Buddhism and Politics in South-East Asia: Part One

Social Scientist

Buddhism and Politics in South-East Asia: Part OneAuthor(s): Francois HoutartSource: Social Scientist, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Oct., 1976), pp. 3-23Published by: Social ScientistStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3516522 .

Accessed: 24/06/2014 21:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Social Scientist is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Scientist.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.214 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 21:07:15 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=socialscien

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3516522?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


FRANCOIS HOUTART

Buddhism and Politics in South-east Asia

PART ONE

THE POINT of view developed in this article is sociological, of how in various societies religious and political systems are interrelated in mutual dependence and why this is so. Although it means falling back on history as a basis, the logic followed is not chronological but of interrelations. However it is in terms of a historical perspective essential for understanding the present that the subject matter is divided.

South-east Asia, and Sri Lanka in south Asia, fall within the compass of this study. Apart from Vietnam, all profess Theravada Buddhism, a legacy of the Hindu kingdoms which emerged from the colonization with its origin in north India and extending as far as the Champa kingdom in Vietnam. The conquest of Sri Lanka took place sometime before the third century before Christ. In Burma, Indian colonization started in the first century of the Christian era and in Thailand and Java in the second. The kingdom of Fu-nan was established in the first century, distinctly marking the Indian presence in Cambodia. In the fourth century, colonization spread to Malaysia and a Hindu kingdom was founded in Sumatra. While Laos remained within the Khmer or Thai sphere of influence late into the thirteenth century after Christ, Borneo and Bali came under Hindu monarchies in the fifth and sixth centuries. As for Champa, the first Hindu dynasty dates from the second century A D.



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

It was much later that Theravada Buddhism appeared on the scene. It was introduced into Cambodia in the tenth century A D, Burma in the eleventh, Thailand in the thirteenth and Laos in the fourteenth centuries. In Sri Lanka Buddhism was preached by Asoka's missionaries, soon to become the official religion of the island. Burma got it before the first century A DI. Buddhism together with Hinduism is found in Champa and Java from the fifth century. Thailand from the sixth, Sumatra from the seventh, Cambodia from the

tenthl, Vietnam (with the Ly dynasty) in the eleventh century and in Laos from the thirteenth centurv of the Christian era.

It was Brahmanisr that followed the flag of Hindu colonies and kingdoms. Buddhism, a latecomer, coexisted with Brahmanism as

long as the colonies were essentially mercantile in character. Theravada Buddhism was later adopted as oflicial religion probably-for the moment a hypothesis-when feudal regimes were established by appropriation or strict control of the means of production, namely, land and water or both.

Socio-political Background

In Buddha's time, north India was a patchwork of small kingdoms tracing their origin to the various clannic groups. They were dominated

by the religious system of Brahmanisirm which imposed a class division of the o)rnas. In the hierarchy, the Brahmins, or the religious agents, constituted the dominant class. The Kshatriyas in the second rung were

kings and administrators. Agriculture and trade were reserved for the

Vaisyas. At the bottom as a servile class stood the Sudras. Each social

category was knit together by strong kinship relations which were at the basis of the jatis, corresponding to lineages.

As the Brahmanic tradition laid down the divine origin of social

hierarchy, and kinship relations regulated the internal organization of

social groups, allegiance to the varnas became the norm. The weak development of the productive forces induced the rajas

to make war for the acquisition of the surplus produced by their

neighbours. They were not so much keen on annexing territories as on

imposing tributes. The peasants, vulnerable in such a situation, paid the

Kshatriyas a part of their surpluses in return for protection. A sizable

part of the surplus was also absorbed by the Brahmins who developed an elaborate system of religious practices linked inseparably with animism. All the groups which could afford it were seeking symbolic protection through religious observances, sacrifices and recitation of the

;naitras. The Sudras, deprived of a disposable surplus, were practically excluded from these religious safeguards.

Brahmanism slided into a state of decadence to which Buddhism and Jainism were reactions. Buddha came from the Kshatriya

group which, because of the hegemony of the Brahmins, was losing its

4



BUDDHISM AND POLITICS

authority and revenues. Buddha's sermons proclaim rejection of the Brahmanic beliefs and practices, refusal to recognize a God, spirits and

magic, to be replaced by the personal effort of man, detachment from all that is conducive to unhappiness. He also advocated the end of social

inequality perpetuated by the varna system and religious sanctions. By the institution of the sangha, Buddha aimed at a separation of religion flom the state, and preached that men of religion should not get involved in political matters.

These were the social conditions out of which Buddhism arose, which provide the key to an understanding of the values that Buddha wanted to introduce.

The connection between Buddhism and the state is central to this

alnalysis. In all the countries under review, a fundamental link had been established (and still exists in the case of Thailand) between the monarchical political system and Buddhisrn. T'he main question is to know why. We will have recourse to history again, starting with India in the third century B C and continuing with some sociological analyses and reflections about the relations between Buddhism and the state.

State Religion

Buddhist expansion in India followed the development of a rmer- cantile economy which originated in the north during the seventh century B C and in the south from the third. From the seventh century B C, Persia and its capital city Seleucia attained a degree of economic development which made it, for several centuries, the centre of west Asia. Persian

lmerchants came to north India and encountered the political atomization and the peculiar socio-religious situation already described. This is why Cyrus made the conquest of a part of north India in 530 B C, to assure for himself the riches of Kashmir. Two centuries later one of his successors, Darius, unified all the kingdoms on the great merchants' routes between India and Seleucia. It was also the beginning of the formation of merchant groups among the Vaisyas and of important commercial centres in the Indo-Gangetic plain. Alexander the Great who defeated Darius did not remain for long in the commercial ccntres of the territories for-

merly occupied by the Persians, but he succeeded in politically unifying the small kingdoms anid laid the foundations of the empire that the Mauryan dynasty built.

