Burglary of Retail Establishments - ASU Center for Problem ...€¦ · Burglary of Retail Establishments Ronald V. Clarke This project was supported by cooperative agreement #99-CK-WX-K004

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Community Oriented Policing Services

www.cops.usdoj.gov

Burg lary ofReta i lEstab l i shments

byRonald V. Clarke

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police SeriesNo. 15

Burglary of RetailEstablishments

Ronald V. Clarke

This project was supported by cooperative agreement #99-CK-WX-K004 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S.Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of theU.S. Department of Justice.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police SeriesGuide No. 15

iAbout the Guide Series

About the Guide Series

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police summarize knowledgeabout how police can reduce the harm caused by specificcrime and disorder problems. They are guides toprevention and to improving the overall response toincidents, not to investigating offenses or handling specificincidents. The guides are written for police–of whateverrank or assignment–who must address the specificproblem the guides cover. The guides will be most usefulto officers who

• Understand basic problem-oriented policing principlesand methods. The guides are not primers in problem-oriented policing. They deal only briefly with the initialdecision to focus on a particular problem, methods toanalyze the problem, and means to assess the results ofa problem-oriented policing project. They are designedto help police decide how best to analyze and address aproblem they have already identified. (An assessmentguide has been produced as a companion to this seriesand the COPS Office has also published an introductoryguide to problem analysis. For those who want to learnmore about the principles and methods of problem-oriented policing, the assessment and analysis guides,along with other recommended readings, are listed at theback of this guide.)

• Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on thecomplexity of the problem, you should be prepared tospend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing andresponding to it. Carefully studying a problem beforeresponding helps you design the right strategy, one thatis most likely to work in your community. You shouldnot blindly adopt the responses others have used; youmust decide whether they are appropriate to your local

ii Burglary of Retail Establishments

situation. What is true in one place may not be trueelsewhere; what works in one place may not workeverywhere.

• Are willing to consider new ways of doing policebusiness. The guides describe responses that other policedepartments have used or that researchers have tested.While not all of these responses will be appropriate toyour particular problem, they should help give a broaderview of the kinds of things you could do. You maythink you cannot implement some of these responses inyour jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places,when police have discovered a more effective response,they have succeeded in having laws and policies changed,improving the response to the problem.

• Understand the value and the limits of research knowledge.For some types of problems, a lot of useful research isavailable to the police; for other problems, little is available.Accordingly, some guides in this series summarize existingresearch whereas other guides illustrate the need for moreresearch on that particular problem. Regardless, researchhas not provided definitive answers to all the questions youmight have about the problem. The research may help getyou started in designing your own responses, but it cannottell you exactly what to do. This will depend greatly on theparticular nature of your local problem. In the interest ofkeeping the guides readable, not every piece of relevantresearch has been cited, nor has every point been attributedto its sources. To have done so would have overwhelmedand distracted the reader. The references listed at the end ofeach guide are those drawn on most heavily; they are not acomplete bibliography of research on the subject.

iiiAbout the Guide Series

• Are willing to work with other community agencies tofind effective solutions to the problem. The police alonecannot implement many of the responses discussed inthe guides. They must frequently implement them inpartnership with other responsible private and publicentities. An effective problem-solver must know how toforge genuine partnerships with others and be preparedto invest considerable effort in making thesepartnerships work.

These guides have drawn on research findings and policepractices in the United States, the United Kingdom,Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, andScandinavia. Even though laws, customs and policepractices vary from country to country, it is apparent thatthe police everywhere experience common problems. In aworld that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it isimportant that police be aware of research and successfulpractices beyond the borders of their own countries.

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you toprovide feedback on this guide and to report on your ownagency's experiences dealing with a similar problem. Youragency may have effectively addressed a problem usingresponses not considered in these guides and yourexperiences and knowledge could benefit others. Thisinformation will be used to update the guides. If you wishto provide feedback and share your experiences it shouldbe sent via e-mail to [email protected].

vAcknowledgments

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series is very much acollaborative effort. While each guide has a primaryauthor, other project team members, COPS Office staffand anonymous peer reviewers contributed to each guideby proposing text, recommending research and offeringsuggestions on matters of format and style.

The principal project team developing the guide seriescomprised Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus,University of Wisconsin Law School; Ronald V. Clarke,professor of criminal justice, Rutgers University; John E.Eck, associate professor of criminal justice, University ofCincinnati; Michael S. Scott, police consultant, Savannah,Ga.; Rana Sampson, police consultant, San Diego; andDeborah Lamm Weisel, director of police research, NorthCarolina State University.

Karin Schmerler, Rita Varano and Nancy Leach oversawthe project for the COPS Office. Megan Tate Murphycoordinated the peer reviews for the COPS Office.Suzanne Fregly edited the guides. Research for the guideswas conducted at the Criminal Justice Library at RutgersUniversity under the direction of Phyllis Schultze byGisela Bichler-Robertson, Rob Guerette and LauraWyckoff.

The project team also wishes to acknowledge the membersof the San Diego, National City and Savannah policedepartments who provided feedback on the guides' formatand style in the early stages of the project, as well as theline police officers, police executives and researchers whopeer reviewed each guide.

ContentsAbout the Guide Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

The Problem of Burglary of Retail Establishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Related Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Factors Contributing to Burglary of Retail Establishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Premises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Goods Sold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Length of Time in Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Security Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Understanding Your Local Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Locations/Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Measuring Your Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Retail Establishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Police Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Retailer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22City Planning Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Burglary of Retail Establishments . . . . . . . . . 29

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

viiContents

viii Burglary of Retail Establishments

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Other Guides in This Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

1The Problem of Burglary of Retail Establishments

The Problem of Burglary of RetailEstablishments

Retail burglaries are a problem for many communities. ABritish survey found that stores lose as much to burglarsas they do to shoplifters. These losses impact the viabilityof businesses and, consequently, of the communitiesaround them. Although much research has been conductedon burglary in general, little of it has specifically focusedon retail burglaries–break-ins at stores to steal cash orgoods.† However, the research that has been done pointsto a number of effective responses to the problem. Thisguide reviews what is known about retail burglaries,suggests ways to analyze them in your jurisdiction, andprovides guidance as to appropriate responses.

The businesses covered in the guide include shops indowntown areas, in strip malls, in covered malls (or“shopping precincts,” as they are known in the UnitedKingdom), and in retail parks. They also include stand-alone superstores, neighborhood stores and rural stores, aswell as restaurants, beauty parlors and off-track bettingestablishments. Not covered are wholesale warehouses orretail outlets in industrial parks.

Related Problems

The problem of retail burglaries needs to be distinguishedfrom those of (1) other retail thefts and (2) othercommercial burglaries. These problems, which should beaddressed separately, include:

• robberies of retail establishments;• shoplifting;

† This guide also covers smash-and-grabs and so-called "ram raids."Smash-and-grabbers rely on theelement of surprise to break displaywindows or showcases and escapebefore the alarm sounds. Ramraiders use stolen vehicles to smashtheir way into buildings, usually afterhours. They grab what they wantand make a quick escape, often inanother vehicle.

