This article was downloaded by: [Ananda Abeysekara] On: 16 December 2011, At: 03:18 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Culture and Religion Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcar20 Buddhism, Power, Modernity. Gathering leaves and lifting words: Histories of Buddhist monastic education in Laos and Thailand Ananda Abeysekara a a Virginia Tech, USA Available online: 07 Dec 2011 To cite this article: Ananda Abeysekara (2011): Buddhism, Power, Modernity. Gathering leaves and lifting words: Histories of Buddhist monastic education in Laos and Thailand, Culture and Religion, 12:4, 489-497 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2011.626110 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

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  • This article was downloaded by: [Ananda Abeysekara]On: 16 December 2011, At: 03:18Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

    Culture and ReligionPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcar20

    Buddhism, Power, Modernity. Gatheringleaves and lifting words: Histories ofBuddhist monastic education in Laosand ThailandAnanda Abeysekara aa Virginia Tech, USA

    Available online: 07 Dec 2011

    To cite this article: Ananda Abeysekara (2011): Buddhism, Power, Modernity. Gathering leaves andlifting words: Histories of Buddhist monastic education in Laos and Thailand, Culture and Religion,12:4, 489-497

    To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2011.626110


    Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

    This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

    The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representationthat the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of anyinstructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primarysources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.


    Buddhism, Power, Modernity

    Gathering leaves and lifting words: Histories of Buddhist monasticeducation in Laos and Thailand, by Justin Thomas McDaniel, Seattle:

    University of Washington Press, 2008, 392 pp., $24.69 (paperback), ISBN: 978-


    Seemingly belonging to the specialised area-studies subject of Buddhist monastic

    education in Southeast Asia, this text by historian of Theravada Buddhism

    McDaniel (2008) seeks to intervene in (and reorient) the broader debates and

    questions about colonialism, power, post-colonial life and religion by making a

    set of grand theoretical claims. The text critiques a presumed post-colonial

    argument about the relationship between colonial power and vernacular

    religion, and between elite power and non-elite (Buddhist) life. Central to this

    critique is the conceptualisation of power in general and modern (colonial and

    post-colonial) power, as something distinct from, and opposed to, some local

    Buddhist monastic life in particular. This critique is based on the presumption

    that elite power is never total (p. 18). This presumption more or less forms the

    basis of the argument. Perhaps unaware of the well-known Foucauldian

    productive notion of power, which does not negate, repress or control but

    enables and authorises, the author understands power in a negative moralist,

    repressive sense of being elite, separate from non-elite life. However, if power

    is something only (colonial and post-colonial) elites exercise, elite power must,

    by necessity, constitute an excess of life, in which power becomes something

    abnormal and external to life. According to this logic, since non-elite Buddhist

    monks do not have and cannot exercise power, they must be more normal and

    ordinary than elites. And since elite power is not total, non-elite life then

    constitutes the normal total life. Despite the frequent use of the term in the

    humanities and popular discourse today, who can possibly determine what

    constitutes an elite life, let alone elite power, unless one thinks of power in

    terms of some excess of life such as violence? If so, non-violence, as opposed to

    power/violence, would constitute the normalcy of life!

    Governed by this moralistic sense of elite power, the author speaks of an

    internal colonialism to refer to the supposed takeover (pp. 220, 292) of Buddhist

    educational institutions by local Marxist and royal elites, who ultimately sought

    to colonise and control non-elite life by way of specific monastic reforms in

    Laos and Thailand. Given this sense of power, despite the texts claim to disavow

    any sense of orthodox Buddhist life, non-elite life eventually becomes a form of

    orthodox, historical life that must be separated and liberated from the violence of

