Chapter I - 26 Cases

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION | Atty. Mercader | Page ! of !1 27

CHAPTER I: STATUTES IN GENERAL

Case: determination of law’s duration (how implied; expiry date); validity of said temporary statute Peritioners in the instant case challenge the validity of 4 EOs issued by the president pursuant to CA No. 671, which was passed in view of a national emergency as a result of war and which delegates to the president powers “so vast as to amount to an abdication of the National Assembly of its authority.” The question on the constitutionality of the EOs was hinged on WON CA No. 671, the statutory basis of the President's power, was

still in effect at the time of their issuance. Notably, CA 671 did not fix the duration of its effectiveness. Thus, the Courts resorted to the Act's intent, purpose and provisions, and pertinent Constitutional provisions, to determine the extent of its duration and consequently, the validity of the assailed EOs.

FACTS: - The consolidated petitions challenge the validity of the EOs issued by the President pursuant to CA No. 671, which was enacted by the National Assembly:

a) to declare a state of total emergency as a result of war and b) to authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency

- The powers granted were “so vast as to amount to an abdication of the National Assembly of its authority” e.g. those that relate to reorganization of government, taxation, national revenue, national debt etc.

- Assailed EOs: EO 62: regulates rentals for houses and residential buildings EO 192: controls exports from the Philippines EO 225: appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the RP EO 226: appropriates funds in connection to the national elections ISSUE: WON CA No. 671, the statutory basis of the President's power, was still in effect at the time of their issuance.

HELD: CA No. 671 has a fixed term of effectivity. And it ended with the opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. 1. It is to be preseumed that CA No. 671 was enacted with the following limitations in view: a. Sec. 26, Art. VI, 1935 Constitution

"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President for a

limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.

- “limited period”: restrictive duration - "emergency": must be temporary in order to justify the delegation of powers

- no need for a new and different law that would terminate the delegation because if so, then the period for the delegation would in effect become unlimited, uncertain and indefinite and that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law"; - moreover, under the above scenario, Congress might not enact a repeal or in case it does, the President may just veto the same; it would also become easier for Congress to delegate such power than to take it back because delegation only requires a simple majority while recalling the same by way of another law would require 2/3 vote from each House voting separately b. Sec. 4, CA No. 671

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder

shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall provide otherwise." - law was silent on the repeal of the authority itself (law) but made an express mention about the repeal of rules and regulations issued in pursuance thereof - such is a clear manifestation of the belief of the National Assembly that there was no necessity for a similar repeal for the authority itself

1. ARANETA v. DINGLASAN (1949)

Author: M. Molina


- there would be no point in repealing such rules and regulations if the National Assembly intended for the authority to remain in force because in that case the President may simply restore the ones already annulled by the legislature c. Sec. 3, CA No. 671,

"The President of the Philippines shall, as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines, report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted." - from which it may be inferred that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war - CLEAR TENOR: that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which time the President was to give an account of his trusteeship; the section did not say 'each meeting'

President Quezon's statement re: duration of CA No. 671 - CA No. 671 was "only for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted"

- together, they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period - Pres. Quezon called for a special session of the NA when it became evident that the country was completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely that the PL would hold its next regular session - it can be discerned therefrom that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon the specific view to the inability of the NA to meet; indeed, no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the NA of its authority

2. The point of expiration of CA No. 671 is the first regular session and not the first special session. - In a special session, the Congress may consider general legislation or only such as the President may designate (Sec. 9, Art. VI) - In a regular session, the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law 3. The president's authority to issue contested EOs being statutory, that is, based on CA No. 671, the same was obliterated upon the cessation of the latter's effectivity.

Case: self-executing constitutional provisions; interpretation of the terms employed in the Constitutional

provision FACTS: - MPH in its bid to purchase 51% of the shares of the MHC (which owns Manila Hotel), invoked the Filipino First Policy which orders the preference to qualified Filipinos - GSIS, pursuant to the government's privatization program, sold the MHC to its winning bidder, Rehong Berhad (a Malaysian firm) which bought it at 44.00/share versus MPH's 41.58/share - Pending the declaration and perfection of the sale to Rehong Berhad, the petitioner matched the bidding price of 44.00/share - Having its managers' check rejected and apprehensive about that GSIS disregarded the tender of the petitioner's matching bid and that the sale may be disregarded - the Court then issued a TRO preventing the consummation of the sale ISSUES: 1.WON the sale of the MHC to Rehong Berhad is a violation against the Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution a. WON the Sec. 10, ART. XII is self-executing b. WON GSIS, being a government-owned and controlled corporation is covered by the said provision Petitioner’s Arguments:

1. Filipino First Policy - Product of Philippine nationalism; the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,

privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony

2. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS (1997)

Author: M. Molina


2. Sec. 10, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution - Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony as it is practically already a "historical monument which

reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture" - Manila Hotel is part of the national economy because 51% of the MHC is owned by GSIS, GSIS being a

government-owned and controlled corporation and a part of the tourism industry Respondents’ Counter-Arguments:

1. For the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to law down conditions under which business may be done

2. "National patrimony" refers only to lands of public domain and the invoked Constitutional mandate is addressed only to the State, not GSIS, which possess a personality of its own

3. 51% of shares does not make it significant to the national economy; MPH should have also questioned the respondent's right fromt he beginning

4. Petitioners made a misplaced reliance on the rules of bidding which provides that if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid - the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the

Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares - thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be

awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

5. Petition was grounded on grave abuse when there was no evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform HELD: Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII, 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. Under which, the GSIS is left with no choice but to yield to the Filipino First policy and award the bid to the petitioner after it has matched the bid of Renong Berhad. 1. Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII, 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. non-self-exceuting provisions: - mere declarations of policies and principles; provisions which require the legislature to enact laws and carry out tje purposes of the framers; e.g. ART. II, 1987 Constitution self-executing: - provisions which are complete in itself and becomes operative without the need of a supplementary or enabling legislation - a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is reffered to the legislatuer for action In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. - Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. Based on the ConComm Records, Sec. 10, Art. XII was only couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but only for purposes of style. - in self-executing provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the Constitution - the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated stateute squares with the Constitution - the mere fact that legislation may supplement or prescribe a penalty for the violation of self-executing provisions does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation 2. That the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 10 is NON-SELF-EXECUTING because it is implied from the tenor of the 1st and 3rd paragraphs preceding and following it, respectively, is untenable. - a constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another - the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 10 is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement; it is per se judicially enforceable for it only means that qualified Filipinos should be preferred - where a right exists, there is a remedy

Author: M. Molina


3. "National patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. - Manila Hotel has become a landmark--a living testimonial of the Philippine heritage; though restrictively American when it first opened in 1912, it has evolved to be truly Filipino - for more than 8 decades, Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos 4. The 51% of the the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter - 51% comprises the majority and controlling stock, meaning anyone who acuires it will have actual control and management of the hotel - said amount of shares cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands 5. "Qualified Filipinos" refer to both persons and corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos as per Con Comm Records - Sec. 10 (2) explicitly mandates the pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns 6. The constitutional provision is addressed to the State; it likewise applies to the instant case. - the sale of the 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through the respondent Committee on Privatizxation - such makes the GSIS sale a state action - the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered STATE ACTION covered by the constitution:

1. When the activity it engages in is a public function 2. When the governmen is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government

responsible for his action 3. When the government has approved or authorized the action

