FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 161594. February 8, 2007.]FERTILIZER and PESTICIDE AUTHORITY (FPA), petitioner, vs. MANILA PEST CONTROL COMPANY (MAPECON) and WOODROW CATAN, respondents.

D E C I S I O NPUNO, C.J p:

On appeal are the Decision 1 dated July 31, 2003 and the Resolution 2 dated January 8, 2004 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67175. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, which ruled that the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) did not have jurisdiction or regulatory power over the acts and business operations of Manila Pest Control Company (MAPECON).Petitioner FPA is an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture. It was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1144, "Creating the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority and Abolishing the Fertilizer Industry Authority," that took effect on May 30, 1977.Respondent MAPECON is a franchised and licensed urban pest control operator, and duly accredited by the National Committee on Urban Pest Control (NCUPC). MAPECON and its branches nationwide are licensed and accredited to engage in the manufacture, distribution, and application of its 38 patented pest control products. It has operated its urban pest control business since the 1960s. Respondent Woodrow Catan is the MAPECON Dumaguete City branch manager.Upon the request of Pablo Turtal, Jr., Manager of Supreme Pest Control (SUPESCON) who was holding office in Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Vicente Lañohan, the FPA Dumaguete Office Provincial Coordinator, issued an undated certificate that MAPECON-Dumaguete City branch had no license to operate, and that its pesticide products were not registered with the FPA. Thus, it could not engage in pest control operation "until such time that this above-mentioned business entity can secure a license from the [FPA]." 3 Lañohan also sent a letter to the Department of Trade and Industry, Dumaguete Office, dated December 29, 1993, wherein he requested the office to suspend the processing, approval, and/or release of the business trade name registration of MAPECON because of its alleged violation of the provisions of P.D. No. 1144. 4Using the certificate issued by Lañohan, Turtal sent letters to respondents' current and prospective clients, urging them to desist from dealing with respondent MAPECON. As a result, respondent claimed that it was disqualified and prohibited from participating in several private and public biddings, and that almost all of the winning bids had been awarded to SUPESCON, the pest control business of Turtal.Respondents MAPECON and Catan filed a complaint 5 on January 18, 1994, for injunction with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order and damages, against Vicente Lañohan and Pablo Turtal, Jr., before the RTC of Dumaguete City. Respondents sought to enjoin Lañohan and Turtal from disturbing their business operations and from requiring them to obtain a license from the FPA; and to desist from prohibiting respondents from participating in any and all private and public biddings. Respondents also sought payment of damages for the alleged evident bad faith of Lañohan and Turtal, who had allegedly conspired in easing respondents out of business. aIETCAIn an Order dated January 19, 1994, the trial court restrained Lañohan and Turtal, their agents, and all persons acting for them, for 20 days, "from stopping and disturbing in any form, the business operation of plaintiffs as described in said complaint, from requiring plaintiffs to obtain a license and/or permit from the [FPA], and to cease and desist immediately from prohibiting plaintiffs from participating in any and all private and public bidding related to its business." 6

On January 27, 1995, respondents MAPECON and Catan filed an amended complaint, 7 which impleaded the FPA and its officers Francisco C. Cornejo and Nicholas R. Deen, Executive Director III and Deputy Executive Director III, respectively, as defendants. Respondents alleged in their amended complaint that Cornejo and Deen, as officers of the FPA, had also sent letters to several clients of MAPECON, advising them to desist from dealing with the company, because it had no license to engage in pest control. Respondents further claimed that, despite knowledge of the pendency of the instant case, Cornejo and Deen had issued certifications and released news items stating, among other things, that MAPECON had no license to operate from the FPA. Lastly, respondents MAPECON and Catan alleged that they were being eased out of business, and that their good name and reputation were being destroyed by Cornejo and Deen, in connivance with the other defendants.On March 9, 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents MAPECON and Catan. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations and finding the restraining order prayed for by the plaintiff to be meritorious and well-founded, it is hereby ordered that defendants Vicente Lañohan as an agent of FPA and Pablo Turtal, Jr. as the Manager of SUPESCON and their representatives and other persons working for and in their behalf, to cease and desist immediately from stopping and disturbing in any form the business operations of the plaintiff, from requiring plaintiff to obtain a license and/or permit from the FPA and from prohibiting plaintiff from participating in any and all private and public biddings related to its business. No pronouncement as to damages and costs.SO ORDERED. 8

