagonism" between Hindus and Muslims. The constitutional manifestation of this

'antagonism' lay, according to Coupland, in a unanimous rejection by Muslims of

"majority rule in principle and of joint electorates in particular" ever since the

beginning of elected representation. He classified Congress as "prominently Hindu in

fact, though non-communal in principle.'792 Little wonder, then, that he considered

91 Coupland, Indian Politics. part II. (Oxford, 1944), p. 15. There is, of course, no proof of such an offer; nor does Coupland give one.

92 n..;A v A..l.l.U.I,p ..

102

\

Congress as essentially incapable of representing Muslims! A coalition between the two

organizations would, thus, appear to be the only way in which both Hindus and

Muslims could be represented in the government.

(iii) Maulana Abu! Kalam Azad, narrating the story of India's freedom in his

autobiography written in post-partition India, must have wondered where things went

wrong. Partition, to him, was a negation of his long cherished dream of a united India.

In trying to explain this failure with hindsight and perhaps fading memory, 1937

appeared to him the turning point: "Jawaharlal's action (of not agreeing to a coalition)

gave the Muslim League in U.P. a new lease of life. All students of Indian Politics

know that it was from the U.P. that the League was reorganized. Mr. Jinnah took full

advantage of the situation and started an offensive which ultimately led to Pakistan."93

Interestingly this was not how he looked at things in 1937 as one of the

prominent actors. Replying to a query regarding a Congress-League coalition, Nehru

thought that Azad was "definitely" opposed to it.94 Azad himself said, in an interview to

the press, that there was no question of communal representation in the UP Assembly.

When asked if Congress would be ready to take one of the Muslim Leaguers, Maulana

said: "one man cannot serve two masters." If any party wanted to join Congress, "it

must give up its separate identity and identify itself with the Congress.'>95

(iv) Khaliquzzaman's own version on the coalition96 might be taken as authentic for

coming straight from the horse's mouth, or alternatively, it might be taken with a pinch

of salt because of Khaliquzzaman's direct involvement in the coalition talks. He had a

93 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, (Bombay, 1959), p. 160.

94 Letter to Abdul Wali, 30 March 1937, .swlli, Vol. 8, p. 77.

95 The Leader, 15 July 1937.

% Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, pp. 160-68.

103

personal stake in the coalition and would certainly have become a minister if the

coalition had materialized. Haig had found Khaliquzzaman to be "a man very anxious

for office'>97 with "personal ambitions and adroit maneuverings.'>98 He was caught in the

dilemma of negotiating a ministership with Congress without wanting to abandon his

base in Muslim League. He refused to join Chhatari's ministry for the reason that the

"new ministry could not last more than four months and that any one who joined it,

would be politically discredited.'>99 It would have meant sinking his boat completely as

far as Congress was concerned. Knowing that his position in Muslim League was

precarious, 100 he started reaching out to Congress leaders, mainly Nehru and Pant, 101 at

the risk of antagonizing other ·~~on-Congress Muslims.''102 Haig's impression was that

"his personal reception by Jawaharlal Nehru was not very cordial."103

Khaliquzzaman's colleague in Muslim League, Ali Zaheer, who resigned from

Muslim League in the late 1930s, recalled many years later, in an interview, how, during

the Individual Satyagraha of 1932, Khaliquzzaman had been nominated the 'dictator' of

Congress in Meerut and his job as a 'dictator' was to court arrest, but he had escaped

arrest and thereby let down Congress "and the whole movement practically came to a

97 Letter to Linlithgow, 31 March 1937, IE, p. 310.

98 Letter to Linlithgow, 7 May 1937, ibid, p. 479.

99 Letter to Linlithgow, 31 March 1937, ibid, p. 310.

100 .Thi.d.

101 Khaliquzzaman was a close associate of Nehru but they had drifted apart in 1936 after Khaliquzzaman had joined Muslim League. Nehru had expressed his displeasure at Khaliquzzaman joining the "reactionaries". Nehru's letter to Abdul Wali, 30 March 1937, s.w.lN, Vol. 8, p. 77.

102 Haig to Linlithgow, 22 April 1937, IE. p. 422.

103 Haig to Linlithgow, 7 May 1937, ibid, p. 479.

104

standstill (in Meerut) because of that."104 It is worth speculating whether this had

anything to do with the 'cold reception' that he had probably received from Nehru!

