CAPSTONE 2

P5+1: How State Relations with Iran Reflect Sanctions and Voting

Bassam ShawlDr. Francine D’Amico

Spring 2015

IRP 412

1

INTRODUCTION

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this case study is to examine whether interstate relations of the

P5+1 (USA, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) and the selected Middle Eastern

stakeholder states of Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria (labeled as SAIS) with the

enigmatic Iranian Republic influence their voting records on UN resolutions against

Iran, specifically on human rights and nuclear enrichment.

Significance of Study

Research on the P5+1, Middle East voting alignments are relevant because of the

polarization within the latter’s geopolitics and its influence across the globe. Several

regional conflicts including civil wars, proxy skirmishes and rampant militancy have

flooded the UN and its Security Council with endless questions on how to best cope

with the issues at hand. Iran remains a dominant player in many of these conflicts

including (but not limited to) the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars, the Yemeni insurgency

and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As of early April 2015, a comprehensive yet

tentative agreement was reached between the P5+1 and Iran, aiming to curb the

Islamic Republic’s uranium enrichment, limit their nuclear research and to monitor

their reactor and atomic facilities. In return for cooperating with the P5+1 within

the framework of this deal, it is expected that many of the crippling economic

sanctions against Iran would be relieved on both UN and state levels. The possibility

of normalizing relations with Western states has been discussed since the

negotiations began in 2011. Among the largest opponents of this potential deal are

Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as Israel views Iran’s nuclear

2

ambitions as an “existential threat to their Jewish state”, citing Iran’s anti-Zionist

rhetoric and funding of Hamas and Hezbollah. The GCC, led by Saudi Arabia,

considers Iran to be a rival in the region due to their contrasting ideologies (GCC

primarily Sunni Islam, Iran primarily Shiite Islam) and the potential economic

competition over oil and petroleum reserves. Syria remains Iran’s only regional ally

with the Assad regime relying heavily on Iranian support during its ongoing civil

war. Syria’s ruling family belongs to a minority Shiite sect, contrasting with its Arab

counterparts Sunni affiliation. Syria’s ties with both Iran and Russia enhance its

geostrategic importance in the region. The tentative deal with Iran will undoubtedly

have a lasting effect on the global power hierarchy and balance of the major world

powers.

Background

Following the deposition of the Western-supported, autocratic Shah Mohammad

Reza Pahlavi in 1979, Iran has been under the leadership of two Supreme Leaders

and 7 Presidents. From 1979-1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini served as the first

Supreme Leader of Iran; a charismatic leader that promoted an anti-imperialist and

revolutionary Islamic ideology that would establish the foundation of the Islamic

Republic. Following his death in 1989, his successor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was

elected Supreme Leader (after serving as President from 1981-85) and began

following a more pragmatic approach towards foreign and domestic policy in

comparison to his revolutionary predecessor. The four most prominent Iranian

presidents mentioned in this paper are Akbar Rafsanjani (1989-1997), Mohammad

Khatami (1997-2005), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) and Hassan Rouhani

3

(2013-present). Whereas Rafsanjani and Khatami were considered moderates

willing to engage with the West through dialogue, Ahmadinejad’s venomous

rhetoric and lack of compliance in the international community led to Iran’s further

isolation from the world. In 2013, the centrist Hassan Rouhani assumed the

presidency, promising to repair Iran’s international reputation and normalize

relations through dialogue. As of 2015, Rouhani is in the second year of his

presidency while Ayatollah Khamenei continues to serve as the Supreme Leader.

Theoretical Perspective

I approach this study primarily using a neorealist (or structural realism) lens,

drawing theoretical ideas from Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. This notion

indicates that the states being researched all share behaviors that are rooted in self-

interest, security dilemmas and relative gains/competition. According to Mingst and

Karns, states are unitary actors that define their national interests in terms of

maximizing power and security. International law and norms do not carry much

weight because they lack enforcement power (Mingst and Karns pg. 9). John

Mearsheimer’s realist theory revolves around the notion that states’ primary

motivation is a constant security competition, and that the actors seek nuclear

superiority over their rivals in an anarchic system. In an interview with the

scholarly journal “Iran Review,” Mearsheimer criticizes the United States and other

Western countries for their hypocritical approach in deterring Iran’s nuclear

weapons program while supporting the non-officially nuclear-armed Israel (Ziabari

and Mearsheimer 2012). Mearsheimer points out that the US, like many great

powers, often uses one set of standards for its friends, and another set of standards

4

for its adversaries. This declaration supports the idea that each state within the

P5+1 (all considered to be major powers) has specific policies and agendas that are

tailored to their strategic interests. In a briefing paper for the EU parliament,

Professor Peter Ferdinand of the University of Warwick discusses how these

pragmatic interests are relevant in the voting trends of Russia and China in the UN

Security Council. While Russia and China may not desire a nuclear-armed Iran, both

states continue to cooperate with Iran on regional issues within their geographic

vicinity as well as trade agreements (Ferdinand 2013). Paradoxes and

contradictions in the two states’ respective foreign policies are a result of various

strategic objectives on how to maximize Russian or Chinese influence and power. In

his piece entitled “A Realist Reply,” Mearsheimer asserts that international

institutions are relevant within structural realist though, but only because great

powers use these organizations to further their interests (Mearsheimer 1995). The

P5’s permanent status on the Security Council and veto privileges allows them to

dictate responses to global crises and problems without having to consult majority

of the UN member states. We see a clear example of this in the Iranian deal that was

reached in April 2015, as lesser powers such as Israel and Saudi Arabia voiced their

discontent about not having direct input in the agreement in addition to not

agreeing with the terms of the deal.