Petitioner and Vicente Lañohan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court also denied petitioner and Lañohan's motion for reconsideration.Hence, this appeal. Petitioner raises a lone issue for resolution, which is whether the acts or business operations of respondent MAPECON are under the jurisdiction or regulatory power of petitioner FPA.In defending its jurisdiction, petitioner FPA invokes P.D. No. 1144 which created it. It cites Sections 8 and 9 of said law, to wit:

Section 8.Prohibitions Governing Sale and Use of Fertilizers and Pesticides. It shall be unlawful for any handler of pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemicals or for any farmers, planter or end-user of the same as the case may be:(a)To engage in any form of production, importation, distribution, storage and sale in commercial quantities without securing from the FPA a license therefor;(b)To use any pesticide or pesticide formulation on crops, livestock, and the environment in a manner contrary to good agricultural practices as hereinabove defined;(c)To deal in pesticides and/or fertilizers which have not been previously registered with FPA, or which registration has expired or has been suspended or revoked;(d)To adulterate pesticides formulation and fertilizer grade;(e)To impose as a condition for the purchase of fertilizer, the simultaneous purchase of pesticide for other agricultural chemical inputs and vice-versa;(f)To mislabel or make claims which differ in substance from the representation made in connection with a product's registration or from its actual effectiveness; and(g)To violate such other rules and regulations as may be promulgated by FPA.Section 9.Registration and Licensing. No pesticides, fertilizers, or other agricultural chemical shall be exported, imported, manufactured, formulated,

stored, distributed, sold or offered for sale, transported, delivered for transportation or used unless it has been duly registered with the FPA or covered by a numbered provisional permit issued by FPA for use in accordance with the conditions as stipulated in the permit. Separate registrations shall be required for each active ingredient and its possible formulations in the case of pesticides or for each fertilizer grade in the case of fertilizer.No person shall engage in the business of exporting, importing, manufacturing, formulating, distributing, supplying, repacking, storing, commercially applying, selling, marketing, of any pesticides, fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals except under a license issued by the FPA.The FPA, in the pursuit of its duties and functions, may suspend, revoke, or modify the registration of any pesticide, fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals after due notice and hearing. cADaIH

Petitioner also cites Ministry of Health Administrative Order No. 39, s. 1979, which delisted "pesticide, insecticide and other economic poisons as household hazardous substances under Category V" from those subject to the licensing and registration requirements of the Food and Drug Administration. According to the Administrative Order, "under [P.D.] No. 1144 dated May 30, 1977, creating the [FPA], it was found desirable 'to have one Agency to regulate . . . pesticide labelling, distribution, storage, transportation, use and disposal.'" 9Further, petitioner invokes the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated July 15, 1980 between the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the FPA, represented by then Ministry of Agriculture, which stated that the FPA shall have jurisdiction over the registration of household pesticides, insecticides and other economic poisons; the registration of handlers of household pesticides; and the accreditation of all commercial pest control operators.Lastly, petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1144, which requires the registration of pesticides with, and the licensing of their handlers by the FPA, is a special law. On the contrary, the laws invoked by respondents are laws of general application which cannot excuse respondent MAPECON from complying with a special law.Respondents, on the other hand, contend that their products are duly patented with the Philippine Patent Office and registered with the MOH per P.D. No. 552 (Sanitation in Tourist Facilities), P.D. No. 865 (New Sanitation Code), and Health Circular No. 155, s. 1975. Respondents' products are also registered with the Ministry of Public Works per P.D. No. 1096 (New Building Code), the Ministry of Labor per P.D. No. 442 (Labor Code), and with the Philippine Investors and the Ministry of Finance per P.D. No. 1423 (Philippine Inventors Incentive Act). We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.We hold that the FPA has jurisdiction only over agricultural pesticides, not over urban pest control products. "Pesticides" in P.D. No. 1144 refer only to those used in farming and other agricultural activities, as distinguished from pesticides used in households, business establishments, and offices in urban areas. The preamble of P.D. No. 1144 provides the first glimpse of this interpretation. It reads as follows:

