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Wikileaks Note: The full text of this cable is not available. S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 007378 SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2003 TERRORISM REPORT (U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert S. Deutsch; reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). -------- OVERVIEW -------- ¶1. (U) Combating terrorism has long been a priority for the Government of Turkey (GOT). In 2003, Turkey continued its strong support of the coalition in the global war against terror in Afghanistan by agreeing to extend its leadership of the International Security Force (ISAF) into 2003. On October 7, the Turkish Parliament authorized the GOT to contribute up to 10,000 troops to an Iraq stabilization force for up to a year, but conditions in Iraq prevented deployment in 2003. ¶2. (U) In separate November incidents in Istanbul, terrorists detonated truck bombs near two synagogues and, five days later, outside the British Consulate and a British-owned bank. Over 50 people were killed in the attacks, while over 700 were wounded. Turkish authorities quickly condemned the attacks, and police have arrested a

Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey

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8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey

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Wikileaks Note: The full text of this cable is not

available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 007378

SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2003 TERRORISM REPORT

(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert S.

Deutsch; reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

--------OVERVIEW 

--------

¶1. (U) Combating terrorism has long been a

priority for the Government of Turkey (GOT). In

2003, Turkey continued its strong support of the

coalition in the global war against terror in

Afghanistan by agreeing to extend its leadership of

the International Security Force (ISAF) into 2003.

On October 7, the Turkish Parliament authorized the

GOT to contribute up to 10,000 troops to an Iraq

stabilization force for up to a year, but

conditions in Iraq prevented deployment in 2003.

¶2. (U) In separate November incidents in Istanbul,terrorists detonated truck bombs near two

synagogues and, five days later, outside the

British Consulate and a British-owned bank. Over

50 people were killed in the attacks, while over

700 were wounded. Turkish authorities quickly

condemned the attacks, and police have arrested a

8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey

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number of suspects. Domestic and transnational

terrorist groups have targeted Turks and

foreigners, occasionally including USG personnel,

for over 40 years. International and domestic

terrorist groups operating in Turkey include

Marxist-Leninist, radical Islamist, separatist, andpro-Chechen groups. In response to these threats,

GOT has developed both strong determination and the

capability to fight terrorism. Turkey continues to

support the USG's international, coordinated

approach.

U.S. Designated Terrorist Organizations

¶3. (U) On October 8, 1997, the Secretary of State

named the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

and the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary People's

Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C, formerly known as

Revolutionary Left, Dev-Sol) terrorist organiza-

tions, making them subject to the Anti-terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. On

October 11, 2001, the Secretary of State renewed

those designations for another two years. (The PKK

changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and

Democracy Congress, or KADEK, and in November 2003

changed names again, becoming the Kurdistan

People's Congress, KHK. The USG quickly indicated

that the group will continue to be viewed as a

terrorist organization.)

Marxist-Leninist

¶4. (U) The main radical-left terror organization,

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DHKP-C, conducts small-scale operations against

Turks and foreigners alike (armed attacks on

uniformed police, suicide and other bombings,

assassinations). This organization increased

operations in the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF) and continues to organize itself predominant-ly within Europe. According to government

authorities, DHKP-C cooperates with other groups in

Europe by providing support, shelter, and arms to

them. Turkish authorities believe there has been a

resurgence in membership attributed to the left's

dissatisfaction with the current government, which

has Islamist roots. DHKP-C claimed responsibility

for a number of attacks against Turkish targets in2003, including an attempted suicide bombing of a

police bus in Ankara and two separate IED attacks

on Turkish government vehicles in Istanbul. In its

rhetoric, DHKP-C continues to attack U.S. foreign

policy, especially with regard to Iraq, and

credible reports suggest it continues to target

American interests.

¶5. (U) Other active far-left terrorist

organizations include the Turkish Communist

Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML), the Turkish

Workers' and Peasants Liberation Army (TIKKO), and

the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP).