Khaliquzzaman failed to bring Muslim League and Congress together. He failed to

obtain a minister's post in the Congress government which went to Hafiz Ibrahim Khan

who had joined Congress after resigning from Muslim League. He also ran the risk of

losing his credibility within League though this risk was overcome by his total and

unconditional return to Muslim League. But the failure of the coalition to materialize

was also a personal failure for him in more ways than one.

The origins of the coalition story, thus, lay in the political judgement of a

Governor, the paradigm of a contemporary historian, the hindsight of a nationalist leader

and the personal experiences of a man who was trying to bring it about. One thing that

was common to their perception was that all of them emphasized the desirability of the

coalition, completely overlooking its feasibility or unfeasibility. In other words, was a

coalition on the political agenda in UP in early 1937? And on whose agenda? Were the

political forces moving towards an alliance between Congress and Muslim League in

UP?

2.2.3 Men 'For' and 'Against' in Muslim League a~d Congress

The complex nature of UP elections in 193 7 still remains unexplored. The

arguments for coalition do not have adequate empirical backing. Alliance finds no

mention in the records of the two parties. But the various facets of the relationship

between the two organizations remain unexplored. If cooperation was not the dominant

theme, neither was hostility. The nationalist thrust of Muslim League's election

propaganda has been pointed out in the previous chapter. At the local level certain

instances of working with a common purpose are quite visible. In Allahabad, Rafi

104 Interview with S.Ali Zaheer by B.R.Nanda, Oral History Section, NMML. 105

Ahmad Kidwai raised five thousand rupees for Abdur Rahman, an activist of Ahrar

party and the Muslim League candidate, to contest election against the NAP

candidate.105 Abdur Rahman eventually lost this election to a much stronger candidate

Nawab Mohammad Yusuf of NAP A, who got nearly seventy three percent of total votes

polled as against a mere twenty seven percent for Abdur Rahman.106 Shaukat Ali, while

campaigning for the Muslim League candidate at Jhansi, asked Muslims to be

sympathetic to Congress and hinted at the possibility of an agreement between Jinnah

and Nehru after the elections.107 According to the CID report on Nehru's election tour,

he regretted in his speeches the lack of Muslim Congress candidates and asked his

audience to vote for a Muslim League candidate if he was anti-government and if there

was no Congress candidate contesting there. 108This was later confirmed by Nehru

himself. 109 In his note on the state of political parties at the end of 1936, Haig mentioned

that in western UP "some propaganda (was) done for the League by the Congress

(press)."110 The election campaign of the two organizations in UP generally avoided

making hostile remarks against each other. 111

There were many reasons for this. The active presence of the NAPs supported by

the government had changed the complexion of the situation and had necessitated a fight

105 19, 1937; WRPA.

106 Reeves, Elections in Uttar Pradesh, p. 299.

107 54(c), 1937; WRPA.

108 65 (c), 1937; ibid.

109 "During my tours where there was no Congress Muslim candidate, I usually supported the League candidate, if he was not an obvious reactionary as sometimes he was." Letter to Rajendra Prasad, 21 July 1937, SWJN, Vol. 8, p. 166.

110 Haig's note, undated, Hai2 Papers, Roll no. 2.

106

between the pro-government and anti-government candidates. "As we looked upon the

election campaign it was a tussle with the Agriculturist party which was a wholly

government party of big zamindars. The League was also opposing them and so

inevitably our opposition to the League weakened. We did not want to split the forces

opposed to pure reaction", Nehru recalled.112 This, it seems, was also the official

Congress policy in UP. A circular issued to all the DCCs stated that in the

constituencies where there was no Congress candidate and any candidate of the NAPs

was contesting, Congressmen should lend support to his opponent. 113 Vis-a-vis Muslim

League there was no clear cut policy or any arrangement between the two, "but a kind of

convention developed."114 This observation ofNehru was substantiated by Ali Zaheer in

an interview thirty years later. He recalled that there had been a kind of tacit

understanding that the progressive elements among Muslims and Hindus would fight

the elections on Muslim League and the Congress tickets, respectively. 115 A coalition

government was generally being anticipated because no one expected that any one party

would get a clear majority in the legislatures. 116

The election results proved them wrong, yet it was not an unblemished victory

for Congress; it had riot won a single Muslim seat. "Quite a piquant situation has arisen

owing to Congressmen securing an absolute majority ... coupled with Congress Muslim

111 "During the general elections in UP there was not much conflict between the Congress and the League. It was the desire of both parties to avoid a conflict as much as possible and to accommodate each other." Nehru to Rajendra Prasad, 21 July 1937, ~. Vol. 8, p. 165.