WHEREAS, it is Government policy to provide adequate assistance to the agricultural sector in line with the national objective of increasing food production;WHEREAS, fertilizer and pesticides are vital inputs in food production and must be supplied in adequate quantities at reasonable costs;WHEREAS, improper pesticide usage presents serious risks to users, handlers, and the public in general because of the inherent toxicity of these compounds which are, moreover, potential environmental contaminants;WHEREAS, there is a need to educate the agricultural sector on the benefits as well as the hazards of pesticide use so that it can utilize pesticides properly to

promote human welfare while avoiding dangers to health and environmental pollution;WHEREAS, the fertilizer and pesticide industries have much in common in terms of clientele, distribution channels, system of application in farmers' fields, and technical supervision by the same farm management technicians under the government's food production program;WHEREAS, the foregoing considerations make it desirable to have one agency to regulate fertilizer importation, manufacture, formulation, distribution, delivery, sale, transport and storage as well as pesticide labeling, distribution, storage, transportation, use and disposal;WHEREAS, the Fertilizer Industry Authority was created by Presidential Decree No. 135, dated 22 February 1973, and amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 517 and 669, dated 19 July 1974 and 11 March 1975 respectively, in order to regulate, control and develop the fertilizer industry but does not include the pesticide industry in its jurisdiction;WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to create a technically-oriented government authority equipped with the required expertise to regulate, control and develop both the fertilizer and the pesticide industries;[Emphases supplied.]

Further, P.D. No. 1144 uses the term "pesticides" always in conjunction with "fertilizers" or with the phrase "fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals/chemical inputs" or the phrase "other agricultural chemicals," thus:

Section 6.Powers and Functions. The FPA shall have jurisdiction, on over all existing handlers of pesticides, fertilizers and other agricultural chemical inputs. The FPA shall have the following powers and functions:I.Common to Fertilizers, Pesticides and other Agricultural Chemicals.

xxx xxx xxx(2)To promote and coordinate all fertilizer and pesticides research in cooperation with the Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research and other appropriate agencies to ensure scientific pest control in the public interest, safety in the use and handling of pesticides, higher standards and quality of products and better application methods;

xxx xxx xxxIII.Pesticides and Other Agricultural Chemicals(1)To determine specific uses or manners of use for each pesticide or pesticide formulation;(2)To establish and enforce tolerance levels and good agricultural practices for use of pesticides in raw agricultural commodities; DSAacC(3)To restrict or ban the use of any pesticide or the formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or during certain periods upon evidence that the pesticide is an imminent hazard, has caused, or is causing widespread serious damage to crops, fish or livestock, or to public health and the environment;(4)To prevent the importation of agricultural commodities containing pesticide residues above the accepted tolerance levels and to regulate theexportation of agricultural products containing pesticide residue above accepted tolerance levels;(5)To inspect the establishment and premises of pesticide handlers to insure that industrial health and safety rules and anti-pollution regulations are followed;(6)To enter and inspect farmers' fields to ensure that only the recommended pesticides are used in specific crops in accordance with good agricultural practice;

(7)To require if and when necessary, of every handler of these products, the submission to the FPA of a report stating the quantity, value of each kind of product exported, imported, manufactured, produced, formulated, repacked, stored, delivered, distributed, or sold;(8)Should there be any extraordinary and unreasonable increases in price or a severe shortage in supply of pesticides, or imminent dangers or either occurrences, the FPA is empowered to impose such controls as may be necessary in the public interest, including but not limited to such restrictions and controls as the imposition of price ceilings, controls on inventories, distribution, and transport, and tax-free importations of such pesticides or raw materials thereof as may be in short supply.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 8.Prohibitions Governing Sale and Use of Fertilizers and Pesticides. It shall be unlawful for any handler of pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemicals or for any farmers, planter or end-user of the same as the case may be:(a)To engage in any form of production, importation, distribution, storage, and sale in commercial quantities without securing from the FPA a license therefor;(b)To use any pesticide or pesticide formulation on crops, livestock, and the environment in a manner contrary to good agricultural practices as hereinabove defined;(c)To deal in pesticides and/or fertilizers which have not been previously registered with FPA, or which registration has expired or has been suspended or revoked;(d)To adulterate pesticides formulation and fertilizer grade;(e)To impose as a condition for the purchase of fertilizer, the simultaneous purchase of pesticide for other agricultural chemical inputs and vice-versa;(f)To mislabel or make claims which differ in substance from the representation made in connection with a product's registration or from its actual effectiveness; and(g)To violate such other rules and regulations as may be promulgated by FPA.Section 9.Registration and Licensing. No pesticides, fertilizers, or other agricultural chemical shall be exported, imported, manufactured, formulated, stored, distributed, sold or offered for sale, transported, delivered for transportation or used unless it has been duly registered with the FPA or covered by a numbered provisional permit issued by FPA for use in accordance with the conditions as stipulated in the permit. Separate registrations shall be required for each active ingredient and its possible formulations in the case of pesticides or for each fertilizer grade in the case of fertilizer.No person shall engage in the business of exporting, importing, manufacturing, formulating, distributing, supplying, repacking, storing, commercially applying, selling, marketing, of any pesticides, fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals except under a license issued by the FPA.The FPA, in the pursuit of its duties and functions, may suspend, revoke, or modify the registration of any pesticide, fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals after due notice and hearing.

