CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE - Macedonia and Greece in The Hague –

THE INTERIM ACCORD, A CHALLENGE TO THE BASIC VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

by Slobodan Casule

THE UGLY PICTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

by Zvonimir Jankulovski

FLAWED ARGUMENTS AND OMITTED TRUTHS: A COMMENTARY OF THE “ELIAMEP THESIS” ON THE “NAME ISSUE”

by Vladimir Misev and David Vitkov

“IS EU POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ULTIMATELY A MATTER OF POLITICAL WILL?”

by Dejan Siljanovski

THE CHALLENGES FOR MACEDONIA’S MEMBERSHIP IN EU

by Arta Ibrahimi Alibasic

CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

- Macedonia and Greece in Th e Hague –

Macedonian Information Centre

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July - October 2009

Vol. VII, No. 2

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ISSN 1857-5412

korica-02-vol.07.indd 1korica-02-vol.07.indd 1 10/16/2009 1:22:02 AM10/16/2009 1:22:02 AMProcess BlackProcess Black

Analyses of Macedonian Politics, Economy and Society

Skopje, July - October 2009Vol. VII, No. 2



Dragan Antonov, DirectorMircela Dzuvalekovska-Casule, Editor-in-ChiefZora Atanasova, Translator

Design: MIC & Simco Sandulovski I Print: Maring Skopje I Circulation 500

© Copyright by MIC, 2009. All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or a retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

MIC is an independent news agency with complete editorial independence. The attitudes presented in this publication do not necessarily represent those of MIC. They belong only to the authors. The ar-ticles do not represent any consensus of beliefs and they may be different from one author to another.

MACEdonIAn AffAIrSAnalyses of Macedonian Politics, Economy and SocietyJuly - october 2009, Vol. VII, no. 2

Please, send manuscripts and letters to the editor to: The Macedonian Affairs Editor

Address: Macedonian Information Centre Naum Naumovski Borce 73 1000 Skopje Republic of Macedonia

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ISSN 1857-5412

CONTENTS

1. The InTerIm Accord, A chAllenge To The bAsIc vAlues of democrAcy Slobodan CaSule ..................................................................................... 5

2. The ugly PIcTure of The InTernATIonAl PolITIcs Zvonimir JankulovSki .......................................................................15

3. flAWed ArgumenTs And omITTed TruThs: A commenTAry of The “elIAmeP ThesIs” on The “nAme Issue” vladimir MiSev and David vitkov .....................................................23

4. “Is eu PolIcy ImPlemenTATIon ulTImATely A mATTer of PolITIcAl WIll?” Dejan SilJanovSki ...............................................................................41

5. The chAllenges for mAcedonIA’s membershIP In eu arta ibrahiMi alibaSiC ....................................................................51

APENDEXES :

InTerIm Accord mAcedonIA-greece, 1995 ...................67

relATed leTTers ..........................................................................77

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ThE INTErIm ACCOrd, A ChAllENgE TO ThE bASIC vAluES

Of dEmOCrACy

Slobodan CaSule

The Interim Accord (IA) between Macedonia and Greece is probably the most important international document of the post-war and post-Communist era of the 20th century. Partially implemented, it prevented a conflict in the already exploding Balkans between an EU and NATO member Greece and an emerging democracy, the Republic of Macedonia. It also delayed the rupture of the basic values of the UN, EU and NATO.

In essence the IA provided the confirmation and integration of the new nation emerged from the former Yugoslavia. Although such confirmation by third parties is, generally, not necessary, especially if the process of self-determination has resulted with independence and sovereignty recognized by the state from which the secession was completed, the International Community in the face of the UN and the US, were forced to move in and prevent another Balkan tragedy, probably worse than those already witnessed with shock by the entire world.

Even though the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the face of its constituent, the Republic of Serbia recognized the independence of Macedonia in its present borders, Greece through unilateral economic sanctions, the closing of borders and blockade, accompanied with military threats denied the independence of its neighbor. Starting with the attributes of state such as nation, flag, constitution and name, the government in Athens, quite contrary to international law and the

Slobodan Casule is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Assemly of the Republic of Macedonia. Currently he is Editor-in-chief of the Forum weekly magazine.

6 - Slobodan CaSule

international order used its position in the then EEC (later EU) and NATO, not only to block the sovereign Republic, but to deny its right to existence.

In brief, a situation of dictate and imposition was created, a phenomena Europe believed relegated to the past after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. The shock was even worse when Greece involved itself in the bloody falling apart of Yugoslavia, and when the true dimensions of Greece’s involvement became apparent.

Having no ideological, or any other residues of the divisions of Europe obliterated with the fall of the Berlin wall that could have contaminated their relationship, or given some sort of explication for the behavior of the government in Athens, Greece’s blockade, blackmail, imposition and dictate were, and still are and growing in similarity, analog if not identical to those of the period immediately before the Second World War, when nations were coerced in to submission, or dissolved under pressure of the Nazi Third Reich, with open compliance of the International Community, and by the solutions provided by Neville Chamberlain. In brief, Greece wanted, and still insists, to obtain political, economic, cultural and ethnic spoils of war in its dispute with Macedonia: the disappearance of Nation, without having to go to war. To worsen the situation, Greece’s pretensions were to be obtained by blackmailing not only Macedonia into obedience, and subsequent submission and dissolution using in the process the values of the EU, NATO and the UN as a weapon, but by threatening with the consequences of its doings, it coerced the mentioned multilateral organizations into accepting an outcome only possible after a victorious war of intervention. Thus, the UN, NATO and the EU were forced to accept as valid behavior a blatant contradiction of the very values all of them were conceived for. By using them Greece intended and still intends to use them to achieve something Nazi Germany tried to obtain with one of the bloodiest wars, and even bloodier Holocaust: the disappearance of a nation!

Therefore, such as at the moment of its creation and today even more, the IA has a paramount value, not only for the Republic of Macedonia, but also for the International community, above all NATO the EU and the UN, whose basic values are threatened by Greece and its abuse of its membership in them. In that sense, the case Macedonia

the interiM aCCorD – a Challenge to the basic values of Democracy - 7

opened before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague has a broader value.

The ICJ should rule in favor of the IA and its implementation, thus the risks of Greece’s destructive attitude and behavior can salvaged, and the values on which Europe’s peace and stability were obtained and maintained can safeguarded.

Macedonia’s case is solid. The arguments are clear, and the importance of the full implementation of the IA undeniable. The underlying reason for the creation of the IA, and its specific wording,

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is regional and continental security, impossible then, and now, without the integration of Macedonia in NATO and the EU, and the subsequent elimination of the so called Macedonian Question from the map of political problems and crises. The geostrategic situation in which the EU finds itself today, faced with a crises of definition, the economic recession that has devastated the financial system, the near collapse of some the economies of its new members, together with several other global issues makes this necessity even greater.

The US and NATO, strategically, and the EU strategically and economically, have their own priorities in this particular region of the Balkans, of which Macedonia is an important link. Without this juncture between the Black and the Adriatic/Ionic Sea the underbelly of Europe is open and vulnerable. Trade and communications will be difficult, if not disrupted, and even worse, this particular part of the region, parallel with Serbia’s and Kosovo’s border with Macedonia, better known as corridor Eight will fall captive to organized crime with al the consequences for the region and Europe. Since, quite naturally, the predominant interest of the EU, US and their defense alliance NATO is, without any doubt, continental security, in times of economic collapse and financial chaos all of them want not only to avoid a crises based on ethnic disputes in the Balkans, which means in Europe, a crises that can easily be inspired and detonated in case of a “successful” Greek offensive against Macedonia. NATO, US and the EU have no resources available, nor energy to deal with it faced with two wars that the western alliance is losing, the one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the situation in Pakistan is worsening, as a consequence of these two wars, and the country is on the verge of disintegrating and falling piecemeal with its nuclear potential in the hands of Taliban extremists. This alone can have unforeseen consequences in Asia, affect India, and undoubtedly affects the US, NATO and the EU. The security challenges and fears of Europe and the US received recently additional fuel with the reelection of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in control of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Last, but not least, the Israeli – Palestinian dispute show no signs of loosening its grip on the region, and the stability and security of Europe and the US.

Greece’s dispute with Macedonia threatens, in such a geopolitical context the very foundations of Europe’s peace and the values that made it possible. This alone is enough reason for an ICJ ruling upholding


the IA, and in favor of its full implementation through Macedonia’s integration in NATO and the EU.

The other reason is the necessity to eliminate the method Greece is using to coerce into obedience a sovereign state. If victorious, Greece’s abuse of the values and standards of the EU, UN and NATO will establish a precedent in international relations. This coercion of one European democracy towards another is, not only very dangerous, because it undermines the basic values of the western civilization, but is, unfortunately spreading. In other words, the Republic of Slovenia is using an analog method of blackmail in its territorial dispute with the Republic of Croatia. Together, Greece’s dictate towards Macedonia to autodestruct its identity, and therefore, existence – in essence the result is ethnic cleansing - and Slovenia’s dictate towards Croatia in order to obtain territorial claims, are nothing more and nothing less but the methods that The Third Reich and its NAZI leadership used against Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland. This contemporary version of casus belli in favor of ethnic cleansing and modification of borders under coercion is an utter contradiction with the aqui on which the EU stands and differs only in the fact that military power and the threat of war is not used. Although in the case of Macedonia, at the very beginning of the dispute with Greece, the imposed complete blockade established by the government in Athens was only one step away from conflict.

It was the IA that prevented the escalation, and the IA can be, at this particular and, as we saw, very delicate moment, once again a tool of compromise.

Finally, Macedonia’s position is solid because Greece has no choice but to adhere to the ruling of ICJ. Who ever the ICJ finds in breech of the IA, both sides will vouch that the other is in fault with the IA, and will insist that the accord is implemented by them. This means that both countries recognize the active existence of the IA, and are willing to implement it. Furthermore, Greece by accepting to prove that it is not in breech of the IA, but Macedonia according to them is, already has given, this time legal proof, that it not only recognizes the IA but is, therefore willing to implement it, so that it will not be in fault with the IA.

If so, and having in mind the above mentioned geostrategic needs, and dangers, Greece will have to cede and accept Macedonia’s

10 - Slobodan CaSule

membership in NATO and the EU; Macedonia, on the other hand, will have agree with joining these two multilateral organizations of vital importance for it under the temporary reference The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The rulings of the ICJ cannot be imposed on the sides in dispute, there is no mechanism, but both countries, forcibly will have to accept the rulings; Macedonia because it initiated process and Greece because it accepted to defend its position. Greece will find itself in a very delicate position if it decides to ignore the rulings, and the implementation of the IA, since it has submitted to the arbitration of the ICJ a series of its own disputes with Turkey.

A curious situation has arisen. The IA prevented a conflict, thus proving its validity and importance, but was not implemented to the fullest. Both countries according to their interests, position and understanding of the situation established particular, and in many aspects different interpretations of the document, and followed them as guidelines. Greece insisted on the clauses form which it deducted that Macedonia must change its name, based upon their interpretation of the IA; while Macedonia either followed suit, or, as Skopje is trying now, insisted on the implementation of the clauses that guaranty the country’s accession to NATO and the EU.

Common in both positions is the recognition, although very frequently implicit, by both countries of the IA. Their interpretations, and in many cases insistence, such as the positions now; both countries defending themselves from the accusations of breeching the IA, accusing the other of doing so, very clearly speak of their recognition of the document. Since in both cases, who ever is found in transgression, if at all, the fact that both sides in the dispute defend the IA, and insist on its validity implying, furthermore, that the other side must implement it, the logical conclusion for the ICJ will be to insist on its implementation, since by the very process and dispute both countries explicitly and with legal documentation and arguments have vouched that, even though the IA has outreached its term, it is still in force, according this particular clause.

This kind of ruling, i.e. the confirmation of the IA by the ICJ, but also, and this is very important, by Greece and Macedonia, is in essence the compromise we all need. The two countries, the International


Community, and especially NATO, the EU and ultimately the US can all profit from it.

Greece can use the ruling of the ICJ that it is obliged to implement the IA and accept Macedonia’s membership in NATO and subsequently to the EU, as a fait accompli, something it has to abide, having in mind its disputes with Turkey. Athens can sweeten the compromise in its public opinion, which trough manipulation and constant abuse of the dispute has extreme chauvinist demands for the solution, with the fact that Macedonia will have to, once again, accept the use of the acronym Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. The additional

12 - Slobodan CaSule

sweetener will be the temporary character of the compromise pending further negotiations.

Macedonia will have to accept this compromise and membership in NATO as FYROM, and the insistence for further talks, as part of its accession to the EU, which now will be promoted to negotiations that will have to result with a solution. Macedonia’s membership in NATO will also sweeten the public opinion in the country, which has also escalated into unprecedented extremes that border with isolationism and xenophobia, damaging in many aspects, of which the most challenging are the relations with the large Albanian community dissatisfied by the delay of the processes of integrations. This dissatisfaction is manipulated by the political elite in the Albanian community, and with a growing in insistence has been put before the government, the Macedonian part of it, asking for it to cede in the dispute with Greece, with threats that the Albanians will have to choose another way to join their brothers which are already in NATO and on their way to the EU. The goal of this maneuver is quite obvious, further concessions in the process of the implementation of the so called rights of the Albanian citizens, all the way to the establishment of a bi-national states. This outcome is a strategic goal by the Albanian political elite in the region, although it means an outright redefinition of Macedonia. Such a process will eventually destabilize the country and the region as will, with serious implications for Albania and Kosovo. The Albanian politicians are aware of the fact that this will endanger even more their aspirations to a full membership in NATO, so they will, as they are doing, manipulate the case, but at the same time be cautious with it.

Finally, the ruling of the ICJ in favor of the IA will also bring relief for the stressed out IC, especially NATO, which, even without Greece’s irrational behavior, is in a crisis of definition. NATO is severely weakened by the global economic crises, and also challenged by Russia aggressive “protection” of its interests in Georgia with an outright intervention. To add to the grievance of NATO was the latest move of Moscow creating rapid intervention forces with the majority of USSR’s former Republics, now sovereign states. The ruling of the ICJ will expedite Macedonia’s membership in NATO, and will accordingly help consolidate the southern flank of NATO. Macedonia has fulfilled all the prerequisite of the Membership Action Plan (MAP), actively participates in NATO operations in Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and actively participates in EU’s rapid intervention brigades.