Using this structural realist theory, I expect my “independent variable”

countries (the P5+1 and Middle Eastern states) to have different histories and

agendas with the enigmatic Islamic Republic state as well as have varying levels of

concern regarding its nuclear program. Neorealism predicts the terms of the deal

5

will continue to be dominated by powerful states with regional interests. The

negotiations will primarily be decided outside of the UN but will still be constrained

by certain IGO structures that each P5 approaches differently. However, as each

member of the P5 has veto rights and influences within different blocs of the UN,

structural realism indicates some level of anarchy and a higher level of competition

over relative gains. Many states in the Middle East region have conflicting interests

with Iran in regards to power, stability and influence.

Methodology

For this descriptive case study, all voting records and resolutions from the United

Nations Security and Human Rights Councils from 2006 to the present year of 2015

are reviewed. I chose descriptive analysis due to its focus on connections and

patterns that lead to theoretical evolution, thinking the inter-state relations and

voting trends would support the structural realist argument. The UNHRC was

created in 2006, so the voting data aligns with the United Nations Security Council

nuclear sanctions that were initiated in the same year with UNSC Resolution 1696.

This year was also specifically chosen as then-Iranian President Mahmud

Ahmadinejad implemented a “Renaissance of Imam Khomeini’s ideas” towards

foreign policy, departing from the previously pragmatic and centrist principles held

by Presidents Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Khatami (1997-2005).

All other sanctions on Iran issued by members of the P5+1 and the group SAIS on a

state-based level will be listed from 1979 to present 2015. Classifying SAIS refers to

the states Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Syria. This classification revolves around these

countries’ geographic proximity, political history and contrasting opinions on Iran’s

6

nuclear program. These three states are the primary stakeholders in the Middle

Eastern region in assessing Iran’s role in the international community.

The states involved in this case study that do not have voting histories

against Iran within the Security Council include Germany, Syria, Saudi Arabia and

Israel. Their voting records within the Human Rights Council serve as surrogates for

their voting records for or against Iran.

Using voting records taken from the Human Rights and Security Councils, a

numerical score will be given to each country signifying their support or contempt

for Iran. Votes against the Iranian state are given a -1 point, while votes for Iran are

listed as +1. Abstention votes are counted as 0. The highest score a nation can score

indicating positive relations with Iran maximizes at +9, while -9 exemplifies the

most negative relationship. To summarize, I will be determining if a country’s

political/economic relationship with Iran is reflective on how it votes on the Islamic

Republic’s human rights abuses and nuclear enrichment, two factors that have

polarized Iran from the international system.

The “independent variables” will be defined as nations’ political/economic ties with

Iran, specifically after the 1979 Revolution and the end of the Cold War, as these two

pivots remain the most significant event in shaping modern Iranian policies. The

dependent variables are the votes in the UNSC and HRC by the P5+1 and classified

‘SAIS’ states. Political and economic relationships are briefly summarized separately

and categorized as POSITIVE, NEUTRAL or NEGATIVE given the qualitative evidence

and history between the respective state and Iran.

7

The ‘Middle East’ stakeholders referenced in this paper as “SAIS” include: Saudi Arabia Israel

Human Rights Resolutions USA UK FRANCE

GERMANY RUSSIA CHINA SYRIA ISRAEL

SAUDI ARABIA

A/RES/68/184 (2013) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES ABSTAINA/RES/67/182 (2012) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES ABSTAINA/RES/66/175 (2011) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES ABSTAINA/RES/65/226 (2010) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES ABSTAINA/RES/64/176 (2009) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YESA/RES/63/191 (2008) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES NOA/RES/62/168 (2007) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES NOA/RES/61/176 (2006) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES NOA/RES/60/171 (2005) YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES NO

SyriaThe P5+1 includes:

USA UK France Russia China Germany

Hypothesis

A positive relationship between the state and Iran, the less likely the former is to

vote against the latter in the Human Rights and Security Councils. This applies vice-

versa. This will require a qualitative methods approach as I’ve use economic

evidence and connections in addition to exploring the political/historical ties

Security Council ResolutionsUSA UK FRANCE RUSSIA CHINA

S/RES/2159 (2014) YES YES YES YES YESS/RES/2105 (2013) YES YES YES YES YESS/RES/2049 (2012) YES YES YES YES YESS/RES/1984 (2011) YES YES YES YES YESS/RES/1929 (2010) YES YES YES YES YESS/RES/1803 (2008) YES YES YES YES YESS/RES/1747 (2007) YES YES YES YES YESS/RES/1737 (2006) YES YES YES YES YESS/RES/1696 (2006) YES YES YES YES YES

8

between the given country and Iran. Despite the references to economic ties

between Iran and a respective country, the theoretical approach remains that of a

structural realist, as the argument can be made that despite Iran’s poor

international reputation, many states maintain an economic association for

pragmatic and geostrategic purposes. Through my hypothesis, I should expect states

that are listed as POSITIVE to have a numerical number above 0, while NEGATIVE

interstate relations will have scores less than 0. NEUTRAL classification is proven if

the score is equal to 0. If not sufficiently proven, the null hypothesis would conclude

that inter-state relations with Iran are unrelated to that country’s voting records.

This would occur if any states within the P5+1 or SAIS have a numerical voting score

that does not correlate with the classification of political/economic relationship.

