Buch BePro133 engl - Körber-Stiftung

133rd Bergedorf Round Table

Reforms in the Middle EastHow Can Europe and the US Contribute ?March 17–19, 2006, Washington, D. C.

Picture Documentation 1Participants 20Summary 21

Annex

Participants 110Recommended Literature 118Glossary 120Index 128Previous Round Tables 132The Körber Foundation 143Imprint 144

Welcome 23

I. EU and US Approaches 241. Definitions of the Middle East 242. EU and USA: Strengths, Weaknesses and Common Ground 253. The Middle East After the Invasion of Iraq 394. Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib 44

II. Regional Perspectives 471. The West and the Region’s Autocrats 472. Perceptions and Prejudices 513. The Arab-Israeli Conflict 564. Causes of Radicalism 585. Can the Middle East be Democratic ? 60

III. What Should Be Done ? 751. The Arab-Israeli Conflict 762. Iran 813. Instruments and Partners for Reform 894. Iraq 975. Transatlantic Cooperation 996. Turkey and Lebanon — Models for the Region ? 103

CONTENTS

Protocol

2120

INITIATOR

Dr. Kurt A. Körber

CHAIR

Dr. Theo SommerEditor-at-Large, DIE ZEIT, Hamburg

SPEAKERS

Professor Dr. Sadeq Al-AzmVisiting Professor, Princeton University, PrincetonDr. Khalil A. Al-KhalilMember, Committee of Security Affairs, Al-Shura Council, RiyadhHisham KassemVice Chairman and CEO, El-Masry El-Youm, CairoProfessor Dr. Elaheh KoolaeeAssociate Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of TehranProfessor Dr. Ernest MayProfessor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, CambridgeGhassan MoukheiberMember, Finance Committee, Lebanese Parliament, BeirutDr. Friedbert Pflüger, MdBParliamentary State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Defence, BerlinRuprecht Polenz, MdBChairman of Foreign Affairs Committee, German Bundestag, BerlinKurt VolkerPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State

PARTICIPANTS

Professor Dr. Ebtisam Al-KitbiProfessor, Department of Political Science, United Arab Emirates University, Al AinThe Hon. Howard L. BermanCongressman, U. S. House of Representatives, Washington D. C.VLR I Dirk BrengelmannHead of Division 211, USA, Canada, Security and Dis-armament Policy, West and South European States and Nordic Countries, Turkey, Federal Chancellery, BerlinDr. Patrick O. CohrsFellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, CambridgeDr. Haleh EsfandiariDirector, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D. C.

Joschka Fischer, MdBfmr. German Foreign Minister, German Bundestag, BerlinMDg Dr. Horst FreitagDirector General, Near and Middle Eastern Affairs and the Maghreb, Federal Foreign Office, BerlinDr. Werner Hoyer, MdBDeputy Chairman and Spokesman for Foreign Affairs, FDP Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, BerlinDr. Saad Eddin IbrahimChairman of the Board, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, CairoDr. Mohamed M. KamalMember, Committee on Education and Youth, Shura Council, CairoProfessor Dr. Gilles KepelChair, Middle East and Mediterranean Studies, Institut d’Etudes Politiques ParisHans-Ulrich Klose, MdBVice Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee, German Bundestag, BerlinDr. Marina S. OttawaySenior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C.Dr. Thomas PaulsenManaging Director, Bergedorf Round Table, Körber Foundation, BerlinProfessor Dr. James PiscatoriFellow, Wadham College and Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, Oxford University, OxfordAmbassador Janusz ReiterEmbassy of the Republic of Poland, Washington D. C.Ambassador Eric RouleauIndependent Author, ParisAmbassador Dr. Klaus SchariothGerman Embassy, Washington D. C.Dr. Peter W. SingerDirector, Project on U. S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, The Brookings Institution, Washington D. C.Professor Dr. William R. SmyserAdjunct Professor, Georgetown University, Washington D. C.Dr. Klaus WehmeierDeputy Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, HamburgDr. Richard von Weizsäckerfmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany, BerlinProfessor Dr. Samuel F. Wells Jr.Associate Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D. C.Christian WriedtChairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, HamburgDr. Gottfried ZeitzOffice of President Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin

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What contributions can Europe and the United States make to stabilize and mod-ernize the Middle East ?

The 133rd Bergedorf Round Table fundamentally analyzed the respective strengths and weaknesses of the United States and the EU (pp. 24–38). In the view of many, the robust, often short-term oriented US approach constitutes the direct opposite of the EU strategy, which takes a longer view but is criticized as lacking initiative and effectiveness. Does this view have a point ? How can the two approaches best complement each other ?

The discussion of contrasting perceptions and prejudices (pp. 51–56) was dominated by the allegation that, depending on its real political interests, the West applies a double standard in its attitude toward the region’s autocrats (pp. 47–51).

Regarding historical and cultural obstacles to democratization (pp. 60–66) in the Middle East, some of the region’s representatives called for patience and respect for regional peculiarities. Others said that cultural peculiarities were used as an excuse by the ruling autocrats, so as to delay reforms ad infinitum. These voices said many countries in the Islamic world have a democratic tradition and that potential support for democratic values there is just as strong as elsewhere. Can democratization from outside work (pp. 66–69)? While some of the region’s representatives said that open support for western actors undermines the credibil-ity of the democratic opposition, others considered outside pressure to be the only way to accelerate reforms. On the issue of instruments of democratization the discussion centered on the role of the media (pp. 71–73) as well as the importance of elections on the one hand and building up functioning systems for the political process and the rule of law on the other hand (pp. 69–71).

Primarily, however, specific challenges and political approaches to resolving them were at the forefront of the discussion. Did the Iraq war, as a “controlled earthquake,” set a positive dynamic moving in the region, or are incalculable secu-rity threats its chief legacy (pp. 39–44) ? How can the transatlantic partners prevent the situation from getting out of hand (pp. 96–101) ? What role do Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib play for the perception of the West within the Arab world and what course should the United States take in this regard (pp. 44–46) ? How do the region’s people regard the Arab-Israeli conflict (pp. 56–57) and how can the West help solve the conflict (pp. 76–80)? What strategies should the transatlantic part-ners adopt towards the nuclear dispute with Iran — what can the EU-3 achieve and what effects would direct talks between the USA and Iran have (pp. 81–86) ?

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SUMMARY

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How can the West effectively apply instruments such as mass media, finan-cial support, and conditionality (pp. 88–91) and what local traditions can be utilized (pp. 91–94) ? Can Turkey serve as a model for secular democracies in the region (pp. 103–107) or does the future lie in a dialog with Islamists, whose power appears to be growing steadily ? Secular reformers said that only the mostly repressive conditions in the Muslim world are responsible for the success of Islam-ist politicians — and that the West must reply by redoubling pressure on regional regimes to adopt democratic structures (pp. 94–97).

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Welcome

Let me welcome you to Dumbarton House, an outstanding exam-ple of Federal Period architecture and thus a legacy of the great formative years of US democracy. In these befitting surroundings we will speak about one of democracy’s present-day frontiers: the democratization and modernization of the Middle East. Partici-pants from the region, the United States, and the EU member states will analyze what Europe and America can contribute to-

wards triggering reform. Controversies between the transatlantic partners about the most promising strategy have risen to new heights since the US invasion of Iraq, and the topic will remain a major foreign policy challenge in the years to come. Theo Sommer, Editor-at-Large of »DIE ZEIT«, will moderate the discussion.

The Middle East, long known as one of the most dangerous cockpits of conflict in the world, has become even more unstable and insecure in recent years. The re-gion is at boiling point, Iran’s nuclear ambitions are frightening the world, Iraq is teetering between stabilization and civil war, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved, and Afghanistan is a far cry from being pacified. While we agree that a both protracted and painful transformation process lies ahead, it has not yet been resolved what Europe and the US can or should contribute to this process.

The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’

oral contributions.

PROTOCOL

von Weizsäcker

Sommer

EU and US Approaches 24 25 EU and USA: Strengths, Weaknesses and Common Ground

1. Definitions of the Middle East

Let us clarify the terminology before we turn to the specific problems at hand. I myself spoke about Afghanistan as part of the Middle East in my introduction. Af-ghanistan does not belong to the Middle East by traditional definition but is part of the so-called Greater Middle East, a term introduced by President George W. Bush at the G8 summit meeting in 2004 in his proposal for a new Western strategy for the region. When we speak of the Middle East, some of us will be using this new definition, whereas others will have other geographic boundaries in mind.

Our definition of the region affects our analysis and determines our political ap-proaches. Regardless of Western penchant for simplicity, you must precisely iden-tify your point of reference. Is it Lebanon, Syria, Egypt or Iraq ? Putting countries that do not belong with each other in the same bag affects our analysis: Lebanon has a free press, which did not stop the mob from torching the Danish embassy in Beirut. Even a free press does not always support liberal, Western points of view. Only a proper differentiation allows you to identify the West’s real problem.

The “Broader Middle East” is not a bad title, but a proper analysis requires preci-sion. One should not equate Yemen with Jordan, Lebanon with Saudi Arabia, Syria with Oman, or Egypt with its neighbor Libya. Yemen is far away from democracy, while Lebanon might have a chance to be democratic in the near future, and Syria is more similar to the pre-1989 Eastern European “People’s Democracies” than to any other regime in the Arab world.

Equating the Islamic world with the Middle East would be misleading. Not all societies in the region are monolithically Islamic and follow a traditional inter-pretation of the Qu’ran.

Vague definitions also hamper policy choices. The inaugural “Forum for the Future” 2004 in Rabat brought together representatives from the civil society of the BMENA nations including Iran and Turkey (Turkey was then part of the BMENA region, now it is involved in BMENA as a partner). Right from the start, transla-tors were needed because the Turks and the Iranians did not speak Arabic and the Arabs did not want to use English or any other third language. When Arab participants asked why Turks and Iranians were present, the answer was: because the Americans decided to include them in BMENA. How can the US hope to foster

I. EU and US Approaches

Sommer

MoukheiberOur definitions determine

our political approaches

KloseProper analysis requires precision

Moukheiber


interaction between the actors of civil society of a region if it artificially includes countries whose citizens need translation in order to interact with those of the majority of countries involved ?

I agree, each country in the Middle East needs a tailor-made individual approach.

Of course notions like “Middle East”, “Greater Middle East”, “Arab world”, “Islamic world” or “the region” are fuzzy around the edges. But for pragmatic reasons we have to hope that we share a conventional working meaning for all these catego-ries. If what holds true for the Arab world does not hold true for the Islamic world, we need to make that clear specifically.

The G8’s decision to aim at the “Broader Middle East” rather than at the “Middle East” in a narrower sense was of course a political decision. But airtight boundaries are objectively inappropriate for the Middle East because, for example, the situa-tions in Iran and Iraq are closely interrelated. The concept of the Middle East had to be somewhat broadened for practical purposes when conceptualizing policies.

The respective geographical definitions of the US and the EU initiatives are part of the competition for the region’s markets. Terminological issues have very practical implications in terms of agenda-setting and the distribution of funds.

2. EU and USA: Strengths, Weaknesses and Common Ground

Let us now speak about which approaches the transatlantic partners have used until now to foster reforms in the region. How do these approaches differ, where do they coincide, and in which way do they contradict or complement each other ? Ernest May, Charles Warren Professor of American History at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, will assess the present administration’s agenda against the background of American foreign policy tradition. Ruprecht Polenz, Chairman of the German Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee, will take a decidedly political approach.

Regarding the Bush Administration’s push for democracy in the Middle East, two questions occur to a historian. First: how new is the policy ? Second: what is its likely staying power ? Will “a democratic world” be an enduring US objective

Polenz

Al-AzmThe geographical definitions

are fuzzy around the edges …

Ottaway … but airtight boundaries are inappropriate

for the Middle East anyway

Moukheiber

Sommer

MayHow new is the Bush Administration’s policy

and what is its likely staying power ?

The Islamic world is not the the Middle East.

Moukheiber


comparable to the “open door” or “containment ?” Or will it be more evanescent, like Woodrow Wilson’s “make the world safe for democracy” or Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights ?

As for the newness of the policy, the answer depends in part on how one inter-prets US priorities. Its objectives include: (1) regional peace and order; (2) assured flow of oil; (3) internal liberalization bringing open elections, rule of law, equality for women, and greater religious and ethnic tolerance; (4) improved economic and educational opportunity for youth; and (5) abatement in terrorism.

Some of these have been long standing objectives of Americans though not necessarily of the US government. Broadly speaking, Americans have always seen Muslims of the Middle East as backward. Islam’s heyday came and went, after all, several centuries before the United States was born. In much of the nineteenth century, American missionaries were busier in the Ottoman Empire than in China. The American University in Cairo is one of their legacies.

As oil became important in the world economy, American individuals and firms became counselors to Middle Eastern rulers. Over time, the US government took a larger hand. During the Cold War, ambitious programs of economic and military aid sought to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining allies in the region. One need only recall the huge US contribution to the military build-up of Iran under the last Shah.

The seemingly novel ingredient in the Bush Administration’s approach is its emphasis on democratization as a primary means of achieving America’s multiple objectives. While this is new for the Middle East, it is hardly new in itself. Ameri-cans have consistently urged others to copy their political example. They did not at first recommend democracy. In 1804 Alexander Hamilton termed democracy a “disease” from which the United States could perish. Not until the 1830s did Americans become comfortable seeing a foreign analyst like Alexis de Tocqueville write of their country as a democracy.

Until the very end of the 19th century, the emphasis was simply on setting an example. In the formal empire acquired after the 1898 war with Spain, the United States introduced institutions like its own. Wilson went on to attempt to remake Mexico and parts of the Caribbean in the US image. His ambassador in London once explained to a British Foreign Secretary that Wilson’s aim in Mexico was, “Make ’em vote and live by their decisions.” To the question “But suppose they will not so live ?,” the ambassador replied “We’ll go in and make ’em vote again.” Asked “And keep this up for 200 years ?,” the ambassador answered, “Yes.

Americans have always seen Muslims

of the Middle East as backward

Democratization is an old aim

of American foreign policy

Even former American politicians termed democracy a “disease”.

May


The United States will be here in two hundred years and it can continue to shoot men for that little space till they learn to vote and rule themselves.”

The Senate’s rejection of Wilson’s peace treaties in 1919 seemed repudiation of his whole program, applying to democratization as much as to collective secu-rity. Subsequent presidents backed away from efforts to make Latin Americans vote and abide by their decisions. Franklin D. Roosevelt, though a Wilson protégé, is supposed to have said of one Caribbean dictator that he was “a son-of-a-bitch, but our son-of-a-bitch.”

During the Second World War, Roosevelt was cautiously Wilsonian, insisting that all peoples should have “the right … to choose the form of government under which they will live.” He did not rule out their choosing non-democratic forms of government such as that of America’s then-ally, the Communist USSR. During the Cold War, though American leaders praised democracy, they were generally content not to fuss too much about tyranny so long as the tyrants were our sons-of-bitches.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, American leaders groped to define the national mission. At one point, Bill Clinton’s National Security Adviser mystified the world by saying that the central objective of the United States was “enlarge-ment.” But interventions in Haiti and the Balkans evidenced an impulse to pro-mote democracy as well as simply stability and order. In brokering the Middle East process, US envoys steered Palestinians toward more open political processes.

Meanwhile, calling to mind Keynes’ maxim that the minds of political lead-ers are often captives of “some academic scribbler of a few years back,” it became fashionable for American political scientists to advance the neo-Kantian argument that democratic regimes had a propensity to be peaceful, at least in relations with one another. Meanwhile, economists who had previously seen democracy as a product of modernization began to argue that it might work the other way around.

The presidential election of 2000 brought to high positions individuals greatly influenced by these scribblers. Some also happened to be close to Likud and to champion a Middle East peace settlement that reconciled Muslim regimes to an Israel more or less coterminous with ancient Judea and Samaria. The neo-Kantian formula offered hope. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, combined with mistaken con-sensus concerning Saddam Hussein’s advanced weapons program, provided the catalyst for a military campaign to make Iraq the first in a chain of democracies bringing the Middle East peace, stability, and modernization.

The current government

agrees with the theory …

… that democratization

leads to modernization


Since the future of Iraq remains uncertain and problematic, it is an open question whether this particular experiment will be deemed a success or a fail-ure. Rhetorically, however, President George W. Bush has committed himself to the proposition that democratization is the means by which the world, and the Middle East in particular, will move to what his father vaguely characterized as a “new world order.”

Question two concerns the staying power of this US commitment to democ-ratization. In the past, the most important determinant of the vigor and life ex-pectancy of an American foreign policy in the United States has been, ironically, the depth of its roots in the American democratic system. Most foreign observ-ers — and many Americans — deceive themselves about the nature of this system. They ignore the truth that the American people express support for a policy not only through approval of a president but also equally through more fragmented communication to members of the Senate and House.

In many instances, presidents’ policies have turned out to be non-policies be-cause Congress withheld endorsement. The famous Monroe Doctrine had no sub-stance for three-quarters of a century. Only after the Spanish War and Theodore Roo-sevelt’s succession to the presidency did Congress make the doctrine a reality that actually deterred European powers from acting against nations in the Caribbean. The détente of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger was of even flimsier material. Congress made clear from the beginning that it would never endorse even-handed arms control arrangements along the lines of the original SALT agreement and would never accept Soviet control over Eastern Europe as a semi-permanent reality.

Thus far, neither Congress nor the public for which Congress speaks has endorsed aggressive promotion of democracy in the Middle East. If the Iraq War eventually turns out well, that could change. If Iraq never seems more tranquil or at peace internally than at present, it is not impossible that Congress will register disapproval tantamount to the disapproval of Wilsonianism registered after 1919.

For the moment, the best bet is that promotion of democracy will continue to be a feature of the US approach to the Middle East but not a dominant feature. George W. Bush’s initiative seems likely to have enduring effects resembling those of Jimmy Carter’s initiative on human rights.

How do the US’ and the EU’s policies regarding reform in the Middle East differ ? The United States’ current administration argues that terrorism is rooted in the

Bush has committed himself

to bringing democracy to Iraq

Thus far, neither Congress nor the public

has really accepted his aggressive strategy

Polenz


lack of freedom, and that this can be overcome through democratic development. Security at home is best secured by promoting freedom and democracy through-out the world. From that perspective, the path from September 11 to the invasion in Iraq follows a compelling logic. But the loss of US credibility following the war in Iraq gravely damaged Western efforts to promote democratization in the Mid-dle East. The war and the subsequent events — including the photographically documented brutal and inhuman treatment of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib — are not only a moral disaster for the United States but also have devastating effects for American foreign policy. Amr Hamzawy’s study „Zeitgenössisches politisches Denken in der arabischen Welt. Kontinuität und Wandel” concludes that the US intervention in Iraq reinforces the belief in the region that current US foreign policy aims at restoring the colonial status of the Islamic world. The impression that freedom, democracy and the declaration of human rights are only a pretext for enforcing American power makes more and more citizens in the Middle East loathe the US.

The Broader Middle East Initiative — meanwhile renamed to Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) — created to support democratization, has not yet yielded any results. One reason for that is that neither the EU nor G8 could agree with the United States on a common strategy. So what is the EU’s approach ?

The European Union focuses not on regime change through pressure and military force but on individual approaches to different countries and on a dialog with the existing regimes. The EU’s strategy is a long-term strategy approach on the assumption that democratization can only succeed if it arises alongside economic prosperity and political participation. The institutional foundations of democracy — transparency, pluralism and the rule of law — must be strengthened to trigger lasting changes; democracy consists of more than elections.

As the local political elites have little desire for reform because they want to retain their power, the EU has established a structure to give incentives for reform. In 1995, it launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (“Barcelona Process”), to foster political, social and economic modernization in neighboring countries in the Mediterranean through domestic reform and regional cooperation. To achieve the necessary consent of the ruling elites in its partner states, the EU provides financial support and offers to gradually establish a free-trade area.

The EU’s second mechanism of cooperation, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) established in 2004, shares the objective of enhancing stability at

From the point of view of the American

government, the path from September 11 to

the invasion in Iraq follows a compelling logic

BMENA has not yet yielded any results

Local political elites have little desire for reform because they want to retain their power.

Polenz


Europe’s borders by creating stable and modern societies in neighboring coun-tries. Directed at the EU’s neighbors in the East and in the South alike, it uses the experience of the EU’s enlargement process in selectively applying some of its instruments to help partner countries modernize their economy and political systems according to individual Country Reports and Action Plans, though with-out providing a membership perspective. The ENP is supposed to build upon the Barcelona Process.

Taking stock today shows that both projects must be viewed critically despite isolated successes. Reviews of the Barcelona Process, conducted in November 2005, ten years after its launch, showed that the process has failed to initiate a broad wave of political reform in the region. It has not yet become a motor for political reform and the development of vibrant civil societies. The failure was most notice-able in that the participants at the 10th anniversary conference in November 2005 could agree on a code of conduct on countering terrorism only in a watered-down statement, even though a remarkable institutional apparatus had been set in mo-tion to prepare the conference.

The process has failed firstly because, within the repressive general condi-tions, the partner countries inadequately implemented the agreements while the EU distinguished itself mainly through deficiency. Secondly, the EU’s expectations focused primarily on security while the partner states concentrated above all on economic interests. Thirdly, the Barcelona Process suffers both from a lack of pri-ority-setting and a lack of coordination with the European Neighborhood Policy.

How do the European and American approaches to the Middle East differ, Mr. Fischer ?

Both the US and the EU have strategic interests in the region, but Europe as geo-political neighbor is indissolubly linked to the Middle East. Europe can thus never completely withdraw, and close cultural and historical ties reinforce the relation-ship. Middle Eastern security is therefore an integral part of European security, whether we like it or not. Europe has strong interests not only in democratization but also, for example in improving minority rights and solving migration issues. Whether the Mediterranean becomes a sea of cooperation or confrontation in the 21st century is a decisive question for the EU and the Middle Eastern countries alike (the lack of adequate institutions to jointly address our common tasks issue is another question).