Foreign occupation lasting for more thaln two centurics and the development of the mercantile activities rmant a serious blow to Brahmanism, especially in the urban milieux. The cities Nwere not only commercial centres, but foci of political activity. As centres of consum-

ption and absorption of the economic surplus, marny Buddhist and Jain monasteries established themselves in these cities, bringing the Kshatriyas and the Vaisyas into close contact with the new religions. M-ilitary and

5



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

mercantile operations called for some rational thinking and behaviour associated more with the Buddhist philosophy than with the animistic

practices of decadent Brahmanism. However it was only when the royal houses adopted Buddhism as a philosophical and ethical system that it

penetrated to all strata of the population and more particularly to the rural areas.

Contrary to common belief, Asoka was not the first king to adopt Buddhism. The credit goes in all probability to the Haryanka dynasty which founded the kingdom of Magadha (at present Patna and south

Bihar). Expansion however coincides with Asoka because of the vastness of his empire. The adoption of the principles of dharma by his people constituted for the emperor a guarantee of peace within a rational political and administrative system.

Buddhism and the Monarchy under Asoka

After the conquest of Kalinga which was the last of a long series of

battles to achieve the unity of the empire, Asoka faced a new political responsibility. The Mauryan kingdom was not built on the direct appropriation of the means of production (land), but on the surplus produced by mercantile activities and on taxes paid in exchange for protection. In this sense it was not, strictly speaking, a feudal mode of production. Typically enough, the king did not appear as a tyrannical autocrat, but as protector of the people. As a rule, each unit in the kingdom retained its

autonomy and traditional leadership, with the clannic organization at the base. Hence the concept of social contract between the king and the

various groups (the former clans). This could be found also in the

southern kingdoms later on, the Pandyans of Tamil Nadu and the Cheras

of Kerala. Such a concept was in conformity with Buddhist philosophy constituting the groundwork on which stood the Buddhist social concepts of kingship.

Asoka who conquered other kingdoms needed a potential unifying and reinforcing element for his empire and this was the main reason (not so deliberate) which made him adopt Buddhism as the ideological

pattern. It was more functional for the rational activities of the ruling

groups than the animistic type of Brahmanism, and simultaneously

suppressed the caste barriers to salvation. The utilization of Pali, the

popular language of the time, helped the diffusion of Buddhist ideas

among the common people. Buddhism became for all practical purposes a state religion, but it

was never imposed by force. Propagation of the faith was assured by

preaching of missionary monks far and wide, and support of the sangha. Buddhism was a useful means of ideological unification, but not an

ideological justification of political power through supernatural means. This was to come later on, under the influence of Hinduism. For the same reason the emperor was never deified. Not only would this have

6




been contrary to Buddhist teaching, but it was superfluous in view of

royal authority based on social contract. For these reasons the alliance with the sangha assumed special

importance. The sangha acted as the instrument of religious propagation and also as a guarantor of its orthodoxy. The ideological function of Buddhism being essential for the unity and peace of the empire the monks had a central role. This is why Asoka paid close attention to details of religious doctrine and organization. He convened the Third Buddhist Council and finalized the official canon. As protector of the sangha, he exercised control over its functioning and built 84,000 pagodas all over the empire. Needless to say, the sangha furnished a firm

guarantee for the legitimacy of the king. Thus was established an intimate relationship between the political and the religious systems.

It has been necessary to dwell on this historical period, because Asoka became for all Theravada countries the archetype of State-Religion relationship, well into our own time.

Defender of the Faith

The pattern established by Asoka has been followed wherever Theravada Buddhism has a foot-hold. This is a fact to be confirmed before going into the causes. The main reason for the intervention of the monarch in sangha affairs was that he was considered the protector of the Buddhist faith. This is why for example, Pali texts were regarded as the authorized versions. King Anuruddha of Burma (1044-1077) brought the Pali canons to his capital city Pagan.s In Burma again in 1871, King Mindon Min presided over a revision of the Pali canons4. The same thing happened in Ceylon.5 The king was hailed as protector of Buddhism in Laos8 and Thailand.7

As a consequence, the attention given to the sangha was considerable. Not only were the kings caring for its temporal requirements as in the long history of the Singhalese kingdoms8, but they were also

preocccpied in matters spiritual, like the institution of the bhikkus by King Siuligna Vongsa of Laos, (1637-1694)'. Reform of the sangha was also one of the royal prerogatives as King Dammazedi of the Mon (1472- 1492) did in Burma'?. It happened in Ceylon on various occasions: King Dharma-suriya (1687-1707) established contact with other Theravada countries, purged the sangha of undesirable elements and renewed links between the different nikayas '. A few years later, King Kirthi Sri Rajasingha reorganized the sangha with monks from Siam, which led to the constitution of the Siam nikaya, main guardian of the orthodoxy in Ceylon.' 2

The special responsibility of the king was exercised directly or

indirectly. In Ceylon, the king was considered the sangharaja, or the head of the sangha8 . There were instances of the king assuming for himself the role of the central head. King Kirthi Sri Rajasingha tried it

7



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

ill Ceylon, but not with success.14 In Burma the lhathanabaing (sangharaja) was appointed by the king. 5 It was the same in Thailand, where the supreme patriarch is still appointed for life by the king, after consulta- tion with the sangha. 16 The third way of exercising this influence was

through a department of religious affairs under the king's direction. In Burma a lay official, the mahadantwun was responsible for the support of the sangha. 7 In Ceylon a separate department' 8, and in Thailand the krom dharmakara, was assigned to this job.'

Once the clannic mode of production was replaced by a monarchy the political system became dominant, determining directly or indirectly the economic functions of the various groups. However it needed some kind of a unifying force. As long as the king fulfilled a purely intermediary function, like in the mercantile societies, he had no need to introduce any religious system as an ideological basis for the unity of the

kinlgdom or his own authority, the main reason being that he was able to get a good part of the surplus through his intermediary role and through granting protection. There was no need to take direct control of

tile means of production. But as soon as other circumstances arose, new

coinsequences came in their wake. For Asoka, the social function of

religion was to build up the ideological unity of ari empire, not a

kingdom. Other kingdomrs had been conquered in order to icinforce the mercantile economy of norith India. Religion was an important tool for

creating unity, but it did not become the ontological explanation, nor the moral justification of the position of the king.