2 Burglary of Retail Establishments

• stockroom thefts by employees;• thefts by delivery personnel;• insurance frauds involving false burglary reports made by

store owners;• burglaries of banks (considered a separate problem due to

banks' much greater security);• burglaries of other commercial spaces such as offices,

manufacturing premises, transport facilities, constructionsites, and cargo-handling facilities; and

• false burglar alarms.

Compared with residential burglaries, commercialburglaries–especially retail burglaries–have been thesubject of few studies. In part, this is due to the muchlarger number of residential burglaries, but it is alsogenerally believed that commercial burglaries have lessserious consequences for victims and for the communityat large. However, growing recognition of the importantpart small businesses play in urban regeneration hasheightened concern about crimes that might reduce theirviability.1 In turn, this has led to more research on crimesagainst businesses (including retailers), particularly in theUnited Kingdom, Holland and Australia. As a result, wenow know more about retail burglaries, though ourknowledge is still patchy. The following are the best-established facts:

• Even though there are considerably fewer retail burglariesthan residential burglaries, the risk of retail burglary pernumber of premises is very high. For example, a nationalsurvey in Britain found that, in 1993, 24 percent of retailestablishments were burgled, compared with just 4 percentof residences.2,† This is because stores tend to be empty atnight; may, if big, offer many entry points to burglars; andmay contain a lot of goods (and, sometimes, cash).

† There seem to be no comparabledata for the United States, thoughthe commercial burglary rate(calculated for the number ofpremises at risk) in one largenortheastern city in 1968-69 wasfound to be nearly 10 times higherthan the residential burglary rate(Conklin and Bittner 1973).


• Most retail and residential burglars are young men whocommit a variety of predatory crimes. Interviews revealthat their main motivation is economic, though someburglars also claim to enjoy the excitement. They do notdo much planning, but show some care in selecting “safer”targets. They claim to be little deterred by physical security,but try to avoid being seen. Many have drug or alcoholhabits.3

• A small number of retail burglars are highly prolific,accounting for many burglaries. Some retail burglars arealso more sophisticated in their planning and methods.They work in small gangs and generally rely on disablingthe alarm, which allows them more undisturbed time onthe premises. They target high-value goods and the safe,which they may remove entirely.

• Most retail burglaries occur at night or on weekends, whenstores are closed (while most residential burglaries occuron weekday afternoons, when residents are not likely to behome).4

• Retail burglars generally enter the premises through doorsor windows. They force door locks, break through doorsor side panels, or force/break windows. The use ofvehicles to break through doors or windows (ram raiding)is much less common.†

• Substantial variations in burglary risks exist among stores,depending on the location, premises, goods sold, andsecurity.

• As with some residences, some stores suffer substantialrepeat victimization.5 This is due to their location orsecurity, the attractiveness of their goods, and the fact that,once successful, burglars may strike the same premisesagain. National data for Britain show that 2 percent ofretail premises experienced a quarter of the retailburglaries in 1993.6 A repeat burglary can occur soon afterthe initial one–usually within a month.7

† For example, the commercialvictimization survey conducted bythe British government in 1995found that only 2 percent of break-ins were ram raids (Mirlees-Blackand Ross 1995).


• The average financial loss due to burglary is about 20percent greater for stores than for residences. Perhaps forthis reason, a larger proportion of retail burglaries (about95 percent) are reported to the police than domesticburglaries (80 to 85 percent).8 According to a nationalBritish survey of retailers, stores lose as much to burglaryas to shoplifting, and only very rarely recover stolengoods.9

• Burglary, especially repeat burglary, can have seriousconsequences for stores. They can become insolvent, andowners are sometimes forced to lay off staff, increaseprices or close the stores. Staff can suffer psychologicaleffects similar to those suffered by people whose homeshave been burgled.10 They report feeling that their personalspace has been invaded, and they worry that the offendersmight return when they are on the premises.

• Unless burglars are caught in the act, they are very difficultto detect. The clearance rate for burglaries as a whole(figures for retail burglaries are not available) is the lowestfor the eight UCR index crimes.

Factors Contributing to Burglary of RetailEstablishments

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problemwill help you frame your own local analysis questions,determine good measures of effectiveness, recognize keyintervention points, and select appropriate responses.

Not all stores face the same burglary risks. Some are inareas with low crime rates, and some are not. Some areopen for longer hours, perhaps around the clock. Somesell goods that are less attractive to thieves due to theirlow value or bulk. Some are located where they receiveconstant surveillance from passing traffic or pedestrians.


Research tends to confirm these factors' effects onburglary risks, though there are several reasons why we candraw few definitive conclusions:

• As mentioned, researchers have only recently begun tofocus on retail burglaries, and we still lack large studies(particularly in the United States) that have adequatelymeasured important risk factors.

• Many of the risk factors overlap. For example, liquorstores in deprived areas might be at greater risk because oftheir location and the goods they sell. However, ownersare aware of the risk, and they might have more security inplace than owners of other neighborhood stores or ofliquor stores in safer areas. To sort out these relationshipswould require a very large and complex study.

• Many risk factors, such as the strength of window bars orthe ease of driving vehicles to the back of a store, arequite subtle and difficult to measure in large surveys.

• Despite the predictable role of certain risk factors, there isstill a considerable element of chance and opportunity inburglary, which is impossible to detect in research. Forinstance, a particular store might be burgled because athief happened to overhear an employee talking about atemporary breakdown in store security.

For all these reasons, we cannot yet make firm statementsabout all the risk factors in retail burglaries. However, bypiecing together research findings in the United States andabroad, we can be fairly sure that the risks vary with thefollowing store factors: location, premises, size, goodssold, length of time in business, and security precautions.


Location

Studies of crimes against small U.S. businesses have foundthat retail burglary rates are highest in deprived inner-cityneighborhoods, and lowest in small towns and rurallocations. This probably reflects variations in the numberof offenders living close to the stores.11

Premises

People's presence in and near stores protects them fromburglary, and this factor varies with the nature of thepremises. For example, several studies have suggested thatstand-alone superstores located away from the downtownarea are particularly at risk, because the sites are desertedat night. Supermarkets open around the clock areprotected from burglary by the staff's constant presence,and mall stores seem to be at reduced risk because theytend to be protected by security guards after hours.† Shopsin busy downtown areas also appear to have lowerburglary risks, again due to the constant surveillancepassersby provide.12

† Stores with attractive goods canhave higher burglary rates even ifthey close late (Mirlees-Black andRoss 1995).

Stores that are open around the clock are protected from burglaryby the constant presence of staff.

Kip Kellogg


Size

National victimization surveys conducted in Australia andthe United Kingdom have found that smaller shops havelower burglary rates than larger ones.13 This may be duepartly to location (downtown shops tend to be smaller thanthose in retail parks or malls), and partly to the smallernumber of goods to steal.