With Macedonia’s full membership the existing gap between NATO members Albania and Bulgaria, i.e. the Othrant gate in the Ionic/Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea and its entrance to the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, as two strategic pivots of the flank will be closed with an active member with proven qualities.

Macedonia’s NATO membership, through the guaranties of the Charter, and the very character of solidarity between democracies, will quell the already rising tides of negation with clear views of territorial pretensions by most of its neighbors. It will also, once and for all, simmer down the frequently boiling interethnic relations, by guaranteeing the multicultural character of the country, versus the growing ambitions of some Albanian politicians for a bi – national state. In other words, one of the traditional fuses of the powder keg called the Balkans will be eliminated for good.

Furthermore, the gains of the IC from the inevitable ruling of the ICJ will manifest themselves through the consolidations of all of the values the Western Alliance stands for. Namely, the revalidation and implementation of the IA by the ICJ will eliminate the method of blackmail and dictate as used by Greece, and recently Slovenia. The ruling in favor of the IA will eliminate the lopsided position of Macedonia in the dispute with Greece, simply by opening the door of entry for it in NATO. Once there, Macedonia and Greece can as allies continue their process of negotiations on the bases of equanimity and, thus achieve a true and lasting compromise to the satisfaction of both sides, as the IA and the UN resolution governing the issue stipulates.

NATO, the EU and, consequently the UN, will prevent by implementing the ruling of he ICJ on the/and the IA further damage to their basic values. They will not be used any longer as elements of blackmail in order to serve as instruments for he achievement of pretensions only possible by means of war, and so far successfully prevented by the same values now abused by Greece and Slovenia!

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ThE ugly PICTurE Of ThE INTErNATIONAl

POlITICS

Zvonimir JankulovSki

On 17 November 2008 Macedonia addressed the International Court of Justice in Hague in search for justice against the Republic of Greece for the violation of the bilateral Interim Accord from 1995. Macedonia sued Greece for violating Article 11 of the Interim Accord, which stipulates that Greece should not block the country’s access to the NATO Alliance provided that it applies under the provisional reference for its name.

The key question in the dispute is how to interpret the stipulation of Article 11 of the Interim Accord, which says that the First Party (Greece) had agreed not to object to the application or membership of the Second Party (Macedonia) in international, multilateral, or regional organizations and institutions in which the First Party is a member. One of the possible legal interpretations is that Greece will refrain from blocking the access of the Republic of Macedonia in any international organization regardless of the other criteria for access, limiting itself only to the question of the name under which our state applies to that organization. Or, Greece has the right to block the access of our state to any international organization if it believes that our state does not fulfill the criteria for access to that organization, as it did by blocking our access to NATO. The other criteria were nothing but the only one: the question about the name.

In Bucharest, the question of the name of our state was elevated to the level of a dispute that imperils the stability of the entire region. According to Greece, Macedonia did not receive the desired membership

Prof. Dr. Zvonimir Jankulovski is a former Macedonian Ambassador to the Council of Europe.

16 - Zvonimir JankulovSki

in NATO because it is “not capable of creating conditions for stability” and “contributing to further development of peaceful and friendly international relations” in conformity with the NATO standards. Another question that the Court in Hague will have to view and find an answer to is the question if the countermeasures of Greece in response to the previous violations of the Interim Accord on the side of the Republic of Macedonia are allowed. The Court will have to investigate whether these measures have been justified by Law and proportionally applied in the context of the dispute over the name.

Everything is just fine up to here from the legal side of the dispute. I will not deal with the duration of the procedure in front of the International Court of Justice in Hague and the effects of the possible positive verdict for Macedonia. I will not even analyze the functioning of the Court and its limited power in the execution of its decisions by the states that have lost the lawsuits, as well as the indifference of the Security Council in defining consequences for their attitude. Why? Because I have never considered the dispute over the name to be a legal question. The dispute over the name has nothing to do with International Law. What I believe that no normal international solicitor can understand is how an irrational dispute can cause such an irrational attitude of the organized international community. It is funny how an essentially bilateral dispute can be transferred as international. It is funny how a legal question has become political, and how the international community has treated this all these years, as ell as how it manages to digest something that puts the entire system of international law and international organization under doubt.

There is one thing that I cannot understand, or otherwise I would share the optimism of our politicians and a part of the academic public that, through law, we will have justice in the dispute over the name. I have a problem in understanding what arguments are the feedback for the optimism and on what foundations are their beliefs that justice can be done in the international system. Particularly knowing (some may not know) that the International Law has never been treated as a rigid and compulsory codex of behavior of the actors in the international system. This attitude towards the International Law exceeds the political ideology and political stances. Perhaps the roughest picture for this relationship towards the International Law was manifested during the NATO military intervention in Kosovo in 1999. According to the words of the U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin, in the

the ugly PiCture of the international PolitiCS - 17

dispute between U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her British counterpart Robin Cook that some international solicitors in Great Britain oppose the NATO military intervention against Serbia without the approval of the UN Security Council, her answer was simple: “Take new solicitors”. Madeleine’s response was probably not diplomatic but it speaks a lot about the tough view towards the real nature of International Law, that International Law is a composition of norms of the states for the states and that its contents and applicability are always open for “earnest” disputes.

It is obvious that the International Law does not have a global meaning for all in the frameworks of the international system. Every independent state has the legal right and duty to view and interpret the International Law from its own perspective. In other words, when there is the question about the meaning and requirements of he International Law, the answer will most probably depend on who are the solicitors who are interpreting and viewing it. I would not like to sound pessimistic and claim that the International Law is a simply created illusion within the international system, or that it must and may be ignored by the states in their mutual relations. However, I would be less or more restrained concerning its power in the relations among the states. I believe that it is best to view the International Law as a sum of norms of attitudes of the states, which arise from the custom or the mutual agreements, in which some are stronger and others are very weak in their application in the relations among the states. In 1812 Judge John Marshal pointed out one of the main characteristics of the International Law: agreement. Finally, the obligation of the norms of the International Law depends on the agreement of sovereign states. They can interpret it in conformity with their understanding and interest, they can try to change it, or simply ignore it, as long as they are prepared to accept the political, the economic, and even the military consequences of their attitude. In reality, this is the essence of sovereignty that guides the states in the international system. Just look at the attitude of Greece in the dispute over the name and you will see what I am writing about.

The dispute over the name with Greece opened another question in the international relations, especially on the European Continent. I have the impression that the dispute over the name (if we can call it a dispute) has seriously undermined the foreign political idealism promoted by the politicians and intellectuals in Europe. It is the idealism on whose


foundations the concept of the European Union has been developed. It is the idealism that had as a challenge the minimizing of the conflicts via maximizing the cooperation among the states, the one that places its focus in foreign politics on formal and legal aspects of international relations and moral issues like human rights.

In monitoring the Macedonian case, I have a problem in accepting the claim of American Professor John J. Mearsheimer that the European foreign politics is a triumph of idealism versus realism. If what is happening with Macedonia should be the picture of modern idealism in Europe that was going to change the world, then we should seriously ask ourselves in which direction these changes go. The European idealists were led by the idea to change the world to the better by transforming the foreign politics in such a way that the states would no longer have to worry about strength and power as an unchangeable determinant in the security competition in the world and by creating a harmony. Perhaps when they think of the world in harmony they think of their own exclusive European club. This is why it is not enough for them if you have better arguments in an international dispute as is ours, but what matters is that you have the winning one. We obviously don’t have it. Greece does: the membership. It looks to me more every day that we are becoming their load on the road to harmonization of the relations in Europe, like a stone on the throat that pulls them down. Unfortunate for them, there are more stones, and fewer roads.

At least I am relaxed in context of the dispute when I read the statements of our supporters who are encouraging us by saying that justice is on our side. And this is not in dispute. However, what do we gain from justice on our side? Especially knowing that the dominating concept of justice in the international relations is laid down on the teaching that the politicians in the international relations are acting in conformity with interests defined as power. Most frequently, the good intentions in the foreign politics are a creamed interests liberated from moral principles for the sake of reaching the goal. It is an irony that the new “global” forms of justice in the international relations are less universal and more a replacement for those laid down in the UN Charter. David Held claims that the new International Law must be spread and defended from those democratic states and civil societies capable of governing the essential political courts and knowledge about the ways in which the political practices and institutions must be changed in order to be adapted to the new regional and global challenges. According


to this understanding of justice in the international system, the states that take over the global leadership in the 21st century have the right to arrange the world according to their own understandings and ideas about the new world order that has to be established.

So, in the modern international system the rights of the small and weak states may be broken on the base of the belief that the right may not be fully applied for them, while the powerful states may ask for immunity in the implementation of the same right from the simple reason that they are the only capable to implement it within the international system. Such arguments in the context of the new


concept of justice in the global world are slowly becoming an official doctrine. The world is turning into an arena created by the powerful and rich states, in which there is obviously not a place for justice and righteousness. The development of global justice is a process that minimizes the sovereignty of the states. Today, the sovereignty of the small states is becoming a legal fiction, a mask under which power is manipulating. The world has been positioned on realistic premises: order before justice. This, unfortunately, is the new old global world.

If in the dispute over the name the justice is on our side, why do they make me keep quiet about the gaffs of international representatives? Why do they make me keep quiet that my and your nationality as Macedonian will be defined by the statutes of the international institutions as is the EU? Why other people tell me what language I speak? Just imagine: justice is on our side, but at the moment the international community is consciously and intentionally changing the text of Resolution 817 (93) of the UN Security Council about the provisional name of our state, or about the name for international use. It forces us to change it. And now a dilemma is imposed on me: what justice can we expect in the new global world that has declaratively been laid on freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and basic liberties and rule of law? In Macedonia, everything that the international community convinced us that we have to believe in has been run over. Take the concepts on which the global world is laid: they are reserved only for the powerful and the rich. If you are not in their shoes, they become flexible and stretching, as is for instance the Republic of Macedonia, or FYROM as they prefer to call us.

And what about us? We will continue living with the hope and conviction that justice is on our side and that we will get justice through law. In the meantime, we will continue to digest the gaffs of Brussels’ or other worldwide bureaucrats when they rename us as they wish. We will argue that not even the jus cogens norms in the international law are what they should be. We will continue to be the reflection of the desires of the powerful, reinforcing the dilemmas in the legal character of the International Law among the theoreticians. We will continue to be a state whose unique international case they evade to process in the theory of International Law. Why? Because you will not find the answer to the dispute in Law, but in politics.

You know, there is time for theory and there is time for practice. Today it is not time for theory. Some may see that it is time for


pragmatism. I do not think that it is time for any of this. It is time to show the ugly face of the old new world through the dispute over the name and be persistent in it. And, although Macedonia is the biggest loser in this virtually extorted dispute, it has yet proved to be worthwhile to convince us (and not just us) what the international politics is really like; to show the difference between what it is and what it wants to present itself to be. This is like the difference between the photographed and painted portrait. The photograph shows whatever can be seen with a bare eye, while the painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by a bare eye, but it shows something that the eye cannot see: the expression of the face or the human dimension of the portrayed face. The dispute over the name has uncovered, or if you wish totally stripped the real substance of the foreign politics in which the interest of the powerful remains dominating.

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flAWEd ArgumENTS ANd OmITTEd TruThS

A COmmENTAry Of ThE “ElIAmEP ThESIS” ON ThE “NAmE ISSuE”

vladimir MiSev and David vitkov

InTrodUCTIon

In April 2009, ELIAMEP, a Greek Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, published a “Thesis” entitled “The Current Macedonian Issue between Athens and Skopje: Is there an Option for a Breakthrough?”

http://www.eliamep.gr/en/european-integration/publications-european-integration/the-current-macedonian-issue-between-athens-and-skopje-is-there-an-option-for-a-breakthrough/

The paper was written by Evangelos Kofos, a long-time “Consultant” to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His views have and continue to form key aspects of Greek foreign policy in relation to the Macedonian issue.

Although ELIMEP’s paper is presented in a clear and concise manner, it contains a number of flawed arguments and omits certain truths on the “name issue” which will be outlined in this paper.

vladimir Misev – President of the institute for DemocracyDavid vitkov – researcher in the institute for Democracy

24 - vladimir MiSev and David vitkov

1. on the constitutional name of the republic of Macedonia

“[The] current constitutional name, “Macedonia”, is, however, identical with the name of the wider geographic region “Macedonia”.”

This claim is false. The constitutional name of the country is not simply “Macedonia” - it is the “Republic of Macedonia”. There is a clear political qualifier (“Republic of”) preceding the noun “Macedonia”. If the Republic of Macedonia wanted to use the name “Macedonia”, without any qualifiers, then this might give rise to confusion or monopolisation. However this is clearly not the case.

Moreover, in Greece there is no region simply called “Macedonia” nor is there an “EU region of ‘Greek Macedonia’” as Kofos has erroneously claimed. In Greece, there are three separate administrative regions or “Peripheries” which use the noun “Macedonia” in their name. These regions are: “Region of Western Macedonia” (Περιφέρεια Δυτικής Μακεδονίας), “Region of Central Macedonia” (Περιφέρεια Κεντρικής Μακεδονίας) and “Region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace” (Περιφέρεια Ανατολικής Μακεδονίας και Θράκης).1 These regions are clearly distinguishable one from another by the respective prefixes “Region of Western”, “Region of Central” and “Region of Eastern” used before the noun “Macedonia”. Moreover, these internal administrative regions of Greece are easily differentiated from the independent and sovereign state called the “Republic of Macedonia”.

2. on Macedonian ethnicity and the Greek Macedonians (Makedones)

“The third, and even more disturbing development to Greek public opinion, particularly to the Greek Macedonians, was a re-appraisal of the ethnogenetic dogma of the “Macedonian” ethnicity. In their view, the state controlled educational system in FYROM, by extending the historical roots of the new nation to classical antiquity, was encroaching upon an illustrious past, which had been recorded in the annals of Hellenic heritage almost

1 These three regions were created in the 1980s when Greece was divided into 13 administrative regions. Incidentally, in 1988 the Ministry of Northern Greece was renamed the “Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace” (Prime Ministerial decision no. 704, 19 August 1988).

flaWeD arguMentS anD oMitteD truthS - 25

a millennium prior to the arrival of Slavic tribes in the region. The Greeks, particularly the Makedones, feel that a cherished human right, their right to their heritage and identity is in jeopardy. Moreover, by claiming the entire geographic Macedonian region of modern times as their “tatkovina” (fatherland), Slav Macedonians laid claim to everything Macedonian. As a result, the new generation, graduating school after the emergence of an independent Macedonian state in 1991, have espoused the new dogma, which those over 45 are at a loss to comprehend.”

