Bulatom Annual Forum, Bulgaria, Varna - Riviera, 2-4 June 2011 LICENSING PROCESS FOR BELENE NPP: CURRENT STATUS AND NEXT STEPS Tinko Ganchev Head of Department

Bulatom Annual Forum, Bulgaria, Varna - Riviera, 2-4 June 2011

LICENSING PROCESS LICENSING PROCESS FOR BELENE NPP:FOR BELENE NPP:

CURRENT STATUS CURRENT STATUS AND NEXT STEPSAND NEXT STEPS

Tinko GanchevTinko GanchevHead of DepartmentHead of Department

Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory AgencyBulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency

LICENSING PROCESS LICENSING PROCESS FOR BELENE NPP:FOR BELENE NPP:

CURRENT STATUS CURRENT STATUS AND NEXT STEPSAND NEXT STEPS

Tinko GanchevTinko GanchevHead of DepartmentHead of Department

Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory AgencyBulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency

Bulatom Annual Forum, Bulgaria, Varna - Riviera, 2-4 June 2011 2

Content of the presentationContent of the presentation

1.1. IntroductionIntroduction

2. Legal requirements on licensing and safety 2. Legal requirements on licensing and safety assessmentassessment

3. Regulatory review of Belene NPP TD, ISAR 3. Regulatory review of Belene NPP TD, ISAR and PSAand PSA

4. Additional analyses and discussions of 4. Additional analyses and discussions of selected safety issuesselected safety issues


1. Introduction1. Introduction


Main Advantages of AES-92 Main Advantages of AES-92 Design- Generation III LWRDesign- Generation III LWR

•• Provision of a “core catcher” for severe Provision of a “core catcher” for severe accident cases, leading to a core melting accident cases, leading to a core melting and reactor pressure vessel breach and reactor pressure vessel breach

• • Long design operation life time: 60 Long design operation life time: 60 provisional years of operationprovisional years of operation

• • Substantial reduction of core damage Substantial reduction of core damage frequency : frequency : ~10 ~10 -7-7/y/y


Main Advantages of AES-92 Main Advantages of AES-92 Design- Generation III LWRDesign- Generation III LWR

•• Two individual completely Two individual completely independent reactivity control independent reactivity control systemssystems

• • Redundancy for all safety functions Redundancy for all safety functions provided by the use of both active provided by the use of both active and passive safety systems and passive safety systems

• • Use of a special double containment, Use of a special double containment, designed to withstand a large range designed to withstand a large range of internal and external eventsof internal and external events


2. Legal requirements2. Legal requirementson licensing and safety assessmenton licensing and safety assessment


Legislation applied to Legislation applied to licensing new nuclear facilitylicensing new nuclear facility

• Primary legislationPrimary legislation– EU legislation, Conventions, Constitution of the Republic EU legislation, Conventions, Constitution of the Republic

of Bulgariaof Bulgaria– Act of the Safe Use Act of the Safe Use

of Nuclear Energy (Nuclear Act)of Nuclear Energy (Nuclear Act)– Energy ActEnergy Act – Environment Protection Act Environment Protection Act – Act on the Territorial StructureAct on the Territorial Structure

• Secondary legislationSecondary legislation

- - 2222 regulations for the application of the Nuclear Act regulations for the application of the Nuclear Act


Nuclear Act: Nuclear Act: Types of Authorisations Types of Authorisations

° permit for site selectionpermit for site selection° order for approval of the selected siteorder for approval of the selected site° permit for designpermit for design° order for approval of the technical designorder for approval of the technical design° permit for constructionpermit for construction° permit for commissioningpermit for commissioning° licence for operationlicence for operation° licence for decommissioninglicence for decommissioning


Main NRA regulations Main NRA regulations applied during licensingapplied during licensing

• Regulation for the procedure for issuing licenses Regulation for the procedure for issuing licenses and permits for safe use of nuclear energy (2004)and permits for safe use of nuclear energy (2004)

• Regulation on ensuring the safety of nuclear Regulation on ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants (2004)power plants (2004)

• Regulation on basic norms of radiation protection Regulation on basic norms of radiation protection (2004)(2004)

• Other relevant regulations issued under the Other relevant regulations issued under the Nuclear ActNuclear Act


Regulation on Ensuring the Regulation on Ensuring the Safety of NPPsSafety of NPPs

Design limits and safety assessmentDesign limits and safety assessment

• Acceptance criteria for the barriers;Acceptance criteria for the barriers; • Radiological and other technical Radiological and other technical

acceptance criteriaacceptance criteria • Frequency of a large radioactive release Frequency of a large radioactive release

into the environment that requires into the environment that requires undertaking of immediate protective undertaking of immediate protective measures for the population shall not measures for the population shall not exceed 1E-6 events per NPP per year.exceed 1E-6 events per NPP per year.


