Chapter 8-Police Reform in Mexico, Advances and PErsistent Obstacles.pdf

8172019 Chapter 8-Police Reform in Mexico Advances and PErsistent Obstaclespdf

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247

POLICE REFORM IN MEXICO

ADVANCES AND PERSISTENT

OBSTACLES

Daniel Sabet

INTRODUCTION

At no time in Mexicorsquos history has there been a greater need for professional po-lice forces The current security crisis which resulted in an estimated 6587 or-

ganized crime related killings in 2009 has brought police reform to the top ofthe national agenda1 While law enforcement should be the primary tool to ad-dress the countryrsquos crime problems the police are viewed as part of the problemrather than part of the solution A brief review of the daily newspapers revealsproblems such as (1) corruption and collusion with organized crime (2) abuses ofhuman rights in the form of torture unwarranted search and seizure violationsto due process and inversion of the presumption of innocence and (3) ineffec-tiveness exempli1047297ed by the inability to stem the violence poor investigation andintelligence gathering capabilities and high rates of impunity Evidence of thesethree problems has produced a deep seeded lack of con1047297dence in the police whichironically makes the police even less effective and further perpetuates corruption

and abuseAddressing Mexicorsquos security crisis will require creating an effective police force

operating within the con1047297nes of the law This chapter seeks to provide an over-view of police reform in Mexico and elucidate the obstacles to institutional changeThe chapter begins with an introduction to policing in Mexico and offers a briefexploration of the evidence of corruption abuse and ineffectiveness that plagueMexicorsquos various and numerous police departments The analysis brie1047298y considersthe different approaches to reform including a limited discretion approach profes-sionalization and militar ization I then offer an overview of reform during the lastthree federal administrations Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leoacuten (1994ndash2000) VicenteFox Quesada (2000ndash2006) and Felipe Calderoacuten Hinojosa (2006ndash2012) The analy-

sis concludes that considerable advances have been made but is forced to recognizethat the fundamental problems of corruption abuse and ineffectiveness remain Tounderstand why I explore the considerable obstacles that continue to serve as a chal-lenge to reform efforts

1The number of organized crime related ki llings is based on estimates from Reforma newspaper



248

DANIEL SABET

POLICING IN MEXICO

While there are con1047298icting counts of Mexicorsquos police forces estimations as of June2007 placed the number of public security personal in Mexico at 454574 of which368315 were police officers (See Table 11) When populat ion is taken into accountit is estimated by Guil lermo Zepeda Lecuona that there are 351 police for every one-hundred thousand people in Mexico and 299 police for every one-hundred thousandpeople when the Federal District is excluded Both these numbers are above theUnited Nations average of 225 and the recommended level of 280 police per one-hundred thousand people (although a few individual states fall below this mark)2

These law enforcement personnel are divided by both jurisdiction and function Jurisd ictionally the police are div ided into municipal state and federal police de-partments each of which has different responsibilities For example drug traffickingis considered a federal crime and falls under the jurisdiction of the federal policeHomicides are state crimes and investigated by state police Functionally the po-lice have traditionally been divided into preventive and investigative departmentsPreventive police departments operate at all three levels of government and are typi-cally organized under the auspices of a Secretariat of Public Security3 Their primary

job is to conduct patrols maintain public order prevent crime and administrativeviolations and be the 1047297rst responders to crime The transit police responsible forsanctioning traffic violations and responding to accidents are technically consid-ered part of the preventive police however in some cases they are organized as aseparate police force The ministerial police formerly known as the judicial policeorganized under the auspice of federal and state public ministries are responsible for

investigating crimes and carrying out judicial and ministeria l warrants4 Unfortunately a number of authors and studies have clearly identi1047297ed persistent

patterns of corruption abuse and ineffectiveness among all of these different typesof forces

Corruption Mexicorsquos chapter of Transparency International Transparencia

Mexicana AC has conducted surveys measuring self-reported bribe pay-ments that have consistently found that bribes to transit police officers and

2Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona 2009 ldquoMexican Police and the Criminal Justice Systemrdquo In Robert ADonnelly and David A Shirk Police and Public Security in Mexico San Diego University Readers pg 423Technically the Federal Police is no longer a preventive police force Reformers in the Calderoacuten adminis-

tration have sought to simplify Mexican policing by eliminati ng the jurisdictional and functional divisionswithin the police As such the 2009 Federal Police Law granted the newly named Federal Police investi-gative functions Also on the legislative agenda is a proposal to elim inate Mexicorsquos municipal police forcesThese issues will be dealt with in greater detail below4See Benjamin Reames 2003 ldquoPolice Forces in Mexico A Pro1047297lerdquo Working Paper Reforming theAdministration of Justice in Mexico Center for US-Mexican Studies or Ernesto Loacutepez Portillo Vargas2002 ldquoThe Police in Mexico Political Functions and Needed Reformsrdquo In Transnational Crime and PublicSecurity edited by John Bailey and Jorge Chabat La Jolla Center for US-Mexican Studies for an in-depthdescription of the Mexican police str ucture



249

POLICE REFORM IN M EXICO ADVANCES AND PERSISTENT OBSTACLES

TABLE 1 BREAK DOWN OF MEXICOrsquoS ESTIMATED 454574 LAW

ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL (JUNE 2007)

Police Number Percent

Federal PreventivePolice and NationalMigration Institute

18296 497

State ministerial police 25615 695

Federal ministerial police 5900 160

State preventive police 94587 2568

Mexico Federal Districtpreventive police

77132 2094

Municipal preventive police 146785 3985

Total Police 368315 10000

Non-police publicsecurity of1047297cials

Number Percent

Public ministers and spe-cialists 24453 2835

Prison personnel 30403 3525

Police administrators 31403 3641

Total 86259 10000

Note There is no authoritative tally of Mexicorsquos police forces and federal agencies have provi-

ded con1047298icting numbers The 1047297gures reported by Zepeda Lecuona are the most comprehensivebut the estimates of federal police forces contradict other government estimations Data citedbelow on the federal forces provided in the Calderoacuten administrationrsquos annual report puts thetotal number of PFP and AFI in 2007 at 21761 and 7992 respect ively

Source Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona 2009 Mexican Police and the Criminal Justice System InDavid Shirk ed Police and Public Security in Mexico San Diego University Readers Using statis-tics from the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Puacuteblica



250

DANIEL SABET

public security personnel top their list of the most common acts of corrup-

tion in Mexico5 Fur thermore dai ly newspaper reports and academic writ-ings a lso reveal extensive collusion with organized crime6 Abuse A study conducted by Fundar a Mexico City based think-tank

reveals interesting variation in the type of abuses across departments7 Thestudy 1047297nds that of 744 Mexico City residents who had contact with thepolice 385 (517 or 105 of the tota l sample) reported some form ofabuse or mistreatment by the police (broadly understood to include insults)Transit police were most often accused of soliciting bribes preventive policewere most often accused of threats to be charged on false grounds insultsand humiliations and soliciting br ibes and ministerial police were mostoften accused of threats to obtain a confession to cause harm or to charge

on false grounds8

In addition human r ights commission reports have de-tailed speci1047297c cases of police excesses9