SAIS States

SAUDI ARABIA

HISTORY/CURRENT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP: NEGATIVE

Prior to the 1979 Revolution, Iran and Saudi Arabia maintained a normalized

diplomatic relationship reflected by the Saudi-Iranian friendship treaty1. During the

1960’s, the second shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and then-king King Faisal took

turns visiting one another’s kingdoms and committed to the idea of Islamic

solidarity and shared oil dominance in spite of Iran’s recognition of Israel and

1 "Iran and Saudi Arabia: Eternal "Gamecocks?" | Middle East Institute." Iran and Saudi Arabia: Eternal "Gamecocks?" | Middle East Institute. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Mar. 2015

9

reacquisition of various islands within the Persian Gulf.2 Following the abdication of

the shah and ascension of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, political relations cooled as

the Iranian Supreme Leader denounced the Saud monarchy as being haram

(forbidden) by Islam and as an American satellite, lamenting “Mecca is now in the

hands of a group of infidels who are grossly unaware of what they should do.”2

Relations were at a breaking point during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), as the

Saudis provided direct financial assistance to Saddam Hussein while encouraging

other Arab states to help the Iraqis and alienate their Persian rivals. Tensions

between the two countries were furthered increased following the demonstrations

and massacre of Iranian nationals by Saudi forces during their Muslim pilgrimage of

Hajj in Mecca, which inspired rioters in Tehran to siege and overrun the Saudi

embassy, causing the death of a Saudi diplomatic official.3

The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 opened the opportunity for the new

Supreme Leader Khamenei to pursue pragmatic and strategic national interests

over Khomeini’s ideological mission of ‘exporting the revolution’ to other states in

the region. As Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait directly created a security

dilemma for their states’ borders and regional influence, the Saudis re-established

diplomatic ties with Iran in 1991, working to improving the stability in the region.

22 "Iran-Saudi Arabia: A Troubled Affair." - Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Mar. 2015

22 "Iran-Saudi Arabia: A Troubled Affair." - Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Mar. 2015

33 "Rivals-Iran vs. Saudi Arabia." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Mar. 2015.

10

By the late 1990’s, the relations between the two states thawed considerably after

cooperation agreements and dialogue through the Organization of the Islamic

Conference in ’97 and numerous official visits delegates from both nations3.

Following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, formal

diplomatic relations remained intact but tensions remained from the US invasion of

Iraq and subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein that saw both Iran and Saudi

Arabia vie for influence within the new Iraqi government, causing an ongoing

sectarian civil war between Iraqi Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites. Following the numerous

Arab uprisings in the winter of 2010, the two states traded accusations of meddling

into the internal demonstrations and protests within various Middle Eastern states

including, but not limited to Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain4. Politically, the two

states’ ambitions to be the regional hegemonic power and leaders of the Muslim

world have spawned several proxy wars within the Middle East, many of which are

ongoing situations that do not necessarily indicate a viable and immediate solution.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS: NEGATIVE

Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are leaders in oil and gas reserves, further intensifying

their rivalry on an economic and trade level. The two are prominent members of

OPEC but have consistently been at odds over pricing and competition. Because of

the crippling sanctions against the Iranian regime, Saudi Arabia has maintained

dominance on oil exports and leading OPEC, directly supplying crude oil to the

United States and other Western states at low monetary rates from Saudi’s own

3

44 "Rivals-Iran vs. Saudi Arabia." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Mar. 2015.

11

discretion5. In response to sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, Saudi Arabia had

publically announced in 2012 it would raise its oil output, usurping much of Iran’s

opportunities in favor of their own. According to a Reuters report, removal of

sanctions on Iran’s economy could bring as much as 800,000 barrels of oil per day to

the international market as well as FDI opportunities that could very well lead to cut

Human Rights Resolutions

SAUDI ARABIA (+3)

A/RES/68/184 (2013) ABSTAIN (0)A/RES/67/182 (2012) ABSTAIN (0)A/RES/66/175 (2011) ABSTAIN (0)A/RES/65/226 (2010) ABSTAIN (0)A/RES/64/176 (2009) YES (-1)A/RES/63/191 (2008) NO (+1)A/RES/62/168 (2007) NO (+1)A/RES/61/176 (2006) NO (+1)A/RES/60/171 (2005) NO (+1)rate prices on Iranian oil and petroleum reserves6. This impact on the world oil

market would spark price competition between the two leaders of oil production in

the Middle East, an outcome Saudi Arabia is determined to avoid. Trade between the

two states has remained minimal, with the only prominent example of migration of

Iranian citizens being related to the Islamic pilgrimage of Hajj in Mecca. According

to the UN Comtrade Database, there had been no formal economic exchange

between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2014.

55 Kirkpatrick, David. "As U.S. and Iran Seek Nuclear Deal, Saudi Arabia Makes Its Own Moves." The New York Times. The New York Times, 30 Mar. 2015. Web. 30 Mar. 2015.

66 "Exclusive: Iran Crude Oil Exports Rise to Highest since EU Sanctions.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 31 Jan. 2013. Web. 22 Mar. 2015.

12

Saudi Arabia’s score of +3 indicates that within an international context, the Sunni

monarchy does not have an overwhelmingly hostile attitude towards Iran. However,

due to the similarity of both country’s human rights situations, it is easy to assume

Saudi Arabia simply does not want to attract international attention on its own

domestic practices by supporting resolutions against Iran. The lone vote cast in

favor of a resolution against Iran was in the year of 2009, following Iran’s brutal

crackdown of electoral dissent that was granted large amounts of global scrutiny

and condemnation.

SYRIA

HISTORY/CURRENT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP: POSITIVE

Syria has and remains Iran’s strongest ally within the region, with Syria being the

first Arab state to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran in 19797. The Assad family

of Syria belongs to the minority Alawite Shiite sect of Islam despite ruling a nation

predominately of the Sunni faith. Although Iran’s government and population is

primarily Shia, any notion of religious solidarity between the two states is more

symbolic due to the fact that Assad’s regime stresses secularism, socialism and Arab

nationalism, contrasting with the religious conservative Persian identity held by

Iran. The partnership between the two regimes is based on common regional

agendas and shared security/power dilemmas7. During the Iran-Iraq War, Syria

77 "The Iran Primer." Iran and Syria. USIP, n.d. Web. 18 Mar. 2015.

77 "The Iran Primer." Iran and Syria. USIP, n.d. Web. 18 Mar. 2015.

13

sided with the Iran against the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, cutting Iraqi oil

pipelines and providing military and financial assistance to the Iranian government.