Kings Divine

Was the protection given to Buddhism by the kings of south and south-east Asia of the same type as in the case of Asoka or are we dealing with something different? Before the introduction of Theravada

Buddhism, Hinduism, Buddhism and even other religions had co-existed in south India (Pandyans, Cholas), in the Champa kingdom between the first century AD and the eleventh (when it was destroyed by the Anna-

mites), in Burma during the second and third centuries AD, in Java and in Sumatra in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries and in Cambodia in the ninth and tenth centuries. This was clearly related to the mercantile

economy reflecting the situation analyzed before. After the introduction of Theravada Buddhism a new phenomenon emerged: the deification of the kings.

Nothing in Buddhism lends support to the deification of the kings reacting as it does strongly against the belief in divine beings. The Buddha himself was a man, who showed the "vwav". We shall first see how deification of kings was incorporated into the religious system out of a social demand and examine why Theravada and not Mahayana Buddhism became associated with it.

Two religious traditions converged in the apotheosis of the

8




monarchs: the idea of the dharmaraja which had a Hindu origin20 and the concept of bodhisattva in Mahayanism. In the Hindu kingdoms, the deification of kings had been more the result of concrete religious practice than of a doctrinal approach. It dated from the time when kings began to take a major part in the life of the temples and when alongside the statues of the deities they placed their own. People associated them with the deities among whom in popular belief the king became one. It is also at around this time that important ceremonies came to be performed by Brahmins on the occasion of coronation or enthronement.

All this was evidently related to new situations in the mercantile kingdoms, where the kings were obliged to exercise a tighter control on the local social units, in order to assure their share of the surplus. Most of the south-east Asian kingdoms passed through such a process. The Hindu origin of the "divine king" explains the Brahmins' place in the order of precedence even until the present time. In Burma till the abolition of the monarchy, Brahmins were attached to the court as clergymen, astrologers and even magicians (which reveals the influence of tantrism)." In Thailand grand ceremonies were regularly performed with pomp and circumstance especially for the coronation of the kings.aa Brahmins were always associated with this ceremony. In Laos at the court of Luang Prabang Brahmins were present2

s and in Ceylon they performed functions of purohita (counsellor) till the end of the monarchy. However their religious function did not appear as developed as in the kingdoms of south-east Asia.

Bodhisattva Concept

If influence of Hinduism can explain a certain continuity in the religious practices around the person of the king, the introduction of this idea in the Buddhist system had another origin. In Mahayanism the role of the bodhisattva was quite central as a person retarding access to the nirvana for the few, (in order to help the many) or as a future Buddha. This had been applied quite universally in the south-east Asian kingdoms. It was the case in Siam during the whole history of the three kingdoms of Sukothai (1230-1350), Ayudhya (1350-1767) and Bangkok (since the eighteenth century) and in Burma2' and Laos.26 In Ceylon it was even thought that the king had 32 marks on his body, characteristics of the bodhisattva.27 In Cambodia, Jayavarman VII (1181-1215) considered himself as bodhisattva lokesvara and placed an image of himself as a Buddha in the Bayon temple, with replicas in all the provinces.28

In some cases it went even further, especially in Burma or in the regions under Burmese influence, and in Cambodia. A messianic trend existed relating the king to the next laitreya Buddha and making of him a chakravartin (universal king.)29 This persisted till the nineteenth century, ,when, for example, King Bodawpaya of Burma founded a new Buddhist nikaya, the paramat, because the sangha refused to recognize him as a

9



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

Maitreya Buddha. 0 In Ceylon this divine quality had been recognized (after death) in Ananda who had been sent by Asoka.83 In Siam, the first king of the Chakkri dynasty was also considered a chakravartin.'8 In Cambodia, the concept of the Buddha Maitreya was a direct import from China.38

The bodhisattva concept does not imply the apotheosis of the

person, as it would really contradict the Buddhist faith, and the Theravada tradition in particular. But there is a remoteness between official inter-

pretation and popular belief. This is true of all the religious systems. It is quite understandable that the concept of bodhisattva will lead to some kind of deification even if this word has to be used with caution because of its many connotations. In Ceylon the great processions (peraheras) celebrating the Buddha as well as the Hindu deities were held with the

participation of the king who made his appearance as "the king of

gods"."8 In Burma the people considered the king as a living Buddha or divine king, 5 as they do even today in the rural areas of Thailand.

Deification under Feudalism

Deification of the king happens when an arbitrary power has to be

justified. This was obvious in Ceylon when absolute kingdoms were established and feudal relations built between the king and the people in the villages. The appearance of deification corresponds to the passing of the clannic society to the feudal, or of a mercantile society where the

king has a role of intermediary (social contract between groups) to a feudal monarchy. The former seems to be the case in Ceylon and the latter in most of the other kingdoms of south-east Asia.

Religious explanation for social mechanisms is typical of all traditional societies because of the weak development of the productive forces and in particular of the knowledge about nature and society. However all traditional societies do not have god-kings who are found when royal power becomes totally arbitrary and when the control of the sources of production (Asian mode of production) or their direct appropriation (feudal mode of production) is monopolized by the sovereign. This arbitrary power must have a justification, and only the supernatural explanation of 'divine will' can provide it86 in addition to buttressing the

solidity of the social order. The way this objective is realized varies

according to the religious systems: symbolic in Hinduism (idols in the

temple, ceremonies for the enthronement) rational in Buddhism (the king as bodhisattva), theological in Catholicism (the king with a mission from

God, which is guaranteed by the Church). Everywhere the justification is

religious. It is only when religious explanations for social processes are

questioned by groups or individuals who view society as man-made that

problems are created. In Europe it happened with the development of mercantile capitalism: in south and south-east Asia, it was western colonialism which began to destroy the set pattern.