The Barcelona Process has so far failed …

… the EU focused mainly on security;

the partner states on economic interests

Sommer

FischerMiddle Eastern security is an

integral part of European security

Unlike the US, Europe is indissolubly linked to the Middle East.

Fischer


The US has no such inescapable need to ensure security and prosperity in the Middle East. Although the region is of course tremendously important for Ameri-can security as well, the Atlantic does make a difference.

The United States cannot easily withdraw from the Middle East just because of its geographical position: The US will never leave Israel on its own.

Of course the US is tied to the region because of Israel and numerous other strate-gic issues. But Europe, is directly affected for geographical reasons by immigration or the fate of Turkey, while the US is surrounded by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and has Canada and Central America as its only neighbors.

The different European and the American attitudes had an impact on the transatlantic partners’ different reactions to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. In 2001 both, the US and Europe came to the conclusion that the status quo in the region was no longer acceptable. A new strategy was needed, and America’s European allies without exception supported the NATO strike against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The subsequent invasion of Iraq, though, was something different. The US adopted the risky strategy of reshaping the whole region and thus creating an American Middle East based on democratization, market econo-mies and modernization. They were not as pessimistic as the Europeans were regarding the risk of failure and of thus creating a vacuum that would pose a serious global threat.

The US administration believed at the time that the perceived threat from Iraq and Saddam’s refusal to cooperate with the UN Security Council justified an in-vasion. We know more in retrospect than we knew back then and there may be good reasons for an intensified debate. But I suggest that we instead turn to the challenges ahead.

Europeans know from their own history what a painful and violent process mod-ernization can be. That makes them act sometimes a bit more cautiously and modestly than the Americans when it comes to modernizing other countries.

Even though I believe that the US approach was way too optimistic in the case of Iraq, I want to make a more general statement to put that specific statement in the right context: The unique combination of values and interests in US foreign policy is a gift to the world. America must retain this core political concept, at all costs.

The US has less need to ensure security

in the Middle East than the EU

Smyser

Fischer

The US adopted a risky strategy in Iraq

VolkerWe should turn to the challenges ahead

FischerModernization can be painful and violent

The US will never leave Israel on its own.

Smyser


Other than the US, Europeans have no such term as “rogue states” in their dip-lomatic vocabulary. They are also quite skeptical concerning democratization achieved by foreign powers. They are aware that the West has supported auto-cratic governments in the Middle East for more than sixty years, be it because of the Cold War or the protection of Middle Eastern oil and trade markets.

Europe is prone to self-criticism and restraint because it is aware of its colonial past. The colonial powers have always alleged that they were acting in the interest of the peoples they were ruling. In the 19th and early 20th century, France justified its expansionist policies by referring to its “civilising mission” (“mission civilisa-trice”). Nowadays, the French are so aware of the negative aspects of colonialism that the French Constitutional Court struck down a law requiring history teachers to stress the “positive aspects” of French colonialization, although colonialization undoubtedly led to progress in certain areas.

There are similar reasons today to be equally skeptical of the real motivations of those big powers who preach democratization. Europeans doubt that democracy can be exported and believe that the system of government should be a domestic af-fair, the sole responsibility of the indigenous people. This is why the EU’s Barcelona Process is conceptualized as a process of dialogue and not of democratisation.

The EU’s Barcelona Process was an invitation to cooperate in the fields of politics, economics and security. Unfortunately, its success has hitherto been limited. The offer of financial aid was rejected because of conditionality. In fact, the Arab lead-ers did not even participate in the last meeting of the Barcelona process.

The US and Europe have strengths and weaknesses on the issue of moderniza-tion and democratisation that actually meld well. Europe is very good at institu-tion-building and at harmonizing neighboring countries’ legislation, especially from the EU integration experience. But it lacks convening power in the Middle East: the absence of major Arab players at the last Barcelona meeting makes this process almost irrelevant. In turn the US has neither experience nor capacity to promote democracy and reform the way Europe does, but it does have immense military resources and political weight.

While the US is strong enough and willing to enforce its own interests, Europe out of necessity relies on incentives and cooperation. Lacking the necessary political will, institutions and resources to use force, the EU has devised efficient tools of

Rouleau

Europe is prone to self-criticism

because of its colonial past …

… that’s why the Barcelona Process is

a process of dialogue, not democratization

Klose

SingerThe US and Europe have

strengths that meld well

Fischer The Americans enforce their own interests

while the Europeans rely on incentives

The unique combination of values and interests in US foreign policy is a gift to the world.

Fischer


peaceful influence. The single most successful European foreign policy up to now has been enlargement; Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, just to mention a few, are great success stories of transforming and modernizing societies. America ap-plied similar methods incidentally, e. g. when influencing Mexico through NAFTA, but that has not become the American way of carrying out foreign policy.

Europe can sustain long-term initiatives because the Brussels administration’s personnel changes very slowly and the Commission can be sure that its successor will not change course abruptly. The Barcelona Process for example is a prime example of a long-term process — it was recently reviewed and re-launched after ten years.

The United States, by contrast, is institutionally incapable of sustaining such long-term initiatives. No doubt the next administration, whether Democratic or Republican, will still talk about democratizing the Middle East. But the next presi-dent will reshuffle, reorganize and redefine the priorities. Then, again, US policy will probably be out of step with the EU approach.

The US and Europe indeed have different time frames for political strategies. While the US is typically impatient, Europe is overly-institutionalized. For exam-ple, Europe is on the Barcelona track, which basically takes forever and might never get anywhere, while the US’ BMENA initiative is scheduled to end around 2008. The challenge is to bring the two approaches together in a working mecha-nism that creates both stamina and dynamism.

The assumption that the US cannot pursue long-term foreign policy goals for structural reasons is entirely wrong. I hope that European politicians are not mis-led by its seeming plausibility. US foreign policy’s stamina is unmatched if — and only if — the Congress registers sufficient public support over a longer period of time. No European political system, except maybe for Great Britain’s, allows com-parable staying power.

The US consistently pursued its Open Door policy since the late 19th century. Containment and deterrence were long time strategies during the Cold War, pur-sued until they succeeded. Warning Europe against the impossibility of US long-term foreign policy strategies is a prime example of how the search for sweeping theses leads over simplification to plain falseness and finally detrimental political impact.

OttawayEurope can sustain long-term initiatives …

… whereas the US is incapable of such

Singer

MayOf course the US can and does

pursue long-term strategies


The new US security strategy relies much more on diplomacy, multilateral orga-nizations like NATO and long-term strategies like nation-building than its pred-ecessor.

The US and Europe have one thing in common: so far, European and American presence in the region have both been predominantly motivated by securing energy resources and responding to military crises and threats. The interest of people in the region living a better life often seemed not to be at the top of the agenda.

We all know that democratization in itself is not nearly as important to the United States as security. What the US does to support Middle Eastern democracy is cer-tainly not done for the love of people in the region. Every honest representative of the administration will admit that security is paramount. That does not mean, though, that we should not welcome external pressure for democratization.

Indeed, the current administration wants to increase US security by spreading democracy. Only security reasons can make the US invest such an incredible amount of money.

Democratization became the policy of the United States only with President Bush’s second inauguration in January 2004, not with the invasion in Iraq in 2003. It became the State Department’s official policy on December, 11th 2005, with Sec-retary of State Condoleezza Rice’s article in the Washington Post “The promise of democratic peace.” Secretary Rice stated that having democratic governments all over the world is part of American security requirements, because these “conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”

This notion was reinforced by Thomas Barnett’s bestseller “The Pentagon’s New Map”, which is widely read and very influential among the senior staff of the Department of Defense. In his book, Mr. Barnett, Senior Managing Director of the strategic planning firm Enterra Solutions, defines what he calls “the functioning core” or “core countries” as those which are democratic, globalized and inter-linked. On the other hand, he identifies countries of the “non-integrating gap”, which are in need of democratization and reform. Many of these countries are situated in Africa and Latin America. Every Muslim country in the world is part of the non-integrating gap, including Albania, Pakistan and, I am sorry to say, Mr. Al-Azm’s preferred role model Turkey. In his follow-up to “The Pentagon’s New Map”,

Pflüger

Al-Khalil

KassemUS support of democracy in the Middle East

is not done for the love of the people there

Smyser

Democratization is not as important to the US as security.

Kassem


titled “Blueprint for Action”, Barnett actually prescribed a formula for solving the world’s problems through military engagement: invade, leave a stabilizing force and then slowly but surely convert these countries to democracy.

While the upper levels of the Pentagon love this book, the lower levels, the people who would actually have to fight the wars, hate it. If you ever read it it will make your hair stand on end. Why ?

Mr. Barnett’s ideas imply two major problems. First, they would bring the Westphalian system to an end that has provided the basis for peaceful interna-tional relations for over three and a half centuries. Since the peace treaties of Münster and Osnabrück in 1648 which ended the Thirty Years War, this system governed international relations in the modern system of nation-states, based on the mutual acknowledgment of each country’s sovereign rights. Choosing a form of government is one of these rights.

Second, the costs for Mr. Barnett’s strategy are unsustainable. Nobel prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz, a former Chief Economist of the World Bank, calculated the cost of the Iraq War at $ 600 billion (including follow-up costs caused, for example, by medical treatment and pensions for soldiers and the interest on the national debt). Stiglitz estimates that if the war continues for two more years, the cost will increase to a trillion dollars. The United States cannot afford more wars like this.

US policy in the Middle East is not only guided by security aspects, but also by the assumption that everybody in the region admires the Western way of life. This assumption is very American — I strongly doubt its accuracy. We should be more self-critical when it comes to exporting our way of life.

American politicians promote democratization for security reasons as far as the US government’s foreign policy is concerned. But at the same time they support it for idealistic reasons through other channels: every year the US Congress allocates tens of millions of dollars for civil society development in other countries through powerful institutions led by some of our most influential politicians. The National Democratic Institute associated with the Democratic Party is currently chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and the International Republican Institute’s current chairman is Senator John McCain. These and many other insti-tutions promote democracy as a system that should be expanded throughout the world. They are supported and aided by non-governmental organizations which

The US cannot afford more wars like this

Klose

Smyser

We should not suppose that everybody in the region admires the Western way of life.

Klose


often bring their own funding or other, supportive funds. They have even attracted President Putin’s wrath with their work in support of Russia’s civil society.

As Francis Fukuyama demonstrates in his new book “America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neo-conservative Legacy”, part and parcel of a neo-con legacy in Iraq — and also the Likud legacy in Palestine — is a belief in Western com-mitment and superior military technology. The relative ease of regime change in the Soviet Union led to the notion that every unwanted regime melts away in the face of American resolve and functioning civil societies will grow from the ruins. But neither the military victory in Iraq nor the unilateral Israeli pullout from Gaza translated into the expected positive consequences.

The United States does have military power and uses it, but other elements of governmental power are less impressive. Civil programs are much too limited and lack sufficient consultation and agreement between their actors.

In 1987, only two and a half years before the Berlin Wall came down, President Reagan demanded that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev “tear down this wall”. The prompt fulfillment of Reagan’s wish left the false impression that the end of the Soviet Empire was caused mainly by a firm US foreign policy. In reality, it was a result of joint efforts of many actors in Western societies. For instance, West German TV broadcast into East Germany played a major role in delegitimizing the GDR’s ruling party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany). The provision of Xerox machines helped Poland’s Solidarity, the first independent Trade Union in the Soviet Bloc, to survive the years of martial law (1981–1983). You all know about the important role of the CSCE. Persuasive power and support for the op-position were vital for bringing down the Soviet Union, not threats — let alone the actual use of force.

I can hardly understand why influential members of the administration still consider the use of force an efficacious tool for achieving the huge variety of US foreign policy goals, including democratization. We are deeply bogged down in Iraq, public support for the war is waning, and getting out without huge damage will be difficult enough.

In contrast to Europeans, Americans are used to taking risks and they believe in the efficacious use of force. Regarding risks, the US economy cycles like a

KepelThe Neo-Cons believed in

superior military technology

May

The end of the Soviet Union was not

caused by threats or military action …

Berman

Wells

Americans believe in the efficacious use of force.

Wells


rollercoaster, our politicians make vast attempts at social engineering, and conse-quently, America also takes risks in its foreign policy. Furthermore, many Ameri-cans believe that if a system is deadlocked — as much of the Middle East apparently was — we see an appropriate use of force as an efficient means of shaking things up to trigger a change for the better. The Reagan administration applied a lot of forceful rhetoric and heavy military expenditures on an already declining Soviet Union to accelerate its downfall. That undoubtedly inspired the administration’s decision to invade Iraq to a certain extent.

American proponents of the use of force sometimes forget that the US also had some less promising experiences. My mentor Ernest May mentioned President Wilson’s interventions in Mexico: when General Victoriano Huerta overthrew the Mexican government in 1913 and declared himself Mexico’s military dictator, Wilson decided to intervene, first by financially supporting Mexico’s legitimate government and then militarily. But he failed to initiate a self-supporting process of democratization. The US withdrew in 1917, and only much later, when Mexico was largely ignored by the United States, did democratic institutions gradually evolve. A real transformation into a more open society took place only when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in 1994. It took almost a century to get the Mexicans on the verge of what American democracy promoters had in mind under Wilson.

Do the American robust approach and European patience and willingness to enter into dialog rather complement or neutralize each other ?

American activism is always in danger of being self-righteous, European caution is prone to becoming inactivity — but together they have sometimes worked just fine. In January 1977, US President Carter unleashed a yearning for participation and human rights all over the Communist world with his supportive letter to Russian dissident Andrei Sakharov, Nobel Peace Prize laureate of 1975. The West-ern European governments reacted very cautiously at the time, urging the US administration not to risk good relations with the Soviet Union on a crusade mo-tivated by self-righteousness and zealotry. They argued that despite the necessity of pressuring the USSR on human rights issues, the West also needed the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement and a détente. Also, the US should be careful not to trigger the emergence of anarchistic movements or other political developments leading to chaos and instability. When both transatlantic partners

… as some people in the current

administration believe

The US has also had some less promising

experiences with the use of force

Sommer

Pflüger

EU and US Approaches 38 39 The Middle East After the Invasion of Iraq

contributed their specific policies , the furthering of human rights and the safe-guarding of good relations were brought together in a mutually productive way.

Europe’s and the United States’ specific assets have both contributed to reform in the Middle East. Europe’s major assets in its relations with the Middle East is its strong economic and trade relations, its geographic proximity, its cultural affinity, and its knowledge of Middle Eastern history and traditions. In addition, Europe’s balanced attitude has resulted in a low level of animosity and controversy between the two regions. As for the US, its assets are numerous. The US has both political and military power, advanced technology and sizable economic capacity. Moreover, its history is free of colonialism, and many Middle Eastern countries have embraced American values such as Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points. America has institutionalized the accommodation of Middle Eastern and Muslim immigrants exemplarily. Like Europe, the US has been offering Middle Easterners the best opportunities for advanced education in its academic and military institutions. In the case of Saudi Arabia alone, 400,000 Saudi students have benefited from these opportunities in America over the past 50 years, and have certainly played a major role in the modernization of the Kingdom.

We must admit that US foreign policy is put under a microscope and criticized much more harshly than anything that the EU does. Some of you applaud the Bush Administration for initiating a renewed interest in democracy, but you then criticize them for pushing democratization too rapidly. You disagree with their focus on security and forced regime change, yet then criticize them for giv-ing financial aid to NGOs in the region. You demand that the US foreign policy consistently supports human rights, but then when it pushes for human rights accuse the US of imposing its own standards without respect for other country’s individuality. It seems the United States permanently has to steer between Scylla and Charybdis, where it can do no right in European and regional eyes, even when it does what they ask. With the cartoon controversy Europeans are for the first time facing similar scrutiny.

Today, while the United States is determinedly pushing for reform, the EU is still acting reluctantly. Until the Europeans realize the scope of the threat and start acting in concert with the US, there will be no society based on egalité, fraternité, and liberté, but extremism, theocracy and state failure in the Middle East.

Al-KhalilEurope and the US have specific assets

SingerUS foreign policy is criticized

more harshly than EU policy

KassemWhile the US is determinedly pushing for

reform, the EU is still acting reluctantly

The US permanently has to steer between Scylla und Charybdis.

Singer


3. The Middle East After the Invasion of Iraq

Let us take a closer look at the region today — how has it developed during the past years ? We all agreed that the invasion of Iraq has changed the Middle East, but regarding to the assessment of these changes there are quite differing views.

Reform in the Middle East and the Islamic world has been a major concern since the emergence of modern states in the region. However, reform has not succeeded in meeting the needs and aspirations of the states and peoples of the region. At the beginning of the third millennium, Muslims and Arabs are great in number yet burdened by economic, social, and political disappointments. Their govern-ments are ineffective in some cases, and in others such as the governments of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon are incapacitated. As a result, the existing states have not played a satisfactory role in independently determining their destiny. Reform in the Middle East requires clear vision, competent governments, freedom of thought and expression, civil society organizations, and political stability.

The third Arab Human Development Report (2004) concludes that “the Arab de-velopment crisis has widened, deepened and grown more complex to a degree that demands the full engagement of all Arab citizens in true reform.” It identifies political restrictions as the major impediment to development in the region. But these restrictions are not the only reasons for the lack of vibrant civil societies. The debate about the free press, sparked by the publication of cartoons showing the Prophet Mohammed in the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten, made it clear that some fundamental contradictions between Western democracy and Islamic traditions have not yet been resolved.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, both the United States and Europe focused even more on enhancing security and stability in the Middle East. Multiple initiatives to trigger reform were devised, as diverse as the EU’s Barcelona Process and the US-led invasion of Iraq. Why, then, is the state of affairs today in some aspects worse than ever according to leading experts from the region itself ? Neither security nor stability have been achieved, and the image of the West has deteriorated.

One positive development must be mentioned, though. People in the Middle East are now discussing political and economic reform, increasing the pressure

Sommer

Al-Khalil

PolenzReform demands the full engagement

of all people in the region

There are positive developments

in the Middle East …


on Arab regimes to intensify reform programs, most notably in Morocco, Jordan and Bahrain.

Mr. Polenz gave a rather bleak description of the state of affairs in the region, but with some glimmers of hope. Do the positive developments he mentioned offer a promising perspective for the future ? And did the US invasion of Iraq contribute to these positive developments ?

The US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent policy of the administration has of course some debatable features, to say the least, but it has at the same time triggered immense progress in the region. A few years ago, stability in the Middle East meant oppression and autocracies. Kurds and Shiites were mass-murdered in Iraq, even if the media did not bring it to the world’s attention. Terrorism in and from the region threatened our security: 9/11 happened before the American invasion.

The invasion in Iraq has caused bloodshed and instability. But on the other hand, democracy has made tremendous progress. I saw positive developments almost everywhere during my recent visit to the Gulf States. While nobody in the Middle East cared about human rights and democracy five years ago, today newspapers and people on the streets are discussing human rights throughout the region, even in the conservative Emirates. Bahrain saw a conference on women’s rights, and Morocco has passed reforms on women’s rights. It remains impossible to challenge the leading families openly, but Qatar held its first parliamentary election last year. Ms. Al-Kitbi has just been elected to the first human rights board in her country, and Lebanon has conducted free elections: this nearly amounts to a revolution. Revolutions are sometimes bloody, there were setbacks and mistakes, and there will be further setbacks and mistakes. Still, we should always remember that the region was not in a state of peace and harmony before the invasion and that important steps forward have been made.

In Iraq, we have seen a constitutional referendum and an election with an impressive turnout of about 75 %. Given the security situation, this was a strong message that people are willing to embark on the path toward democracy.

I am more skeptical than you are. Most European citizens and governments were “not convinced” that Iraq had WMD and supported Al-Qaeda, to quote Mr. Fischer’s reply to Donald Rumsfeld at the 2003 Munich Security Conference. And

Sommer

Pflüger… which the Iraq invasion has triggered

Despite bloodshed and instability,

the invasion has helped

democracy make progress

Klose


at least to some extent they were right: Iraq was not a terrorist problem then, but today it is.

I hope that the United States has a lot of staying power in Iraq. After World War II, it took four years to conduct elections and introduce a constitution in Germany, and ten years before the country was granted at least limited sover-eignty.

Iraq in 2006 is very different from Germany in 1945. In Germany, democracy had strong historical roots, the economy soon gave reasons for hope, and the citizens were united in their identification with the German nation.

Comparing their current situation with that during Saddam’s regime, people con-clude that freedom without security is of no use. Regime change in and of itself is no guarantee of better governance if it does not entail stabilizing the society and ensuring education and public safety. The US failures strengthen the impression that neither indigenous reforms nor foreign intervention will ever fundamentally change the situation.

Paradoxically, the US invasion of Iraq makes many autocratic governments in the region feel more self-confident and powerful, because the US is unlikely to risk another endeavor.

The US’ behavior as the only ‘super power’ and the many mistakes in its attempt to recreate the Middle East have unnecessarily created many enemies of America.

The Iraqi quagmire is not very tempting as a role model for anybody interested in democratization. If you were living in the Middle East and longing for democracy, would you throw your lot in with the people who are responsible for the current situation in Iraq ?

Stability in the Middle East is too important and too delicate to act upon wishful thinking, Mr. Pflüger. Take a good look at reality: instead of triggering a chain reaction of democratization in the region, the US invasion in Iraq has created a dangerous vacuum.

By toppling Saddam Hussein, the Bush Administration wanted to transform the old Anglo-French Middle East marked by its colonial past and traditional conflicts, by corruption, stagnation and desperation, into a flourishing region

Do the Americans have as much patience

with Iraq as they did with post-war Germany ?

von WeizsäckerIraq in 2006 is very different

from Germany in 1945

Al-Kitbi

Many autocratic governments in

the region feel more self-confident

Al-Khalil

Rouleau

FischerStability in the Middle East is

too important for wishful thinking


of democracy, civil society and modernized Islam. They attempted to repeat the transformation of Eastern Europe after 1989, but unfortunately in a completely different and ill-suited environment. You need not be a clairvoyant to see that the administration’s plan will fail.