The two governments provided funding and support to the Hezbollah militancy

group during the Lebanese Civil War, a relationship that remains in tact today with

the ambitions of directly attacking the Israeli state and maintaining a proxy

influence within the government of Lebanon. While the two diverged their agendas

on how to influence Lebanese politics, the disagreements did not hinder their

partnership8. Both states remain sponsors of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in

Palestine with the aim of combating the Israeli presence. During the US invasion of

Iraq, both Syria and Iran provided arms and aid to insurgents to combat Western

presence, undoubtedly feeling a mutual security dilemma that the US could include

their states in “the War Against Terror.” As Syria remains entangled in an ongoing

civil war, Iran has repeatedly come to the Assad regime’s defense, providing support

through its Revolutionary Guards Corps to combat both the Free Syrian Army and

ISIS rebels in the region. Syrian President Bashar Assad continues to laud Iranian

support against what they label as a foreign plot to overthrow the regime in favor of

radical Sunni militants9. Despite the civil war entering its fifth year, both countries

maintain frequent diplomatic visits to the capitals of Tehran and Damascus.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS: POSITIVE

88 Pan, Esther. "Syria, Iran, and the Mideast Conflict." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 18 July 2006. Web. 01 Apr. 2015.

99 Rafizadeh, Majid. "Three Decades of ‘strategic Resistance’ between Iran and Syria." Al Arabiya. N.p., 2 May 2014. Web. 21 Mar. 2015.

14

In response to Syria’s support for Iran against Iraq in the 1980’s, Iran provided

discounted and complimentary barrels of oil to the Syrian regime. Iran has

consistently allocated investments into Syria’s domestic infrastructure,

transportation and banking industries9. Prior towards the outbreak of the Syrian

Civil War, Iran and Syria had signed a 10 billion natural gas agreement that was to

be constructed from Iran into the Mediterranean running through Syria and

Lebanon. To combat the sanctions imposed by the US, EU and Arab League, Syria

and Iran had created a free trade agreement that facilitates trade and business

between state-owned corporations and banks1010. In spite of ongoing the Syrian

conflict, the governments of Iran and Syria reiterated their economic partnership by

signing cooperation agreements that included petroleum exports, medical and

technological information sharing and further direct investment into Syrian private

sector. We see in the chart below that Syria has always voted against human rights

resolutions specifically targeting their Iranian allies. For their relationship with Iran,

Syria scored a +9, the highest numerical amount that illustrates positive connection.

Human Rights Resolutions SYRIA (+9)A/RES/68/184 (2013) NO (+1)A/RES/67/182 (2012) NO (+1)A/RES/66/175 (2011) NO (+1)A/RES/65/226 (2010) NO (+1)A/RES/64/176 (2009) NO (+1)A/RES/63/191 (2008) NO (+1)A/RES/62/168 (2007) NO (+1)

99 Rafizadeh, Majid. "Three Decades of ‘strategic Resistance’ between Iran and Syria." Al Arabiya. N.p., 2 May 2014. Web. 21 Mar. 2015.

1010 "The Geopolitics of Gas and the Syrian Crisis: Syrian "Opposition" Armed to Thwart Construction of Iran-Iraq-Syria Gas Pipeline." Global Research. N.p., Sept. 2014. Web. 01 Apr. 2015.

15

A/RES/61/176 (2006) NO (+1)A/RES/60/171 (2005) NO (+1)

ISRAEL


After the 1979 Revolution, Iran completely severed diplomatic and financial ties

with Israel and refused to acknowledge Israel as an official state. Ayatollah

Khomeini labeled Israel as an “enemy of Islam,” and adapted a staunch anti-Zionist

position within Iran’s government1111. During the Iran-Iraq however, Iran had

received significant clandestine arms support from Israel, facilitated by the Reagan

administration of the United States. Over 100 million dollars worth of missiles,

aircraft parts, small arms and anti-tank launchers were provided to the Iranian

military. In spite of the overwhelming evidence of Israeli and US assistance and

eventual revelation of the Contra Scandal, Ayatollah Khomeini vehemently denied

any sort of cooperation with the Israelis, claiming they were secretly aligned with

Saddam’s Baathist regime.1212 The following decades saw Iran directly fund anti-

Israel militant groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad, using the

Palestinian conflict to instigate proxy skirmishes against the Israeli state. During the

Khatami era in Iran, the Iranian president labeled Israel as a “parasite”, while

1111 Nader, Alireza. "Iran and a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Middle East." Arms Control Today 41.7 (2011): 20-22. JSTOR. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23629113?ref=no-x-route:40bfec2a04ecd332060e21b88efa2921>.

1212 Slavin, Barbara. "New Iran-Contra Book Shows How US-Iran Ties Were Scuttled - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East." Al-Monitor. N.p., Aug. 2014. Web. 24 Mar. 2015.

16

Supreme Leader Khamenei called the Jewish state a “cancerous tumor”.1313 In 2005,

Iran’s newly elected President Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be “wiped off the

map,” as well as publicize his denial of the Holocaust1414. Because of the sharp anti-

Zionist and Israeli rhetoric, Israel’s government fears Iran’s nuclear ambitions are

driven with the goal of destroying the Jewish state through a uranium-enriched

bomb. Both countries have and continue to exchange threats towards one another’s

countries, with the Israeli government continuing to lobby against any nuclear deal

or reconciliation with the Iranian government. Current Israeli Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu’s further demonstrates the Israeli government’s stance that a

nuclear Iran threatens Israel’s existence, the very essence of a security dilemma.

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: NEGATIVE

Due to the lack of official state recognition both countries have for one another, any

Iranian-Israeli trade or business is considered illegal. Both states have implemented

sanctions on any companies doing business with either side, and do not directly

interact with one another on a substantial economic level.