Firstly, ethnic Macedonians and indeed the Republic of Macedonia have not claimed the “entire geographic region of modern times as their ‘tatkovina’”. The Macedonian people in the Republic of Macedonia consider the Republic of Macedonia to be their homeland or “fatherland”. The only people who in the Republic of Macedonia who might consider (and rightly so) Greek Macedonia as their “tatkovina” are the ethnic Macedonians born in Greece, who to this very day are denied the right of return to their “fatherland” (this issue will be addressed later).

Moreover, what is to be said about the ethnic Greeks in Greece with origins in Asia Minor who consider Asia Minor to be their “fatherland”? Additionally, what is to be made of the “Historical Map of Greece” officially published by the Greek Parliament and proudly displayed in Greek diplomatic missions abroad?2 This map denotes the “unitary Greek world” including territories in Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey)? Should one consider these territories part of the Greek “fatherland”?

Secondly, it is quite absurd to speak of “Hellenic heritage almost a millennium prior to the arrival of Slavic tribes in the region”. Neither Greek-Macedonians nor ethnic Macedonians are direct descendants of ancient peoples. Over the centuries, the whole Balkan Peninsula was invaded by different peoples including Slavic tribes who went as far south as the Peloponnese. The inhabitants intermixed and therefore if “Slav Macedonians” exist then surely “Slav Greeks” exist too (of course Kofos does not suggest the use of this term).

2 Official publication of the Greek Parliament under the supervision of the Geographic Military Service (GMS). A scanned copy of the map available at http://www.florina.org/news/2007/july06_e.asp


The right of ethnic Macedonians to make a cultural connection to the past including the ancient past cannot be denied, just as ethnic Greeks are not denied this right. If it is argued that ethnic Macedonians do not possess such as right, then in light of the fact that part of the population of Greek Macedonia today has origins in Asia Minor, do they have a right to call themselves “Greek-Macedonians” and make a cultural connection to ancient Macedonia?

In order to fully understand the term Makedones (Greek Macedonians), it is useful to briefly explain the ethnic and cultural composition of the population of Northern Greece. The southern part of the geographic region of Macedonia (today’s Greek Macedonia or Northern Greece) officially became part of the Greek state in 1913. At that time, the population was very mixed, comprising of a variety of different ethnic and linguistic groups (Macedonians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Turks, Albanians, Jews, etc). Different sources give different figures as to the size of each group. What cannot be disputed is that the entire region was multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic. For the purposes of this paper and without any prejudice to the identities of the above mentioned groups, we shall, in an abstract manner, use the term “natives” to describe the above mentioned category of people living in Greek Macedonia (Northern Greece) when it became part of the Greek state.3

In 1923, according to the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, about 1,500,000 Orthodox Christian refugees (Greek and Turkish speaking) were resettled from Asia Minor, Anatolia and Eastern Thrace to Greece. About half of these refugees were settled in Greek Macedonia, which severely altered the ethnic and linguistic structure of the region in question. For the sake of this paper and without any prejudice to the identity of the above mentioned group, we shall, in an abstract manner, use the term “settlers” to describe this category of people now living in Greek Macedonia (Northern Greece).4

Today, broadly speaking, these two groups (“natives” and “settlers”) make up the population of northern Greece. According to the Greek government they are all Makedones (Greek Macedonians).5 As mentioned

3 “Natives” in are known in Greek as dopii meaning “locals”.4 “Settlers” are known in Greek as prosfiges meaning “refugees”.5 At the last census in 2001, the total population of Greek Macedonia (Region

of West Macedonia, Central Macedonia and East Macedonia and Thrace was 2,424,765. Kofos and indeed the Greek government claim that there are about 2,500,000 Greek-Macedonians i.e. the entire population of Greek Macedonia.


above, among the “native” population, a group identifies as ethnic Macedonians i.e. a distinct ethnic, cultural and linguistic group. However Kofos conveniently makes no mention of this fact. Indeed, the Greek government denies ethnic Macedonians the right to call themselves Macedonians, yet somehow the “settlers” from Asia Minor have a right to call themselves Macedonians or Greek-Macedonians (Makedones).

Thus, according to Kofos and the Greek government, ethnic Macedonians who have lived in Greek Macedonia from the time of its incorporation into the Greek state in 1913 cannot be Macedonians for this usurps the right of the Greek Macedonians, hundreds of thousands whose ancestry is from Asia Minor and not Macedonia! Perhaps instead of applying offensive labels to ethnic Macedonians (i.e. Slav Macedonians, bilingual Greeks, etc), it might be more appropriate and

However it should be noted, it is impossible to know how many persons in Greece declare a Greek Macedonian identity, for questions on identity were excluded from the census. The number of ethnic Macedonians is also unknown due to the same reason.


constructive to find prefixes which more accurately describe many of today’s Makedones who prior to 1923 were Greek and Turkish speaking Orthodox Christians living in Asia Minor. Given the fact they settled in Macedonia as recently as 1923, a more accurate label might be them “New Macedonians” (Νέο Μακεδόνες – Neo Makedones).

Of course to be called “New Macedonians” would be unacceptable to “settlers” and rightly so. The right to self-identification is paramount and must be respected by both sides. In practice this means respect for and recognition of the existence of ethnic Macedonian identity and the Macedonian language by Greece and the respect and recognition of a Greek-Macedonian by the Republic of Macedonia (i.e. ethnic Greeks with a Macedonian regional/cultural identity).

The recognition of the right of both identities to co-exist in should be enshrined in an eventual final agreement on the name issue. There would be no confusion in the use of the term “Macedonian” as both are clearly defined. The use of the prefixes before the word “Macedonian” clearly distinguishes between the two groups (i.e. ethnic Macedonians and Greek-Macedonians). Moreover, both terms are ones of self-identification which is of fundamental importance. No undesirable names are being imposed (e.g. Slav Macedonian, New Macedonian) and both identities remain unaltered.

3. on Macedonian political refugees from Greece

“The emergence of a new generation of politicians in Skopje, belonging to the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party, some of them with family roots in Greek Macedonia, brought to the surface issues and grievances dating back to the years of the Greek Civil War of 1945-1949. For the past two decades, the Greeks have managed to mend fences of their savage fratricidal war. Nevertheless, in FYROM third generation descendants of the so-called “Egejski” refugees, including the current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, attempt to rekindle the travails of that period. The Greeks are certainly aware of the role of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and more so of the Slav Macedonian nationalists of Skopje at the time, in fanning the armed conflict in Greece, hoping to profit themselves. By now, it is well known that the price for the Yugoslav support to the Greek communist insurrection was Greek Macedonia. In the midst of negotiations over the “name issue”


to reopen such old wounds would hardly be productive to people on both sides of the border.”

Firstly, it should be stated the issue of the return of citizenship and property to ethnic Macedonian political refugees is not being pushed by “third generation descendants”, but by the refugees themselves! Furthermore, it is disgraceful to claim that “[f ]or the past two decades, the Greeks have managed to mend fences of their savage fratricidal war” while omitting to note that Greece continues to deny the right of return to ethnic Macedonian political refugees.

As a bit of background to this issue, during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) thousands of Greek citizens, from a variety of ethnic groups fled Greece. Following the end of the war, all those who left Greece during this period were stripped of their Greek citizenship and property. In 1982 the Greek government passed an amnesty law (Law no. 106841) which declared that political exiles who fled during the Civil War and were stripped of their citizenship are allowed to return provided they are “Greeks by genus”. In 1985, Law 1540 was enacted which granted political exiles who fled during the Civil War to reclaim confiscated property, provided they are “Greeks by genus”. The term “Greeks by genus” is a reference used by the Greek government for all those who identify themselves as ethnic Greeks. Hence, ethnic Macedonians and others who left Greece under the same conditions as the ethnic Greeks and had their citizenship and property confiscated are excluded from enjoying the rights granted under these laws.

This severely questions the very standing of the laws based on the grounds of equality and fairness. Moreover, the construction of the wording as relating to these laws is not benign, it has a clear intent to discriminate against all those who belong to the category of people classified as political refugees and who are not “Greeks by genus”. Given that ethnic Macedonians predominantly make up this category of people, it is indisputable that they have been the ones targeted by this exclusivist definition and the ones who have suffered the most. The individuals excluded by these two laws reside in the Republic of Macedonia, the United States of America, Australia and Canada and throughout Europe. The term “Greeks by genus” in these two laws, which are still in force today, are in violation of the fundamental principle of non-discrimination.6 Therefore, the “fence”

6 Greece is a part to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms


will be “mended” when and only when these refugees are allowed the right to return to their country of birth, Greece.

4. Kofos’ Conclusions and recommendations

The “ELIAMEP Thesis” makes several conclusions and recommendations which shall be dealt in this paper individually.

“In order to resolve the dispute, one has to approach constructively those “existential” elements, which are of particular concern to both parties. It is evident that the dispute is not simply the state name of Greece’s neighbour, it is what is conveyed through it. Skopje – and third parties offering their services for a compromise solution – need to understand that the geographical region of Macedonia, which includes the entire region of “Greek Macedonia”, is not and cannot be considered the “tatkovina” (fatherland) of the Makedonski people living in FYROM. This is a red line for Greece and the Greeks!”

Many things can be conveyed through a name, however this is not the Republic of Macedonia’s responsibility to be concerned about what irrational persons might perceive. Again, as argued previously, the Macedonian people in the Republic of Macedonia consider the Republic of Macedonia their homeland or “fatherland”. The only people who in the Republic of Macedonia who might consider (and rightly so) Greek Macedonia as their “tatkovina” are the ethnic Macedonians born in Greece, which to this day are denied the right of return to their “fatherland”. As previously argued, this is similar to the way in which ethnic Greeks from Asia Minor now living in Greece consider Asia Minor to be their “fatherland”!

“Similarly, Slav Macedonians need to realize that their newly conceived ethnogenetic dogma, extending to classical antiquity, encroaches upon the Hellenic cultural heritage and the identity

of Racial Discrimination (1965) and as such has an obligation under international law to “…condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races, and, to this end…undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons…”


of their Greek neighbours to the south. As such, it threatens to ignite a clash of identities in the region as a whole.”

This is absolute nonsense. The so-called “ethno-generic dogma” of the ethnic Macedonians is just a mirror image of the ethno-generic dogma of Greece and the ethnic Greeks. Moreover, it should be noted that the Republic of Macedonia does not seek to monopolise or claim exclusivity of the cultural heritage of ancient Macedonia, but rather wishes to share it. Notwithstanding what one may think of policies to rename airports, stadiums, highways, surely one must agree that if Greece and ethnic Greeks have a right to claim origins in classical antiquity and subsequently establish such a tradition, then surely the Republic of Macedonia and ethnic Macedonians also possess this right!

Moreover it is interesting to note Kofos’ and Greece’s complete silence on the issue of Bulgaria’s “ethno-genetic dogma, extending to classical antiquity”. In Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, there is a street named “Alexander the Great”, while in Plovdiv, the country’s second


largest city, there is a statute of Philip II. Furthermore, in many towns in the District of Blagoevgrad (Pirin Macedonia) there are streets named “Vodenska” (the Bulgarian and Macedonian name for the town of Edessa in northern Greece), “Solunska” (the Bulgarian and Macedonian name for the town of Thessaloniki in northern Greece) etc.

4.1. on the adoption of a geographic qualifier

“The state name needs specifically to refer to and describe the present region of FYROM. It should apply erga omnes in multilateral and bilateral international relations and transactions and should be observed by all organizations, states, and other non-governmental international organizations, including the government and the agencies of FYROM. In this writer’s opinion, the parties should accept the name used by the inhabitants of FYROM for their region of geographical Macedonia, i.e. Vardar Macedonia, or preferably Vardar Makedonija”

Geographic qualifiers cannot be basis of a solution. Names such as “North Macedonia” or “Upper Macedonia” allude to a “divided” Macedonia and could encourage irredentism on both sides. Moreover, such geographic descriptors impact on Macedonian ethnic identity and the Macedonian language, (e.g. “North Macedonia” = “Northern Macedonians” and “Northern Macedonian language”). Similarly, a name such as Vardar Macedonia tampers with ethnic Macedonian identity (e.g.: “Vardar Macedonia” = “Vardar Macedonians”). Tampering with Macedonian identity and the Macedonian language is a red line for the Republic of Macedonia and ethnic Macedonians.

4.2. on identity and self-identification

“Issues touching upon the self-identification of persons, which includes their ethnicity and their right to identify themselves, should be respected. This means that their name, Makedontsi, by which they identify themselves in their language, should be respected in all foreign languages, including the Greek. A similar arrangement might apply to the use of Makedones for the Greek Macedonians.”


Kofos began this paragraph well when he said that “Issues touching upon the self-identification of persons, which includes their ethnicity and their right to identify themselves, should be respected”. He should have ended the paragraph here instead of totally manipulating the proper use of the term “self-identification”. Indeed, ethnic Macedonians in the Macedonian language refer to themselves as “Makedonci – Makedontsi”. Of course in the English language for example they refer to themselves as “Macedonians”. Just as in the Greek language, Greeks refer to themselves as “Ellines”, in English they refer to themselves as “Greeks” and not “Ellines people” speaking the “Elliniki language”. Does Kofos also think it appropriate for such a formulation to apply to the Greeks and other cultural groups – e.g. the “Deutsch language” for the Germans and the “Français language” for the French?

Of course, there is a simple democratic alternative to Kofos’ approach which is the recognition of self-identification without restrictions or manipulations. This is the use of the terms ethnic Macedonians and Greek Macedonians, translatable and easily distinguishable in all languages.