Goods Sold

Research has clearly established that shoplifters exhibitstrong preferences in the goods they steal, and that storescarrying these goods are particularly at risk (see theShoplifting guide in this series). In the United States,shoplifters favor tobacco products (particularly cigarettes),health and beauty products, recorded music and videos, andclothing (designer, in particular). The more-limited researchon retail burglaries shows similar preferences,14 with somepredictable variations resulting from differences inshoplifting and burglary methods. For example, burglars aremore likely to target electronic goods, such as videocassetterecorders and televisions, than are shoplifters, who wouldhave difficulty taking such goods out of a store withoutbeing seen. A comparison of supermarket goods stolen byshoplifters and burglars found that both groups targetedcigarettes, liquor, and health and beauty aids, but as wouldbe expected, the burglars stole these in much largerquantities than did the shoplifters. The burglars also robbedstore ATM machines.15


Length of Time in Business

Newer businesses have higher victimization rates thanolder businesses.16 This might indicate that stores becomemore experienced in preventing crime the longer they arein business–or that store survival depends on resistingcrime.

Security Precautions

Stores at greatest risk of burglary tend to take the mostprecautions, and while these precautions may reduce therisk of burglary, they do not entirely eliminate it. It is alsothe case that stores often increase their security after beingburgled. These facts could help explain why some studieshave found little statistical relationship between stores'level of security precautions and their rate of burglary.17

However, evaluations of recent crime prevention projectsin Britain (the Safer Cities project and the Small Businessand Crime Initiative) have concluded that improvedsecurity at recently burgled stores can reduce repeatburglaries and, as a result, overall burglary rates in targetedareas.18 In addition, some studies have produced evidenceof the effectiveness of specific measures, such as installingburglar alarms and hiring security guards. While oftenfalling short of proof, this evidence is reviewed below inthe "Responses to the Problem of Retail Burglary"section.

9Understanding Your Local Problem

Understanding Your Local Problem

The information provided above is only a generalizeddescription of retail burglaries. You must combine thebasic facts with a more specific understanding of yourlocal problem if you are to develop an effective response.In most cases, your burglary problem is likely to involve agroup of stores, such as those in a downtown area or in aparticular mall. In other cases, your problem might berelated to stores of the same general type (say, pharmaciesor building supply stores).† If the problem involves asingle store (unless it is a very large store), you might moreappropriately deal with it by offering routine crimeprevention advice rather than undertaking a full-scaleproblem-oriented policing project. Your analysis is likely tofocus on differential burglary risks among the stores inyour group, and the reasons for those differences. Youranalysis should address the risks of repeat victimization, assome particularly effective responses are focused on repeatvictims. Bear in mind that registers of businesses may usecorporate names, which may be different from "doingbusiness as" names. The registers are also frequently out-of-date, and you might need to make your own list.

In general, you should seek to establish what kinds ofoffenders are involved, what kinds of stores they target,how they gain access to the stores, how they deal withsecurity measures, and, finally, how they dispose of stolengoods. Knowledge of these factors will help you design aneffective response to the problem.

Police crime reports or calls-for-service data do notgenerally distinguish the different kinds of nonresidentialburglaries. Retail burglaries are lumped together withburglaries of educational institutions, medical centers,

† Each of these variations in retailburglaries deserves its own guide,but the information provided hereshould be sufficiently broad toprovide assistance in all cases.


offices, and construction sites. Consequently, gatheringinformation about your local problem can be labor-intensive. It requires a careful review of police records andthe identification of retail burglary incidents. Fortunately,the large majority of retail burglaries are reported topolice, but it can still be difficult to identify repeatburglaries because locations may not be systematicallyrecorded. For example, the store name might be includedin some crime reports, and only the street address inothers.

In addition, many important details about the type ofbusiness, points of entry and nature of losses may not beincluded. Thus, you should try to gather systematicinformation about these details using other data sources.Because gathering and analyzing data can be time-consuming and involve technical problems, you shouldseek help from your local university, especially one with acriminal justice department. Data collection methods thatcan provide useful information include the following:

• Interviewing store owners or managers. You canobtain much valuable information by interviewing storeowners or managers, using a standard set of questions.You should ask about burglary incidents, burglaryconsequences, security measures in place at the time ofburglary, and measures subsequently introduced. Unlessyou are dealing with a very large number of stores, youshould try to conduct face-to-face interviews, since thesewill generally yield valuable information not directlycovered in the questions. Mail or self-completion surveyssuffer from low response rates and missing information.

• Reviewing store records. Some stores, particularly verylarge or chain stores, keep records of burglaries.


• Reviewing security company records. Large securitycompanies generally maintain records of burglaries onclient premises. Apart from asking to review these records,you might interview security personnel familiar with thestores in your group, since they often know whether or nota store is serious about security.

• Conducting site surveys. You should conduct sitesurveys of stores that have been burgled. These shouldcover the store's location on the block, the rear entrance(s)of the store, the businesses near the store, the amount ofnatural surveillance and street lighting the store has, thestore's distance from main roads, and other site variablesrelated to burglary risks (see "Targets" under "Asking theRight Questions" below).

• Using computer mapping of incidents. Computermapping of retail burglaries can reveal risk patterns andsuggest possible reasons for those patterns. For example,burglaries may be clustered near a bar area, a drug marketor a public transport hub. Or heavy clusters of repeatburglaries may indicate that a prolific burglar lives nearby.Mapping prolific offenders' addresses in relation toincident clusters may also be helpful.

Kip Kellogg

Site surveys of stores should include an assessment of the naturalsurveillance, lighting and security of the stores' rear entrances.


• Interviewing burglary investigators. If burglaryinvestigators are not part of your project team, be sure tointerview them. They may have considerable knowledgegained through dealing daily with retail burglary cases.

• Interviewing burglars. Systematic interviews witharrested burglars can provide useful information aboutmethods of burglary and disposal of goods.19 Here,assistance from your local university could be particularlyimportant, because offenders generally talk more openly toresearchers.

Asking the Right Questions

The following are some critical questions you should try toanswer in analyzing your particular retail burglary problem.Your answers to these and other questions will help youchoose the most appropriate set of responses later on.

Offenses

• What is the clearance rate for retail burglaries?• How often is property recovered?• What is the ratio of attempted burglaries to completed

burglaries?• What are the usual entry points or methods?• What proportion of burglaries have been repeat burglaries

within the past year? • What is the typical length of time between repeats? • How long do burglaries take? How long are burglars in the

building/on the property?• How much is typically lost (dollar value of materials, repair

costs, lost business, insurance premium increases)?• What proportion of burglaries (and attempts) are reported

to police?


Offenders

• Are there many different offenders involved, or is a smallgroup of prolific offenders responsible?

• How many of the prolific offenders have records forcommitting retail burglaries? How many have recentlybeen released from prison?

• How much planning do offenders do? • Do they work in gangs? How many offenders are in the

gangs? • Do they belong to any particular ethnic, occupational or

other group?• What proportion commit burglaries primarily to support a

drug or alcohol habit? • What proportion are juveniles?• Do they appear to know the premises burgled? If so, how

do they get the information?• Where are they coming from, and how do they get to the

burglary locations? On foot? In vehicles?• Are they drawn to the area by burglary opportunities, or

for some other reason? • Do they specialize in commercial establishments, or more

precisely, retail establishments?• How do they dispose of stolen goods (exchange them for

drugs, sell them at pawnshops or flea markets, sell them toprofessional fences, etc.)?