Human Rights Resolutions ISRAEL (-9)A/RES/68/184 (2013) YES (-1)A/RES/67/182 (2012) YES (-1)A/RES/66/175 (2011) YES (-1)A/RES/65/226 (2010) YES (-1)A/RES/64/176 (2009) YES (-1)A/RES/63/191 (2008) YES (-1)

1313 "Ex-Iranian Leader Blames Bush Policies for Terrorism." CNN. Cable News Network, Sept. 2006. Web. 01 Mar. 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/04/iran.khatami/index.html>.

1414 Fathi, Nazila. "Wipe Israel 'off the Map' Iranian Says." NY Times. N.p., Oct. 2005. Web. 4 Mar. 2015. <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2005%2F10%2F26%2Fworld%2Fafrica%2F26iht-iran.html>.

17

A/RES/62/168 (2007) YES (-1)A/RES/61/176 (2006) YES (-1)A/RES/60/171 (2005) YES (-1)

Israel’s score of -9 places it at the lowest value for relations with Iran, indicating a

tremendously antagonistic opinion towards the Islamic Republic.

The “+1”: Germany

GERMANY

HISTORY/CURRENT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP: NEUTRAL

Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran and Germany maintained normal

diplomatic ties established during the Qajar era of Persia. In an interview with

Matthew Kuntzel, Iranian political analyst Davood Kiani claims the only Western

country that continued to have friendly relations with Iran after the revolution was

Germany.1313 The two states share a mutual “Aryan” heritage, a common ancestry

that, according to Kiani, remains staunchly embedded in both their respective

national identities. However the decades following the revolution indicate a

complicated political relationship between Iran and Germany. During the Iran-Iraq

War, West German businesses were discovered to have been directly involved in

1313 Kuntzel, Matthias. "Hidden Diplomacy: The German–American Dispute over Iran." American Foreign Policy Interests (2014): n. pag. JSTOR. Web. 24 Mar. 2015. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10803920.2014.947873>

18

manufacturing Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons program, an Iraqi arsenal that

claimed the lives of more than 100,000 Iranians. In 1997, Germany expelled Iranian

diplomats from Berlin and recalled its Tehran ambassador in the wake of an

investigation that ruled the Islamic Republic was directly involved in the 1992

assassinations of Kurdish insurgents at a Berlin restaurant.1414 This suspension of

relations was implemented for less than year before Iran’s political reconciliation

efforts were successful. Under the Khatami presidency, the political connection

between the two states became more interlinked with their economic partnership

and trade. This relationship continued through the mid 2000’s however, Germany

began to distance itself from the anti-Semitic and controversial statements made by

then President Ahmadinejad. As the nuclear ambitions of Iran became known

internationally, Germany initially promoted diplomatic approach to curbing Iran’s

program. From 2003 to 2005 Germany, acting with France and the UK as the EU3,

embarked on negotiations to halt uranium enrichments and to increase

transparency with the Iranian government. These were unsuccessful because of

Iran’s lack of cooperation and internal secrecy. Germany joined the US and UK in

approving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to implement safeguards

and consistent monitoring of Iran in 2005.1515 The following year, Germany voted in

favor of UNSC sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, as both sides continued to

disagree on a comprehensive deal. In addition to approving UNSC sanctions,

1414 "Germany and Iran Embroiled in Diplomatic Spat | Germany | DW.DE | 28.04.2004." Deutshe Welle. N.p., 4 Apr. 2004. Web. 27 Mar. 2015. <http://www.dw.de/germany-and-iran-embroiled-in-diplomatic-spat/a-1184162>.

1515 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. ACA, Jan. 2014. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals>.

19

Germany’s implementation of EU sanctions against Iran include asset freezes, travel

bans, and trade restrictions with the justification of Iran’s lack of nuclear and human

rights transparency. In spite of Germany’s voting record and close ties with the

Western states within the P5, Berlin maintains a strong anti-military intervention

policy preference regarding Iran’s nuclear program, aligning itself with Russian and

Chinese policy. As the P+1 negotiations continue to reach their final stages, it is clear

that Germany plays a key role in bridging the gap between the international

community and Iran despite its lack of permanent council and nuclear capability

status.

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: POSITIVE

Human Rights Resolutions GERMANY (-9)A/RES/68/184 (2013) YES (-1)A/RES/67/182 (2012) YES (-1)A/RES/66/175 (2011) YES (-1)A/RES/65/226 (2010) YES (-1)A/RES/64/176 (2009) YES (-1)A/RES/63/191 (2008) YES (-1)A/RES/62/168 (2007) YES (-1)A/RES/61/176 (2006) YES (-1)A/RES/60/171 (2005) YES (-1)Despite EU and UN sanctions against Iran, Germany and the Islamic Republic

maintain strong economic ties. Germany remains Iran's biggest trading partner in

Europe and business exchanges continue to rise through sales of technology,

agricultural products and medicine. Germany exported over 3.4 billion dollars

worth of goods in 2012 with another $1.8 billion in exports between January and

September 2013.16 16The German Chamber of Foreign Trade maintains a strong

16 16 "German Firm Inks One Billion Euro Gas Deal With Iran." German Firm Inks One Billion Euro Gas Deal With Iran. Mehr News, Jan. 2010. Web. 01 Mar. 2015. <http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jan/1179.html>.

20

presence in Tehran and there are over 1,500 German companies doing business in

Iran. Private German industries such as Bayer, Siemens, BOMAFA, GEMU and

Herrenkechnt all have contributed materials, labor and designs towards Iranian

infrastructure and development.1717 Several German energy firms have maintained

billion-dollar gas distribution and manufacturing contracts despite the EU bans on

Iran’s gas and oil industries.

Despite a mutually beneficial and consistent economic partnership, Germany’s score

of -9 reflects its government’s disapproval of Iran’s domestic policies on human

rights. The German-Iranian relationship further validates the theoretical notion of

neorealism, as their cooperation enhances their relative gains but does not directly

indicate an alliance in various international political institutions.

