Art 19

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP V. CAG.R. NO. 81262 August 25, 1989

FACTS:

Respondent Restituto Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay in a dual capacity, as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, globe Mackay discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Respondent was the one who discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice President and General Manager of Globe Mackay.

A day after respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect and ordered him to take one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open and to leave the office keys. When respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a “crook” and a “swindler.” Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. Also, he was instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies. Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, Jose Fernandez who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.

Petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

Dioscoro Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents were not those of Tobias. Moreover, lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. Notwithstanding the two police reports, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently, five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.

Meanwhile, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been terminated. Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which has been dismissed by the labor arbiter. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the labor arbiter’s decision. Secretary of Labor reinstated the labor arbiter’s decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor’s order with the Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal, petitioners and respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty.

Respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss respondent. On the other side, respondent contends that because of petitioners’ abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the petitioner must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to respondent in relation to Article 19 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to Tobias and for which the respondent must be indemnified. Furthermore, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides that, “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some

illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said that respondent Tobias was a ‘crook’ and a ‘swindler’ to the company. Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was yet to be submitted, the statement made by Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the New Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effect flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden & Ruby Lim vs. ReyesG.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005

Facts:

Robeto Reyes known as “Amay Bisaya” was seen in a hotel lobby by his friend Dr. Violeta Filart, who he identified to have invited him to the party of the hotel’s outgoing manager. However, Ruby Lim, the coordinator of the party asked him to leave since it is an exclusive party and he is not one of those invited. Reyes did not leave the party as was instructed but created a scene thereby he was escorted out the party by the policeman. He sued the hotel and Ruby Lim for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof; thereby, becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

Held:

No. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that –Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. Absent such intention and as the Court observed the conduct of Lim of asking Reyes to leave was in an exemplary manner, there can be no damages to be awarded. Any damage suffered by Reyes must be borne by him alone. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them, had plaintiff simply left the party as requested; there was no need for the police to take him out. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.

Art 20

RCPI vs. CA143 SCRA 657 (1986)

FACTS:

Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him by the operator RCPI not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know said defamatory words. RCPI claims, as its defense, that the additional words in Tagalog were not intended for plaintiff and were included in the original telegram unintentionally. Dionela filed for damages and was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals the liability of RCPI company employer. RCPI now comes to the Supreme Court alleging that the CA erred in holding that RCPI should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal action of its employees.

ISSUE:

Is RCPI directly and primarily liable to Dionela for damages?

HELD:

Yes. The action for damages was filed directly against RCPI not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The cause of action of Dionela is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code as well as on petitioner’s breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence, the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of RCPI. To hold that RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of RCPI’s business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

LAMBERTO V. TORRIJOS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent

G.R. No. L-40336 October 24, 1975

Facts:

Lamberto V. Torrijos bought a parcel of land containing an area of 39.9643 hectares located in Sitio Cacuban, Barrio Gumatdang, Pitogon, Benguet from Wakat Diamnuan and his wife. The petitioner however sued Diamnuan for estafa after selling to one Victor de Guia the same property, which the petitioner has originally purchased. The accused was sentenced to an imprisonment of 3 months and to indemnify the petitioner for the damages. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which led to the increase in the indemnity. On March 7, 1973, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied; thus, he appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The accused died on August 5, 1973 and for this reason his counsel moved that the appeal be dismissed arguing that the “death of a convict extinguishes, not only the personal penalties, but also the „pecuniary penalties‟ as long as the death occurs before final judgment.” The CA sustained the motion. Hence, on February 20, 1975, the petitioner challenged the order of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is still liable under Article 20 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

Yes. The court ruled that the acquittal from the criminal liability of the accused by death does not extinguish his accountability for his civil obligations. Thus, the petitioner is not precluded from pursuing a civil action for the injuries. Moreover, the accused is liable under Article 20 of the Civil Code, which states that “every person, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same”, since he deliberately sold again the property to another person which has been previously sold to the petitioner, thereby causing damage to the latter. “Wherefore, the challenged order dated February 20, 1975 is hereby set aside, the appeal shall proceed with respect to the issue of civil liability of the accused appellant.”

Art 21

CECILIO PE, ET. AL. VS. ALFONSO PEG.R. No. L-17396

May 30, 1962

FACTS:

Cecilio Pe, the plaintiff and father of Lolita Pe, filed a case against the defendant, Alfonso Pe, an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a relative of Lolita’s father. The defendant was a frequent visitor in the plaintiff’s residence in Marinduque, and this was where he met Lolita.

Lolita Pe (24, single) and Alfonso Pe’s (married) friendship grew into a clandestine love affair where the two would even meet in the town of Gasan and in Boac. The parents forbade them from seeing each other, but the forbidden love affair persisted, through love letters sent to one another. Deportation proceedings were even filed against the defendant in the parents’ wish of separating the two.

In April 14, 1957, while residing in 54-B España Extension, Quezon City, Lolita disappeared from the family’s residence. The family found a note in her cabinet written in the defendant’s handwriting telling her of their supposedly rendezvous. The two decided to elope and were not seen again.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant, Alfonso Pe, is liable for damages under Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

HELD:

Article 21 states, “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

The defendant is held liable to the damages he had caused the plaintiff’s family. Despite the fact that he is a married man, he still pursued Lolita to the point of making her fall in love with him. “Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.”

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,vs.

CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

.