10




Following the social and religious aspects of apotheosis of kings in the Indian cultural tradition. it remains to formulate a hypothesis about the association between "divine" kings and Theravada Buddhism. Kings were deified before. But they invariably became divine after its introduction and many adopted Theravada Buddhism as a means of assuring their authority on the people. Buddhism was quite influential among merchants and this was surely the main reason why it penetrated all the mercantile colonies and kingdoms established by Indians in south-east Asia. Mahayana and Theravada coexisted.

King-Sangha Link in Theravada

In Theravada Buddhism, the sangha is quite pivotal, because of thl doctrine of nirvana which reserves it for the monks. The sangha in countries of Theravada Buddhism can also become a powerful instrument of ideological transmission, based on the reverence paid to the monks, who make their presence felt in practically all the villages. Celebacy of the monks facilitates institutional continuity sustained by recruitment and training (not birth) which make its control more stable and easy. All this was responsible for creating a general ethos in the country, including respect for the king as an indivisible part of it. The efficiency of such a latent function had to be guaranteed by its orthodoxy. Hence the importance of keeping an eye on dogma, recruitment and training of the moniks, and adherence to the Pali texts assuring restoration of doctrinal purity and moral strictness in times of decadence.

In order to assure the union between the sangha and the king, it was vital for him to be a Buddhist. At least in principle this was so, although in Ceylon, for example, Hindu kings were also protectors of the sangha. This unity formed the keystone of the social and cultural structure of all kingdoms. So the main reason for the adoption of Theravada Buddhism was structural rather than doctrinal. The king at the summit of the social pyramid was the protector of the sangha which in turn accorded legitimacy to him. At the base the Buddhist temple was the centre of the villages7 which was the primary unit of the feudal order, assured by the rajakariym (service to the king) in Singhalese feudalism, or as an autonomous social entity in most other cases. Theravada Buddhism prevailed side by side with popular beliefs in spirits, deities or even deified kings, because all these demands were related to temporal life, and not to the path to nirvana. They even encroached on the Buddhist temples without affecting the purity of the doctrine which was essential for the monks but not for the laity. So the synthesis with popular beliefs, due to the weak development of productive forces, was accomplished quite easily. One can even say that all the religious elements combined logically into a single system and not as a kind of syncretism more or less integrated.38

It is in this context that the divine nature of kings passes into

Ir



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

popular belief without destroying the Theravada orthodoxy of the

sangha. The introduction of the Mahayana concept of bodhisattva was one way of solving the problem within a Buddhist framework. The reason why Mahayana Buddhism was not adopted as a whole is probably because the sangha did not have the same significance in Mahayanism. According to it salvation is open also to laymen. The sangha therefore did not fulfil the same finction in the villages as in Theravada. Buddhism in Vietnam, if not elsewhere, was more of a folk religion close to the common people and thus mixed with former religious forms and beliefs. In contrast to the Theravada countries, there was no instrument of orthodox continuity. Various schools of thought existed among the

sangha.

The Mahayana Experience

Mahayana Buddhism spread to countries where the kings were not

Buddhist, but Confucian. No doubt some of them found in the Mahayana Buddhism functional elements, like the concept of chakravartin, but the association between Buddhism and political power in China, Korea, Japan or Vietnam, has been relatively provisional and of a different type. However the influence of Mahayana in some countries of south-east Asia has been very real, as in Burma and more especially in Cambodia, due to Chinese influence. In Vietnam, Mahayana Buddhism was the only one existing until recent times. Even though some kings adopted Buddhism for a short while, like the Ly dynasty in the eleventh century, Buddhism remained a popular religion generally not associated with the rulers and thus a possible factor of political opposition.89

Because of the link between the king and the sangha, as a rule Buddhist monks in Theravada countries did not intervene much in political life unlike in the Mahayana countries like Vietnam where Buddhists were often persecuted by the Confucian kings.4 This non-intervention has been noted in Burma, Cambodia and Siam. There were a few excep- tions, namely, in cases of tyranny, when the Buddhist ethos was not

respected by the ruler. It was, at least in Burma, a sign that the karma of the king had come to an end. When a king was overthrown by another, the

sangha lost no time to accord recognition and legitimacy to the successor as long as he was able to hold power. This brought Milford E Spiro to the conclusion that contrary to the Hindu dharma, which did not allow

any change in the position of the individual in the social structure, the Buddhist karma, without envisaging a possibility of structural change, was allowing positional changes. This has been, according to him, the basis of stability of the Buddhist kingdoms, while permitting change of rulers at the top.4

During several centuries the union between Buddhism and the state governed the political and religious lives of the Theravada countries. It fitted very well into the feudal or Asiatic mode of production

12




(the last one being characterized by the strong autonomy of the villages). It was to be progressively destroyed by the introduction of the capitalistic mode under European political and economic hegemony.

This investigation continues to pose the same question as to the reasons for a rapid or sometimes a gradual dissociation of Buddhism from political power. It has been observed that the birth of Buddhism and even more, its expansion, were not unconnected with political developments. What follows is an examination of the political conditions which led to the destruction of the structural unity in Theravada countries between Buddhism and the state.

Western Colonialist Takeover

It is European colonization which introduced capitalism into south and south-east Asia. Portuguese colonization has been important only for Ceylon, the kingdom of Kotte passing to the crown of Portugal in 1583, after some years of commercial relations and protectorate.'4 The Portuguese conquest was religiously legitimized as a "spiritual conquest" against the Moors to begin with, and the pagans afterwards. This is why the encounter between the Buddhist kingdoms and the Catholic colonial power did not lead to religious tolerance: Both political systems were relying on religious ideology, and the supremacy of the one over the other was necessarily expressed by the suppression of the religious system.48 However the Portuguese were not able to overrun the central part of Ceylon and remained on the coast. Buddhism continued to flourish in the kingdom of Kandy, which became the bastion of Theravada orthodoxy and sangha patronage.