TKP/ML and TIKKO primarily operate in the areas of

Ordu, Tokat, and Samsun. MLKP conducts small-scale

terrorist operations, usually using IEDs called"sound bombs," within metropolitan areas. MLKP has

conducted a low-level bombing campaign against

western businesses in all the major Turkish cities

in 2003. In each instance, a sound bomb was placed

on a doorstep or in the vicinity of a business in

the evening hours when injury to innocent

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bystanders was least likely. These sound bombs

result in minimal damage.

Radical Islamist

 

¶6. (U) The primary radical Islamist terror group

of Turkey is Turkish Hizbullah. Known to fight its

rivals, namely the PKK (and its successors) and

rival Islamic groups, Turkish Hizbullah has avoided

confrontations with authorities. Turkish Hizbullah

has not carried out any major operations in 2003

but, according to state authorities, continues tomaintain the capability to conduct operations.

Local press has speculated that Hizbullah may have

played a role in the November bombings in Istanbul.

¶7. (U) Other Islamic groups include the Great

Eastern Raider's Front (IBDA-C), Federal Islamic

State of Anatolia (Kaplancilar), Selam Group,

Islamic Movement Organization (IHO), the Jerusalem

Warriors, Selefiler, Sofular, and Beyyiat-I El-

Imam. Both IBDA-C and Beyyiat-I El-Imam are

sympathetic to Al Qaida. IBDA-C claimed to have

conducted the Istanbul bombings in November, but

Turkish authorities said publicly that the group

could not have conducted the operation without the

assistance of a larger organization such as Al

Qaida.

Separatist

¶8. (U) KHK, formerly known as the PKK and, later,

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KADEK, is the largest separatist organization in

Turkey. There are credible indications that the

group is organizing again to launch attacks against

the GOT in Turkey's western cities. KHK's

capability to operate has been drastically reduced

due to vigorous and on-going counter-insurgencyefforts of the Turkish Armed Forces, Jandarma,

Turkish National Police (TNP), and village guards

(a paramilitary guard force recruited from local

villagers). This effort ultimately led to the

arrest and conviction of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan

in 1999. The European Union (EU) designated the

PKK a terrorist organization in May 2002. In April

2002 the group changed its name and organization.Renamed the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy

Congress (KADEK), the organization expanded its

operations by focusing more on political

activities.

¶9. (U) In the summer of 2003, KADEK renounced its

self-proclaimed cease-fire and threatened to renew

its separatist struggle in both the Southeast and

Turkey's western cities. Turkish press

subsequently reported several incidents in the

Southeast in which Turkish security forces were

attacked by KADEK militants. As part of the GWOT,

the U.S. is committed to eliminating the threat to

Turkey posed by the PKK/KADEK in Iraq. In November

2003, KADEK changed its name to the Kurdistan

People,s Congress (KHK) and now claims to be anorganized political group advocating Kurdish

rights. According to Turkish government experts

and NGOs, KHK maintains approximately 500-armed

militants in Turkey and up to 5000 armed militants

in Northern Iraq.

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Chechens in Turkey

¶10. (U) Although Chechen terrorists did not

conduct any major operations in Turkey in 2003,they maintain the capability to do so, according to

Turkish officials. Large numbers of Turks, many

with roots in the Caucasus, are sympathetic to

Chechen ambitions. In April 2002, Mustafa Yilmaz,

a Turkish citizen of Chechen origin, seized the

Marmara Hotel in Istanbul and held 13 hostages for

approximately twenty minutes until he surrendered

without incident. This followed an April 22, 2001seizure of Istanbul's Swiss Hotel by 13 pro-Chechen

Turkish citizens who held 150 hostages, including

37 Americans, for approximately 12 hours.

¶11. (U) The capitalized titles below correspond to

reftel questions.