7. While the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid, it is not yet the winning bidder. - the bidding rules provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder AFTER IT HAS NEGOTIATED AND EXECUTED the necessary contracts and secured requisite approvals - the mere tender of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder - where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding, exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of foreign entity - foreigners may only be awarded the sale ONLY IT a) no Filipino qualifies or b) if the qualified Filipino failes to match the highest bid - rightly, it was only after the petitoner matched the bid and the same was rejected by the respondent that the cause of action arose Doctrine of constitutional supremacy - the constitution is the fundamental law of the land and thus it is deemed written in every statute and contract - any statute or contract which violates the constitution shall be declared null and void (ART. 7, CC)

FACTS: - RA 10153, An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the ARMM,reset the elections from 8 Aug 2011, to the 2nd Monday of May 2013, and every three years thereafter to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections - The law also granted the President the power to appoint OICs for the offices in ARMM Petitioners’ arguments on RA 10153’s constitutionality

1. Violation of Sec26(2), Art. VI: It didn’t comply with the 3-reading requirement 2. It violates people in ARMM of their right of suffrage. 3. It granted the President the power to appoint OICs (who will remain in office until May 2013) which gave

the President the power to control ARMM (in violation of Sec16, ArtX of the 1987 Constitution) - SC the resolved to DISMISS the petitions, UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA10153 and LIFT the TRO issued. - Petitioners then filed the present motion for reconsideration.

3. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2011)

Author: M. Molina


HELD: 1.The Constitutional requirement for three readings of a bill may be waived when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. SUCH CERTIFICATION was present in the instant case. - The presidential certification of necessity dispenses with the both requirements under Sec. 26(2) ART. VI a. that the bill passes three readings on separate days b. that it is printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved - the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met is untenable - the factual basis of the presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements deisgned to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review - in the instant case, the HOR gave full recognition to the President’s certification and promptly enacted RA 10153 2. Yes. The constitution mandates the synchronization of ARMM elections with the national and local elections, which includes the ARMM. a. ArtXVIII of the 1987 Constitution, Sec 1,2,5 and the ConComm deliberations

- The purpose of the following provisions is to synchronize the national and local elections which began in 1992. This, in effect, gave a bonus of 2 years to HoR members and local elective officials. In 1992, the was a SINGLE election held for ALL elective officials.

b. Petitioners assail that ARMM is not included since it wasn’t mentioned in the said article. - ARMM wasn’t organized yet when the Constitution was passed. - Sec1, ArtX of the 1987 Constitution mentioned “autonomous regions of Muslim Mindanao thereby giving the effect that ARMM is a local government. - The Constitution only distinguishes between local and national government and doesn’t make a distinction between a local and a regional government. - Local (in its plain definition) pertains to serving the needs of a particular limited district or region. Thus ARMM elections are deemed to be local elections.

3. No. The incumbents cannot holdover their positions until the May 2013 elections. - Sec7(1), ArtVIII of RA9054 which provides for the holdover capacity of the elective officials in ARMM is against the constitution.

a. It is in violation of Sec8, ArtX, 1987 Consitution which says that Congress has no authority to extend the 3-year term limit by inserting a holdover position in RA 9054. The holdover rule can only apply where no legislative intent to the contrary exists (e.g. holdover capacity of brgy and SK officials) b. The Congress, in passing RA10153 to eliminate the holdover rule, is exercising their wisdom, therefore a political issue.

4. No. COMELEC may not call for special elections in ARMM - The Constitution merely empowered COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The Omnibus Election code, sec5, and Sec6 provide for COMELEC’s power to provide for holding special elections in unexpected and unforeseen circumstances (e.g. terrorism, violence) - IN CONSTRAST, ARMM elections were postponed by law in furtherance of a constitutional mandate of synchronization. In addition to that, RA 10153 already set the date and COMELEC has no authority to set a different one (since the legislature was the one to enact RA10153) 5. No. The power of appointment given to the President is not unconstitutional. - Petitioners: The President’s power to appoint only applies to appointive officials, not elective ones. - The Court said the Sec16, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the broad appointive power of the President. He shall also appoint “…all other officials whose appointments are not provided by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.” - Petitioners assail that RA10153 where it provides for the appointive power of the President is in violation with Sec16, ArtX of the 1987 Constitution which states that the President can only exercise the power of supervision over autonomous regions - The Court says that the power of supervision is not the power of control that the petitioners are afraid of. Since the President can no longer remove the officials he appointed as OICs (as provided by Sec3, RA 10153), these officials will no longer be under his control. - RA 10153 is an interim measure. It is a necessary effect in order to comply with the Constitution mandate of synchronization. Furthermore, the other options (i.e. lengthen/shorten the term of officials in ARMM and COMELEC’s

Author: M. Molina


special elections) are unconstitutional. Thus the only solution is the appointive power of the President, which can be

compared to the President’s appointive power to fill in the vacancy for any cause in Sangguniang Pampook. It is because of the unconstitutionality of the two that the power was given to the President.

Case: how bills are passed; justiciability and constitutionality of IRP violations FACTS: - Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo questions the validity of RA 8240 ("sin taxes" on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes) which, he alleged, was not properly passed due to the violation of House Rules when: a. no yeays and nays but was approved by motion b. deliberately ignored petitioner's clarifications on the existence of a quorum c. session was hastily adjourned by Speaker JDV - According to petitioner, under Sec. 16 (3), Art. VI, each House may determine rules of its proceedings; thus, a violation thereof would amount to a violation of the constitution ISSUES: 1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the said violation 2. WON there was grave abuse of discretion 3. WON there was irregularity/"railroading" HELD: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction over violations of the IRP of the Senate lest constitutional provisions or rights of private individuals have been violated - in the enactment of RA 8240, what was allegedly violated are merely internal rules of procedure of the house rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law (Art. VI, Sections 26-27) - no rights of private individuals were involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court - what was questioned was not even the existence of a quorum but the prevention of the inquiry into the existence of one - the Courts are denied the power to inquire into allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a) constitutional provisions or b) of rights of privats individuals Rules are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them because they are primarily PROCEDURAL. - Courts have no concern over their observance - mere failure to conform thereto does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure 2. Where the Court cannot declare void an act of the legislature for mere noncompliance with its own IRP, it

neither has a case in which a branch of government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of judicial review (Sec. 1, ART. VIII). - the jurisdiction of the Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Sec. 5, Art. VIII and to the requirement of justiciable controversy before the Courts can adjudicate Constitutional questions - under Sec. 1, Art. VIII, the Court's function is merely to check WON the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view 3. There was no irregularity--that is, the railroading when the session was adjourned notwithstanding Arroyo’s query--that was illegal - yeays and nays are not required in passing committee reports by the Constitution except on: a. the last and third readings b. at the request of 1/5 of members of the House c. upon repassing of the bill after the President’s veto - Petitioner's questions were dilatory tactics because quorum was obviously existent; the Court noted that only 5 out of the 11 members of the House questioned the manner by which the committee report was approved

4. ARROYO v. DE VENECIA (1997)

Author: M. Molina


4. Enrolled bill doctrine must be applied. - where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of teh bills have not been observed on the basis only of an allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, the Court should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill

Case: probative value of legislative journals Counsel for appellant asserts that the Act under which the appellant was charged was not passed on or before the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature, and that for the same reason, said Act is consequently null and void. His contention made necessary the inquiry into 1) the authority of legislative Journals and 2) their admissibility in Court.

