Upload
andres
View
217
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 1/17
Wikileaks Note: The full text of this cable is not
available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 007378
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2003 TERRORISM REPORT
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert S.
Deutsch; reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
--------OVERVIEW
--------
¶1. (U) Combating terrorism has long been a
priority for the Government of Turkey (GOT). In
2003, Turkey continued its strong support of the
coalition in the global war against terror in
Afghanistan by agreeing to extend its leadership of
the International Security Force (ISAF) into 2003.
On October 7, the Turkish Parliament authorized the
GOT to contribute up to 10,000 troops to an Iraq
stabilization force for up to a year, but
conditions in Iraq prevented deployment in 2003.
¶2. (U) In separate November incidents in Istanbul,terrorists detonated truck bombs near two
synagogues and, five days later, outside the
British Consulate and a British-owned bank. Over
50 people were killed in the attacks, while over
700 were wounded. Turkish authorities quickly
condemned the attacks, and police have arrested a
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 2/17
number of suspects. Domestic and transnational
terrorist groups have targeted Turks and
foreigners, occasionally including USG personnel,
for over 40 years. International and domestic
terrorist groups operating in Turkey include
Marxist-Leninist, radical Islamist, separatist, andpro-Chechen groups. In response to these threats,
GOT has developed both strong determination and the
capability to fight terrorism. Turkey continues to
support the USG's international, coordinated
approach.
U.S. Designated Terrorist Organizations
¶3. (U) On October 8, 1997, the Secretary of State
named the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
and the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary People's
Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C, formerly known as
Revolutionary Left, Dev-Sol) terrorist organiza-
tions, making them subject to the Anti-terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. On
October 11, 2001, the Secretary of State renewed
those designations for another two years. (The PKK
changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and
Democracy Congress, or KADEK, and in November 2003
changed names again, becoming the Kurdistan
People's Congress, KHK. The USG quickly indicated
that the group will continue to be viewed as a
terrorist organization.)
Marxist-Leninist
¶4. (U) The main radical-left terror organization,
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 3/17
DHKP-C, conducts small-scale operations against
Turks and foreigners alike (armed attacks on
uniformed police, suicide and other bombings,
assassinations). This organization increased
operations in the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) and continues to organize itself predominant-ly within Europe. According to government
authorities, DHKP-C cooperates with other groups in
Europe by providing support, shelter, and arms to
them. Turkish authorities believe there has been a
resurgence in membership attributed to the left's
dissatisfaction with the current government, which
has Islamist roots. DHKP-C claimed responsibility
for a number of attacks against Turkish targets in2003, including an attempted suicide bombing of a
police bus in Ankara and two separate IED attacks
on Turkish government vehicles in Istanbul. In its
rhetoric, DHKP-C continues to attack U.S. foreign
policy, especially with regard to Iraq, and
credible reports suggest it continues to target
American interests.
¶5. (U) Other active far-left terrorist
organizations include the Turkish Communist
Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML), the Turkish
Workers' and Peasants Liberation Army (TIKKO), and
the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP).
TKP/ML and TIKKO primarily operate in the areas of
Ordu, Tokat, and Samsun. MLKP conducts small-scale
terrorist operations, usually using IEDs called"sound bombs," within metropolitan areas. MLKP has
conducted a low-level bombing campaign against
western businesses in all the major Turkish cities
in 2003. In each instance, a sound bomb was placed
on a doorstep or in the vicinity of a business in
the evening hours when injury to innocent
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 4/17
bystanders was least likely. These sound bombs
result in minimal damage.
Radical Islamist
¶6. (U) The primary radical Islamist terror group
of Turkey is Turkish Hizbullah. Known to fight its
rivals, namely the PKK (and its successors) and
rival Islamic groups, Turkish Hizbullah has avoided
confrontations with authorities. Turkish Hizbullah
has not carried out any major operations in 2003
but, according to state authorities, continues tomaintain the capability to conduct operations.
Local press has speculated that Hizbullah may have
played a role in the November bombings in Istanbul.
¶7. (U) Other Islamic groups include the Great
Eastern Raider's Front (IBDA-C), Federal Islamic
State of Anatolia (Kaplancilar), Selam Group,
Islamic Movement Organization (IHO), the Jerusalem
Warriors, Selefiler, Sofular, and Beyyiat-I El-
Imam. Both IBDA-C and Beyyiat-I El-Imam are
sympathetic to Al Qaida. IBDA-C claimed to have
conducted the Istanbul bombings in November, but
Turkish authorities said publicly that the group
could not have conducted the operation without the
assistance of a larger organization such as Al
Qaida.