112 Ibid, p. 166.

113 The Leader, 2 February 1937.

114 Nehru to Prasad, 21 July 1937, ~.Vol. 8, p. 166.

115 Ali Zaheer uses the term "advanced sections" but it is quite clear that he refers to progressives. Oral History Section, NMML.

116 Ibid.

107

nominees' crushing defeat," noted the Leader. It was afraid that the "Muslim

communalists would now vilify the Congress as a Hindu body of the province, if it

decides to accept ministry." However, it added: "the trend of the talk is that the

Congress will not enter a coalition, but if the inclusion of any strong member seems

expedient, the Congress will insist on him, according to parliamentary procedure, to

disown his former allegiance and to seek re-election on the Congress ticket."117

Rajendra Prasad too ruled out the possibility of coalition with parties not

accepting the Congress policy and prograrnme.118 Later he re-iterated the same point

specifically in relation to Muslim League on · the ground that the two were

fundamentally different in their objectives and no coalition government could therefore

be formed, if Congress decided to accept office. 119 Nehru called it a 'discredited policy'

and saw no reason why the Congress should go for it. 120 It had been a mistake,

acknowledged the Congress leaders even before the election results were oue 21, not to

set up more Muslim candidates. This discrepancy had to be compensated for, in ways

other than a coalition with Muslim League.

During the elections Muslim League had not been the main enemy of Congress.

That position belonged to the NAPs. League's status in the eyes of Congress leadership

was that of an enemy's enemy. But did that make Muslim League an ally of Congress?

Certainly the Congress leadership did not think so. Any kind of coalition with League

117 The Leader, 6 March 1937.

118 Ibid, 4 March 1937.

119 Ibid, 8 March 1937.

120 "We have thought for long in terms of pacts and compromises between communal leaders and neglected the people behind them. That is a discredited policy and I trust that we shall not revert to it." Address to Congress Legislators, 19 March 193 7, ~. vol. 8, p. 62.

121 Bhulabhai Desai on UP elections, The Leader, 31 January 1937; and Neluu's speech at Ara, ibid, 3 February 1937.

108

was clearly not on their agenda. Some Muslims within Congress were alarmed, as the

rumours of a coalition began spreading soon after the elections, as it would undennine

their position within Congress. Regarding a "scheme that was being hatched ... to bring

about a coalition between the Congress and the League parties in the Assembly", Abdul

Wali, an old Congressman from Lucknow, wrote to Nehru:

To tell you the truth, I am deadly against it. My conviction is that the Congress will not be doing its duty to the Mussalmans of India if it ever thought of making pacts and coalitions with the Muslim League. The Congress belongs as much to the Mussalmans as to Hindus. It can very well make coalitions or enter into pacts with socialist groups - but it cannot do any such thing with any of the communal groups. That would mean that the Congress disowns that particular community .... My idea is . that once the Congress enters into pact with the Muslim League, it loses the right to ask the Muslims to join it.122

Nehru replied characteristically, expressing his firm opposition to all such pacts and

compromises.123 Since Pant, as alleged by Abdul Wali, was involved in the coalition

talks, Nehru also conveyed to Pant his "conviction" that any pact with Muslim League

would be "highly injurious."124 Pant, in his reply, ruled out the possibility of any such

talk of a pact. 125

This was not all. There were other sections within Congress who looked upon

the idea of a coalition with disfavour. Notable among them were the socialists. Congress

socialists resented any dealing with Muslim League for a pact. Upon hearing of a move

being made in that direction, they made a representation to Pant "strongly urging him to

drop the idea."126 If the version of the Leader is to be believed, then the absence of

122 Letter to Nehru, 28 March 1937, IE, p. 289.

123 Letter to Abdul Wali, 30 March 1937, SWlli, Vol. 8, p. 77.

124 Letter to Pant, 30 March 1937, ibid, p. 78.

125 Letter to Nehru, 2 April1937, IE, p.328.

126 The Leader, 20 July 1937. 109

Congress-League alliance may have been a pre-condition behind the decision of the

socialists to accept office and join the ministry. 127 The reasons for this aversion of the

left wingers to a Congress-League coalition should not be difficult to conjecture. To

them, one very definite advantage of the ministry making lay in the implementation of

the agrarian tenancy legislation. It was unlikely that Muslim League, with strong

landlord presence in it, would have gone along with the Congress in getting the tenancy

bill passed. Sajjad Zaheer, a young left-wing Congressman closely associated with