Actual introduction of the capitalist mode of production began only with the great commercial companies, French, British, Dutch and so on, and with the political colonization of the nineteenth century. The countries of south and south-east Asia were brought into the orbit of the

capitalist system for extraction of raw materials, not through local development of manufacturing industries. Indian industry, in particular the textiles of Bengal, was suppressed in order to cut competition with British textile industry.

Three types of political strategy have been followed by the western

powers: suppression of kingdoms and royal power, submission of the existing states, and creation of a buffer state. The first strategy was

adopted by the British in Burma and Ceylon. Lower Burma fell into British hands in 1852 and Upper Burma in 1886. The kingdom of Kandy in Ceylon was abolished in 1815. The second strategy was followed by the French who retained existing monarchies, but established colonization

through so-called protectorates: Cambodia in 1884, Cochinchina in 1867, Annam in 1883, Tonkin in 1895 and Laos in two steps, 1914 and 1917.

The buffer state was Thailand not only because of the struggle between the French and the British, but also the cleverness of its rulers

13



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

who were able to avoid colonization. The first king who understood it was Narai (1657-1688). He introduced western elements into the royal court44 but political circumstances forced a reversal of this trend during the next 150 years. Buddhism was used during the nineteenth century as an efficient means of strengthening unity of the nation and relations between the king and the Buddhist faith along the traditional lines:

support of the sangha, control of the orthodoxy, appointment of the

supreme patriarch, and non-interference of monks in politics. It is only the American presence and the war in Vietnam which made some indirect but profound impact on an apparently stable state of affairs.

Sangha on the Wane

Once monarchy was abolished,as in the British-controlled territories, the sangha found itself in acute difficulties. The basis of material support was gone, and so was its role of protector and gurantor of orthodoxy, in other words, central authority. The consequences were disastrous for the sangha. In Lower Burma, the sangharaja lost his authority and the sangha began to splinter into numerous sects.' 5 When the office of thathanabaing fell vacant the monks asked the then political power, the British, to make the appointment. They refused, saying that they did not want to intervene in religious matters and that the monks had to elect the thatha-

nabaing themselves. This resulted in the division of the monks into two

groups. ' In Ceylon, the disappearance of the king had a profound impact

on the sangha. The secularization of the state by the British resulted in its thorough disorganization.4 7 Some monks wanted the Queen of England to intervene in sangha affairs. It may be recalled that the British had taken away the relic of the tooth of the Buddha, which was the symbol of political legitimacy. The relic was finally returned to the temple of

Kandy, but it lost its full political symbolism. In the two rebellions of 1818 and 1841, bhikkus took part hoping for a restoration of the kingdom.

Religious schools were being run in most of the Buddhist temples. The introduction of secular education through the initiative of colonial

governments or Christian missionaries was another cause for the weaken-

ing influence of the sangha. In Burma the loss of control of the school meant also a fall of enrolment in monasteries.'4 In Ceylon it became one of the major problems, especially because a quasi-monopoly of

English-medium schools had been given to the Christian churches.49 It is in British colonies that school education in a western language had been the most developed, consistent with the colonial policy of recruiting local people into intermediary jobs in government. In French-dominated Cambodia and Laos, however, the control of the educational system did

pass to the state: In Cambodia it dated from 1912, when some of the monastic schools were transformed into elementary public schools.50 Even in Thailand, the modernization of society did have similar

14




consequences. In 1896, schools were taken over by the state and it meant

equally a diminution of the influence of the sangha.5 What accelerated this process was the creation of a new Buddhist

lay elite. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, and especially at the beginning of the twentieth, many associations were formed like, for

example, the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) in Burma5 and Ceylon. In Ceylon the Buddhist revival and the temperance movement were important religious and political events led by the

laity.58 The sangha did not take the initiative in such movements even

though monks took part. The religious reforms had always been the

responsibility of the kings and not of the sangha. The abolition of the

monarchy left a void which was gradually filled by laymen. In Ceylon the movement for religious renewal was allied with nationalist tendencies,54 and Burma's religious revival showed strong influence of the movement in Ceylon.55

Rise of Westernized Elite

A weakening of the sangha was inevitable under these circumstances. When the preceding structure of society and culture had been

destroyed, the sangha found itself isolated. In Ceylon there was the additional problem of ordination of the monks, its legitimacy deriving formally from the king.56 It was clear that not only did the position of the sangha in society suffer, but serious internal problems came to the fore. The protection given by the colonial powers to the Christian churches was also an element of change. The Christian groups expanded their proselytizing mission. Their western origin as well as important cultural and social services (schools and medical work) to the colonial

political system put them in a privileged position compared to the sangha.

The creation of a local elite trained in western values was at the core of British colonial policy. In the French territories less importance -was attached to this process because the French were latecomers and also because they tended to make alliances with the former feudal

princes, maintaining a remote control of the local levels. In Cambodia and Vietnam, westernization was set in motion by the royal court.57 In Thailand, it was sponsored by the rulers, in particular, kings Mongkut

(1851-1868) and Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). In the colonial countries the new class was formed to serve as

intermediaries in the performance of two main functions. First and foremost was the extraction of surplus produced in the form of raw

materials, plantation products and taxes. Efficiency demanded a great number of persons at the service of the colonial power and able to communicate with the people. It was found cheaper to train people from the country itself and this is what the British did. In order to make them better servants of the British Crown they were educated, as

15



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

Maculay said at the beginning of the nineteenth century, into people with a British culture and a brown skin. The second function was the administration and policing of the territory including all the necessary services to maintain the work force and assure law and order. In the French territories the former ruling class was introduced into such functions and the new middle class developed less rapidly than in British colonies.

Clhallenge to Buddhism?