Facts:

Cesar Syquia, a 23-year old man from a prominent family courted the cashier of their barbershop, Antonia De Jesus then 20 years old. Their intimate relationship resulted in the pregnancy of Antonia and the baby was born on June 17, 1931. Through out her pregnancy, Cesar has been constantly visiting her and later shouldered the expenses of her labor and hospitalization. Further, Cesar, on the eve of February 1931 before his departure for China and Japan he wrote a note for the priest which read:

Saturday, 1:30 p. m.February 14, 1931

Rev. FATHER,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

CESAR SYQUIA

After the labor, Cesar took Antonia and the baby and they all lived together for a year as a family. Over the course of time, as Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy; Cesar deviated his attention to her and married another woman. Also, instead of the baby boy being christened as Cesar Syquia Jr. as planned, Cesar arranged that the baby be christened Ismael Loanco.

Issue:

Given these facts, Antonia demanded for the recovery of the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting form a breach of promise of marriage, to compel him to recognize the two children as natural children and to pay them the amount of five hundred pesos per month. It was pondered upon (1) whether the letters written by Cesar during Antonia’s pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity and (2) whether the breach of promise to marry is actionable.

Held:

(1) In the issue of acknowledgement of paternity, the plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence in the form of documents (letters) with regard to Cesar’s recognition of paternity and hence the Supreme Court granted Antonia’s appeal of monetary support and acknowledgement of only their son.

(2) For the issue of whether the breach of promise to marry is actionable, the Supreme Court ruled that Antonia shall not be given damages for the breach of promise to marry because for a promise to be actionable, Article 21 of the Constitution posed that there should be fraud, deceit or abduction or rape. These elements were not evident in this case. However, Antonia will recover incurred expenses pursuant to the subsection 19.2.2 of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Art 22

CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. vs. USHIO Realty and Development CorporationG.R. No. 138088 January 23, 2006

Ponente: Justice Carpio

FACTS:USHIO Realty alleges that CAR COOL leased the property from the former owners, spouses Lopez, since 1972. On

June 15, 1995, Hector Lopez wrote to CAR COOL informing the latter of his intention to sell the property. Hector Lopez gave CAR COOL the option to buy the property before offering it to prospective buyers. CAR COOL failed to respond to the offer. Thus, on June 28, 1995, Hector Lopez terminated the lease agreement and gave CAR COOL until August 31, 1995 to vacate the property.

In a letter dated August 31, 1995, USHIO Realty informed CAR COOL that it had purchased the property from the spouses Lopez. CAR COOL continued to occupy the property despite USHIO Realty’s demand. This prompted USHIO Realty to file a complaint for ejectment.

CAR COOL, on the other hand, alleges that Hector Lopez agreed to renew the lease agreement for another two (2) years covering the period from January 1, 1995 to December 1996. CAR COOL further claims that it had paid in advance to Hector Lopez the monthly rentals covering the 2-year period. In this regard, CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL.

ISSUE:Whether or not to award damages by way of rentals in favor of USHIO Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at

the expense of CAR COOL.

HELD: Contrary to CAR COOL’S allegations, the Supreme Court held that the payment of damages in the form of rentals for

the property does not constitute unjust enrichment. The court finds that the allegations of the complainant (USHIO Realty) are true.

Article 22 of the Civil Code states that every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

The principle of unjust enrichment under the above stated article requires two (2) conditions, namely:1) That a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and2) That such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.

USHIO Realty, as the new owner of the property, has a right to physical possession of the property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, the latter has the legal right to receive some amount as reasonable compensation for CAR COOL’s occupation of the property.

CAR COOL is ordered to pay the aggregate amount of P198,000 as the rental fee for the use of property from December 19, 1995 to November 18, 1996 (the date when CAR COOL vacated the property).

Agapito Bonzon, Plaintiff-Appellee vs The Standard Oil Company of New York, et al., the Defendant

The Standard Oil Company of New York, the Appellant

Facts:

On the 19th of November, 1912, the defendant Standard Oil Company appealed to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cavite to recover the sum of P2,160, with legal interest from the month of December, 1909, and costs. On the month of November 1909 an execution was issued in favor of Standard Oil Company against Alipio Locso and the said writ of execution which involves seven parcels of land owned by Alipio Locso was placed in the hands of Leonardo Osorio, sheriff of the Province of Cavite. On December 23, 1909 the said property was sold at a public auction to the plaintiff-appellee, Agapito Bonzon for P2,160. Prior to the sale of the said property, a written notice stating that the parcels of land belong to Felix, Pablo Cuenca and others was given to the sheriff. Disregarding said written notice the sale continued and the plaintiff took possession of said property. The payment of P2,160 was duly given by the sheriff to Kincaid and Hurd, attorneys of Standard Oil Company. On the month of March 1910, Felix Cuenca and others commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cavite to recover the said parcel of land and on 29th of March 1912, the judge ruled in favor of the said Felix Cuenca et al..

Issue:

When the right, title, and interest, of a judgment debtor to the possession of property sold by the sheriff are brought into question and it later develops that the judgment debtor had no right, title or interest in the property sold, and there are no irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale, can the purchaser, upon being evicted, recover the purchase price from the judgment creditor?

Held:

The plaintiff Agapito Bonzon was not able to obtain favorable judgment hence the plaintiff appealed to the court. In this jurisdiction under the principle that one person may not enrich himself at the expense of another, a judgment creditor would not be permitted to retain the purchase price of land sold as the property of the judgment debtor had no title to the land and that the purchaser had been evicted therefrom. No claim was made either in the lower court or here that the defendant, in any way, participated in the alleged illegal sale of the property sold under said execution. There is no claim made by any of the parties that the purchaser was evicted from the property sold, in consequence of any irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale of the same. There is no claim that there was any irregularity in the proceedings, for which the defendant was, in any way, responsible. In fact, no charge of any irregularity is made, except the fact that the sheriff sold the property of one man for the purpose of paying the debt of another.

Art 23

Anita Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al.