Targets

• Which kinds of stores are most at risk of burglary? Whichstores are not burgled?

• Which goods are burglars stealing? Are they targetingcash?

• Which stores are being burgled repeatedly? What do theyhave in common?

• How long have the stores been in business?• How big are the stores? Are they part of a larger chain? If

so, how does the burglary experience vary among stores inthe chain? How does it compare with that of similar storesin other chains?


• What time do the stores close? Are there businessesnearby that are open at night and on weekends?

• Is the property isolated? Is lack of natural surveillance acontributory factor?

• What site features facilitate burglary? Corner location?Rear access?

• Is victim carelessness a contributory factor?• Which structures on the property are most at risk?• How do burglars typically gain entry?• How often do they disable alarm systems?• What security measures have the stores taken to prevent

burglary? What special measures have they taken to protectthe most valuable merchandise/equipment?

• Do store employees follow correct cash-handlingprocedures?

• Is there evidence of collusion between staff and burglars?• Do security guards patrol/check stores after hours? Are

they carefully checking the stores' vulnerable areas?

Locations/Times

• When do burglaries usually occur (time of day, day ofweek, month, season)?

• What is the nature of the surrounding neighborhood?• Is the problem part of a wider problem of commercial

burglary affecting the whole area or jurisdiction?• Where do events concentrate? Are they clustered near

major roads?


Measuring Your Effectiveness

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree yourefforts have succeeded, and suggests how you mightmodify your responses if they are not producing theintended results. You should take measures of yourproblem before you implement responses, to determine howserious the problem is, and after you implement them, todetermine whether they have been effective. All measuresshould be taken in both the target area and thesurrounding area. (For more detailed guidance onmeasuring effectiveness, see the companion guide to thisseries, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guidefor Police Problem-Solvers.)

The following "outcome" measures can be useful inassessing whether your responses have impacted the retailburglary problem:

• reductions in reported retail burglaries and related calls forservice;

• fewer repeat victims and offenders;• reductions in burglary-related financial losses and insurance

claims;• reductions in business closures resulting from burglary; and• greater perception of safety among store owners and

managers, among staff of other businesses and amongresidents (if it is a mixed-use area).

In addition, the following "process" measures mightprovide some indication of the degree to which selectedresponses are being properly implemented:

• increased arrests, prosecutions and convictions of retailburglars; and

• higher proportion of stores following standard securitypractices, installing security devices and/or using guardservices.

17Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Retail Establishments

Responses to the Problem of Burglary ofRetail Establishments

Your analysis of your local problem should give you abetter understanding of the factors contributing to it.Once you have analyzed your local problem andestablished a baseline for measuring effectiveness, youshould consider possible responses to address theproblem.

The responses discussed below provide a foundation ofideas for addressing your problem. These responses aredrawn from a variety of research studies and policereports. Several of them may apply to your particularproblem. It is critical that you tailor responses to localcircumstances, and that you can justify each responsebased on reliable analysis.

In most cases, an effective strategy will involveimplementing several different responses. Lawenforcement responses alone are seldom effective inreducing or solving the problem: you should give carefulconsideration to who else in your community sharesresponsibility for the problem and can help police betterrespond to it. Building a partnership with these variousstakeholders can be essential to success. For example, ifyou decide to target career burglars, you may need the helpof parole and probation officers or local prosecutors insecuring appropriate prison sentences. If you believe thatstreet lighting must be improved, you will need help fromthe city and the local utility company. Above all, you willneed to persuade individual retailers to take the securitymeasures you will surely find are needed. Local businessassociations might help you in securing retailers'commitment.


Be aware that chain stores may need to get the headoffice's approval for any new security measures. Chains arelikely to have their own security departments, and securitystaff will need to be convinced that changes in companypractice are needed to meet local conditions. On the otherhand, the security departments might help you formulateyour response, or put you in touch with local lossprevention specialists.

Several other important considerations should guide yourchoice of responses:

• You should pay particular attention to repeat burglaries,since focusing on these can provide important dividendsfor detection as well as prevention.

• You should not overlook the fact that the burglary is onlythe first stage of the crime. The burglars will subsequentlysell or exchange the stolen goods, leading to additionalresponse possibilities.

• You should be alert to the possibility of displacementresulting from the implementation of some responses. Inparticular, you might expect some displacement to otherstores when stores that have been burgled increase theirsecurity. If your responses are successful, you might alsoexpect some displacement to nearby areas that fall outsidethe scope of your measures. However, research has shownthat offenders typically do not travel far, and thatgeographic displacement is rather limited. It is also thecase that if stores with the most-attractive goods are givenincreased protection, burglars will not necessarily robother stores with less-attractive goods. Finally, research hasfound that protecting an entire area from burglary canresult in a "diffusion of benefits" to surrounding areas, sothat their burglary rates decline as well.20


• You should remember that, once you have completed yourproblem-oriented project and moved on to other duties,some responses you have introduced might not besustained. There is the added danger that a reduction inburglaries will induce complacency and the belief that theproblem has been “licked.” There are several ways to dealwith these threats,† but an important one is to makerelatively permanent changes in the physical environment,changes whose effectiveness does not depend on humanbackup. For example, a business watch program andstrengthened doors/windows might both result in initialreductions in burglary, but the latter's effect is likely to lastlonger.

The responses discussed below are organized under threemain headings according to the groups with the main roleto play in implementing them: the police, retailers andcity/local government. It will be clear that researchevidence about the effectiveness of most responses ispatchy and sometimes inconsistent. If direct evidence of aparticular response's effectiveness is lacking, the responseassessment is guided by accepted crime preventionprinciples.

Police Responses

1. Targeting repeat offenders. Police crackdowns canproduce reductions in crime, but these reductions may notlast long. Research has shown that after the police leave, itis often "business as usual" for the local offenders.††

However, a recently published study found that acrackdown on prolific local burglars, followed by a“consolidation” phase in which the properties most at riskwere target-hardened, produced reduced residential burglaryrates in one community in England. The crackdown was

† For a discussion, see Curtin et al.(2001).