What the US has achieved instead is the destabilization of the whole region. The fall of Saddam Hussein initiated a contest for regional hegemony with Iran as the most promising player. Today, the US is dependent on Iranian support not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq; 130,000 American soldiers in the region are potential hostages, and an oil price above $ 100 per barrel would be economically devastating for the West. Besides Iran, Turkey and Israel are also fighting to fill the growing vacuum left by Saddam, while Jihad terrorists are fanning out to open up their next battleground in Jordan. Iran’s nuclear ambitions turn this already explosive mixture into the ultimate Molotov cocktail.

I can only hope that the region’s way to modernity and democracy will not be as violent and bloody as Europe’s during the 20th century, where hegemonial aspirations and misguided optimism, and later a nuclear arms race, led to two World Wars and the danger of mutual destruction.

Wishful thinking is not helpful, but neither are exaggerated catastrophic sce-narios. I am very willing to leave doomsday prophecies to former foreign ministers and restrict myself to differentiated analyses.

The invasion of Iraq has not destabilized the Middle East — because the region was not at all stable before. Stagnation and stalemates among autocrats are not stability. America attempted, in a bold and resolute strategy, to get things mov-ing through a controlled earthquake. Now Europe and the US must join forces to prevent this earthquake from getting out of control.

The US military intervention in Iraq, for all its shortcomings, lack of legitimacy and planning and horrific consequences for many people, was still an effective push for reforms in the region. The alternative would have been stagnation, state failure and a subsequent Western intervention on a much larger scale. Let me explain:

At the beginning of the 21st century, the status quo in the Middle East was becoming increasingly intolerable. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, democ-ratization took hold everywhere except for the Middle East. Here five regime

Violence in Iraq, hegemonial

aspirations, Iran’s nuclear program —

the region is highly explosive

PflügerExaggerated catastrophic scenarios are

just as useless as wishful thinking

Reiter

KassemWithout the Iraq invasion, a Western

intervention would have soon been necessary

Since 1989 democratization took hold

everywhere except for the Middle East

The invasion of Iraq has not destabilized the Middle East.

Reiter


changes failed to initiate reform, inept Arab diplomacy failed to end the Arab-Is-raeli conflict and declining economies failed to provide welfare for our alarmingly fast growing population: 60 percent of Middle East’s population is younger than 25, while the region’s combined GDP, $ 550 billion according to the UN’s Arab Human Development Report, is less than Spain’s $ 592 billion. Economic failure is caused mainly by a lack of accountability and good governance in the club of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes.

The combination of economic decline and demographic growth would over time inevitably have lead to state failure. Then, the West would have intervened anyway. Europe and the US can tolerate failing states in Sub-Saharan Africa, but not in the Middle East where oil resources and Israel’s existence are at stake.

Could the West not have forced the region’s autocrats to change course by peaceful means ? I strongly doubt it. Engagement and dialog would have lasted for decades without effecting any serious change, while an arms boycott as the only serious leverage would not have made the region’s regimes embrace reform but turn to suppliers like North Korea, thus further radicalizing them. The US intervention has at least shaken things up, and to a lower price than intervention at a later point in time.

There have been encouraging developments in Iraq and in the region after the in-vasion. Since 2003 there has been a tremendous explosion of civic activity, modest democratic reforms and open discussion without political taboos. Certainly, the rhetoric about a democratic Iraq being a model for change in the region was some-what overblown. But a unified and pacified country will provide a positive impetus.

In 2005, the Middle East discovered the magic of the ballot. In Palestine, Iraq, and under the worst conditions, in Afghanistan. Given the opportunity, the people, especially women, vote in large numbers. Today even traditionally anti-democratic forces, like the communists and Islamists, surprisingly agree with President Bush’s advocacy of democracy. Less surprisingly, autocrats (and American allies) like Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt are not so eager to follow Bush’s advice.

The examples of Palestine and Iraq have made many Arabs wonder if occu-pation is a condition for having have fair and free elections. Everyone saw that the Palestinian election was fair and free, and in Iraq nobody questions the elec-tions’ integrity, despite the horrific calamities and the bloodshed that cast a dark shadow on the country’s future.

The region’s autocrats will not

change course without force

Volker

Ibrahim

Is occupation a condition for fair and

free elections in the Middle East ?

In 2005, the Middle East discovered the magic of the ballot.

Ibrahim

EU and US Approaches 44 45 Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib

There are indeed developments at the micro level that give much reason for hope. After Hamas won the election for the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2005, defeated Fatah decided not to participate in a Hamas government. Instead, Fa-tah announced it would reorganize itself to better meet its voters’ needs in the next elections. What would be the normal course of action for a losing party in the West is a revolutionary development in the Arab world, never seen before in 40 years.

Also, in Syria or Egypt it would be unthinkable for the president to exchange letters with a democratically elected prime minister from the opposition party. But Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh exchanged letters as President and Prime Minister. The specific reasons for that may be debatable, but still it is a major step forward.

Maybe some Islamists are setting aside the idea that the Qur’an is “the solution,” but in countries across the region the Qur’an remain a primary source for national constitutions. No Islamist party has yet run a country in a completely secular way, without leaning towards the Sharia law, at least on social issues, for example per-sonal status law and familial relations. Regarding women’s rights in some coun-tries in the region, we are even worse off today than we used to be, for example in Iraq. The Iraqi city of Basra, once secular, has become a miniature version of an Islamic republic — politically, legally, even socially.

4. Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib

American and European speakers as well as representatives from the region have pointed out positive aspects of the robust American approach. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are certainly not among these positive features.

Nobody was more appalled by the Abu Ghraib photos than President Bush. Of course the United States needs to be a model of the rule of law and human rights, for principal reasons and to be an effective actor in the region. With measures like the McCain Amendment signed we made it clear that torture and degradation of prisoners, both civilian and military, abroad or domestically, will not be toler-ated. Also, I would like to remind you that at least the atrocities were discovered through an internal military investigation, which led to the conviction of those responsible. When a second wave of photos was published recently, every soldier pictured was already in jail.

Al-AzmDevelopments at the micro level

give much reason for hope

EsfandiariThe Qur’an remains a primary source

for national constitutions in the region

Sommer

VolkerAbu Ghraib and Guantanamo:

torture and degradation of

prisoners will not be tolerated …

EU and US Approaches 44 45 Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib

We are aware that Guantanamo is negatively affecting the perception of the United States throughout the world. But traditional legal frameworks are insuf-ficient for the fight against Islamist terrorists, and that is not just an American problem. According to international law, prisoners of war are detained until the end of the conflict. Can we treat the unlawful combatants captured in Afghani-stan and the terrorists who have attacked American civilians accordingly ? No, because they are not soldiers in a traditional war. Some of our European allies see a civilian code of justice as an adequate framework for the long-term struggle we are waging. But on the battlefields in Afghanistan forensic investigations can-not be properly conducted and the means for adequate civil trials are not readily available. Also, some captives released from Guantanamo subsequently conducted terrorist attacks in Russia or Afghanistan or threatened Danish cabinet ministers, which demonstrates that the cost of mistakes is higher for these people than for the average criminal. The US has improved the legal treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo and ensured that certain legal standards are fulfilled. We still need to work on a more sustainable answer to the legal issue, though. I encourage our European partners to contribute actively to that process because dealing with organized terrorism in a way which both protects citizens and respects the rule of law is our common challenge.

The argument to deny prisoners an adequate trial on account of their being espe-cially dangerous and being neither ordinary criminals nor soldiers in a national army is well known in the Middle East. Arab autocrats justify their treatment of some members of the Muslim Brotherhood precisely in the same way. I am very sad to hear these arguments from a member of the United States’ government.

To claim Senator McCain’s amendment as a victory for the executive branch is a bit of a stretch, because the Bush administration fought to prevent this legisla-tion tooth and nail. As I know from personal experience as someone involved in the investigations at Abu Ghraib, we in fact did not deal with it forthrightly in a timely manner. The abuses happened in October 2003, but the army investigation did not start until January 2004, and by the time the media reported on it in April 2004, it had still not yet been dealt with appropriately. Indeed, in terms of the responsibilities of the chain of command (as opposed to the individual soldiers), it still has not been dealt with. Until we create a sense of accountability up the entire military and civilian chains of command — including the attorney general and ci-

… but traditional legal frameworks

are insufficient for the

fight against Islamic terrorists

Al-Azm

SingerThe Bush administration fought to prevent

the McCain amendment tooth and nail

EU and US Approaches 46

vilian contractors — the world will not believe our commitment and our credibility will be severely damaged. Restoring our credibility is not only important from a moral point of view — anti-Americanism is a very real threat to our security. As an American patriot, I urge our European friends to keep up the pressure on the US government: We need your assistance in holding us up to our ideals.

The McCain Amendment was indeed strongly resisted by the administration at first. The administration would have preferred to demonstrate that they are de-termined to clean up this mess themselves without any outside pressure. But in the end the legislation was passed by Congress, the President signed it, and now it is the law of the United States.

Regarding the legal basis for the detainment and the treatment of individual prisoners in Guantanamo, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the administration did their best to put this back on the right track. Many of you would prefer to hear me announce the dismissal of the Secretary of Defense, but I cannot do you this favor.

Your explanation of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo and the steps taken to deal with it make some sense, but they are insufficient and emotionally unconvincing. Donald Rumsfeld only held lower-rank personnel accountable, whereas former great defense secretaries, like George Marshal (1950–51) or Robert Lovett (1951–53) would have court martialed the general officers in charge immediately. And if similar scandals had occurred under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961), the Secretary of Defense himself would probably have gone to the wall right away.

I understand Mr. Al-Azm’s and Mr. Singer’s criticism, but at the same time I am convinced that the American administration is sincerely shocked about the abuses that happened and has done a lot to improve the situation. Still, for the sake of its own credibility, the only way to go is closing down Guantanamo.

VolkerAlthough the McCain amendment

was strongly resisted …

… the government did its best

to improve the prisoners’ treatment

MayGreat defense secretaries would have

court-martialed the general officers in charge

PflügerFor the sake of its own credibility,

the US should close down Guantanamo

47 The West and the Region’s Autocrats

II. Regional Perspectives

We will now focus on regional perspectives: What is the state of affairs ? What are people in the region thinking about reform and about the role hitherto played by the West ? Who are the regional reform agents ? What do they want, and what do they expect from the United States and Europe ?

1. The West and the Region’s Autocrats

Many people in the region and in the West claim that the West should not try to impose democracy on us because democracy cannot be imposed from out-side. That argument is entirely wrong. Instead of imposing democracy, just stop imposing dictatorship ! President Bush rightly said that the West has supported the region’s dictators for 60 years to ensure stability, and to no avail. 60 years of foreign support for dictatorships have brought most states in the Middle East to the brink of failure.

“Stop supporting autocrats, we can take care of the rest” sounds very convinc-ing, but I doubt that Western support is the only reason there are autocrats in the region. If your societies have a huge democratic potential, some of them a long-standing democratic tradition, then why is it so hard to create a functioning democratic opposition ? Being dependent on oil does not necessary lead to support for autocrats. The Western countries would no doubt prefer relations with oil-rich democracies to relations with oil-rich autocracies.

The West has a responsibility for the ongoing autocratic rule in the region. Even though it was not the West that created these dictatorships, they would not have lasted this long without economic support, arms exports, and intelligence input (CIA etc.) for overcoming domestic opposition.

Autocratic regimes are not there only through Western support. The will of the leaders that some call “dictators” to survive and their regime’s stability is quite strong. For instance, President Bashar al-Assad’s demise is still far away despite considerable international pressure on Syria following the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon.

We should not play a blame game on whether internal or external actors are re-sponsible for the stagnation in the Islamic world. But it is of utmost importance

Sommer

KassemSupport for the region’s dictators has brought

the Middle East states to the brink of failure

Polenz

RouleauWithout support, dictatorships

would not have lasted this long

Al-Khalil

Cohrs

that the western powers avoid double standards. If the United States continues to place itself above international law, due process and other core principles, how can it expect the states of the Middle East to adopt these very principles ? If Israel continuously violates international standards in the region without being put under serious pressure from Europe and the United States, how can the western powers be seen as a credible partner ? I cannot help but feel a certain understand-ing for people in the region doubting that the US administration will continue its “democratization efforts” once they get the impression that such efforts might jeopardize American oil or security interests.

The West makes its support of autocrats worse still by applying double standards. Let me give you two examples of how it supported dictators in spite of democratic rhetoric. In 1998, an EU official proudly pointed out to me that the impending Association Agreement with Egypt would include an article on democratic princi-ples and human rights. Set backs in these areas would lead to the cancellation of the whole agreement. In May 2001, Mr. Ibrahim, sitting here with us at the table, was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison by a government court for criticizing the government. Nevertheless, the EU signed the Association Agree-ment only a few weeks later and it entered into force in 2004 without any visible problems caused by the violation of its Article 2. Future historians will struggle hard to understand how this blatant discrepancy and hypocrisy, verbal support for democrats but aid and trade for dictators, could be the official policy of leading countries of the world.

Another prime example of Western double standards was the way Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and French President Jacques Chirac dealt with Libya. Sanctions against former sponsor of terrorism and dictator Muammar Al-Qaddafi had only just been suspended when Western leaders began flocking to his tent to get oil concessions even though his rule is still one of the most disgusting regimes in the world — Qaddafi may even deserve the medal of the region’s worst dictator, given the fact that he has the advantage of seniority vis-à-vis his most important contender Al-Assad.

The people of the Middle East wonder if the West wants to help Muslim countries develop themselves or just pursues its own interests. Abrupt shifts in Western policy towards Muslim countries often left them standing in the rain: American-Libyan relations are an example of such a shift. These sudden changes of position

The West should avoid double standards

and respect international law

Kassem

Berlusconi and Chirac are prime examples

of Western double standards

Al-KhalilAbrupt shifts in Western policy often

left reformers standing in the rain

Regional Perspectives 48

The West does not have to export democracy. Just stop imposing dictatorship !

Kassem

have undermined the credibility of Europe and the US. Certain Western countries rush to sell military weapons to some countries whenever funds are available at the expense of the basic needs of those nations.

Turning a blind eye to human rights violations by Western allies like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, while harshly criticizing Iran, indeed shows double standards and destroys our credibility.

Western foreign policy sets its priorities in favor of non-Muslims. While the con-flict in East Timor was resolved through the power of Europe, the Kashmir issue is still pending. To the Muslim nations, the only explanation for this situation is religious bias. It is true that ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina was resolved in Europe in favor of Muslims in that nation, which was greatly appreciated. How-ever, the feeling of blackmailing Muslims in the political arena is still growing.

The West in some cases accepts the instrumentalization of radical groups by Middle Eastern powers. Hizb Allah (‘Party of God’) presently is an example of the danger of this political phenomenon. Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been using Hizb Allah to serve their own political agendas at the expense of Lebanon’s national security and unity.

The West obviously applies double standards. While the US invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan reminded people in the region of crusading Western armies, the West at the same time continues its unconditional support of Israel, thereby strength-ening radical trends among Muslims, especially younger ones, and simultaneously deterring moderate and responsible groups.

The United States’ major foreign policy tool in the Middle East, the proverbial big stick, is applied very selectively. Heavy pressure, sanctions and the use of force are reserved for the so-called rogue states accused of violating human rights, sponsor-ing terrorism and seeking to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (as of today, only North Korea and Iran remain on the list while Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan are off, after having adopted American standards of good behaviour).

Vis-à-vis its friends and allies, the US uses very slight or no pressure at all. Cosmetic changes are hailed as great progress. The US talks about progress in Iraq even though so-called free elections and courteous exchange of letters between the President and the Prime Minister do not make a democracy. On the other hand,

Polenz

Al-KhalilWestern foreign policy sets its priorities

in favor of non-Muslims …

… and accepts the instrumentalization

of radical groups

Koolaee

RouleauThe US’ proverbial “Big Stick”

is applied very selectively

49 The West and the Region’s Autocrats

Regional Perspectives 50 51 Perceptions and Prejudices

reactions to Hamas’ recent victory in Palestine proves that democratic elections are recognized as such in the US only if their outcome pleases the White House.

It is plainly obvious that Europe and the US treat oil states very differently than non-oil states. This is as obvious in the EU’s Barcelona process as it was during the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha in 2001. Since then, en-ergy policies have become an even more important issue. It is important to note that when in August 2005 Hurricane Katrina interrupted US fuel supply and fuel prices soared, energy security became an issue of national discourse in the United States, on which there was broad bipartisan consensus of its security importance for the very first time in over 3 decades. I am afraid the importance of oil will only increase in the next decades. Let us all be fortright and admit that among the reasons. the Middle East is of strategic importance for Western governments because of its oil resources.

American support for democracy will always intermingle with realpolitik. The US supported autocrats in Latin America, Asia, Africa and in the Middle East for 60 years not for their love of them, but because of their national interests. In the Middle East, these interests were and still are oil and Israel.

The West’s democratization and security agendas inherently contradict each other. For the sake of stability the West encourages autocratic regimes in the Arab world to further suppress their people’s freedom and civil rights.

Western values are discredited not only in the Middle East, but also — for simi-lar reasons — in Latin America and Russia. Credibly supporting democracy and freedom with credible engagement is as urgent there as it is in the Middle East. The United States’ credibility regarding democratization is no less at stake than Germany’s: consider the widespread denouncement of Germany for its close bi-lateral energy cooperation with Russia disregarding the interests of its European partners as well as problematic tendencies in Russia in the areas of human rights and a democratic political system.

The willingness to compromise with autocratic regimes doomed most Western efforts to democratize the region from the beginning. For decades autocrats and their mirror image, the theocrats, have dominated the political arena, while the

Singer

KamalAmerican support for democracy will

always intermingle with realpolitik

Al-Kitbi

Hoyer

IbrahimPatience with autocrats doomed

most democratization efforts


democrats were squeezed in the middle. For over half a century, the Western pow-ers have stood firmly behind these regional autocrats for security reasons. How could people in the region now take their democratization agenda seriously ?

Neither part of the world has ever been treated consistently by the West over several decades. The consistent Western support for democracy in Eastern Europe during the Cold War was possible only because of the strong indigenous desire for democracy.

The EU countries used to be even more patient with autocratic regimes than the US.

I fear that insufficiently thought-out policies and their inadequate implementa-tion have led to such disastrous results that the US administration will reverse course. We may see a paradigm shift away from the freedom and democracy agenda back towards support for the autocrats for pragmatic reasons before the end of 2006.

2. Perceptions and Prejudices

For Western help to be accepted by the people in the region, people would need to perceive Europe and the US as their allies. Given the almost unanimous criticism of Western double standards I doubt that they do that. Or do they ?

Western countries are viewed by the majority of people in the Middle East as partly responsible for their political instability and poor socio-economic conditions.

The United States is accused by many in the region of enforcing a neo-colonialist regime for reasons of power politics under the fig leaf of bringing freedom and democracy to the region.

Mistrust of the US is much higher than mistrust of the EU. At a recent conference in Cairo devoted to reform, all participants, including the Islamists, assessed EU involvement in the region much more positively than US activities.

President Ahmadinejad’s remarks about the Holocaust stirred up very harsh Western reactions, yet the Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Mohamed were

Ottaway

Koolaee

HoyerWe may see a paradigm shift back

towards support for the autocrats

Sommer

Al-Khalil

Pflüger

MoukheiberMistrust of the US is much higher

than mistrust of the EU

Koolaee


published across Europe without protest. Personally, I believe in the freedom of the press, but among religious and secular Muslims alike, these cartoons were perceived as an attack against fundamental Islamic values.

As for the condemnation of the violence of enraged Muslims against Scandina-vian embassies as a response to the cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed, violence obviously was inappropriate. But Muslems should be able to protest and express their pain and displeasure in a suitable way, while accepting the princi-ple of freedom of the press in communities in which they live and not isolating themselves from the rest of world.

An atmosphere of deep mistrust towards the West prevails throughout the region. I have been a field worker in the Middle East for more than half a century, first as a journalist and then as a diplomat. In the last fifty years I have never observed such deep and lasting feelings of hate, frustration and mistrust towards the West. Our support for the regional dictators and our biased policy regarding the conflict between Israel and Palestine contribute to this state of affairs. We will achieve nothing in the region as long as we are seen as two-faced hypocrites following their own selfish agendas.

Western counter-terrorism is often perceived as an ongoing Western crusade against the Muslims. Taking into account the extent of Western Islamophobia, we should not be surprised that people in the Muslim world are skeptical of our good intentions. The Danish cartoons showed the Prophet with a bomb on his head, thus depicting him as a terrorist. Today, many in the Western World equates terrorism with Islam, as if a bunch of criminals called al-Qaeda with their own interpretation of Islam were authentic representatives of the Prophet’s religion.

While such self-flagellation clearly inspires our discussion, I doubt that the West contributes most efficiently to improving the situation by constantly assuming responsibility for everything that goes wrong in the region.

Blaming the West for all of the shortcomings in the Arab world, for autocratic regimes, gender inequality and lack of civic activities, only gives people in the region an alibi for inactivity. We should not relieve them of their duty to find their own road towards modernization.

Esfandiari

RouleauWe will achieve nothing in the region as

long as we are seen as two-faced hypocrites

BrengelmannWestern self-flagellation does not efficiently

contribute to improving the situation …

Fischer … it only gives people in the

region an alibi for inactivity

I have never observed such feelings of hate towards the West in this region as I do now.

Rouleau


The US cannot be blamed for the situation in the region: democratization most of all depends on domestic actors.