G.R. No. L-4160 July 29, 1952

Facts:

Standard Vacuum Oil Co. ordered the delivery of gasoline to the Rural Transit Company on May 13, 1949. Unfortunately, the gasoline tank-truck trailer used in the delivery accidentally caught fire. Julito Sto. Domingo, the driver, with Igmidio Rico, moved the truck and abandoned it in the middle of the street resulting to the destruction of buildings within the area. Both Sto. Domingo and Rico were acquitted of criminal charges because it cannot be proved that it was their negligence that started the fire. Anita Tan, the plaintiff, was one of the owners of the houses destroyed during the accident. Tan filed a case against the two companies as well as the two employees involved for the damages she suffered. However, the defendants filed separate motions for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s allegation.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendants are liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Held:

The Court, based on Article 23 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, decided that Rural Transit Company is with no doubt liable for damages. With Sto. Domingo moving the truck to avoid a greater harm, it was the Rural Transit Company which benefited the most. The fire should have caused the explosion of the company’s gasoline deposit yet it was avoided. And under Article 23 of the Civil Code, the defendant is held liable as long as he gets benefited even if the act or event that caused damage is not his fault, thus it applies to the company’s situation.

VICENTE PEREZ, plaintiff vs. EUGENIO POMAR, defendant

G.R. No. L-1299; November 16, 1903

FACTS:

On August 27, 1902, Vicente Perez filed a case against Eugenio Pomar for the recovery of due and unpaid wage. Plaintiff alleged that he rendered his service from December 8, 1901 up to May 31, 1902, as an English interpreter for the Tabacalera Company. Herein defendant, an agent of the said company, was alleged to have paved the way for Perez to be the company’s interpreter in various meetings and conferences where prominent business people and military authorities were present. Being assured by the defendant of the company’s generosity in compensation, plaintiff held himself ready to render service whenever needed on account of his private business, a soap factory, which he later on abandoned for the same reason. Plaintiff portrayed a vital role in the company’s business transactions, for the employees of the company do not understand the business language. The company obtained large profits; however plaintiff did not receive any compensation. The

defendant denied the plaintiff’s allegations and alleged that there was no legal relation existing between him and the plaintiff because the latter’s services were spontaneous, voluntary and in its private capacity as the defendant’s acquaintance and not as the company’s agent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to compensation despite the fact that there was no written contract agreed upon by the parties.

HELD:

The Court decided in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to pay 200 Mexican Pesos less the 50 Pesos personal debt of the plaintiff to the defendant. Whether the plaintiff's services were solicited or offered to the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives rise to the bilateral obligation of the parties to render service and payment to each other. If it is a fact sufficiently proven that the defendant, Pomar, on various occasions consented to accept an interpreter's services, rendered in his behalf and not gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a reasonable remuneration therefor, because it is a well-known principle of law that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another, as provided for under Article 23 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Art 24

Rongavilla vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 83974. August 17, 1998

Ponente: Justice Quisumbing

Facts: The complainants in this case were Mercedes de la Cruz, age 60, and Florencia de la Cruz, age 71. Both are spinsters, uneducated in English, but knows how to read and write in Tagalog. They earned their livelihood as embroiderers and dressmakers. Both were living in house constructed in a parcel of land consisting of 131 square meters.

On May, 1976, the complainants borrowed P2, 000 from Dolores Rongavilla, their niece, for the purpose of having their dilapidated roof repaired. After a month, one of the defendants, visited her aunts and asked them to sign a document which was written in English. When the complainants asked, in Tagalog, what the document was all about, the defendant replied that it was just a document admitting their debt of P2, 000. Hence the complainants signed it. After four years, Dolores Rongavilla asked the complainants to vacate the land claiming that she and her husband were already the owners of the land. It was only then that the sisters learned that what they have signed four years ago was a deed of sale of their property to the defendants. Then the complainants filed a complaint to declare the sale as null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the Court should declare that the deed of sale to be void, due to the fraudulent nature in which the signature to the deed was secured.

Held: Yes. The Court is of the opinion and so holds that there was fraud exercised by the defendants in securing the signature to the deed of sale. Undoubtedly the deed of sale is simulated, fictitious and void. The Court also declared that “ public policy

is also well served in defending the rights of the aged to legal protection, including their right to property that is their home, as against fraud, chicanery and abuse of trust and confidence by those who owed them respect and candor.

Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-56169

FACTS:

Carlos Telosa who is a fisherman and farmer with very limited education acquired a loan from the Rural Bank of Lucena. In exchange for the granted loan, his property located at Bo. Amugeria, Malunay, Quezon, with an area of fifty thousand square metres was mortgaged.

Several months after the said transaction, the Rural Bank of Lucena became a distressed bank. The Monetary Board later decided to liquidate the Rural Bank of Lucena. Among the assets inventoried was the mortgaged property of Carlos Telosa. In the document shown in the records of the bank, it specified that the principal amount owed to them by Carlos Telosa was P5,000.00. Carlos Telosa fully aware of the fact that the obliged amount was only P300.00 not P500.00 submitted an affidavit in protest of the demand letter submitted to him.

Claiming that payments did not satisfied the whole balance of P9,032.22, the Central Bank extra judicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and sell it in a public auction.

To restrain the auction of the mortgaged property, a complaint was filed by the widow and children of Carlos Telosa before the Court of First Instance of Quezon seeking that the mortgage executed bu Carlos Telosa is null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether the extra judicial foreclosure of the property should continue?

HELD:

The court has ruled that the heirs of Carlos Telosa are entitled to the appeals they have submitted. Due to the fact that the contract entered upon by Carlos Telosa was anomalous in nature. This was proved by a receipt which served as evidence showing that the receive amount was on P300.00, and a testimony of Ponciano Mendoza who was present during the transaction stating that Carlos Telosa was made to sign blank forms by the Rural Bank of Lucena. This then proves that the said bank has taken advantage of the limited education of Carlos Telosa.