Regulation on Ensuring the Regulation on Ensuring the Safety of NPPs:Safety of NPPs:

Safety Analysis and AssessmentSafety Analysis and Assessment

• Plant safety shall be analyzed using Plant safety shall be analyzed using deterministic and deterministic and probabilistic methodsprobabilistic methods to verify and confirm the to verify and confirm the established design basis and the effectiveness of established design basis and the effectiveness of defense in depth arrangement defense in depth arrangement

• Postulated initiating events (PIEs)Postulated initiating events (PIEs) shall be also analyzed shall be also analyzed

• Computer codes, analytical methods and plant models to Computer codes, analytical methods and plant models to be used in the safety analysis shall be verified and be used in the safety analysis shall be verified and validated, uncertainty of the results shall be quantifiedvalidated, uncertainty of the results shall be quantified


Safety Margins and Safety Margins and UncertaintyUncertainty


Probabilistic Safety Criteria of European Utilities Probabilistic Safety Criteria of European Utilities (EUR): (EUR): more restrictive than the criteria of the IAEAmore restrictive than the criteria of the IAEA EUR Probabilistic Safety Targets:EUR Probabilistic Safety Targets: - Core damage frequency: CDF<1 E-5- Core damage frequency: CDF<1 E-5 - Frequency of release>limited impact (LI): 1 E-6- Frequency of release>limited impact (LI): 1 E-6 - Early or large release frequency (ELRF): 1 E-7- Early or large release frequency (ELRF): 1 E-7 IAEA Probabilistic Safety Targets for future IAEA Probabilistic Safety Targets for future plantsplants(INSAG 3, 1999)(INSAG 3, 1999) - CDF: 1E-5 per reactor year - CDF: 1E-5 per reactor year - LRF: 1E-6 per reactor year- LRF: 1E-6 per reactor year

Examples of international Examples of international safety and reliability safety and reliability

criteriacriteria


3. Regulatory review of TD, ISAR 3. Regulatory review of TD, ISAR and PSA for Belene NPPand PSA for Belene NPP


Current Licensing Current Licensing StatusStatus

AprilApril 2008 2008

Application Application

forfor Design Design

ApprovalApproval

Review

and Assessment

of Submitted

Documentation


Main documents Main documents subject to subject to assessmentassessment

• Technical Design (TD)Technical Design (TD)• Interim Safety AInterim Safety Annanalysis Report (ISAR)analysis Report (ISAR)• Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA)Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA)

-Amount of the technical documents submitted: > 30 000 pages-Amount of the technical documents submitted: > 30 000 pages


Internal expert opinionInternal expert opinion

•Within the BNRA frames

•According to approved program - stages, experts, terms

Review and assessment by Review and assessment by consultantsconsultants

• ISARISAR – Riskaudit– Riskaudit International International ((GRS & IRSNGRS & IRSN))

• Chosen technical designChosen technical design solutions solutions – – EnproConsult Ltd.EnproConsult Ltd.

• PSAPSA - - IAEAIAEA in the frame of national TC projectin the frame of national TC project

BNRA rBNRA review and eview and assessment process:assessment process:


In-depth analyses of selected safety In-depth analyses of selected safety issues by Riskauditissues by Riskaudit

1. Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Study

2. Core-Catcher Features and Performance Investigation

3. Coupled ATHLET-COCOSYS analysis for a BDBA LOCA DN80

4. ATHLET BDBA analysis Small break DN80 and total loss of power for 24 hours

5. COCOSYS accident analyses for NPP Belene

6. Structure mechanical analyses of the containment behavior

7. Analysis of the resolution of the IAEA Safety Issues for WWER-1000/V-320 Nuclear Power Plants for Belene NPP

Review and Review and assessment of the assessment of the

ISAR (Rev.0)ISAR (Rev.0)


•Total amount of experts’ report – 1000 pages

•There are no issues that could not be resolved

Classification of the Review 2008-2009Classification of the Review 2008-2009 recommendations :recommendations :

• Class 1 – essential for safety “Must do”• Class 2 – having an effect on safety “Should

do”• Class 3 – without significant effect on safety

“Nice to have”

Results from the review of TD Results from the review of TD and ISAR (Rev. 0) and ISAR (Rev. 0)


Review and assessment of Review and assessment of the Technical Designthe Technical Design

EnproConsult Task: Review and assessment of EnproConsult Task: Review and assessment of chosen design solutions chosen design solutions

• Geotechnical issues • Primary circuit• Hermetic construction• Safety related I&C systems (including software) • Control Systems• Systems for management of severe accidents• Reliability of chosen main structures • Analysis of the fire risk and protection measures• Analysis of the measures for ensuing seismic

safety• Measures for ensuring radiation protection


RReview and assessment of TDeview and assessment of TD and ISAR – Rev.2and ISAR – Rev.2