Aside from the use of the word "pesticides" always in conjunction with "fertilizers" or with the phrase "fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals/chemical inputs" or the phrase "other agricultural chemicals," the italicized portions of P.D. No. 1144, as quoted above, buttress the interpretation that the law applies only to pesticide use for agricultural purposes.Further, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1144 reads:

Section 1.Creation of the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority. The Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority, hereinafter referred to as the FPA, is hereby created andattached to the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of assuring the agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer and pesticide at reasonable prices, rationalizing the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer, protecting the public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and educating the agricultural sector in the use of these inputs. HCDaAS

Significantly, the above-quoted provision of P.D. No. 1144 sets the parameters of the powers and duties of the FPA. First, the FPA is designated as an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture. Urban pest control or pesticide use in households, offices, hotels and other commercial establishments has nothing to do with agriculture. Second, it spells out the purposes for which the FPA was created, viz: "for the purpose of assuring the agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer and pesticide at reasonable prices, rationalizing the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer, protecting the public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and educating the agricultural sector in the use of these inputs." All these purposes limit the jurisdiction of the FPA to agricultural pesticides.We go back to the basics of statutory construction. In interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a review of the whole law must be made, and its intendment must be given effect. 10 The various provisions of P.D. No. 1144 show its consistent intent to apply the term "pesticides" only to agricultural use. Thus, urban pest control operators and their urban pesticides are excluded from its coverage.Finally, we note that petitioner FPA, through House Bill No. 18740 filed in 1991, attempted to amend certain provisions of P.D. No. 1144 to expand its powers and functions by including urban pest control in its jurisdictional scope. Unfortunately for petitioner, House Bill No. 18740 did not pass. It was rejected by the bicameral committee. The amendment would result in petitioner FPA's usurpation of other governmental agencies' authority. 11 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67175, dated July 31, 2003 and January 8, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008.]

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J p:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot 1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu 2 and Antonio Pastor 3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila 4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, 6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 — A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713: 8

SEC. 7.Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b)Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2)Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; . . . (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1.A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. 10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODEOF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITYAPPLIES ONLY TO FORMERGOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 11 we ruled that Rule 6.03prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." DHcEAa

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOTSECTION 7 (B) (2) OF RA 6713,GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OFPROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCALGOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:

SEC. 90.Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b)Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, Thatsanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1)Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2)Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3)Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4)Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c)Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus. 13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of thesangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of

the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays. jurcda

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod orsangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of thesangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. 16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICEWHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICELAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITYFROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. 17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12.No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government;Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:

And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied) cCHETI

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: IAEcCT

CANON 7.A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. 18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath 20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance. SCaITA

SO ORDERED.

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 166735. November 23, 2007.]

SPS. NEREO & NIEVA DELFINO, petitioners, vs. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC., and THE HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

Before Us for Resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., seeking the reversal of Our Decision dated 5 September 2006. Respondent assails the Decision on the ground that the Court had erroneously interpreted the 1991 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, in ruling that the St. James Hospital is a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Moreover, respondent now contends that the case must now be decided in accordance with the latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning Ordinance which was only submitted as evidence in the instant Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondent now claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance shows that commercial and institutional uses were expressly allowed in Sec. 2, par. 1 of said Ordinance as it retained uses that are commercial and institutional as well as recreational in character and those for the maintenance of ecological balance. Thus, respondent postulates that even if parks, playgrounds and recreation centers which were expressly provided for in the 1981 Zoning Ordinance under letters (h) and (k) were excluded in the enumeration in the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, the same cannot, by any stretch of logic, be interpreted to mean that they are no longer allowed. On the contrary, respondent explains that what appears is the fact that parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers are deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which speaks of ". . . other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and maintenance of ecological balance . . . ." Hence, respondent concludes that the same reading applies in the non-inclusion of the words hospitals, clinics, school, churches and other places of worship, and drugstores which cannot be interpreted to mean that the aforesaid uses are to be deemed non-conforming under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as these uses are allegedly covered by the clause allowing for institutional and commercial uses.