Art 25

After doing an intensive research with the aid of the internet and the different books covering the civil code of the Philippines, I found out that article 25 which states that “Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution” has no jurisprudence provided by the supreme court. This provision was approved by the congress because they were aware of the anomalous and unquestionably shameful iniquities existing in our society and they are quite anxious that the social order be not unnecessarily jeopardized, especially during periods of national distress or emergency and economic difficulties by ostentatious display of wealth by the affluent. It was enforced by President Ferdinand Marcos during martial law through general order 15.

GENERAL ORDER No. 15

WHEREAS, one of the objectives for the issuance of Proclamation No.1081, dated September 21, 1972, placing the entire country under martial law, is to effect social, economic and political reforms, and thus bring about the transformation of a new society in our country, one infused with a profound sense of discipline, and social conscience;

WHEREAS, every citizen and resident of the Philippines should participate in bringing about anew and reformed society in our country;

WHEREAS, every effort to save and economize on the nation's already scarce resources should be exerted;

WHEREAS, among others, Article 25 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No.386) enjoins against thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of emergency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No.1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No.1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby call upon every resident and citizen of the Philippines, including all elective local officials from provincial governors and city mayors down to barrio captains and councilmen, to avoid and prevent, as the case may be, ostentatious display of wealth and extravagance, including lavish town fiestas or social gatherings. To this end, they are directed to limit town fiestas and other local festivities to one day, which should be as simple and economical as possible.

All concerned, particularly the local executives aforementioned, are enjoined to comply with and to enforce this Order.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

Art 26

Hal McElroy vs. Hon. Ignacio Capulong and Juan Ponce EnrileG.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988

Ponente: Justice Feliciano

FACTS:Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,

sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and

from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile’s right of privacy was violated, under Article 26 of the Civil

Code, by the production of the film “The Four Day Revolution”.

HELD:The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private

respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. The subject matter of the film does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account. Movie’s theme is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure”. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitutes matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.

Private respondent cannot object to his inclusion in the movie on the EDSA Revolution by invoking his right to privacy. The right of privacy is not an absolute right. The right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from “unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.”

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL133 SCRA 179

November 14, 1984

Facts:

Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy.

Trial court through Judge Leuterio awarded P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Had it not been a late action for publication of rectification and apology––which only took place 15 April 1969 issue of Manila Times–– Doctor Aramil could have not suffered mental anguish and his income would have not been reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Petitioner assailed the decision of the Appellate Court when it affirmed the trial court’s decision. Furthermore, the corporation contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court and still continues to argue that the case is not covered by article 26.

Issue:

Whether or not the case filed against St. Louis Realty Corporation is covered by Article 26 of the new Civil Code.

Held:

Yes, this case is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. Through that negligence, persons who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Art 27

BAGALAY VS. URSAL

G.R. No. L-6445 July 29, 1954

Ponente: Justice Padilla

FACTS: The City Assessor of Cebu, Genaro Ursal, during the course of his duties, mailed a letter to the appellant, Tomas Bagalay informing the latter that he was delinquent in the payment of realty tax from 1947 to 1951 on a parcel of land assessed at P1,800, amounting to P98.45 including penalties, and that unless the same be paid the real property would be advertised for sale to satisfy the tax and penalty due and expenses of the auction sale. The letter caused the appellant mental anguish, frights, serious anxiety, moral shock and social humiliation, due to such, Bagalay fairly estimates his moral damages with the sum of P10,000. The Court dismissed the case upon the motion of the appellee. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ursal is liable for moral damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code.

RULING: The order appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff. The Court ruled that despite the truthfulness of the facts were proven, Bagalay is not entitled to recover for moral damages he claims to have suffered as a result of the writing and mailing of the letter by the defendant in his official capacity and receipt thereof by the plaintiff because the former has done nothing more than to write and mail the letter. There is no allegation in the complaint that the amount due for the realty tax and penalty referred to in the defendant's letter complained of had been paid by the plaintiff. According to Article 27, “Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.”, the same contemplates a refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant or employee to perform his official duty which causes material suffering or moral loss. The provisions of the article invoked by the plaintiff do not lend support to his claim and contention, because the defendant did not refuse nor did he neglect to perform his official duty but on the contrary he performed it. All the moral damages the plaintiff claims he has suffered are but the product of over sensitiveness.

Nessia vs. Fermin and Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental

G.R. No. 102918 March 30, 1993

Ponente: Justice Bellosillo

FACTS: According to Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a judicial relief may be given to “any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty.” Applying this, herein petitioner filed a case against the respondent for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of his official duties as the then Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias. Petitioner claimed that respondent deliberately ignored and caused the non-payment of the vouchers because he defied the former's request to all municipal officials to register and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local elections. However, herein respondent counterclaimed that the vouchers were not approved because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial relief shall be accorded to the herein petitioner for suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee (respondent) refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty.

HELD: The allegations in the complaint such as, "petitioner presented the said claims to the respondent Mayor Jesus Fermin, but refused and continued to refuse the payments thereof" and "respondents refused and continue to refuse to pay," should not be interpreted as mere admission of the act of disapproval of the claims. Refusal to pay is not inferred solely from disapproval of claims but from inaction as well. However, while it is true that herein respondent may not be compelled by law to approve vouchers because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations, he may, nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not act on the vouchers. It should be noted that public officials should act efficiently on matters pending before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may the petitioner continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the petitioner is left in the darkness of uncertainty. In this regard, official "inaction" cannot be equated with "disapproval."