Nehru, has pointed out this aspect in an article written many years later. UP Muslim

League in 1937 "was jaded with Muslim landlords and Nawabs." Nehru's decision,

supported by the left forces, to reject a compromise with Muslim League was, therefore,

"correct". 128

But this was the Congress side of the story. What about Muslim League? Forces in

Muslim League were moving in diverse directions. Those interested in entering office . I

I

hoped for an understanding with Congress. Khaliquzzaman' s early efforts were geared

towards gaining the approval of Congress leadership. And so, when Chhatari convened

a meeting exclusively of Muslim legislators, Muslim Leaguers under Khaliquzzaman's

leadership stayed away from it. 129 1hey also refused to join Chhatari's ministry. 130 The

interim government was not going to last lorig and joining it would have destroyed all

chances of an understanding with Congress. Khaliquzzaman, therefore, kept in close

touch with Pant, and tried hard for a "close understanding between the Muslim League

and Congress, in the hope that ifthe Congress came into power, they would have to take

127 Ihld, 21 July 1937.

128 ''Notes on Hindu-Muslim Unity", Mainstream, 17 June 1967, p. 28 and 29.

129 The Leader, 4 March 1937.

130 Ibid, 6 April1937.

110

a Muslim minister from the Muslim League."131 Till as late as July 1937 he expressed

the hope that Congress would serve the country better by being in office. 132

Khaliquzzaman's efforts and priorities came into direct conflict with the all India

priorities of Jinnah. Jinnah, at this stage, had started working towards the development

of Muslim League as an authoritative body of the Indian Muslims. Muslim League,

under Jinnah's leadership, had not been very successful in utilizing the opportunities

· offered by provincial autonomy. Bengal and Punjab, the two most important Muslim

majority provinces, had thrown up inter-communal political formations and the leaders

there, Fazlul-Huq of the Praja Krishak Party in Bengal and Sikander Hyat Khan of the

Unionist Party in the Punjab, had shown little inclination towards the exclusively

communal politics of the Jinnah variety, though retaining focus on the Muslim seats.

These were the compulsions of the electoral politics containing separate electorates -

Muslim League could not form a government in any province on the basis of Muslim

seats only. Herein lay the paradox - the practice of separate electorates, which activated

and provided an incentive to communal politics, prevented its further advance into ·

formal structures of power which required a majority status. The problem was even

more acute in a Muslim minority province like UP where the Muslim League, even if it

won all the Muslim seats (66 in a house of 228), would have to remain a party in

opposition, or at best play a subordinate role to the party in power, depending on the

goodwill of the majority party. Keeping these limitations in mind, learning the right

lessons from the elections of 193 7 and having been rebuffed by the leaders representing

the Muslims of the Muslim majority provinces, Jinnah proceeded to build his alternative

politics of developing Muslim League into an all-India structure. The politics of

131 Haig's letter to Linlithgow, 7 May 1937, I.E, p. 479.

132 The Leader, 10 July 1937.

111

safeguards and concessions had been rendered obsolete and must now give way to a

politics of seeking parity with the other all India structures. An inkling of Jinnah's

renewed p~orities could be seen in his election campaigns, particularly his reference to

'Muslim India' constituting a third party.

With this perspective, Jinnah decided to intervene in UP politics and take on

Khaliquzzaman. He started with a statement barely days after the rumour regarding a

coalition had got off the ground: "I shall be glad if the Muslim League is not included

in ministries in provinces where the majority does not want to seek itself (sic). I hope

independent Muslims will refuse to sign the pledge of another party for the sake of

ministries."133 If Muslim League wanted a coalition, it could be made with Chhatari's

party. He initiated a talk of coalition with Chhatari 134 and drew satisfaction from the

possibility of the Muslim members of NAPs merging in Muslim League. 135 Sensing the

mood of a section of Muslim Leaguers in UP, he did not press for it, as it might have led

to a split in his party. He asked Congress to leave the Muslim seats alone and called the

Congress decision to contest the Bahraich Muslim seat "a great mistake."

The rift in Muslim League in UP became sharper. Khaliquzzaman held important

consultations with Nelifu and Nawab Ismail Khan told the Press that the majority of the

Muslim Leaguers in UP were prepared to join Congress. 136 Syed Mohammad Husain,

Jinnah's representative in UP Muslim League, reacted strongly, criticizing the politics of

133 The Leader, 15 March 1937.

134 Ibid.

135 Illlil, 22 March 1937.

136 Illlil, 23 April 193 7.

112

the 'left wing' ofMuslim League of trying to follow Congress line and betraying Jinnah.