CHINA


The People Republic of China officially recognized the Islamic Republic of Iran

within days of its founding, despite the Ayatollah’s distrust of the communist

regime’s ideological presence and intentions1818. However, Beijing made efforts to

reach out to their Iranian counterparts for a variety of reasons; their shared position

of isolation from the international world, distrust of American and Western powers

1717 Germany-Iran Foreign Relations. Iran Tracker, July 2010. Web. 24 Mar. 2015. <http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/germany-iran-foreign-relations>.

1818 Nader, Alireza. "The Nature of the Chinese-Iranian Partnership and the Challenges It Poses for the U.S." China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations. RAND, 2012. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP351.html>.

21

intentions and their potential oil partnership. The Chinese were one of the few

nations that provided arms to Iran during the First Persian Gulf War with Iraq,

further cementing a pragmatic partnership with the Islamic Republic. Energy and

arms cooperation became the principle dynamic between the two authoritarian

states and China’s assistance in nuclear development allowed Iran to construct

research reactors in addition to completing Iran’s Bushehr power plant.1818 The

exchange of nuclear, missile, naval technology has helped modernized the Iranian

Human Rights Resolutions CHINA (+9)A/RES/68/184 (2013) NO (+1)A/RES/67/182 (2012) NO (+1)A/RES/66/175 (2011) NO (+1)A/RES/65/226 (2010) NO (+1)A/RES/64/176 (2009) NO (+1)A/RES/63/191 (2008) NO (+1)A/RES/62/168 (2007) NO (+1)A/RES/61/176 (2006) NO (+1)A/RES/60/171 (2005) NO (+1)Security Council Resolutions CHINA (-9)S/RES/2159 (2014) YES (-1)S/RES/2105 (2013) YES (-1)S/RES/2049 (2012) YES (-1)S/RES/1984 (2011) YES (-1)S/RES/1929 (2010) YES (-1)S/RES/1803 (2008) YES (-1)S/RES/1747 (2007) YES (-1)S/RES/1737 (2006) YES (-1)S/RES/1696 (2006) YES (-1)military in spite of the sanctions and limitations of their economy. China, along with

Russia, often has acted as a shield for Iran against UNSC sanctions, agreeing to

1818 Nader, Alireza. "The Nature of the Chinese-Iranian Partnership and the Challenges It Poses for the U.S." China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations. RAND, 2012. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP351.html>.

22

resolutions only after enduring international scrutiny but not closely adhering to

the restrictions imposed due to their veto-power and global economic status.

Although China does not feel directly threatened from a potentially nuclear Iran,

Beijing has indicated it does not wish to spark a nuclear arms race within the

unstable Middle Eastern region. As former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Selehi

declared, ”Tehran and Beijing ties are strategic and their prospects are bright.”1919

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: POSITIVE

Iran is China’s primary crude oil supplier as more than 80% of China’s imports from

Iran is from its reserves. China exclusively owns the rights to dozens of Iranian oil

and gas fields with multi-billion dollar contracts lasting over 25 years.2020 China in

turn has provided immense foreign direct investments into Iran’s petroleum,

transportation, banking, and construction industries. In exchange, Iran provides

various raw materials such as coal, iron, methanol, propane, and butane. In 2014,

China officially became Iran’s largest trade partner with over 13 billion dollars (non-

oil related) in export/imports within a year. The total amount of trade between the

states in 2014 was estimated well over 50 billion dollars, a significant rise from the

previous 40 billion reported in 2013.2121

1919 "Iran's New Alliance With China Could Cost U.S. Leverage." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 2004. Web. 11 Mar. 2015. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55414-2004Nov16.html>.

2020 Ahouie, Mahdie. "Mahdi Ahouie: Iran’s Relationship with China, India and Russia." Exploring Geopolitics. N.p., Jan. 2015. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/interview_ahouie_mahdi_iran_relationship_china_india_russia_oil_gas_industry_foreign_direct_investments_economic_technological_cooperation_ties_trade_balance/>.

2121 "China Becomes Iran's Largest Trade Partner." Washington Free Beacon. N.p., Feb. 2015. Web. 22 Mar. 2015. <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-becomes-irans-largest-trade-partner/>.

23

China’s score of 0 accurately depicts its strategic realist policy towards Iran: Human

rights within the domestic realm of the Islamic Republic are not of the concern to

Beijing, a government that also resists infringement on its state’s sovereignty. And

while China has voted for limited sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, China has

provided its own scientists and resources to Iran’s power plants, indicating their

inter-state relations remain cooperative despite its voting.

RUSSIA


The USSR was the first nation to recognize the Islamic Republic following the 1979

Revolution. This gesture was snubbed, as Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized the

republic’s strong anti-Communist ideology, also citing the Soviet’s history with

Iran’s communist Tudeh party and predicting the USSR model would eventually

soon fail.2222 Relations between the neighboring states became further contentious

as the Soviets began assisting Saddam’s Iraq against Iran in the First Persian Gulf

War (1980-1988). Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 also raised security

concerns in the Iranian government, which began to question the geopolitical

motivations of the Soviet bloc. By the time of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989,

Russia and Iran had initiated significant improvements in their relations directly

2222 Shaffer, Brenda. "Partners In Need." (n.d.): n. pag. Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2001. Web. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PP_57_PARTNERS_IN_NEED.pdf>