Mr. Rouleau, I have the impression that your intense study of the Middle Eastern picture of the West brought you on the verge of adopting that picture. If I may, I would like to remind you that people focusing attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Western interventions instead of economic decline and bad govern-ance in the Middle East is just what the region’s dictators like to see. A former Egyptian ambassador once complained to me about the United States’ exceedingly negative image in Egypt. In every café in Cairo he said, people are talking about the US killing Iraqi children because of its boycott of Iraq. Yet the ambassador knew very well that Iraq’s misuse of the UN’s Oil for Food program (implemented to assure that the Iraqi people get all the medicine and food they need) was truly responsible for this failure. Apparently, he did not attempt to actually tell the people in the cafés of Cairo who should be held responsible.

Many people in the region do indeed hold the West responsible for political and economical shortcomings in the Middle East. But it is the region’s governments that are responsible for the state of democracy or the economy.

The West is not responsible for all of the Middle Eastern conflicts. It was Iraq that attacked Iran in 1980, and even though some Western governments supported him, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher harshly criticized Iraq’s aggression. It was Iraq that attacked Kuwait in 1990 and it was the US that liber-ated Kuweit.

I see one important structural reason for the estrangement between the West and the Islamic world: modern telecommunications infrastructure. Today we are living in an interlinked world. Potentially, that might increase the pressure on autocratic governments. But it has so far only led to a standardization of consumer preferences, not to commonly accepted standards for a civil society, and it has led to an increased spread of conspiracy theories throughout the Islamic world.

In Arab countries, governments direct public opinion through the media, but electronic means of mass communication such as text messaging and e-mail flow freely. Rumors spread within seconds and cannot be checked against inde-pendent information sources, thus forming the breeding ground for all kinds

Kamal Democratization depends on domestic actors

Berman

VolkerThe region’s governments are responsible for

the state of democracy and the economy

Klose

Polenz

Electronic media form a breeding

ground for conspiracy theories …


of public outcries and conspiracy theories. This further enhances the already prevalent opinion among people in the Middle East, in particular Islamists, that democratic Western societies are egoistical, decadent, hostile towards family life, and lacking values. They enhance the impression that Western policies are imperi-alistic, endangering national sovereignty, independence and control of economic resources.

State controlled media is contributing its share to radicalization. It shows Ameri-can weapons being used by the Israeli military against Palestinians. This is a major source of the prevalent animosity against the US: the undeservedly high priority given to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Even if the impression of an anti-Muslim Western policy is overstated and used as a tool by local autocrats, I encourage you nevertheless to take a critical look at Western attitudes towards the Muslim world.

There is widespread mistrust against anything coming from the Muslim world throughout the West. Even though President Bush pronounced the United Arab Emirates a “valued and strategic partner” in the War on Terror, the US Congress prevented a deal which would have given the Dubai-based company Dubai Ports World control of six US ports. The only reason for this was the company’s Middle Eastern background. For the region, this was a clear signal that the US promotes globalization everywhere in the world, except at home.

Most people in the West underestimate Arabs and Muslims. I have experienced this over decades. When I worked on Tunisia at the State Department, French diplomats used to say: “Oh, les Arabes, ils ne peuvent rien faire”. They showed no respect for the local culture, despite the fact that Carthage had been a great civi-lization long before France. But the French, as you may remember, lost the wars against the Arabs. Today, most cartoonists in the US depict Arabs and Muslims as either rich sheikhs carrying oil cans, or as terrorists carrying bombs. It was no accident that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld grossly underestimated the amount of troops needed to pacify Iraq. Prejudices against the Arab world also surfaced when Harvard and Georgetown University received $ 20 million dona-tions each to finance Islamic studies from Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz Alsaud, a Saudi businessman and member of the Saudi royal family. Instead of

Kassem… and state controlled media

radicalize public opinion

Sommer

Al-Kitbi

Smyser

The US promotes globalization everywhere in the world — except at home.

Al-Kitbi


being welcomed as an opportunity to build cultural bridges, the donations’ moral acceptability was challenged because of the Prince’s open intention to change America’s attitude towards Islam.

Islamophobia has grown stronger in the West recently: just think of the public outcry following Dubai Ports World’s attempt to take over American ports. This fear of Islam is on the one hand fed by extremists in the Arab world, on the other hand reinforced by intolerant forces in the West. Radicals on both sides are steal-ing the middle ground; they try to force people to adopt their own extremist siege mentality.

Since 9/11 and President Bush’s ensuing distinction between good and evil, the Muslim world has become the target of the Western War on Terror — a crusade similar to President Reagan’s condemnation of the Soviet Union as an evil empire in the 1980s. Suddenly the West is treating all Muslims like potential terrorists.

The concept of ‘Islamophobia’ is very alive in Western intellectual circles and pub-lic arenas. Some misleading notions have become popular lately, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. One such notion is that people in the Middle East resent the western values and way of life. This notion is presented to the public by po-litical leaders in a state of crisis. Its validity is questionable. Muslims do not ‘hate’ the West. In fact, a survey conducted in 2004 by the Center of Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan entitled “The Arab Street Revisited: Research from Within,” revealed that what Muslims admire most about the West is technology, democracy, and freedom of expression. One look at the gates of Western embas-sies with Muslims lining up to obtain entry visas is evidence that Muslims hold Western values in high regard regardless of the loud alienating voices of Muslim extremists and terrorists.

Islam is considered a threat to the West. Muslims have been portrayed in the Western media, some school books, and movies as fundamentalists, extrem-ists, and terrorists. There are indeed extreme, violent, and fundamental groups within the Muslim world. But the same holds true for the West. This false notion of an Islamic danger ultimately lends support to the theory of a clash of civiliza-tions. Indeed, Islam has obviously become a part of Western civilization. Muslims are medical doctors, athletes, musicians, academics, politicians, businessmen, lawyers, and active citizens in the West. The modern world is not divided ac-

VolkerRadicals on both sides are

stealing the middle ground

KoolaeeSince 9/11 the West is treating

all Muslims like potential terrorists

Al-KhalilThe people of the Middle East

do not hate the West

Islam has obviously become a part of Western civilization.

Al-Khalil

Regional Perspectives 56 57 The Arab-Israeli Conflict

cording to religion any more. There no longer is a Pope governing one part of the world and a Muslim Caliph governing the other. Muslims understand today that the concept of ‘dar al-harb’ (land of war) and ‘dar al-islam’ (land of Islam) is outdated.

For centuries the West has committed serious mistakes in dealing with the Is-lamic world, first through colonialism, and then by exporting doomed ideological concepts like nationalism, fascism and Marxism. Muslims have good reasons to be suspicious of Western concepts. But better governance, less corruption, and more social justice are in the interest of the Islamic world, even though they are advocated by the West.

The West must advocate its concepts within the region to give people a chance to make their own decisions about democracy. Eastern Europe’s democratization was a success not so much of European or American political strategy but of West-ern ideas. Nothing is more powerful than ideas. Certainly, Central and Eastern Europe was a friendly environment. Now we should try to make our ideas work in the less friendly environment of the Middle East. Europeans tend to doubt their values out of historical experience, but let us advertise for our core beliefs and then leave it to the people in the Middle East to decide. Be ready to accept their decision, but do not prevent them from choosing.

3. The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Before we turn to the future there is no way around addressing one major cause, maybe the major cause for mistrust against the West in the Arab world in detail: How do people here assess our role in the Arab-Israeli conflict up to now ?

The issue of Western credibility regarding democratization is indissolubly linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict, because the Western powers’ biased position affects their overall credibility and constitutes one of the sources of motivation for ter-rorists. The US is no longer perceived as an honest broker; it is notorious for its double standards.

The perception of the West and particularly of the United States in the Islamic world is indeed strongly influenced by our approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Pflüger

ReiterLet us advertise our core beliefs and then

leave it to the people in the region to decide

Sommer

Moukheiber

Polenz

Regional Perspectives 56 57 The Arab-Israeli Conflict

In the experience of Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, each and every regional conflict was instigated by either the US or European countries or other powers from outside the region. Israel is the best example. It was an alien entity planted in the heart of the Middle East by Europe and later sustained and protected by the US. It is common knowledge that Israel could not have existed one decade without the tremendous amounts of money, advanced technology, military weapons, and political support it has received from Western countries since its creation.

Israel was not established by Europeans but by the UN. The General Assembly’s approval of the partition plan in 1947 led to the foundation of the state of Israel. If the Palestinians and the neighboring Arab countries would have accepted that plan, it would have given a Palestinian state almost as much territory as Israel.

The perspective given by Mr. Al-Khalil is biased. How many Arab governments engage in open trade with Israel ? How many have diplomatic relations with Israel or recognize it as a state ? How many are actively pushing Hamas to recognize Israel ? Before any solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians can be reached, the Arab states have to change their policies in a fundamental way.

The unconditional support of Israel is the worst example of Western double stand-ards. How could Muslims trust the West’s call for free elections, when in Palestine the Europeans and Americans are now punishing a majority of citizens for not voting the way they should have ? When the Israeli Prime Minister’s chief advisor Dov Weissglas cynically joked that Israel would not starve the Palestinians, but only put them on a diet for electing Hamas, his colleagues broke out in laughter, a fact which was published both by the Israeli and Arab press. No Israeli or West-ern politician criticised Weissglass or asked him to apologize for his inhumane joke.

The late Yasser Arafat wasted many years during the reign of five Israeli prime ministers. Nobody held him accountable for his neglect of his people’s needs and his bungling in negotiations. When President Anwar Sadat stood up in the Egyp-tian parliament and announced his will to visit the Knesset, the Israelis delivered, and the Americans acted as a reliable broker and provided the main body of the forces observing the terms of the Camp David accord.

Al-KhalilIsrael is an alien entity in the

Middle East planted by Europe

KloseIsrael was not established by

Europeans but by the UN

Volker

Rouleau

Kassem

To solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab states have to change their policies.

Volker

Regional Perspectives 58 59 Causes of Radicalism

The Arab-Israeli conflict is of course an obstacle to democratization in the region. Double standards towards Israel and its Muslim neighbors encourage terrorism in the region.

Also, foreign occupation blocks democracy’s development — Lebanon was paralyzed by the long occupation of Syrian forces.

But we should neither accept that the Palestinians claim they cannot develop a democratic system before the Israelis leave nor that other governments use the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as an alibi for not embarking on the way towards democracy.

4. Causes of Radicalism

What are the other challenges in the region ? Where does the steadily increasing radicalization that provides the basis for terrorism stem from ?

Radicalism in the region is a major Western security concern. Rooting out radicalism is probably the most important motive for Western democratization efforts.

It was 9/11 that returned the Middle East to our political radar. Before this terrible event, few people or conferences dealt for example, with domestic policy in the Middle East or Iran. Only after 9/11 did our fear of Islamist terrorists make West-ern politicians care about the Islamic world, try to understand Islam, its different branches and its political implications, and discuss the Middle East in parliament as well as in public. We are now forced to analyze the causes for the region’s prob-lems and do something about them, if only for security reasons.

Terrorism does not only stem from the shortcomings of Middle Eastern societies and political systems, but also within the unjust nature of our globalized world. Instead of only focusing on the War on Terror, the West must reduce the gap between underdeveloped and developed countries and strengthen the role of in-ternational institutions. Once a more just international system will come about, an important source of extremism and terrorist dangers will run dry.

Terrorism is brought to us by a minority of self-proclaimed holy warriors. The conflict is not a clash of civilizations because it is not a fight between Muslims and Christians or Westerners, but between extremists and democratic societies.

Moukheiber

Sommer

PolenzIt was 9/11 that returned the

Middle East to the political radar

KoolaeeTerrorism stems from the unjust

nature of our globalized world

Klose

Regional Perspectives 58 59 Causes of Radicalism

One of the factors contributing to radicalization is demographics, by far the big-gest challenge for Middle East in the years to come. In the next generation, 100 million young people are going to search for jobs in slow, unsteadily growing or stagnating economies. One can only hope that their commitment to reform will not be undermined by the sheer hopelessness of their economic prospects. Moreover, this generation will grow up in the post-9/11 world, in a context of hate and anger: this is why some call them the “hateration.” Preventing them from radicalizing will be a difficult but immensely important task.

Is the victory of Hamas in Palestine an indication that radical Islamism is on the rise in the region ?

The elections for the Palestinian Authority were fair and free, and they reflected a deep commitment to democracy by the citizens who voted under the most seri-ous conditions.

The victory of Islamists of course throws into doubt the acceptance of people in the Middle East for democratic ideals as understood by the West. But I am con-vinced that the vote for Hamas was not a vote against democracy or for Islamism, but for a better everyday life, for security, for social services and for education, which Fatah failed to deliver.

Talking about developments in the region, we must not forget Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia is a key country for democratization in the region, and a most problem-atic one. It is not only one of world’s largest exporters of oil, but also an ardent exporter of its austere and feudal 18th century brand of Islam, Wahhabism. The effects of Saudi Arabia’s financial aid, given generously to those willing to follow its rigid interpretation of Islam, are unpredictable.

Wahhabism supports the negative Western image in the region, and Saudi Arabia is supposedly an exporter of Wahhabism, funding it with large amounts of money, including both private and charitable contributions. While Saudi Arabia officially supports the War on Terror and condemns Islamist terrorism, is it not counterpro-ductive to help spread anti-Western sentiments, Mr. Al-Khalil ?

I have to admit that the much criticized export of Wahhabism, with its strong anti-Western sentiments, has become a domestic problem for Saudi Arabia, too.

Singer

Sommer

Fischer

The victory of Islamists throws into doubt

the acceptance of democratic ideals

Berman

BrengelmannWhy does Saudi Arabia help spread

anti-Western sentiments ?

Al-Khalil

Demographics is by far the biggest challenge for the Middle East.

Singer

Regional Perspectives 60 61 Can the Middle East be Democratic?

The Saudi government has already taken large steps towards a solution, including the closing down of the influential Riyadh-based Al-Haramain Islamic Founda-tion — along with other Saudi charities and committees which were suspected by the US of funding terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. A new entity — the Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad — will work to keep charitable donations out of the wrong hands in the future.

Saudi Arabians are not hostile against the West, apart from a deep commit-ment to the rightful Palestinian cause. In fact, the Saudis’ relationship with Europe and the US has been very fruitful in recent decades. Since 1950, countless Saudis have studied there — more than 400,000 in the United States alone, which makes Saudi Arabia an almost bilingual country. At the same time, Saudi Arabia never forgot its affiliation to the Islamic world. It is well-connected to its neighbors in the GCC, other Middle Eastern countries and the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia cares about regional problems, has often taken a leading role and is ready to help.

5. Can the Middle East be Democratic ?

Many people claim that democracy can never work in the region for cultural and religious reasons. I would like to ask those who live in the Middle East whether they feel characterized adequately by that analysis.

I refuse to accept that we are all genetically determined to be undemocratic Mus-lims. That is just a pretext for those in power for keeping their people from deter-mining their own way of life. Unfortunately, especially those in the West who try to be understanding regarding our local traditions often fall into this trap.

Democracy is not new in the Middle East. Many ignore that we had a liberal age, and that Egypt had an elected parliament back in 1866. Even before Germany and Italy were united, we had liberalism and democracy. It was not Westminster-style democracy, but participation in the political process. People over 60 like Mr. Al-Azm and I, still remember the tail end of this liberal age. In the 1960s, we traded defamed democracy for autocrats, dictators, and military regimes who promised the liberation of Palestine, social justice and Arab unity, an alternative social con-tract to the democratic liberal human rights-based legacy. Today, 50 to 60 years later, Palestine has not been liberated one inch, the Arab world has not been united and instead of social justice we are left with stagnation and decay.

The Saudi government is taking steps to

monitor religious charities and foundations

Sommer

KassemMuslims are in no way genetically

pre-determined to be undemocratic

IbrahimInstead of social justice there has been

50 years of stagnation and decay …

Democracy is not new in the Middle East.

Ibrahim


The pretension that Western-style democracy cannot work in the Arab world for cultural and religious reasons is Europe’s favorite excuse for inaction. It is as unfounded as it is popular. 60 to 70 years ago, many politicians and social scientists in America were convinced that Germans could never be democratic because of their authoritarian mentality and that the Japanese could not live in a democratic system because of certain Confucian traditions. Slavs, it was said, were bound to live under autocratic rule for historical reasons and until the 1970s important groups claimed that the South American and South European dictators were ap-propriate for the Catholic population of their countries. Nevertheless, since 1974 a hundred countries of all races, colors and religions have transformed themselves into democracies, beginning with Portugal. I am unwilling to accept the seemingly sympathetic argument that people from my part of the world will be doomed to spend their life under dictatorial or theocratical rule because they are for histori-cal, mental or religious reasons unable to be democratic citizens. Look at me, does my DNA prevent me from being a citizen of a democratic state like you ?

Opponents of supporting democratization in Eastern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s alleged exactly the same as those who argue today that Western-style democracy is not applicable to the Middle East. The communist regimes’ claim that their people were not ripe for Western democracy and should be allowed to find their own specific way resonated well with certain political groups in Europe, much to our distress in Poland.

The desire for reform and modernity in the Middle East dates back to the 19th century and the quest in the region for human rights and democratization is not new.

Strengthening human rights should not be hindered by exaggerated respect for indigenous cultural traditions. Every UN member state is required to respect the human rights outlined in the Human Rights Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

The oldest reform movement in the region was driven from within: Turkey’s role as the leading modernizer in the Islamic world started with the Ottoman Tanzimat. In 1839, the Ottoman Sultan decided to stop his empire’s falling behind European powers. He modernized the army and the education system and started to fight corruption. Tanzimat, which can be translated as “reorganization” like the Soviet

… because some argue that the region

cannot become democratic

Reiter

Esfandiari

Strengthening human rights should not be

hindered by exaggerated respect for traditions

Al-Azm


Union’s perestroika in the 1980s, peaked in 1876 with the implementation of a constitution that was meant to limit the Sultan’s autocratic power. Despite some harsh backlashes, the modernization of the Ottoman empire and its successor Turkey continued until after World War II. The Young Turks and the later leaders of the Republic were educated in schools established during the Tanzimat.

Many people in the Muslim world, especially in Iran, reject modernization, secu-larization, relativism and individualism as Western values contradicting their own traditions and identities shaped during many centuries. Democratic values have never taken root in large parts of the Muslim world, and the rise of political Islam has further limited their influence in the region.

Iran, though, has a long tradition of democratization. The ideas of democracy, human rights, gender equality, and the rule of law have been influencing Iran’s society ever since the bourgeois democratic Russian Revolution in 1905, earlier than anywhere else in Western Asia. Political Islam is not the only viable alterna-tive to despotic secular regimes in my country. Today, the Iranian theocracy no longer fulfills the people’s expectations. Our population is divided into those who support the Mullah’s rule, rejecting any kind of international influence, and those who want reform and see international influence as a potentially positive factor.

Democratization is not about imposing a Western way of life on the Middle East — democracy is a way of organizing political representation and is in no way necessarily linked to consumerism, mass culture and other features of Western societies.

Some claim that the only accepted alternative to authoritarian rule in the region is Islamism because at present, the secular parties are weak. But their weakness is due to their suppression, and the Islamist’s rise is due to the fact that they are less vulnerable to suppression.

Let me explain what I mean with the example of Egypt. The regime, albeit formally democratic, has been under periodically renewed martial law ever since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. For more than 20 years, the parties of the so-called “old opposition” have been suppressed: their activities have been restricted, their activists confined to their headquarters and their newspa-pers closed down. Today, these parties are only shadows of their former selves. They are chaired by discredited, corrupt leaders, and no longer seriously chal-

Koolaee

Iran has a long tradition of democratization

Al-Azm

KassemIslamists are less vulnerable to

suppression than secular parties are


lenge Hosni Mubrarak and his ruling National Democratic Party. In recent years, a “new opposition” serious about a democratic change of power and unwilling to take part in Mubarak’s charades, has arisen. These parties include Hizb al-Ghad, (Tomorrow Party) a centrist, liberal and secular political party which I am part of, and Hizb al-Wasat (Center-Party), a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot with moderate tendencies and Coptic members, on its way from Islamic fundamentalism to mod-ern politics. Finally, there is the Nasserist-leaning Hizb al-Karama (Dignity Party). The Hizb al-Wasat and the Hizb al-Karama still lack a full license granted by the Political Parties Committee of the Shura Council, which is necessary to operate legally in Egypt. Hizb al-Ghad’s got its license only after an appeal to the Political Parties Court of the Higher Administrative Court.

So why did the Islamists score big in the last elections in Egypt ? Only because secular parties were not allowed to operate while the Islamists are operating from the mosques which the regime could not close down. The only choice left to the Egyptian people was between the regime and the mosque. With the old opposition discredited, and the new opposition weak and vulnerable to regime harassment, the people voted for Islamists because there are no alternatives. The decline of secular parties in the region is almost a carbon copy of the develop-ments in Egypt. The only place where dissenters are allowed to congregate is the mosque. Until that changes, secular parties will remain at a great disadvantage to the Islamists.

While we had irregularities in the last parliamentary elections, the ruling party won only 34 % while the majority of seats went to independent and opposition candidates. The opposition should not blame the government for its internal problems.

Mr. Kassem, you claim that harassment from the Egyptian government is respon-sible for the decline of secular parties in Egypt. But secular parties are declining throughout the region. In Morocco, where secular parties are given more leeway than in Egypt, they nevertheless face the same problems. Is there not a broader crisis of secular parties in the Middle East because these parties have failed to make contact with potential constituencies recently ?

If you have good advice on how the secular parties can better connect to their constituencies, I will gladly pass it on to America’s secular party which is in dire need of closer relations to its constituencies, too.

The people vote for the Islamists

because there are no alternatives

KamalThe opposition should not blame the

government for its internal problems

Ottaway

Berman


Saudi Arabia does not yet need immediate democratization. Not because of Is-lam, but because our current political system is best suited to achieve prior goals like accountability, efficient use of national wealth or education. In 1950, the illiteracy rate was 95 %; there were no modern schools and no universities. The great progress since then is the merit of our government. Our Western-educated intellectuals share this view. Personally, I support democracy and other Western ideas — after all, I spent 17 years of my life in the United States, my two daughters are American, and one of them is studying at Georgetown University right here in Washington D. C. But Saudi Arabia needs its current government and political system in the years to come to modernize our society.