4.3. on the role of the international community and the so-called “monopolisation” of the term “Macedonian”

“Finally, the international community needs to share its responsibility for resolving the name issue. After all, it is partially the culprit. Through the use of leading international languages – English, French, German and so on – they translate four different identities of Macedonian/Macedonians by one and the same name, “Macedonian”. The issue at hand is not merely one of semantics. Whoever succeeds to impose on foreign languages its own version of “Macedonian” acquires international monopoly for its use” Kofos makes a poor attempt to portray the international community

as a culprit against Greek interests. The only thing the international community can be accused of is continually denying a sovereign state, namely the Republic of Macedonia from exercising its right to self-determination, as guaranteed under international law.7

7 See the Charter of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.


Furthermore, talk of the Republic of Macedonia somehow monopolising the term “Macedonian” is groundless. The Republic of Macedonia has never sought to use the term exclusively or to deny Greek-Macedonians from self-identifying as such. As argued in this paper, two types of “Macedonians” can co-exist, without confusion or clash i.e. “ethnic Macedonians” and “Greek Macedonians”. Both terms are terms of self-identification and are mutually exclusive.

4.4. Kofos’ proposals on the use of “Macedonian”

“In order to overcome the name problem two solutions seem possible. (1) One would be to employ a traditional method and add to the respective Macedonian versions an appropriate prefix: Slav-Macedonian/s, Greek-Macedonian/s, Bulgarian-Macedonian/s or Albanian-Macedonian/s. (2) A second approach would be to apply in international languages the derivates of the various Macedonian versions in the original form of the respective local languages. Thus, the Slavic terms


Makedontsi (noun) and Makedonski (adjective) would be transferred to English and other languages in an un-translated Latin alphabet (for example: “the Makedontsi immigrated to the United States…”; “The Makedonski language…”). Similarly, the Greek terms Makedones (noun) and Makedonikos (adjective) could be adopted to identify the Greek variant of the Macedonian name.”

The issue of self-identification has already been addressed.

However Kofos’ examples in the above paragraph cannot pass without comment. His demonstration of how the terms “Makedontsi” and “Makedonski” could be used in an English sentence are quite ironic. His first example, “the Makedontsi immigrated to the United States…” is ironic because more than a century ago when people from all parts of Macedonia migrated to the United States of America, many of them declared their nationality (ethnicity) to be Macedonian, something different from Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek. According to the official records from Ellis Island, in the period 1897 – 1924, there were 7,821 such persons.8 This was decades before the so-called “fabrication” of the Macedonian nation by Tito’s Yugoslavia, as Greece has claimed.

In the other example, Kofos suggests the Macedonian language be renamed the “Makedonski language”. It should be noted that all serious linguists are in agreement on the use of the term Macedonian to describe the language. Moreover and ironically again, one of the most unequivocal pieces of evidence proving the existence of a language called Macedonian comes not from the academic world but from the Greek state itself. In the Greek national census of 1920, the Macedonian language (not “Slav-Macedonian”, not “Slavic” language, not “Slavic” idiom and not “Makedonski” language) was listed as a language spoken by parts of the population in Greece. Parts of the official census results were published (and therefore recognised) by the Greek state.9 Given that Greece in 1920 officially referred to the Macedonian language as Macedonian, any attempt by the same state almost a century later to

8 Ellis Island Foundation, http://www.ellisislandrecords.org.9 General Archives of the Greek state, republished in Μ. Χουλιαράκης, Γεωγραφική,

διοικητική και πληθυσμιακή εξέλιξη τησ Ελλάδας, τόμος 3, σελίδα 363. A scanned copy of this document can be found at http://www.florina.org/news/2000/minority_language_g.asp.


suggest that such a language does not exist or that the people who use it refer to their language is absurd and must be rejected.

4.5. Kofos’ explanation of the different meanings and identities of the term “Macedonian”

Kofos ends his analysis with a selective attempt to explain the “different meanings and identities of the term “Macedonian”” as it is used as a noun and an adjective in the Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Bulgaria.

Each of Kofos’ explanations deserves a close examination:

“In FYROM [sic] the noun Macedonians (Makedonci – Makedontsi – in the local Slavic language) identifies, (a) in the legal sense, all citizens of the Republic (including Slavs, Albanians, Greeks, Roma etc), and (b) in the ethnic/national sense, a million and a half local Slavs.”

The use of the generic racial term “Slav” to describe ethnic Macedonians is not only insulting but also inaccurate. According to the 2002 Census in the Republic of Macedonia, the 64.17% of the citizens of the country were declared their ethnicity to be Macedonian and not “Slav”.10 Therefore Kofos definition of the noun “Macedonians” as it is used in the Republic of Macedonia needs to be corrected and should read: “In the Republic of Macedonia, the noun Macedonians (Makedonci – Makedontsi – in the Macedonian language) identifies, (a) in the legal sense, all citizens of the Republic (including ethnic Macedonians, ethnic Albanians, etc) and (b) in the ethnic/national sense, of more than a million ethnic Macedonians.”11

“In Greece the noun Macedonians (Μακεδόνες – Makedones – in the Greek language) identifies, in the regional/

10 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 - Book XIII, Skopje, 2005, State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, available at: http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf

11 It is interesting to note that Kofos, in a typically manipulative manner, alludes to the Greek ethnic community as one of the larger communities in the Republic of Macedonia (officially 422 persons according to the 2002 census). It is likely that in reality Kofos was not referring to the Greeks in the Republic of Macedonia, but to the Aroumanians (Vlachs) which number 9,695 according to official figures from the 2002 census.


cultural sense, almost two and a half million ethnic Greeks of the region of Greek Macedonia.”

What Kofos conveniently omits to point out is that the term “Macedonian” is also used in Greece by a different group of people. While ethnic Greeks might use the term “Macedonian” (Μακεδόνες – Makedones – in the Greek language) in a regional/cultural sense, ethnic Macedonians in Greece also use the term “Macedonian” (Македонци – Makedontsi in the Macedonian language) to describe their ethnic identity. More importantly, ethnic Macedonians use this term to distinguish themselves from ethnic Greeks. The ethnic Macedonians have a distinct culture and speak a distinct language called Macedonian, thus forming a distinct linguistic and ethnic minority. A Macedonian ethnic/linguistic minority is not officially recognized by Greece, a position which has been critised by various domestic and international human rights organisations.12

“In Bulgaria the same name Macedonians (Makedonci – Makedontsi – in Bulgarian) identifies, in the regional sense, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Bulgarian.”

The “ELIAMEP Thesis” also fails to mention that the term “Macedonian” is also used in Bulgaria by a different group of people. While some ethnic Bulgarians might use the term “Macedonian” (Makedonci – Makedontsi – in the Bulgarian language) in a regional sense, the term “Macedonian is also used by thousands of ethnic Macedonians in Bulgaria (Македонци - Makedontsi – in the Маcedonian language). In fact, at the last census in 2001, there were officially 5,071 Bulgarian citizens who described their ethnicity as Macedonian.

12 See various reports from the last few decades from the Greek Helsinki Monitor, Human Rights Watch, US State Department, Council of Europe bodies including the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the Commissioner for Human Rights, the various judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (1998 and 2004). The latest international organisation to condemn Greece’s treatment of its ethnic Macedonian minority was the United Nations. Namely, the Independent Expert on Minority Issues released a report on Greece on 18 February 2009 citing a number of human rights violations and urged “Greece to withdraw from the dispute over whether there is a Macedonian or a Turkish minority in Greece and focus on protecting the rights to self-identification, freedom of expression and freedom of association of those communities.”



Of course one could also challenge Greek identity based on a similar reasoning as Macedonian ethnic identity is contested. Do Greeks today have a right to identify as Greeks (Έλληνες – Ellines)? Modern day Greeks are not direct descendants of the ancient Greeks, therefore should we distinguish between the two by using prefixes? What sort of prefixes should be used? Maybe, prefixes describing the ethno-cultural composition of Greece would be most appropriate e.g. Albanian-Greek, Vlach-Greek, Slav-Greek?

ConCLUSIon

This commentary has exposed the fundamental flaws and omissions in ELIAMEP’s analysis which are characteristic of the official Greek position in general. A solution to this irrational dispute might just be found if international law, respect for human rights and rationality prevail. However in order for this to occur, it will be essential that Greece stops acting “kofos” and listens, one and for all, to the sounds of reason. 13 Regrettably, this is something that it has resisted to do thus far.

© institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” Skopje, [email protected]

13 In addition to being the surname of Evangelos Kofos, the word “kofos” in Greek means “deaf”.

40

41

“IS Eu POlICy ImPlEmENTATION

ulTImATEly A mATTEr Of POlITICAl WIll?”

Dejan SilJanovSki

Differences in the European Union member states’ implementation record (of the EU policies and Directives) initiated debate among European scholars. These differences have presented a ‘fertile ground’ for development of different theories concerning the factors that affect implementation1 of the EU policies (Toshkov 2007). The main arguments discussed in the literature are related to the division between Institutional and Cultural factors. The institutional factors analysed in the first section of this essay comprise of ‘goodness of fit’ (Duina 1997; Knill & Lenschow 1998, 2000; Börzel 2000), veto players (Héritier 2001; Tsebelis 1995, 2002) and administrative efficiency (Pridham 1996). On the other hand, the Cultural factors examined in the second section, and developed by Falkner et al (2005, 2007), were divided into different worlds (law observance, domestic concerns and transposition neglect); depending on the political culture of the EU member states. Going through the institutional and cultural camps I analyze the influence of political will (political support of the Government for particular policy) in each segment. The main argument of the essay is that political will, influences the process of (non)implementation in

1 Implementation and/or compliance with EU policies and directives in this essay is defined as transposition of the EU Directives into the national legislation of the EU member states

Dejan Siljanovski – Executive Director of Regulatory Area in Makedonski Telekom, Master of European Studies, Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn, Germany, and Master of Science in International Economic Relations, University of Sofia, Bulgaria.

42 - Dejan SilJanovSki

both institutional and cultural divisions. However, the political will it is not the sole aspect that ultimately determines the EU member states’ implementation record, as it is demonstrated by the empirical evidence. Nevertheless, such ‘integrative’ approaches (Institutional and Cultural) hardly identify how European and domestic factors interact (Borzel 2000). Nor can they explain the differences in implementation and compliance. The findings lead us to suggest that there is variation in compliance not only among the different EU member states but also different factors explain variations across different policies within one single state.

The ‘goodness of fit’ argument (as part of the institutional framework) unquestionably contributes in illuminating why some member states will tend to comply more easily than other, depending on the (mis)fit of their domestic institutions and policies with the ones on European level. Understandably, countries whose existing institutions and policies are comparable with those of the EU will implement more swiftly than those who are radically different. However, policy misfit does not inevitably leads to non-implementation. The mobilization of national actors (e.g. interest groups) who ‘pull’ the policy down to the national level by pressuring the Government to implement it appropriately may convince domestic public actors ‘to give priority to particular policy and to embrace new directions’ (Pridham 1994:84). National mobilization is most efficient if it is capable to connect with the European Commission which may ‘push’ an EU policy from above by opening infringement proceedings against refractory member state. Overall, if the Governments are pressurized from above (EU) and below (domestic actors), EU policies have a good possibility to be implemented efficiently, even if implementation is costly due to policy misfit.

Moreover, a high level of misfit may be a prospect for national authorities to transform the current situation in a more desirable direction. For example, the Working Time Directive implicated enormous restructuring in Ireland. However, the Irish Government readily implemented it because it had public support for the drive of the reforms. Contrary, even comparatively insignificant alterations to national legislation may encourage ideological confrontation by political parties and their followers. Hence give rise to considerable postponements in implementation regardless of the lower level of misfit. To illustrate, the German right-wing Government declined to conform to the negligible requirements arising from the Parental

iS eu PoliCy iMPleMentation ultiMately a Matter of PolitiCal Will? – 43

Leave Directive because the requirement (to include men from single-income couples) was not in accordance with the conservative family policy preferences. Only when the new left-wing Government came into power it implemented the Directive and even followed its non-obligatory suggestions (Bursens 2002). Hence, it may be argued that the political will of the Government in both cases undeniably influenced the (non)implementation of the Directives. However it should be noted that without the public support for (non)implementation, the Directive transposition into national legislation would induce cost to the Government in power. Thus as well affect its legitimacy of the reform. Hence it would be fair to state that the political will was not the sole determining factor.

The veto player argument, which was initially developed in the context of comparative politics, begins with the postulation that the reform capacity of a political system decreases as the number of distinct actors (e.g. multi-party Government) whose agreement is required to pass a particular reform increases (Tsebelis 2002). However the empirical analysis demonstrates that the veto player argument does not match in every case very well either. The analysis of Labour directives implementation suggests that there is only a weak association between the number of veto players and Member State implementation record (Falkner et al 2007). Obviously, some states do correspond to the expectations of the veto player argument. In Germany the Directive on Packaging Waste required slight lowering of the strict standards concerning the Refillable Drink Packaging (Mastenbroek 2005). Although supported by the German Government, the Bundesrat refused its support and led to 2 years delay. Contrary, other states do not correspond to the veto player argument. The case of Denmark underlines these conclusions. Although the Government in power had fierce opposition (and required votes from the opposition in the Folketing to implement the Labour Directives) there were no delays in transposition. Hence, it can be argued that in some member states, the political will of the actors involved in the political process was determining factor when (non)implementation was taking place as the Waste Packaging Directive shows. However this argument can not be applied in each case.

On the other hand, there are number of states where implementation frequently remains an administrative procedure isolated from the Government (for long period of time). With these circumstances,


best demonstrated by Greece, the number of political veto players is irrelevant for long periods of the process, as political actors do not even become involved in the first place. This is the rationalization for why Greek performance is poor regardless of the low number of veto players (Greece had single party Government throughout the 90’s). Certainly, the low number of veto players (according to the logic) eases up the implementation process of the Government when pressures from the Commission increase in order to end the bureaucratic sluggishness. However this is not the case if the administration of the institutions in charge does not initiate the reform process in the first place. For example in the case of the Transport Directive, the data shows that Greece’s implementing instruments were on average 60 weeks delayed due to administrative inefficacy (Kaeding 2006). The veto player argument is therefore not incorrect, but veto players sometimes just do not have a critical role in implementation. Hence the administrative incapacity and bureaucracy have more influence on the inefficiency of the Greek implementation record (Pridham 1996) rather than the political will of the Greek Government. Additionally, the lack of domestic interest groups (e.g. NGOs) support to encourage change in the system (which would pressurize Governments to react) influences the low implementation record of Greece.

Altogether, therefore, the world appears more complex than the institutional factors and political will argument suggest. In their research (about the implementation of the Labour Directives in the EU) Falkner et al (2007) argue that some EU members are displaying regular patterns of (non)compliance regardless of the goodness of fit or the number of veto players in their administrative system. They acknowledged three worlds of compliance (world of law observance, world of domestic politics and world of transposition neglect) hence a ‘specific national culture of appraising and processing adaptation requirements’ (Douglas 2001).