    ISSN 1475-5610 print/ISSN 1475-5629 online

    q 2011 Taylor & Francis



    Culture and Religion

    Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2011, 489497




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  • elite power. This orthodox, non-elite life is one in which local Buddhist monks

    were creative agents (p. 18), who, though influenced, were not impacted by

    powers external to local life. The practice of local monastic life was based on

    their own traditions, histories and experiences, which changed on their own terms

    over time. This creative monastic life involved the practices of lifting words

    (yok sab) from Pali canonical and non-canonical texts and creatively engaging

    with them (p. 7). We find this local monastic creativity in (pre-modern)

    pedagogical texts such as vohara, nissaya and namasadda, which are

    idiosyncratic lecture and sermon notes around the selected translation of

    words and passages from individually chosen canonical and extra-canonical Pali

    texts (p. 122; emphasis added). In a culture of translation unique to Lao and

    Thai monkhood, the vernacular practices of learning and teaching Buddhism

    have changed in modern times. This change is found in the shift from texts to

    media-based approaches to learning Buddhism today. The modern study of

    Dhammapada (verses), separate from their traditional commentarial narratives, is

    one example; a similar change is seen in the way Abhidhamma texts are used for

    ritual purposes. All this change reflects the dynamic agency and creative ways

    in which monks expressed themselves (pp. 122, 168), even using trans-local

    methods in modern times, without aping the West (p. 209). The Pali canon as

    such plays no role in these practices of learning Buddhism. Some monks do not

    even know Pali. What matters is the vernacular translation and manipulation of

    Pali texts and words.

    Here, following the lead of other historians of Buddhism such as Anne

    Blackburn and Anne Hansen, McDaniel accuses other scholars of being

    orientalist for trying to remove creative agency from monastic life. The

    prejudice for the original true meaning or original intention over the living,

    evolving traditions still plagues much of the early and Theravada Buddhist

    scholarship and does not acknowledge the creative work of individual Lao

    monastic teachers and scholars. The preference for Pali has caused the Lao

    vernacular and Buddhist-inspired literature and ritual to be overlooked (p. 178).

    Tradition evolves; what evolves lives; what lives becomes creative. Creativity

    supposedly becomes the internal essential condition of Buddhist monastic life

    that resists and overcomes the impact of external elite power. Indeed, creativity

    becomes its own condition and predicate. Monks were creative because they were

    motivated to be creative (pp. 51, 84, 122). This becomes one of several

    tautological arguments that occur repeatedly in the text. One wonders about

    individual Buddhist monks who fail or are not motivated to live a Buddhist

    life of creativity, since every individual monk, like every human being, cannot be

    creative, inventive or expressive! Consider living a life always trying to be

    creative, inventive and expressive. This is why Nietzsche (2002) argues that one

    often mistakes inventing (Befindung) for discovering/finding (Erfindung).

    This is also why Heidegger (1996) argued against an entire Western tradition,

    that life is not something one lives by way of being creative or expressive; rather

    one finds oneself in life/existence (Befindlichkeit), into which one is thrown

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  • (geworfen). And compare this with what Asad (1993) has called disciplinary

    practices that constitute religious life. One can find no creativity to life, much

    less any individually chosen expression of it, in such disciplinary practices of


    These questions of life/existence/practice are lost on the author as he is too

    quick to supplement Buddhist life with a Western secular attribute like individual

    creative agency, the very Western attributes from which the text ironically seeks

    to liberate Buddhist monastic life. This liberal sense of Buddhist life remains at

    work throughout the texts moralistic conception of power, which in turn

    translates into a number of other moralistic distinctions and divisions: canonical

    Buddhism vs. non-canonical Buddhism, Western modernity vs. non-Western

    modernity, discourse vs. power, internal life vs. external force and central state

    vs. vernacular life. These distinctions and divisions are continuously and

    repetitively asserted throughout the text even as it claims to do away with them.

    Despite the authors occasional attempts at qualifying a few terms by way of

    putting quotation marks around them, these distinctions remain decisive to the

    text. However, this repetition, by way of the logic of determination if it can be

    called a logic is presumed to pass for a historicalempirical actuality about the

    difference in and divisibility of human (Buddhist) life in general.