24

associated with Russia’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and brokerage of a ceasefire

with Iraq. As the USSR collapsed, Iran endorsed the Moscow government run by

Gorbachev, claiming the disintegration of the USSR would lead further to instability

and Western imperialist interests. As the new Supreme Leader Khamenei began to

“revisit” Iran’s nuclear energy program in the 1990’s, Russia helped rebuild the

Islamic Republic’s nuclear reactor in Bushehr. The two states also cooperated on

ending the 1997 civil war in Tajikistan. Under the scrutiny of the IAEA and UN

Security Council, Russia and Iran agreed to a deal that would enrich uranium for

Iran’s fuel reactors within Russian sovereignty, strategically avoiding the sanctions

against Iran2222. However, under the Ahmadinejad administration, Iran began to

refuse Russia’s trade proposals of enriching commercial grade uranium and opted

to enrich the nuclear materials domestically, prompting Russia to reconsider its

sanctions policy. Moscow has followed the pragmatic approach of voting for

sanctions to placate its US interests, but maintains a working relationship with Iran

in spite of the sanctions imposed. The two states have both supported the Assad

regime in the Syrian civil war, opposing Western intervention in the region. Russian

leaders have stated they do not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons

capability2727, but does not consider the possibility of a nuclear Iran as a direct

security threat to Russia

2222 Shaffer, Brenda. "Partners In Need." (n.d.): n. pag. Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2001. Web. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PP_57_PARTNERS_IN_NEED.pdf>

2727 Borshchevskaya, Anna. "How Russia Views the Iran Nuclear Talks." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. N.p., Mar. 2015. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-russia-views-the-iran-nuclear-talks>

25

Human Rights Resolutions RUSSIA (+9)A/RES/68/184 (2013) NO (+1)A/RES/67/182 (2012) NO (+1)A/RES/66/175 (2011) NO (+1)A/RES/65/226 (2010) NO (+1)A/RES/64/176 (2009) NO (+1)A/RES/63/191 (2008) NO (+1)A/RES/62/168 (2007) NO (+1)A/RES/61/176 (2006) NO (+1)A/RES/60/171 (2005) NO (+1)Security Council Resolutions RUSSIA (-9)S/RES/2159 (2014) YES (-1)S/RES/2105 (2013) YES (-1)S/RES/2049 (2012) YES (-1)S/RES/1984 (2011) YES (-1)S/RES/1929 (2010) YES (-1)S/RES/1803 (2008) YES (-1)S/RES/1747 (2007) YES (-1)S/RES/1737 (2006) YES (-1)S/RES/1696 (2006) YES (-1)ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: POSITIVE

Similar to Beijing’s approach to Iran, Russia views the Islamic State as an important

trading partner within the global market. Oil and energy agreements between the

two states have remained consistent, with Russian industries such as Gazprom and

Atomstroyexport maintaining lucrative contacts with Iranian petroleum and energy

companies. Rosoboronoexport exports arms and military technology to the Islamic

Republic. In 2014, the two established a $20 billion dollar oil-for-goods exchange

that provided metals and food goods2323. Russia and Iran are the leading states of

the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, setting energy quotas and prices along with

2323 "Iran, Russia Working to Seal $20 Billion Oil-for-goods Deal: Sources.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 02 Apr. 2014. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/02/us-iran-russia-oil-idUSBREA311K520140402>.

26

nine different states in the global market. Iran holds the world’s second largest

natural gas reserves, second to only Russia, indicating potential competition

between the two if a deal with Iran is completed.

Just as the case with China, Russia’s neutral score of 0 reflect its pragmatic interests with Iran’s position in the international community. Human rights are not a priority for the Russian Federation and the country has continued to find ways to avoid economic sanction restrictions on Iran despite their SC voting.

THE WESTERN 3 of the P5:USA, UK, FRANCE


The most contentious relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5 are

with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the French Republic. Immediately

after the fall of the Shah, the newly established Islamic theocracy made it their anti-

US and British feelings abundantly clear to the international community, citing the

Western state’s constant interference in the Iranian government and economy

during the Pahlavi era. The refusal to extradite the ousted Shah to Iran further led to

the breakdown of relations, as the Ayatollah publically denounced America as the

“Great Satan”.2424 In retaliation for the storming of the US embassy in Tehran and

the hostage crisis that followed, the US, UK, and France all imposed sanctions on the

Ayatollah’s regime. All three states supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war

through various military, financial, and tactical support mediums. Through the use

of their proxy militant groups like Hezbollah, Iran engaged in numerous attacks on

American and French embassy and military bases during the 1980’s. In 1988, the

2424 Pollack, Kenneth M. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. New York: Random House, 2004. Print.

27

United States shot down an Iranian civilian airplane near the Gulf, further

estranging the two states2525. Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against British author

Salman Rushdie caused London to break off diplomatic ties with Tehran, an action

replicated by all EU members. Despite reformist leader Mohammad Khatami’s call

for better dialogue with the West at the beginning of the 2000’s, no formal

breakthrough of relations was achieved. President Bush’s declaration of Iran as one

of the 3 Axis of Evil in January 2002 sparked outrage in the Islamic Republic, now

being accused to developing a nuclear arsenal. As France and UK (along with

Germany) began to negotiate with Iran over its uranium enrichment program in

2003, the US continued its decades long economic sanctions towards the Islamic

Republic. By 2005, the populist and controversial Mahmud Ahmadinejad was

elected President2626 and refused to suspend Iran’s enrichment activities.

Ahmadinejad’s support of proxy terror groups and his contentious rhetoric against

the West further alienated Iran from the international community and prompted 4

SC resolutions condemning and sanctioning Iran’s nuclear program. Based on the

agreement that was reached in early April 2015, it is clear that President Rouhani’s

desire for better dialogue with the West can be considered genuine. All three states

interpret Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a threat, especially towards the state of Israel,

whom the US and the UK consider an ally. The US, UK and France all directly

sanction Iran in addition to their votes supporting multilateral UNSC sanctions.

2525 "US-Iran Relations: A Brief Guide." BBC News. N.p., Nov. 2014. Web. 22 Mar. 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661>.

2626 "Iran and France: Shattered Dreams | Middle East Institute." Iran and France: Shattered Dreams | Middle East Institute. Middle East Institute, n.d. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.mei.edu/content/iran-and-france-shattered-dreams>.