In the world of law observance, the compliance objective generally overrules domestic concerns. Even if the EU policies are not in line with the domestic (policy) ideology, implementation of EU Directives is regularly in time and proper. Moreover, the public is used to complying. This model is supported by a domestic ‘compliance culture’. Non-implementation usually happens only seldom and only when essential national traditions are at stake. Additionally, the propensity is for occurrences of non-compliance to be finalised swiftly. Based on detailed


empirical analysis of implementation patterns customary in fifteen states, Falkner assigned Denmark, Finland and Sweden to this country cluster.

A case in point would be Denmark’s implementation of the Young Workers Directive. The Directive necessitated Denmark to increase its minimum age border for children to be allowed to execute light work. The centre-left minority Government supported the policy, however the opposition parties were ferociously opposing the legislation. Since the government did not have a majority in the Folketing (Parliament), it needed the assent of one opposition party. As the policy preferences between the political actors were not in agreement, this was a situation for expecting implementation stalemate. However that was not the case. As the implementation deadline was approaching, the Government offered some concessions not related to the raising of the minimum age, and the opposition abandon its confrontation in order to avoid an implementation delay. In other words, Falkner suggests that policy and ideological differences were superseded by a shared commitment and political will of complying with the law.


Danish political parties, moreover, feel politically bound by EU directives, since they have had the prospect to influence the Danish negotiation position in the Folketing. Additionally, the proportional representation within the European Committee (of the Danish Folketing) ensures that all actors are trustworthy to the European decisions, even in cases where Denmark was outvoted in the Council, since they were included in the policy-making (Eliason 2001:201). The same argument clarifies the early involvement of interest groups (e.g. for Environmental policy). Their participation guarantees an agreement among the private interest groups, avoiding their disagreement with the implementation of EU Environmental policies later on (deBerranger 1997:129). Eliason (2001:211) concludes that the Danish example for implementation of the Environmental Directives discloses the ‘residual adaptive capacity’ of institutions based on prearranged consultation and conciliation ‘predicated on an expectation of pragmatic compromises among competing interests’. Hence it may be argued that there is interaction among the Institutional set-up (Committees) and domestic interest groups together with the political actors (assisted by the political will of the actors involved). Moreover, these actors effectively influenced the implementation of the Environmental policies, rather than their political culture of conforming to every EU Directive as Falkner et al (2005) argue. But then again one single factor such as political will was not determining in this case either.

On the other hand, in the world of domestic politics, domestic concerns regularly prevail if there is a conflict of interests. Implementation is timely and appropriate when no national interests dominate over the weak objective to comply. In cases of clash of interests between EU and national politics, non-compliance is the outcome. Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK belong to this typology according to Falkner.

In the countries forming the world of transposition neglect, Falkner et al argue that compliance with EU law is no goal in itself. At least as long as there is no powerful action by supranational actors (like an infringement procedure by the European Commission), implementation is frequently not recognised at all in these countries. Only after a Commission intervention, the implementation may be started and might advance rapidly. According to their empirical findings, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal form this country cluster.


The last empirical case (illustrated bellow) argues against Falkner arguments of cultural divisions and countries typologies. Nevertheless it clearly exemplifies how political will of the Government, however, supported by interest groups and public opinion, encourage non-compliance of EU policies even if there are infringement procedures raised by the Commission. It can be argued (in some cases) that the main determinant when implementing EU Directives is the characteristics of the Member state‘s voters. As for domestic policies, Governments will follow EU Directives and policies that match to the voters’ preference (Oppermann and Viehrig, 2008:2). Hence, they will adjust to the public opinion. For instance, the Commission decided to place two infringement procedures against France on the Wild Birds Directive in 1998. The Directive has been implementation failure for years, because of the powerful hunting lobby in France. Thus France deliberately failed to comply. This case exemplifies that the domestic ‘legitimacy’ affects political actors not to comply, depending on the importance of the policy and the public interest. The Wild Bird Directive clearly shows how domestic concerns prevail when salient issues are touched upon. This example explains once again that the political will of the Government is not the sole determining factor for non-compliance. Moreover, public opinion and domestic interest groups ‘assist’ Government decision for non-compliance. Furthermore, Falkner placed France in the ‘world of transposition neglect’ rather than in the ‘world of domestic politics’ as our empirics demonstrates. His divisions can be contested for another reason. This particular case undoubtedly clarifies that even if there are pressures from the Commission and the European Court of Justice (in the ‘world of transposition neglect’ where Falkner placed France), when it comes to salient issues (that may affect Governments legitimacy and its rating for the next elections), domestic concerns which affect political will, influence Governments on their decision not to comply with particular policy. Therefore Falkner’s ‘worlds’ are not always true when analyzed with different EU policies.

Hence, the empirical evidence presented in this paper might lead us to suggest that the arguments for the institutional and the cultural frameworks are not precise in each and every case. Moreover, it can be argued that political will obviously has influence in country’s implementation record. However according to the empirical evidence so far it can be clearly stated that the world of compliance is much more complicated than European scholars would suggest. There are


many factors that influence implementation. Nonetheless, although there are typologies of compliance and groupings of factors that affect particular countries record it can be argued that in the ‘real world’ these divisions are not accurate. There are differences in implementation not only among groups of countries (or divisions of factors) but different directives have different implementation record even in the same country. Thus each case should be analyzed independently. In conclusion, the political will of the Government influences the implementation of the EU policies and Directives. However is not the ‘overarching meta-property’ that particular country’s implementation record ultimately depends on.

Bibliography:

Börzel, T., (2000) Why There Is No ‘Southern Problem’: On Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 7(1): 141–162.

Duina, F. (1997) Explaining Legal Implementation in the European Union International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 25(2): 155–179.

de Berranger, T. (1997) `Danemark’, in Rideau, J., ed., Les Etats Membres de l’Union Europe¨enne. Adaptations, Mutations, Resistances. Paris: LGDJ.

Eliason, L. (2001) Denmark: Small State with a Big Voice’, in Ze¡, E. E. & Pirro, E. B., eds, The EU and the Member States: Co-operation, Co-ordination and Compromise. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Falkner, G. Treib, O. Hartlapp, M, Leiber, S. (2005) Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York.

Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M. (2007) Worlds of Compliance: Why Leading Approaches to EU Implementation Are Only ‘Sometimes-True Theories, European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming.

Héritier, A. (1996) The Accommodation of Diversity in European Policy-making and Its Outcomes: Regulatory Policy as a Patchwork”, Journal of European Public Policy, 3(2): 149–167.

Knill, C, Lenschow, A, (1998) Coping with Europe: The Impact of British and German Administrations on the Implementation of EU Environmental Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(4): 595–614.


Kaeding M. (2006) Determinants of Transposition Delay in the European Union. Journal of Public Policy 26(3) p.229-253.

Knill, C., Lenschow, A., (2000) Do New Brooms Really Sweep Cleaner? Implementation of New Instruments in EU Environmental Policy”, in Implementing EU Environmental Policy: New Directions and Old Problems, (Eds.) Knill, Christoph, Lenschow, Andrea, pp. 251–282, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Oppermann, K. and Viehrig, H. (2008) Issue Salience and the Domestic Legitimacy Demands of European Integration. The Cases of Britain and Germany, European Integration Online Papers, Koeln.

Pridham, G. (1994) ‘National environmental policy-making in the European framework: Spain, Greece and Italy in comparison’, Regional Politics and Policy 4(1) Special Issue: 80–101.

Pridham, G. (1996) ‘Environmental policies and problems of European legislation in southern Europe, South European Society and Politics 1(1): 47–73.

Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science 25: 289–325.

Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. New York: Sage.

Toshkov, D. (2007) In search of the worlds of compliance: culture and transposition performance in the European Union, JEPP, 14, 6, pp. 933-59.

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51

ThE ChAllENgES fOr mACEdONIA’S

mEmbErShIP IN Eu

arta ibrahiMi alibaSiC

Generally about Western Balkan’s Membership in EU

The enlargement made the European Union what it is today – a huge power for the promotion and support of peace, democracy, and prosperity, as well as a force for projecting the European values and influence on the rest of the world. It is this enlargement that enabled the European Union transform former dictatorships into democracy of the member states. There were reservations during every enlargement but in all the cases the Union proved its institutional, financial, and political capacity for including new members in the family.

The latest enlargement in 2007, experienced the historical dimension of a repeated unity of Europe, and this was just another economic success that enhanced the European economic dynamics, the growth and creation of new jobs, and boosted investments and free trade.1

However, while the majority is waiting for the enlargement, many European citizens have doubts with regard to its speed and achievement. The Union must respect the existing commitments. At the same time, there is a need for an informative debate on the future expansions and their importance for the Union as a whole. The issue concerning the way in which the EU can endure the access of new members while expanding its main goals is not new. In Copenhagen in 1993 the European Council became famous for its “absorbing” capacity, while the “Agenda 2000”

1 COM (2006) 200,3.5.2006

Arta Ibrahimi Alibasic – South East European University - Tetovo

52 - arta ibrahiMi alibaSiC

proposed a package for institutional reforms, politics and budget, which opened the road to a successful expansion in May 2004.2 In this way the European Union proved to be capable of accepting new members and remain efficient. In order to prove that it can do this again, there is the necessity to ensure joint spirit in the sense that further expansion will help the common European project. So, the process for a country’s membership in EU is long and complicated.

As for the EU access of the Western Balkans, there are at least two vague questions: the first is whether they will become members of the EU individually or as a group and the second is whether the EU will commit to expand within its financial framework distributing the main budget (financial perspectives for the period 2007-2013).

With reference to the first question, according to the analysis of the International Crisis Group (ICG), the “Thessalonica Statement of 2003” of the European Union about the Western Balkans is treated as a signal according to which there will not be a group expansion for the five states3 and that each one of them will be separately ranked according to individual achievements.

However, although the latest expansion in 2004 was done on the same basis, the final result was a group membership. The integration of the Western Balkan countries in EU, one by one, can rather create problems than give a solution for the region as an entity. The learned lesson from the latest expansion was that the individual approach has limits. In any way, it seems impossible for all Western Balkan countries to become members of the EU together. Macedonia can hope to gain scores from the success of Croatia; as an alternative, there is the risk for it to join the group of Western Balkan countries that have not applied for membership yet.4

The promise for membership was made based on all the conditions of the EU for the region of the Western Balkans, starting from cooperation with the Hague Tribunal to the institutional strategic questions as is the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia.

With the enlargement from 2007, which covered Bulgaria and Romania, the Balkans has been thoroughly surrounded by member countries of the EU and thus the Balkan states have remained as a framed 2 Copenhagen criteria 1993 Agenda 2000, http://ed.europa.eu/agenda 2000/index_en.3 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro4 International Crisis Group 2005b

the ChallengeS for MaCeDonia’S MeMberShiP in eu - 53

ghetto in the core of Europe. It seems as though the influence of the EU in the region is decreasing only when the Balkan political elite does not believe that membership in EU is something that can come true. This will definitely not leave enough room for initiatives of the governments in the region to undertake difficult reforms and there is the probability that this may return the region back to the destructive politics from the past. If this happens, the European Union will find itself in a position of spending more time on stabilizing strategies – related to wars or political missions – and less on the development of the institutional differences. This would be a disaster not only for the region and it might also be the most difficult test for Europe’s foreign politics.

The certainty of a probable strategy for the integration of the region in EU and the prevention from the formation of a Balkan ghetto is a solution not only for the region but also for the EU itself. Without taking into the account the tiredness of the EU from expansions, a minority believes that the Balkan success remains the main interest of the EU not only because it can represent the most impressive successful politics of Europe (or its biggest and most expensive failure) but because it is a far cheaper and better alternative than to see the region go back to a political instability.5

Concerning the second question – the financial aspects of the further EU expansion, the European Commission has prepared the Rule Book of the Council for Enhancing the Assisting Instrument for Pre-Approaching (IPA), which will define the quantity, and what is more important – the kind of EU support to be given to the Western Balkan countries in the period 2007-2013.

In December 2006 the European Commission decided to reinforce the EU Enlargement Agenda. A consensus on enlargement was reached that was based on “3 Principles C” (2005); reinforcement, conditioning, and communications. By the day they get the approval, the states must be prepared to fulfill all the conditions for membership in the Union. The speed of the accession process particularly depends on the reforms of each negotiating state.

Macedonia’s Membership in EU

The information in 2003 that Macedonia would apply for membership in EU was accepted with an evident lack of enthusiasm 5 European Stabilization Initiative, ESI, www.esiweb.org


by the member countries and institutions of the EU. At that time, the European Union welcomed with astonishment the preparedness of the Irish chairing for accepting the official application from the then Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski on 26 February 20046.

The High Commissioner for Foreign Politics and Security (CFSP) Javier Solana described the Macedonian application as a “signal for great achievements and hope for the entire region”. Stability Pact coordinator Erchard Busek called the application an indicator for the resoluteness of the countries from the region to integrate in Europe. However, European Parliament’s President Pat Cox pointed out that the “goal of the country to accession and to the road to Europe is also the vision of the European Parliament”.7

On 17 May 2004, the EU Council of Ministers asked the European Commission to prepare the public, the so-called avis, in reference to the Macedonian application (which was handed in September 2005). In the meantime, the Macedonian authorities were asked to prepare the all-encompassing Rule Book presented by the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi in Skopje in September 2004.8

The EU avis was structured based on the so-called Copenhagen criteria (1993) for evaluating the capacity of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe for membership in EU.9 On

6 Yes, but when this was just about to happen, the news arrived in Dublin about the fatal air crash carrying President Boris Trajkovski and the ceremony was postponed for 22 March 2004.

7 International Crisis Group 2004b8 The Rule Book encompasses questions related to a number of issues connected with

the political system, the economy, the legislation, the administration, and the social questions.

9 The three Copenhagen criteria are: 1) Stability of the institutions that guarantee democracy, implementation of laws, human rights, and respect for the minorities; 2) commercial functional economy, including the capacity for dealing with the pressure of the competition and the commercial forces within the Union; and 3) Ability for taking over the duties for membership, including monitoring of the goals of the political, economic, and monetary union. In 1997, in Luxembourg, the European Council gave the status of candidate to all the candidate members (without taking into the account the defects related to the political criteria of Slovenia and Turkey), but the negotiations only began with those that were evaluated to have a functional commercial economy; after the reshuffle of the authorities in Slovenia, the negotiations started with all the other states in 1999 except with Turkey. The eight former communist countries became members in May 2004. The other two countries, Romania and Bulgaria, were expected to become members in 2007.


the basis of the positive avis from the end of 2005, Macedonia was given the candidate status10, but by the end of 2008 it had not yet been given the date for negotiations for membership in EU.