    The author of course wants to tell us otherwise: the story he tells is

    supposedly based on a complicated Buddhist history that he locates on the

    ground, undermining trendy scholarly orientalist presumptions about modern


    There is a trend in Southeast Asian studies to focus on the rupture between thepresent and the past, the early modern and the modern, the precolonial and thepostcolonial, the preprinting press and printing press periods. For the Buddhisthistory of Northern Thailand, the question of when modernity began is complicated.Northern Thailand was only tangentially colonized, although there was influencefrom American Christian missionaries in the nineteenth century, and from British,Dutch, and French traders and travelers as early as the sixteenth century.Industrialization, global advertising, and tourism did not seriously impact the regionuntil the late twentieth century. Marking the advent of modernity with the arrival ofthe Westerners in the region reveals an orientalist Eurocentric perspective, however.Can one talk about modernity without talking about the West? (p. 97; emphasisadded)

    Here, the questions of who/what (the West) influenced, and who/what did

    not seriously impact whom and until when, are quite boldly and self-evidently

    determined. This is ultimately an attempt to determine the innate difference and

    opposition between the West and the East. Once qualified with quotation marks,

    the influence of the West is acknowledged, as if one cannot escape it and as if it

    is something that merely passes or flows by. But the influence (of the West) on the

    East is denied the seriousness of an impact. There is flawed logic here: An

    impact becomes an impact by virtue or shall we say the law? of it being

    serious. That is, an impact is something that can be determined because it does

    not merely pass by; an impact stays around, long and visibly enough for the

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  • scholar to determine its presence, its actuality. This logic comes by way of the

    following repetitive, tautological claim: an influence was not an impact because

    said influence had only little effect or little lasting effect; or said influence had

    no effect, lasting effect, or no long-term or widespread effect (pp. 27, 48, 56,

    90, 105, 110, 113); or more simply, the actual effects of [elite] control were

    minor (p. 110). Thus, for an impact to be an impact, said impact must have an

    effect (p. 201). In plain tautological terms: the influence of colonial and post-

    colonial elite power did not have an impact because it had no effect! The claim is

    repeated so frequently that one loses count.

    Thus, the text makes the seriousness of determining an actual impact

    seemingly more serious by saying that it must have an effect. But, as Nietzsche

    argued in many instances, what constitutes an effect cannot be determined by the

    most discerning, without the impossible task of determining what supposedly

    gives rise to an effect, the effect of all effects, the origin of origins, if you will, the

    cause (Ursache). The task of determining an effect and its origin/cause becomes

    more serious for the text because it is an attempt to determine an effect across an

    expanse of time and (geographical) space in Laos and Thailand. (Recall that the

    text assures us that the West had no long-term or widespread effect on the East.)

    Here, since the question of effect is always a question of origin, the text

    reproduces the same problem of being concerned with original true meaning

    or the original intention over the living. Also, as it seeks to understand Buddhist

    living/life in terms of the question of cause/effect, the text becomes implicated in

    a long Western logocentric problem. Again it is an irony that a text that claims to

    talk about [Eastern] modernity without talking about the West already

    subsumes Eastern lives into a Western problematic.

    The author ostensibly resolves this problem by providing a history of the

    traditions of vernacular Buddhist monastic education. Here this history, followed

    by conjectures and suspicions, becomes the medium through which the

    relationship between cause and effect is presumably determined. He tries to

    position these vernacular traditions against, and separate them from, the efforts

    (by both colonial and local royal [precolonial] and post-colonial individuals and

    states) to reform monastic education. The story here becomes redundantly

    familiar. In Laos, French colonisation had little impact on how the local Buddhist

    monks taught, learnt and practiced Buddhism. There were Western travellers and

    missionaries who made pejorative, derisive (p. 34) and condescending (pp. 26,

    45, 58) commentary on what they saw as the great pomp, ritual and ceremony of

    Buddhist monastic life. Even the French administrators spent more time setting

    up coffee plantations, mining tin and cutting trees, and less time building schools,

    hospitals and roads (p. 27). The French administrators of course sought to

    separate secular schooling from religious. However, once again: Generally the

    French separation of secular schooling from ritual, festival, and community

    religious life made little impact on monastic approaches to education (p. 27).