†† For a recent review anddiscussion, see Novak et al. (1999).


not the usual kind, involving heavy police presence in aparticular neighborhood. Instead, it involved concentratedpolice attention on–including intensified investigationof–burglary suspects in one local area. Police identified,targeted and arrested 14 suspects thought to be among themost prolific local burglars, resulting in a 60 percentreduction in burglaries. There was no evidence of anydisplacement of burglary to other crimes or to nearbyareas; indeed, car thefts dropped in the crackdown area,and burglaries dropped by 50 percent in nearby areas,suggesting that the offenders arrested were responsible formany of those crimes, as well.21 A combined crackdownand consolidation along these lines could be equallyeffective in reducing retail burglaries.†

2. Targeting repeatedly burgled stores. There is a largebody of evidence that focusing police and crime preventionresources on repeatedly burgled homes can producesubstantial declines in burglary. Similar benefits could beobtained by concentrating preventive resources on repeatedlyburgled stores.22 The research also suggests that repeatburglaries are frequently the work of highly prolific offenders,who often return soon after the original burglary. Short-termuse of measures focused on recently burgled stores mightresult in arrests of these offenders. As well as the deploymentof directed patrols, such measures include the use of high-tech devices such as portable, covert closed-circuit television(CCTV) (which records pictures and sound only duringperiods of activity); portable silent alarms (which alert thepolice when activated); proximity alarms (which loudly soundwhen premises are approached from a particular direction);and "forensic traps" (such as chemically treated mats to pickup intruders' footprints).††

† For a comprehensive assessmentof repeat offender programs, seeSpelman (1990).

†† Experience with these high-techdevices is limited to date, but itappears that they can posenumerous practical problems. Forexample, store owners/employeesoften forget to activate the deviceswhen they leave at night, or forgetthey are activated when they return(Taylor 1999). As with conventionalintruder alarms, portable burglaralarms also pose the problem offalse alarms (see the False BurglarAlarms guide in this series).


3. Disrupting markets for stolen goods. Far too little isknown about how offenders dispose of stolen goods, andtoo little is done to disrupt markets for the goods. It istrue that in many jurisdictions, pawnshops are required toreport the goods they receive to the police. While thisrequirement's effectiveness has not been properlyevaluated, the best programs seem to be those in whichpawnshop records are automated, downloaded daily to thepolice, and automatically searched against the policerecords database for hits on stolen property. In any case,burglars can dispose of stolen goods in many other ways,including peddling them on the street, selling them tofriends or acquaintances, selling them through newspaperads or in bars and clubs, exchanging them for drugs, andeven selling them door-to-door. Burglars also sell goods tosmall shops, and police in many areas have undertaken"stings" in which they set up bogus fencing operations inused-goods stores. The popularity of these stings appearsto have declined. They are expensive and time-consuming,and research suggests that they can lead to an influx ofcrime into the area around them.23 Alternative strategies todisrupt sales of stolen goods to stores include (1)conducting surveillance of suspect stores in your area togain evidence of thieves' entering and making sales, so asto prosecute both the thieves and the fences; (2)encouraging stores that buy used goods to display signsstating they are part of a crime prevention program toreduce sales of stolen goods; and (3) implementing localordinances requiring stores to establish proof ofownership for used goods they buy.24

4. Establishing business/shop watch programs.Despite their popularity, there is little evidence thatneighborhood watch programs are effective deterrents toburglary. Similarly, there is little evidence that


business/shop watch programs produce tangible resultsbeyond some possible public relations benefits.25 Theseprograms are also difficult to establish.26 Greater successmight result from establishing “cocoon” business/shopwatch programs in which police encourage stores close toa recently burgled store to exercise heightened surveillancefor a month or two.

Retailer Actions

5. Upgrading external security. This target-hardeningoption covers a variety of measures, including:

• strengthening locks and reinforcing doors and windows;• installing strengthened glass, shutters or grilles in windows;• installing video cameras to monitor possible entry points;• installing security lighting at entry points; and• installing concrete pillars or decorative planters to prevent

ram raiding.

Installing pillars, posts or planters in front of store doors helps prevent burglarsfrom driving vehicles through the doors.

Kip Kellogg


As mentioned, the research evidence regarding thesemeasures' value is unclear and inconsistent. Burglars saythey find these measures of little hindrance, and from apolice point of view, they may provide little benefit if theymerely displace burglary to other stores. Planningauthorities may resist some of these measures, particularlyshutters and security lighting, because they can make anarea less attractive.27

That said, there is some limited evidence from recentstudies that target hardening can be effective in preventingburglary of particular premises and, if perceived to bewidespread, can also protect an entire area.28 Whichmeasures to use with which stores depends on a variety ofcost, convenience and aesthetic considerations; the adviceof a professional security consultant might be required.

Burglar alarms, private security patrols andsafes for especially valuable merchandise,along with signs indicating these securityfeatures are present, can all help reduceburglary of retail establishments.

Kip Kellogg


6. Installing burglar alarms. Most stores have burglaralarms, and research suggests these can effectively protectthe premises from burglary.29 One study has found thatareas with a higher number of premises with burglaralarms have lower rates of burglary.30 However, manyburglar alarms have unacceptably high rates of falsealarms, and more-sophisticated thieves can disable them.Different systems vary considerably in their costs forowners and for the police. For more information on thesetopics, see the False Burglar Alarms guide in this series.

7. Safeguarding cash and valuable stock. This approachfalls under the situational prevention category of "targetremoval." It includes:

• removing high-value goods from window displays;• concealing goods;• minimizing stock with "just in time" deliveries;• using safes or secure cages for the most valuable items in

stockrooms;• marking valuable goods such as computers with traceable,

hard-to-remove identification numbers;• banking cash each day; and• leaving empty cash registers open at night (to prevent their

being broken into).

While these techniques are good security practice, nothing isknown from research about their effectiveness in preventingretail burglaries. However, cash reduction is a well-provenmethod of preventing commercial robberies, and removal ofcoin-fed fuel meters in British homes has been shown toprevent residential burglaries.31

8. Locking escape routes. It is good security practice tomake it as difficult to get out of a store after hours as it is


to get in. (Fire exits must not be locked during normalbusiness hours or when the store is otherwise occupied).When leaving at night, store managers should cut off thepower supply to loading-bay doors, and make sure otherdoors and windows cannot be opened from the inside.

9. Screening and training shop staff. It is good securitypractice (where law permits) to screen prospectiveemployees for criminal records. It is also good practice totrain staff in security measures, to clarify theirresponsibilities (particularly for key security), and toencourage their involvement–for example, by keepingwatch for suspicious behavior and unfamiliar vehicles.

10. Employing security guards after hours. Burglarssay that security guards pose the greatest threat to theiractivities.32 Guards are widely employed in large malls andretail parks, which helps to account for the relatively lowburglary rates of stores in these locations. An alternativeadopted by some large stores is to employ a night crewthat handles cleanup, restocking and display dressing. Thestore is protected from burglars while this necessary workgets done.

Private security patrols around large shopping malls help reduceburglaries to retail establishments located in and around the malls.

Kip Kellogg


11. Using crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED). CPTED entails changing landscapingand design to (1) discourage access to all but intendedusers, (2) allow intruders to be spotted, and (3) establishthe boundaries between private and public property. Whileresearch provides little guide as to CPTED's effectivenessin reducing retail burglaries, the general principles of thisapproach are widely accepted.33 If stores in your area arecontemplating either major remodeling or construction ofnew premises, they should consider incorporating CPTEDstrategies to reduce their future burglary risks. A CPTEDsurvey can be done for an entire area, not just forindividual businesses. If a block of businesses or abusiness district cooperates in paying for a CPTEDspecialist to undertake a survey and recommendimprovements, the cost will be minimal. Informationabout CPTED can be obtained from the National CrimePrevention Council (www.ncpc.org/cpted.htm) and theInternational CPTED Association (www.cpted.net).