Ineffectiveness Using large sample victimization surveys the Citizen

Institute of Insecurity Studies (Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios de laInseguridad mdash ICESI) estimates that 115 of Mexicans were a victim ofcrime in 2008 Moreover they 1047297nd that citizens only report 22 of thesecrimes and only 15 of these crimes results in an open case 1047297le10 Zepedaand others have found that only a very small percentage of crimes result insuccessful prosecutions11

These 1047297ndings have been con1047297rmed by qualitative ethnographic stud-ies that reveal in great detail the nature of corruption abuse and ineffectiveness

5Transparencia Mexicana 2007 Informe ejecutivo Iacutendice Nacional de Corrupcioacuten y Buen Gobierno Mexico CityTransparencia Mexicana AC6See for example John Bailey and Matthew M Taylor 2009 ldquoEvade Corrupt or Confront OrganizedCrime and the State in Mexico and Brazilrdquo Journal of Politics in Latin America Vol 2 3ndash29 Daniel MSabet 2010 Confrontation Collusion and Tolerance The Relationship between Law Enforcement andOrganized Crime in Tijuana Forthcoming in The Mexican Law Review Vol 3(1) Luis Astorga 2005 ElSiglo de las Drogas El narcotraacute1047297co del Por1047297riato al nuevo milenio Mexico City Plaza Jaacutenes7Claire Naval 2006 Irregularities Abuses of Power and Ill-Treatment in the Federal District The Relationbetween Police Officers and Ministerio Publico agents and the population Meacutexico Fundar Centro de Anaacutelisis eInvestigacioacuten AC8Ibid 9For example in 2006 police from the State of Mexico clashed with protestors in San Salvador Atenco

resulting in numerous alleged violations including arbitrary detentions torture and sexual abuse ComisioacutenNacional de Derechos Humanos 2006 Recomendacioacuten 382006 sobre el caso de los hechos de violencia suscitadoslos diacuteas 3 y 4 de mayo de 2006 en los municipios de Texcoco y San Salvador Atenco Estado de Meacutexico Mexico CityComisioacuten Nacional de Derechos Humanos10ICESI 2009 Sexta Encuesta Nacional Sobre Inseguridad Resultados Primera Parte Mexico CityInstituto Ciudadano de Estudiso sobre la Inseguridad AC11Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona 2009 Iacutendice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia Mexico City Centro deInvestigacioacuten para el Desarrollo AC



251


in Mexicorsquos police forces and the factors that give r ise to these problems such as poor

working conditions perverse institutional incentives distrust between police andcitizens and low moral12 Some scholars contend that corruption abuse and inef-fectiveness should not be surprising given that historically the police primarily ex-isted to support the governing regime rather than to protect and serve the Mexicanpeople13 This was the case from Benito Juarezrsquos Rurales formed in the mid-1800rsquosto the Institutional Revolutionary Partyrsquos Federal Security Directorate (DireccioacutenFederal de Seguridad mdash DFS) which was dissolved in 198614 Regardless of whetheror not these problems are the product of historical legacies however there is clearlyan urgent need for reform

APPROACHES TO REFORM

Given the above mentioned 1047297ndings it is necessary to ask why are officers not actingconsistent with their mission and what can be done to reduce corruption and abuseand improve police effectiveness Many Mexican police leaders have answered theformer question with Robert K litgaardrsquos formula that monopoly plus discretion equalscorruption As such rather than address the causes of corruption they have attemptedto reduce police discretion15 The hallmarks of what can be termed the ldquolimiteddiscretion modelrdquo include constant rotation of personal (to prevent police from de-veloping unhealthy commitments) deployment in large groups (to make it harder toarrange corrupt deals) restricted access to information and reductions in authorityFor example preventive police are often sent to patrol in a district of which they

have no knowledge they are not allowed to make arrests un less a criminal is caughtred handed and they are prohibited from handling evidence or interviewing wit-nesses Ministerial police are tasked to carrying out warrants on cases they knownothing about they are asked to chauffeur witnesses to the public mini sters ratherthan conduct interviews themselves and they are buried under paperwork

Ironica lly these policies have not only failed to reduce corruption and abuse theyhave had the unfortunate impact of turn ing the police into ineffective and reactivesecurity guards For example Elena Azaola argues that rather than create account-able police reporting requirements for investigative police have created what she

12Nelson Arteaga Botello and Adriaacuten Loacutepez Rivera 1998 Policiacutea y corrupcioacuten El caso de un municipio en

Meacutexico Meacutexico Plaza amp Valdeacutes Elena Azaola and Marco Antonio Ruiz Torres 2009 Investigadores de PapelPoder y derechos humanos entre la policiacutea judicial de la Ciudad de Meacutexico Fontamara Meacutexico DF Mariacutea EugeniaSuaacuterez de Garay ldquoMexican Law Enforcement Culture Testimonies from Police Behind Barsrdquo In Robert ADonnelly and David A Shirk Police and Public Security in Mexico San Diego University Readers13Paul J Vanderwood 1992 Disorder and Progress Bandits Police and Mexican Development WilmingtonScholarly Resources Inc Lopez Portillo The Police in Mexico14See Astorga El Siglo de las Drogas for dissolution of the DFS15Robert Klitgaard 1988 Controlling Corruption Berkeley University of California Press



252

DANIEL SABET

calls ldquoinvestigadores de papelrdquo or ldquopaper investigatorsrdquo16 Guillermo Zepeda sums

the problem up well when he writes ldquoGenerally speaking both society as a wholeand the authorities themselves mistrust the police but instead of taking steps to im-prove the police the police have seen their functions stripped away piece by piecerdquo17

This paradigm is still predominant in a number of departments and altering it con-fronts a chicken and egg problem treating the police as corrupt and abusive perpetu-ates unprofessional departments however police cannot be treated as professionals ifthey are corrupt and abusive

Recognizing the failure of the limiting discretion approach more recent reformshave sought to produce police forces deserving of the authority and discretion neces-sary to be effective These include a wide range of reforms such as raising salariesand bene1047297ts improving recru itment and selection criteria elevating training times

and standards offering specialized training developing and certifying operationalprocedures offering a system of merit based promotion vetting officers and creatingand strengthening accountability mechanisms and oversight

Despite a growing consensus on these measures there are considerable imple-mentation challenges to such a holistic reform package Moreover these changes arebeing carried out under two very different paradigms (1) citizen oriented profes-sionalization and (2) militarization The former can be seen in police departmentsled by reformist civilian police chiefs and have been complemented with citizenoutreach and community oriented policing strategies Documented examples in-clude the Chihuahua City police force (1998ndash2009) and the Queretaro state police(2003ndash2009)18