    This is so because much of it was mere rhetoric that did not amount to making a

    real impact: There is a difference between the rhetoric of modernity and the

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  • ideology of reform and initiation and implementation of reform on the ground

    (p. 22; emphasis added). (An effect is also determined by way of

    implementation! After all, to implement something is to put something into

    an effect! No socialpolitical discourse would have any impact until it is

    implemented). Further examples of the lack of such effect/implementation are

    given. Some French scholars of Buddhism came to Laos (from Cambodia) to

    promote the study of Pali because of the general attitude that Pali was the

    original and superior language of learning (p. 40). They even established

    institutions such as the Institut Bouddhique and the Pali school; The Pali school

    was one small part of the hopes of the French linking Cambodia and Laos

    culturally as well as economically and politically (p. 43). But again none of this

    made any real impact/effect because there certainly seems to be little direct

    colonial influence on Lao monastic education (p. 42). After all, the colonisers

    never forced (pp. 4851) monks to study Pali; they did not oppress or

    discourage the monastic education (p. 31). Rather, the French encouraged the

    monks to study (p. 39); so there was no explicit oppression (p. 63).

    The absence of this explicit colonial oppression in Laos leads to a new

    perspective on the nature of colonialism:

    The Lao case presents a new perspective on the nature of colonialism andOrientalism. There was not an overwhelming and internally consistent colonialideological machine that attempted to change all modes of Lao intellectual andreligious expression. The motivation of many EFEO scholars was not simplyorientalist. That is, they were not simply trying to discount the local . . . (p. 42;emphasis added)

    Here, I need not remind the reader of the vast amount of literature

    demonstrating why colonialism never was or never had to be internally

    consistent in any colonised place. But what needs to be noted is the texts logic

    of understanding colonialism: colonialism made no impact because there was

    neither direct implementation nor motivation; nor was there an over-

    whelming and internally consistent colonial machine to change local

    Buddhist expression. An impact is also then to be determined by the consequence

    of it being overwhelming and internally consistent. Here, the bar is set very

    high for colonial power to do anything to produce an impact on local life.

    However, the sense of thinking that supposedly denies colonial power having an

    impact on local life ironically grants that colonial power unlimited freedom. By

    this logic, colonial power can do almost anything and everything and still not

    count as having impacted or changed the local Buddhist culture. Given the

    unlimitedly broad and expandable senses of the words, no action would ever

    qualify for the criterion or the consequence of being overwhelming and

    internally consistent. True to the definitions of the words, even if colonialists

    did overwhelm an entire Buddhist local culture if such a thing were possible

    such action still would not qualify for being overwhelming since it must be

    internally consistent as well. That is, for an action to be internally consistent,

    it must meet the impossible criterion of being unchanging over a period of time.

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  • This is an impossible thing to decide. No one can ever decide what is internally

    consistent in terms of the scope, reach and expanse of time. Here, time becomes

    an excess of itself that can never be determined as it can expand itself infinitely.

    More simply put: How much time would count for something to be internally

    consistent? How much time should something have had to qualify for having

    remained unchanged for a consistent period of time: 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000 or

    many more years? But ironically it is this impossible thing that the text claims to

    know and determine when it uses the above language, to decide what did and did

    not cause an impact/effect. I point out the decisive importance of this flawed

    choice of language to the text because this is a work by an author versed in many

    languages who claims to be attentive to the complex use of languages in terms of

    languaging that goes into monastic practices of lifting words from texts.

    This so far is the upshot of understanding power in moralist terms.