FACTS: - Juan Pons was found guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium. - In his appeal, counsel of Pons alleged and offered to prove the following: a. that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; b. that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed nor approved on or before the said date but on March 1, thus null and void. - However, the journal of the Philippine Commission stated that the Assembly adjourned sine die (w/o assigning another day for a further meeting or hearing) at 12:00 midnight on Feb. 28, 1914. - The counsel in his argument says that the Assembly’s clock was stopped on Feb. 28, 1914, at midnight and the session actually ended on the early hours of the day after. ISSUES: WON the legislative adjourned on Feb. 28, 1914. To prove this the court answered two sub-issues. 1. WON the date of adjournment can be proven by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence. 2. WON the court can take judicial notice of the journals. HELD: 1. The necessity for and authority of Journals find statutory basis in: - Rule 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides “that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal” and that it shall be the duty of the secretary “to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission” - The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides in Section 7, that the Philippine Assembly shall keep a journal of its proceeding, which shall be published. - Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the US and the Philippines shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence.” - Section 313 (as amended by sec. 1 of Act no. 2210) of the same code also provides that “official documents may be

proved as follows: (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of

either house thereof or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order: provided, that in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature where there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provision of such Act and of due enactment thereof.” * However, the enrolled bill doctrine is recognized as more controlling than the legislative Journalds - US Jurisprudence: Journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. Thus, the court must take judicial notice of the journal. - The journals show that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o‘clock midnight on February 28, 1914. 2. Legislative journals will be controlling in the determination of, for example, the date of adjournment of the Philippine Legislature. - acts of government > individual memory - Counsel for the appellant must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses while legislative journals are the acts of the government itself. To inquire into the veracity of the journals would be to violate the respect for a co-equal but separate branch of the government.

5. US v. PONS (1916)

Author: M. Molina


- The court held that if it be actually believed ad recognized that the clock was stopped, ―the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery and memory. - This led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. To take this rule away for one purpose is to take it away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters. - Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time by facts resting only in the memory of the individuals. DISPOSITIVE: Judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Case: Petitioner asks refund of the sums it spent upon the importation of "UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE", invoking the Central Bank circular which provides payment exemption for a certain list of products upon importation. Notwithstanding the CB's earlier issuance of a permit, Auditor of the Central Bank and consequently, the Auditor General, denied the same on the

ground that SEC. 2 of the CB Memorandum invoked exempts "UREA FORMALDEHYDE", as in the finish product, and

not the separate raw materials of UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE as petitioner argues. Petitioner's second argument is based on the contention that when the law invoked was still a bill, Congress made use of

the conjunction AND. Court upheld CB's decision based on the a) explanation of the National Institute of Science and Technology and b) enrolled bill doctrine. FACTS: - Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95 which fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions; - Exemptions for the payment demanded in the Circular were likewise made available to a certain list of imported products by the CB in a subsequent memorandum - Petitioner company – which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers – bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde (raw materials of said glues). It also paid a margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. Casco made another purchase in May 1960 and paid P6,345.72. • Relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, petitioners sought the refund of the fees, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from such fee. • The Central Bank issued vouchers for the refund of the fees, but the Auditor of the Bank refused to approve them since the said exemption is not included in Sec. 2, Par. 18 of R.A. 2609.A Pertinent laws/provisions: Sec. 2, Par. 18 of R.A. 2609: “the margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users” ISSUE: WON “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee (NO) HELD: 1.“Urea formaldehyde” as it appears in the provision cannot be construed as “urea and formaldehyde.” - Urea formaldehyde, as defined by the Commissioner of the National Institute of Science and Technology, is a finished product; It is different from “urea” and “formaldehyde” which are raw materials used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde.”

6. CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. v. GIMENEZ (1963)

Author: M. Molina


2. Petitioner cannot rest his argument on the alleged contents of the bill approved in Congress - Petitioner: the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde”, and it was the intent of members of Congress to exempt such materials separately as raw materials. In support of this view, petitioners cited the statements made by members of Senate during the consideration of the bill before the House. - individual statements do not reflect the view of the Senate and do not indicate the intent of the House of Representatives. - the enrolled bill uses the term “urea formaldehyde”, not “urea and formaldehyde” - under the enrolled bill doctrine, it is conclusive upon the courts as regards to the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. - Also, if there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree PRINCIPLES: Enrolled bill theory - A principle of judicial interpretation of rules of procedure in legislative bodies - Under the doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body and is signed into law, the courts assume that all rules of procedure in the enactment process were properly followed. That is, "[i]f a legislative document is authenticated in regular form by the appropriate officials, the court treats that document as properly adopted.

Case: enrolled bill doctrine; one-subject-one-title rule The constitutional challenge to RA 7354 which withdrew the franking privileges from the Judiciary did not prosper under the one-subject-one-title and enrolled bill doctrine but it was found meritorius ont eh ground of the EP clause. FACTS: - The Philippine Judges Association (PJA), members of the lower courts, assial the validity of Sec. 35 of RA 7354 of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC), which withdraws the franking privileges--from the SC down to the MTCs--among several other goverment offices while exempting, at the same time, the Executive and Legislative branches of government and even some private individuals Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All franking privileges authorized by law are repealed. - The SC even as an interested party still ruled upon the case simply because no other office has the authority to do so Grounds for nullification:

1. Sec. 26 (1), Art. VI: RA 7354 embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes in the title An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities

2. Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI: It did not pass the required readings in both House of Congress and there was no distribution of the printed copies of the bill in its final form among members before its passage

3. Sec. 1, Art. III: The law discriminates and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary RULING: Unconstitutional for violating the EP clause HELD: 1. The title of the bill is NOT REQUIRED to be an index of the body of an act. - silence on the repealing clause is valid, after all, the repeal on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute - repeal is an EFFECT of the new statute; it is NOT THE SUBJECT of the new statute; thus, it is not required to be expressed in the title because only subjects are required to be done so 2. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the Act is conclusive upon the Judiciary except in matters that have to be entered in journals. - doctrine of sepration of powers: the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of a bill’s approval

7. PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. V. PRADO (1993)

Author: M. Molina


3. Insofar as the Act withdraws the privilege from the Judiciary but retains the same for other offices and private individuals, the PPC failed tot consider a fair and valid classification. - the privilege was extended to the less deserving - if the problem is the loss of revenues, then the proper remedy is to withdraw the privilege altogether - private gain vs. Public service: withdrawal will only delay the administration of justice

ONLY PROCEDURAL ISSUES WERE INCLUDED IN THIS DIGEST. CHECK HANDWRITTEN NOTES FOR THE REST RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the Naitonal Internal Revenue Code.

* VAT – equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money goods or properties sold, bartered, or exchanged or of gross receipts from sale or exchange or services

RULING: a. NO. RA 7716 does not violate Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution – originate in house b. NO. RA 7716 does not violate Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution – passed in 3 separate readings c. NO. The Bicameral Conference Committee did not commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it “reconciled” SB 1630 and HB 11197 – to revise/ add inconsistencies d. NO. RA 7716 does not violate Art. VI, Sec. 26(1) HELD: 1. RA 7716 does not violate Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution.

8. TOLENTINO v. SEC. OF FINANCE (1994)

Petitioner SC

1. RA 77116 did not “originate exclusively” in the HOR because it is the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills. • This means that to be considered as having

originated in the House, RA 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

1. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required to “originate exclusively” in the HOR • Senate may in fact amend bills from the HOR to the

extent of producing an entirely different bill • Senate may go as far as changing the entire bill that

originated in the house • To say that it is the LAW and not the BILL which

should originate from the HB is tantamount to: a. Denying co-equal power to the Senate b. Usurpation of Senate authority by HOR

• To insist the statute to be the same as the House bill would mean to deprive the Senators to concur or propose amendments

2. The Senate’s power is supposed to be limited in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power.

2. The treaty-ratifying power is a non-legislative power by the Senate and is not comparable to the power to legislate; it is a check on the executive • The legislative power is conferred on both the HOR

and Senate and no preference is given to any single chamber.