Asians were also attracted by western culture, because it constituted an essential factor of social mobility. As a rule these were

people from the higher strata of the traditional societies. A French- or English-medium school was the gateway to new social avenues. It was also the means of spreading the dominant ideology of bourgeois liberal- ism corresponding to the development of the capitalist mode of

production. This had of course all kinds of cultural consequences demon- strated in the attitudes to the traditional Asian societies and religions and to western domination. One of the main accusations levelled by Buddhist circles against Christian schools in Ceylon was that they were producing atheists.

Conversion to Christianity was no longer a pre-requisite for entry into the ideological pattern of the colonial powers (as under the Portu- guese) because the capitalist mode of production can do without a

religious ideology. In Europe it broke with religion more or less violently. Economic progress through rational exploitation of nature being clearly a human performance, reliance on divine justification became superfluous. However religious institutions had their use in implementing colonial policy and for the Asians at least provided a positive factor of social mobility. It was said that in Ceylon conversion to Christianity was a passport to the middle class. All the same, only a small minority embraced Christianity and the majority of the westernized elite remained Buddhist, at least nominally.

The new class was expected to remain subordinate to the colonial

power. In fact a dialectical process developed and large numbers entered progressively into the nationalist movement with varying degrees of conviction and enthusiasm. However, the occasional revolts which took place, generally of mass origin, were forcibly suppressed.

From the Buddhist point of view the formation of this new inter-

lmediary class was fraught with dire consequences. First, it prepared the ground for a new Buddhist elite, as already pointed out. Secondly it created an influential group having a secular ideology which could not envisage the union between Buddhism and the state. Thirdly, it developed new kinds of demands on Buddhism as a doctrine and as a religious system: correspondence between the Buddhist faith and modern science and appropriate religious expression, devotion and cult. Although

16




essentially an urban phenomenon, it created new responsibilities for at least a part of the sangha.

In south and south-east Asia most of the nationalist movements had their origin in the westernized social class situated in the social structure possibly at a vantage point for taking the initiative. The traditional types of social leadership were either abolished or left to exercise authority in the existing sectors of precapitalist societies. The masses of small peasants and agricultural labourers were kept under a double oppression, the traditional one and that imposed by the capitalist mode of production. They were generally unable to react, much less to organize themselves. The responses took the form of sporadic revolts, sometimes of entire groups: tribes promptly and violently repressed by the colonial armed forces. The only group able to react in this framework was the new "middle class".

Their place in the economic and administrative echelons, English education as well as entry into the social and cultural spheres of colonial society provoked a double claim: a bigger share of the surplus; and political participation in conformity with the liberal ideology of the west. Buddhism was not necessary for them as an ideological basis and it was considered by a good many as a backward albeit respectable cultural system. However, various factors brought them progressively nearer to Buddhism. First of all, normal and direct political activities were not allowed by the colonial rulers. It was only indirectly through religious movements or associations that these became possible. Secondly the entire national history of the countries was linked with Buddhism and thus nationalist movements began rediscovering these roots. Finally the necessity of links with the popular groups where Buddhism was well

implanted arose more and more when popular support became necessary, especially for elections in British territories towards the closing years of the colonial regime.

The Nationalist Connection

This explains why, to a certain extent, lay people were closely associated with the Buddhist renewal. It was particularly true in Ceylon, where the revival began around 1860." It penetrated to the new middle class, which was westernized and had an urban base.8? It manifested itself also in the publication of Buddhist literature which helped to create a new awareness of the traditional values.6' One of the leaders of

Singhalese nationalism was Dharmapala, a Buddhist layman. The temperance movement also played a major role, because it was simultaneously a reaction in favour of traditional Buddhist values and an attack on the source of revenue of the colonial power: It was religious and political, which the British found difficult to suppress. Even the early trade unions were linked with Buddhist revival in which the leaders of the labour movement were involved well into 1920. 2

17



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

In Sri Lanka the sangha's role was not so significant. Individual bhikkus did take part in intellectual work of some kind or the other but as a whole there had been no collective activity of the sangha. Immediately before independence a group of monks joined the more radical groups, even Marxist, to demand total independence from Britain, but it was a minority.63 In fact the great majority of monks were out of touch with the westernized elite. It must be remembered also that the low country had been occupied by western powers since the sixteenth century and that the activities of the bhikkus had been for long confined to the high country, the kingdom of Kandy. The nationalist movements developed in the low country, and only in the urban milieux while it was in the villages that the monks continued to maintain contact with the

people. In Burma during the closing decades of the last century and the

beginning of the present, the pattern was quite similar. Nationalism became perhaps more rapidly linked with Buddhism than in Ceylon, because of the more recent colonial hegemony. Several lay associations were very active, namely the YMBA and the General Council of Buddhist Associations,64 giving a religious tone to the nationalist movement.65 It was not uncommon to hear that "to be a Burman is to be a Buddhist".66 The resistance movements of 1885 to 1897 had active Buddhist leaders.67

Monks in Politics

The Burmese Buddhist monks took an active part in the nationalist movement. It was occasioned by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Act of 1819, integrating Burma into the Indian administrative set-up which appeared to the Burmese Buddhists as a real threat to their religion. Through the influence of Mahayana Buddhism, the monks had a tradition of political intervention. Immediately after the reforms began to be implemented the reactions surfaced. One leader came to the forefront, a Buddhist monk named U Ottama.68 In 1921 an organization of the politically-minded monks was formed, the Sangha Sametggi Council, and an year later the General Council of Sangha Sametggi which wielded a tremendous influence on the sangha. In the 1920s it was estimated that about 60,000 out the 80,000 monks were its members.69 In the early 30s the sangha was a real political power and when elections were organized, the candidates could not manage without the support of the monks. The colonial power reacted with repression. Quite a few monks were arrested and one of them died after a long hunger strike in prison in 1929.7 The intervention of the monks in political life engendered theoretical discussion on the link between the way to nirvana and the struggle for inde-

pendence.7 ' The old Buddhist tradition of the union between state and religion provided plenty of arguments for political intervention of the monks. More than a political attitude, it assumed the proportions of a struggle for Buddhism itself.