Separatist
¶8. (U) KHK, formerly known as the PKK and, later,
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 5/17
KADEK, is the largest separatist organization in
Turkey. There are credible indications that the
group is organizing again to launch attacks against
the GOT in Turkey's western cities. KHK's
capability to operate has been drastically reduced
due to vigorous and on-going counter-insurgencyefforts of the Turkish Armed Forces, Jandarma,
Turkish National Police (TNP), and village guards
(a paramilitary guard force recruited from local
villagers). This effort ultimately led to the
arrest and conviction of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan
in 1999. The European Union (EU) designated the
PKK a terrorist organization in May 2002. In April
2002 the group changed its name and organization.Renamed the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy
Congress (KADEK), the organization expanded its
operations by focusing more on political
activities.
¶9. (U) In the summer of 2003, KADEK renounced its
self-proclaimed cease-fire and threatened to renew
its separatist struggle in both the Southeast and
Turkey's western cities. Turkish press
subsequently reported several incidents in the
Southeast in which Turkish security forces were
attacked by KADEK militants. As part of the GWOT,
the U.S. is committed to eliminating the threat to
Turkey posed by the PKK/KADEK in Iraq. In November
2003, KADEK changed its name to the Kurdistan
People,s Congress (KHK) and now claims to be anorganized political group advocating Kurdish
rights. According to Turkish government experts
and NGOs, KHK maintains approximately 500-armed
militants in Turkey and up to 5000 armed militants
in Northern Iraq.
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 6/17
Chechens in Turkey
¶10. (U) Although Chechen terrorists did not
conduct any major operations in Turkey in 2003,they maintain the capability to do so, according to
Turkish officials. Large numbers of Turks, many
with roots in the Caucasus, are sympathetic to
Chechen ambitions. In April 2002, Mustafa Yilmaz,
a Turkish citizen of Chechen origin, seized the
Marmara Hotel in Istanbul and held 13 hostages for
approximately twenty minutes until he surrendered
without incident. This followed an April 22, 2001seizure of Istanbul's Swiss Hotel by 13 pro-Chechen
Turkish citizens who held 150 hostages, including
37 Americans, for approximately 12 hours.
¶11. (U) The capitalized titles below correspond to
reftel questions.
---------------------------------------------------
GOT ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST
TERRORISM (A)
---------------------------------------------------
¶12. (U) Turkey remained a strong and active
contributor to the Global War on Terrorism effort.Turkey agreed to extend its leadership of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
beyond December 2002 (when its six-month term what
set to end) to February 2003. Turkey also
contributed forces to ISAF III under the leadership
of the Germans/Dutch and to ISAF IV under the
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 7/17
leadership of NATO.
¶13. (U) Although it denied permission for U.S.
troops to deploy to Iraq at the onset of Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from Turkey, Turkey providedsubstantial assistance to OIF, allowing overflight
by U.S. aircraft bound for Iraq and supporting
ground lines of communication (GLOC) through Turkey
for supply and re-supply of U.S. forces in Iraq.
The Turks permitted the transport to Iraq of
humanitarian goods, contributed humanitarian goods
and services and sold vital material such as fuel,
food and water to U.S. forces in Iraq. Turkey alsosold electricity to Iraq. The Turks offered to
provide training to Iraqis, including Iraqi police
and customs officials, and to provide personnel to
CPA and a number of other goods and services
related to Iraqi reconstruction. Turkey pledged
USD 50 million at the Madrid Conference. In
October 2003, the Turkish Parliament approved a
motion granting the GOT permission to deploy
Turkish force in Iraq as part of a Stabilization
Force for OIF. In November 2003, the GOT, in
consultation with the USG, decided not to deploy
troops.
¶14. (U) Turkey continues to counter Al-Qaida
activity in Turkey. In 2003, Turkish authorities
apprehended several senior-level Al Qaidaoperatives. Turkish officials speculated in the
press that arresting the high-ranking Al Qaida
members may have prompted the November bombings in
Istanbul.
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 8/17
¶15. (SBU) In compliance with UN Security
Resolution 1373, Turkey has ratified all United
Nations conventions on combating terrorism.
However, Turkey has acted (by Council of Ministers
decrees) to freeze the assets only of those
terrorist organizations, persons, and entitiesdesignated pursuant to UN Security Council
resolution 1267 (relating to Taliban and Al-Qaida),
because Turkish law does not currently permit it to
freeze the assets of other such organizations,
persons, and entities. The initial decree, No.
2001/3483, dated December 22, 2001, has been
updated by decree Nos. 2002/3873, dated March 21,
2002, 2002/4206, dated May 16, 2002, 2002/4896,dated October 1, 2002, and 2002/5426, dated March
28, 2003. Turkey needs to pass laws that will: 1)
explicitly criminalize the financing of terrorism;
2) resolve jurisdictional disputes between courts;
3) make it easier to seize terrorists, assets; 4)
improve functioning of MASAK (the Turkish financial
intelligence analysis unit); and 5) strengthen the
Suspicious Transaction reporting regime. Turkey is
drafting legislation that Turkish officials say
will meet these needs, and has requested U.S. and
EU assistance in drafting and implementation. The
U.S. has initiated such assistance, and the EU
plans to do so beginning in early 2004.