Author: M. Molina


2. NO. RA 7716 does not violate Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution – passed after 3 readings of separate days and final form has been printed and distributed three days before it is finally approved

3. NO. The Bicameral CC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it “reconciled” SB 1630 and HB 11197

4. NO. RA 7716 does not violate Art. VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution

3. Senate Bill 1630 was passed not in substitution of House Bill 11197 but of another Senate Bill

3. There is nothing wrong if a substitute bill was passed in Senate in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, as long as it is not acted upon by the Senate while waiting for the receipt of the House Bill.

• Constitution only states the initiative for the filing of revenue, tariff or tax bills coming from HOR.

• Senate never seemed to consider the Bill- it was only looked into after receiving the proposed bill by the HOR on Nov 23 1993

• Senate preserving HB and writing its own version is = Senate preserving a bill of its own on the same subject matter

Petitioner SC

1. S. No. 1670 did not pass 3 reading days. • 1st: Feb 8, 1994 • 2nd: March 22, 1994 • 3rd: March 22, 1994

1. Sec. 26(2) allows the Congress to do away with the requirement of 3 separate reading days, if the President certifies that it is urgent.

2. The certification of the bill was invalid because the condition stated as urgent—growing budget deficit—is not an unusual condition in this country.

2. No member of the Senate controverted the reality of the factual basis of the certification.

Petitioner SC

1. The bill, which became RA 7716, included provisions not found in either the HB or SB; these provisions were surreptitiously inserted by the CC.

1. Nothing unusual with the “closed door meetings” of the CC in order to avoid any compromise and reach an agreement on the conflicting provisions. • It is possible for the CC to draft an entirely new bill

since: - The only requirement is that it should be

germane to the subject of the H and S bills. - The final bill passed in the CC would still be

approved by the House and the Senate.

Petitioner SC

1. PAL: Title did not indicate that there is an amendment that would affect the exemption previously enjoyed by PAL on taxes. • Special laws cannot be amended by general law-

PAL’s tax exempt is a special law (precedent to Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty)

1. The title is not an index of its contents; it is enough that it provides the general purpose and that all provisions are germane to the general subject. • The provision withdrawing the tax exemption

previously enjoyed by PAL is germane to the general subject, which is to widen the scope of the VAT system.

• Under Article 7 Section 11: Congress, after giving grant to franchise for operation of public utility, is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires

Author: M. Molina


*Enrolled bill theory - Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of RA 7716 must be resolved in its favor.

Case: Basis for city status (WON IRAs are supposed to be included in the gross annual income of municipalities which is the basisfor their convertion into cities). Toelento v. Sec. Of Finance: Filing of the bill was initiated by the HOR. FACTS: The constitutionality of RA 7720, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was being challenged on 2 grounds:

a) that the bill therefor did not originate from the HOR and b) that the Municipality did not meet the minimum average annual income required in order to be converted into a city

HELD: 1. HB 8817, which later became RA 7720, was an initiative of the HOR, in compliance with Sec. 24, Art. VI, 1987, Constitution. - Tolentino v. Sec. Of Finance:it is not the law but the bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the HOR - Bills of local application like HB 8817 should really originate exclusively in the HOR - it cannot be denied that HB 8817 was filed in the HOR first before SB 1243; the filing of HB 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB 1243; - HB 8817 was that which initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of RA 7720 - HB 8817 was already approved on the third reading and was duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB 8817 - clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB 1243 until it received HB 8817 2. IRAs form part of the income of LGUs. - "income” as defined in the LGU Code: all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU - IRAs are income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU - IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury, needless of any further action on the part of the local government

Case: RIDERS.SC affirmed the CFI’s nullification of a provision in RA 1600 relating to the status of reserve officers in the AFP was included in the Appropriations Act on the ground that it violates Sec. 19 (2), Art. VI, 1935 Constitution. FACTS: - Petitioner Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reverted to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments. - Garcia protests against his reversion to inactive status and claims it is in violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service. - On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57). ISSUE: WON RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill? HELD:

9. ALVAEZ v. GUINGONA (1996)

10. GARCIA v. MATA (1975)

Author: M. Molina


1. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. - RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation ofgovernment while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. - Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutionalprohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. - It also violates the one-subject one-title rule. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

FACTS: - assailed: RA 3836—An Act AMENDING SEC. 12 OF CA NO. 186 as amended by RA 3096--insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators, Representatives, and elective officials of both Houses on the following grounds: a. vs. Sec. 21 (1), ART. VI: assailed provision is not expressed in the title of the bill b. vs. Sec. 14. ART. VI: prohibition on the increase in salary and other emoluments before the expiration of term

c. “selfish class Legislation”: 12 years before retirement as compared to 20 years for all other government employees d. another attempt to further increase their compensation

HELD: 1. Petitioners HAVE STANDING to bring suit. - This Court has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, as in this instant case, is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to bring this suit - Philconsa is precisely a non-profit, civic organization, the main objective of which is to uphold the principles of the Constitution - RA 3836 (affects taxpayers because it) involves the disbursement of public funds 2. RA 3836 clearly VIOLATES Sec. 14, ART. VI. “... No increase in the compensation (and emoluments) of the members of Congress shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all members approving such increase.” - RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of members of Congress that will take effect immediately, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the members of Congress - Also, the Congress has been provided with several limits in the Constitution in guarding against the temptation to increase their salaries - “other emoluments”: profit arising from office or employment; compensation received for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office as salary, fees, and perquisites 3. RA 3836 also violates the EP clause 4. RA 3836 VIOLATES Sec. 21(1), ART. VI - RA 3836 gives no inkling or notice to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to the members of Congress - CA No. 186, which RA 3836 amends according to its title, concerns the retirement benefits of members of the GSIS who have rendered at least 20 years of service to the government - RA 3836 concerns members of Congress and elective officers thereof who ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE GSIS Purpose of Sec. 21(1), ART. VI

1. to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature

11. PHILCONSA v. GIMENEZ (1965)

Author: M. Molina


2. to fairly apprise the people - satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the content - the constitutional provision should be construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation

Case: tax provisions, not necessarily needed to be mentioned in the title In the instant case, the title which states the creation of a Videogram Regulatory Board necessarily covers the taxation of videogram businesses. It is in fact also included in the PD’s preamble and wheras clauses. FACTS: - Videogram operators challenge the constitutionality of PD 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board, on the following grounds:

a. Section 10 thereof is a RIDER: imposition of 30% tax on gross receipts payable to the LG is not germane to the subject matter in the title of the PD b. harsh, confiscatory, oppressive taxation c. no factual or legal basis for the

d. undue delegation of power e. ex post facto law f. regulation on the video industry as if it were a nuisance - Some of the rationale for the PD’s enactment as provided for in its preambular cluases: a. unregulated proliferation of videograms etc. to the predjudice of movie houses and theaters b. 600M untaxed profit from the video industry vs. 450M losses of government in the movie industry c. economic recovery d. clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth HELD: PD 1987 is constitutional. 1. PD 1987 has sufficiently complied with the one-subject one-title rule and the tax provision in the PD is not a rider. - the foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the general objective of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram regulatory Board as expressed in its title - taxation is a tool for regulation; and in the PD, it is but one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree - the preamble also explains the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure - the title of PD 1987 is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions 2. On other issues: - The rate of taxes is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature - The Court reserves resolution of the question on the validity of the President’s exercise of legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, which is still pending in other cases - there is no question that public welfare is at the bottom of the enactment - the bottomline is that, the petitioner really is questioning the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the decree—matters which are of legislative concern

Case: WON exclusion of the amendatory provisions from the title is sufficient to invalidate the Act FACTS:

• Consolidated case involving the constitutionality of R.A. 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNIT) which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, mainly Sections 21 and 29

12. TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD (1987)

13. TAN v. DEL ROSARIO (1994)

Author: M. Molina

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION | Atty. Mercader | Page ! of !15 27o Section 21: applies SNIT only to professionals and self-employed o Section 29: limits the deductions of professionals and self-employed to seven types of direct costs: (a)

raw materials, supplies and direct labor; (b) salaries of employees directly engaged in the profession or business; (c) telecommunications, electricity, fuel, light and water; (d) business rentals; (e) depreciation; (f) contributions to the government and accredited institutions; and (g) interest on business loans from accredited financial institutions. For those direct costs which were difficult to determine, a maximum 40% of gross receipt is allowed as deduction.