Art 28

PRO LINE SPORTS CENTER, INC., and QUESTOR CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, UNIVERSAL ATHLETICS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, INC.,and MONICO SEHWANI,respondents

G.R. No. 118192. October 23, 1997

FACTS: On 11 February 1981, Edwin Dy Buncio,General Manager of PRO LINE, whose domestic company is the exclusive distributor of “Spalding” sports products in the Philippines, sent a letter-complaint to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) regarding the alleged manufacture of fake “SPALDING” balls by UNIVERSAL. On 23 February 1981 the NBI applied for a search warrant with the then Court of First Instance, Br.23, Pasig Rizal, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera. On that same day, Judge Vera issued Search Warrant No. 2-81 authorizing the search of the premises of UNIVERSAL in Pasig. In the course of search, some 1,200 Basketballs and volleyballs marked “SPALDING” were seized and confiscated by the NBI. And days later, Judge Vera issued another order to seal and padlock the molds, rubber mixer, boiler and other instruments at UNIVERSAL’s factory that were used to manufacture the fake “Spalding” products.

ISSUE: Whether Universal Athletics Industrial Products, Inc. is liable for unfair competition even if the selling has not been proved?

HELD: Yes. The respondents’ act constituted unfair competition even if the element of selling has not been approved. To hold that the act of selling is an indispensable element of the crime of unfair competition is illogical because if the law punishes the seller of the imitation goods, then with more reason should the law penalize the manufacturer. In this case, it was observed by the Minister of Justice that the manufacture of the “SPALDING” balls was obviously done to deceive would-be buyers. The projected sale would have pushed through were it not for the timely seizure of the goods made by the NBI.

MCDONALD'S CORPORATION and MCGEORGE FOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioners, vs. L.C. BIG MAK BURGER, INC., FRANCIS B. DY, EDNA A. DY, RENE B. DY, WILLIAM B. DY, JESUS AYCARDO, ARACELI AYCARDO, and GRACE HUERTO,

Respondents.

G. R. No. 143993 - August 18, 2004

FACTS: McDonald’s Corporation is a corporation bound by the laws of the United States. It consists of many family marks including the “Big Mac” mark for its “double-decker hamburger sandwich”. The trademark for Big Mac is registered in the United States Trademark Registry as well as in the Philippines’ Intellectual Property Office for its franchises in the country. The approval by the then PBPTT for the registration of McDonald’s for the Big Mac mark in the Principal Register was given on 18 July 1985.

Respondent L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc., a domestic corporation operating in Metro Manila and selling hamburger sandwiches along with other food items.

The respondent corporation applied with PBPTT for the registration of “Big Mak” mark for its hamburger sandwiches but was quickly opposed by the petitioner corporation on the ground that “Big Mak” was a colorable imitation of its registered “Big Mac” mark, a mark which the petitioner exclusively owns.

Respondent corporation claimed that they are not liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition, as “Big Mak” is not a colorable imitation of “Big Mac” and also because they do not pass of their hamburger sandwiches as those of petitioner’s Big Mac hamburgers.

Although previous marks have been registered for the “Big Mac” mark by the Isaiyas Group of Corporations and one Rodolfo Topacio, the former’s registration was only in the Supplemental registration of the PBPTT and the latter’s rights were acquired by McDonald’s Corporation in a Deed of Assignment dated 18 May 1981.

ISSUE: Whether L.C. Big Mak Burger Inc. is liable for unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code

HELD: The Court reinstated the decision made by the Regional Trial court of Makati dated 5 September 1994 which found L.C. Big Mak Burger Inc. liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition.

The court arrived at this decision upon defining the elements of an action for unfair competition, which are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of goods, and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitior. The intent to deceive and defraud may be inferred from the similarity of the appearance of goods as offered for sale to the public. Unfair competition exists not only if there is a likelihood of confusion for the two goods but also if there is an actual or probable deception on the public because of the general appearance of goods.

To support their claim of unfair competition, petitioners allege that respondents fraudulently passed off their hamburgers as "Big Mac" hamburgers. Petitioners add that respondents' fraudulent intent can be inferred from the similarity of the marks in question. Also, the respondents' goods are hamburgers which are also the goods of petitioners. If respondents sold egg sandwiches only instead of hamburger sandwiches, their use of the "Big Mak" mark would not give their goods the general appearance of petitioners' "Big Mac" hamburgers. However, since respondents chose to apply the "Big Mak" mark on hamburgers, just like petitioner's use of the "Big Mac" mark on hamburgers, respondents have obviously clothed their goods with the general appearance of petitioners' goods.

Moreover, there is no notice to the public that the "Big Mak" hamburgers are products of "L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc." The plastic wrappers used for the “Big Mak” hamburgers did not bore the respondent’s corporation name thus providing no notice to the public that “Big Mak” hamburgers are goods owned by the respondents and not of the petitioners. Because of this, intention to deceive the public is existing in the part of L.C. Big Mak Burger Inc.

The order appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the respondent corporation. The Court reinstated the decision made by the Regional Trial court of Makati dated 5 September 1994 which found L.C. Big Mak Burger Inc. liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition.

Art 29

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. DALMACIO CATIPON

G.R. No. L-6662 January 31, 1956

Ponente: Justice Reyes

Facts: Charged with estafa for having misappropriated and convereted the the merchandise covered by the trust receipt but after a while with due trial, Catipon was acquitted from the charge. Shortly thereafter, the bank initiated the present action to recover the value of goods by filing a civil case. But Catipon appealed that his acquittal in the estafa case is a bar to the Bank’s instituting the present civil action for the bank did not reserve the right in the criminal case its right to separately enforce the civil liability of the defendant.

Issue: Whether or not Catipon may be charged with a civil case following his acquittal from the criminal case of estafa.