Militar ization shares many of the same elements of reform but with a strong em-

phasis on discipline and hierarchy under the command of current or former militaryleadership As such the militarization approach is best viewed as a half-way pointbetween the limited discretion model and the professionalization model as officersare still afforded very limited authority and di scretion While a professionalizationapproach is more desirable given the lack of trust in the police and the ever worsen-ing security cri sis the militarization paradigm currently predominates This can beseen most visibly in increasingly common appointment of military and retired mili-tary personnel to lead Mexicorsquos state and municipal police forces19

16Elean Azaola and Marco Antonio Ruiz Torres 2009 Investigadores de Papel Poder y derechos humanos entre la polic iacutea judi cial d e la Ciudad de Meacutexi co Fontamara Meacutexico DF

17Zepeda Lecuona ldquoMexican Police and the Criminal Justice Systemrdquo pp 4218Daniel M Sabet 2009 Two Steps Forward Lessons from Chihuahua In Robert A Donnelly andDavid A Shirk Police and Public Security in Mexico San Diego University Readers Juan Salgado 2009ldquoBuenas praacutecticas en prevencioacuten del delito y seguridad ciudadana en Meacutexicordquo Presented at the SeminarioInternacional de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana Chihuahua March 1919See Roderic A Camprsquos contribution to this working paper series for statistics on mi litary personnel inlocal law enforcement See Fogelson (1997) for a discussion of militarization vs professionalization in USpolicing Fogelson Robert M 1977 The Big-City Police Cambridge Harvard University Press



253


OVERVIEW OF POLICE REFORM IN MEXICO

In the following section I offer an overview of police reform in Mexico under the lastthree federal administrations As all police departments and all three federal administra-tions have seen their fair share of corruption scandals it is tempting to conclude thatMexican police are the same as they were 1047297fteen years ago A closer look however re-veals that some important advances have been made Nonetheless there are a frustratingnumber of reforms that have never made their way from paper to implementation andothers that have not survived administration changes or changes in police leadership

Police reform arguably did not become a national priority until the administra-tion of Ernesto Zedillo (1994ndash2000) however previous administrations did confrontcivil society pressure to address human rights abuses As mentioned above PresidentMiguel de la Madr id Hurtado was pressured to disband the DFS and following the1990 murder of Sinaloa human rights activist Norma Corona (who had uncovered

judicia l pol ice abuses and extrajud icia l ki ll ing s) the administration of Carlos Sa linasde Gortari established the National Human Rights Commission The Commissionwas later made independent given constitutional status and replicated across theMexican states Unfortunately the Commissionrsquos credibility has declined during theFox and Calderoacuten administrations and the governmentrsquos war against drug traffickingorganizations has produced an increase in allegations of arbitrary detention tortureand violations of due process20 Nonetheless the commissions have had a profoundimpact on Mexican policing While human rights abuses still occur at unaccept-able levels the commissions offer aggrieved citizens an autonomous institution toinvestigate their complaints Non-obligatory recommendations emitted by the com-

missions while too frequently ignored at least offer civil society an authoritativeaccount of alleged abuses Moreover the commissions are frequently responsible fortraining police officers and educating the public about human rights As a result ininterviews reformist police officers contend that there has been a signi1047297cant shif t inofficersrsquo attitude and behavior as a direct result of the human rights commissions

ZEDILLO

A crime wave in the mid-1990rsquos revealed the de1047297ciencies in the countryrsquos policeforces and moved police reform onto the national agenda A diagnostic study con-ducted early in the Zedillo administration was not encouraging and identi1047297ed a

20From 1990 to 2002 the federal government reports an average of 72 officers a year sanctioned as a resultof recommendations of the National Human Rights Commission however since 2003 the governmentreports no such sanctions Felipe Calderoacuten Hinojosa 1999 Tercer Informe de Gobierno For a critique of theCommission see Human Rights Watch 2008 ldquoMexicorsquos National Human R ights Commission A CriticalAssessmentrdquo Vol 20 No 1B New York Human Rights Watch The report argues that the Commissionhas become a ldquochronicler of the status quordquo having narrowly interpreted its mandate failed to follow up onrecommendations not promoted reform and hesitated to ldquoname and shamerdquo



254

DANIEL SABET

litany of weaknesses across the countryrsquos many departments21 Investment in public

security was minimal estimated at 008 of the GDP There were over 2000 de-partments across the country but only 41 police academies and many police neverreceived any formal training Of the 41 academies only 14 required education up tothe 9th grade and the majority of preventive police throughout the country (556)had only primary school or no education at all22 The report recognized the lack ofcapacity in state and municipal forces and the lack of coordination across the coun-tryrsquos many departments

To improve coordination across jurisdictions and to set national policy for policeprofessionalization and operations the Zedi llo administration oversaw the creationof the National Public Secur ity System (Sistema Nacional de Segur idad Puacuteblica mdashSNSP) The system entailed the creation of a National Public Security Council

made up of state and national police and political leaders and state and local coun-cils made up of federal state and municipal leaders 23 While national policy andinter-jurisdictional cooperation have been elusive targets the SNSP continues to bethe primary mechanism to set national policy24

Rather than confront the weaknesses of the poorly trained and ill-equipped stateand municipal forces more directly the Zedillo administration chose to create andfocus its attention on a new federal police force the Federal Preventive Police (PFP mdashPoliciacutea Federal Preventiva) By mid-2000 the new agency totaled around 11000 menand women made up of roughly 5000 military personnel 4000 officers from for-mer federal highway police 700 from the countryrsquos intelligence agency (CISEN) andover 1000 new recruits trained at a recently created national police academy 25 ThePFPrsquos primary responsibility was to support and coordinate with local authorities to

maintain order prevent crimes and administrative violations and provide security infederal areas (eg highways railways ports etchellip) however unlike other preventiveforces it was to participate more actively in investigations and intell igence

The administration also conducted a massive purge of the Federal Judicial Police(Policiacutea Judicial Federal mdash PJF) 1047297ring over 700 officers (of roughly 4400) and re-plenishing its ranks with over 1000 mil itary personnel26

21Sandoval Ulloa Joseacute G 2000 Introduccioacuten al Estudio del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Puacuteblica Mexico CityUnknown publisher22 23For a more detailed discussion see Vivianna Maciacuteas and Fernando Castillo 2002 Mexicorsquos National

Public Security System Perspectives for the New Millennium In John Bailey and Jorge Chabat edsTransnational Crime and Public Security La Jolla Center for US-Mexican Studies24The SNSP is governed by what is known as a ldquoGeneral Lawrdquo a somewhat unique feature of Mexican

jur ispr udence as s tates and municipal ities must adapt their legislat ion to i ts provis ions As such re forms tothe General Law of the National Public Security System in 2009 offered the Calderoacuten administrat ion themeans to set a number of new requirements for local police professionalization25Loacutepez Portillo The Police in Mexico26PGR 2006 AFI Un Nuevo Modelo de Policiacutea Mexico City Procuraduriacutea General de la Repuacuteblica