He warned Muslims not to fall in the Congress trap and rally behind Jinnah instead. 137

The battle continued without either side giving in. Which way League's politics

would go in UP depended on who would be shaping it - Jinnah with his man, or

Khaliquzzaman and his team. Jinnah declared that it would be useless for any

individual to arrive at a settlement with a particular group and accompanied his

disapproval of such a settlement with a direct warning to Khaliquzzaman:

It is no use dealing with those men who are in and out of the Congress and in and out of the League, at one tinie with one and another time with the other, as it suits them. I am sure the Muslims of UP won't betray the Mussalmans of India and, therefore, any effort to settle by individuals which may be advantageous to them for the time being won't carry us anywhere. I have been promised by Mr. Khaliquzzaman ... that he would let me know what the situation is in UP. I have sent him reminders and I am waiting to hear from him for the last three weeks, and I can't understand the mystery of his silence. I only trust he won't enter into any commitments which may be repudiated not only by Muslims of his province but by the Muslims of all India. 138

Khaliquzzaman, not the one to yield at this stage, retaliated:

Mr. Jinnah has been carried away by half truths that were conveyed to him from interested quarters. When he will know the exact situation, I am sure that he will be sorry for having made some exaggerated statements .... My political efforts have always b~n directed and shall continue to be directed towards an honourable settlement with the majority community, with a view to make the freedom of the country easy of attainment. Mr.Jinnah should know that what I strive for is a settlement with a community and not with me personally. 139

The expression 'freedom of the country' was a direct rebellion against Jinnah's

leadership and a reminder to him that Khaliquzzaman, after all, was a Congressman

137 lli.id, 21 April1937.

138 Statement to the press, 26 April 193 7, IE, p. 428.

139 The Leader, 28 April1937.

113

inside Muslim League, and therefore most suited to the task of carrying negotiations

with Congress.

More threats to Jinnah followed. A sub-committee of All India Muslim League

under the Presidentship of Nawab Ismail Khan recommended a change in the creed of

' Muslim League to "attainment ofthe status of a free and independent country by India."

The committee also recommended the abolition of the office of permanent president and

a complete reorganization of Muslim League "in order to make it truly representative of

the Muslim masses."140 Jinnah dismissed the recommendations, called them "entirely

incorrect and misleading" and reiterated the old creed of Muslim League (the attainment

of full responsible government in India). He also denied that the office of the president

of Muslim League was a permanent one. 141 This was the 'left wing' of UP Muslim

League rising in rebellion. Jinnah had to put it down by asserting his all India authority.

And so, a committee meeting of Bombay Presidency Muslim League passed a

resolution in the first week of May appealing to all the Muslim League legislators in UP

not to act in such a way as to cause disunity among the Muslims of India by arranging

sectional and provincial settlements with Congress. 142

Both the sides were heading for a;'showdown. Lucknow was to be the venue and the

occasion was the meeting of UP Muslim League Parliamentary Board to be held on 8

May and a general meeting of all the legislators convened by Congress the next day.

Muslim League had, under Khaliquzzaman's leadership, given its consent to attend the

Congress meeting. 143 Jinnah was to, now, use all his influence to prevent this from

· 140 .Ibid, 4 May 193 7.

141 .Ibid, 5 May 1937.

142 The Leader, 6 May 1937.

143 IJ:llil, 28 April 193 7.

114

happening. Having arrived in Lucknow well before the League meeting, he declared:

"If! am not afraid of reactionaries, I am not afraid ofthe left wing opposition as well."

Criticizing Ahrars and Jamaitul-Ulema-i-Hind for supporting Congress, he made it clear

that he would join hands neither with Congress nor with British government. w

Leader reported that Jinnah spoke in the vein of a Hitler or a Mussolini. 144 Jinnah's

campaign looked likely to be successful. "Mr. Jinnah's presence had its effect and none

(from UP Muslim League) now talks of joining the Congress. None should be surprised

if the UPML Parliamentary Board decides on non-participation in the meeting of May

9th convened by Mr. Pant," noted the Leader. 145

This was what happened. Muslim League Parliamentary Board decided that "it

cannot and should not. join Congress in its policy and programme of wrecking the

constitution" and added that cooperation in other fields, excluding separate electorates

and the Communal Award, could be explored on the basis of work in the legislature.