City Planning Measures

12. Improving street surveillance through lighting andCCTV. Commercial burglars prefer targets that receivelittle surveillance,34 and they could be expected to avoidwell-lit streets† and those with CCTV surveillance.Consistent with this, a study in Britain found largereductions in shop burglaries following the introduction ofCCTV surveillance in three downtown areas,35 and a studyin Portland, Ore., found that improving the lighting on acommercial strip produced a significant drop in retailburglaries.36 As with all security measures, lighting has tobe carefully designed to provide maximum benefitswithout unnecessary cost.††

† State or county crime preventionassociations may provide grants tofund lighting improvements.

†† For a discussion, see Poyner andFawcett (1995), and Painter and Tilley(1999).


13. Promoting "living over the shop." In an effort torestore downtown areas' vitality and provide after-hourssurveillance of retail properties, the British government issponsoring a program to encourage people to live invacant space above shops. The program, which has beenadopted by many towns and cities, has the additionalbenefit of increasing the supply of low-cost housing.37 Arecent evaluation, based on interviews with a variety ofinterested parties, found that most people supported theprogram and believed it helped to reduce crime indowntown areas.

14. Promoting business improvement districts (BIDs).Many U.S. cities have designated BIDs formed bycoalitions of local businesspeople. The objective is topromote investment in declining business areas. Similarinitiatives in Britain fall under the title of "town centermanagement." An important objective of most BIDs† is toreduce crime and the fear of crime. To this end, initiativesmay include improvements in street lighting, installation ofpublic CCTV systems, regular cleaning of graffiti andrepair of vandalism, dedicated patrols by police andsecurity guards, and formation of a force of "city guards"to provide a street presence and assist visitors or tourists.Evaluations of BIDs are currently being undertaken in theUnited States.38

† Though not, apparently, of mostTCM schemes (Beck and Willis1995).

29Appendix

Appendix: Summary of Responses toBurglary in Retail Establishments

The table below summarizes the responses to retailburglaries, the mechanism by which they are intended towork, the conditions under which they ought to work best,and some factors you should consider beforeimplementing a particular response. It is critical that youtailor responses to local circumstances, and that you canjustify each response based on reliable analysis. In mostcases, an effective strategy will involve implementingseveral different responses. Law enforcement responsesalone are seldom effective in reducing or solving theproblem.

1.

2.

19

20

Targeting repeatoffenders

Targetingrepeatedlyburgled stores

Incapacitatesthose offendersresponsible for alarge portion ofburglaries

Concentratespreventionwhere it is mostneeded;facilitates thearrest of prolificoffenders

…police canreliably identifyhabitualcriminals; there isa high proportionof repeatburglaries; courtsare willing toaward custodialsentences; andcrackdowns areconsolidatedthroughenvironmentaldesign changes

…a smallproportion ofstores experiencea largeproportion ofburglaries, andmeasures can beput in placequickly

Requires thecooperation ofprosecutors,courts, probationand paroledepartments, andcity planningdepartments

Requirescooperationamong policedivisions (localofficers, crimepreventionofficers,detectives),business ownersand city officials

ResponseNo.

Page No. Response How ItWorks

WorksBest If…

Considerations

Police Responses


3.

4.

5.

6.

21

21

22

24

Disruptingmarkets forstolen goods

Establishingbusiness/shopwatch programs

Upgradingexternal security

Installing burglaralarms

Reduces theincentive fortheft by makingit difficult foroffenders to sellstolen goods

Increasesoffenders' risk ofpoliceinterventionand/orsubsequentidentification

Stops or slowsdown offenders

Increasesoffenders' risk ofgetting caught

…stolen-goodsmarkets are notwidespread

…concern aboutretail burglariesis widely sharedamong stores

…existingsecurity is low,and naturalsurveillance ispoor

…a highproportion ofstores are fittedwith alarms, andalarms areconnected toCCTV systemsthat allow privatesecuritycompanies toverify that aburglary is takingplace beforecalling the police

Can be difficult toobtain informationabout how andwhere offenderssell or exchangestolen goods; stingsare expensive andof doubtfuleffectiveness;courts often take alenient view onreceiving stolenproperty charges

Can be difficult toenlist store owners'participation; amore effectivealternative is toestablish temporary"cocoon" watchprograms aroundrecently burgledpremises

Target-hardeningsolutions need tobe carefully tailoredto individual stores,often requiring theadvice ofprofessionalsecurity consultants

Burglars candisable alarms;there are highrates of falsealarms, butimproved systemsare coming on themarket

ResponseNo.


WorksBest If…

Considerations

Retailer Actions

31Appendix

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

24

24

25

25

26

Safeguarding cashand valuablestock

Locking escaperoutes

Screening andtraining shopstaff

Employingsecurity guardsafter hours

Using crimepreventionthroughenvironmentaldesign (CPTED)

Reduces therewards ofburglary

Slows offendersdown andincreases theirrisk of gettingcaught; limits theamount of stockoffenders canremove

Reduces the riskof "inside jobs";increases staff'sresponsibility forstore security

Increasesoffenders' risk ofgetting caught

Makes burglarymore difficult;increasesoffenders' risk ofgetting caught

…burglars'principal target iscash or stockreadily convertibleto cash

…stores arelocated in areaswith good naturalsurveillance, andstolen goods arebulky/heavy

…stores arelocated in high-crime areas, andstaff turnover ishigh

…stores areclosely clusteredtogether, andguards areconstantly orfrequently present

…retailers areplanning majorremodeling or theconstruction ofnew buildings

Little research isavailable on thisstrategy'seffectiveness

A commonsenseapproach, but oneon which littlerelevant evaluativeresearch has beendone; depends onwell-trained anddisciplined staff

Laws must permitscreening ofpotential employees;employees musthave incentives toshare in the securityfunction

Burglars reportbeing most deterredby security guards; alow-cost alternativefor larger stores isto employ a nightcrew to handlecleanup, restockingand display dressing

IncorporatingCPTED principlesneed not be costlyand can bring long-term benefits;CPTED surveyscan be undertakenfor an entirebusiness district, aswell as forindividual premises

ResponseNo.


WorksBest If…

Considerations


12.

13.

14.

26

27

27

Improving streetsurveillancethrough lightingand CCTV

Promoting"living over theshop"

Promotingbusinessimprovementdistricts (BIDs)

Increasesoffenders' risk ofintervention bypolice and/orsecurity guards;increasesoffenders' risk ofsubsequentidentification

Increases naturalsurveillance ofstores at nightand on weekends

Increases naturalsurveillance inthe area

…stores arelocated indowntown areasor businessdistricts

…stores arelocated indowntown areasor businessdistricts

…BIDs havededicated patrolsby security staff

U.S. civil libertygroups oftenoppose theinstallation ofpublic CCTVsystems; lights andCCTV equipmentare sometimesvandalized in high-crime areas

This initiative isusually part of awider revitalizationprogram;accommodationssometimes do notprovide goodsurveillance of thestores below; thisapproach appealsmost to singles andyoung people whoare often away fromhome and thereforeprovide lesssurveillance

BIDs depend onwidespread supportfrom the businesscommunity; BIDs'crime preventionvalue has not yetbeen demonstrated

ResponseNo.