Held: Although the trial court has realized that the Catipon’s case has no merit. The decision acquitting Catipon of the charge of estafa, however, does not bar or prevent the filing of the Bank’s action to enforce his civil liability. The acquittal of Catipon was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt has not been duly established and the acquittal being equivalent to one on reasonable doubt does not necessarily prevent a suit to enforce the civil liability for the same act or omission and it does not finally determine nor expressly declare that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist.

In addition, the declaration in the decision of the acquittal to the effect that if any responsibility be given to the accused, which would be civil in nature and not criminal, amounts to a reservation of the civil action in favor of the offended party, for the court in its decision had no reason to dwell on a civil liability that it intended to extinguish by the same decision.

Finally because Catipon executed the trust receipt, that the present action seeks to enforce, he is liable ex-contractu for its breach, whether he did or he did not misappropriate, misapply or convert the said merchandise as charged in the information filed in the criminal case. Thus, a civil liability may be charged against Catipon.

FRANCISCO BONITE vs. MARIANO A. ZOSA

G.R. No. L-33772 June 20, 1988

Facts: On September 24, 1968 Florencio Bonite was working as “caminero” in the Bureau of Public Highways. He was hit by a truck driven by a private respondent, as a result Bonite died on the same day. A criminal complaint for homicide trough reckless imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs. As private prosecutor Atty. Alberto Dulalas activrly participated in the prosecution of the criminal case. December28, 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same accused on account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III, docketed as Civil Case No. 2806. In an order dated 25 February 1971.

Issue: Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action.

Held: The court believes and so holds that as the plaintiffs did not reserve the right to file an independent civil action, and the further fact that the plaintiffs have been represented by a private prosecutor in the prosecution of the criminal case, the action presently filed by the plaintiffs is already res adjudicata and therefore, dismisses the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

Art 30

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, Accused-Appellant.

G.R No. 102007 September 2, 1994

FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, in Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Bayotas appealed his case, but before the final judgment, he died at the National Bilibid Hospital. The Supreme Court decided to dismiss the criminal aspect of the appeal but required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayota's civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

The Solicitor General commented that the death of the accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability and insists that the appeal should be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction on which the civil liability is based.

ISSUE: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

HELD: Affirmative. Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

"When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."

What Article 30 recognizes is a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a criminal offense. In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the determining factor of the criminal liability is the condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action. That is, when the criminal action is cancelled out by death of the accused while pending appeal, the said civil action cannot survive. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter and states that death of the convict before final judgment totally extinguishes his criminal liability. Whether asserted in a criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.

We hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

Wherefore, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

I

G.R. No. L-33254

January 20, 1978

Ponente: Justice Aquino

FACTS: In a scheme of malversation, accused Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23. After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each with 3 criminal cases, with reclusion perpetua being the highest. Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to the Supreme Court. Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not after his criminal liability was extinguished because of death that the civil liability stands even when there is no separate civil action.

HELD: The supreme court are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability for his estate for the amounts malversed was duly substantial. The Supreme Court held that claims for civil liability survive the death of the accused, there by treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.

Art 31

The Heirs of Jose Marcial Ochoa vs. G & S Transport Corporation

G.R. No. 170071, March 9, 2011

Ponente: Justice Corona

FACTS: On the night of March 10, 1995, Jose Marcial K. Ochoa died while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation, a common carrier. The death certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City cited the cause of his death as vehicular accident it was found that the death of Jose Marcial Ochoa was caused by negligence on the part of the taxicab driver employed by G & S Transport Corporation, Bibiano Padilla. However, the taxicab driver, Bibiano Padilla, was acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Regardless, the petitioners alleged that respondent, as a common carrier, was under legal obligation to observe and exercise extraordinary diligence in transporting its passengers to their destination safely and securely. The contract was entered the moment Ochoa entered the vehicle owned by the respondent. The failure of the respondent, as evidenced by the death of Ochoa, led the petitioners to aver that they, the respondents, are liable for having breached the contract of common carriage. The heirs thus prayed for G & S to pay them actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may proceed with the civil action given that there was already an acquittal in the related criminal case.

HELD: The Supreme Court declared the ruling of Cancio, Jr., v. Isip, which stated that “in the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of

action, i.e., culpa contractual.” Considering Article 31 of the Civil Code, the petitioners’ claim for damages is valid considering that the civil action, being based on an obligation, proceeded independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Thus, the respondent is liable to pay the petitioners for damages because by not transporting Jose Marcial Ochoa safely to his destination the former breached its contract with the passenger.

Cancio vs. Isip

G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002

Ponente: Justice Ynares- Santiago

Facts:

The petitioner, Jose S. Cancio Jr. represented by Roberto Cancio filed 3 cases of estafa against respondent Emerenciana Isip for allegedly issuing 3 checks (a. Php 80,000.00, b. Php 80,000.00 & c. Php 30,000.00) without sufficient funds. The trial court dismissed the complaint due to lack of interest or failure to prosecute. It was also held that the civil case filing amounted to forum-shopping (filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure favorable judgment). After a few months, the courts lso denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the estafa cases’ dismissal bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the checks’ value which is the subject of the estafa cases.

Held:

The complaint filed by the petitioner show that his cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action (portions of the complaint reads: that when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for encashment, the same were all dishonored for reason of drawn against insufficient funds, that several demands were made upon the defendant to make good the checks but failed and refused and still refuses without justifiable reasons to pay plaintiff). The respondent’s breach of contract is the petitioner’s cause of action. Based on Article 31 of the Civil Code, “when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless the result of the latter”. As such, the case at bar is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless the dismissal of the criminal case filed. Therefore, the instant petition is GRANTED. The orders of the regional trial court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Art 32

LIM VS. PONCE DE LEON

G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975

FACTS: On April 29, 1961, Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke’s Point, Palawan a motor launch named M/L “San Rafael”. A year later, Timbangcaya filed a complaint alleging that Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. Without a search warrant and in the absence of consent, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon effected the impound of the motor launch from Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon explained in his request that the subsequent sale of the motor launch to a third party cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. In his defense, Fiscal de Leon claimed that “he was in good faith, without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha” when he ordered the seizure of the motor launch.