Postponing democratization because pressing challenges can supposedly be mas-tered best by an autocracy is exactly the wrong thing to do. Only functioning democratic institutions allow states to deal with challenges effectively.

Mr. Al-Khalil, your candid statement that Saudi Arabia is neither ready for nor de-sirous of democracy frightens me. I believe that the countries in the region need democratic systems based on the people’s sovereignty, not on sovereignty arising from God-made rules and kings who are supposed to implement God’s will on Earth. For me as a Lebanese, such a system is nightmarish. We need to secularize the management of our state, even if that is complex and tedious.

I wonder how many Saudi Arabians are willing to wait until the state begins to fail before taking the first steps toward democratization.

In Saudi Arabia, many petitioners in the last years have been asking for account-ability, reform and a constitution.

Of course many Saudis seek reform — and so do I — but immediate Western-style democratization would hinder our progress toward enhancing accountability, the rule of law, equality and the use of our national wealth to better people’s lives.

So there is an indigenous basis for reform in the region ?

Today’s Middle East is noticeably different from the one portrayed in the last Human Development Report. Today, there is a constituency for reform, not only

Al-KhalilSaudi Arabia does not need

immediate democratization

Kassem Do the Saudis want to postpone democrati-

zation until the state has already failed ?

Moukheiber

Kassem

Al-Kitbi

Al-Khalil

Sommer

Kamal


among the opposition and civil rights activists, but also within government cir-cles themselves. Politization is increasing and political mobility is taking place in many countries. One of the reasons is demographic change: today, over 70 % of the population is less than 30 years old. The young generation, influenced by the mod-ern world via satellite television and the internet, supports the reform process.

For a long time, the people in the Gulf region have traded their political rights for the benefits oil has brought them. But today people are asking for freedom of speech and the right to criticize the government.

The people want reforms ardently. But the regimes control their citizens so tightly that reformers are often unable to express their discontent.

Democratization in the Middle East is motivated by the failure of alternative poli-cies to end political stagnation. After nationalist and populist reform agendas flat-lined, many reformists in the 1980s switched to supporting civil society, democ-racy, the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Albeit aided by foreign support, this new consensus was driven by domestic needs and determined reformists.

At the micro-level, important progress has been made recently in the politi-cal landscape and towards the reinforcement of civil societies in the Middle East. Small as these processes may seem, they have an almost revolutionary dimension. This is what the United States and the European Union should support.

The same holds true for the emerging debate over civil society based on re-spect for human rights, freedom of expression and a religiously neutral state. Even if only a third of the population is currently in favor of what I would call the new liberal consensus, that is a great advance. Finally a significant part of the citizens have embraced the only option for breaking the vicious circle of stagnation, cor-ruption and decay which all too often leads to turmoil and sometimes civil war.

Interestingly, this new consensus was first embraced and is most vociferously and competently defended by the left, even the traditional Marxists. When the failure of socialism’s quest for a more advanced form of democracy became obvi-ous with the end of the Soviet Union, the left retreated to its second line of defense, a civil society based on “bourgeois” values like human rights and secularism.

Many Islamists today also support this liberal consensus. The Muslim Brothers have fought from their moment of creation, as a political and social revolutionary movement in 1928, to defend a traditional interpretation of Islam and the Islamic

The internet generation

supports the reform process

Al-KitbiThe people are no longer willing to trade

their political rights for material benefits

Moukheiber

Al-Azm

There is a new liberal consensus

in the Middle East …

… which many Islamists support

The political landscape in the Middle East is changing on the micro level. Small processes have an almost revolutionary dimension.

Al-Azm


countries against any kind of foreign or modernist influence. But after their at-tempts to violently seize power in Syria, Algeria and Egypt failed spectacularly, they recently changed course. They stopped demanding the immediate applica-tion of Sharia law and restoration of the Muslim Caliphate in favor of the liberal consensus. Understandably, they avoid the word “secularism” by all means, but they speak of “civil government” and mean a secular state. After they recognized that Sharia law will not be applied any time soon, a religiously neutral state is the second best solution from their point of view.

All participants from the region present at the table — mostly academics and civil society activists — have expressed their desire for reform. I am glad to hear that but cannot block out nagging doubts about how representative these views are. What about the Islamists who are not present among us ? Nobody in the West foresaw the election of President Ahmadinejad in Iran or Hamas’ landslide victory in Palestine. They were hastily interpreted as protest votes against a cor-rupt establishment, not as a general rejection of democracy. As much as I would like to share that interpretation, I fear it might instead be that we simply do not know anymore and refuse to acknowledge what the majority in the Middle East is thinking nowadays. These people might be on a completely different path by now.

Are the Muslims attending this Round Table representative for the region ? Very much so. That might not apply to our secular beliefs: while the Islamists believe in legitimacy granted by God through the Qu’ran, we believe in legitimacy coming from the people. But that is not the main point. The main point is, people in the Middle East want reform, free and fair elections, and an end to corrupt govern-ments. They want jobs, independent judges, civil rights, participation, more active civic organizations and more active political parties: in this respect, we are very representative.

Can democracy be imposed or supported from outside ?

Democracy can never be imposed. Unlike a machine you cannot export it to oper-ate anywhere. Like a seedling it needs decades, perhaps even centuries, to take roots and grow, and it constantly remains vulnerable. After 9/11 democracy was jeopardized in the United States by the Patriot Act — without tough opposition

BrengelmannHow representative are your demands ?

MoukheiberThey are representative because

the people want reform

Sommer

Kassem

Unlike a machine, you cannot export democracy to operate anywhere.

Kassem


from American civil society and a well-functioning legal system the US might have descended into authoritarian rule.

Still outside actors can do and should do a lot to pressure the region’s autocrats to reform. You should not wait until all our governments agree that their people are now ready to become democrats. Of course the Middle East is not ready for democracy. The region is plagued by sectarianism, nationalism, and Islamic fun-damentalism ! But beware of rulers reiterating that Westminster-style democracy is still far away. That is their favorite pretext for not even starting to move toward this goal. Recently, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak agreed that democratization in the region will take a generation. I agree too, but Mubarak is one of the people responsible for the fact that democracy is still so far away. If it were up to him, democracy would be postponed eternally on the grounds of the society not being ready to implement it successfully all at once.

Middle Eastern governments will embark on the path to change only if they are given serious incentives or put under great pressure. In Lebanon, international pressure by the US, Europe, and the UN following Hariri’s assassination was in-strumental for the so-called Cedar Revolution. It is time to push for democracy and stop worrying about its possible negative impact on regional stability, which is all too often used as an excuse to support dictatorships. But the West has to walk the fine line between assistance, which is truly welcome, and intervention, which is mostly rejected.

After the recent Color and Flower Revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, many people in Iran who are striving for reforms believe that external pressure might accelerate democratization in Iran.

Triggering reform from outside without an indigenous basis is impossible. The comparison between current American policy in the Middle East and the Ameri-can efforts in Germany after 1945, as it is discussed in the United Sates, is inap-propriate. Germany had a long-standing democratic tradition and had leaders like Konrad Adenauer, Kurt Schumacher and Theodor Heuss, who had been devoted to Western democratic standards for decades. The Middle East lacks both.

There has been a positive example recently, though. Lebanon has witnessed ma-jor changes following Rafik Hariri’s assassination. During a visit after the tragedy, my colleagues from the German Federal Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and I met with many courageous civic activists in Lebanon who were protesting

You should not wait until our governments

agree that they are ready for democracy

MoukheiberIt is time for the West to push for democracy

and stop worrying about regional stability

Klose

The Middle East lacks both democratic traditions and devoted political leaders.

Klose


against the Syrian occupation and calling for domestic reform. In the end, these protests, supported by international pressure, with the UN, the US and France play-ing a leading role and cooperating very closely, succeeded. The Syrian occupation forces were ousted and free elections were held, putting Lebanon on the path to democracy. This could be a model for positive Western interference in the region.

We need a sense of ownership for reform in the region. First, regional elites must develop their own concepts of reform. After that, we might provide, if requested, advice, help and assistance to realize these concepts for reform.

Western policy for the Middle East should neither return to the tenets of security-induced realpolitik nor to an idealistic Wilsonian democratization policy. Between these two extremes there must be a middle course. It should be up to the govern-ments in the region to come up with their own visions and their respective road maps for reform, to which they should then be held accountable. At best, Western governments should provide incentives to help these countries evolve both in the right direction and according to their own goals.

When supporting reform, the West must take the political, cultural, and social realities of each respective country into account instead of trying to duplicate other regions’ experiences on a one-to-one basis.

Democracy also needs the civil society. But the civil society must grow from within, as the result of grass-roots movements. It should not be imposed by out-side forces, i. e. the EU or the United States.

The argument that democratization cannot be imposed from outside was also used against the United States’ promoting democratization in the Far East during the 1980s and 1990s. It is as wrong now as it was then. Democratization in Tai-wan, the Philippines and South Korea did get helpful boosts from outside, even though it would of course have been impossible without economic development and indigenous democratic forces.

External assistance might be necessary for two reasons:1. Authoritarianism is weakened by weakening its political basis. As authori-

tarian regimes are made up of coalitions, you need to encourage those parts of the

Scharioth

Kamal

Koolaee

EsfandiariCivil society in the Middle East

must grow from within

BermanDemocratization in the Far East

got helpful boosts from outside

Piscatori

We need a sense of ownership for reform.

Scharioth


regime that are willing to be reformists. In this context, conditionality does play a meaningful role — though it has to be calibrated carefully.

2. External assistance can facilitate and encourage normative change. Assist-ance to civil society groups not only helps change individuals’ lives, but also helps plant the seeds of the ideas of freedom, justice and democracy within the minds of the citizens, upon which we can build.

Western pressure has already helped many dissidents. Mr. Ibrahim, sitting here with us, was released from prison because of constant, year-long pressure by West-ern governments and NGOs. By the way, very few of his Arab colleagues worked for his release.

We need to soberly evaluate which projects of fostering indigenous attempts at democratization make sense. For example, the US government supports a training program for female election candidates. Women from the United Arab Emirates participate in the program, despite the fact that in their country nobody elects anybody.

To encourage reform in GCC states, you need carrots but also sticks. I do not see any sticks — how could the West put these regimes under pressure ? They have enough money and do not need financial support.

How does democracy come about — is it there once fair and free elections have taken place or are elections the last step in a long process ?

The United States seems to be obsessed by the idea that elections are the spark that ignites democratization. While it is true that democracy without elections is impossible, elections do not necessarily lead to a lasting democratic progress. Elec-tions in an early stage of transition are not necessarily proof that democracy works. They may even pave the way for parties that want to reverse the whole process at the first opportunity. German history provides a good example. In 1932 a majority of non-democratic parties was democratically elected in the German parliament, with Hitler’s NSDAP as the strongest force. You all know the outcome.

We should put more emphasis on the development of legal systems than on hav-ing elections as soon as possible.

KassemWestern pressure has already

helped many dissidents

Ottaway

Al-KitbiWhere is the stick to put

these regimes under pressure ?

Sommer

Klose

Polenz


How can one argue for delaying democratization until this or that political chal-lenge has been mastered ? An open society can best take care of the challenges ahead — establishing procedures and institutions is the key. Therefore, democrati-zation should have priority over political goals like better education, an independ-ent legal system or a reform of personal status law.

Democratization efforts cannot be put into a sequence: elections and the rule of law are required simultaneously. As an economist, I have seen developing market economies discredited around the world because they lacked the rule of law, func-tioning cartel offices or were unable to guarantee individual property rights.

To establish democracy and free markets in the Islamic world, we must give the highest priority to establishing a functioning legal system in dialog with the region.

Especially the US placed too much emphasis on establishing formal character-istics of market economy and democracy — like, for example, elections — , neglect-ing institution building and strengthening the rule of law. Without functioning courts and public registers, neither democracy nor market economies work. Both Russia and Latin America conduct elections and are formally market economies but lack independent, functioning legal systems.

Fair and free elections created a juxtaposition of sectarian parties in Iraq that-proved unable to build a democratic Iraq. In Palestine, they brought Hamas a landslide victory. Free elections are of little use as long as the necessary institu-tions are missing.

Free and democratic parliamentary elections do not guarantee democracy, as long as parliament does not have serious legislative and controlling competences. Therefore democracy is not only about free and fair elections.

But elections are of course one of democracy’s core elements. Lebanon’s unfair and unfree elections went largely unnoticed by the West for more than 15 years, but the latest elections were under great scrutiny as a result of the turmoil fol-lowing former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination. However, in its haste to rubber-stamp the elections, the EU failed to recognize a number of serious viola-tions of this election’s rules, including abuses relating to media and party fund-ing. In Egypt, the government tampered with the election, yet the West criticized only cautiously this. This incoherence seems to indicate the West might ignore

Ibrahim

HoyerDemocratization needs elections and

the rule of Law in equal measure

KepelFree elections are of little use as

long as the institutions are missing

Moukheiber

Elections are one of

democracy’s core elements

Without functioning courts and public registers, neither democracy nor market economies work.

Hoyer


cover-ups for the sake of having a clear conscience and thus encourages regimes to confine themselves to merely cosmetic improvements.

To trigger reform, the West must concentrate on helping people build institutions from within rather than on replacing politicians. Good governance means free and fair elections, effective parliaments, an independent judiciary, a free press (which has to include audio-visual media), and a vivid civil society. Currently, these tools have been crippled, and they have to be rebuilt from within.

In Iraq and Palestine we neglected institution building. Instead we destroyed institutions which could have helped us. In Iraq, US Administrator Paul Bremer disenfranchised the Iraqi army and in Palestine, “tanks paid for with American dollars destroyed Palestinian institutions paid for with euros” — to quote Chris Patten, former EU Commissioner for External Relations. Without institutions, democratic societies cannot be built sustainably.

For democratization, you need democrats. The West should do much more to strengthen democracy at grass-roots level to create a basis for its efforts.

Which indigenous conditions are needed for Western support to be fruitful ?

Democracy needs a vibrant, effective and independent civil society. But most Arab countries, except Lebanon, and, to a lesser degree, Morocco, lack the legal and financial framework for such institutions. The Cedar Revolution in Lebanon was not organized by traditional political parties, but by the people, and the process of building democracy is driven by active, well-connected NGOs. Many movements for reform in the Arab world are connected to the human rights movement. While political participation is severely restricted in many Arab countries, human rights is the only area where demands for reform can be expressed. Unfortunately, the West often supports cronyism-plagued government offshoots which are civil so-ciety organizations in name only, instead of insisting on the creation of adequate conditions for the development of civil society.

Second, examples are vital for democratization in the Arab world, as the events in the aftermath of the Cedar Revolution showed. The pictures of the Lebanese taking to the streets, the media going beyond theorizing about reform to actually having people on TV or radio, discussing politics on air and thus being

Moukheiber

Kepel

Al-Kitbi

Sommer

MoukheiberThe West often supports cronyism-plagued

government offshoots

For democratization you need democrats.

Al-Kitbi


part of the unfolding democratization process, brought enormous motivation to the region. The Lebanese people showed that democratization does not depend on ideas spread via foreign TV and radio — it was a positive example of democratiza-tion from within.

Independent media is an important condition for the development of a function-ing democratic society. Unfortunately, most of the countries in the region still lack a free press and independent TV stations, among them my country Egypt.

As publisher of a critical newspaper, you should know that the level of freedom of expression in Egypt today is unprecedented.

Much to the contrary, Egypt is one of twelve countries in the world where journal-ists are imprisoned for criticizing the government. I do indeed run an independent newspaper. The government’s attitude is: you say what you like, we do what we like — and I do not want to go into the details of this. Since President Mubarak made a promise to give more freedom to the media, the whole country is waiting for him to deliver. But he never has. TV and radio stations, which reach more of the population than newspapers, remain dominated by the state.

Freedom of information, a crucial prerequisite for a functioning democracy, is not so much about independent newspapers as it is about independent TV and radio stations. Only a minority reads; the majority has to be addressed through audio-visual media. Throughout the region, control of this media is still firmly under government control, except for Lebanon.

Considering that many more people watch TV rather than read newspapers, are Western programs welcome voices of democracy, or are they simply perceived as Western propaganda ? As a German parliamentarian, I am especially interested in how people receive Deutsche Welle and its Arab programs, because we spend a lot of money on them.

For most people in the Arab world, independent regional media like Al-Jazeera enjoy much more credibility than Western satellite TV channels broadcasted in Arabic, like Al-Hurra. The people are skeptical about this channel, not least be-cause it is funded by the US Congress and directed by the US Broadcasting Board

KassemEgypt is still waiting for Mubarak

to give more freedom to the media

Kamal

Kassem

MoukheiberIn the Middle East, TV and radio are more

important than newspapers …

Polenz

Al-Kitbi… and regional media are more

important than foreign channels


of Governors. Moreover, its expressed purpose is to counter the — from a Western perspective — biased, anti-American reports and commentaries from Qatar-based Al-Jazeera and UAE-based Al-Arabiya. But these independent, regional media are much greater assets for democratization than foreign channels — especially those which are widely seen as government propaganda.

We should indeed not be too fearful of al-Jazeera and other Arab channels even if they sometimes may appear to contradict with Western press standards, for instance by broadcasting Osama bin Laden’s videos. Al-Jazeera has brought about a sort of audio-visual Ummah where issues range from politics to Muslim’s day-to-day lives. There is a new kind of pluralism in the Muslim world that was im-possible when government-controlled media was the only means of information. Deutsche Welle and other Western programs could have a complementary role.

Foreign and regional media — including Al-Arabiya and even Al-Jazeera — cannot replace local media when it comes to pushing for reform. In Lebanon, audio-visual media had an immense influence on developing democracy. To a large extent, it replaced the inefficient parliament in discussing issues like corruption.

Which local actors are pushing for reform or could be partners for the West ?

Even though the Arab League is practically absent as an actor, there are some posi-tive developments. Trying to make reforms acceptable to every member, the Arab League searches for the smallest common denominator; thereby mostly achieving cosmetic changes. But even though its human rights declaration, its economic and social council and its concept for a unified Arab parliament fall short of most peoples’ expectations, the attempt to create inbred institutions for democratiza-tion is still an encouraging sign.

Second, the judiciary in several states finally shows signs of embarking on its way to real independence. In Egypt, 1200 judges of the Alexandria Judges Club threatened in April 2005 to withdraw their supervision of the parliamentary and presidential elections unless they are guaranteed real independence. Unfor-tunately, this move has not really been heeded, but Egyptian judges continue to fight for their independence. In Lebanon, independence of the judiciary as a cornerstone of democratization has been the valiant cry of intellectuals and politi-cians ever since the Cedar Revolution ended the decay of our judicial system under

Pflüger

Moukheiber

Sommer

MoukheiberEvery attempt by the Arab League to aid

democratization is encouraging

The judiciary is showing

signs of independence

Regional Perspectives 74

Syrian domination. The European Union has offered to provide advice, assistance and financial support within the framework of its Neighborhood program for a reform of the judicial system. In Lebanon, there have also been encouraging steps to ensure that the rule of law is civilian, immune to religious influence. Recently, Lebanese intellectuals set an unprecedented example of defending the independ-ence of politics: when pro-Hizbullah scholar Sheikh Afif Naboulsi issued a fatwa prohibiting any Shia not belonging to the Amal party (party of God) from joining the Lebanese cabinet, eight intellectuals sued him for “identity theft, threatening and terrorizing in an attempt to obstruct the practice of civil rights, instigating sectarian differences and portraying political disputes as disputes between reli-gions and sects.” They said Sheikh Afif Naboulsi was not entitled to “issue a fatwa and prevent Shiite citizens from practicing their constitutional rights.”

Third, reform-minded parliamentarians in and outside the ruling parties recognize constitutional reform and independent legal systems as prerequisites for lasting change. In Egypt and Lebanon, for example, some parliamentarians no longer accept a merely cosmetic role in their countries’ political processes.

There are similarities between Middle Eastern states like Egypt and Syria and pre-1989 Eastern European countries regarding their institutions. The security apparatuses and the mass organizations for the youth and for students in Middle Eastern countries were essentially copied from East European models and created with the help of East German advisers.

During the Soviet Bloc’s final crisis in the late 1980s, existing reform factions within the ruling parties stepped out into the open to smooth the transition of power. I can see no such, more or less coherent reformist factions either in Syria or other Middle Eastern countries with single-party systems. These countries are more similar to communist Romania than to pre-1989 Hungary or Poland. While Poles and Hungarians managed a peaceful transition, the Romanians overthrew their Communist regime by force and executed its leaders. A potential collapse of Middle Eastern political systems must be managed skillfully to avoid chaos and violence.

Al-AzmEgypt and Syria are similar to pre-1989

Eastern European countries …

… but lack the coherent reformist factions that

smoothed the transition in Eastern Europe

75

III. What Should Be Done ?

In the third section of our Round Table discussion we will discuss what the EU and the US should do in the region. Khalil Al-Khalil, Member of Saudi Arabia’s Com-mittee of Security Affairs, the Al-Shura Council, will start us off.

How can the relations between the Middle East and the West be improved ? Europe and America should engage in honest and constructive dialog with the Middle East at all levels: states, civil organizations, business communities, intellectual leaders, and political and Islamic movements. It is crucially important to under-stand Islam and Muslims accurately through involvement with Muslims them-selves instead of learning about them from special interest groups . The Western powers must clear the political and intellectual atmosphere of anti-Islamic myths and confusing notions. We should emphasize that extreme groups on both sides do not represent the majority and should not dictate the agenda. Western support for reforms will be appreciated if these reforms enhance people’s lives directly and raise the standard of living.

So which role should Europe and the US play in fostering reforms in the Mid-dle East ?