255


While the Zedillo administration set in motion several important initiatives as

well as the militarization of the police it discovered the implementation challengesinherent in police reform For example the admini stration announced the creationof a nationwide secure communications network databases for improved infor-mation sharing and a national registry of law enforcement personnel These wereto be important mechanisms to ensure coordination and prevent departments fromunknowingly rehiring corrupt officers that had been 1047297red from another agencyHowever at the time departments used entirely different criteria to quantify andclassify crimes lacked technical capacity and infrastructure and were resistant tosystematically tracking and shar ing information Over ten years later and after mil-lions of dollars in investments officials are stil l working to put national crime data-bases and the police registry to effective use

FOX

The Vicente Fox administration (2000ndash2006) maintained the SNSP and the PFPnot a foregone conclusion in the politics of Mexican law enforcement and continuedto build the federal governmentrsquos policing capacity Fox moved the PFP out of theinterior ministry and into a newly created Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) Thecenterpiece of Fox era police reform however was the dissolution of the scandalridden PJF and the creation of what was intended to be a new model of profes-sional investigative policing the Federal Investigations Agency (Agencia Federal deInvestigaciones mdash AFI)

In addition to considering the PJF corrupt and ineffective incoming administra-tion officials felt that investigations and intelligence had taken a backseat to reactionand dissuasion that the agency was too smal l that its structure was too decentralizedwith insufficient internal supervision mechanisms and that officers lacked propertraining salary and bene1047297ts27 The newly created AFI sought to overcome the errorsof the past through the following

A police civil service with improved selection criteria emphasis on educa-

tion and tra ining a merit-based promotion process improved salaries andimproved equipment and facilities For example by 2005 incoming AFIagents were required to have a college degreeA new police structure prioritizing planning t actical analysis

and investigationsAn emphasis on improved statistics information 1047298ows technology and

uni1047297ed databases known as AFInetA focus on clear processes and procedures much of which were ISO-9001

(International Standards Organization) certi1047297ed

27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET

An emphasis on improved accountability mechanisms including an office to

investigate officers a second office to conduct vetting and a third to over-see the agency as a whole The administration reported that during its six

years there were 512 criminal invest igations result ing in 277 penal processesagainst 353 officers28

The AFI was not without problems as salaries remained relatively low corrup-tion persisted and agents criticized promotion criteria and arbitrary decision makingNonetheless the new standards and procedures established at the AFI represented anadvance for Mexican policing Ironically however its former director Genaro GarciacuteaLuna who was promoted to Secretary of Public Security in the Calderoacuten administra-tion would later act to undermine the agency hoping to transfer its functions to the SSP

As will be discussed below this merger was unsuccessful and left the AFI weakenedWithout question the Zedillo and Fox administrations focused their efforts onbuilding federal police capacity however they did take some steps to strengthenthe state and municipal departments that contained the majority of the countryrsquospolice The Public Secur ity Support Fund (Fondo de Aportaciones para la Segur idadPuacuteblica mdash FASP) grew to include an annual transfer of $5 billion pesos to the statesby 2006 (roughly $500 million in 2006 US$) The states were asked to match apercentage and meet certain reporting requirements The fund supported the de-velopment of emergency call and dispatching centers under a uni1047297ed 066 number(equivalent to the US 911) the continued development of national cr ime and policedatabases and training and inf rastructure development

While a portion of the funds were supposed to trickle down to the municipalities

the states tended to use the FASP funds to build up their own capacity rather thanshare the funds For example during the Fox administration the states of ChihuahuaBaja California and Sonora all spent enormous sums to create new elite (albeitsmall) state police forces leaving little left over for the municipalities

The Fox administration also intended to develop initiatives to build local capac-ity The Preventive Police Standardization Program hoped to create model crite-ria for future police development a pilot initiative called the Planning and PoliceControl System was developed to improve local level operations and internal super-vision and the AFI planned to work with state invest igative police in creating modelpolice investigations units Unfortunately these efforts were all under-prioritizedpilot programs For example of the 500 officers selected to participate in the model

investigations units only 42 passed the programrsquos vetting procedures29 Fortunatelyhowever the Calderoacuten administration which maintained much of the same policeleadership learned from these mistakes gave money directly to the municipalitiesand made local police professionalization a centerpiece of their reform efforts

28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN

Upon coming into office the Calderoacuten administration proposed dissolving the stateand municipal police forces and creating a unitary national police force The admin-istration contended that such a force would avoid the coordination problems across

jur isd ictions offer a unity of command and faci litate reform Officials could pointto both Chile and Colombia as national police forces that had successfully under-gone transformations in a relatively short period of time Nonetheless the requiredconstitutional reform and major restructuring of the Mexican state was a politicalnon-starter Instead the administration set its sights on at least unifying the federalpolice by merging the investigative and preventive forces Again they were unableto rally sufficient congressional support and in mid-2009 the AFI and the PFP werereplaced with the Federal Ministerial Police (Policiacutea Federal Ministerial mdash PFM)and the Federal Police (Policiacutea Federal mdash PF) respectively30

The restructuring did include some important changes The AFIrsquos tactical analysisand reactive operations were transferred to the PF allowing the future PFM to intheory focus more on investigations The reforms a lso resulted in expanded powersfor the PF as compared to its predecessor organization offering it more tools in gath-ering intelligence and combating organized cr ime such as the authority to conductinvestigations operate undercover locate cell phones and tap phone lines (all withsupervision by either the public minister or a judge) Officials in the Secretariat ofPublic Security can boast an impressive new intelligence center and contend that thestatersquos intelligence gathering capacities are stronger than ever

However the restructuring also had unintended negative consequences First

just as there was the greatest need for federal invest igative capacity the uncertaintyregarding the restructuring weakened the ability of the federal government to in-vestigate crimes News reports suggest a decline in the AFIrsquos ability to carry out itsfunctions due to a drop in personnel resources and infrastructure31 Much of theAFIrsquos newer recruits transferred over to the SSP leaving critics to allege that the re-maining officers were holdovers from the old and discredited Federal Judicial PoliceOne of the AFIrsquos most celebrated accomplishments in the previous administrationthe system of databases known as AFInet was reported to be no longer operationaland much of its data had been transferred to the PF

Second when the AFI was created in 2001 it was heralded as a new model ofpolicing and the solution to Mexicorsquos policing problems The subsequent dissolution

of the agency seemed to repudiate this message and increased skepticism towards yet another new police force Third restructuring inevitably requires high costsin creating and adapting to new work structures and risks leaving the underlying

30As of this wr iting the PFM is still formally referred to as the AFI and wil l be until the Calderoacuten adminis-tration emits the internal regulations for the new agency31Rolando Herrera and Antonio Baranda ldquoConcentran a AFI en labor ministerialrdquo Reforma