---------------------------------------------------

GOT ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST

TERRORISM (A)

---------------------------------------------------

¶12. (U) Turkey remained a strong and active

contributor to the Global War on Terrorism effort.Turkey agreed to extend its leadership of the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

beyond December 2002 (when its six-month term what

set to end) to February 2003. Turkey also

contributed forces to ISAF III under the leadership

of the Germans/Dutch and to ISAF IV under the

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leadership of NATO.

¶13. (U) Although it denied permission for U.S.

troops to deploy to Iraq at the onset of Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from Turkey, Turkey providedsubstantial assistance to OIF, allowing overflight

by U.S. aircraft bound for Iraq and supporting

ground lines of communication (GLOC) through Turkey

for supply and re-supply of U.S. forces in Iraq.

The Turks permitted the transport to Iraq of

humanitarian goods, contributed humanitarian goods

and services and sold vital material such as fuel,

food and water to U.S. forces in Iraq. Turkey alsosold electricity to Iraq. The Turks offered to

provide training to Iraqis, including Iraqi police

and customs officials, and to provide personnel to

CPA and a number of other goods and services

related to Iraqi reconstruction. Turkey pledged

USD 50 million at the Madrid Conference. In

October 2003, the Turkish Parliament approved a

motion granting the GOT permission to deploy

Turkish force in Iraq as part of a Stabilization

Force for OIF. In November 2003, the GOT, in

consultation with the USG, decided not to deploy

troops.

¶14. (U) Turkey continues to counter Al-Qaida

activity in Turkey. In 2003, Turkish authorities

apprehended several senior-level Al Qaidaoperatives. Turkish officials speculated in the

press that arresting the high-ranking Al Qaida

members may have prompted the November bombings in

Istanbul.

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¶15. (SBU) In compliance with UN Security

Resolution 1373, Turkey has ratified all United

Nations conventions on combating terrorism.

However, Turkey has acted (by Council of Ministers

decrees) to freeze the assets only of those

terrorist organizations, persons, and entitiesdesignated pursuant to UN Security Council

resolution 1267 (relating to Taliban and Al-Qaida),

because Turkish law does not currently permit it to

freeze the assets of other such organizations,

persons, and entities. The initial decree, No.

2001/3483, dated December 22, 2001, has been

updated by decree Nos. 2002/3873, dated March 21,

2002, 2002/4206, dated May 16, 2002, 2002/4896,dated October 1, 2002, and 2002/5426, dated March

28, 2003. Turkey needs to pass laws that will: 1)

explicitly criminalize the financing of terrorism;

2) resolve jurisdictional disputes between courts;

3) make it easier to seize terrorists, assets; 4)

improve functioning of MASAK (the Turkish financial

intelligence analysis unit); and 5) strengthen the

Suspicious Transaction reporting regime. Turkey is

drafting legislation that Turkish officials say

will meet these needs, and has requested U.S. and

EU assistance in drafting and implementation. The

U.S. has initiated such assistance, and the EU

plans to do so beginning in early 2004.

¶16. (U) Turkish efforts to seize the assets of

those who fund terrorist organizations have beenfurther hampered by insufficient training and

limited cooperation between agencies. The U.S. and

EU assistance referenced above is intended as well

to address these deficiencies. The success of

these efforts will in large part be dependent

political support from top levels of the GOT.

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-----------------------------------

RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (B)

-----------------------------------

¶17. (U) State Security Courts (DGM) in eight

provinces, with jurisdiction for all crimes that

fall within the purview of the Anti-Terror Law,

take a vigorous approach towards prosecuting

terror-related crimes. Approximately 5,500 cases

came before the State Security Courts in 2003,

although not all were related to terrorism.Average trial times run more than a year, and

defendants are usually incarcerated during

their trials.

-----------------------------------------

EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (C/D)

-----------------------------------------

¶18. (U) In 2003, the Republic of Turkey did not

seek the extradition of any suspects from the

United States on terror-related charges, nor did

the United States seek the extradition of such

suspects from Turkey. There are no impediments to

host government prosecution and/or extradition of

suspected terrorists.