New contracts withNew contracts with Riskaudit Riskaudit and and EnproConsult signed in May – July 2010EnproConsult signed in May – July 2010

• Task 1:Task 1: Review and assessment of the Revision 2 Review and assessment of the Revision 2

of TD and ISARof TD and ISAR

• Task 2:Task 2: Performance of part 2 of research oriented Performance of part 2 of research oriented

activities and generic oriented in-depth studies for activities and generic oriented in-depth studies for

selected safety issues and accident scenarios selected safety issues and accident scenarios

identified in the course of TD and ISAR review with identified in the course of TD and ISAR review with

a special focus on the novel passive safety systemsa special focus on the novel passive safety systems


Review and Assessment Review and Assessment of the PSAof the PSA

National TC project supported by the National TC project supported by the IAEAIAEA Assessment of PSA:– Preliminary Mission – February 2009– IPSART Mission for assessment of PSA Rev. 0 -

May 2009. Final Report - August 2009– Follow-up IPSART Mission, PSA Rev. 2 - October 2010. Final Report - February 2011

Importance ranking of findings:Importance ranking of findings:

- “HIGH” - “MEDIUM” - “LOW” - “N/A” - “HIGH” - “MEDIUM” - “LOW” - “N/A”


Review and Assessment Review and Assessment of the PSAof the PSA

Conclusions of the PSA review:

• Large number of findings of the IPSART Mission has been resolved in the PSA Report Rev.2

• Some of the PSA issues can only be resolved during the detailed design stage when the required details will be known and available


4. Additional analyses and discussions 4. Additional analyses and discussions of selected safety issuesof selected safety issues


BNRA internal review of BNRA internal review of consultants’ recommendationsconsultants’ recommendations

High level decision-making group has been created in High level decision-making group has been created in the BNRA:the BNRA:

Task:Task: To review and assess all the recommendations made To review and assess all the recommendations made by the BNRA experts and by the consultants and to take a by the BNRA experts and by the consultants and to take a decision about their importance for the current licensing decision about their importance for the current licensing stage - approval of the designstage - approval of the design

Results:Results: Class 1 recommendations (must be resolved Class 1 recommendations (must be resolved before approval of the plant design):before approval of the plant design):• RiskAudit – 83RiskAudit – 83• EnproConsult – 31EnproConsult – 31• Total – 114Total – 114List of missing Topical reports has been preparedList of missing Topical reports has been prepared


NRA internal review of NRA internal review of consultants’ recommendationsconsultants’ recommendations

Further analyses and discussions Further analyses and discussions

needed:needed:

NovelNovel passive safety systems: passive safety systems:

-- Molten Core Retention System (“Core catcher”);Molten Core Retention System (“Core catcher”);

- Passive secondary Heat Removal System (PHRS);- Passive secondary Heat Removal System (PHRS);

- Quick Boron Injection System (QBIS)- Quick Boron Injection System (QBIS)

- Containment structure and PHRS - airplane crash impact- Containment structure and PHRS - airplane crash impact

Dual use of some systems for normal operationDual use of some systems for normal operation

Systems and components classificationSystems and components classification

Submission of additional Topical reportsSubmission of additional Topical reports


EU (ENSREG) “Stress EU (ENSREG) “Stress tests” analysis of Belene tests” analysis of Belene

NPPNPP

“Stress test”: Stress test”: targeted reassessment of the safety targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs.margins of NPPs.

Technical scope:Technical scope:

a) Initiating events: earthquake; flooding;

b) Consequence of loss of safety functions from any initiating event: loss of electric power, including station black out; loss of ultimate heat sink; combination of both;

c) Severe accident management issues: loss of core cooling function; loss of the cooling function of the fuel storage pool; loss of containment integrity


EU (ENSREG) “Stress tests” EU (ENSREG) “Stress tests” analysis of Belene NPPanalysis of Belene NPP

Progress report Final report

Licensee report August 15, 2011 October 31, 2011

National report September 15, 2011 December 31, 2011

• The final National report will be subject to a peer review process• The EC will present a progress report to the EU Council for the meeting scheduled on 9th December 2011 and a consolidated report for the meeting scheduled for June 2012.

Timeframe:


Next licensing stepsNext licensing steps

Design approval order

Construction permit

Commissioning permit

Operating License

Documents

Bulatom Annual Forum, Bulgaria, Varna - Riviera, 2-4 June 2011 LICENSING PROCESS FOR BELENE NPP: CURRENT STATUS AND NEXT STEPS Tinko Ganchev Head of Department