ISSUE: Is the defense of good faith enough to clear the liability of Fiscal de Leon under Article 32 of the Civil Code?

HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court citing Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission stated that the very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defect the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith.

Aberca vs. Ver

G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988

Ponente: Justice Yap

FACTS: Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance thereof, the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids, certain members of the raiding TFM confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners were arrested without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. For some period after their arrest, they were arrested with denied visits of relatives and lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, through threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.

Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the regional trial court of Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver. Respondents, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners’ detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may invoke state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties and functions.

HELD: The petition is GRANTED, with costs against the respondents. The respondents may be, as members of the AFP, merely responding to their duties, as they claim, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres. Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial Law on January 27, 1981, and in

pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged CT underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined and protected by the Constitution. Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employees, or any private individual, liable in damages for violating the constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statute.

Art 33

Garcia vs. Florido

G.R. No. 35095, Aug. 31, 1973

Facts: On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference. Their car then collided with an oncoming passenger bus. Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment. Said action was filed, however, despite the pending of a criminal case filed prior to that of the petitioners, when they were still recovering from the accident.

Issue: Whether or not the civil case be allowed to prosper, despite the pendency of the criminal proceedings?

Held: The Supreme Court cited its ruling in the case of Meneses vs. Luat, stating that when the criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner, vs. MERLIN J.ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents, September 10, 2001

-364 S.C.R.A. 792-G.R. No. 130362

Facts: Respondents Merlin Argos and Jaja Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of the petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. (IFFI). The general managers reported directly to Hernan Costa, a Spaniard who was the appointed managing director of the operations of the petitioner in the Philippines. Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a “Release Waiver and Quitclaim” on December 10, 1993. That same time, Costa issued a “Personnel Announcement” which described respondents as “persona non grata” and urged the

employees not to have further dealings with them. Two Information were filed against Costa for the criminal charge of libel while the respondents also filed a civil case for damages against Costa and petitioner (IFFI), in its subsidiary capacity as the employer of Costa.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents could sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner’s employee.

Ruling: Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, the injured party may bring a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence.

In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), the Court held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature. The court ruled that the civil suit filed against the petitioners in their subsidiary capacity is premature under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.

Art 34

Cancio, Jr. vs. Isip

391 SCRA 393

November 12, 2002

Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago

FACTS: Petitioner filed three cases of violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of Estafa against respondent for allegedly issuing checks without insufficient funds. The three cases for Estafa were filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pampanga and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On October 21, 1997, after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal case. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money to recover amount of checks subject of the estafa cases. Thus, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that petitioner’s action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases (Estafa cases) against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases.

2) Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. According to the Supreme Court, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from criminal action [Article 33 of the Civil Code]. Under the present rules, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.

Moreover, the Supreme Court believed that the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for collection of the value of checks issued by the respondent. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata will not operate to bar the same.

Art 35

Estanislawa Canlas v Chan Lin Po, Remedios Diala, and LimKoo| Barrera

G.R. No. L-16929, July 31, 1969 | 2 SCRA 973

FACTS: On June 11 1951, Juanito Chan, son of Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala, drove and operated a motor vehicle (a truck) along Rizal Ave Ext, Manila allegedly in a reckless and imprudent manner and so hitting Nicolas Paras, 65 yrs old, and ran over his head, crushing it, resulting to his instantaneous death. It must be noted that the truck was co-owned by Juan’s parents and one Lim Koo.

At the initial stage of the criminal trial, Petitioner, Estanislawa Canlas (widow of Nicolas, representing also 5 minor children), made a reservation to file a separate civil action.

Trial Court held: Juanito is guilty, serve sentence of 1yr-8mos, plus 5K indeminity. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, it was modified: 1yr not less than 4 yrs of imprisonment, indemnity also affirmed.

In the civil action, the same facts were alleged. Defendants disclaimed liability by establishing that Juanito is married and is no longer a minor living in the company of his parents, and that he is also not an employee of Lim Koo. Thus, Neither Juanito’s parents can be made liable under vicarious liability (2180 of the NCC) nor the owner of vehicle be the subsidiary liable under 103 of the RPC.

The separate civil action was dismissed, since petitioner already tried to execute the indemnity adjudged in the criminal action and Juanito already served subsidiary imprisonment because he was unable to pay indemnity. Petitioner insists on the liability of parents and truck owner. Her Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS: Whether or not the judgment of the criminal case bars the civil action?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI: NO.

2180 par 5 of the NCC (primary liability-vicarious liability) only applies if the offender is a MINOR LIVING in the COMPANY of his PARENTS. In this case, Juanito was already married and lives independently from his parents

103 of the RPC (subsidiary liability) only attaches if the act happened while he was discharging his duties (as employee). In this case, no evidence was presented to establish such relationship.

The civil complaint was confused with the nature of liability to charge (103 or 2180). Court however clarified that the lower court erred when they adjudged that the civil action is barred by res judicata. The civil action from criminal act and independent civil action are of different nature and purpose.

The 2 cases affect different parties. In the independent civil action, subsidiary and vicarious liability were being established. Nevertheless, since 2180 of NCC and 103 of RPC was inapplicable, the action was still dismissed.

William R. Bayani vs. Panay Electric Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 139680 April 12, 2000

Ponente: Justice Quisimbing

FACTS: Private respondent Panay Electric Co., Inc.(PECO) discontinued supplying electric services to two pension houses owned by petitioner William Bayani, alleging that it had discovered theft of electricity in the establishments of the latter. Private respondent then filed two complaints under R.A. No. 7832 or Anti- Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/ Materials Pilferage Act against petitioner in the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City but such complaints were dismissed. PECO then appealed the dismissal to the Secretary of Justice.