First, they must contribute to enhancing security. Europe and America are mainly responsible for world security and peace. They should emphasize the significance of mutual respect, peaceful negotiations, bilateral and regional trea-ties and international law, and should eliminate political polarization from world politics. Militarized groups, violent groups, and militias inside some recognized countries should not to be supported for any reason.

Second, the West must aim at tolerance of cultural diversity and the preserva-tion of human rights when dealing with immigrants from the Muslim world.

Third, reform supported by the West has to be a comprehensive package of de-velopment encompassing basic needs such as human rights, education, freedom of expression, free press, minority and women’s rights, and sanitation.

Fourth, the US should be more careful when acting like a global policeman in a global empire. Europe should be careful to avoid unconditionally joining the American camp because that might increase resentment against Europe. The cartoon controversy in Danish newspapers is a matter of concern to me in that regard.

Fifth, offering Turkey a fair chance to be a member of the European Union would be a practical step in the right direction. Turkey could serve as a crucial link between Europe in particular and the Middle East.

Sommer

Al-KhalilThe Western powers must clear

the air of anti-Islamic myths

What Should Be Done ? 76 77 The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Finally, the crucial element that Europe and the US could provide to foster re-form is education. Problems such as poverty, unemployment, ignorance, extrem-ism, social diseases, and political unrest are directly or indirectly related to the lack of efficient education. Western academic institutions such as the American University in Beirut and the American University in Cairo have greatly contrib-uted to the modernization of the Middle East. The West should take up that tradi-tion and offer education to Middle Easterners in their nations and abroad through encouragements, grants, and scholarships.

An alarming notion is the categorization of a country like Saudi Arabia, which is known to experts as a moderate nation and a reliable ally to the US, as belong-ing to the ‘axis of evil.’ Saudi Arabia was considered as such by political strategists like Richard Perle and David Frum in their book ‘An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror’ (2003). This raises big question marks about the intentions and expertise of some political strategists in Europe and the US.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been one of the closest allies to the US dur-ing both war and peace for seven decades. It has enjoyed solid partnership with some European countries as well. The role Saudi Arabia played in the second Gulf War to liberate Kuwait in 1990 is further testimony of these fruitful relationships. Another example is the outstanding collaboration of Saudi Arabia with Europe and the US to fight Al-Qaeda and terrorism after September 11th.

Let us now try to develop policy recommendations for the most pressing issues. Clearly, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major obstacle for the democratization of the Middle East. Is there anything promising the West can do to foster a peaceful solution ?

1. The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Unfortunately, Israel’s unilateral retreat from Gaza did not provide a great impe-tus to the peace process. Within the last few months, we have seen a real stale-mate arising with Hamas’ election. The European Union and the United States are now obliged to consistently stick to their principles : As long as Hamas refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist, support the peace process, and renounce vio-lence, the West will neither cooperate with Hamas, nor finance the Palestinian Authority.

Saudi Arabia does not belong

to the “axis of evil”

Sommer

Pflüger


Given the importance of what Palestine for the Islamic world, a visible dedication of the West to achieve justice for the Palestinian people would help placate the Sunnis in Iraq and Iraqi Muslims in general.

Solving the Arab-Israeli conflict could trigger a positive domino effect. The West must press both sides to get on and implement the Road Map which is still the most promising base for a solution. That requires applying equal standards. We must demand that Hamas honors the Oslo Accords, renounce violence and regognize Israel’s right to exist. But our demand will be more legitimate if we remind the Israeli government at the same time that it has not implemented the settlement freeze stipulated by the Road Map. Also, even though a wall might be necessary to prohibit terrorist attacks, we should insist that it be erected accord-ing to the cease fire line of 1967. Last, we should remind Israel that the Road Map is about a negotiated solution to the conflict, not the unilateral “solution” Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Olmert has announced. Hopefully, American diplomacy will be tough on both sides.

Regarding the wall being built in Israel, as well as the settlements and the need to follow the Road Map, we are talking with Israel’s government in very frank terms.

For the time being, the peace process is stalled because of the Hamas victory. The Israeli government will withdraw unilaterally and there will not be a negotiated solution. Hamas’ victory is just another self-inflicted setback for the Palestinian cause.

If the West supports democracy in the region, it must respect the outcome of free elections. It must recognise the Hamas government, initiate a dialogue, use the traditional instruments of diplomacy, incentives and pressure, to further the cause of peace.

The Western reaction to Hamas’ victory is not an example of double standards but of consistency. The West welcomed free and fair elections in Palestine. But the outcome, namely a Hamas government, poses a problem because Hamas contra-dicts the very principles that have been guiding the peace process since its begin-ning. These principles — refraining and stopping terror and violance, recognizing

Al-Azm

PolenzSolving the Arab-Israeli conflict could

trigger a positive domino effect

Volker

Fischer

RouleauThe West must respect the

outcome of free elections

FreitagWe are criticizing Hamas, not the elections


the right of Israel’s existence and accepting signed agreements — have not been invented or specifically tailored for the Hamas government, but reflect long-stand-ing principles which have also been applied to the Fatah government. Ballots and bullets do not mix. It is a cynical approach by Hamas claiming the failure of the Oslo Accords when it was Hamas itself which initiated the derailment of the proc-ess by carrying out bombings once the Accords were signed in 1993. Now that the majority of Palestinians has supported Hamas, the West must still adhere to the standards it has been following for the past years. Accepting a government which refutes the fundamental principles of the peace process as a political partner would destroy our credibility.

Hamas’ victory does not call into question the US government’s long-term commit-ment to democratization. Hamas’ victory is a setback insofar as it makes a negoti-ated settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis very improbable at this point of time. We do not agree with Hamas’ policies and refuse to support this government as long as it does not recognize Israel’s right to exist, honor previous accords and renounce violence. At the same time, we welcome the fact that the elections were free and fair. Also I am cautiously optimistic regarding the effect of democracy on Hamas itself. It was not elected for its support for terrorism, but because people had had enough of Fatah mismanagement. If the Palestinians now hold Hamas accountable for its performance, it may change its policies to meet the electorate’s demand.

The West formulated three conditions for dealing with the Hamas government: recognizing Israel’s right to exist, respecting existing agreements, and putting an end to violence.

Recognizing Israel’s right to exist: within which borders, those of 1947, 1949 or 1967 ? Did the EU and the US ever ask Israel to recognize the legitimacy of a Palestinian state within the frontiers determined by the United Nations’ General Assembly and the Security Council ? Did Americans and Europeans ever exercise pressure on Israel to stop the creeping annexation of Palestine ?

Respecting existing arrangements: the Oslo agreements and the Road Map are dead. Have we forgotten that the right-wing Israeli governements which followed the assassination of Itzhak Rabin have condemned the Oslo accords while system-atically violating them ? Likewise, the Road Map has never been implemented by Israel. The peace process has made no progress during the past ten years. Ariel

VolkerHamas’ victory is a setback

Rouleau

The Western conditions for dealing

with Hamas are unacceptable


Sharon refused to speak to Yasser Arafat, he rarely spoke with his successor Mah-moud Abbas, and he never actually negotiated with him. The present Prime Min-ister Ehoud Olmert also abstains from opening any kind of dialogue. Israel keeps on saying that it “has no Palestinian partner”. But is it really seeking one ? Is it not establishing the “final frontiers” of Israel unilaterally ?

Putting an end to violence: did the West ever tell Israel to stop its daily opera-tions in the occupied territorries ? In violation of all international laws, the Israeli government practises freely what it calls “target assassinations” of Palestinian activists. The US government has used its right of veto over and over again to prevent any condemnation of any Israeli act by the Security Council, in defiance of the international community. We are asking Hamas to stop all violence while knowing perfectly well that it has observed a uniltaral ceasefire for the past year or so, while its leading members-political or military figures-are being systemati-cally murdered.

So what should be done ? Israel and the West should put an end to the boycott of the Hamas government and call for direct or indirect negotiations without any pre-conditions. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, in 1973, the P. L. O. was excluded from the Geneva Peace Conference since it had not yet recognized Israel. Nahum Goldmann, then President of the World Jewish Congress, described this attitude as being “plain stupid”. The fact that the P.L.O. was ready to negotiate, he said, indicated that it was recognising the Jewish State. This was plain common sense. Will it prevail 30 years later ?

Demanding that Israel start unconditional negotiations with Hamas would be a grossly biased policy and would only accelerate the confrontation. If the West wants to support the peace process, taking a balanced position is the most impor-tant prerequisite.

The peace process is not dead, but a reality — as unpleasant as that reality might be for both sides. The Hamas government is the living proof: Hamas was elected as a result of the Oslo Agreement. Without the Oslo Agreement, no Pal-estinian Authority, without Palestinian Authority, no elections, without elections, no Hamas government. Now go ahead and show me that the peace process is dead. It is self-evident that Hamas must accept the principles on which it bases its power.

As to the recognition of Israel’s right to exist, of course the European position is that the Palestinians’ rights for self-determination within their own state is just

Israel is defying the

international community

Fischer

The peace process is not dead, but a reality.

Fischer

What Should Be Done ? 80 81 Iran

as important. Territorial questions should be solved based on the borders of 1967, any changes must be negotiated.

The Hamas government must stop behaving like a revolutionary organization in exile and accept democratic principles and international law. If Hamas stops its terrorist activities, I am sure that Israel, America and the EU would enter into some kind of relationship with the Hamas government. At the moment, Hamas is a listed terrorist group in the US and partly responsible for the terrorist activities that made the peace process derail.

If Hamas is unwilling to accept the Oslo Agreement, how about accepting the conditions of the Arab Peace Initiative formulated during the Arab League summit in Beirut in 2002 ? If Israel withdrew its forces from the occupied territories and recognized an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital, the Arab states would recognize Israel, reconsider the Arab-Israeli conflict and establish normal relations with Israel.

The West is not punishing the Palestinian people for Hamas’ victory. The EU has decided to continue financing the Palestinian Authority, as has the US. Former World Bank President James Wolfensohn, the Middle East Quartet’s Special Envoy for the Gaza Disengagement, is currently calling on the international community to continue financing the Palestinian Authority. Western powers only decided that financial support should not go the Hamas.

What has Saudi Arabia with its enormous financial power done to ease the bur-dens of the Palestinians ? I understand that people from the region blame the West, but they should also demand that their own governments do their job.

I still doubt that Saudi Arabia, as one of the most important players in the Middle East, is willing to accept Israel’s right to exist. Remove that suspicion and we have a completely new perspective.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be the last Muslim country to recognize Israel, if only because it is unwilling to immediately recognize anything. It took us 70 years to finally recognize the borders of our neighboring state of Yemen. Even the eight goals that Germany scored against Saudi Arabia in the 2002 Soccer World Cup were heavily debated, and many Saudis denied our defeat. Israel will be recognized only if the Palestinian issue is solved in a completely satisfactory way. King (then

The Hamas government must stop behaving

like a revolutionary organization in exile

Klose

PflügerWhat has Saudi Arabia done to ease

the burdens of the Palestinians ?

HoyerIs Saudi Arabia willing to recognize

Israel’s right to exist ?

Al-Khalil


Crown Prince) Abdullah’s 2002 peace initiative made our conditions for Israel’s recognition very clear.

Personally, I do not believe there will be a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict until we have governments which can be held accountable. The region’s autocrats will keep on conveying a distorted picture of Israeli atrocities and American biased policy through state controlled media to rally support for their regimes.

2. Iran

One of the most immediate security challenges is the alleged Iranian attempt to develop nuclear weapons.

I believe that Iran wants nuclear weapons. The Iranians not only misled the internatio-nal community and the IAEA for 18 years, they are also developing long-range ballistic missiles that make sense only for transporting nuclear, not conventional warheads.

Iranian nuclear weapons would threaten the whole region, trigger a nuclear arms race and thus increase the danger of nuclear proliferation to terrorists. No Arab I have spoken to is in favor of the Iranian nuclear program. The Europeans and Americans want a political solution, but Iran has to cooperate. Of course Iran is worried about its security with US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. But Iranian se-curity would profit from a regional security system backed by the Arab countries, Europe, the United States and Iran much more than from nuclear weapons.

The United States must cooperate with the EU and use all the diplomatic tools available when dealing with Iran and its nuclear issues. But be assured that while ordinary Iranian people do not want their country to acquire a nuclear capability, they do thoroughly believe Iran is pursuing and has the right to pursue the peace-ful use of nuclear energy, including enrichment.

Concerning Iran’s nuclear program, we need to be very clear: An undemocratic re-gime whose president threatens Israel with extinction cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons. It cannor be permitted to have a closed nuclear cycle either, be-cause that could lead to a nuclear weapons program. Iran can have civilian nuclear power, possibly with enrichment taking place on Russian soil. To change Iran’s course, the US administration is committed to using all diplomatic means avail-

Kassem

Sommer

KloseIran wants nuclear weapons …

… no Arab is in favor of the program

KoolaeeThe Iranians believe in their right to pursue

the peaceful use of nuclear energy

VolkerAn undemocratic regime cannot be

permitted to have a closed nuclear cycle


able with the EU-3, the UN and the IAEA. In the longer run, we need to strengthen Iran’s democratic processes and civil society. If Iran were truly democratic and respected Israel’s right to exist, the West might still be reluctant to accept a closed fuel cycle, but the level of concern would definitely be lower.

We cannot force others to take certain decisions. The Iranian government decides about its nuclear program, its regional policy and its position on Israel and the Holocaust. All we can do is take the appropriate steps to influence these decisions. We should not, for example, take a credible military option off the table. While nobody in the US administration favors it, we should be aware that diplomacy may fail in the end.

The US administration needs to coherently explain why it seems to be rewarding the Indian nuclear arms program and winking at Israel’s nuclear capacity while at the same time opposing Iran’s nuclear program.

Considering India’s tremendous importance as a future economic and strategic partner, the American move is sensible. But it was wrong to sign a nuclear ac-cord because legitimizing the Indian nuclear program sends the wrong message to those benevolent people in Iran who are ready to limit nuclear efforts to the civilian sphere. You run the risk of triggering a new arms race when countries in the region (and far beyond) follow India’s example: forget the NPT and all these nasty obstacles, do whatever you think will enhance your strategic position in the world, resist outside pressure to play by the rules and one day you will end up in the Security Council as a permanent member.

After extensive consultations with Security Council members, NPT members and the Indian government on how to support the development of the Indian civilian nuclear program, in March 2006 President Bush sealed a nuclear accord with India. The coun-try will get access to US civilian nuclear technology and in return will open a part of its nuclear facilities for inspection. We send a clear message to Iran that a democratic, responsible and trustworthy government prepared to work with the international community paves the way to successful cooperation and international approval.

India has developed nuclear weapons outside of the NPT. You are sending a clear message, but your message is not that playing by NPT rules is best for your country, but secretly developing nuclear weapons is best.

MayWhy is the US government rewarding

India’s nuclear arms program ?

Hoyer

Volker

PflügerIndia has developed nuclear weapons

outside the NPT …

The American nuclear accord with India sends the wrong message.

Hoyer


No, India has never been a nuclear proliferator and has never sponsored terror-ism. In contrast to Iran, India is willing to engage in a process of guarantees on non-proliferation.

A regional security system has to include Israel as well. Not only for Israel’s se-curity, but because almost everyone in the region worries about Israel’s nuclear warheads. It is high time to revive the multilateral track dealing with key issues (including the NPT) that emerged after the bilateral talks at the Madrid Confer-ence in 1991.

The big difference between Israel’s and Iran’s nuclear ambitions is that nobody wants to wipe out Iran, whereas some governments and many people in the re-gion want to wipe out Israel — including the President of Iran.

Iran’s nuclear ambitions are a matter of great concern for the international com-munity. I believe, though, that by taking Iranian interests into account and by act-ing in concert, Europe and the US have a good chance to resolve the conflict. Iran is the largest country in the region, but it is politically isolated, concerned about its security and desperately needs to create jobs for its very large, young and fairly well-trained population. We need, first, to offer economic cooperation — here, Eu-rope can play a big role. Second, we need to address Iranian security concerns. In this regard, only direct US involvement in the negotiations with Iran can create a security structure attractive enough for Iran to give up its nuclear option.

Iran, strengthened by the US invasion of Iraq, is attempting to overthrow the strategic architecture of the region with its nuclear ambitions. But Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt will not accept Iranian nuclear predominance, they will start a nuclear arms race. That arms race will not resemble the Cold War scenario but rather the much less rational nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. After the terrorist attack on the Indian Union Parliament in New Delhi in 2001, India positioned missiles at the border with Pakistan which it blamed for supporting the terrorists. Pakistan was also in possession of atomic weapons and the world was at the brink of a nuclear war on the subcontinent. A nuclearized Middle East will have an even lower level of rationality — a nightmare scenario.

Vis-à-vis Iran, a common Western position and a direct involvement of the US in the negotiations is paramount. Iran will try to split the West as they tried

Volker … but guarantees non-proliferation

Kamal

Klose

von WeizsäckerEurope and the US have a good chance

to resolve the conflict

FischerThe region will not accept

Iranian nuclear predominance

Iran must decide between

cooperation and isolation

A regional security system has to include Israel as well.

Kamal


unsuccessfully with the EU-3. Therefore I encourage the United States to join the EU-3 and take the lead in the negotiations. Let us make it absolutely clear that we stand united and offer them a common proposal and a clear-cut decision: coopera-tion or isolation.

We should state that we accept Iran’s right to the civilian use of nuclear power and are prepared to cooperate on that, open our markets, allow for technology transfer and are willing to normalize our relations. This is the carrot. The stick would be if you refuse to behave responsibly in the region, to suspend nuclear enrichment and to conduct your nuclear activities in a completely transparent manner, we will isolate you. We are not horrified by soaring oil prices and you will not profit from it; Russia and Saudi Arabia will get rich, but not you. We are un-willing to play your games — agreements with Russia today, agreements revoked tomorrow, enrichment on Iranian soil to be suspended today, to be continued tomorrow, a new separate agreement with Russia etc. We are unwilling to let you play for time to get on with your nuclear activities. You have a choice: consider our offer, accept or reject it, and face the consequences. For the US, such a com-mon offer would of course mean putting regime change aside and engaging in a transformation strategy reminiscent of the Cold War era. But if they are willing to do so, there is a real opportunity for a diplomatic breakthrough.

Without a common EU-US package, transatlantic unity will be increasingly at risk the more we move forward within the Security Council. Iran is very aware of this. When confronted with a joint offer, the Iranian government will understand that isolation is a real threat, and that isolation within the G77 framework and with regard to its relations to Russia and China is no longer impossible, either.

The US indeed needs to enter into negotiations with Iran because only the Ameri-cans can credibly negotiate over Iranian security concerns. During the meeting between Chancellor Schröder and President Bush in Mainz in February 2005, the US agreed to support the negotiation process of the EU-3 as far as the WTO and spare parts for aircraft were concerned. Now you have to raise your stakes in that process.

The United States should indeed enter into direct negotiations with Iran, an idea also supported by the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee’s Chairman Richard Lugar. The EU can provide technological and economic cooperation to ensure Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy without a closed fuel cycle and foster economic

We are unwilling to play Tehran’s games

BrengelmannOnly the US can credibly negotiate

over Iranian security concerns

Polenz


growth, but only America can answer Iran’s legitimate security and regional inter-ests. Iranian-American talks on Iraq could be a first step. Then, a summit similar to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 might provide a framework for a compre-hensive discussion between all countries concerned — including the US.

To put the necessary pressure on Iran, we must ensure unity among the countries that supported the IAEA Board of Governors’ Resolution on February 4, 2006 to report Iran-related issues to the UN Security Council. If the West rushes these nations, we risk a split. The US must leave Russia more time to negotiate its offer to do enrichment on Russian soil, and China also needs time to conduct the negotiations it deems necessary. Representatives of China have assured me that they are firmly against expanding the number of nuclear armed states and to ensure compliance with the NPT.

Secretary of State Rice and Undersecretary of State Burns are in frequent contact with the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany, Philippe Douste-Blazy and Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The packages and ideas presented by the EU-3 in discus-sion with the Iranians have our full support and backing — we want to make sure that the Iranians know that we are all in the same boat on this issue.

The West must coordinate, but I doubt that the US government should seek direct negotiations with Iran. The US is not willing to play any more diplomatic games with the Iranian government. As long as the fundamental facts of Iran’s nuclear program — enrichment, nuclear military research and the development of carrier missiles — remain unchanged, we are not going to get anywhere with direct negotiations.

It is crucial that the US and the EU coordinate their policies toward Iran. In Febru-ary 2005, during President Bush’s visit to Germany, the US fortunately expressed its support for the EU-3 diplomatic initiative. The Russian-Iranian preliminary agreement about enriching uranium on Russian soil might be a way out of the crisis. As the Iranians stick to their right to a closed nuclear cycle within the NPT, though, the negotiations with Russia could also be just another attempt to win time for nuclear research. The EU and the US should, apart from avoiding a split as occurred during the Iraq crisis, also bring the Russians and the Chinese on board in order to keep maximum diplomatic pressure on Iran.

Despite its oil revenues, Iran has enormous economic and social problems, including one million more young people looking for jobs every year. Even Presi-

VolkerEuropeans and Americans

are all in the same boat

The US is not yet willing

to have direct negotiations

Pflüger

Iran cannot afford to pursue

a North Korean-style isolation policy


dent Ahmadinejad can probably not pursue a North Korean-style isolation policy. The need for technological cooperation with the West might win over the Iranian elite and prevent escalation.

The West should also be adamant in its position toward President Ahmadined-jad’s recent comments. It must make clear that it rejects to talk about wiping out Israel or denying the Shoa. It is important that not only the Western countries criticize this — there must also be strong criticism coming from the Arab world.

The US must open up a multitude of communication channels with Iran. I hope that Ambassador Khalilzad’s talks about Iraq with representatives of the Iranian government will lead to more comprehensive negotiations, and I hope that America will also find ways to communicate with and support moderates like Ms. Koolaee.

