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PERSPECTIVES FROM THE GLOBAL EXPERIENCE KNOWLEDGE-SHARING AND COLLABORATION ON DRG DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”)

Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

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Page 1: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

PERSPECTIVES FROM THE GLOBAL EXPERIENCE

KNOWLEDGE-SHARING AND COLLABORATION ON DRG DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA

Case Mix Payment(“DRGs”)

Page 2: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

2

The President Has a Request

Page 3: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

SOURCE: OECD report, 2002

1 Length of stay in 1997 2 Length of stay in 1998

Case mix/activity-based payment systems have been

introduced in many countries, including Eastern Europe

Years of utilization of DRG-type financing

0-5 years

U.K.

Germany

Finland Sweden

NorwayFrance

Hungary

Netherlands

Switzerland

Czech Republic

AustriaAustraliaSpain1Italy2

Benefits and drawbacks for implementing

activity-based reimbursements

10 years

15 years

20 years

25 years

Average

length of

stay

▪ Facilitates competition

between providers

▪ Improve responsiveness to

patient needs

▪ Improves cost transparency

and increase efficiency

within providers

Benefits

Draw-

backs

▪ Increases complexity in

financial flows and data

recording

▪ Faces risk of significant

increase in costs (due to

increase in volume of

activities) if not properly

implemented and controlled

▪ Leaves space for frauds

(e.g., up-coding)

Hospitals: Diagnosis-Related-Groups (DRGs) is the payment mechanism towards which most developed systems are converging, having also positive implications in terms of efficiency

U.S.

Page 4: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

14 countries with a DRG payment system

11 countries piloting a DRG payment system

9 countries exploring a DRG payment system

OECD…plus…Emerging EconomiesCountry overview

1. Croatia

2. Estonia

3. Ghana

4. Hungary

5. Indonesia

6. Kyrgyzstan

7. Macedonia

8. Mexico

9. Mongolia

10. Poland

11. Romania

12. Thailand

13. Tunisia

14. Turkey

Page 5: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

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Methodological Issues

Page 6: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Case-Based Groups – Complex!

Patient classification system

Data collection

Price setting Actual hospital payment

• Diagnoses

• Procedures

• Complexity

• Frequency of revisions

• Demographic data• Clinical data

• Cost data• Sample size, regularity

• Cost weights

• Base rate(s)

• Prices/ tariffs

• Average vs. “best”

• Volume limits

• Outliers• High cost cases

• Negotiations

2 Options or Paths Globally

Page 7: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Option 1 “BUILD YOUR OWN”

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Page 8: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Challenges

Data (!) Availability (?) and IT Requirements

Availability of diagnosis data is a prerequisite for DRGs, but often only once a DRG system is in place, are systems set up to generate the necessary data.

1) Lack of standardized and systematized data generation and coding has been slowing down the introduction of DRGs

Many countries in Europe: clinical data = all patients; but, US used 5% sample of claims with inconsistent coding of Dx

2) Cost data, cost accounting data from hospitals to adjust cost weights to local context and to assure adequate reimbursement perceived as equitable.

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Page 9: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Option 2BUY AND MODIFY AN EXISTING GROUPER

9

Page 10: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Borrowed a DRG Grouper for Categories and Weights

Ireland

Portugal

Poland

China Taiwan

Slovenia

Estonia

Alternative

Clinical Patterns and Cost Structures

Similar?

10

Indonesia

Page 11: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Borrowed a DRG Grouper for Categories and Weights

Ireland

Portugal

Poland

China Taiwan

Slovenia

Estonia

Alternative

Clinical Patterns and Cost Structures

Similar?

Failed

11

Indonesia…Ongoing Refinement

Page 12: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Going Forward:Avoiding Grouper Failure

12

Page 13: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Costing: Adjust the Weights Based on Local Cost or Charge Data

Classification: Refine Your Categories to Reflect National Clinicial Practice

Coding: Build a national cadre of expertise o a platform of coding standards

Develop Impact Analysis

Page 14: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

How Many Facilities’ Cost Data are Needed?

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Percentage of Hospitals

Note: Green = % admissions. Finland surveyed only 5 reference hospitalsRed = Top down costing; others used bottom up costing

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Page 15: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

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Always, Always…do an Impact Analysis…before phase-in

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

Year 1

hospital 1

hospital 2

hospital 3

hospital 4

hospital 5

hospital 6

hospital 7

hospital 8

hospital 9

hospital 10

Page 16: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

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Summary:Questions for Future Development

Build or Buy the Grouper?

1. How Much Time Will the Minister Provide?

2. Patient Claims through MOH or Insurer? Data Quality?

3. Use Charges or Costs? Have charges, for costs do hospitals have standardized accounting systems?

4. Physician Advisor Teams: Review Groupings by MDCs and create finer groupings over time

Page 17: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

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Implementation Issues

Avoiding Mistakes of Other Countries

Page 18: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Policy Tools/ResponsesAddress Negative Impacts on Quality

+ Fiscal Exposure

Five (5) Things Are Done Globally

1. Unnecessary Admissions which could be treated at outpatient level. So, Admission criteria/pre-certification programs needed

2. Utilization review in Hospital-- to prevent skimping on needed services and to prevent early discharge

3. Payment reductions for re-admissions which tend to increase because hospitals then receive “double payment”

4. Review of Coding practices….code creep tends to occur in every country

5. Phase-in payment formula over 4-5 years…this helps protect the Ministry of Finance and protect providers, too – especially if data and Grouper not precise.

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Page 19: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Phase in Slowly: Purchasers and Providers Need Time

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

United States

Kyrgz Republix

Slovenia

Estonia

Germany

Years

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Page 20: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

How to Phase-In? Transition to a case-based payment

system Incremental inclusion of hospitals (e.g., geographic

region…in US, New Jersey)

Incremental inclusion of reimbursed costs (e.g., start with variable costs)

Incremental inclusion of types of cases (Philippines, Korea, China Taiwan)

Incremental movement from hospital-specific to system-wide base rate (US, Germany)

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Page 21: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Thank You

[email protected]

Page 22: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Annex

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Page 23: Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) - InaHEA · BETWEEN VIETNAM, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA Case Mix Payment (“DRGs”) 2 The President Has a Request. SOURCE: OECD

Incentives of DRG-based

hospital payment

Strategies of hospitals

1. Reduce costs per

patient

a) Reduce length of stay

optimize internal care pathways

inappropriate early discharge

b) Reduce intensity of provided services

avoid delivering unnecessary services

withhold necessary services (‘skimping’)

c) Select patients

specialize in treating patients for which the hospital has a competitive

advantage

select low-cost patients within DRGs (‘cream-skimming’)

2. Increase revenue per

patient

a) Change coding practice

improve coding of diagnoses and procedures

fraudulent reclassification of patients, e.g. by adding inexistent

secondary diagnoses (‘up-coding’)

b) Change practice patterns

provide services that lead to reclassification of patients into higher

paying DRGs (‘gaming/overtreatment’)

3. Increase number of

patients

a) Change admission rules

reduce waiting list

admit patients for unnecessary services (‘supplier-induced demand’)

b) Improve reputation of hospital

improve quality of services

focus efforts exclusively on profits

Incentives and Impacts in OECD Countries

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