January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET

challenges confronting the police (eg accountability) unaddressed A year after leg-islative changes went into effect the Calderoacuten administration had still not issuedinternal regulations for these new agencies leaving them in a state of legal limboand delaying advances on everything from using undercover agents to addressing

internal corruptionOfficial data f rom the Calderoacuten administration presented in Table 2 suggests thaton the plus side the federal investigative police are attending to a greater num-ber of cases carrying out more judicial warrants per officer and reducing the timethat it takes to investigate a case In addition a sl ightly higher percentage of thesecases come before a judge than the national average among state investigative police(153 as compared with 12)

TABLE 2 FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE POLICE

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Averagemonthly fed-eral crimesreported

Average timeto completeinvestigation

(days)

Percent ofinvestigations

that go be-fore a judge

Percent ofsentencesof cases

investigated

Backlogof judicialwarrants

2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054

Based on the 1047297rst six months of the year

Source Tercer Informe de Gobierno Data on the judicial warrant backlog came from the PGR

2009 Informe de Labores Mexico City Procuraduriacutea General de la RepuacuteblicaNote Among the states the national average was 12 with states like Sonora reaching upto 36 Eduardo Bours 2009 Sexto Informe de Trabajo Hermosillo Gobierno del Estadode Sonora



259


On the other hand Table 2 re1047298ects the policersquos large backlog of judicial warrants

More importantly the percent of cases going before a judge and the percent result-ing in a conviction has declined in recent years inviting criticism that many of theadministrationrsquos heavily promoted drug related arrests are based on insufficient evi-dence Authorities use a policy called ldquoarraigordquo to hold detainees accused of involve-ment in organized crime for up to eighty days without charge Proponents defendthe arraigo policy as a necessary stop gap measure however unless the detainee con-fesses or becomes a protected witness it is very difficult to build a solid criminal caseafter arrest Nationally the situation is even worse Guillermo Zepeda calculates thatin 2007 only 171 of crimes resulted in a detention and 124 in a sentence32

While improvements in effectiveness continue to be elusive the Calderoacuten adminis-tration can be credited with overseeing unprecedented 1047297nancial investments in public

security and the criminal justice system Table 3 shows that since 2006 the total numberof federal police and size of the federal agenciesrsquo budgets have grown dramaticallyIn addition the administ ration has focused its efforts on strengthening Mexicorsquos

municipal police departments Although federal crimes such as drug trafficking cap-ture the headlines the vast majority of crime continues to be local and local policeofficers make up a majority of the countryrsquos forces Unable to nationalize the po-lice the Calderoacuten administration turned to the power of the purse to encourageand facilitate local professionalization In addition to continuing the FASP 1047297nancialtransfers to the states in 2008 the administ ration initiated a program targeted at thecountryrsquos largest and most dangerous cities (initially 150 and later 206) known asthe Municipal Public Security Subsidy (Subsidio de Seguridad Puacuteblica Municipal mdashSubsemun) In order to obtain the funds however municipalities have to comply

with a series of requirements including the following

Matching 30 of the funds and dedicating these monies to

police remunerationUsing the funds for communication technology equipment purchases and

infrastructure improvements and police professionalization much of whichis targeted at vetted model police unitsConnecting to a shared system of national databases known as Platform

Mexico (Plataforma Meacutexico) and uploading information to those databasesincluding the national registry of police and the national crime databaseDeveloping model police units of 100 officers who undergo ldquocon1047297dence

controlrdquo testing or vetting which involves psychological and intelli-gence testing drug-testing medical examination asset declarations and

32Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona 2009 Mecanismos a lternatives de solucioacuten de controversias y sal idas alter-nativas al juicio oral en la propuesta de Jalisco Presented to the Consejo Ciudadano de Seguridad Puacuteblicadel Estado de Jaliacutesco Guadalajara Sept 24 Available at httpwwwconsejociudadanocommxlecuonapdf Comparative data is hard to obtain Zepeda uses an a nalysis by Lucia Dammert from 2000 in A rgentinacalculating that 12 of crimes result in a rrest and 23 result in sentences



260

DANIEL SABET

TABLE 3 CHANGE IN THE SIZE OF THE FEDERAL POLICE

FORCES AND SPENDING

AFI PFPTotal federal

forces

PGR budget(thousands of

pesos)

SSP budget(thousands of

pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168

Data from June 2009 when the PFP became the PF Budget for 2009 is the tota l amount au-thorized by Congress

Note As both the PGR (Attorney Generalrsquos Office) and the SSP (Public Security Secretariat)are larger than the AFI (Federal Investigations Police) and the PFP (Federal Preventive Police)the budgets presented are larger than the budgets of these police agencies For example the PGRalso includes public ministers and the SSP includes prison wardens and guards

Source Tercer Informe de Gobierno de Felipe Calderoacuten



261


background checks polygraph ( lie-detector) test and examinations on basic

police knowledge and tacticsAdopting a form of police civil service that determines cr iteria for selection

training promotion and disciplineAdopting a national police operations manual and a standardized police re-

porting mechanism implementing new patrolling policies and part icipatingin joint operations

As this partial li st of requirements suggests the Subsemun program re1047298ects a com-prehensive and ambitious approach to police reform As a result the effort confrontsenormous implementation challenges and perverse incentives for municipalities toimplement window dressing reform The main tool to ensure compliance has been

the threat of ldquoturning off the tap of fundsrdquo but the administration has also pur-sued a consensus building strategy The tragic kidnapping and death of 14 year oldFernando Martiacute in June 2008 and subsequent civil society mobilization led to thesigning of the National Agreement on Security Justice and Legality in August 2008The agreement committed signatories to many of the reforms already included inthe Subsemun program These professionalization measures were also approved bythe National Public Security Council and were incorporated into the 2009 revisionto the General Law of the National Public Security System (Ley General del SistemaNacional de Seguridad Puacuteblica) For example the 2009 law requires all states to cre-ate state trust control centers to provide ongoing vetting and certi1047297cation of stateand municipal officers

Table 4 offers a glimpse of the situation at the municipal level at the end of

2008 The eleven municipalities presented responded to a survey sent to the fortylargest departments in the country Given an expected self-selection process itis safe to assume that these are the better municipal departments in the countryWhile each municipality scored well on certain indicators there are wide 1047298uc-tuations suggesting that advances are uneven In the last couple of years severaldepartments have adopted minimum high school education requirements for in-coming cadets Although those with a high school degree or greater only makeup around half of the responding police forces this is a signi1047297cant improvementfrom the 1990rsquos when over half of the police had only a primary level of educa-tion33 While spending has increased across the board it nonetheless varies amongthe departments Only Chihuahua stands out as having made up the de1047297cit in

police vehicles But even standouts like Chihuahua have been hesitant to addresscorruption as evidenced by the very small internal affairs agency Torreoacuten on theother hand has 1047297red a number of officers for corruption but lags in many of theother areas

33 Sandoval Ulloa Introduccioacuten al Estudio del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Puacuteblic a



262

DANIEL SABET

TABLE 4 SELECT INDICATORS ON MUNICIPAL FORCES 2008

CONTINUES ON FACING PAGE

CityMinimumeducation

requirement

Percent ofquali1047297ed

applicantsaccepted

to theacademy

Percent ofpolice with ahigh schooldegree or

greater

Durationof cadettraining(months)

Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)

Ahome High School 5400 5515 12 $6269

Chihuahua High School 1567 4707 10 $8745

CuernavacaHigh Schoolfor traf1047297cpolice

5580 $5952

Guadalajara Secondary 2660 3417 8 $7916

Meacuterida Secondary 2839 3 $4672

Meacutexico DF Secondary 2202 4003 6 $8186

Monterrey Secondary 6591 3397 6 $7243

Puebla High School $7226

SL Potosiacute High School 1282 3527 8 $6506

Torreoacuten Secondary 4507 6 $6625

Zapopan Secondary 3230 3455 6 $9050



263


Source Information provided by police departments in response to the Police ProfessionalismSurvey admin istered in early 2009 by the author

City Vehiclesper police

Budget perpoliceof1047297cer(pesos)

Internal affairsemployees per

100 police

Average annual1047297rings as a per-cent of police

Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043

SL Potosiacute 022 135 381

Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET

ADVANCES AND CONTINUED CHALLENGES

In summary there have been a number of changes to Mexican policing over the lasttwo decades It is possible to conclude that Mexican law enforcement has advancedin the following areas

As illustrated in Table 5 there has been a major and sustained increase

in public security budgets a llowing for improvements in equipment andtechnology From 2007 to 2008 and from 2008 to 2009 spending in thepolicy arena increased 202 and 217 respectively These investments haveallowed for the strengthening of 066 (911) call centers and communicationssystems and the purchase of vehicles uni forms bullet proof vests guns andother tools necessary to professional police workThe federal government has a far greater law enforcement capacity than it

had 15 years ago Federal police officers have grown from 11000 in 2000 toapproximately 37000 in 2009 more than triplingThere is consensus on the need to professionalize federal state and munici-

pal law enforcement through better selection and recruitment improvedtraining better remuneration and improved operational procedures ratherthan simply limiting officer discretion This consensus has been enshrinedin law and the federal government has provided funding to help states andmunicipalities comply with the lawThere has been a dramatic and impressive increase in the use of vetting

including polygraph tests The SSP conducted 54536 trust evaluations over

the course of one year including 24971 applicants 3878 federal personneland 25687 state and municipal police34

Institutional mechanisms (eg National Public Security Council) commu-

nication systems (ie Platform Mexico) and databases (eg registry of lawenforcement personnel) have been created to allow for (but not guarantee)better coordination between Mexicorsquos police forces

While these advances deserve recognition they have been obscured by continuedevidence of corruption abuse and ineffectiveness Organized crime related kil lingshave increased every year since they spiked in 2005 and even targeted efforts in spe-ci1047297c regions have failed to quell the violence Daily newspaper articles reveal cases of

34SSP 2009 Tercer informe de labores Mexico City Secretariacutea de Seguridad Puacuteblica pg 77 The federal go-vernment released aggregated test results in late 2008 showing that nationwide 616 of tested officers werenot recommended for service Rather than 1047297re the vast majority of their officers local police leaders reportthat they view the test results as red 1047298ags that need further substantiation The response has merits part icu-larly given the limitation of the lie detector test and the inadmissibil ity of its results in court Nonethelessit only highl ights the continued importance of a currently ineffective internal i nvestigation agency



265


corruption rising to the highest levels of police agencies35 Faced with insecurity andcorruption scandals citizens are left to wonder why announcements of improvedselection criteria training vetting and other professionalization reforms have failedto alter this status quo

It is therefore necessary to ask why reforms have not been more successful First andforemost from a US perspective it is important to recognize that police reform inthe United States was a decades long process Warren Sloat for example documentscongressional inquiries and civil society mobilizations against police corruption inNew York City in the late 1800rsquos36 Over 70 years later the 1972 Knapp Commission

35

To offer a few examples in 2008 and 2009 Saulo Reyes Gamboa the former director of municipal policein Ciudad Juaacuterez Hugo Armando Reseacutendiz Martiacutenez the former assistant attor ney general in DurangoCarlos Guzmaacuten Correa the former head of public security in Caacuterdenas Sinaloa Gerardo Garay Cadenathe former head of the Federal Preventive Police Noeacute Ramiacuterez Mandujano former acting director of thecountryrsquos anti-drug agency (SIEDO) Francisco Velasco Delgado former head of the municipal police inCancuacuten Juan Joseacute Muntildeiz Salinas former head of the municipal police in Reynosa and Roberto Teraacuten theformer head of the municipal police in Pachuca Hidalgo were al l arrested for ties to organi zed crime36Sloat Warren 2002 A Batt le for the Sou l of New York Tammany Hall Po lice Corruption Vice and theReverend Charles Parkhurstrsquos Crusade against Them 1892ndash1895 New York Cooper Squa re Press

TABLE 5 SPENDING ON PUBLIC SECURITY PROSECUTION OF

JUSTICE AND PRISONS

Municipaland statebudget(in millionsof pesos)

Federalbudget(in millionsof pesos)

Totalbudget (inmillions ofpesos)

Percent ofgovernmentbudget

Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17

Note The state and municipal budget for 2009 made up 601 of the total Subsemun and FASPmonies are included in the municipal and state budgets and made up 47 and FASP 84 of thetotal budget The total budget grew 202 from 2007 to 2008 and 219 from 2008 to 2009

Source Developed by Carlos Mendoza Mora 2009 El Costo de la Inseguridad en Meacutexico MexicoCity Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad Based on state and federal budgets



266

DANIEL SABET

was still uncovering widespread corruption and abuse and it was not until the 1990s

that the New York City Police Department became a model agencySecond it is a mistake to ana lyze the police as an isolated actor Rather the police

force is embedded within a larger political legal and cultural system Politically itis important to remember that the police leadership is appointed by highly depen-dent on and accountable to the elected president governor or mayor While nopresident and only one governor has ever been convicted on collusion charges thereare no shortage of al legations of political collusion with organized crime and thereappears to be widespread tolerance37 Collusion and even tolerance effectively rulesout the possibility of meaning ful reform Lega lly there is considerable ambiguity inthe justice system discretion in the application of the law and a tendency to elevateinformal rules above the law Culturally citizens expect and sometimes even bene1047297t

from the ability to bribe officers As officers frequently point out in rationalizingtheir own corruption it is typically the citizen who wil l offer the bribe 1047297rst38 Executive power and police dependence on the executive appears to be one of the

biggest obstacles to reform In theory executive appointment of police chiefs shouldmake the police more accountable to citizens and executive discretion should fa-cilitate rapid reform but in practice this power has led to window dressing reformpatronage appointments poor policies and a lack of continuity in reform efforts