The importance of this decision, not only for Macedonia but also for the region, was emphasized by some international analyses and it was said that this decision had a positive and demonstrative effect on the other countries from the Western Balkans, as was the case with the avis of Croatia. Practically, the additional access to the EU Fund and the publication of the annual reports on the process made by the EC would have been implied instead of the reports on stabilization and association.

The same international analyses attracted the attention by saying that Macedonia remained a vulnerable state imperiled by the low capacity of its institutions and the weak confidence of the citizens in them. The political process in Macedonia is controlled by special strong interests and by the “undemocratic nature of the political parties that remain in the center of the crisis of political representation”.11

All right, but according to Mark Beunderman, the negotiations for membership in EU will be focused on the persuasion for an improved and professional civil service, so that we can expect, as in the other countries in transition, the key sectors of the state administration to improve their performances. In the meantime, the result of the process of the avis will, in any way, depend almost totally on the development here, while the exterior factors will affect the EU schedule.

This approach, according to the “merits”, was reaffirmed by the European Commissioner for Enlargement Oli Ren, who said that the Macedonian candidacy does not imply automatic beginning of the

(International Crisis Group 2004b).10 The European Commission, “Commission Opinion on the application from the

Republic of Macedonia for membership for the European Union” Brussels, 9 November 2005: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fyrom/key_document.htm. (In the original text the author is using the provisional reference for addressing the Republic of Macedonia as used by the EU institutions.)

11 International Crisis Group 2004b; similar was also the part regarding the political criteria of the Annual Report of the EC for Macedonia published on 6 November 2007 (see Republic of Macedonia 2007 Progress Report, Commission Staff Working Document, November 2007; Enlargement strategy and main challenges, COM (2007) 663, Brussels 6.11.2007).


negotiations for membership. However, according to former Dutch Foreign Minister Bot, the next step might be very far away.12

The Republic of Macedonia started the relations with the European Union at the beginning of the 90s in the last century. In the first year of the new millennium, it became the first state from the Western Balkans that signed the Stabilization and Association Pact, and at the end of 2005 it received the candidate status. This is a dynamic development of one of the rare examples where a country, from a war situation, in only four years became an EU candidate. This is why the written history (further in the text) about the relations between Macedonia and the EU is truly a history with positive results in the post-conflict process with European dimensions, exactly as was the very European idea after the Second World War: reconciliation and integration. Since 2004, the Stabilization and Association Pact has represented the basic legal framework for the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the EU. From a normative aspect, here are some parts of the Pact: preamble, main text, seven annexes, five protocols, and four joint speeches. The text of the Pact itself is divided into ten chapters: general principles, political dialogue, regional agreement, free flow of goods and workers, foundation of companies, services and capital, harmonization of legislation and implementation of laws, courts and internal affairs, politics of cooperation, financial cooperation, and the tenth chapter – institutional determination, basic and definitive. According to Article 1 of the Pact, “an association is formed between the Union on the one and Macedonia on the other side”.13 The association (according to Article 5) “will be fully accomplished not further than in ten years”.14

As regards the implementation of this Agreement, Articles 108 – 109 define the institutions and the process of implementation as are the Stabilization and Association Council composed of representatives from Macedonia and the Council of the European Commission as the highest institutional structure that meets once a year.15 After the EU-Macedonia Stabilization and Association Pact had come into force (April 2004), its implementing bodies were formed.12 Mark Beunderman, “Macedonia fells enlargement blues as Paris blocks EU status”,

http://euobserver.com/9/20529.13 See: Stabilization and Association Pact between Macedonia and EU.14 Ibid.15 The first meeting was held on 5 June 2004 in Skopje, the second on 18 July 2005

in Brussels, the third on 16 October 2006 again in Brussels, and the fourth on 23 July 2007 also in Brussels.


Beside the Stabilization an Association Council, there also operate the Stabilization and Association Committee and seven multi-disciplinary sub-committees, covering various spheres, like: courts and internal affairs, commerce, industry, borders, taxes, agriculture, fishing, internal commerce, competition, economic and financial questions, researches, technological development, social politics, transportation, energy, and politics of the region.16

There is the joint parliamentarian committee of the Macedonian and the European Parliaments (JPC)17 in this institutional structure of the stabilization and association process, and starting from 2006 Macedonia received the status of observer in the Conference of the Commissions for European Questions in the National Parliament (COSAC).18

16 After the first meeting in 2004, the Stabilization and Association Committee held its second meeting on 10 June 2005, the third on 19 June 2006 in Skopje, an the fourth on 19 June 2007.

17 The first meeting was held in 2004, the second on 5 December 2005 in Brussels, and the third in April 2006.

18 The Commission for European Questions of the Government of the Republic of


In the frameworks of the preparations of Macedonia for integration in EU, the “Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for Integration in EU” was adopted in 2004.19 According to this Strategy, the “Integration of Macedonia in EU represents a clear and undisputable strategic interest and a priority goal in the politics on all administrative levels”.20 This strategic and voluminous document of the Republic of Macedonia did not just define exactly the general framework of the entire process of integration of Macedonia in EU, but also the implementing aspects of this long-term vision.

As mentioned before, after the adoption of the “statement for submitting request for membership of the Republic of Macedonia to EU”21, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia submitted an official request for full membership in EU (22 March 2004). Upon the request of the Council of Ministers, in May 2004 the European Commission started the procedure of the so-called “avis” according to which the Macedonian Government had to fill in the voluminous questionnaires of the EC in order to depict the adequate situation in Macedonia in context of the fulfillment of the EU criteria.

Beside the classical criteria of the EU, the Republic of Macedonia had to fulfill additional political criteria that were simplified in the implementation of the peace agreement. This implied that on its road to integration in EU Macedonia had to fulfill only one more precondition: full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement22. This Agreement covers many EU standards that are also standards of the stabilization and association process. By the end of 2005, Macedonia had implemented most of the Ohrid Agreement and thus it fulfilled

Macedonia participated in the conference held in Vienna from 22 to 23 May 2006. 19 The national strategic plan for integration of the Republic of Macedonia in EU (The

Government of the Republic of Macedonia, March 2000); see the Government of the Republic of Macedonia n. 541, Skopje, 10 March 2004; see the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, legal council, n.44/4273, Skopje, 16 March 2004.

20 Ibid, p. 13; finally, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted this Strategy on its session on 6 September 2004.

21 Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia n. 07/04.22 The highest authorities of the EU have repeated this view many times with the

famous formulation: “The road of the Republic of Macedonia to EU passes via Ohrid”. OSCE representative De Gut, during his visit to Macedonia in April 2008, stated that Macedonia needed a strategy for proportional participation of the ethnic minorities, and he particularly pointed out the fact that in the judiciary system of Macedonia there is only 6 percent Albanians (see for more in the interview of De Gut for “Fakti”, 28.04.2006).


the main political precondition for receiving the status of candidate, while some parts of this Agreement remained not implemented in the period 2006-2008.23

After a very laborious work, but with the shared responsibility of all the parties of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 14,000 pages with 1,921 questions of the EC questionnaire were filled in an express deadline (14 February 2005), which were officially delivered to EC President José Manuel Barroso. Finally, as a confirmation for the responsible and serious work of the Macedonian Government and based on the EC positive opinion (9 November 2005), the European Council, backed by the decision of 17 November 2005, gave Macedonia the status of candidate.

This was an encouraging development for Macedonia, which was expected to consolidate its stability by focusing on the development of the institutions, improvement of the implementation of the law, good administration, de-centralization, consolidation of trust among the ethnic communities, and normally, economic development and foreign investments attraction. The implementation of the reforms requires consolidation of the administrative capacities by transforming the public administration into a service trusted by the citizens, which will guarantee the general interest but will not affect the economic decisions in which the private sector should be free to operate and create wealth without intervention. The capacity of Macedonia in facing these challenges in a successful way should enable the state consolidate its stability and show further understanding for a common administration with the EU.

The Macedonian authorities are trying to fulfill the political criteria for membership particularly via the implementation of the

23 Efforts are made for a full implementation of the Annexes B and C of the OPMD, which implies adoption of laws on the use of the languages and national symbols, as well as mechanisms for confidence building by improving the national participation in the administration, police, army, judiciary system. De Gut made concrete remarks about the judiciary system, and during his latest visit to Skopje in April, he said that the ethnic participation of the Albanians in the judiciary system of the Republic of Macedonia needed improvement, which was at the moment only 6 percent; the problem of making the Albanian language official and of giving social support to the victims of the 2001 conflict was neither solved inside Gruevski’s Government (August 2006-April 2008) nor following the May Agreement between BDI and VMRO-DPMNE or after the March Agreement between these two parties.


Ohrid Agreement, the reforms in the judiciary system, the public administration, the police, and the war against corruption and organized crime. Yes, but there are many things left to be done, as is for instance the full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement or the rule of the laws and the judicial reforms as foundations of the political criteria.

However, according to the Annual Report of the EC on its progress, in the period 2006-2008 Macedonia was stagnating in settling down these political criteria.

It is necessary to say that Macedonia’s attempts on its road to the implementation of the European Agenda were strongly supported by the EU with the efforts of it special representatives24 located in Skopje. The European Commission is giving its support through stabilizing processes and joint mechanisms, also assisted by the CARDS Program (since 2008 with the assistance of the IPA Program), thus forming an adequate framework for institutional reforms accompanied by a package of concentrating projects in legal questions and internal affairs which encompass management of border integration as well.25

Normally, however, the assistance is not sufficient unless there is a high level of engagement of the state institutions and the Government. In the EC annual reports on the advancement of Macedonia in the last few years it is concluded that there is a “stoppage on the road to the reforms”.

Without resoluteness and without attempts for identifying yourself in order to follow the general interests, you cannot make reforms that are of a more advanced development or prepare the terrain for further reforms in the field of economy, in the general and special sectors, as well as in the field of legal reforms and greater efficiency of the judicial system. The efforts regarding economic reforms is of special importance in fulfilling the criteria for membership, particularly the main criteria for commercial economy, and therefore it should not be taken as something granted without taking into the account that, in the past, Macedonia used to be more developed than many other states that managed to pass the test and are now becoming EU members.

The judicial reform is also becoming an imperative, because as international monitors observe, as well as experts and citizens, the

24 Macedonia is the state in which, for the first time, EU Ambassador Ervan Fuere had a double mission: special EU envoy and Head of EC Delegation.

25 With the new financial program IPA, the first project financed by this instrument is for the police reforms.


existing defense system of the legitimate rights and the compensations are not on the necessary level. This goes for both criminal and civil felonies. This was definitely a result of the lack of cooperation in the exchange of information, lack of independence, and lack of a clearly defined system of defense of the judges and prosecutors, but also a result of the lack of proper distribution of the funds of the new legislative system that is not playing the role of the third authority of the state vis-à-vis the Government and the Parliament.

The consolidation of the process of European integrations with the demonstration of the will of the Government aimed at abiding to the principles of the stabilization and association process will hopefully obtain the role of a catalyst in the internal stability, in the relaxation of the inter-ethnic relations, as well as in the realization of the economic and institutional reforms necessary for the advancement of the Republic of Macedonia.

If we were to make a sum out of this complicated process, we could draw the final result, which is that the stabilization and association process in the case of Macedonia had developed into two phases before it received the candidate status (the end of 2005):

1. The first phase or the implementation of the more important parts of the rapprochement, stabilization, and legal approximation of Macedonia with EU acquis.26

2. The second phase that led to the end of this preparatory process with the desired epilogue – for Macedonia to receive the candidate status.

Well, after the candidate status was received, as stated in the preparatory elaborates, according to the EC assessments in the last few years Macedonia has reduced progress in many fields, particularly as regards the fulfillment of the political criteria. Macedonia continued its preparations for membership in EU with all that.27

Macedonia’s progress in this preparatory process was assessed not only through the complete fulfillment of the political and economic

26 The legal aspects in connection with the preparation of the laws in harmony with the EU legal standards.

27 Republic of Yugoslavia 2007. Progress Report, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels 6.11.2007. Proposal for a Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Macedonia and repealing Decision 2006/57/EC, Brussels 6.11.2007.


criteria from Copenhagen, but also through the degree of the adoption of the EU right (acquis). The latter had to confirm its capability not only for harmonizing Macedonia’s legislation with the one of the EU, but also its implementation.28 This implies administrative and legal capacities for its implementation.

The Stabilization and Association Pact is definitely the basic legal framework in the Republic of Macedonia-European Union relations until its full membership. Together with the Stabilization and Association Pact, the main weapon that will be used in monitoring the implementation of the entire process of the membership of the Republic of Macedonia in EU remains the “European Partnership” that came in force on 30 January 2006.29

In November 2007, the Commission proposed a change from European Partnership into Accession Partnership that the Council approved of for the first time for the Republic of Macedonia on 18 February 2008.30 The Government of the Republic of Macedonia had previously adopted the Action Plan for European Partnership31, but at the beginning of March 2008 it approved the Action Plan for the implementation of the Accession Partnership.

We may say that the complete and continued implementation of the defined priorities with the Accession Partnership32, particularly

28 It is assessed that Macedonia has translated into Macedonia approximately 20 percent of the EU legislation.

29 The Government of the Republic of Macedonia – Sector for European Integrations: “Information connected with the process of membership of the Republic of Macedonia in EU for 2005”, Skopje, February 2006, p. 11; also, “National Draft Program for the Adoption of the EU right (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, March 2006, p. 17)”.

30 Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Macedonia and repealing decision 2006/57/EC, Brussels, 6.11.2007; and Council decision 18.02.2008.

31 Ibid p.12.32 The priorities emerging form the Accession Partnership that the Council presented

to Macedonia cover short-term priorities (1-2 years) and mid-term priorities (3-4 years). There are 120 in the first group, 34 of which are connected with the implementation of the political, two with economic criteria, and 84 with the implementation of the EU acquis. There are 52 priorities in the mid-term priorities; seven are connected with the political criteria, five with economic, while 40 with the implementation of the acquis. Council, GAERC: “The Republic of Macedonia 2007, Accession Partnership, adopted on 18.02.2008.


the “8 benchmarks”33, should remain Macedonia’s main commitment on its road to the EU membership because the progress of the general integration process will be measured based on the progress in this process.