This ruled out the possibility of the League legislators attending the Congress meeting

the next day. The League board placed on record "its complete confidence in the policy

initiated and pursued by Mr. Jinnah and assures him of its loyal and unqualified

support."146 This was Jinnah's victory - absolute and complete.·· Although

Khaliquzzaman attended the Congress meeting in his individual capacity, he had clearly

surrendered. 147 Jinnah had triumphed in imposing his all India priorities on UP Muslim

League.

144 Ibid, 9 May 193 7.

145 Ibid.

146 Thid, 10 May 1937.

1 ~7 Surprisingly, Khaliquzzaman makes no mention of the May meeting in his book.

115

Why did Khaliquzzaman surrender? Did he overestimate his support base in UP

League? Or, did he fail to convert, as he was hoping to, more League legislators to his

pro-Congress stand? Or was it, as the Leader pointed out, "Mr. Jinnah's presence and

his forceful convincing speech"148 which turned the tables on him? Or was it because he

did not receive the right signals from the Congress leaders to go for a confrontation with

Jinnah? Was it the fear of being left in the lurch? It is interesting that Khaliquzzaman

did not resign from Muslim League to join Congress as had been done by his colleague

Hafiz Ibrahim two months ago. As it happened, the ministerial seat went to Hafiz

Ibrahim and not to Khaliquzzaman who had been trying very hard for it. Whatever be

the explanation for Khaliquzzaman's defeat in Lucknow, the coalition story for all

practical purposes ended here, even though it was to linger on till July. 149

2.2.4 The Consequence

The failure to arrive at an understanding with Khaliquzzaman on mutually accepted

terms meant that Muslim League party under his leadership would sit in opposition. 150

148 The Leader, 10 May 1937.

149 A long letter from Nehru to Rajendra Prasad ( 21 July 1937, £W,lli, vol. 8, pp. 165-71) gives details of the last effort made by Khaliquzzaman in July regarding a position in the ministry. It appears he was willing to give a "blank cheque" if he and Nawab Ismail Khan were included in the ministry. Nehru "disliked the bargaining for seats in the ministry." This dislike, according to Nehru, was shared by others in Congress. Yet, in spite of all the risks that it involved (pp. 168-69) they were attracted to the possibility of UP League being wound up. So "stringent" conditions were offered for the inclusion of two Muslim Leaguers in the ministry. The Congress policy in the legislature was to be accepted in !QlQ; all the League legislators were to become members of the Congress legislative party and abide by its discipline; they were to support the Congress candidates in the bye-elections; and go along with Congress legislative party if it resigned from the ministry. (p.169) These were difficult conditions and Khaliquzzaman had no authority to accept them. The official coalition talks thus ended.

It should be clear from the preceding discussion that it was a complete miscalculation on Nehru's part to hope for a winding up of League parliamentary board through an agreement with Khaliquzzaman.He could not possibly carry UP League with him even in March/ April when he had greater control over it. In May it had become an impossibility after Jinnah's intervention in UP and Khaliquzzaman's surrender to him. Quite obviously, he did not have much of a "blank cheque" to offer!

150 Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p. 161.

116

Congress on its part chose Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and Hafiz Ibrahim as Muslim ministers

in a cabinet of six. This arrangement continued till October 1939 when the Congress

ministries resigned and walked out of the legislatures. Many developments of this

period as also the subsequent intensification of communal politics have been attributed

to the failure of' coalition' to materialize. For instance, that "the absence of a substantial

Muslim component within the Congress legislative party made it insensitive to Muslim

sensibilities" and rendered Congress's secular image vulnerable;151 that it led to

increasing communal trouble and the widening of the gulf between the two

communities;152 that it was a blunder, by Congress, ofthe first order; 153 "a fatal error, the

prime cause of the creation of Pakistan"; 154 are some of the oft repeated allegations.

These positions will be examined later in this thesis when the development of politics'

between 1937 and 1939 is discussed. A few points can, however, be made here.

Immediately after the breakdown of Congress-League talks, signs of a rupture

began to appear in UP Muslim League. Three of its members denounced League

activities in a statement, resigned from its membership and joined Congress. 155 ~

Leader estimated that the total number of imminent defection of Muslim legislators,

both independent and Leaguers, to Congress would be about twelve. 156 Notable among

these Muslim legislators were Suleman Ansari and Saiduddin Ahmad (from Muslim

151 Kesavan, "1937 as a Landmark", pp. 29-30.

152 Coupland, Indian Politics. part II, p. 184.

153 V.Hodson, The Great Divide, p. 67.

154 Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, p. 15.