• Petitioners are taxpayers who claim to be adversely affected by the continued implementation of SNIT

Facts in G.R. No. 109289: • Petitioner asserts that the Act violates the following constitutional provisions:

1. Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

o Petitioner: House Bill which eventually became RA 7496 is a misnomer or deficient because it was entitled “Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession” while the actual title contains the said title with the additional phrase, “…Amending Section 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code”.

2. Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall

evolve a progressive system of taxation.

o Petitioner: Act taxes self-employed and professionals differently from the manner it imposes

the tax on corporations and partnerships, thus violating the equal protection clause.

3. Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall

any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Facts in G.R. No. 109446:

• Petitioners contend that respondents have exceeded their authority in promulgating section 6, Revenue regulations no. 293, to carry out R.A. No. 7496.

o Section 6 basically provides that SNIT applies to partners in general professional partnerships (GPP).

Petitioners question the administrative interpretation of respondents in applying SNIT to GPPs.

They cite pertinent deliberations in Congress during the enactment of RA 7496, where it was stated that the bill is not applicable to business corporations or partnerships.

ISSUES:

1. WoN RA 7496 is deficient for being merely entitled, “Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession” (NO)

2. WoN R.A. 7496 violates the Constitution for imposing taxes that are not uniform and equitable (NO) 3. WoN SNIT should apply to partners in GPPs (YES)

HELD: 1. The objectives of Sec. 26(1), Art.VI of the Constitution have been met:

a. To prevent log-rolling legislation which would unite members of legislature who favor one of the unrelated subjects in the whole act b. To avoid surprises or fraud c. To apprise the people of the subjects of the legislation

- Anything else included in title would be a compendium of the law which is not the intention of the said provision.

2. Uniformity of taxation, like equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. - It does not offend classification as long as:

1. Standards are based on substantial distinctions 2. Classification is germane to the purpose of law 3. Law applies to both present and future conditions 4. Classification must apply equally to all members of the same class

- Legislative intent: shift the income tax system towards the scheduled approach in taxation of individual taxpayers and maintain present global treatment on corporations. Thus, classification is neither arbitrary nor inappropriate

Author: M. Molina


*Note: Difference between scheduled and global approach – in scheduled approach, income tax treatment depends on the kind or category of taxable income of the taxpayer. In global approach, tax treatment disregards tax base and treats as common all categories of taxable income of the taxpayer.

- Petitioner’s contention that Act is violative of due process is without merit - Due process clause may only be invoked when there is a clear contravention of constitutional limitations on the exercise of tax power. –this is not evident in case at bar. 3. There is no distinction in income tax liability between a person who practices his profession alone or individually and one who does it through a partnership with others in a common profession. - Under present income tax system, all individuals deriving income from any source are treated in the same manner under a common set of rules - In GPP, income tax is not imposed on the professional partnership but on the partners in their individual capacity.

Different from ordinary business partnerships, which are taxable partnerships. GPPs are exempt partnerships, which are deemed to only a mechanism in the generation and distribution of income to each of the partners as individuals.

DISPOSITIVE: Petitions dismissed.

Principles: One-subject-one-bill; titles don’t have to be too detailed. They just need to adequately account for all the provisions contained in the bill. FACTS: - RA 7675 An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong

prior to enactment: Mandaluyong and San Juan constitute 1 legislative district effect: Mandaluyong and San Juan will now be entitled to one legislative district each

- RA 7675 was ratified by 70% of voters in a plebiscite and was consequently put into effect - the constitutionality of the law was challenged on the ground that it violates:

Art VI, Sec 26(1): Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Art VI, Sec 5(3): Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. Art VI, Sec 5(1): The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

- RA 7675 resulted to an increase in the composition of the HOR - the division of legislative district was not made pursuant to any census that shows said municipalities have attained the minimum requirements

Art VI, Sec 5(4): Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

- RA 7675 preempted the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts HELD: 1. NO VIOLATION of Sec. 26 (1), Art. VI because the conversion of Mandaluyong into a city necessarily involves and implies the creation of a separate district - the two subjects cannot be taken separately from each other

14. TOBIAS v. ABALOS (1994)

Author: M. Molina


- Art VI Sec 5(3): Each city must have its own representative; Thus, Mandaluyong’s conversion into a city automatically made it a unique congressional district. Sumulong v. Comelec : Art VI Sec 26 “should be given a practical rather than a technical construction”, i.e., so long as the title gives a general idea of all the provisions contained in the bill, there is no need for the title to enumerate each and every topic in the bill.

Lidasan v. Comelec : No need for a title that “fully [indexes] or [catalogues] all the contents and the minute details” of a bill, so long as it adequately informs “the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation”. 2. NO VIOLATION of Sec. 5 (1), Art. VI because the Act enjoys the presumption that it was passed through a regular Congressional process. - its violation cannot be ascertained on the mere allegations that the minimum required 250,000 inhabitants was not attained - the 250-member limit is NOT ABSOLUTE; the "unless otherwise provided" clause may be increased if Congress so mandates - Presume regularity of congressional processes – Congress must have first checked if San Juan and Mandaluyong both met the population requirement (at least 250,000 people) before they approved a law that would cleave San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. - Nothing requires Congress to present what data they had considered before enacting a law. 3. NO VIOLATION of Sec. 5 (4), Art. VI because Congress itself passed RA 7675 and it cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. - An absurd proposition, because “it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law” – they wouldn’t have crafted a law that took away a Constitutionally-endowed duty from them. DISPOSITIVE: Dismissed for lack of merit.

Facts:

The following were the vetoed provisions and the reasons therefor: (Note: pertinent provisions are highlighted.)

1. Sec. 55 of Appropriations Act of ’89: provides that no further restoration or increase may be enacted by any other body of government shall be permissible once the Congress has removed or did not include it.

15. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA (2005)

16. GONZALES v. MACARAIG (1990)

TIMELINE

December 16, 1988 Congress passed General Appropriations Act of 1989

December 29, 1988 - President signed the bill into law, declared it to have become RA 6688. - In the process, Section 55 (a general provision) was VETOED.

February 2, 1989 Petition was filed assailing constitutionality of the veto, seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing RA 6688.

January 19, 1990 Senators filed a Supplemental Petition as President once again vetoed a similar provision on the GAA ’90 declared to have become RA 6831.

Author: M. Molina


- Grounds for Veto: Sec. 25 (5) of Article VI provides for the exercise of augmentation of the budget within each department as may be prescribed by law.

- President cites the consequence of not being able to use their savings in times of calamity or any other time of urgent need.