The translation of about 100,000 pages of the “acquis communautaire”34 is the obligation of the government of the candidate country (and not the Union) that in the end must prepare the national version of the “acquis”. This implies that it has to do with a very responsible and complicated process that, according to the experiences of the so-far member states, can last for years. The translation of the EU legislation is not just a linguistic and information material, but also a legally-committing document and a precondition for further progress of the general integrating process of the Republic of Macedonia in EU.

In conformity with the Stabilization and Association Pact and the Accession Partnership, the Republic of Macedonia has now adopted the National Program for the implementation of the EU acquis.35 However, ahead of it there are many preparations, first of all the previous preparations for membership,36 continuation of the negotiations for visa regime liberalization with the EU and creation of working groups composed of experts for every chapter of the EU “acquis”.

Setting the date for the onset of negotiations on accession

In its decision for candidate status given to the Republic of Macedonia on17 December 2005, the EC did not set a date for starting

33 These eight referential points of priorities for Macedonia were published by EC on 5 March 2008.

34 This voluminous material covers 15,000 pages of the EU Official Gazette and 850 key decisions of the European Court of Justice.

35 After the “First Program for Approximation of the national legislation to the EU acquis” (2001), which was monitored on an annual level, in March 2006, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia presented the “National draft Plan for implementing EU acquis”. This draft was viewed by the EC and was adopted in April 2007, while the Government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted the final version at the beginning of 2007. The National Draft Plan for implementation of the EU legislation. (The Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, March 2006, pp. 1-2; until May 2008.)

36 One of the preparatory tasks (before starting the negotiations for access to EU) is the process of translation of the Union’s legislation and the preparation of the version of the Republic of Macedonia for the acquis. For this purpose, the experiences of the other states as is the case of Slovenia prove that a special class has to be formed, composed not only of linguists, but of lawyers, too, because parallel with the translation it has to be revised and then transformed into national legislation.


accession negotiations as it was the case with other countries. As it was pointed out the date was to be defined later depending on the achieved progress in realization of the priority activities, first of all the political criteria: implementation of the Ohrid Agreement; free and democratic elections, sustainable reforms in the public administration, judiciary, police, and the struggle against corruption.

This is why the later phase associated to the relations with the EU was supposed to start after the decision on starting accession negotiations. The two consecutive years – 2006-2008 – showed a stagnation in Macedonia’s approximation to EU because 2006 was an election year, 2007 was the year in which many of the requests noted in the EC annual report were not accomplished37, and especially because of stagnation in the implementation of the political criteria, while 2008 was again an election year due to the early parliamentarian elections.

At the beginning of 2008, following the encouraging messages of EC Vice President Franco Frattini and Commissioner for Enlargement Oli Ren (during their visits to Skopje in February and March 2008), there appeared hopes that the Republic of Macedonia could catch the step with the acceleration of the reforms after a two years’ stagnation.

However, later (for the third time in April 2008) Greece blocked the invitation to Macedonia for NATO at the NATO Summit in Bucharest because of the issue with the constitutional name. For that reason, the Macedonian authorities handed over the memorandum against Greece to the International Court of justice in The Hague. The document, which contains statements of Greek politicians given after Athens put a veto to the country’s entry into NATO in Bucharest in April 2008, would serve as an evidence that Athens violated the interim agreement with Skopje not to block the country’s integration in international organisations.

Following the adjournment of the Macedonian Assembly (12 April 2008) and the scheduling of early parliamentarian elections (1 June 2008), as well as the signals sent during the beginning of the election campaign, it seems that it was difficult for Macedonia to get a positive statement about the progress that could open the road to setting the date for starting negotiations for accession to EU. In the period between 2006 and 2008, after the fulfillment of the three Copenhagen criteria, there always came an additional one for the Republic of Macedonia,

37 Daily newspaper ”Dnevnik”, 20 July 2009


which was “to find a commonly acceptable solution for the name with Greece”38. Although this condition was not a part of the Copenhagen criteria, it became so strong that it was presented as a serious obstacle to the Euro-Atlantic integration of Macedonia. This was also evinced by blocking the invitation to Macedonia for membership in NATO by Greece, at the Summit in Bucharest, on 3 April 2008 and the continual threats that Greece might use the veto in setting the date for starting EU accession negotiations.39

If we add the fact that the Macedonian Parliament was adjourned40 and early elections were scheduled,41 it seems that the probability for setting a date for starting accession negotiations with Republic of Macedonia somewhere in mid 2008 became smaller. This was because the implementation of priorities emerging from the Accession Partnership and especially from the eight referential points requires time and utmost engagement of all the administrative capacities.

38 The EC decisions, Brussels, 13.12.2007.39 “Karamanlis is threatening with veto for EU, too” (according to A1 Television on

its news at 7 p.m. on 12.04.2008).40 On 11 April 2008, the Macedonian Assembly dissolved itself with 72 votes in

favor.41 The former Macedonian Assembly Chairman set the date for the early

parliamentarian elections (on 1 June 2008).

66

67

A P E N d E X E S

INTErIm ACCOrd mACEdONIA-grEECE, 1995

INT ErIm ACCOrd

Minister Karolos Papoulias, representing the Party of the First Part (the “Party of the First Part”) and Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, representing the Party of the Second Part (the “Party of the Second Part”), hereby DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:

Recalling the principles of the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of States incorporated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the United Nations Charter and, in particular those referring to the obligation of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Guided by the spirit and principles of democracy and fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights and dignity, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and pertinent acts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Considering their mutual interest in the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in their region,

Desiring to confirm the existing frontier between them as an enduring international border,

Recalling their obligation not to intervene, on any pretext or in any form, in the internal affairs of the other,

Desiring to develop their mutual relations and to lay firm foundations for a climate of peaceful relations and understanding,

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Realizing that economic cooperation is an important element for the development of mutual relations on a stable and firm basis, as well as desiring to develop and promote future cooperation,

Desiring to reach certain interim agreements that will provide a basis for negotiating a permanent Accord.

Have agreed as follows:

A. frIEndLY rELATIonS And ConfIdEnCE-BUILdInG MEASUrES

Article 11. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the

First Part recognizes the Party of the Second Part as an independent and sovereign state, under the provisional designation set forth in a letter of the Party of the First Part of the date of this Interim Accord, and the Parties shall at an early date establish diplomatic relations at an agreed level with the ultimate goal of relations at ambassadorial level.

2. The Party of the First Part shall as promptly as possible establish a liaison office in Skopje, the capital of the Party of the Second Part, and the Party of the Second Part shall as promptly as possible establish a liaison office in Athens, the capital of the Party of the First Part.

Article 2The Parties hereby confirm their common existing frontier as an

enduring and inviolable international border.

Article 3Each Party undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the territorial

integrity and the political independence of the other Party. Neither Party shall support the action of a third party directed against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of the other Party.

Article 4The Parties shall refrain, in accordance with the purposes and

principles of the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force, including the threat or use of force designed to violate their existing frontier, and they agree that neither of them will assert or

interiM aCCorD MaCeDonia-greeCe, 1995 - 69

support claims to any part of the territory of the other Party or claims for a change of their existing frontier.

Article 51. The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices

of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

2. Recognizing the difference between them with respect to the name of the Party of the Second Part, each Party reserves all of its rights consistent with the specific obligations undertaken in this Interim Accord. The Parties shall cooperate with a view to facilitating their mutual relations notwithstanding their respective positions as to the name of the Party of the Second Part. In this context, the Parties shall take practical measures, including dealing with the matter of documents, to carry out normal trade and commerce between them in a manner consistent with their respective positions in regard to the name of the Party of the Second Part. The Parties shall take practical measures so that the difference about the name of the Party of the Second Part will not obstruct or interfere with normal trade and commerce between the Party of the Second Part and third parties.

Article 61. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that

nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in the Preamble thereto or in Article 3 of the Constitution, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis of any claim by the Party of the Second Part to any territory not within its existing borders.

2. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in Article 49 as amended, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis for the Party of the Second Part to interfere in the internal affairs of another State in order to protect the status and rights of any persons in other States who are not citizens of the Party of the Second Part.

3. The Party of the Second Part furthermore solemnly declares that the interpretations given in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article will not be superseded by any other interpretation of its Constitution.

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Article 71. Each Party shall promptly take effective measures to prohibit

hostile activities or propaganda by State-controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other.

2. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the Second Part shall cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force.

3. If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do so.

Article 81. The Parties shall refrain from imposing any impediment to the

movement of people or goods between their territories or through the territory of either Party to the territory of the other. Both Parties shall cooperate to facilitate such movements in accordance with international law and custom.

2. The Parties agree that the European Union and the United States may be requested to use their good offices with respect to developing practical measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 5 so as to assist the Parties in the implementation of Article 8.

B. HUMAn And CULTUrAL rIGHTS

Article 91. In the conduct of their affairs the Parties shall be guided by the

spirit and principles of democracy, fundamental freedoms, respect for human rights and dignity, and the rule of law, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Helsinki Final Act, the document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of


the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

2. No provision of the instruments listed in paragraph 1 above shall be interpreted to give any right to take any action contrary to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, or of the Helsinki Final Act, including the principle of the territorial integrity of States.

Article 10Convinced that the development of human relations is necessary

for improving understanding and good-neighborliness of their two peoples, the Parties shall encourage contacts at all appropriate levels and shall not discourage meetings between their citizens in accordance with international law and custom.

C. InTErnATIonAL, MULTILATErAL And rEGIonAL InSTITUTIonS

Article 111. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the

First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

2. The Parties agree that the ongoing economic development of the Party of the Second Part should be supported through international cooperation, as far as possible by a close relationship of the Party of the Second Part with the European Economic Area and the European Union.

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d. TrEATY rELATIonS

Article 121. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Parties shall

in their relations be directed by the provisions of the following bilateral agreements that had been concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part on 18 June 1959:

(a) The convention concerning mutual legal relations,(b) The agreement concerning the reciprocal recognition and the

enforcement of judicial decisions, and(c) The agreement concerning hydro-economic questions.The Parties shall promptly consult with a view to entering into

new agreements substantially similar to those referred to above.2. The Parties shall consult with each other in order to identify

other agreements concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part that will be deemed suitable for application in their mutual relations.

3. The Parties may conclude additional bilateral agreements in areas of mutual interest.

Article 13Having regard to the fact that the Party of the Second Part is

a land-locked State, the Parties shall be guided by the applicable provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as far as practicable both in practice and when concluding agreements referred to in Article 12.

Article 141. The Parties shall encourage the development of friendly and

good-neighborly relations between them and shall reinforce their economic cooperation in all sectors, including that of water resources management. In particular they shall promote, on a reciprocal basis, road, rail, maritime and air transport and communication links, using the best available technologies, and facilitate the transit of their goods between them and through their territories and ports. The Parties shall observe international rules and regulations with respect to transit, telecommunications, signs and codes.


2. To this end the Parties agree to enter forthwith into negotiations aimed at promptly implementing agreements of cooperation in the aforementioned areas, taking into account the obligations of the Party of the First Part deriving from its membership in the European Union and from other international instruments. Such agreements shall relate to visas, work permits, “green-card” insurance, air space transit and economic cooperation.

E. EConoMIC, CoMMErCIAL, EnVIronMEnTAL And LEGAL rELATIonS

Article 151. The Parties shall strengthen their economic relations in all

fields.2. The Parties shall in particular support development and

cooperation in the field of capital investments, as well as industrial cooperation between enterprises. Special attention shall be paid to cooperation between small and medium-size companies and enterprises.

Article 161. The Parties shall develop and improve scientific and technical

cooperation, as well as cooperation in the field of education.2. The Parties shall intensify their exchanges of information and

of scientific and technical documentation, and shall strive to improve mutual access to scientific and research institutions, archives, libraries and similar institutions.

3. The Parties shall support initiatives by scientific institutions and by individuals aimed at improving cooperation in the sciences.

Article 171. The Parties shall take great care to avoid dangers to the

environment and to preserve natural living conditions in the lakes and rivers shared by the two Parties.

2. The Parties shall cooperate in eliminating all forms of pollution in border areas.

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3. The Parties shall strive to develop and harmonize strategies and programs for regional and international cooperation for protecting the environment.

Article 18The Parties shall cooperate in alleviating the consequences of

disasters.

Article 191. The Parties shall cooperate in improving and promoting business

and tourist travel.2. Consistent with the obligations of the Party of the First Part

arising from its membership in the European Union and from relevant instruments of the Union, the Parties shall make joint efforts to improve and accelerate customs and border formalities, including simplification in the issuance of visas to each other’s citizens, taking into account Article 5, paragraph 2, of this Interim Accord.

3. The Parties shall endeavor to improve and modernize existing border crossings as required by the flow of traffic, and construct new border crossings as necessary.

Article 20The Parties shall cooperate in the fight against organized crime,

terrorism, economic crimes, narcotics crimes, illegal trade in cultural property, offenses against civil air transport and counterfeiting.

f. fInAL CLAUSES

Article 211. The Parties shall settle any disputes exclusively by peaceful

means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.2. Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties

concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Interim Accord may be submitted by either of them to the International Court of Justice, except for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1.


Article 22This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or

entity and it does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force that the Parties have concluded with other States or international organizations.

Article 231. This Interim Accord shall enter into force and become effective

on the thirtieth day following the date on which it is signed by the representatives of the Parties as set forth below.

2. This Interim Accord shall remain in force until superseded by a definitive agreement, provided that after seven years either Party may withdraw from this Interim Accord by a written notice, which shall take effect 12 months after its delivery to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have, through their authorized representatives, signed three copies of this Interim Accord in the English language which shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Within two months of the date of signature, the United Nations is to prepare, in consultation with the Parties, translations into the language of the Party of the First Part and the language of the Party of the Second Part, which shall constitute part of the registration of this Accord.