There is a tendency among political leaders coming into office to repudiate thepast administration restructure the police and introduce new programs Howeverchange is not the same as reform In the discussion above it was noted that the struc-ture of the federal police changed dramatically under each administration and suchpractices are perhaps even more common at the state and municipal level For ex-

ample in the early 2000s most state judicial police were renamed ministeria l policeand many municipal police departments became secretariats While a new namenew uniforms and new logos are meant to symbolize a break from the past thereis often insufficient substance to such reforms Moreover political human and 1047297-nancial capital is spent adjusting to the new structure rather than tackling the realchallenges of police reform

Despite signi1047297cant efforts to strengthen the municipal police since 2008 thereis (at the time of this writing) a proposal on the table with considerable politicalmomentum to dissolve the countryrsquos municipal forces and subsume them withinthe state police While it is argued that the proposal will allow for improved coor-dination and facilitate reform implementation it is hard not to see the proposal as

just another restructuring without confronting the real challenges of pol ice reformThe proposal would likely change ldquowhordquo provides policing services rather than alterldquohowrdquo those services are provided

37Astorga El Siglo de las Drogas Ravelo Ricardo 2006 Los Capos Las narco-rutas de Meacutexico Mexico CityDeBosillo Jesuacutes Blancornelas 2002 El Caacutertel Los Arellano Feacutelix La ma1047297a maacutes poderosa en la historiacutea de

Ameacuter ica Latin a Meacutexico Plaza amp Janeacutes Meacutexico38For a more thorough exploration of these themes see Azaola and Ruiz Torres Investigadores de papel



267


Ironically while executive control makes rapid change possible it makes real re-

form difficult to institutional ize For example it is common for a municipal admin-istration to focus on improving the quality of selection criteria and training only tohave the following administration prioritize dramatically increasing the size of theforce and in so doing undermining previous efforts to improve selection and train-ing Although undermining accountability to voters does not appear advantageousincreasing accountability to the law rather than to the executive and granting citycouncils state legislatures national and state public security councils citizen publicparticipation committees and citizen observatories meaningful oversight authorityoffers an attractive alternative to the current system39

Third reform efforts have not been more successful because even with an in-creased emphasis on vetting they have not sufficiently confronted corruption

Whether by design or by default reformers (particularly at the local level) have in-stead prioritized improving selection criteria education and training and investingin equipment and technology over developing robust accountability mechanisms40 As the latter entails confronting organized crime and the rank and 1047297le police whosupplement their salary with daily bribe payments state and municipal political andpolice leaders have opted for less threatening reforms41 Such a strategy might pro-vide a long term foundation for tackling corruption but in the short term existingreforms have proven to be insufficient to improve police effectiveness Creating ac-countability will also require an effective mid-level command structure promotedbased on their merits rather than their personnel ties Although a civil service typereform is central to the current package of initiatives it chal lenges the tradition ofclientelism and confronts considerable opposition and implementation hurdles

Fourth the challenges of building accountability mechanisms and merit-basedpromotion criteria point to the fundamental problem of implementation A largeliterature has sought to understand the gap between reform policy and reform im-

39Kelling and Moore argue that real reform did not begin in the US until the 1930rsquos when reformist chiefssucceeded in insulating themselves from the political process and civil ser vice reforms were passed KellingGeorge L and Mark H Moore 1988 The Evolving Strategy of Policing Perspectives on Policing Vol 440Even when combating corruption has been made a priority the results have often been less than desirableAbsent effective investigative capacity anti-corruption crusaders have simply assumed police culpabilitydespite insufficient evidence Azaola and Ruiz Torres in Investigadores de Papel go so far as to argue thatanti-corruption initiatives actual ly help fuel corruption They wr ite that the promotion of zero-tolerance

policies against impunity have led to a ldquoreaction of resistance and rationalization on the part of those whoare stigmatized a s guilt y in this case the police that results in more actions of abuse of power and corrup-tionrdquo (46) This is not to say that anti-corruption crusades should be abandoned merely that departmentsrequire effective investigative capacity41Departments typically have an internal affairs t ype unit responsible for investigating police corruptionhowever as they respond to citizen complaints they do not tend to address corruption issues More im-portantly with lim ited investigative capacity such agencies have a hard time building a solid enough caseto prove corruption beyond a reasonable doubt In addition these agencies are focused on 1047297nding rottenapples and rarely analyze and address institutional causes of corruption



268

DANIEL SABET

plementation42 It is far easier to write a policy outlining merit based reform than

to implement it In fact departments frequently have had formal policies outliningsuch promotion criteria on the books for over a decade Opponents to reform often1047297nd ways to subvert what on the surface appears to be good policy For examplemany departments are now able to track arrest and crime indicators at the neighbor-hood level in close to real time But as soon as performance becomes measured basedon statistics there is an incentive to manipulate the data As one officer interviewedby Azaola and Ruiz Torres offers ldquoIf they want numbers wersquoll give them numbers

mdash even if theyrsquore garbagerdquo43 In fact other authors have shown how the police dis-courage crime reporting to keep crime statistics low44 The problem is not a desireto measure police performance which is of course a positive development but theimplementation challenges of developing reliable data The Calderoacuten administra-

tionrsquos Integral Police Development System and New Police Model outline the correct poli-cies required for long term change but the real challenge is implementation 45

Finally underlying and compounding al l of these factors is of course the presenceof powerful and unscrupulous organized criminal organization If organized crimeis able to credibly threaten police officers then a well trained well educated vettedofficer is just as subject to the choice between the bullet and the bribe as his or herpredecessors Protecting officers by secur ing radio communications properly equip-ping officers allowing threatened officers to carry weapons off duty transferringofficers when necessary and most importantly investigating and prosecuting policekillings remain chal lenges for the future

In summary it is important to recognize both the advances that reformers haveachieved in Mexico but it is also necessary to recognize continued corruption inef-

fectiveness and abuse On the one hand it is perhaps unrealistic to expect a radi-cal revolution in Mexican policing in the short term On the other hand therehas perhaps never been such an opportunity for real reform Nonetheless speedingup reform efforts will require a sober and realistic analysis of the continued chal-lenges ahead In short police reform will likely require greater police insulationfrom the political arena accompanied by greater accountability to the law the legis-lative branch public security councils or directly to citizens As a corollary to thi spolice reform will require long term efforts that outlast police and political leadersReal change wil l also require confronting corruption head on not by reversing thepresumption of innocence but by developing a merit based mid-level commandstructure appropriate accountability mechanisms that address both the rotten barrel

42 Jeffrey L Pres sman and Aaron Wi ldavsky 1979 Implementation How Great Expectations in Washington areDashed in Oakland Berkeley University of California Press43Azaola and Ruiz Torres Investigadores de Papel pg 7944Catalina Peacuterez Correa Front Desk Justice Inside and Outside Criminal Procedure in Mexico City TheMexican Law Review Vol 1(1) 3ndash3145SSP 2009 Sistema Integral de Desarrollo Policial Mexico City Secretariacutea de Seguridad Puacuteblica SSP 2009Nuevo Modelo Policial Mexico City Secretariacutea de Segur idad Puacuteblica