¶19. (U) In the past, Turkey has faced difficulty

in extraditing terror-related suspects from

European countries. According to government

officials, Turkey has requested the extradition of

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245 high level administrators of terrorist

organizations since 1991. Sympathy with Kurdish

political and cultural aspirations in some European

states, allegations of torture by Turkish

officials, and Turkey's legal provision for the

death penalty have all proved impediments to suchextraditions. However, in August 2002, as a part

of the European Union reform package, the Turkish

Parliament passed a law banning the use of the

death penalty.

------------------------------------

RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (E)------------------------------------

¶20. (U) Turks see themselves to be among the

world's primary victims of terrorism. They cite

the 15-year insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers'

Party (PKK), and the worldwide assassination

campaign against the Turkish diplomats and their

families by Armenian activists of the 1970s and

1980s. They have long complained about European

countries' harboring Kurdish (PKK), leftist (DHKP-

C) and Islamist (Hizbullah, Kaplanists) terrorists.

The Turkish government and media were quick to

respond to the events of September 11. At all

levels, there was an outpouring of sympathy and

solidarity. There was widespread public sentiment

that now others were beginning to experience whatTurks had lived with for years. Turkey's pre-9/11

historic cooperation with the U.S. in law

enforcement, military and intelligence activities

has increased over the last two years. There has

been visible support for the security of Americans

at our mission's buildings by local police.

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¶21. (U) The Turkish stand on terrorism has been

somewhat softer in the case of the Chechens. There

are cultural and religious ties between Turks and

Chechens, and both have had a long-time rivalrywith Russia. The media treated the takeovers of a

ferryboat in 1999 and a hotel in 2001 in Istanbul

more like protests than terrorist attacks.

¶22. (U) The leftist and Islamic fringe press

sometimes portrays Chechen rebels, Palestinian

suicide bombers and even Al Qaida members as"freedom fighters." Terrorism has long been an

interest of academics and writers in Turkey. In

recent years there have been several conferences on

the topic. Those organized by institutions of the

State have been seen as tools in the fight against

terrorism. Privately funded academic programs have

focused more on analyzing the impact of terrorism

and the root causes of terrorism.

---------------------------------------------

 MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE GOT (F)

---------------------------------------------

¶23. (U) The Government of Turkey continued its

aggressive counterterrorism efforts in 2003. Inaddition to sharing intelligence information on

various groups operating in Turkey, the Turkish

National Police and the National Intelligence

Organization (MIT) conducted an aggressive

counterterrorist campaign and detained numerous

suspected terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting

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these groups before terrorist acts could be carried

out. In 2003 the GOT took into custody a number of

high-level Al Qaida operatives.

¶24. (U) The GOT continues its active suppressionof the PKK/KADEK/KHK, though its security

operations tempo has been significantly reduced in

line with a reduction in the conflict. It

continues to monitor the organization's political

movements in an effort to stem any potential

disturbances.

------------------------------------

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (G)

------------------------------------

¶25. (U) The GOT consistently and strongly opposes

both domestic and international terrorism. Turkey

does not view its maintenance of diplomatic or

economic/commercial relations with Cuba, Iran,

Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria as constituting

support for international terrorism.

----------------------------------------------

SUPPORT STATEMENTS FOR TERRORIST COUNTRIES (H)

----------------------------------------------

¶26. (U) Turkey shares borders with, and has been

an historic trading partner of Syria, Iran and

Iraq. It balances a condemnation of terrorist

activities in those countries (including providing

havens for the PKK) with the need to access

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historic trade routes. Public statements against

state-supported terrorism are clear.

--------------------------------------------------

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TERRORISM (I)

--------------------------------------------------

¶27. (U) Since the attacks of September 11, the GOT

has taken an active role in the worldwide

opposition against terrorism. In May 2002 the

European Union placed the PKK and DHKP/C on itslist of terrorist groups after an intensive push by

the GOT for the EU to adopt tougher measures

against Turkish terror groups operating in Europe.