But even if the US engages in direct negotiations with Iran, I doubt that we will prevent a nuclearized Iran. In public, American officials dealing with nuclear issues insist that we must stop the Iranian attempt to get nuclear wapons. In pri-vate, the same people argue that they do not see any chance to do that. Therefore, our internal planning should focus on developing a plan B, a plan of how to deal with a future nuclearized Iran, on establishing a regional security system and an international structure capable of deterring Tehran even if it possesses nuclear weapons.

The US administration needs to soften its rhetoric on regime change, pre-emp-tive military strikes etc. These options can be discussed in internal circles but must not be repeatedly be brought out into the open.

Iran is not only important in that it is perceived as a potentially dangerous poten-tial nuclear power, but also as the largest country in the region facing immense domestic problems and with a political system that is problematic from the Western point of view. What should be done by the Iranians themselves and by the West ?

We should not give up on regime change in Iran. We need democratic change and the development of a civil society. I agree, though, that an aggressive Western attempt to topple the regime is not desirable. We need regime change, but as a long-term development from within — and yes, it might be useful to think of what we did during the Cold War. We can only help by creating support and provid-

Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israeli

rhetoric is not acceptable

Wells

Sommer

VolkerIran needs a regime change

There is probably no chance to prevent the Iranians from getting nuclear weapons.

Wells


ing suitable conditions. In this context, our primary purpose of supporting civil society NGOs is not directly aimed at regime change, but at strengthening civil society.

To promote democracy in Iran and other Islamic societies, the West needs to take into account the fact that these societies are often guided more by emotions origi-nating from historical experiences than by rationality. Rapidly imposing Western values, patterns of behavior or lifestyles on these people will only trigger a back-lash. Change is inevitable but it must come gradually.

In Iran, nationalist sentiments are a reality and so are historical memories: large parts of the population equate the Western attempts to make Iran suspend nuclear enrichment with the coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq initi-ated by the British after Mossadeq’s nationalization of the oil industry.

Iran is by no means a monolithic society. While some Iranians are modernistic, to some degree even westernized, traditionalism is also strong and the original values of the Islamic Republic of Iran have become increasingly popular in some strata of the population recently. Religious, ethnic, sectarian and social strife is a real danger in our country.

Iran has a better chance of democratization than most of the other countries of the Broader Middle East, in spite of the rhetoric of its political leaders. It has a highly educated, mostly reform-minded young population (more than 60 % below 23) many of whom admire the United States. While we must take a tough stand as far as the nuclear question is concerned, we should not isolate Iran as part of the “axis of evil.” The German parliament engages in dialog instead. Since the Mykonos affair — the 1992 assassination of four prominent Kurdish leaders in a Berlin restaurant, supposedly ordered by the Iranian chief of intelligence — which marked the low point in the relations between Germany and Iran, the Bundestag has built up a dialog with its colleagues in the Iranian Majlis. Honest relations and a mutual understanding among politicians can help improve the lives of Iranian citizens and bring Iran closer to democracy.

But Western policy lacks consistency and frequently leaves democratic forces in Iran out in the cold. Prince Charles visited Iran before the seventh parliamentary elections in 2004 even though many reformist candidates were disqualified. The history of Western influence in Iran is a fiasco of contradictory EU and US policy

KoolaeeGradual change is inevitable

but it must come gradually

Iran is both modernistic and traditional

Klose

Koolaee

Western policy frequently leaves

democratic forces in Iran out in the cold

What Should Be Done ? 88 89 Instruments and Partners for Reform

and wrong moves at the wrong time. Along with the unsatisfying track record of reformist President Khatami, this has created a deep frustration among reform-minded Iranians.

Oil and gas reserves are an obstacle to reform and democracy in Iran and else-where, because they allow mullahs, kings and autocrats to satisfy the people’s needs by simply distributing oil revenues. There is no need to create income through a functioning private sector producing goods for the world market. There is no need to invest in higher education and technological progress, no need to create adequate conditions for private enterprise to function. There is no account-ability to the people because rulers can exist on oil revenues and do not need to raise taxes. The consequences are widespread corruption and economic decline.

Reform-minded people have continued and will continue their efforts to democra-tize Iranian society and will be grateful for Western help. But the transformation of a society shaped by traditional ideals and autocratic rule over centuries needs time, as the West should know from its own history. Teaching the people about democratic values takes a generation at least. It is naïve and simplistic to attempt an overnight transformation. Only if the West acts consistently, prudently and patiently at the same time, can engagement of international actors be fruitful and help pave the way for democratization. Also, Iranian peculiarities must be taken into account.

Recent US policy changes in favor of dialog with the region are steps in the right direction. I hope that the US will also enter into a real dialog with Iran. But the decision of the US Senate to financially support democracy in Iran will have counterproductive effects, to say the least. The State Department request for an additional 75 million dollars to increase support for democratic forces, expand radio broadcasting, begin satellite television broadcasts, expand fellowships and scholarships for Iranian students and bolster the US’ public diplomacy efforts, might seem convincing at first sight. But any Iranian individual or organization that receives support from the US loses its credibility instantly.

Iran has a very vibrant civil society, but if Iranian NGOs reach out to the US and the EU for financial support they will be subject to a government clampdown. If Western support for NGO’s is tied to a program of regime change, the credibility of these NGOs will be totally undermined.

Polenz

Koolaee

Any Iranian individual or organization

that receives US support

loses its credibility instantly

Esfandiari

Oil and gas reserves are an obstacle to reform and democracy.

Polenz


Western funding has often discredited civil society groups in the region. To sup-port democratization, the West needs to find other mechanisms.

The problem of how to influence developments from outside without creating counter-reactions is a general one. How should the West proceed and which in-struments should it use or avoid ?

3. Instruments and Partners for Reform

The West must throw its weight behind the democratic forces by insisting on con-ditionality. You can support democratization effectively by supporting only those politicians who are following a road map for democracy and civil society. The EU’s Barcelona process and the G8’s BMENA may fail because conditionality was not applied when dealing with autocratic leaders like Egypt’s President Mubarak and Tunisia’s President Ben Ali. Helsinki-type conditionality should be a cornerstone of Western policy.

Conditionality as a means to encourage reform should be applied but its effects should not be overestimated. Yes, conditionality is mentioned in all the Barcelona documents and the ENP’s Action Plans and yes, it is important. But that does not exempt us from setting priorities and from balancing competing long-term democratic development and strategic interests of stability. In Egypt for example, we have — on one hand — seen fraudulent elections and martial law being ap-plied. Progress toward democratization is indeed slow and allowed only to such an extend as to not jepordize the current government. On the other hand, we have no interest in endangering Egypt’s important stabilizing role in the region. Conditionality can help in supporting concrete and specific steps towards reform particular in the legal sector and in helping to promote the rule of law and in building a pluralistic society in which the choice is not only either the well-estab-lished ruling parties or a fundamental islamic opposition.

In Egypt, sanctions or conditionality, let alone military intervention by the West would not help to promote democracy. The West’s image is so negative that no-body wants to be perceived as closely associated with the US or Europe. Dialog, based on mutually agreed benchmarks and incentives, is a much more promising strategy for the West.

Al-Khalil

Sommer

Ibrahim

Freitag

KamalIn Egypt neither sanctions nor conditionality

would help promote democracy

Teaching people about democratic values takes a generation.

Koolaee


What is wrong with conditionality ? Why let autocrats develop time tables and guidelines for reform without including our own benchmarks ? We must of course create individual approaches in a dialog, but that does not mean simply abandon-ing conditionality.

A push from the outside through conditionality, benchmarks and a time schedule for reform is greatly welcomed in the region.

The West must be adamant in rejecting cosmetic ploys. The European Union in particular must take Article Two of the 2002 Association Agreement with Lebanon stating that relations shall be based “on respect of democratic principles and fun-damental human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” seriously and implement the conditionality clause allowing for appropriate meas-ures if the opposing party fails to meet the obligations of the agreement.

Education is of crucial importance in the long-term. With 70 % of the population below 30, and 60 % below 25, there is a whole generation looking for education qualifying them for adequate jobs. With public education institutions in a sham-bles, private schools and universities are competing for investment. Europe and the US should be present in this field. This is not only a means of stabilizing Middle Eastern societies, but also of educating a qualified immigrant workforce which some European countries with their aging populations will desperately need soon enough.

We need to change the negative perception of the West in the Middle East. Un-fortunately, as these perceptions are based on emotions, it will take a long time to change them. While the people in the Middle East must be able to define their own path to democracy, we should try to communicate a realistic image of our model of democracy and bolster the indigenous debate on reform, in an open dialog with actors from the region. Promoting inter-cultural dialog via television might help to create a realistic and nuanced image of the West in the long-term, which in turn could provide a role-model to overcome political restrictions. As European history shows, the development of civil societies might take centuries and the commitment of many generations.

We should indeed seek access to the media in the Middle East. Al-Jazeera, al-Ara-biya and other so to speak “post-authoritarian” media are open to demagogues

BermanWhat is wrong with conditionality ?

Moukheiber

Kepel

PolenzCivil societies take centuries to develop

Kepel

European countries with aging populations will soon need a qualified immigrant workforce.

Kepel


like bin Laden, but they are also open to Westerners. For example, Mr. Rouleau and I quite often appear on al-Jazeera. This is a means to address a wider audience in the Middle East in their own language.

The West should use the internet extensively to give information to and commu-nicate with the people interested in reform in the Middle East. If Al-Qaeda can put manuals of how to build a bomb on the web, it ought to be possible to also offer advice on how to improve the rule of law or provide adequate conditions for private enterprise — and also links to people in the West that would be willing to act as consultants. That might help to engender confidence and present a more positive picture of the West.

It is widely accepted that the West should build its reform efforts on local tradi-tions. How can that be done in practice ?

Instead of discussing democracy in a paternalistic, Eurocentrist way (“Westmin-ster for everybody”), we support indigenous traditions. In Kuwait, for example, we have the Diwaniyas, private meeting places where men discuss politics openly. There is Shurah, the traditional method by which Arabs have selected leaders and make major decisions. To foster democracy, we should not impose our standards, but revive and enhance such regional democratic traditions.

Is a modernized Sharia law something that might make compatible local percep-tions of justice with Western humanitarian values ?

I know from my time as a member of the sixth Iranian parliament (2000–2004) that some modern interpretations of Islam and humanitarian interpretations of Sharia law are suitable for reform and for answering people’s demands for a just regulation of their lives.

We are just beginning to learn about the traditions of the Islamic world. We need to understand as much as we can as fast as we can about different interpretations of Sharia law and about how to make Islamic and Western legal traditions com-patible. We still have a long way to go, but we better start walking because that is the only way to lasting progress, for us and for people in the Middle East. An understanding of where the Western legal system could be compatible with the

MayAl-Qaeda uses the internet more

efficiently than Western democrats

Sommer

PflügerIndigenous traditions instead of

“Westminster for everybody”

Sommer

Koolaee

HoyerWe need to understand Sharia law


different interpretations of Sharia law is decisive for Western support for rule of law in the Muslim world.

Even though Islam has strong religious norms, the political system of Islamic countries are wide open for modernization and no Western idea is rejected just because of its origins.

Do not take it as a given fact that countries in the Muslim world must be guided by Sharia law. Sharia law is man-made law, written 1400 years ago, an interpreta-tion of Qu’ran that can be changed by men. It all depends on the interpretation. I believe that we need new legislation in our countries, but it does not necessarily have to be Sharia law.

Apparently, female members of the Iranian parliament are pointing more and more at the inconsistencies in Islamic traditions in order to justify their fight for more equality. For example, in personal status law, women are supposed to take care of the house and children, but if they are divorced from their husbands, cus-tody is nevertheless awarded to the fathers.

In the Arab world, strong social sentiment against women’s participation in politics persists, as does economic and social discrimination; these conditions are often legitimized by fundamental interpretations of Qu’ran. At this point, several regimes in the region exploit women’s empowerment — urged, among others, by Western initiatives like the MEPI — as a red herring to distract public atten-tion from shortcomings in other key reform issues like incumbency term limits, freedom of the press and political party rights. I have witnessed this especially in the Gulf region, where some women recently became members of parliament or appointed to ministerial-level posts.

Improving women’s rights regarding personal status law and child custody is only worth something if they also get greater economic autonomy.

Justice should be a key issue in every dialog between the Islamic world and the West. It has critical value on both sides, but our understanding of it is different. Religious scholars should be encouraged to translate its meaning to foster mutual understanding.

Al-KhalilEven though Islam has strong religious norms,

Islamic countries are open for modernization

KassemNew laws do not have to be

guided by Sharia law

Polenz

Al-Kitbi

KoolaeeWomen need greater economic autonomy

May

No Western idea is rejected in Islamic countries just because of its origins.

Al-Khalil


We should try to speak our partners’ language. I want to plead for a certain amount of humility in the wording when promoting our ideals. The United States’ new National Security Strategy mentions “freedom” and “democracy” countless times, while citing only once the rule of law. Let us stress elements of democratic societies like due process, rule of law and justice instead, because that is where we can connect to the Islamic world. Islam has a very strong set of religious, social and cultural norms and the respect for norms is widespread in the region. Ger-many could build a stable democracy after 1945 not because of its long standing democratic tradition — its experience with democracy had been rather brief and unpleasant — but because of its long standing tradition of rule of law and due proc-ess. Let us pave the way for democracy in the region by fostering these elements instead of making elections our only goal.

The rule of law is as a key element of the Barcelona Process. Most partner govern-ments are very open to addressing justice and accountability as major elements of civil society. What we have yet to find are partners within civil society and at the same time a way to avoid their being stigmatized as agents of the West.

Participation is the key to real change. The CSCE experience proves that all elites, not only the ruling elites, must participate. CSCE’s tremendous success resulted from its indirect influence on Eastern Europe’s societies. Under Western protec-tion, civil societies could develop. How exactly to support indigenous grass-roots movements without being accused of imposing something from outside remains, of course, a practical problem for us and our foundations.

The Forum for the Future created in 2004 as a centerpiece of the BMENA partner-ship brings together government officials, civil society activists and representa-tives from the private sector. As a joint initiative of the G8 nations and countries in the Broader Middle East and North Africa region, it lends support to indigenous calls for reform through its conferences in the region. The appendant Fund for the Future will offer equity investment to small businesses to support economic growth and job creation. Its funding comes from Western countries and countries in the region, its board consists of decision makers from the Broader Middle East and Europe. At the same time, an independent Foundation for the Future funded by countries from the region, the US, the EU and European countries will provide support to regional NGOs working for democracy and human rights.

SchariothHumility would help the

West promote our ideals

Freitag

Scharioth

Volker

To foster mutual understanding, we need translation — for example concerning the notion of justice.

May


You have to work in real partnerships in order to support and coordinate grass roots democratic efforts.

In order to win partners, we must be credible. Democratization is always a fierce struggle for values and ideas. Indigenous elites and credible foreign support are equally indispensable. Outside support must build on soft power and credibility. Consequently, the West has to adopt a more coherent human rights policy and criticize human rights violations more coherently.

More important than all military campaigns and democratization initiatives is the power of example regarding human and civil rights. The well-known phrase of America being a “city upon the hill” was meant to remind the first colonists that their community is watched by the world, and Ronald Reagan recalled the phrase to state the American claim of being a role model for the world — this is where human rights are a reality. But neither Guantanamo nor Abu Ghraib live up to this phrase. Even if we all acknowledge that the US feels at war after 9/11, we must also consider the Arab perception. For the sake of its own interests, the US should close down Guantanamo prison.

Should the West engage Islamists as partners in the modernization process, as the region’s home-grown alternative to authoriarian rulers ?

The idea of engaging Islamists in the political process is very fashionable at this time. It rests on the assumption that for the genetically Islamic people in the region, Islamism is the only alternative to autocracy. At the moment, there is no political process to engage Islamists or anybody else. That lack of political process is the real problem, and our goal should be to establish the necessary democratic institutions. This would in turn demonstrate that Islamism is not the only force that can be summoned to fight authoritarianism.

Once we have a functioning democratic system, let the people decide whether they want to be ruled by an Islamic government. As long as our institu-tions guarantee that the people will also be able to vote them out in future elec-tions, there is no need to be afraid of them. Remember, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to come to power in 78 years under four different regimes — the monarchy, Nasser, Saddat and Mubarak — which indicates that they may still be lacking in political savy.

Moukheiber

PolenzIn order to win over partners,

we must be credible

PflügerNeither Guantanamo nor Abu Ghraib lives

up to American claims of being a role model

Sommer

KassemThe West should not engage Islamists …

… but demand the creation

of democratic systems

Participation is the key to real change.

Scharioth


Starting to move towards democracy and accountability is of utmost impor-tance. Otherwise, the next election might well turn Egypt into an Iran-style the-ocracy, if people see the Islamists as the only alternative and there are no mecha-nisms to ensure that they can be voted out of office again once they win power.

Theocrats are the mirror image of the region’s autocrats. Stop supporting auto-crats, and Islamism will no longer be the only visible alternative to autocracy.

For me, the main issue today is to stop the Islamists from re-extending Sharia law to all the other parts of the legal system, thus reversing the achievements of the last half-century of secularism — Abdel Nasser limited Sharia law to personal status law, not the Islamists. From an Islamist perspective, it does not suffice to apply Sharia law only to family law.

What about the alleged relation between democratization and stabilization which Mr. Kassem hinted at ? Would free elections in a country that suppresses the secular oppositon lead to a rise of Islamism and would that in turn endanger stability ?

The West fears the Islamist’s impact on terrorism and security while people in the region fear that religious rule may prevent them from running their life through adequate institutions.

Still, fear of Islamists should not prevent external actors from seeking reform and change in the region. Islamists are perceived as a threat to regional stability, civil society, the rule of law and fundamental human rights. But autocrats read-ily use this fear to present themselves as the lesser evil and further tighten their control of their peoples. The main concern regarding Syria, for example, is not its horrible regime, but its potential replacement by Islamists.

The Islamists have a large impact on the people in the region; you should not hope to simply isolate them — least of all the moderate ones. You should remember the proverbial saying, “if you cannot beat them, join them”: you should not actually join them, but to get into some kind of dialog or engagement with them, might help to win the hearts and minds of this region’s people.

In Germany in 1933 democratically elected leaders did indeed put an end to democ-racy, but I cannot remember similar events in the Islamic world. The West should

… then the people are able to vote

for Islamists and vote them out again

Ibrahim

Al-Azm

Sommer

Moukheiber

Fear of Islamists should not

prevent reform or change

Al-Kitbi

Ibrahim

What Should Be Done ? 96 97 Iraq

no longer be afraid of the results of free elections in the Muslim world. 1.4 billion Muslims worldwide are already living under democratically elected regimes.

Autocratic regimes are grateful for the Western fear of Islamist democratic victories and gladly confirm that free elections would put an end to their alleged attempts to modernize and democratize their countries. Since 1991, the Algerian military has had an important influence on the government. Regional autocrats are very clever in instrumentalizing Western fears.

We need to engage in dialog with at least parts of the Islamist groups. The notion of “Islamists” covers a broad spectrum. In Morocco and Egypt, I met Islamist poli-ticians who are Islamists only because that is the only strong alternative to the autocratic governments. There is no alternative to dialog with Muslim Brothers and other Islamist groups.

The United States should widen its far too narrow target group for democratiza-tion. Take, for example, Hamas: even if the organization and its members may not be admirable actors, they are part of the democratization process. Another example are the leftist Syrian parties which have now adopted the liberal con-sensus and support the Syrian movement for democratization and civil society. The US will not support these groups because its definition of democratic actors is too narrow.

American policy towards Islamist groups is changing. For example, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission Report) did put all Islamist groups in the same bag. Arguing for a dialog with Islamist groups would have made you suspect of sympathizing with Al-Queda. Today, even the administration is talking about engaging some of these groups. After all, the only successes of the US’ democratization efforts — the elections in Iraq, Palestine and Egypt, and the changes in Lebanon — each have brought Islamist forces to power. The debate is no longer about whether the US should engage Islamists, but under what conditions.

The United States also supported leftist groups when it was needed. Despite their rhetoric, every US governments has ignored ideological differences for practical reasons. In Postwar Europe, during the early years of the Cold War, the United States energetically supported the non-Communist left. Because the public and

The West should no longer be afraid

of the results of free elections

Pflüger

OttawayThe US should widen its narrow

target group for democratization …

Singer… but American policy towards

Islamist groups is changing

May

Regional autocrats are very clever in instrumentalizing Western fears.

Ibrahim

What Should Be Done ? 96 97 Iraq

the Congress did not support it, this policy had of course to be conducted by the executive, and clandestinely.

4. Iraq

Iraq is perhaps the most important field of cooperation for the transatlantic partners. Even the opponents of the invasion know that we have more important things to do now than retrospectively discussing the pros and cons of toppling Saddam Hussein. Today, we are all sitting in the same boat. But does anybody know where this boat should be going ? We probably agree that withdrawal is not an option. But what should be the Western strategy for Iraq ?

The challenges ahead are more important than asking who was right in 2003. Iraq has been invaded, the US and its allies are there and withdrawal is not an option at this point of time because it would result in chaos and destruction. Fortunately, the European states that opposed the US decision are now willing to cooperate even though they may stick to their former assessment. Only to-gether will we be able to allow the Iraqi people to elect their own government based on their own constitution and eventually build a free, united, secure and prosperous society. Mistakes during the invasion have been made, many of them have been corrected, others still need to be. To create a free and democratic Iraq that no longer depends upon foreign intervention, America needs Europe’s help.

Close cooperation toward this common goal is inevitable in spite of past differ-ences and can profit from distinct approaches. Paradoxically, the political enfeeble-ment of both the US and the EU during the past years has increased the willingness to cooperate, because both sides have been sobered by touching the limits of what they can achieve alone.