WorksBest If…

Considerations

City Planning Measures

33Endnotes

Endnotes

1 Gill (1994); Shapland (1995); Felson and Clarke (1997).2 Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995).3 Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991); Butler (1994); Jacques (1994); Wright and Decker

(1994); Wiersma (1996).4 Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Butler (1994).5 Skogan (1990); Tilley (1993); Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Farrell, Chenery and

Pease (1998).6 Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995).7 Taylor (1999).8 Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995).9 Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995).10 Redshaw and Mawby (1996); Burrows (1997); Brown (2001).11 Reiss (1969); Skogan (1990).12 Butler (1994); Walker (1994); Redshaw and Mawby (1996).13 Walker (1994); Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Perrone (2000).14 Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Shapland (1995).15 Food Marketing Institute (1997).16 Hakim and Shachmurove (1996); Perrone (2000).17 Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Shapland (1995).18 Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998).19 Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991); Butler (1994); Jacques (1994); Wright and Decker

(1994); Wiersma (1996).20 Tilley and Hopkins (1998).21 Farrell, Chenery and Pease (1998).22 Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998); Bowers and Hirschfield (1998); Taylor

(1999).23 Langworthy and LeBeau (1992).24 Clarke (1999); Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001).25 Beck and Willis (1995).26 Tilley and Hopkins (1998).27 Jacques (1994); Beck and Willis (1995).28 Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998).29 Hakim and Blackstone (1997).


30 Hakim and Blackstone (1997).31 Clarke (1997).32 Butler (1994).33 Crowe (1991); Poyner and Fawcett (1995).34 Butler (1994); Wiersma (1996).35 Brown (1997).36 Griswold (1984).37 Beck and Willis (1995).38 Greene and Stokes (1998).

35References

References

Beck, A., and A. Willis (1995). Crime and Security: Managingthe Risk to Safe Shopping. Leicester, England: PerpetuityPress.

Bowers, K., and A. Hirschfield (1998). "High Risk, LowRisk: The Use of Data in the Identification of PotentialTargets of Commercial Crime Offenders." In M. Gill(ed.), Crime at Work: Increasing the Risk for Offenders, Vol.2. Leicester, England: Perpetuity Press.

British Retail Consortium (1994). Retail Crime Costs:1992/1993 Survey. London: British Retail Consortium.

Brown, A. (2001). A Commercial Crisis: A Report IntoCommercial Repeat Victimization. London: Home OfficeResearch, Development and Statistics Directorate, PoliceResearch Award Scheme.

Brown, B. (1997). "CCTV in Three Town Centers inEngland." In R. Clarke (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention:Successful Case Studies (2nd ed.). Guilderland, N.Y.:Harrow and Heston.

Burrows, J. (1997). "Criminology and Business Crime:Building the Bridge." In M. Felson and R. Clarke (eds.),Business and Crime Prevention. Monsey, N.Y.: CriminalJustice Press.

Butler, G. (1994). "Commercial Burglary: What OffendersSay." In M. Gill (ed.), Crime at Work: Studies in Security andCrime Prevention, Vol. 1. Leicester, England: PerpetuityPress.

Clarke, R. (1999). Hot Products: Understanding , Anticipatingand Reducing the Demand for Stolen Goods. Police ResearchSeries, Paper 112. London: Home Office.


Clarke, R. (ed.) (1997). Situational Crime Prevention: SuccessfulCase Studies (2nd ed.). Guilderland, N.Y.: Harrow andHeston.

Conklin, J., and E. Bittner (1973). "Burglary in a Suburb."Criminology 11(2):206–232.

Cromwell, P., J. Olson and D. Avary (1991). Breaking andEntering: An Ethnographic Analysis of Burglary. NewburyPark, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Crowe, T. (1991). Crime Prevention Through EnvironmentalDesign. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Curtin, L., N. Tilley, M. Owens, and K. Pease (2001).Developing Crime Reduction Plans: Some Examples From theReducing-Burglary Initiative. Crime Reduction ResearchSeries, Paper 7. London: Home Office.

Farrell, G., S. Chenery and K. Pease (1998). ConsolidatingPolice Crackdowns: Findings From an Antiburglary Project.Police Research Series, Paper 113. London: HomeOffice.

Felson, M., and R. Clarke (1997). Business and CrimePrevention. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Justice Press.

Food Marketing Institute (1997). Security and Loss-PreventionIssues Survey. Washington, D.C.: Food Marketing Institute.

Gill, M. (ed.) (1994). Crime at Work: Studies in Security andCrime Prevention, Vol. 1. Leicester, England: PerpetuityPress.

Goodchild, B., O. Chamberlain, K. Dalgleish, and B.Lawrence (1997). Crime on the Home Front. York, England:The Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

37References

Greene, J., and R. Stokes (1998). "Policing BusinessDistricts: Problem-Solving in a Different Context." In S.O'Connor and A. Grant (eds.), Problem-Oriented Policing:Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues and Making POPWork. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive ResearchForum.

Griswold, D. (1984). "Crime Prevention and CommercialBurglary: A Time Series Analysis." Journal of Crime andJustice 12:493–501.

Hakim, S., and E. Blackstone (1997). Securing Home andBusiness: A Guide to the Electronic Security Industry. Boston:Butterworth-Heinemann.

Hakim, S., and Y. Shachmurove (1996). "Spatial andTemporal Patterns of Commercial Burglaries." AmericanJournal of Economics and Sociology 55(4):443–456.

Jacques, C. (1994). "Ram Raiding: The History, Incidenceand Scope for Prevention." In M. Gill (ed.), Crime atWork: Studies in Security and Crime Prevention, Vol. 1.Leicester, England: Perpetuity Press.

Langworthy, R., and J. LeBeau (1992). "The SpatialEvolution of a Sting Clientele." Journal of Criminal Justice20:135–146.

Mirlees-Black, C., and A. Ross (1995). Crime Against Retailand Manufacturing Premises: Findings From the 1994Commercial Victimization Survey. Home Office ResearchStudy, No. 146. London: Home Office.

Novak, K., J. Hartman, A. Holsinger, and M. Turner(1999). "The Effects of Aggressive Policing of Disorderon Serious Crime." Policing: An International Journal ofPolice Strategies and Management 22(2):171–190.


Painter, K., and N. Tilley (1999). Surveillance of Public Space:CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention. Crime PreventionStudies, Vol. 10. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Justice Press.

Perrone, S. (2000). "Crimes Against Small Businesses inAustralia: A Preliminary Analysis." Trends and Issues, No.184. Canberra, Australia: Australian Institute ofCriminology.

Poyner, B., and W. Fawcett (1995). Design for InherentSecurity: Guidance for Nonresidential Buildings. London:Construction Industry Research and InformationAssociation.

