1. REPUBLIC VS LIM Facts: Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Shefiled a petition to the court for correction of four erroneous entries in her birth certificate to wit: 1) her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo 2) her fathers name was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been YuDio To 3) her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino 4) that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. After the trial court conducted the appropriate proceeding, it granted the petition sought by respondent to set the records straight and in their proper perspective. However, petitioner herein filed an appeal specifically on the correction of her citizenship (from Chinese to Filipino) not having complied with the legal requirements for election of citizenship. It cited Article IV, Sec 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625 whichprovides the election of citizenship of a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father upon reaching the age of maturity. Issue: Whether or not respondent needs to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority?

legitimate children. The case at bar clearly states that respondent is an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.

2. TECSON VS COMELEC Ronald Allan Kelly

Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.(FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy forthe position of President of the Republicof the Philippines under the Koalisyon ngNagkakaisang (KNP) Party, in Pilipino the

2004national elections. In his certificate of candi dacy, FPJ, representing himself to be anaturalborn citizen of the Philippines,stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be20 August 1939 and his place of birth tobe Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition before the Commissionon

Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and todeny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made of

amaterial misrepresentation in hiscertificate candidacy by claiming to

bea natural-

born Filipino citizen when intruth, according to F ornier, his parentswere foreigners; his mother, Bessie KelleyPoe, was an American, and his father,Alla n Poe, was a Spanish national,

beingthe son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanishsubject. Holding: The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to And even if Allan F. Poe was a

Filipinocitizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an

illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornierbase d the allegation of the illegitimate birth

4. Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching B.M No. 914, October 1, 1999.

of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poecontra cted a prior marriage to a certain

Facts: Vicente Ching is born from a Filipino mother and a father of Chinese national on April 11, 1964. He took the bar exam subject upon submission of proof of his Phil. Citizenship. He passed the bar at the age of 35 years old. There was a question regarding his citizenship

PaulitaGomez before his marriage to Bessie Kell eyand, (2) even if no such prior

marriage hadexisted, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly onlya year after the birth of FPJ.Issue:Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as tobe allowed to run for the offcie of the Presidentof the Philippines.Held:Any

therefore he was not allowed to take oath. The Solicitor General was asked to give comment on the case at bar.

conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from thepresumption that

ISSUE: WON Ching can be admitted to take oath in consideration of the status of his citizenship.

having died in 1954 at 84years old, Lorenzo would have been born

sometime in the year 1870, when thePhilippines was under Spanish rule, and RULING: The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine with citizenship" the 1 in strict of

that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of reside nce upon his death in 1954, in the

absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residencebefore dea th, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill hadeffected in 1902. That

compliance

provisions

Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." He should elect his Phil. Citizenship within a

citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would therebyextend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,during respondent FPJ which regime has

reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years old at that time. With almost 14 years that elapsed upon reaching his age of majority, Ching failed to exercise such right of citizenship election beyond a reasonable period of time therefore he cannot be admitted in the Phil. Rolls of atty. for being a Chinese citizen

seenfirst light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

5. CO VS. HRET

1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those

Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident ofLaoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly

elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born did citizens. more than Besides, merely

privaterespondent

exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be

elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private

eligible

to

run a

for

Congress

would

be The

tantamountto

property

qualification.

Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements. 7. REPUBLIC vs. DELA ROSA

respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his

residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent,Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for

FACTS This case is a consolidation of 3 petitions that primarily aims to declare the naturalized citizenship of Juan Frivaldo as invalid and consequently, nullify his

naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.For the elections of 1984 and

proclamation as governor of Sorsogon. It appears that Frivaldo had served as governor of Sorsogon for six terms already and was only compelled to renounce his citizenship when he sought political asylum in US due to the precarious political atmosphere here in the country during the Marcos regime. As he wasnt

able

to

reacquire

his

citizenship

through

of time, as it should have been filed within three days.

repatriation or through act of Congress, he was forced to file a petition for naturalization on September 1991. The judge set the hearing on March 16 1992 and ordered the publication of the order in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation---for three consecutive

ISSUES 1. W/N Comelec was correct in

dismissing the petitions for being filed out of time? 2. W/N the proceedings were invalid making Frivaldo not a Filipino citizen and thus ineligible for public office? 3. W/N Hermo may be proclaimed winner upon nullification of Frivaldos

weeks, at least once every week, the last publication to be made six months before the scheduled hearing. However, Frivaldo asked the court if the hearing could be moved to an earlier date as he intends to participate in the May 1992 elections, the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy being March 15 1992, a day ahead of the scheduled hearing. The court granted his request and set the hearing on Feb 21 1991. Of this RULING

proclamation?