Despite Turkish pressure, the EU never placed KADEK

on its list of terrorist organizations. Turkish

officials will now press the international

community to recognize the PKK/KADEK successor

group, KHK, as a terrorist organization.

-------------------------------------------------

USG COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH

GOT (J)

-------------------------------------------------

¶28. (U) Turkey remains a staunch ally in the Waron Terrorism. The Turkish National Police (TNP)

continues to provide excellent protection of U.S.

diplomatic and military facilities throughout

Turkey.

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¶29. (U) In September and October 2003, USG

officials met with interagency Turkish teams to

work out a joint action plan to eliminate the

threat posed by the PKK/KADEK/KHK presence in

northern Iraq. Turkey agreed to consider an

information campaign to ensure that the terms ofits "Reintegration Law" and the conditions to which

Turkish refugees in Iraq and PKK/KADEK/KHK

operatives surrendering under the law would return

were well known in northern Iraq. The U.S. pledged

to use all the elements of statecraft in

eliminating the PKK/KADEK/KHK threat. S/CT

Coordinator Cofer Black announced that the

terrorist group had no future in northern Iraq. Togenerate momentum for returns to Turkey, the USG

worked with the Turks and UNHCR in November to

accelerate the voluntary repatriation of Turkish

refugees in northern Iraq. Assistant Secretary of

State for Population, Refugees, and Migration

SIPDIS Dewey met with Turkish and UNHCR reps in

Ankara in late November to move this process

forward.

¶30. (U) As noted above, Turkey is now in the

process of modifying its domestic laws to comply

with the UN Convention on Suppression of Terrorist

Financing, which the GOT adopted in 2002.

¶31. (U) Turkey is also an active participant inthe Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.

Since 2001, the Turks have participated in 20 ATA

courses, including Financial Underpinnings of

Terrorism Seminar and a follow-on Financial Under-

pinnings of Terrorism Seminar for investigators.

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(Information for the Report's classified annex) 

¶32. (S) The Turkish Government continued to allow

the use of Incirlik AFB to support U.S. operationsin and out of Afghanistan and Iraq, including:

- Allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base as a

key transit point for humanitarian assistance

for Afghanistan and Iraq;

- Authorized the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base

to transit Taliban and Al-Qaida detainees from

Afghanistan to GTMO;

- Allowed the U.S. military to station tankers

at Incirlik Air Base to support OIF- and OEF-

related refueling missions;

- Contributed KC-135 tankers to support OEF-

related operations;

- As a result of S/CT Coordinator Black,s

enhanced intelligence sharing regarding

PKK/KADEK/KHK as part of the joint action plan

to eliminate the PKK/KADEK/KHK threat fromNorthern Iraq.

-------------------------------------------

COOPERATION-INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION (K/1)

-------------------------------------------

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(Information for the Report's Classified Annex) 

¶33. (C) The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty betweenthe United States and Turkey, which entered into

force in January 1981, governs investigative

cooperation. The GOT has processed requests for

investigative access to evidence under this treaty.

However, in some cases the GOT has left requests

unanswered for over three years.

----------------------------

COOPERATION-PREVENTION (K/2)

----------------------------

¶34. (U) The GOT coordinates closely with the USG

on anti-terrorist financing initiatives. In

response to USG requests to freeze terrorist-

related financial assets, the GOT has added to its

domestic asset freeze list all names of individuals

and firms designated under UNSCR 1267 (names

related to financing of Taliban and al-Qaida). The

GOT also investigates these names and freezes

assets found in Turkey.

-------------------------------------------------COOPERATION DURING PAST FIVE YEARS-PREVENTION (L)

-------------------------------------------------

¶35. (U) Overall, in the last five years, the GOT

has worked closely with the USG in the

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apprehension, conviction, and punishment of those

responsible for terrorist attacks in Turkey. GOT

response is always immediate and substantial when

alerted to threat or incident involving US

interests.

DEUTSCH

(Edited and reformatted by Andres for ease of 

reading.)