Redshaw, J., and R. Mawby (1996). "Commercial Burglary:Victims' Views of the Crime and the Police Response."International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention1(3):185–193.

Reiss, A. (1969). "Minority Entrepreneurship." Reportsubmitted to the Office of Planning, Research andAnalysis of the Small Business Administration. Hearingsbefore the Select Committee on Small Business, U.S.Senate, 91st Congress. Washington D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office.

Shapland, J. (1995). "Preventing Retail-Sector Crimes." InM. Tonry and D. Farrington (eds.), Building a Safer Society:Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention–Crime and Justice: AReview of Research, Vol. 19. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.

Skogan, W. (1990). "Crime and Survival of SmallBusinesses in Urban Communities." Paper presented atthe 1990 annual meeting of the American Society ofCriminology. Baltimore, November.

39References

Spelman, W. (1990). Repeat Offender Programs for LawEnforcement. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive ResearchForum.

Sutton, M., J. Schneider and S. Hetherington (2001).Tackling Theft With the Market Reduction Approach. CrimeReduction Research Series, Paper 8. London: HomeOffice.

Taylor, G. (1999). "Using Repeat Victimization To CounterCommercial Burglary: The Leicester Experience." SecurityJournal 12(1):41–52.

Tilley, N. (1993). The Prevention of Crime Against SmallBusinesses: The Safer Cities Experience. Crime PreventionUnit Series, Paper 45. London: Home Office.

Tilley, N., and M. Hopkins (1998). Business as Usual: AnEvaluation of the Small Business and Crime PreventionInitiative. Police Research Series, Paper 95. London:Home Office.

Walker, J. (1994). The First Australian National Survey ofCrimes Against Businesses. Canberra, Australia: AustralianInstitute of Criminology.

Walsh, D. (1986). Heavy Business: Commercial Burglary andRobbery. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wiersma, E. (1996). "Commercial Burglars in theNetherlands: Reasoning Decision-Makers?" InternationalJournal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention 1(3):217–225.

Wright, R., and S. Decker (1994). Burglars on the Job.Boston: Northeastern University Press.

41About the Author

About the Author

Ronald V. Clarke

Ronald V. Clarke is a professor at the School of CriminalJustice, Rutgers University. He previously headed theBritish government's criminological research department,where he had a significant role in developing situationalcrime prevention and the British Crime Survey. Clarke isthe founding editor of Crime Prevention Studies, and hispublications include Designing Out Crime (HMSO 1980), TheReasoning Criminal (Springer-Verlag 1986), Business and CrimePrevention (Criminal Justice Press 1997), and SituationalCrime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (Harrow and Heston1997). Together with Herman Goldstein, he has recentlybeen working on problem-oriented policing projects forthe Charlotte-Mecklenburg (N.C.) Police Department.Since 1998, he has chaired the selection committee for theannual Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence inProblem-Oriented Policing. Clarke holds a docorate inpsychology from the University of London.

43Recommended Readings

Recommended Readings

• A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and TheirEnvironments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. Thisguide offers a practical introduction for police practitionersto two types of surveys that police find useful: surveyingpublic opinion and surveying the physical environment. Itprovides guidance on whether and how to conduct cost-effective surveys.

• Assessing Responses to Problems: AnIntroductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, byJohn E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office ofCommunity Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide isa companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. Itprovides basic guidance to measuring and assessingproblem-oriented policing efforts.

• Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of CommunityOriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along withaccompanying computer software, provides practical, basicpointers for police in conducting community surveys. Thedocument is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

• Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series ofvolumes of applied and theoretical research on reducingopportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations ofinitiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.


• Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing:The 1999Herman Goldstein Award Winners.. This documentproduced by the National Institute of Justice incollaboration with the Office of Community OrientedPolicing Services and the Police Executive Research Forumprovides detailed reports of the best submissions to theannual award program that recognizes exemplary problem-oriented responses to various community problems. Asimilar publication is available for the award winners fromsubsequent years. The documents are also available atwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

• Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and CrimeReduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home OfficeCrime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies anddescribes the factors that make problem-solving effective orineffective as it is being practiced in police forces inEngland and Wales.

• Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory forCrime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V.Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98,1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activitytheory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory havepractical implications for the police in their efforts toprevent crime.

• Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990).Explains the principles and methods of problem-orientedpolicing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusseshow a police agency can implement the concept.

45Recommended Readings

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on theFirst 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department ofJustice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,2000). Describes how the most critical elements ofHerman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model havedeveloped in practice over its 20-year history, and proposesfuture directions for problem-oriented policing. The reportis also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing inNewport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains therationale behind problem-oriented policing and theproblem-solving process, and provides examples ofeffective problem-solving in one agency.

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crimeand Disorder Through Problem-SolvingPartnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, ScottPhillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S.Department of Justice, Office of Community OrientedPolicing Services, 1998) (also available atwww.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides a brief introduction toproblem-solving, basic information on the SARA modeland detailed suggestions about the problem-solving process.

• Situational Crime Prevention: Successful CaseStudies, Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles andmethods of situational crime prevention, and presents over20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.


• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems:Case Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampsonand Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office ofCommunity Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also availableat www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effectivepolice problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorderproblems.

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebookfor Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S.Department of Justice, Office of Community OrientedPolicing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction forpolice to analyzing problems within the context ofproblem-oriented policing.

• Using Research: A Primer for Law EnforcementManagers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G.LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explainsmany of the basics of research as it applies to policemanagement and problem-solving.

47Other Guides in This Series

Other Guides in This Series

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series:

1. Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001.2. Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001.3. Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001.4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes.

Rana Sampson. 2001.5. False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001.6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001.8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001.9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002.10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V.

Clarke. 2002.11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002.12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002.13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002.14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002.15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002.16. Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002.17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002.18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel.

2002.19. Misuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

Companion guide to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series:

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide forPolice Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002.


Other Related COPS Office Publications

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook for LawEnforcement. Timothy S. Bynum.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years.Michael S. Scott. 2001.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: CaseStudies in Problem-Solving. Rana Sampson and Michael S.Scott. 2000.

• Community Policing, Community Justice, and RestorativeJustice: Exploring the Links for the Delivery of a BalancedApproach to Public Safety. Caroline G. Nicholl. 1999.

• Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and AdvancingCommunity Policing. Caroline G. Nicholl. 2000.

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime andDisorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships. KarinSchmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott Phillips, Tammy Rinehart andMeg Townsend. 1998.

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police seriesand other COPS Office publications, please call the Department ofJustice Response Center at 1-800-421-6770 or check our website atwww.cops.usdoj.gov.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, NWWashington, D.C. 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call theU.S. Department of Justice Response Center at 1.800.421.6770

Visit the COPS internet web site at the address listed below.e12011408 Created Date: March 13, 2002

www.cops.usdoj.gov

Documents

Burglary of Retail Establishments - ASU Center for Problem ...€¦ · Burglary of Retail Establishments Ronald V. Clarke This project was supported by cooperative agreement #99-CK-WX-K004