In return, petitioner filed a case in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for injunction and damages for malicious prosecution. PECO moved to dismiss the petition. After which, petitioner amended his complaint and prayed for PECO to desist from making false imputations that he allegedly continued to commit violations of the aforementioned republic act. PECO also moved to dismiss the amended petition but the court denied it alongside a motion for reconsideration instituted by PECO.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered him to put up a bond before a writ of preliminary injunction is issued. The court likewise ordered PECO to restore the electric services to the establishments owned by William Bayani.

Petitioner submitted a surety bond but substituted it with a cashier’s check which was approved by the trial court.

PECO appealed to the Court of Appeals and prayed for the reversal of the lower court’s decision which was granted by the same. The petitioned moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, petitioner seeks redress from the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the case filed by petitioner against private respondent is based on malicious prosecution under Art. 35 of the Civil Code.

RULING: Before deciding the matter, it is necessary to define the meaning of malicious prosecution. There is malicious prosecution when a person directly insinuates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime and the maliciously accused is compelled to defend himself in court. Such may be proved when the prosecutor acted without probable cause, the prosecutor was impelled by legal malice, or a prior case was filed against the prosecutor and the same subsequently files a case ahead of the decision in the first case.

In this case, petitioner insists that his case is founder on other causes of action other than malicious prosecution. He alleged particularly that the summary disconnection of the electrical services of his two establishments were in violation of Art. 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

However, a review of the facts of the amended complaint shows that it deals mainly with the criminal complaints instituted by PECO against the petitioner. Moreover, the initial complaint was filed even before the dismissal of the Secretary of Justice of the criminal complaints filed by PECO.

Thus, the Supreme Court finds no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals and, therefore, denies the petition.

Art 36

Ras vs. Rasul

100 SCRA 125 (1980)

Petitioner: Alejandro Ras

Respondent: Hon. Jainal D. Rasul, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Basilan,

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ponente: Teehankee, J.

FACTS:

1. Alejandro Ras was a defendant in the Civil Case No. 73 over a property allegedly sold twice.

2. Alejandro Ras claims the signatures appearing in the prior deed of sale were forgeries and that he never sold the property twice.

3. While the Civil Case against Ras was pending, Criminal Case No. 240 of estafa was filed against him over the alleged double sale subject of the Civil Case.

4. The petitioner Alejandro Ras filed for the suspension of Criminal Case No. 240 due to the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 73 of the same court.

5. The motion for suspension was denied.

6. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Criminal Case against Alejandro Ras should be suspended by the Supreme Court until the matter of the Civil Case is to be decided, on the grounds of the existence of a prejudicial question between the two cases.

HELD:Yes. The resolution of the Civil Case against Alejandro Ras would be directly determinative of the outcome of the Criminal Case. If the alleged forgeries in the former case were to be proven null and void, then the alleged double sale and crime of estafa in the Criminal Case would be a non-existent issue and no offense could be legally charged. Therefore, the Supreme Court decided that there indeed was a prejudicial question present, a valid basis sufficient to suspend the latter case until the Civil Case is resolved.

SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Respondent

G.R. No. 147902; March 17, 2006

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

Facts: Spouses Vicente Yu & Demetria Lee-Yu, among others mortgaged their title, interest and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank as security for the payment of loan. However the petitioners failed to pay the loan, interests & penalties due thereon and the respondent filed a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage on Dagupan City properties before the RTC of Dagupan City. The said properties were auctioned on September 10, 1998 where respondent emerged as the highest bidder. Then four days after the auction a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the respondent and afterwards the sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City.

Then on August 20, 1998, about two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 99-00988-D. A hearing was conducted on September 14, 1999 where the respondent presented its evidence ex-parte by the testimony of Rodante Manuel. But on September 30, 1999 the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Out testimony of Rodante Manuel stating that the Certificate of Sale dated September 14, 1998, was void because respondent violated Article 2089 of the Civil Code in the indivisibility of the mortgaged by conducting two separate foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City. Likewise the petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment for a Certificate of Sale before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-03169-D.

On Feb. 14, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss to Strike Out Testimony of Rodante Manuel. Nonetheless the petitioners filed a Motion of Reconsideration further arguing that the pendency of Civil Law No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 is a prejudicial issue to Special proclamation No. 99-00988-D in RTC Branch 43, but was denied because the pending case before RTC Branch 44 is also a civil case and not a criminal case.

Furthermore on June 1, 2000 petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari but the CA dismissed it. Over and above that the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but were denied again by the CA on April 26, 2001.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a real estate mortgage over several properties located in different locality can be separately foreclosed in different places.

2. Whether or not the pendency of civil case no. 99-03169-D is a prejudicial issue that will render the issues in Special Proclamation no. 99-00988-D moot and academic.

Held: As to the first issue, the court finds that petitioners have mistaken a notion that the indivisibility of a real estate mortgage relates to the venue of extra judicial foreclosure proceedings. The rule on indivisibility of a real estate mortgage is provided for in Article 2089 of the Civil Code. Indivisibility means that the mortgage obligation cannot be divided among the different lots, that is each and every parcel under mortgage answers for the totality of the debt. In addition the court holds that the rule on indivisibility of the real estate mortgage cannot be equated with the venue of foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different provinces since these are two unrelated concepts.

As to the second issue, civil case no. 99-01369-D and Special Proclamation no. 99-00988-D are both civil in nature. Clearly no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions and since the two cases are both civil in nature it can proceed separately and take its own direction independently of each other.

The petition is denied.