1. Comelec erred in dismissing the petitions on the ground that they were filed out of time. The petitions, by their nature, are quo warranto. As such, they are not covered by the 10-day appeal period provided in Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2. The proceedings were invalid and Comelec should have cancelled Frivaldos certificate of candidacy. The Court never acquired jurisdiction over the case due to the following irregularities: (1) there was no order published advancing the date of the hearing, (2) the petition was heard within 6 months from last publication of the petition, (3) Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance when there was still a

advancement of hearing, neither publication nor posting of notice was made. Six days after said hearing, Judge Dela Rosa rendered a decision granting Frivaldos application and allowed him to take his oath of allegiance on that same day. To this, petitioner Quiterio Hermo, Frivaldos rival for governorship in Sorsogon, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging jurisdictional

defects in the proceedings. Subsequently, two petitions were filed mainly alleging that Frivaldo is an American citizen and is therefore ineligible to run, and that the courts decision is null and void for being fraught with legal infirmities. In one of the petitions, petitioner Hermo prayed that the votes casted in favor Frivaldo be declared as stray votes and that he be declared winner instead. These petitions were all dismissed by Comelec on the ground that such petitions were filed out

pending appeal , and (4) Frivaldo did not observe the 2-year waiting period. Thus, as qualifications for public office is a continuing requirement, once lost

(citizenship), title may be seasonably challenged. 3. Hermo cannot be proclaimed as

would not make respondent Ong a naturalborn citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau declaring of Immigration him to and be the DOJ such.

winner. Well settled is the rule that upon disqualification of the winner in an election, the second placer cannot be proclaimed as winner having failed to obtain the mandate of the majority of the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen

9. KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA RULING: Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a naturalborn citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings FACTS: The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot

xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself,

accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is

10. AZNAR VS COMELEC

a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued

FACTS: 1) On November 19, 1987, private

on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. 5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988,

respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. 2) On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial COMELEC Chairman a filed with for the the

COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship? HELD: SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELECs decision. The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private

petition

disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. 3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation issued and Miriam that by submitting the a

Certificate Immigration

then

Deportation Defensor private

Commissioner Santiago

certifying

respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No.

133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B1").

respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In the instant case, private respondent

Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition

for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine HELD: The respondent is a Filipino citizen since her father is a Filipino. Holding of an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. has dual citizenship. DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental.No pronouncement as to costs. At most, she

respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao

Oriental. FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia on May 16, 1934 to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. She ran for governor.

Petitioner, her opponent, filed a case for disqualification on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen since she was issued an alien certificate application of for registration; an there was an of

immigrant

certificate

residence and she was a holder of an Australian passport.

citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

11. VALES VS COMELEC This is a petition forcertiora ri under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997

13. TABASA VS CA

Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila.

Nature of the Case: The instant petition for review1[2] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie

Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996

On the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged: 1. That on 3 August

Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.

1995, Tabasa arrived in the Philippines and was admitted Facts: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a as a balikbayan;

2.

That in a letter dated

natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old (minor), his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen2 of the United States. By derivative petitioner also acquired American citizenship. On August 3, 1995 Petitioner arrived in the Philippines, and was admitted as a balikbayan for one year. After that petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan.

16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul

General of U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State;

3.

Hence,

Tabasa

is

now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily to deported Law and

pursuant

Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Miriam

Commissioner

Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation.

On May 29, 1996 - BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States. US Consul filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the Tabasa on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that the Tabasas passport has been revoked.

and/or Restraining Order

Temporary

Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration a final authorities order of

before

deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to

Schonemann Commissioner

vs. Santiago

a

change

of

his

immigration status as a non-quota immigrant

Sc ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the

because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine

passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to

Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a naturalborn citizen of the

remain in the country. Further, under Office

Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, deportation summary proceedings

Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization

when he was seven years old due to the

lie where the passport of the alien has expired. Thus, it is apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country.

naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.

At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old. On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction

person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners

detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA On June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be considered submitted for decision. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. On June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino deported citizen, or he cannot by be the

economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. CA concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us. Issue whether or not the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. Note: If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported undocumented alien. Ratio: RA 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of for his being an

detained

respondent Bureau. On August 7, 1996 Decision, denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis

Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine

Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos, was enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two classes of persons: (1) Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by

Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by

derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no

evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing the

marriage to aliens and (2) have natural-born lost Filipinos who

their

Philippine minor

repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or

citizenship

including their

children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire

Philippine

citizenship

through

naturalization when he was still a minor. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born

repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a: (1) Person opposed to

Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced citizenship his due to Philippine political or

organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons doctrines government; who uphold and teach

opposing

organized

(2)

Person deending or teaching

economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where

the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;

(3)

Person

convicted

of

a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The

crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4)

Person suffering from mental

repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children

alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

Tabasa does not qualify as a naturalborn Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 817.

of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.

Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171 Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171 Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost by his Philippine derivative He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee which on was

Naturalization

(SCN),

designated to process petitions for

citizenship

repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) Applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship.These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship. What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then,

lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified. P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is

incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than political or economic necessity. Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of renouncing allegiance to ones native country constitutes a necessary and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance, and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity. While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political act, it does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner.

executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration. At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.

Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171 SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, the reason/s why petitioner

Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of

citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine

Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA

citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Reasons why the petitioner cannot reacquire Philippine citizenship. 1. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation on June 13, 1996. 2. Neither can petitioner be a naturalborn Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. 3. He lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It

8171,

still

he

failed

to

follow

the

procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated repatriation. Therefore, passport petitioner was Tabasa, whose his to process petitions for

cancelled

after

admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can be

summarily deported.

His subsequent

repatriation cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

was his father who could have been motivated reasons by in economic deciding to or political for

DOCTRINE: Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire

apply

naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly who to the

natural-born

Filipinos

could

prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended

indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation.

revolution

to

help

in

the

restoration

of

democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that

Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was

HELD: WHEREFORE, this petition for review is

therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for

DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals costs to the petitioner. is AFFIRMED. No

14. FRIVALDO VS COMELEC

the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a Frivaldo was

Facts: Petitioner

Juan

G.

citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His

naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. elective The office qualifications cannot be prescribed erased by for the

electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of

qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

Petition

Dismissed.

Petitioner

JUAN

G.

FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of

repatriation pursuant to Republic Act 8171. Thus, Altajeros claimed that his Filipino

citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. Altajeros sought the dismissal of the petition. Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of the case, recommended that Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the

Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.

15. ALTAREJOS VS. COMELEC Facts: Ciceron P. Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and local elections. On 15 January 2004, Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Altajeros on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that [he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country. Almie, et. al. alleged that based on a letter from the Bureau of Immigration dated 25 June 2001, Altajeros was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien

position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and local elections; on the ground that Altajeros failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship inasmuch as he has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In its Resolution promulgated on 22 March 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director

Zaragoza. On 25 March 2004, Altajeros filed a motion for reconsideration. On 7 May 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of merit. On 10 May 2004, the election day itself, Altajeros filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Altajeros is eligible to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in light of his repatriation under RA 8171. Held: Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 provides that "Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of

Certificate of Registration E139507 issued on 3 November 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. On 26 January 2004, Altajeros filed an Answer stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as 17 December 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for

the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen." The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. Herein, Altajeros took his Oath of Allegiance on 17 December 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after 6 years or on 18 February 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on 1 March 2004. Altajeros, therefore, completed all the

May 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying Altajeros to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. However, considering that Altajeros failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation,as he submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. It is, therefore,

incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of the present case.

16. BENGZON VS. HRET

Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, ofFilipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent

requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections. Republic Act 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Courts ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation subsists. Accordingly, Altajeross repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. He was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the 10

Cruz

reacquired

his Philippine citizenship Republic Act No.

for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian an Alien passport, Certificate and of

through repatriation under

2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of

obtained

Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen ofthe Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of

Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of the

Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriationsimply

Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was

presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian

consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a

citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance.

naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a

naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is

18. LABO vs. COMELEC FACTS:

disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be

Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void

annulled.

ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's

complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such

technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case.

jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice.

2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2)

1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship?

naturalization, and (3) repatriation. - Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in

2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen? 3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? 4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him?

Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest. The contention that his marriage to an

Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that

HELD/RATIO: 1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still

marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy. The Commission on Immigration and

Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine

of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.

of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent of is the not a United citizen of States.

thePhilippines but 3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected.

COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual

citizenship are disqualified from running any 4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo. public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC

reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private

*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.): Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case.

respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent

disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is

20. MERCADO VS MANZANO

simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise

Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the

when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born

proclamation was suspended due to the petition

of

Filipino

parents

but

was

born in

San

Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to

posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign

countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in thePhilippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have Dual

22. AAJS, CALILUNG VS DATUMANONG

renounced Philippine citizenship.

FACTS: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent,

allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private and respondent in effect

Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

elected Philippine citizenship

renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to

renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. ISSUE: By is recognizing RA 9225 & allowing dual

allegiance,

unconstitutional?

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the

HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In

Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual

Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their

allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 23. JACOT VS COMELEC elections. Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is 24. DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC

Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US

citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire Republic his Philippine Act citizenship No. under 9225.

disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007

ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?

elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. HELD: We find that petitioner is disqualified

HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired

from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their

naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; 2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Petitioners oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice mayor.

26. CORODORA VS COMELEC

the supreme court recently ruled that a naturalborn Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an american father and filipino mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an oath of allegiance and executing a renunciation of foreign citizenship under the citizenship

retention and reacquisition act (ra 9225) before citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the phils. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently

become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA NO. 9225 do not apply to him."