155 The Leader, 25 July 1937.

156 Ihid, 24 July 1937.

117

League) and Abdul Hakim and Mohammed Husain (independent). 157 A little later,

prominent Muslim Leaguers like Sir Wazir Hasan (who was the president of the 1936

session of AIML) and Ali Zaheer also resigned from Muslim League. 158 These were

initial setbacks to Muslim League.

It has been suggested that as a result of Congress 'high handedness', Muslim

League consolidated its position in the bye-elections.159 But a close examination of the

results of the bye-elections for the Muslim seats gives interesting information. In the two

bye-elections held before July, League and Congress had won one seat each, the

Bahraich seat going to Congress and the Jhansi-Jalaun-Hamirpur seat to Muslim League

whose candidate, Rafiuddin Ahmad (2652 votes, 58.7%) defeated N.A. Sherwani of

Congress (1915 votes, 41.93%). Of the remaining six bye-elections held between July

1937 and October 1939, Muslim League won four, Congress one and one seat went to

an independent, supported by Congress. Congress had not contested any of these six

seats earlier during the general elections and it improved its position considerably by

getting 77.57%, 45.13%, 40.84%, 34.19% and 24.97% ofthe votes for the five Muslim

seats, the sixth seat going uncontested in favour of the independent candidate. On the

whole Congress got 16076 votes in these bye-elections as against 16918 votes obtained

157 fuid, 3 July and II July 1937.

158 These defections should not be attributed merely to the formation of a government by Congress. Quite the opposite happened in Bihar where a number of Muslims left Congress to join Muslim League, following the Congress decision to form a government. See Papiya Ghosh, "The Making of Congress Muslim Stereotype: Bihar, 1937-39" in IESHR, Vol. xxviii, Number 4, October-December I99I, p. 424.

159 B.B.Misra, The Indian Political Parties, p. 432. However, his statement " .. of the four bye­elections held in UP, the League won four" is factually incorrect. Out of a total of eight bye­elections that were held for Muslim seats, the League won five (Reeves, pp. 31I-I4 ). Of these eight, two had been held before the coalition talks began.

118

by Muslim League.160 The percentage of total votes polled by Congress in these five

constituencies was 48.7 as against 51.3 polled by Muslim League.

The scenario inside the Assembly does not appear to have been decisively

influenced by absence of Congress-League cooperation. Muslims voted both for and

against Congress motions, although the number of Muslim legislators voting for

Congress motions was much less (about eight) compared to those against (from thirty

three to forty). 161 The nature of Muslim League's opposition to the Congress

government and the propaganda carried out both inside and outside the Assembly will

be dealt with in the next chapters.

2.2.5 Lessons, Priorities, Options

To sum up, the various possibilities that existe<!_ in 1937 can be best seen in the light

of the political priorities of the two leading organizations in UP. The general elections of

1937 brought home different lessons to be learnt and different options to be explored by

Congress and Muslim League.

To Congress a very real option was to accept or not to accept office. Once it

resolved to accept office, the priority was to maintain its cohesiveness and all-India

character and also implement, as far as possible, its programme in the legislature. A

major lesson to be learnt was its poor record in the Muslim constituencies. This had

implications for the Congress claim of representing all groups and communities. The

Muslim absence was also capable of weakening their fight against the British

government. Therefore, some method of representing Muslims had to be evolved. One

option was that of indirectly representing them through an alliance with a political party

160 Reeves, Elections in Uttar Pradesh.

161 Proceedin2s of UP Le2islatiye Assembly, Vol. 1-21, Central Secretariat Library, New Delhi.

119

that claimed to represent Muslims. This avenue was open to· Congress in 1937 in UP.

But major political and ideological differences between Congress and Muslim League

did not admit of such easy options. After the Lucknow Pact of 1916, there had not been

many instances of Congress and League working together. Differences had cropped up

on the Nehru Report (1928) and the Communal Award (1932). Jinnah and Rajendra

Prasad, in their capacities as the ·leaders of two different political organizations, had

discovered in 1935 how difficult it was to arrive at mutually acceptable political

positions. 162 As public organizations the two had marched along very different lines

through the initial decades of the 20th century and a mere commonality in their

opposition to the Federation scheme or to the Government of India Act, 1935 was not

enough to bring them together. Their differences were real and could not be brushed

aside.