2. Sec. 16 of Appropriations Act of ’90: same as Sec. 55 of AA’89, except it pertains specifically to savings, so it is made to look like a condition. - Grounds for Veto: Same as the above, except it also violates PD 1177 that allows intra-departmental

augmentation of budget provided it is for a specific reason or purpose. Arguments of Petitioners:

1. The President’s item-veto power only pertains to ITEMS and therefore is not allowed to veto PROVISIONS such as Section 55 of AA’89 and Section 16 of AA’90.

2. Neither can the President veto conditions or restrictions which would violate separation of powers. 3. Power of augmentation as provided for in Sec. 25 Article VI has to be provided by law and so the Congress is

vested with power to restrict that Constitutional provision. Response of Solicitor General:

1. Petitioners had a political remedy, which was to override the veto with 2/3rd’s of the vote of Congress. 2. Section 55 is a “rider” and is extraneous to the Appropriations Act. 3. Power of President to augment was provided for in Secs. 44 and 45 of PD 1177. 4. President is empowered to veto provisions or other “distinct and severable parts” of an Appropriations Bill.

Issue: WON the Presidential veto of Sec 55 of AA’89 and Sec 16 of AA’90 should be declared unconstitutional and without effect. Ruling: The Court ruled to dismiss the petition and held that the Presidential vetoes were appropriate in light of Constitutional provisions. Ratio:

1. Judicial Determination - When the issue is the scope of constitutional powers of the branches of government, the judiciary is burdened

with the duty to uphold the Constitution. (Demetria v Alba) - There is an imperative need for a definitive ruling by this Court as to the parameters of the exercise of the

Presidential veto. - Also, the Senators have standing as taxpayers.

2. The Extent of the President’s Item-veto Power - Court holds petitioners interpretation as restrictive and violates the basic principle that a DISTINCT AND

SEVERABLE part of a bill may be subject to a separate veto. - Cites Bengzon v Secretary of Justice and the Bernas commentaries as basis. - Since Sec. 25(2) Art. VI mandates that provisions in the appropriations bill must relate specifically to a

particular appropriation, it renders provision distinct and separate. - Bengzon also says that veto powers of President must be liberally construed so as not to be interfered with by

the other branches of government. 3. Inappropriateness of the Provisions

- The provisions vetoes are inappropriate for the following reasons: a. Vetoed provisions do not relate to a particular appropriation, which is in violation of the requirement of

Sec. 25(2) Article VI of the Constitution. b. Disapproved or reduced items cannot be found on the face of the bill - one must compare it to the

submitted proposal by the President. c. Vetoed sections are expressions of general legislative policy rather than budget appropriations.

- Henry v Edwards: “Legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity for executive veto.” 4. Inappropriateness of the Conditions or Restrictions:

- Although concededly, the Congress has the power to impose conditions on appropriations and the Executive cannot veto them, contested provisions are NOT conditions.

- They do not exhibit a connection with the money items in a budgetary sense. - They are general law measures that are substantive and therefore, separate legislation.

5. Power of Augmentation and the Validity of a Veto - Augmentation of the budget is constitutionally mandated by Sec. 25 (5) Art. VI of the Constitution and to

legislate the above sections would be unconstitutional. - Also allowed by:

o Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 o Section 12 of the General Appropriations Act of 1989 (pertaining to savings)

- No question that statutory authority is granted.

Author: M. Molina


- Separation of powers is not harmed, as transfer is not from one department to another. - Augmentation from saving cannot be considered a specific appropriation of money. - If Congress’ intention was to repeal PD 1177 it should have done so in a separate enactment. - Or relied on the overriding of veto via a 2/3 vote of Congress

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Dissent: GUTIERREZ, JR., J

- Opines that the fundamental principles underlying the doctrine of separation of powers were violated when President vetoed the above provisions.

- Consequences are the following: o Traditional power of the Congress over public purse is negated. What Court upheld is already fund juggling. o The Court, in effect, allowed a lump sum appropriation for Executive Branch. Savings is at least Two Billion

Pesos. Appropriations don’t have to come under Congress approval anymore. o Executive does not have fiscal autonomy, so restrictive budgetary conditions are constitutionally mandated.

Flexibility is not a must. o Power to augment is for projects, functions and offices where both Congress and President expressly concur. o To give President the power to veto provisions is, in effect, a rewriting of the Constitution.

- As to the item v provision debate, the court cannot expand the definition of provisions. o President may veto a distinct and severable part of the bill if

• That severable part is an item and not a provision • If that severable part belongs to an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill

- The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law: o Congress must first authorize BY LAW this augmentation before the same can take place. o The Congress is within its power to restrict the appropriations and augmentations made by the Executive. o This is not an extraneous part of the provision, this relates directly to appropriations.

FACTS: Pres. Aquino’s veto of GAA of FY 1992, wherein Congress favored the payment of the adjustment of pensions of retired SC and CA justices, was overruled by SC. Previously, she had already vetoed an HB and SB restoring RA 1797 and RA 3595—an Act which adjusted the pensions of retired officials of the Constitutional Commissions and justices of the SC and CA--which were both absolutely repealed by Pres. Marcos’ PD 644. But because of an SC ruling on the ineffectivity of the said amendatory PD due to non-publication since its promulgation (Tanada v. Tuvera, ART. 2, CC), the Congress thought it appropriate to apply the said pension readjustments in the vetoed GAA of FY 1992. HELD: 1. Pres. Aquino’s vetoed PROVISIONS and not mere ITEMS. General vetoes v. Item vetoes: - when it comes to appropriations, it is unwise to veto the whole thing because the Admin needs money to operate; thus the ITEM VETO - in the instant case, the President likewise vetoed RA 1797 and the Resolution of the Court which gave justices adjusted pensions - the President cannot veto laws enacted decades/years before her term and final judgments of the Courts; only another law can recall said privileges 2. The veto likewise violated the FISCAL AUTONOMY of the Judiciary - There is a need for an independent judiciary; the veto impairs the power of the CJ to augment items in the Judiciary’s appropriation

17. BENGZON v. DRILON (1992)

Author: M. Molina


- vetoes, to begin with, dictate how funds should be utilized, and are therefore repugnant to Fiscal Autonomy 3. The veto also deprives retired justices of their statutory rights to pensions due them.

FACTS: - Case at bar is consolidation of 5 cases relating to “claims of authority between the Legislative and Executive” on the General Appropriations Act of 1994 - GAA of 1994: President FVR signed the bill into law (turning it to RA 7663) and VETOED some provisions therein - Petitioners (claiming to have standing as taxpayers and/or legislators) primarily assail the constitutionality of:

1) conditions imposed by the President in some of the items in the budget, and 2) the veto made by FVR on the appropriation for debt service.

- Particular items/special provisions were on: 1) debt servicing 2) revolving fund for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) 3) road maintenance by the DPWH 3) purchase of military equipment & medicines 4) AFP pension fund 5)

CAFGU deactivation (specific items tackled in the ratio) Pertinent laws/provisions:

• Sec. 24 & 25, Art. VI – pertaining to appropriation bills • Sec. 27 (2), Art. VI – Presidential power to veto items in ‘money bills’

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioners have standing (YES) 2. WON veto of special provision for debt ceiling is constitutional (YES) 3. WON vetoes and conditions set by the President on particular items are constitutional (MIXED)

HELD: 1. Case at bar concerns appropriation of national budget, taxpayer suit stands. Legislators likewise granted standing because the petition touches on the legislative power on appropriation as stated in the Constitution.

2. Debt Servicing was one of the special provisions in the GAA; The President vetoed said special provision, without vetoing the amount set aside by Congress (around 86B pesos).

3. The Court relied on the ruling in Gonzales v Macaraig Jr. that defined “inappropriate provisions”, which introduced items that are more appropriate to be tackled in a separate legislation. Moreover, the vetoed provision on debt servicing appeared to be an attempt to repeal PD 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and EO 292. Repeal should be made in another law and not in the GAA.