Representative of the Representative of the Party of the First Part Party of the Second Part

WITNESSED, in accordance with Resolution 845 (1993) of the Security Council, by:

CYRUS VANCE Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

DONE at New York on the 13th day of September 1995

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rElATEd lETTErS

ThE mINISTEr fOr fOrEIgN AffAIrS

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

In implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today’s date the Government of Greece recognizes the Party of the Second Part within its internationally recognized borders with the provisional name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Very truly yours,

KAROLOS PAPOULIAS

Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Cyrus R. VanceSpecial Envoy of the Secretary-Generalof the United NationsThe United NationsNew York City

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Vol. 1891, 1-32193

uNITEd NATIONS NATIONS uNIES

13 September 1995

Dear Minister Crvenkovski:

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me today by Minister Papoulias concerning the implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today’s date.

Very truy yours,

CYRUS R. VANCE

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

His Excellency Stevo Crvenkovski Minister of Foreign Affairs Skopje


Vol. 1891, 1-32193

PErmANENT mISSION Of ThE rEPublICOf mACEdONIA TO ThE uNITEd NATIONS

NEW yOrK

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today’s date, under cover of which you transmitted to me a copy of a letter addressed to you today by Minister Papoulias concerning the implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today’s date.


Very truly yours,

STEVO CRVENKOVSKI


The Honourable Cyrus R. VanceSpecial Envoy of the Secretary-Generalof the United NationsThe United NationsNew York City

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Vol. 1891, 1-32193

ThE mINISTEr fOr fOrEIgN AffAIrS

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

With regard to Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Interim Accord of today’s date the Government of Greece would like to confirm that the symbol referred to in the above-mentioned Article of the said Accord is the Sun or Star of Vergina. In all its historical forms.


Very truly yours,

KAROLOS PAPOULIAS




Vol. 1891, 1-32193


13 September 1995

Dear Minister Papoulias:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today’s date concerning Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Interim Accord of today’s date. I have made the other Party aware of the content of your letter.


Very truly yours,

CYRUS R. VANCE


His Excellency Karolos PapouliasMinister of Foreign AffairsAthens

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Vol. 1891, 1-32193

PErmANENT mISSION Of ThE rEPublICOf mACEdONIA TO ThE uNITEd NATIONS

NEW yOrK

13 September 1995

Dear Mr. Vance:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today’s date, under cover of which you transmitted to me a copy of a letter addressed to you today by Minister Papoulias concerning the implementation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of today’s date.


Very truly yours,

STEVO CRVENKOVSKI




Vol. 1891, 1-32193


13 September 1995

Dear Minister Crvenkovski:

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today’s date concerning the legal effect of the instruments exchanged in connection with the Interim Accord of today’s date. I have made the other party aware of the content of your letter.


Very truly yours,

CYRUS R. VANCE


84

Analyses in Vol. 1, no. 1 (June Issue, 1996)

Military Cooperation - Macedonia & the USA – Quicker to NATO Through the Partnership

Succession to the Former SFRY – Tedious Legal-Political & Property Negotiations

High Education in the Albanian Language – Positive Trends Despite Existing Problems

The Organization of Trade Unions in Macedonia – The Transitions of Trade Unions During Times of Transition

Analyses in Vol. I, no. 2 (July Issue, 1996)

How the Macedonian Banks Are Being Reformed – Banking Between the East and the West

Drug Addiction in the Republic of Macedonia – Macedonia in the Kingdom of Narcotics

Draft-law on Radio-diffusion – Good Intentions in a Bad Package?

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia – A Lot of Work in Protecting the Constitutionality

Analyses in Vol. I, no.3 (october Issue, 1996)

Macedonian-Russian Relations 1992-1996 – Awaiting the Russian Ambassador

Some Aspects of National and Religious Tolerance in the Frameworks of the Elementary Education System in Macedonia – Instruction Without Education

Codification of Macedonian Criminal Law – Substantial Changes in Criminal Law

Results and Technology in Macedonian Privatization – Privatization at Any Cost

Analyses in Vol. II, no. 4 (february Issue, 1997)

Macedonian Political Scene – Political Parties, Election Trends and Macedonian Independence

Following the Local Elections – On Election Figures and Election Messages

Political Parties of Albanians Following Local Elections in Macedonia – Inevitable Radicalization - To Which Degree?

Analyses in Vol. II, no. 5 (April Issue, 1997)

The events in Albania and possible Balkan repercussions – Low Flight Over the Land of Eagles

Southeastern Europe - Geostrategic Analyses – The Historically Limited Sovereignty of the People in Southeast Europe

Paradigm Unbound – U.S. Grand Strategy in the Wake of Intervention in Former Yugoslavia

Analyses in Vol. II, no. 6 (June Issue, 1997)

Macedonia in the Balkans – The Unfavorable Turbulence Is Not Over!

Bulgarian dilemmas in the dispute with Macedonia – Stuck Between Enthusiasm, Tactics and Threats

Macedonian-German relations – A Strong Foundation With Accessible Peaks

Index of some previous articles

85

Reforms in the Macedonian banks – Only Profit Receives Recognition

Analyses in Vol. II, no. 7 (August Issue, 1997)

Inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia – Retrospective View (Dr. Emilija Simovska)

Macedonia-Slovenia – Highly Developed Bilateral Political Relations Behind which the Economic Cooperation Stagnates (Todor Pendarov)

Non-Governmental Organisations – The Long Way to Real Place in Society (Vladimir Petreski)

new Books

Leadership as a Substitute for Domination – Dr Ljubomir Frckovski

Democratic Models with a Touch of Experienced Authenticity – Guner Ismail

An Encyclopedic Dispute About the Minorities – Dr. Natasa Gaber

Statement

So Far the Situation Looks Good – Richard Schifter

Analyses in Vol. II, no.8 (July Issue, 1998)

Combination of Electoral Model Indispendable – Natasa Gaber and Aneta Jovevska

Electoral Model and Policy Dynamics in Macedonia – Ljubomir D. Frckovski

Elections - Mobilization of Prejudices – Ferid Muhic

Disposition Dimensions of Democratic Transition in Macedonia – Ilo Trajkovski and Mihajlo Popovski

Pandora’s Box Remained Closed – Vlado Popovski

Self-Destruction Syndrome – Atanas Vangelov

reviews and Criticisms

Civil Democracy without Citizens – To the book “Civil Association” by Dr. Ilo Trajkovski, Dimitar Mircev

Analyses in Vol. II, no. 10 (february Issue, 1999)

Macedonian Parliamentary Elections in 1998 Many Reasons to replace those in Power – Vladimir Petreski

The Balkans Nation-States – Nothing Bad on the Balkans is a Surprise – Meto Jovanovski

Environmental Policy – Protection of the living Environment and Nature, at Present and in the Future – Miroslav Balaburski

Europe and Macedonia – Roots and Development of European Community and European Union

Analyses in Vol. II, no.11

Expected Changes in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia – Cvetan Cvetkovski

IMF Will wait for the Government to Find Strategic Investors for 12 Loss Makers – Ljupco Zikov

Between Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: The Macedonian Perspective on the Kosovo Crisis – Biljana Vankovska - Cvetkovska

Legal Aspects of the Use of a Provisional Name for Macedonia in the United Nations System – Igor Janev

Analyses in Vol. III, no.1

Macedonian Foreign Policy Facing New Challenges – Dimitar Mircev

Reforms of the Defense System of the Republic of Macedonia – M.I.C. staff

Legal Responsibility of the United Nations for Unlawful Admission of Macedonia to UN Membership – Igor Janev

86

Some Aspects of Political Culture with the Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia – Emilija Simovska

Economic Indicators – Zoran Jovanovski

Macedonian Telecom System - an overview – Zdenka Pavkovik

Analyses in Vol. IV, no.1

The Model of Democracy in the Text of the Framework Agreement of August 13, 2001 – Dr. Gjorge Ivanov

The Political and Legal Aspects of the EU-Macedonia Relations: an Ever Closer Union? – Karolina Ristova- Aasterud

Macedonia: Bankruptcy and Investments – Judge Dejan Kostovski, Vladislav Tamburkovski, MBA

Proposal for Reconstruction of the Coordination in the UN System – Igor Janev


Western Civil-Society Empowerment and the Lessons Learned from the Balkans – Prof. Biljana Vankovska

Macedonia’s Crisis Viewed in Regional Context – Pande Lazarevski, Ph.D.

Searching for Election Model Adequate for the Republic of Macedonia – Natasa Gaber-Damjanovska, Ph.D., Aneta Jovevska, Ph.D.

Post-Bipolar World and Role of Democracy in the New Conditions – Viktor Gaber


The Kosovo Syndrome - Revisited –

Andon Anin , Independent Analyst

Macedonia – Obedient Child or a Sickly Child? – Wolfgang Oschlies, FR Germany

Analysis of Election Results – Ivica Bocevski, Executive Director, Institute for Democracy

Analyses in Vol. IV, no.6/7

The Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of the Republic of Macedonia 1998-2002 – Contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

History of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and Problems of Autocephaly – Prof. Dimitar Belcovski

Conflict - 2001: Lessons Learned? – Stevo Pendarovski

Security Consequences of September 11 Terror Attacks: New NATO–Russia Relations – Nano Ruzin, Ambassador

Time for Reality in the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Macedonia – Tihomir Ilievski, Ambassador

Need of Reform in Judiciary for Establishing Rule of Law and Reaching High Efficiency in Fight Against Corruption – Dragan Tumanovski, LL.M., Judge

Social Determinants of Vulnerability of the Risk Groups and Changes in the Health Status of the Population in Macedonia – Prof. Donco M. Donev, Ph.D. and Prof. Ulrich Laaser, Ph.D.


The Security of Independent Macedonia – Rizvan Sulejmani, Deputy Minister of Defense of the RM

Challenges for Economic Recovery – Bisev Gligor, Ph.D., First Gen. Manager – Stopanska banka AD - Skopje

Reproductive Profiles of Resident and Refugee Roma Women in Macedonia, 2000 – Arne N. Gjorgov, Md, Ph.D., Vladimir Lazarevik, Md


The Societal Security Dilemma: The Case of the Republic of Macedonia – Stojan Slaveski, Ph.D.

Globalization and Development Perspectives of the Republic of Macedonia – Natalija Nikolovska, Ph.D. Professor at the Faculty of Economy

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Stock Market of the Republic of Macedonia – Mr. Milco Kjupev, Macedonian Stock Exchange

Some Aspects of the Legal Status of Macedonia in the UN Organization – Igor Janev, Ph.D.


Surveillance Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission over the Macedonian Capital Market – Vesna Pendovska, Dr.Juris

Basic Ecological Problems of the City of Skopje – Sonja Jordanovska

Plant Protection in the Republic of Macedonia – Filip Pejcinovski, D.Sc.

The National Security of the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic Integration – Stojan Slaveski, Ph.D.


The Role of the State in the Health Care Reforms in Western Europe and Republic of Macedonia – Vladimir Lazarevik M.D., M.P.H.

Staff Potentials in the Republic of Macedonia – Stojance Mitrovski, M.D.

Reform of ARM – Providing Optimal Number and Structure of Qualified Military and Civilian Personnel – Marina Stojanovska

Does the Macedonian Legal and Fiscal Framework Enhance the Growth of the Civic Sector? – Vesna Pendovska, Dr.Juris

Analyses in Vol. V, no.1

Legal Aspects of the Fight Against Corruption in the International and National Level – Dr. Nikola Tupanceski, Assistant Professor

European Union-Western Balkans Relations Careful, Confused, Encouraging – Dobrinka Taskovska

Boris Trajkovski (1956-2004): Pastor in the Land of the Dukes – Saso Ordanoski, Nevena Angelovska

Reality Puzzle and Inverted Sock – Liljana Mazova


Multicultural Societies Between Consensus and Disagreement: Social Integration and Political Discourse – Dr. Petar Atanasov

Fourth Generation of Reforms in the Defence – Saso Kuzmanovski, M.A.

How Close Is the Republic Of Macedonia to Nato Membership? – Saso Kuzmanovski, M.A.

Macedonia Needs Election Code – Zoran Tanevski


Diaspora Cultures Benefit Both the Countries of Origin and of Settlement – Eleonora Petrova-Mitevska, M.P.

Kosovo, a joint venture of Democracy – Slobodan Casule, MP

Macedonia joins European Energy Community – Vesna Borozan, Ph.D.

The Republic of Macedonia - Last Chance for Internal Legitimacy – Stevo Pendarovski


Crisis Management: Necessity for a Stable and Secure Republic of Macedonia – Professor Doctor Marina Mitrevska

How Do Companies in Macedonia Set Their Advertising and – Promotion Budgets

Irena Jakimova-Apelgren

The Media in Southeastern Europe and the Role of Waz – Srgjan Kerim, Ph.D.

Health: Reforms at Crossroads – Spase Jovkovski, Ph.D.

Analyses in Vol. VI, no.1

Kokino – Holy Mountain and Ancient Observatory – Jovica Stankovski, Gjore Cenev

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Arabic Manuscripts in Macedonia – Marijana Kavcic

Restoration of St. Clement’s University in Ohrid – Pasko Kuzman

Prehistoric Macedonian Figurines – Irena Kolistrkoska Nasteva

Golem Grad In Prespa (From Orestians To Romans) – Vera Bitrakova - Grozdanova

Cultural Heritage: A Bridge Towards A Shared Future – Lidija Topuzovska

Who were the Authors of the Trebeniste Culture and the Gold Funeral Masks? – Nade Proeva

Analyses in Vol. VI, no.2

On the Way to European University Education: Changes in the University Education at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje – Gjorgji Martinovski

Transformation of Higher Education in the Republic of Macedonia as Part of its Process of Integration into the European Union – Alajdin Abazi

The European Education and Reforms Compared to the U.S. Education, Opened

Space for Private Education in the Republic of Macedonia – Aleksandar Nikolovski, Gjorgji Tonovski, Mirko Tripunoski

Higher Education of the Republic of Macedonia in the Process of Change – Zlat Milovanovic

Reforms in Higher Education – Pero Stojanovski

Analyses in Vol. VII, no.1

Introduction: About the Macedonian Language – Kole Casule

Speaking Radio Skopje! Speaking Radio Skopje! – Marko Ilkoski

The Macedonian Poetry in the 19th and 20th Century – Rade Siljan

Macedonian Theater Language Experience – Jelena Luzina

Macedonian Press Development – Zaneta Trajkoska

The Macedonian Language as One’s Own Identity and Breaching with Others Motif: Cultural Manifestation 2008 – The Year of the Macedonian Language – Liljana Popovska

Documents

CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE - Macedonia and Greece in The Hague –