¶16. (U) Turkish efforts to seize the assets of
those who fund terrorist organizations have beenfurther hampered by insufficient training and
limited cooperation between agencies. The U.S. and
EU assistance referenced above is intended as well
to address these deficiencies. The success of
these efforts will in large part be dependent
political support from top levels of the GOT.
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 9/17
-----------------------------------
RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (B)
-----------------------------------
¶17. (U) State Security Courts (DGM) in eight
provinces, with jurisdiction for all crimes that
fall within the purview of the Anti-Terror Law,
take a vigorous approach towards prosecuting
terror-related crimes. Approximately 5,500 cases
came before the State Security Courts in 2003,
although not all were related to terrorism.Average trial times run more than a year, and
defendants are usually incarcerated during
their trials.
-----------------------------------------
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (C/D)
-----------------------------------------
¶18. (U) In 2003, the Republic of Turkey did not
seek the extradition of any suspects from the
United States on terror-related charges, nor did
the United States seek the extradition of such
suspects from Turkey. There are no impediments to
host government prosecution and/or extradition of
suspected terrorists.
¶19. (U) In the past, Turkey has faced difficulty
in extraditing terror-related suspects from
European countries. According to government
officials, Turkey has requested the extradition of
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 10/17
245 high level administrators of terrorist
organizations since 1991. Sympathy with Kurdish
political and cultural aspirations in some European
states, allegations of torture by Turkish
officials, and Turkey's legal provision for the
death penalty have all proved impediments to suchextraditions. However, in August 2002, as a part
of the European Union reform package, the Turkish
Parliament passed a law banning the use of the
death penalty.
------------------------------------
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (E)------------------------------------
¶20. (U) Turks see themselves to be among the
world's primary victims of terrorism. They cite
the 15-year insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK), and the worldwide assassination
campaign against the Turkish diplomats and their
families by Armenian activists of the 1970s and
1980s. They have long complained about European
countries' harboring Kurdish (PKK), leftist (DHKP-
C) and Islamist (Hizbullah, Kaplanists) terrorists.
The Turkish government and media were quick to
respond to the events of September 11. At all
levels, there was an outpouring of sympathy and
solidarity. There was widespread public sentiment
that now others were beginning to experience whatTurks had lived with for years. Turkey's pre-9/11
historic cooperation with the U.S. in law
enforcement, military and intelligence activities
has increased over the last two years. There has
been visible support for the security of Americans
at our mission's buildings by local police.
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 11/17
¶21. (U) The Turkish stand on terrorism has been
somewhat softer in the case of the Chechens. There
are cultural and religious ties between Turks and
Chechens, and both have had a long-time rivalrywith Russia. The media treated the takeovers of a
ferryboat in 1999 and a hotel in 2001 in Istanbul
more like protests than terrorist attacks.
¶22. (U) The leftist and Islamic fringe press
sometimes portrays Chechen rebels, Palestinian
suicide bombers and even Al Qaida members as"freedom fighters." Terrorism has long been an
interest of academics and writers in Turkey. In
recent years there have been several conferences on
the topic. Those organized by institutions of the
State have been seen as tools in the fight against
terrorism. Privately funded academic programs have
focused more on analyzing the impact of terrorism
and the root causes of terrorism.
---------------------------------------------
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE GOT (F)
---------------------------------------------
¶23. (U) The Government of Turkey continued its
aggressive counterterrorism efforts in 2003. Inaddition to sharing intelligence information on
various groups operating in Turkey, the Turkish
National Police and the National Intelligence
Organization (MIT) conducted an aggressive
counterterrorist campaign and detained numerous
suspected terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 12/17
these groups before terrorist acts could be carried
out. In 2003 the GOT took into custody a number of
high-level Al Qaida operatives.
¶24. (U) The GOT continues its active suppressionof the PKK/KADEK/KHK, though its security
operations tempo has been significantly reduced in
line with a reduction in the conflict. It
continues to monitor the organization's political
movements in an effort to stem any potential
disturbances.
------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (G)
------------------------------------
¶25. (U) The GOT consistently and strongly opposes
both domestic and international terrorism. Turkey
does not view its maintenance of diplomatic or
economic/commercial relations with Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria as constituting
support for international terrorism.