18




To Cambodia, with a marked Mahayana influence, political intervention of monks was perhaps less alien than in other Theravada countries. In 1942, 2000 monks took to the streets of Phnom-Penh in a demonstration against French colonialism. However it was in Vietnam that the Buddhist impact on nationalism took its immediate origin in the movement for the reformation of Buddhism itself. Indirectly it was also linked with resistance to western colonialism, because a part of the westernized elite became dissatisfied with western values and searched in the Buddhist tradition for new goals in life. This happened most markedly in the 1920s.72 In reality a lay movement, the sangha was also drawn into it. In the 30s, profiting from the surge for renewal, missionary monks from Ceylon introduced Theravada Buddhism, founding a monastery. Both Theravada and Mahayana contributed to the revival.

This became, for a part of the Vietnamese elite, the base of a nationalist movement. It tried to reintroduce the Vietnamese language as a reaction against the alien European culture as well as the old Confucian ethos of Chinese origin. In this sense the religious movement was modernist and was opposed by traditionalist groups. At the beginning the colonial power remained a silent spectator hoping that the strong religious aspect would help to divert the followers from political involve- ment. However, what it did was to create sympathy for the nationalist movement among the youth.7' There was also the rationalist-egalitarian trend, bearing the stamp of French Encyclopedists and the ideologues of the French revolution. This influence did not come through French colonization, but strangely enough, through China. It is in this tradition that some of the leaders of the communist movement were recruited. Others, most notably Ho Chi-minh, made their way directly into the Marxist thought and praxis and combined nationalism with the construc- tion of a socialist society.

The war interrupted the Buddhist renewal. While contributing to the development of nationalism especially in Annam and Tonkin, it never penetrated deeply down to the masses. It is also interesting that in contrast to what happened later on, the Buddhist monks did not participate in the political movements, even those which were nationalist.74

Kings of Siam

Thailand is a special case, but we may deal with it here, as Buddhism has been intimately associated with building national unity. There was no nationalist movement worth the name because the country remained politically independent. However there was a strong move towards westernization or, as it was called, modernization of society and political life. This was initiated by the monarchs themselves and being in the Theravada tradition, they continued to take seriously their role of protector of the Buddhist faith. At the same time they understood the

19



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

the -alue of Buddhism as a unifying factor in a country where centrifugal forces (the Lao population of the north in particular) were considerable and also as reinforcing the legitimacy of the throne.

Together with the nmodernization of the state, King MAongkut of the Chakkri dynasty who ascended the throne in 1851 after being a monk for 17 years started the renewal of the Buddhist faith. He reinter-

preted the dharrna, reformed the ordination ceremony for the monks, and organized the hierarchy and administration of the sangha. He founded the Dhymrnayuttika Nikaya apart from the Mahanikaya. This

congregation of monks, which spread later to Cambodia under Thai

influence, was stricter in its rules, and recruited an elite which was

promoted to the governing posts of the sangha (rajaganah, chief monks of the monasteries, or sangharaja). 7'

Mongkut's successor Chulalongkorn continued the same policy. In 1902 he proclaimed the reform of the sangha by giving it a national structure and one national head. He organized a national system of education for the monks and separated the sangha from political administration.76 Monks were forbidden to intervene in the elections.

Religious liberty was assured to those professing religions other than

Buddhism. However it was one of the king's brothers who was invested with the powers of sangharaja. In order to achieve national unity measures were taken to further integrate the watf (monasteries) of the

North and the Mon temples of Burrnese origin.7 Chlllalongkorn brought Yuan North and Siamese monks into the hierarchy. The Yuan congrega-

tion was finally integrated with the Thai sangha in 1935.

The close control over sangha life and protection of its doctrine

and material resources were assured by Chulalongkorn's successors even

after the abolition, in 1932, of the absolute monarchy. In 1962 the

Sangha Act organized the supreme council, formed by the sangharaja and the heads of the monasteries. The monks were still considered usefull

for the symbolic manifestation of national unity. So only Thai monks

were allowed to officiate. 7

Under Japanese Occupation

It is clear that in Thailand, Buddhism has been an important factor of political stabilization and national sentiment. The union

between the sangha and the king followed the traditionel pattern of

Theravada Buddhism but was accomplished within a framework of

progressive modernization of the state. This transformation meant a

slow introduction of the capitalist mode of production in the country. It

penetrated first through the political and cultural system, but as in

Japan, by the decision of the rulers. However the country was never

allowed to be taken over by foreign economic interests, neither was the

possibility envisaged of developing industrial activities on a large scale

before the Second World War started.

20 4L



BUDDHISM AND IOLITICS

Japan which professed to be a Buddhist nation x .anted to use the religious argument for its military expansion, especially in countries

occupied by non-Buddhist colonial powers. The Pan-Buddhist Movement was created for the purpose. Japanese forces occupied Burma in 1941 and supported a Burmese, Dr Ba Maw, who inaugurated a fascist regime. Under the advice of a Buddhist monk he utilized Buddhism as an instrument of political stability. First of all he resumed the kingly ceremonials. Then he called himself the protector of the sangha and reunified it. The site of the Shwebo pagoda in Rangoon was decl;red sacred ground.

A political association of monks was constituted to work for the

rclewal of Buddhism and collaboration with Japan. The Myanma MNlaha

Sangha Athin which tried to unite all the monks declared the war

against the Allies as a "sacred war". The end of the Japanese occupation marked the end of this movement, but it paved the way for the policy of U Nu in the 1950s.