Arising from this interpretation, respondent maintains that the Court erred in applying Sec. 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which pertains only to existing non-conforming uses and buildings, since, according to respondent, the St. James Hospital and its expansion are consistent with the uses allowed under the zoning ordinance. STaCcA

To address this matter, we deem it necessary to reiterate our discussion in our Decision dated 5 September 2006, wherein we have thoroughly examined the pertinent provisions of the 1981 and 1991 Zoning Ordinances, to wit:

Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive scrutiny of both Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have now been transferred to the institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. 1 This clearly demonstrates the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the residential zone only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals.

It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals gave undue emphasis to the word "institutional" as mentioned in Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and even went through great lengths to define said term in order to include hospitals under the ambit of said provision. However, they neglected the fact that under Section 4, Article VI of said Ordinance, 2 there is now another zone, separate and distinct from a residential zone, which is classified as "institutional", wherein health facilities, such as hospitals, are expressly enumerated among those structures allowed within said zone.

Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed to consider that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term "institutional" as used in Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration of allowable uses contained in the same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light of the restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. 3 Thus, in interpreting the whole of Section 2, Article VI, it must be understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses within a residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as allowable uses within the residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from said exclusion is that said hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from those structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in Santa Rosa, Laguna.

Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. CTAIDE

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Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the legality of the proposed expansion of said hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed medical institution. We shall decide this said issue in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-

conforming buildings, the applicable law at the time of the proposal. As stated in Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance:

Section 1.EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of any building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may be continued, although such does not conform with the provisions of this Ordinance.

1.That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended to occupy a greater area or land that has already been occupied by such use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where such non-conforming use exist at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance. 4 (Emphasis ours.)

It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

From our discussion above, it is clear that the position of respondent is erroneous. As stated in our Decision, a comprehensive scrutiny of both zoning ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have been transferred to the institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. This clearly indicates that the allowable uses in the residential zone have been delimited only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals.

With respect to respondent's claim that the controversy must now be decided in light of latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning Ordinance, it must be stressed at this point that the present case arose in 1994 when respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., applied for a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution, at which time, the zoning ordinance in effect was the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. It is a well-settled rule that the law in force at the time of the occurrence of the cause of action is the applicable law notwithstanding its subsequent amendment or repeal. 5 Hence, in resolving the instant case, the zoning ordinance to be used in interpreting the legality or illegality of said expansion is that which was in full force and effect at the time of the application for expansion which is the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, regardless of its subsequent amendment or repeal by the passage of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance. IDSETA

Moreover, pleadings, arguments and evidence were submitted by both parties as regards the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance only. Apparently, the 1999 Zoning Ordinance was already enacted and in effect by the time the petitioners appealed their case to this Court on 7 February 2005. Petitioners, however, in their appeal, consistently maintained their argument that the expansion undertaken by the respondent in 1994 violated the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, and respondent likewise limited itself to the defense that it had complied therewith. It bears to emphasize that respondent called the attention of this Court to the enactment of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance and asserted its compliance with this latest zoning ordinance only in its Motion for Reconsideration before this Court. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. 6 This rule holds

even more true when the points of law, theories, issues and arguments are belatedly raised for the first time in the motion for reconsideration of this Court's decision.

Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., is hereby DENIED. However, this is without prejudice to respondent St. James Hospital, Inc.'s reapplication for expansion in accordance with the requirements under zoning ordinances now in effect.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005.]

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner, vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, filed by petitioner Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) against ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) and former Senator Loren Legarda, respondents, assailing the (a) Decision dated November 18, 1997, 1 and (b) Order dated August 26, 2002 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-93-16052.

The facts are undisputed.

On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women's University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode.

The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints 3 with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students. CSIHDA

Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not submit "The Inside Story" to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 7 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986 5 and Section 3, 6 Chapter III and Section 7, 7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations. 8

In their answer, 9 respondents explained that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.

On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties' memoranda, the MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the respondents are ordered to pay the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for non-submission of the program, subject of this case for review and approval of the MTRCB.

Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the 'The Inside Story' and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Channel 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing; otherwise the Board will act accordingly." 10

On appeal, the Office of Atty. Henrietta S. Mendez, Chairman of the MTRCB, issued a Decision dated March 12, 1993 affirming the above ruling of its Investigating Committee. 11 Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated April 14, 1993. 12

Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City. It seeks to: (1) declare as unconstitutionalSections 3(b), 13 3(c), 14 3(d), 15 4, 16 7, 17 and 11 18 of P.D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 19 7, 20 and 28 21 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations; 22 (2) (in the alternative) exclude the "The Inside Story" from the coverage of the above cited provisions; and (3) annul and set aside the MTRCB Decision dated March 12, 1993 and Resolution dated April 14, 1993. Respondents averred that the above-cited provisions constitute "prior restraint" on respondents' exercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Furthermore, the above cited provisions do not apply to the "The Inside Story" because it falls under the category of "public affairs program, news documentary, or socio-political editorials" governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers. DaACIH

On November 18, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision 23 in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the assailed Decision and Resolution of MTRCB dated March 12, 1993;

2.DECLARING AND DECREEING that Sections 3 (b), (c), and (d), 4, 7, and 11 of P.D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7, 28 (a) of its Implementing Rules do not cover the TV Program "The Inside Story" and other similar programs, they being public affairs programs which can be equated to newspapers; and

3.MAKING PERMANENT the Injunction against Respondents or all persons acting in their behalf.

SO ORDERED."

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 24

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including "public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials," are subject to petitioner's power of review under Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Court's ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals; 25 second, television programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former;third, petitioner's power to review television programs under Section 3(b)

of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;" and fourth, Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents' constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.

Respondents take the opposite stance. HCTaAS

The issue for our resolution is whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the "The Inside Story" prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The present controversy brings into focus the provisions of Section 3 of P.D. No. 1986, partly reproduced as follows:

"SEC. 3.Powers and Functions. — The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

b)To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export.

c)To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:

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d)To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end and that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television; DcaSIH

xxx xxx xxx."

Vis-a-vis the foregoing provisions, our task is to decide whether or not petitioner has the power to review the television program "The Inside Story." The task is not Herculean because it merely resurrects this Court En Banc's ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals. 26 There, the Iglesia ni Cristo sought exception from petitioner's review power contending that the term "television programs" under Sec. 3(b) does not include "religious programs" which are protected under Section 5, Article III of the Constitution. 27 This Court, through Justice Reynato

Puno, categorically ruled that P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner "the power to screen, review and examine "all television programs," emphasizing the phrase "all television programs," thus:

"The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all ‘television programs.' By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to 'approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . . .' The law also directs the Board to apply 'contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard' to determine those which are objectionable for being 'immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.'"

Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. 28 Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos. Thus, when the law says "all television programs," the word "all" covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. 29 The principle assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or expression. 30

It then follows that since "The Inside Story" is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.

Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the term "television programs" on the ground that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial" protected under Section 4, 31 Article III of the Constitution. Albeit, respondent's basis is not freedom of religion, as inIglesia ni Cristo, 32 but freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo applies squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to note that inIglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs . . . ." Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo's religious program from petitioner's review power. EaIDAT

Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.

If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.

The only exceptions from the MTRCB's power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P.D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. Thus:

"SEC. 7.Unauthorized showing or exhibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in any moviehouse, theatre,

or public place or by television within the Philippines any motion picture, television program or publicity material, including trailers, and stills for lobby displays in connection with motion pictures, not duly authorized by the owner or his assignee and passed by the BOARD; or to print or cause to be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater or public place or by television a label or notice showing the same to have been officially passed by the BOARD when the same has not been previously authorized, except motion pictures, television programs or publicity material imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels." DTEIaC

Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents contend that the "The Inside Story" falls under the category of newsreels.

Their contention is unpersuasive.

P.D. No. 1986 does not define "newsreels." Webster's dictionary defines newsreels as short motion picture films portraying or dealing with current events. 33 A glance at actual samples of newsreels shows that they are mostly reenactments of events that had already happened. Some concrete examples are those of Dziga Vertov's Russian Kino-Pravda newsreel series (Kino-Pravda means literally "film-truth," a term that was later translated literally into the French cinema verite) and Frank Capra's Why We Fight series. 34 Apparently, newsreels are straight presentation of events. They are depiction of "actualities." Correspondingly, the MTRCB Rules and Regulations 35 implementing P.D. No. 1986 define newsreels as "straight news reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels." 36 Clearly, the "The Inside Story" cannot be considered a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs program which is described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. 37 Certainly, such kind of program is within petitioner's review power.

It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has authority to review "The Inside Story." Clearly, we are not called upon to determine whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or the press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program. Neither did it cancel respondents' permit. Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner "The Inside Story" for its review and approval. Therefore, we need not resolve whether certain provisions of P.D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution.

Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTC's ruling that Sections 3(c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P.D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional. It is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself . 38

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Decision dated November 18, 1997 and Order dated August 26, 2002 are hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated March 12, 1993 of petitioner MTRCB is AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents. DCASEc

SO ORDERED.