----------------------------------------------
SUPPORT STATEMENTS FOR TERRORIST COUNTRIES (H)
----------------------------------------------
¶26. (U) Turkey shares borders with, and has been
an historic trading partner of Syria, Iran and
Iraq. It balances a condemnation of terrorist
activities in those countries (including providing
havens for the PKK) with the need to access
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 13/17
historic trade routes. Public statements against
state-supported terrorism are clear.
--------------------------------------------------
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TERRORISM (I)
--------------------------------------------------
¶27. (U) Since the attacks of September 11, the GOT
has taken an active role in the worldwide
opposition against terrorism. In May 2002 the
European Union placed the PKK and DHKP/C on itslist of terrorist groups after an intensive push by
the GOT for the EU to adopt tougher measures
against Turkish terror groups operating in Europe.
Despite Turkish pressure, the EU never placed KADEK
on its list of terrorist organizations. Turkish
officials will now press the international
community to recognize the PKK/KADEK successor
group, KHK, as a terrorist organization.
-------------------------------------------------
USG COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH
GOT (J)
-------------------------------------------------
¶28. (U) Turkey remains a staunch ally in the Waron Terrorism. The Turkish National Police (TNP)
continues to provide excellent protection of U.S.
diplomatic and military facilities throughout
Turkey.
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 14/17
¶29. (U) In September and October 2003, USG
officials met with interagency Turkish teams to
work out a joint action plan to eliminate the
threat posed by the PKK/KADEK/KHK presence in
northern Iraq. Turkey agreed to consider an
information campaign to ensure that the terms ofits "Reintegration Law" and the conditions to which
Turkish refugees in Iraq and PKK/KADEK/KHK
operatives surrendering under the law would return
were well known in northern Iraq. The U.S. pledged
to use all the elements of statecraft in
eliminating the PKK/KADEK/KHK threat. S/CT
Coordinator Cofer Black announced that the
terrorist group had no future in northern Iraq. Togenerate momentum for returns to Turkey, the USG
worked with the Turks and UNHCR in November to
accelerate the voluntary repatriation of Turkish
refugees in northern Iraq. Assistant Secretary of
State for Population, Refugees, and Migration
SIPDIS Dewey met with Turkish and UNHCR reps in
Ankara in late November to move this process
forward.
¶30. (U) As noted above, Turkey is now in the
process of modifying its domestic laws to comply
with the UN Convention on Suppression of Terrorist
Financing, which the GOT adopted in 2002.
¶31. (U) Turkey is also an active participant inthe Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.
Since 2001, the Turks have participated in 20 ATA
courses, including Financial Underpinnings of
Terrorism Seminar and a follow-on Financial Under-
pinnings of Terrorism Seminar for investigators.
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 15/17
(Information for the Report's classified annex)
¶32. (S) The Turkish Government continued to allow
the use of Incirlik AFB to support U.S. operationsin and out of Afghanistan and Iraq, including:
- Allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base as a
key transit point for humanitarian assistance
for Afghanistan and Iraq;
- Authorized the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base
to transit Taliban and Al-Qaida detainees from
Afghanistan to GTMO;
- Allowed the U.S. military to station tankers
at Incirlik Air Base to support OIF- and OEF-
related refueling missions;
- Contributed KC-135 tankers to support OEF-
related operations;
- As a result of S/CT Coordinator Black,s
enhanced intelligence sharing regarding
PKK/KADEK/KHK as part of the joint action plan
to eliminate the PKK/KADEK/KHK threat fromNorthern Iraq.
-------------------------------------------
COOPERATION-INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION (K/1)
-------------------------------------------
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 16/17
(Information for the Report's Classified Annex)
¶33. (C) The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty betweenthe United States and Turkey, which entered into
force in January 1981, governs investigative
cooperation. The GOT has processed requests for
investigative access to evidence under this treaty.
However, in some cases the GOT has left requests
unanswered for over three years.
----------------------------
COOPERATION-PREVENTION (K/2)
----------------------------
¶34. (U) The GOT coordinates closely with the USG
on anti-terrorist financing initiatives. In
response to USG requests to freeze terrorist-
related financial assets, the GOT has added to its
domestic asset freeze list all names of individuals
and firms designated under UNSCR 1267 (names
related to financing of Taliban and al-Qaida). The
GOT also investigates these names and freezes
assets found in Turkey.
-------------------------------------------------COOPERATION DURING PAST FIVE YEARS-PREVENTION (L)
-------------------------------------------------
¶35. (U) Overall, in the last five years, the GOT
has worked closely with the USG in the
8/6/2019 Cable 441: 2003 US Embassy Report on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Turkey
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cable-441-2003-us-embassy-report-on-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-turkey 17/17
apprehension, conviction, and punishment of those
responsible for terrorist attacks in Turkey. GOT
response is always immediate and substantial when
alerted to threat or incident involving US
interests.
DEUTSCH
(Edited and reformatted by Andres for ease of
reading.)