The Pan-Buddhist Movemcnt was partly responsible for Thailand

joiningl the Axis powers in 1942. However when the war ended, Thailand

joined the Allies." " At the erd of the occupation in 1945, the Japanese declared Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam independent of the French, a

move welcomed by young Buddhists in Vietnam who supported Dr Tharn

and Emperor Bao Dai. At the same time a pro-Vict Minh group, the

National Vietnamese Buddhist Liberation Front, was formed )b the

Venerablc Thich Mat The, while Dr Tham and the Venerable Thich Tri

Quang founded the anti-Viet Minh Buddhist National Movement.9 '

Groundworkfor Nation-building

From a sociological point of view, Buddhism had its uses for thle

westernized class both as a cultural basis and a way of establishing links

with popular groups in the anti-colonial struggle. To a certain extent one

may compare this process with the rapprochemenz of a part of the European

bourgeoisie with the Catholic Church during the nineteenth century. The

church in Europe was for the European bourgeoisie a good ideological and social means of establishing its (moral and social) class hegemony.

It did not all happen without obstacles. A contradiction arose

when the western secular ideology of the state, internalized by the

westernized groups, encountered the traditional concept of the link

between Buddhism and the state. The western model of separation of

religion and state prevailed among the lay elite, while a part of the

sangha and some traditionalists were thinking of a rcstoration of the old

order, provoking some of the conflicts described in the second part of this

article. It may seem paradoxical that tthe introduction of capitalism

produced a religious reaction. This is mainly because it came from out-

side, provoking the development of a new class not directly integrated

21



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

into the new process of production, but indirectly through political or cultural channels. Real capitalist classes did not exist in the countries under review and the westernized groups were close to their cultural

origins. The part played by Buddhism in the collective ethos and

cultural expression of the peoples of the Theravada tradition of south and south-east Asia had been so profound that any national reaction could not but take it as a basis. It was true of most of the nationalist movements (also in Thailand) in their nation-building efforts.

1 Vidya Dhar Mahajan, History of India, Chand and Co., New Delhi 1976, pp 379-387. a Ibid., pp 172-173.

Heinz Bechert,Buddhismus. Staat und Gezleschaft in den Landern <des Theravada Buddhismus, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1967, p 4.

4 Ibid., p 54. Urmila Phadnis, Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka, Manohar, New Delhi 1976, p 41.

6 H Hechert, op.cit., p 40. 7 Wendell Blanchard, Thailand, I-zaf Press, New H-aven 1958, p 397. 8U Phadnis, op. cit., p40. 9 H Bechert, op.cit., p 300.

'o Ibid., p 4. " U Phadnis, op.cit., p 47. 12 F Houtart, Religion and Ideology in Sri L,nka, Hansa, Colombo, T.P.I., Bangalore 1974,

p 88-89. 8" Ihid., pp 90-91. ' Ibid., p 95. 5 H Bechert, op. cit., p 16.

' Fred von der Mehden, The Secula-risation of Thera,)ada Buddhism in Burma and Thailand

(manuscript) p 2. 7 Ibid., p 2.

1 U Phadnis, op.cit., p 42. 19 F von der Mehden, op.cit., p 2. 20 H Bechert, op.cit., p 162. s1 Ibid., p14. 22 Ibid., p 210. 28 Ibid.,p 294 24 Frank E Reynolds, "Sacral Kinship and National Development: the Case of

Thailand," Contributions to Asian Studies, Brill, Leiden, 1973, p 41. 25 E R Leach, Political System7s in Highland Burma, London 1954, p 113. 26 H Bechert, op.cit., p 294. 27 U Phadnis, op.cit., p 41. 28 H Bechert, op cit., p 222: F E Reynolds, op.cit, p 47. 20 H Bechert, op.cit., p 162. 8 Ibid., p 52. 8 F Houtart, op.cit, p 79. 82 H Bechert, op.cit., p 210. 88 Ibid., p 251. 84 F Houtart, op.cit., p 86. 18 H Bechert, op,cit., p 162. 86 F Houtart, op.cit., pp 478-479. 87 H Bechert, op.cit., p 322. 88 F Houtart, op.cit., p 92. 89 H Bechert, op.cit., p 324.

22




40 Ibid.,p236. '' Melford E Spiro, Buddhism and Society-A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes,

Allen and Unwin, London 1971, p 439. 42 F Houtart, op.cit., p 143. 48 Ibid., p 151. "4 H Bechert, op.cit., p 182. 405 Ibid., p 17. 46 Ibid., pp 18-19. 4 F Houtart, op.cit., p 208. 48 F von der Mehden, op.cit., p 7. 49 F Houtart, op.cit., p 213. 00 H Bechert, op.cit., p 227. 0 Ihid., p 197.

11 Iid., p 106. 08 U Phadnis, op.cit., p 74 04 F Houtart, op.cit., p 232.

5" H Bechert, op.cit., p 55. "I6 F Houtart, op,cit., p 219.

C5 H Bechert, op.cit., p 229. 08 F von der Mehden, op.cit.. p I1.

"9 F Houtart, op.cit., p 232. 60 U Phadnis, op.cit., p 70. 6I Ibid., p 67. 62 Ibid., p71. 68 Ibid., p 72: F Houtart, op.cit.,p 233. 64 H Bechert, op.cit., p 105. 60 F von der Mehden, op.cit., p 9. 6615 H Bechert, op.cit., p 163. 07 M E Spiro, op.cit., pp 383-384. 68 H Bechert, op.cit., p 107. 9O Ibid., p108.

70 Ibid., p110. 71 Ibid., p 164. 72 Ibid., p 326. 78 Ibid., p 327. 7, Ibid., p 325. 705 Ibid., p 182. 76 F von der Mehden, op.cit., p 12. 7 Charles F Keyes, "BBuddhism and National Integration in Thailand", The 7onrnal of

Asian Studies, vol XXX, no 3, May 1971, pp 552-553. 78 H Bechert, op.cit., p 192. 7 Ibid., 130. 680 Ibid., p 201. 8I Ibid.p 327.

23



Documents

Buddhism and Politics in South-East Asia: Part One