269


and the rotten apples and by protecting officers All of this demands more than well

written policies but the capacity to anticipate and respond to the many implementa-tion challenges and unintended consequences of reform

ACRONYMS

Acronym Spanish English

AFI Agencia Federal deInvestigaciones Federal InvestigationsAgency

DFSDireccioacuten Federal deSeguridad

Federal SecurityDirectorate

FASPFondo de Aportacionespara la Seguridad Puacuteblica

Public SecurityContribution Fund

ICESIInstituto Ciudadanode Estudios de laInseguridad AC

Citizen Institute ofInsecurity Studies

PGRProcuraduriacutea General dela Repuacuteblica

Attorney General ofthe Republic

PF Policiacutea Federal Federal Police

PFMPoliciacutea FederalMinisterial

Federal Ministerial Police

PFPPoliciacutea FederalPreventiva

Federal Preventive Police

PJF Policiacutea Judicial Federal Federal Judicial Police

SNSPSistema Nacional de

Seguridad Puacuteblica

National Public

Security System

SSPSecretariacutea deSeguridad Puacuteblica

Secretariat ofPublic Security

SubsemunSubsidio de SeguridadPuacuteblica Municipal

Municipal PublicSecurity Subsidy





248

DANIEL SABET

POLICING IN MEXICO

While there are con1047298icting counts of Mexicorsquos police forces estimations as of June2007 placed the number of public security personal in Mexico at 454574 of which368315 were police officers (See Table 11) When populat ion is taken into accountit is estimated by Guil lermo Zepeda Lecuona that there are 351 police for every one-hundred thousand people in Mexico and 299 police for every one-hundred thousandpeople when the Federal District is excluded Both these numbers are above theUnited Nations average of 225 and the recommended level of 280 police per one-hundred thousand people (although a few individual states fall below this mark)2

These law enforcement personnel are divided by both jurisdiction and function Jurisd ictionally the police are div ided into municipal state and federal police de-partments each of which has different responsibilities For example drug traffickingis considered a federal crime and falls under the jurisdiction of the federal policeHomicides are state crimes and investigated by state police Functionally the po-lice have traditionally been divided into preventive and investigative departmentsPreventive police departments operate at all three levels of government and are typi-cally organized under the auspices of a Secretariat of Public Security3 Their primary

job is to conduct patrols maintain public order prevent crime and administrativeviolations and be the 1047297rst responders to crime The transit police responsible forsanctioning traffic violations and responding to accidents are technically consid-ered part of the preventive police however in some cases they are organized as aseparate police force The ministerial police formerly known as the judicial policeorganized under the auspice of federal and state public ministries are responsible for

investigating crimes and carrying out judicial and ministeria l warrants4 Unfortunately a number of authors and studies have clearly identi1047297ed persistent

patterns of corruption abuse and ineffectiveness among all of these different typesof forces

Corruption Mexicorsquos chapter of Transparency International Transparencia

Mexicana AC has conducted surveys measuring self-reported bribe pay-ments that have consistently found that bribes to transit police officers and

2Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona 2009 ldquoMexican Police and the Criminal Justice Systemrdquo In Robert ADonnelly and David A Shirk Police and Public Security in Mexico San Diego University Readers pg 423Technically the Federal Police is no longer a preventive police force Reformers in the Calderoacuten adminis-

tration have sought to simplify Mexican policing by eliminati ng the jurisdictional and functional divisionswithin the police As such the 2009 Federal Police Law granted the newly named Federal Police investi-gative functions Also on the legislative agenda is a proposal to elim inate Mexicorsquos municipal police forcesThese issues will be dealt with in greater detail below4See Benjamin Reames 2003 ldquoPolice Forces in Mexico A Pro1047297lerdquo Working Paper Reforming theAdministration of Justice in Mexico Center for US-Mexican Studies or Ernesto Loacutepez Portillo Vargas2002 ldquoThe Police in Mexico Political Functions and Needed Reformsrdquo In Transnational Crime and PublicSecurity edited by John Bailey and Jorge Chabat La Jolla Center for US-Mexican Studies for an in-depthdescription of the Mexican police str ucture



249






18296 497





77132 2094




Number Percent




Total 86259 10000






250

DANIEL SABET




on false grounds8









251












252

DANIEL SABET













253







ZEDILLO





254

DANIEL SABET













255




FOX








27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









249






18296 497





77132 2094




Number Percent




Total 86259 10000






250

DANIEL SABET




on false grounds8









251












252

DANIEL SABET













253







ZEDILLO





254

DANIEL SABET













255




FOX








27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









250

DANIEL SABET




on false grounds8









251












252

DANIEL SABET













253







ZEDILLO





254

DANIEL SABET













255




FOX








27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









251












252

DANIEL SABET













253







ZEDILLO





254

DANIEL SABET













255




FOX








27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









252

DANIEL SABET













253







ZEDILLO





254

DANIEL SABET













255




FOX








27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









253







ZEDILLO





254

DANIEL SABET













255




FOX








27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









254

DANIEL SABET













255




FOX








27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









255




FOX








27Ibid



256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









256

DANIEL SABET










28Ibid 29Ibid



257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









257


CALDEROacuteN









January 11 2010



258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









258

DANIEL SABET







(days)




investigated


2005 7284

2006 9146 270 224 14

2007 11441 151 183 12 44625

2008 11341 152 19 11 43566

2009 10594 157 153 9 39054






259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









259
















260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









260

DANIEL SABET


FORCES AND SPENDING


forces


pesos)


pesos)

2001 4920 10241 15161 $54512 $51568

2002 5525 10830 16355 $69919 $63890

2003 6122 12535 18657 $72670 $62596

2004 8078 14415 22493 $75213 $63976

2005 7676 11756 19432 $75723 $69769

2006 8127 12907 21034 $88624 $86760

2007 7992 21761 29753 $94395 $176269

2008 5996 31936 37932 $89502 $211403

2009 4974 32264 37238 $123099 $329168






261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









261














262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









262

DANIEL SABET




requirement


applicantsaccepted

to theacademy


greater


Basicmonthlysalary

(pesos)




5580 $5952











263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









263






100 police


Ahome 013 050 312

Chihuahua 068 $240183 044 097

Cuernavaca 026 $184471 113 140

Guadalajara 023 $121161 294 076

Meacuterida 025 $147007 064 171

Meacutexico DF 018 $181774 084 309

Monterrey 025 $260976 372 190

Puebla 038 043


Torreoacuten 046 $39880 040 1605

Zapopan 019 114 036



264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









264

DANIEL SABET















265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









265




35



JUSTICE AND PRISONS





Percentof GDP

2007 848469 481107 1329577 59 12

2008 1008040 589827 1597867 62 13

2009 1170024 777665 1947690 64 17





266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









266

DANIEL SABET














267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









267











268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









268

DANIEL SABET











269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









269




ACRONYMS



















National Public

Security System









Documents

Chapter 8-Police Reform in Mexico, Advances and PErsistent Obstacles.pdf