4. Inclusion of debt servicing policy in the GAA was out of place and was clearly an attempt to “log-roll” legislation; Court sustained the veto since the provision was inappropriate anyway and the action was part of the executive’s prerogative/presumption that the President will execute the law faithfully.

1. A) on SUCs: Petitioners argue that the President’s veto of the provision that gave SUCs revolving funds was a

grave abuse of discretion, since other gov’t. agencies were allowed to retain theirs. Court said that agencies such as the Nat’l. Stud Farm (lol), which had a revolving fund as per the GAA, have already been enjoying such as privilege by operation of other laws. Veto valid. B) on 70/30 division for road maintenance: the GAA as crafted by Congress laid down explicitly that only 30% of costs for road maintenance should be contracted out to the private sector. The provision is in consonance with Sec. 25(2), Art. VI of the Constitution and is not an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed. If the President wished to veto this portion, he would have to veto the entire GAA. Veto invalid. C) on medicine purchases by AFP: President vetoed the provision in light of the Generics Drugs Law. Court said that Congress inserted this item in the GAA to ensure compliance of procurement of medicines for the AFP with the National Drug Policy of the DOH. FVR vetoed w/ the belief that it is more appropriate to have a transition period for the AFP’s medicine procurement system to comply w/ Generics Act. Court did not find this reasoning valid enough to justify the veto. Veto invalid.

18. PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ (1994)

Author: M. Molina


D) on military equipment: Congress legislated that modernization fund for AFP will not be released w/o Table of Organization and Equipment (I suppose a budget plan) to be duly reviewed and approved by the legislature. This amounted to a “legislative veto.” The Executive asserted that this violated certain contractual obligations, hence its rejection of the provision. Court found said provisions to be “inappropriate” in character also. Veto valid. E) on AFP pension: provision allowed for money to be re-appropriated by AFP. Violated Secs. 25(5), 29(1), Art. VI. Veto valid. F) on deactivation of CAFGUs: Congress in effect legislated that CAFGUs (vigilantes created by Cory heh) will be deactivated and shall receive benefits, by providing in the GAA of 1994 that CAFGUs were to receive a separation pay. President vetoed as he saw the measure as premature due to ongoing operations of said units in the field. Petitioners claim that by vetoing, the President disregarded the deactivation requirement (and the appropriation of funds thereof). This was an act of impoundment or refusal to tap into appropriations made by Congress; it is in effect an implied veto. Likewise, the subject matter should be tackled in another law, as it appeared to repeal PD 1597 and RA 6758 (again, inappropriate to be placed in an appropriations bill.) Veto valid. G) on SC, CHR, etc: President set conditions on the appropriations for certain items. President’s creation of guidelines on what Congress has legislated is part of his executive power.

Dispostion: Petitions (except those pertaining to debt servicing) dismissed.

FACTS: - assailed: COMELEC en banc Resolution which dismissed the petition to disqualify and to suspend the proclamation of reelectionist Manila Councilor Humberto Basco, who is already on his third consecutive term as such notwithstanding the constant challenges made against his eligibility to assume office - bases:

1) Tordesillas case wherein Basco was removed from his postition as Deputy Sheriff after a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint;effects of which include:

a. dismissal from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits b. “with prejudice to REINSTATEMENT to any position in the government” 2) RA 7160, Sec 40 (b): which disqualifies from office those removed as a result of an administrative case

ISSUES: HELD: 1. RA 7160 cannot be given retroactive effect and thus cannot be applied to the instant case. - Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. 2. The TORDESILLAS ruling also does not bar Basco from running for any elective position. - “prejudice to REINSTATEMENT”: - refers only to appointive positions - any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the career service and who has, though no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified - REAPPOINTMENT of a person who was previously separated from teh service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified 3. Proclamation is not VOID AB INITIO notwithstanding the pending COMELEC case - RA 7166: bar to proclamation: contested returns, not contested qualifications - RA 6646: ...If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is

voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the

19. PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL (1965)

20. GREGO v. COMELEC (1997)

Author: M. Molina


trial and hearing of the action... and may, during the pendencey thereof, order the suspention of the proclamation of the candidate whenever evidence of guilt is strong VS. - Sec. 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure: proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election - Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant not to modify the law - The power of administratice officials to promulgate regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment - The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted - The power cannot be extended to amending or expanded the statutory requirements to embrace matters not covered by the statute

Case: SC Circulars governing procedures > BP 129 and EO 226 The Court resolved the question on the governing law on the manner in which appeals from decisions of the BOI should be filed. The same necessarily included the examination of the following:

a. BP 129:Judiciary Reorganization Act - Vests appellate jurisdiction over all the judgments, decisions, orders or awards of quasi judicial agencies

on the CA b. EO 226: Omnibus Investments Code

- Provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court c. SC Circular No. 1-91

FACTS: - Petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics was favored in the BOI ruling regarding its application to amend its certificate of registration - Oppositor therein appealed to the CA, pursuant to Circular 1-91 - Petitioner argues that oppositor’s basis contravenes the procedure for appeal provided for BP 129 and EO 226, which provides that appeals from BOI decisions and orders shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court BP 129:Judiciary Reorganization Act - Vests appellate jurisdiction over all the judgments, decisions, orders or awards of quasi judicial agencies on the CA EO 226: Omnibus Investments Code - Provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court SC Circular No. 1-91 - Appeals should be made to the CA HELD: 1. SC Circular No. 1-91 EFFECTIVELY REPEALED Art. 82 of EO 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal is involved. SC Circular No. 1-91 - assertion of power granted under Sec. 5(5), ART. VIII (rule-making power), to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts - though a circular is NOT STRICTLY A STATUTE OR LAW, it has, however, the forced and effect of law according to jurisprudence - the SC Circular does not affect any substatnticve right because it merely concerns the procedural aspects which the Court has the power to regulate; SC Circular 1-91 SIMPLY TRANSFERRED the venue of appeals from decisions of BOI to the CA. - though BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Sec. 1, Circular 1-91, it is deemed included in the phrase “ANY QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY” - “AMONG THESE AGENCIES ARE...”: strong implication that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein

21. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v. CA (1994)

Author: M. Molina


Case: Petition to restrain Elec Comm from recognizing the protest filed by one Pedro Ynsua against the election of petitioner Angara as member of the National Assembly for the 1st Assembly District inof the Province of Tayabas. Date fixed by the Elec Comm for the last day of the filing of protest (Dec. 9) is almost a week later than the date already fixed by the National Assembly (Dec. 3) for the proclamation of candidates against whom no protest had thus far been made. In short, some candidates were already proclaimed way ahead of the deadline for the filing of complaints. FACTS: - Petitioner (Angara) and respondents (Ynsua, Castillo, and Mayor) were candidates for membership in the National Assembly for the District of Tayabas - Petitioner Angara was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as member-elect for receiving the most number of votes; he also took his oath of office - National Assembly Resolution (Dec. 3, 1935): Confirmed the election of members against whom no protest had thus far been made - Respondent filed a motion of protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission, seeking the nullification of the said resolution or the declaration of the Petitioner’s members to the NA - Electoral Commission Resolution (Dec. 9, 1935):Fixed the date as the last day of filing of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly - the date fixed by the Elec Comm for the last day of the filing of protest (Dec. 9) is almost a week later than the date already fixed by the National Assembly (Dec. 3) for the proclamation of candidates against whom no protest had thus far been made. In short, some candidates, the petitioner being one of them, were already proclaimed way ahead of the deadline for the filing of complaints. - the Elec Comm denied the Petitioner's motion to dismiss the protest against his proclamation on the ground that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of protests against the election of a member of the NA even after confirmation Grounds of petitioner:

1. The constitutionally conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Elec Comm only concerns merits of contested elections in the National Assembly

2. Said jurisdiction does not include the power to regulate proceedings of said contests; duch power is reserved to the Legislative Department

3. The Elec Comm may take over only when the NA has not availed of its primary power to regulate such proceedings

4. NA > Elec Comm; Ergo, resolutions of the NA must be respected and obeyed 5. That the SC has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental questions raised herein because it involves

the interpretation of the Constitution Arguments of the Elec Comm against judicial review:

1. Case is beyond judicial cognizance and control of the SC because a. The Elec Comm is an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the government and is b. Vested with quasi-judicial functions

2. NA’s Resolution could not and did not deprive Elec Comm of its capacity to set its own deadline and thus take cognizance of protests filed within the newly prescribed period

3. That the Elec Comm is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, or board against which prohibition would lie. ISSUES: 1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the Elec Comm and the subject matter at hand (YES) 2. In the affirmative, WON the Elec Comm has exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the respondent's protest and in disregarding the NA's previous confirmation of candidates (NO) HELD: 1. The Court has jurisdiction over the Elec Comm and the subject matter

22. ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (1936)

Author: M. Molina


- or the determination of the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to Elec Comm as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the NA * Separation of powers - the separation of powers doctrine is actually provided for in divisions in the Constitution--each department of government is tasked with exclusive cognizance of matters within their respective jurisdictions - not absolute: it does not follow from the fact that the 3 powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained by and independent of each other * Checks and Balances - the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between several departments, however, makes it hard to say where one leaves off and the other begins * Judicial Supremacy - the judicial department is the only organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the departments and its constituents - the constitution lacks perfection and perfectibility and thus requires a reliable independent body to be tasked with its interpretation Judicial review in:

* Judicial Review - limited to actual cases and controversies and the question of their constitutionality or the very lis mota presented 2. The power vested in the Elec Comm to judge all contests relating to elections is an implied denial of the exercise of the power of the NA - the present constitution has transferred all powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to election-related matters to the Elec Comm - the Elec Comm is a constitutional organ created for the purpose of determining all contests relating to the elections and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly - it is still bound by the limits of the Constitution even whil acting within its limited authority - all possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the Judiciary - all agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes

Case: Effect of nullification of a statute on the acts done during the time of its effectivity and validity FACTS: - Petitioner PNB appeals the ruling which permanently enjoins it from proceeding with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the land of respondent debtor Serrano after his failure to settle his debt - Serrano’s debt became due in 1944 but petitioner bank only made a claim in 1959, or 15 years later which already falls within the period of prescription - PNB argues that the prescription should not run yet if EO 32, an order which continued RA 342’s suspension of the enforcement of payment of all debts, would be considered valid during the three years of its effectivity (1945-1948) before it was nullified, thereby extending the period during which PNB may make its claim before prescription runds.

US PHILIPPINES

- no express grant in the constitution - such was only set by popular acquiescence in the course of 150 years

- power is expressly granted in Sec. 2 of Art. VIII, 1935 Constitution (now it is expressed in Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

23. FRANCISCO v. HOR (2003)

24. SERRANO DE AGBAYANI v. PNB (1971)

Author: M. Molina


HELD: 1. EO 32 should be considered valid, insofar as the acts done under it are involved, even though it was subsequently declared VOID. - Orthoddox view: That an inconstitutional act cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties - Prior to the decalration of nullity, a challenged legislative or executive act must be in force and had to be complied with; it is entitled to obedience and respect - basis: The judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on WON a legislative or executive act is valid - The actual existence of a statute prior to such determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored - the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration

FACTS: - assailed: constitutionality of

a. RA 8180 An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Indutry and For Other Purposes which ends 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry

b. EO 372 through which the President implemented the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry - consolidation of 2 petitions assailing specifically among others:

a. inclusion of tariff provision in Sec. 5(b) RA 8180 violates Sec. 26(1), ART. VI because it is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry

b. Sec. 15, RA 8180 “The DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil

industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation... a. When the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and b. when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.”

- undue delegation of power because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determing when to implement the full deregulation c. EO 392

- adds another standard to what was provided under RA 8180, that is the depletion of the OPSF fund HELD: PROCEDURAL 1. Justiciable controversy. - where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute - the question thus posed is judicial rather than political 2. Petitioners have locus standi. - The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of trascendetnal significance to the people SUBSTANTIVE 1. Sec. 15, RA 8180 is valid and DOES NOT CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION of powers - discretion to make law = discretion in implementing law - 2 tests on the validity of delegation of legislative power: 1) completeness test, 2) sufficient standard test - The law is COMPLETE as regards the FINAL DATE of full deregulation:

- Congress expressly provided that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, REGARDLESS of the occurence of any event

- the discretion given to the President is only the advancement of the date before March 1997 provided it is when 1) the prices of crude oil and petroleum products decline and 2) when the exchange rate of peso as against the dollar becomes stable

25. TATAD v. SEC. OF ENERGY (1997)

Author: M. Molina


- The terms “as far as practicable,” “declining,” and “stable” need only be understood in thier plain and ordinary meaning 2. EO 392 is VOID because it exceeded the limits provided by RA 8180 in adding another factor (depletion of OPSF funds) - by considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department effectively rewrote RA 8180, in direct contravention of the principle of separation of powers 3.Notwithstanding the separability clause, RA 8180 MUST BE STRUCK DOWN AS A WHOLE for it cannot stand alone after nullifying the abovementioned unconstitutional provisions. - general rule v. Exceptions to the general rule re: complete and partial nullification of statutes - As applied: the provisions on tariff dirrential, inventory and pradatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180, without which Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry

FACTS: - petitioners demand the disclosure of a number of PDs which they claimed had not been published as required by law (ART. 2, CC) - Government argument: the phrase “unless otherwise provided” pertains to the fact of publication; that if a specific date for effectivity is given, publication could be dispensed with - Previous ruling: Publication in the OG is indispensible - present petition seeks to clarify the following matters: a. law of public nature or general applicability b. publication c. where is publication to be made d. when is publication to be made HELD: 1. “Unless otherwise provided” does not refer to publication, it refers to the date of effectivity. - publication is indispensible in every case, be it shortened or extended - reason: omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws - ART. 2, CC in relation to ART. 3: Ignorance of the law shall not be an excuse from compliance therewith. - Prejudice which may result is true not only for penal laws but also for non-penal measures as well - conclusive preseumption: everyone knows the law 2. “Laws” shall refer to ALL LAWS and NOT ONLY THOSE OF GENERAL APPLICATION - Strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly - To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even ifit might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some people only Specifically: - PDs and EOs of the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same is validly delegated by the legislature - Administrative rules: if purpose is to implement existing law pursuant to a valid delagation - charters of a city - circulars issued by the Monetary Board if they are meant to FILL IN THE DETAILS of Central Bank Act Need not be published: - interpretative regulations involving internal matters - letters of instruction - municipal ordinances 3. Publication must be full or there is no publication at all

26. TANADA v. TUVERA (1986)

Author: M. Molina


4. UNFORTUNATELY, the law is clear and provides no other options but to have laws published in the OG and not anywhere else. - this led to the enactment of EO 200 by Pres. Aquino - The Court however agress that there are better forums than the OG in terms of its capacity to disseminate information a. regular publication b. established readership

Author: M. Molina

Documents

Chapter I - 26 Cases