    Unchanged by (underwhelming) colonial power, monks educated themselves

    in Buddhism, without much interest in the study of Pali or canonical texts of

    Buddhism. After all, Laos is the only Theravada country where there is no

    complete Pali canon. Most monasteries have no canonical texts. Even if there

    are canonical texts, they remain dusty and unopened (p. 66). The monastic

    curriculum is one in which Pali is not taught except through gloss and

    explanation of Pali words in sermons (p. 67). This creative task of lifting words

    from the texts and commenting on and explaining them in sermons is the

    languaging of Pali. Again, these creative monastic agents were hardly

    impacted by external efforts to standardise the monastic curriculum in Laos,

    either by the colonial state or by the Marxist regime. Despite decades of

    French, American, Russian and Thai influence, Lao monastic education has

    developed and maintained its own, unique curriculum (p. 67). Even the Marxist

    state could have no impact on monastic practice: Marxists who came to control

    the monastic institutions not only encouraged monks to get involved in politics,

    but they also forced the monks to attend indoctrination seminars aimed at

    demonstrating the relationship between Marxism and Buddhism, trying to

    dismantle their power base and structure (p. 58). Note in particular the

    comparison/contrast here: like the French, the Marxists encouraged monks;

    but unlike the French, Marxists forced monks. Force ultimately belongs to the

    native Marxists, not to the French colonialists. Even the force of the Marxists

    had no impact because the Lao Sangha has had a long tradition of overcoming

    reform, repression, economic and demographic declines, and government

    interference (p. 63). The Buddhist monastic life is ultimately not affected by

    elite power. The effect of monks own uniqueness is the effect of their own

    history of overcoming reform.

    All this does not mean that Buddhism is apolitical by nature in Laos or other

    places; indeed it is often highly political and revolutionary in many Buddhist

    countries and cultures (p. 63). However, Buddhism is not political in Laos as it is

    in other places because there is simply no evidence that links Buddhism to

    rebellion (p. 63). There is no evidence because there was no large-scale or

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  • consistent rebellion (p. 63). The author writes with familiar logic: In short, Lao

    monastic educators have never fostered large-scale or consistent rebellion

    against king, colonialist, or communist (p. 63). In this definition of what

    constitutes political Buddhism, the very idea of the political/politics is strangely

    equated with rebellion (Based on this logic, think how large scale any action

    by any person or group must be to ever be considered to qualify as political, as it

    must involve consistent rebellion! By the same logic, the so-called religious

    right in the USA would never be considered as political since it has never

    engaged in rebellion? By the same logic, Buddhist monks in other places like

    Sri Lanka, who are inevitably different from the uniquely Laotian apolitical

    monks, must be political/rebellious). Now my point here is not that Buddhism is

    political. Rather, the very idea that Buddhism is not apolitical makes possible

    the separation between Buddhism and politics in the first place. The idea is part of

    the general secular story that religion can be politicised. That story, as we know,

    has broad and sinister implications, particularly when it concerns questions of

    Islam today. The idea that religion is or can be political in turn makes possible

    questions (comparativist or otherwise) about which religion/religious life at

    which time is or is not political. In such questions, political/politicised religion

    not to mention the politicised lives of those who supposedly live it can become

    an object needing rectification. Given the texts equation between political

    religion and rebellion, political/rebellious religion then can face whatever

    (necessary, legal or military) force of rectification, a force that can decide not

    only what counts as rebellion but also if rebellion is large scale or consistent,

    warranting the force of law. Thus, the notion that Buddhism is not apolitical is

    not an innocent or an isolated academic gesture. It reinforces the force of law to

    decide what does and does not constitute political Buddhism. The force of law is

    always a force of decision.

    The story of Sangha life continues in the ensuing discussion of pre-colonial

    Thai (Siam) royal and post-colonial attempts to reform monastic study in

    Thailand. Thailand has a long history of efforts by royal powers to reform the

    monastic life and curriculum, which this text traces from the sixteenth century

    onwards. Among them, the Sangha Act of 1902 sought to introduce sweeping

    changes into monastic life including standardising the monastic curriculum and

    making monks sit for particular examinations. But once again these efforts had

    little effect outside the capital and did not fundamentally change the lives of the

    urban and the rural poor. The new Buddhist education created by the elite has

    had little commerce among the vast majority of monks and novices in Thailand

    today (p. 105). To demonstrate further how none of this had any effect, the

    author also gives statistics of a vast number of monks who did not take

    the royally mandated examinations. Number becomes important in determining

    the lack of elite impact on poor monks as it decides between vast and small,

    and between majority and minority. Even though a small number (some 3%)