Also, a coalition with Muslim League could not ensure Muslim participation in the

Congress movements. Muslim League leadership had not been very enthusiastic about

anti-British agitations and was unlikely to join Congress, in case Congress decided to

resort to agitational politics. The proposed coalition was to be confined to legislative

activities and by nature was bound to be short lived. To choose the option of an alliance

with Muslim League Congress would have had to overcome the above mentioned

constraints and also bear the burden of certain disadvantages - such as antagonizing

Congress Muslims, diluting their secular ideology and compromising their programme

in the legislature. A coalition would have appeared to the Congress leadership as an

option which demanded making great efforts (overcoming political differences with

Muslim League) and paying too much of a price (antagonizing Congress Muslims and

damaging its secular credentials) to gain a political advantage (Muslim support) which

162 For the details ofRajendra Prasad- Jinnah talks, see G-65/ 1937, NCC Papers, NMML 120

could, at best, be short lived and confined to legislative activities, and, at worst, highly

unlikely to materialize.

The alternative was to gain Muslim support by making a direct appeal to Muslims

to bring them into Congress fold. This was, then, the agenda to start a Muslim mass

contact programme. It was likely to fulfil the Congress aspirations of being truly a

representative organization. But it contained the risk of antagonizing Muslim League.

As will be seen later, it was the launching of the Muslim mass contact programme, more

than anything else, which earned the hostility of Muslim League and motivated it to

launch a massive anti-Congress campaign.

The lessons for Muslim League were equally unambiguous. The provincial

autonomy with increased franchise brought home the importance of mass politics but

also severe limitations of pursuing minority politics. Khaliquzzaman knew that he was

leading a party in UP which had limited options as it could not contest more than sixty

six seats in a house of228. His party could, at best, play the role of a pressure group, or

a subordinate ally to the party in power, or a formidable opposition. To be able to fulfil

the first two options, Muslim League would have to seek an alliance with Congress.

But a coalition was rendered unnecessary by the election results giving Congress a clear

majority, and un~ttainable by Jinnah's intervention in UP. Also, a coalition with

Congress would serve no purpose unless Muslim League was acknowledged as the sole

spokesman of Indian Muslims. Jinnah ridiculed Congress even for contesting

bye-elections for Muslim seats. The Congress's response was the Muslim mass contact

programme. Herein lay the real conflict between the two. Accepting Jinnah's condition

would have meant Congress abdicating its role of representing Muslims by conceding

this position to Muslim League and thereby reducing itself to being a Hindu

organization. The Muslim mass contact programme of Congress, were it to succeed,

121

threatened to reduce Muslim League into a politically insignificant elite group. It was

suicidal for both to accept each other's conditions. The lesson, therefore, for Congress

was to go ahead with the Muslim mass contact programme to bring Muslims into

Congress fold. The lesson for Muslim League was to deny Congress the right to speak

for Indian Muslims and create all-India political structure of Indian Muslims under its

exclusive leadership. A coalition government of Congress and Muslim League in UP in

1937, though very much on the agenda of a few individuals, was completely marginal

and actually contradictory to the long term intertests or schemes of both the

organizations.

The central theme of this chapter, if indeed there is one, is not to suggest that a

coalition government between Congress and Muslim League in UP would not have

altered the course of the next few years and led to a different situation. The idea is not to

contest the hypothetical observation that the absence of the coalition, along with other . factors, created conditions for the intensification of hostile communal politics. Perhaps

it did. It is always difficult to empirically demonstrate - for or against - hypothetical

conjectures constructed with hindsight. The central idea in this chapter is to argue

against the notion that the objective forces were !lloving towards a Congress-League

alliance and that a 'coalition', rooted very much in the logic of the pre-election situation,

was aborted by Congress leadership after the mandate received in the elections ..

The attempt in this chapter has been to demonstrate that (a) the argument

advocating the coalition is based on fragile and even faulty empirical premises; (b)

forces in the pre-election period were not moving in any one direction (to necessarily

culminate in a coalition) but in a variety of directions, there was nothing pre-destined

about the coalition; (c) the actors for and against the coalition in both the organizations

were unevenly distributed with only one group keen on a coalition; (d) to form or not to

122

form a coalition was a strategic question to be decided by the top leaders of the two

organizations keeping in mind their long term goals and priorities; and finally (e) to

consider a provincial event, or its absence, responsible for the partition oflndia is too far

fetched an idea to deserve serious academic respect. Nothing in the period 1937-39

suggests the inevitability ofthe partition, it could not be foreseen in the ministry period.

123