28

ECONOMIC

RELATIONSHIP:

NEGATIVE

Human Rights Resolutions USA (-9) UK (-9)FRANCE (-9)

A/RES/68/184 (2013) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)A/RES/67/182 (2012) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)A/RES/66/175 (2011) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)A/RES/65/226 (2010) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)A/RES/64/176 (2009) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)A/RES/63/191 (2008) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)A/RES/62/168 (2007) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)A/RES/61/176 (2006) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)A/RES/60/171 (2005) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)The embargo on Iran prohibits trade, banking and credit transactions, and boycotts

any companies associated with Iran. US and EU sanctions have specifically targeted

individuals within the Iranian regime connected with the nuclear program by

freezing their assets, as well as restricting investments in their oil and gas

industries.1515 Travel bans and arms embargos have been heavily incorporated by

EU legislation sponsored by France and the United Kingdom as well as limits on

technology, food products, and raw materials exports.

1515 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. ACA, Jan. 2014. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals>.

29

Security Council Resolutions USA (-9) UK (-9)

FRANCE (-9)

S/RES/2159 (2014) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)S/RES/2105 (2013) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)S/RES/2049 (2012) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)S/RES/1984 (2011) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)S/RES/1929 (2010) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)S/RES/1803 (2008) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)S/RES/1747 (2007) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)S/RES/1737 (2006) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)S/RES/1696 (2006) YES (-1) YES (-1) YES (-1)

All three states share the same numerical score of -9, viewing Iran’s human rights and nuclear ambitions as detrimental to the international system. Given Iran’s rhetoric against these specific countries, it is clear that they view a nuclear Islamic Republic in a destructive and dangerous possibility that could tip the balance of power in the Middle East, a region all three are heavily invested in.

ConclusionFor every state that classified as POSITIVE and NEUTRAL, their numerical scores

were consistent with the hypothesis given. Syria, Iran’s closest ally, scored the

highest with 9 while Russia and China held scores of 0, as their relations with Iran

remain pragmatic in nature, assisting the Islamic Republic when their interests are

directly benefitted and relative gains are increased. Israel, US, UK, and France all

shared NEGATIVE relations with Iran, each scoring -9 on their voting within the UN

against Iran. There were however, 2 “outliers” that did not fit the hypothesis

description. Germany’s POSITIVE economic relations were not reflected in their

voting records, as its NEUTRAL political ties placed them at a -9, a NEGATIVE

numerical classification. And Saudi Arabia’s NEGATIVE political and economic ties

with Iran were not supported by its +3 voting number.

As the examples of Germany and Saudi Arabia indicate, the hypothesis that

positive relations cause voting in favor of Iran and negative relations cause voting

against Iran is only partly valid. Looking back on the research and information

collected, the neorealist theoretical lens best explains that states interests and

relations are not completely demonstrated within an international governmental

institution like the United Nations Security and Human Rights Councils. Germany

and Saudi Arabia’s behavior provide nuance to the null hypothesis statement that

interstate relations do not have a direct connection on voting habits within the UN.

Despite the comprehensive deal being reached in early April 2015, many gaps

within the framework details remain. While Iran wants the removal of all sanctions

quickly after the deal is struck, the United States claims sanction relief will only

occur in stages if Iran maintains its complete compliance. The US also wants Iran to

30

allow its military bases to be under inspection, a request the Islamic Republic does

not find favorable. According to the New York Times2828, the terms for Iran include;

The ability to maintain its nuclear facilities under strict production limits,

with two facilities being solely devoted to research and without fissile

material

2/3 of Iran’s uranium enriching centrifuges are to be removed

Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium is decreased from 10,000 kilograms

to 300 kilograms for the next 15 years

Redesign of the Arak heavy-water reactor to prevent plutonium production

Compliance with IAEA and UN inspectors in Iran’s research facilities

By the end of June 2015, the major world powers of the P5+1 and Iran will decide on

a final multi-faceted deal that will alter the balance of power within the anarchic

international system.

Additional Works

"China–Iran Relations: Cautious Friendship with America’s Nemesis." China Report 49 (2013): 69-88. Sage. Web. 26 Feb. 2015. <http://chr.sagepub.com/content/49/1/69.full.pdf html>.

Creswell, John W. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003. Print.

Ferdinand, Peter. THE POSITIONS OF RUSSIA AND CHINA AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT CRISES. Issue brief. EU Parliament, 2013. Web. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433800/EXPO-SEDE_NT%282013%29433800_EN.pdf>

Gordon, Michael R., and David E. Sanger. "Iran Nuclear Negotiators, Facing Key Differences, Weigh Extending Deadline." The New York Times. The New York Times, 23 Nov. 2014. Web. 03 Dec. 2014.

2828 "The Iran Nuclear Deal: What You Need to Know." The New York Times. The New York Times, 03 Apr. 2015. Web. 17 Apr. 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/world/middleeast/the-iran-nuclear-deal-what-you-need-to-know.html>

31

Mearsheimer, John J. "A Realist Reply." International Security 20.1 (1995): 82. Web

Mingst, Karen A., and Margaret P. Karns. The United Nations in the 21st Century. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2007. Print

Mousavian, Seyed. "Why Geopolitical Shifts Dictate Nuclear Deal with Iran - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East." Al-Monitor. 1 Nov. 2014. Web. 1 Mar. 2015. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/iran-geopolitical-nuclear-deal.html

"Russia and Iran: A Balancing Act." The Diplomat. 1 Nov. 2013. Web. 1 Mar. 2015.<http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/russia-and-iran-a-balancing-act/?allpages=yes>

"Q&A: Iran Sanctions." BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Dec. 2014.

Ziabari, Kourosh, and John Mearsheimer. "Iran and US Should Work toward Reconciliation." Iran and US Should Work toward Reconciliation. Iran Review, Nov. 2012. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. <http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-and-US-should-Work-toward-Reconciliation.htm>

32