    of monks took the examinations, that small number does not simply count as a

    real impact/effect. The author takes this to be a self-evident fact, even as he

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  • doubts that statistics provide an entirely actual account. I cannot get into all the

    problems associated with this statistical sense of majority/minority, which

    scholarship has discredited. The privileging of statistics/number to determine an

    impact is symptomatic of the separation that the text makes between discourse

    and power. In so doing, the text reduces the idea of reform to a difference

    between what is done and what is said, and between what is actual and what is

    rhetoric and ultimately between writing and speech itself (On this view, any

    monk who talked about these reform efforts would not count as having been

    affected by them, as what they said does not appear in and is irrelevant to real

    statistics). But we know that this separation between discourse and power is not

    tenable. And this is why some of us (Abeysekara 2002) have argued that reform

    is not a feature of a determinable reality but a feature of a discourse. Discourse

    is power irreducible to a determinable effect manifesting in number. Imagine

    saying that a discourse like racism has no effect/power because it is mere

    rhetoric and not an implemented law. But given the texts above sense of

    effect/reality, nothing becomes real unless it is really implemented, on a large

    scale and in internally consistent ways. And since even implemented things

    like the Sangha Act eventually ended up having no real effect on monks, it

    seems that nothing (external) ever makes an impact/effect on monastic life.

    However, that nothing has an effect on monastic life is ultimately the effect of a

    more original cause, which is the monks own, internal history of overcoming

    reform. The effect becomes its own cause. Nietzsche (1968) would say that this

    happens when a habit confuses a consequence for a cause.

    I am not denying at all any of the monastic practices that the text presents.

    To some of us who are at least familiar with Buddhist monasticism in other

    places, there is of course nothing new, vernacular or dynamically creative about

    some of these practices. We know that in places like Sri Lanka, for example,

    many poor and even wealthy monks do not have a Buddhist canon or

    canonical texts; they too lift or take words from texts in their sermons and

    writings. Also I am not suggesting that the texts argument is flawed because we

    should see such monastic practices as effects of a larger context of political

    reforms discussed here. Rather, the kinds of logic employed above make it

    impossible to think of monastic practices/lives in ways other than the

    problematic divisions into which they are inserted. These divisions are not real;

    the text decides them to be real because it simply assumes them be opposed to

    each other. The truth of what really happened (i.e. what did and did not affect

    what) is then determined from such opposites. Needless to say, we hardly learn

    anything new about these monks or these oppositions apart from the

    assumptions on which they are based. In some instances, such divisions are

    merely the product of the misreading of works of well-known figures. For

    example, in one final touch, the text tries to reiterate a widely criticised notion

    of hybrid modernity (p. 249) i.e. Western modernity is not the same as

    modernity everywhere only by misconstruing a short eight-page

    interview/article by Asad (1996) on modern power. Asads entire body of

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  • work is precisely against such a division of modernity, the division that remains

    central to this texts organising normative sense of power.


    Abeysekara, A. 2002. Colors of the robe: Religion, identity, and difference. Columbia, SC:University of South Carolina.

    Asad, T. 1993. Genealogies of religion: Discipline and reasons of power in Christianityand Islam. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Asad, T. 1996. Interview: Modern power. Stanford Electronic Humanities Review 5, no. 1:18.

    Heidegger, M. 1996. Being and time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: SUNY.McDaniel, J.T. 2008. Gathering leaves and lifting words: Histories of Buddhist monastic

    education in Laos and Thailand. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.Nietzsche, F. 1968. The will to power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale.

    New York: Vintage.Nietzsche, F. 2002. Beyond good and evil: Prelude a Philosophy of the future, trans. Judith

    Normann. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Ananda Abeysekara

    Virginia Tech, USA

    E-mail: [email protected]

    q 2011, Ananda Abeysekara

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