The Western powers must jointly support the democratization of Iraq. Whether we were in favor of the war or against it, we should leave the judgement to the his-torians. Now, everybody must contribute to stabilizing the country and building sustainable democratic institutions. Germany is contributing its share by training Iraqi security forces. A withdrawal of the United States in the near future is not an option to my mind, but I am very curious about Arab opinions about this.

von Weizsäcker

VolkerFortunately, Europeans and Americans

are now willing to cooperate in Iraq

Reiter

Pflüger

There is no alternative to dialog with Islamist groups.

Pflüger

What Should Be Done ? 98 99 Transatlantic Cooperation

The war in Iraq cannot be won; this failed policy was perceived as an attempt to colonize the region right from the beginning.

To expect a quick success in Iraq would be unrealistic, and a withdrawal would surely lead to a disaster.

The withdrawal of the US from Iraq and the ensuing civil war and potential breakup of the country would create a combination of Somalia, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, with all the regional actors drawn into the confrontation. I fear this scenario might soon become reality.

On March 19th, Jim Hoagland described in the Washington Post an upcom-ing change in US policy in Iraq: US troops will be moving out of the cities as part of a coordinated reduction and concentration of all foreign forces to lower the level of visibility. If I were to play devil’s advocate, I would say this is phase one of the withdrawal. Either the Iraqi security forces would join in and replace the Americans in a coordinated step-by-step withdrawal. Or, if the Iraqi forces are not up to that, a civil war would break out. The administration has an-nounced that in case of a civil war, American troops will be withdrawn. The new American policy could be the first step to leaving Iraq regardless of the conse-quences.

The US will concentrate its troops in less visible places, yes. Having Iraqi security forces manage security and decreasing the visibility of the coalition troops may diminish support for the insurgency. But there will not be an overall withdrawal. We will not get out of Iraq and say we lost a battle, let us get on with the war. We consider Iraq more than a battlefield and we would see an early withdrawal as a strategic error of colossal dimensions.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi insurgents are no fools and they know about the presiden-tial elections in 2008. The first decision of the next president, whether Republican or Democrat, will be about Iraq. Every presidential candidate knows that a wrong strategy for Iraq will ruin her or his political standing. As things look today, it is not improbable that the next president may decide to bring the boys home as quickly as possible. Again, unfortunately the insurgents are no fools. Iraq’s parties and sectarian groups in Iraq are now planning for the day after US Ambassador Khalilzad leaves Iraq together with the last troops.

Al-Kitbi

Klose

Fischer

Will the US soon withdraw from Iraq ?

VolkerThere will not be an overall withdrawal

FischerThe next president may decide

to bring the boys home

What Should Be Done ? 98 99 Transatlantic Cooperation

Being aware that the consequences of a withdrawal would be catastrophic, the US administration is clearly committed to keeping American forces in the country. It is a broad consensus that a withdrawal would not only mean a battlefield defeat, but an unaffordable strategic error. Every candidate in the forthcoming 2008 presidential campaign will be tested regarding his or her commitment to Iraq. By the time a new president is elected, the American military presence in Iraq will be an established, bipartisan position.

We all agree that the United States should not withdraw too rapidly from Iraq. But resisting the military, economic and political pressure to pull out as soon as possible requires considerable political capital. Hopefully, Mr. Volker is right that all the presidential candidates in 2008 will take the high road and withstand those pressures. Some candidates might give in to public pressure and back Con-gressman Murtha’s option for a redeployment of US troops in Iraq “at the earliest practicable date.”

If our European friends are really convinced we should stay in Iraq, they should find economic and political ways to support the American government. Germany for example provides training in the United Arab Emirates for the Iraqi police; other European countries are encouraged to think creatively along these lines.

If the US wants to prevent Iraq from becoming a permanent base for Islamist terrorists, US troops have to stay in the country at this point in time. When ap-proached reasonably, Iraq’s neighbors Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan will be prepared to help the US create a democratic and stable Iraq. An Iraq breaking up or being dominated by fundamentalist Shiite clerics is not in their interest.

5. Transatlantic Cooperation

Iraq is only the most prominent example for the need for transatlantic coopera-tion. I would like to pose the question on a more general level: how should the US and Europe envision their partnership regarding the wider Middle East for the future ?

Both for the US and for Europe, a key challenge is the modernization of the Middle East. The question is not whether the region will modernize, but whether its mod-

Volker

WellsThere is a great deal of pressure

to pull out as soon as possible

If Europe wants us to stay, it has to help us

Al-Khalil

Sommer

Fischer

ernization will be violent or peaceful. We need to encourage the development of a modern Islam and of functioning civil societies in the Middle East by all means.

Today, the US with its immense military and financial resources can barely avoid the implosion of Iraq. Unfortunately, failure in Iraq with all its disastrous consequences cannot be ruled out. It may be that this battle is lost. That makes it all the more important to choose a suitable strategy for the way to a peace-ful Middle East, and this strategy must be jointly developed by the transatlantic partners.

I have been very discouraged by what I have heard this afternoon because it gives me the impression that the war in the Middle East will go on for a long time and may even expand. I fear that the Middle East may become for the United States what the Balkans were for Germany at the end of the 19th century.

As some of you may know, the Balkans at that time were full of mutual resent-ments and of perceived and real injustices as well as of ethnic and religious strife. But Otto von Bismarck, the Chancellor of the German Empire — which was then the most powerful state on earth — refused to involve Germany in Balkan affairs on one side or another of various disputes. He acted as “honest broker.” For him the entire Balkan question was, as he said, “not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier.” At the Congress of Berlin, he caused a lot of anger because of his neu-trality, but he kept Germany out of Balkan wars. Unfortunately, his successors did not inherit his wisdom. Germany began to engage in the Balkans. When it was all over, Germany was no longer the most powerful state on earth. Today, Americans are making a similar mistake in the Middle East, getting deeply involved. They may have noble goals, but they will end the same way as Germany did although they do not know it yet. As an American, I am sorry to say this, but it is the truth and we must recognize it.

One of the purposes of these meetings it to exchange ideas and make mutual suggestions. I have such a suggestion for the Europeans, and I hope those that are here will take it seriously. I urgently advise the Europeans to keep their distance from American policy. Do not get into the same boat with the Americans. If you are already in the same boat, get out and find another boat. That is the only way to remain out of what will become a sequence of terrible tragedies. Please follow your own course, whether it is the Barcelona process, your own dialogue, and your own aid programs. You may from time to time follow a parallel path with the Americans for a brief period, but keep your own agenda and make it clear

Smyser

America is heading for a

disaster in the Middle East

What Should Be Done ? 100

My advice to Europe: Get out of the American boat.

Smyser

that you do. Not only for Europe’s own sake, but for the sake of the Middle East that will need honest brokers. Even for the sake of the United States. There will be times when the Americans will need the Europeans to save a situation and there will be times when the Americans will need the legitimacy of the Europeans to preserve the interest of the West as a whole. It will then be good not to have been too closely associated with the United States.

I have not heard more dangerous advice for quite a while than the idea that Europe should get out of the transatlantic boat as far as the Middle East is concerned.

The Europeans shall not, I repeat not get out of the American vessel and build their own boat. We need the United States to negotiate with Iran, to press Israel on peace in the Middle East, and to provide stability in Iraq. Europe needs to stay in the American boat and influence its course. Besides, two boats could end up colliding.

Instead, as during the Cold War, American activism and European caution can today fruitfully complement each other. Today, the American campaign for democratization of the Middle East is beneficial but in need of European “checks and balances.” Europe should tone down the self-righteousness and foster democ-racy and human rights in an approach closer to the Qu’ran and Islamic traditions. If the Western democratization campaign becomes a real dialog, not a series of naïve demands, it can change the political minds of many Arabs. Especially young people in the region are yearning for more participation. Today they often only have two choices: joining autocratic governments or Islamist movements. Euro-peans and Americans must join forces to strengthen outspoken reformists like Mr. Ibrahim, but without the crusading fervor all too often demonstrated by the Americans.

We have to find common ground between Europe, the United States and the Mid-dle East based on dialog, understanding and shared fundamental values: freedom, democracy, human rights, market economy, and the rule of law. As the Danish car-toon controversy made clear, these values may conflict. You need to walk the fine line between respect for religious beliefs and freedom of expression, for example. The delicate task of finding the right balance can be fulfilled best by a democratic system — Churchill’s dictum holds true in that regard, too: democracy is the worst possible form of government, except for all the others.

Volker

PflügerThe Europeans shall not get out

of the American boat

American activism and European

caution complement each other

Volker

101 Transatlantic Cooperation

What Should Be Done ? 102 103 Turkey and Lebanon—Models for the Region?

The Middle East presents us with a whole complex of interrelated challenges. While some of them are immediate crises and require short-term efforts, others are long-term issues — like the problem of Islamophobia in the West and the cor-responding resentment against Western powers in the Islamic world. We need to find a transatlantic approach that allows both partners to contribute their respec-tive strengths to effectively addressing this complex set of issues on its different levels at the same time.

Why do the EU and the US not deliberately divide and coordinate their policies ? The US puts pressure on the regimes, the EU provides incentives for promoting civil society — a “good cop, bad cop” game on the level of international politics.

The West should use the individual assets of its different nations deliberately. If Europe has a better image in large parts of the region, make use of that fact !

Europe should not focus solely on its own agenda but also on the coordination with the US. We need to combine our respective assets: Europe’s strength in build-ing institutions and harmonizing legislation must be combined with America’s unequaled political weight and resources.

The US and the EU must move from the level of concepts and conferences to concrete programs. So far, the meetings we have had were mostly about having more meetings. For example, at the Forum for the Future, we had a whole session where we brought all the governments together and the big debate was about the next meeting date.

To be able to implement serious programs, the US and the EU need to invest far more financial resources. The European investment in the Barcelona process and in the Forum for the Future is very limited. And the US concentrates its re-sources on military and police work while neglecting the challenge of reform and hearts and minds: the very strategy document of the U. S. government to winning the battle against radicalism, outlines 3 equal pillars. But spending on the first of the three pillars in the war on radicalism, offense, i.e. the military effort, costs about $ 500 billion. The second pillar, defense — homeland security — receives about $ 120 billion. But the third pillar, reshaping the strategic environment (sup-porting reform efforts, public diplomacy etc.) receives little over $ 500 million a year. This is hardly adequate given the fact that this pillar is about sustainably fighting the disease while the other two are about fighting the symptoms.

Al-Kitbi

Moukheiber

Singer

For serious programs, the US and EU

need more financial resources


Of course we need to operationalize our concepts and implement concrete pro-grams. But I would not completely discredit the role of conferences. The CSCE was a roving conference that only met every three years — and it had a huge impact.

6. Turkey and Lebanon — Models for the Region ?

Are there any positive models for the region ?

For a long time, Israeli and Syrian forces occupied Lebanon, and the country al-most vanished in a civil war. Now that its democracy, a rare example in the Islamic world, has been revived, Lebanon can be a role model for the region, showing what can be achieved through the combination of internal and external efforts. Leba-non will soon start seeking foreign aid at a conference in Beirut, with a reform agenda attached. The electoral systems, parliamentary reform, independence of the judiciary, developing a supportive environment for civil society organizations as well as audio-visual media and anti-corruption policies were all ways in which institution-building helped democratization from within. Not only the EU and the US, but also the UN and the World Bank should take this opportunity to act responsibly and supportively.

Lebanon and Morocco could be models of democratization which may trigger a domino effect. Morocco’s Equity and Reconciliation Commission (ERC) is unprec-edented in the Arab world. Established in January 2004, its purpose is to examine human rights abuses committed by the government.

The Islamic world is in dire need of a democratic, liberal, secular role model — and Turkey is the only available candidate at the moment, despite recent progress in Palestine, Lebanon or Morocco. It is a very interesting paradox that secular Turkey is the only country in the Islamic world where an Islamist party came to power through elections. Prime Minister Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party did not try to establish an Islamist state even though it shows no commitment to the Kemalist ideology.

Syria is a good example of the impact and influence of the recent political devel-opment in Turkey. Loathing Turkey is deeply rooted in Syria, for reasons dating back to the days of the Ottoman rule, but also for reasons relating to present-day water supply and territorial lines. But recently the Syrian left, searching for examples of a

Volker

Sommer

Moukheiber

Al-AzmThe Islamic world is in dire

need of a secular role model


functioning civil society and a convincing implementation of the liberal consensus in the region, discovered its fondness for Turkey.

Some Muslim Brothers in Syria also favorably compare the evolution of po-litical Islam in Turkey with the assification and the suppression of political Islam in their own country. They argue that the Brotherhood has not produced a new political idea in four decades — with leaders in their eighties, this does not come as a surprise. In contrast, Turkey became an example for vivid, political Islam, that assumes power in a democratic way.

Both the nationalists and Islamists in Syria who have traditionally hated Turkey for its Kemalist ideology, abolition of the caliphate, Western orientation and its good relations with Israel, are now looking to it as a political model. After blam-ing Turkey and the Ottoman rule (nationalists speak of the “retrograde Turkish occupation”) for everything backward in the Arab world, they are now saying that Turkey’s achievements might have served Arab Muslim interests more than any other regime in the Middle East.

Democratic countries like Turkey can conduct a self-confident and independ-ent foreign policy vis-à-vis the West. When the US administration prepared the invasion of Iraq in 2003, they wanted to open a Northern front in Iraq from Turkey. But Turkey’s parliament narrowly failed to approve the deployment of US troops on its soil and Prime Minister Erdogan consistently refused the United States’ re-quest. President Bush could only acknowledge this outcome, because it was the decision of a democratically elected parliament. Which Arab president, prince or king could refuse President Bush on the basis of a decision from his undemocratic, submissive parliament without being laughed at ?

The Turkish model is now frequently cited by everybody on the right, the left, and in the center of the political spectrum in the Middle East. The AKP’s story is not — as Mr. Al-Azm called it — a paradox, but a promise. Therefore, Turkey must be successful in its quest to join the EU. If Europe fulfils the Turkish promise and if the West consistently applies conditionality, there is a real chance that every country in the region will one day find its own way to democracy.

Unfortunately, I am unable to share Mr. Al-Azm’s optimism regarding the rise of secularism in the region. Mr. Ibrahim called Turkey a promise, but I wonder how Erdogan’s Islamist party would have governed Turkey, had the army not acted as the watchdog over the constitution and in defence of secularism.

Even many Syrians are looking

to Turkey as a political model

IbrahimThe Turkish model is a promise …

Esfandiari… but only as long as the army acts as

a watchdog and defends secularism

Only democratic countries can conduct a self-confident foreign policy vis-à-vis the West.

Al-Azm


Turkey is considered a reform model for the Arab world, even among our Arab colleagues here at the table. Why is that ? Because Turkey has relatively stable democratic institutions and is currently reforming its institutions from the inside to meet European standards. What the Turkish model can teach us is the impor-tance of democratic institutions. The main motive for Turkish institution-building is the wish to enter the European Union, though, which is in turn motivated by the European self-perception of the Turkish elites. The same cannot be supposed for Turkey’s Arab neighbors. For them, Turkey could in turn be a model.

I doubt that many Turks see themselves as part of the Middle East and am even more skeptical that the Arab world will look upon them as such a role model. Turkish regional identity, Arab self respect and the Ottoman colonial legacy make this all but impossible.

But Turkey has successfully achieved the crucial task of regulating the rela-tionship between Islam and politics through clear criteria. In Turkey, every politi-cal party has to abide by the rules of the secular republic. The AKP does not want to change the system and create a religious state based on Sharia law — they do not even claim a monopoly over Islam. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in the Arab world still claim that they represent Islam and still believe in a religious state based on Sharia law. At the same time, almost every po-litical group, party, and most governments in the Arab world still exploit religious issues to achieve political goals. We need to integrate Islamists into the political system so that they can evolve into conservative parties, just as in Turkey.

The success of Turkey as a role model for the integration of Islamists is determined by four factors: 1. a structural authority, 2. broadened constituencies, 3. the feed-back loop and 4. normative change.

1. Structural authority in Turkey’s case means the strong position of the army. Its political supervision is vital for the political integration of the Islamist movement.

2. Once the Islamist parties are actively participating in the system, they are forced to broaden their constituencies and appeal to more voters. They are forced to abandon some of their radical policies.

3. The feedback loop: the longer an Islamist party plays by the rules set by the structural authority, the more willing it will become to abide by those rules. That is why “electoralization”, the increasing use of elections to decide policy

Kepel

KamalThe Arab world will not look

upon Turkey as a role model

Piscatori


matters on all levels of society, is an important factor once democratization is unfolding.

4. As to normative change, Muslim societies need not only participate in elections but also accept them internally. Therefore it is necessary to establish a discourse taking into account historical and theoretical developments and need to discuss questions of democracy extensively.

Strikingly, the combination of these four factors occurred in Turkey without outside assistance, which led to the fact that the integration of the Islamist AKP began once democratic participation was allowed.

Turkey is the European Union’s great responsibility and great opportunity. It will not serve as a model for democratization for all Middle Eastern countries on a one-to-one basis, but it can prove that our democratic values — the rule of law, checks and balances, and human rights — are compatible with Muslim societies.

Astonishingly, Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party are very anxious to lead Turkey into the European Union, which former French President Giscard d’Estaing once called a Christian Club. The Turkish army, guardian of secularism and modernity, is more skeptical about EU accession.

That is why the EU must leave the door open for Turkey. A membership per-spective will prevent the Turkish army from once again interfering in civilian decisions and prevent that a fundamentalist Spirit gains the upper hand in the Islamic Justice and Development Party. Turkey can then be the living proof that democracy can function in the Islamic world. At present, the only well-known contemporary model of Islamic society is the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for which, by the way, the US carries a certain responsibility. Horrible as it is, it should no longer be the only one. Help Turkey to become an antidote to Taliban-style Islamism !

Some EU policy makers have claimed that Turkey’s negotiation process is valuable in and of itself and the final destination does not matter. The final destination does matter in one important way: the Turkish people and moreover, the wider public in the Muslim world will judge the success of Prime Minister Erdogan’s policy based on a simple factor, whether or not Turkey is admitted to the EU. Any intentional misleading of the Turks about their chances of full EU membership is very risky if not irresponsible.

Polenz

Al-Azm

SingerThe EU must not be misleading

about Turkey’s admission chances

Turkey is the European Union’s great responsibility and great opportunity.

Polenz


Reform in the Middle East needs a strong Turkey supported by the West. The ques-tion is not whether Turkey becomes a member of the EU. The crucial point is that Turkey can serve as a model of how other Islamist parties can be integrated into the political system.

If we reject Turkey, the EU will have produced another estranged and disappointed European neighbor. Plus, no Muslim country has ever been as close to the EU as Turkey is now. Disappointing the Turks and making them loathe the European Union will have disastrous repercussions for the entire Muslim world.

I want to thank our chairman, Theo Sommer, for his peculiar combination of severe discipline and tolerance. And I would like to express my gratitude to all of the participants, especially to those coming from the region. It is of the utmost importance that those from both sides of the Atlantic, the Americans and the Eu-ropeans, listen to who lives and works in the Middle East. We have again learned during these past days about the immensely rich and complex culture and history of this region that today presents us with an equally complex set of challenges. Eu-rope and the US are needed here, I think. Their own history provides them with a responsibility for helping the region to overcome its difficult legacy and their own security interests do not even leave them the choice of distancing themselves. But if they want to contribute something useful, they must be willing to really learn. I have the impression that all of us have learned a lot here in Washington.

Pflüger

ReiterDisappointing the Turks would have

disastrous repercussions

von Weizsäcker

Europe and the US are needed in the Middle East.

von Weizsäcker

ANNEX

110 111

Participants

Professor Dr. Sadeq Al-AzmBorn 1934Visiting Professor, Princeton Uni-versity, Princeton; Honorary Presi-dent, Syrian Human Rights Organi-sation.Former positions: Professor, Damas-

cus University; Visiting Professor, Antwerp University, American University Beirut, Humboldt University Berlin, Hamburg University; Fellow, Wissenschafts-kolleg, Berlin and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D. C.; Editor, Arab Studies Review, Erasmus Prize, The Netherlands, 2004; Dr. Leopold Lucas Prize, Tübingen University, 2004.Selected writings: Islamic Fundamentalism Recon-sidered (1997); Salman Rushdi and the Truth of Lit-erature (1992); Materialism and History: A Defence (1990); Self-criticism after the Defeat (1968).Pages: 25, 44, 45, 61, 62, 65, 74, 77, 95, 103, 106

Dr. Khalil A. Al-KhalilBorn 1953Member, Committee of Security Af-fairs, Al-Shura Council, RiyadhFormer positions: Member, Region Education Council, Riyadh; Mem-ber, Scientific Committee for the

International Conference on Fighting Terrorism 2005, Riyadh; Assistant Professor, College of Social Sciences, Imam Muhammad University, Riyadh; Ad-visor, Governor of the General Authority for Invest-ment in Saudi Arabia; Riyadh; Vice-Director, Islamic Affairs Department, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington D. C.Pages: 34, 38, 39, 41, 47, 48, 49, 51, 55, 57, 59, 64, 75, 80, 89, 92, 99

Professor Dr. Ibtisam Al-KitbiBorn 1967Professor, Department of Political Science, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain; Core Team Member, Arabic Human Develop-ment Report for 2006; Treasurer,

Arab Political Science Association; Editorial Board Member, Journal of Social Affairs, UAE.Selected writings: The Global Community and the War on Terrorism: Threat or Opportunity ? (2005); Women’s Political Status in the GCC States (2004); The Nature of Reform in the Arab Region (2004).Pages: 41, 50, 54, 64, 65, 69, 71, 72, 92, 95, 98, 102

The Hon. Howard L. BermanBorn 1957Congressman, U. S. House of Repre-sentatives, Washington D. C.; Mem-ber, Committee of International Relations and Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia.

Former positions: Assembly Majority Leader, Cali-fornia State Assembly; Chair, Assembly Democratic Caucus and the Policy Research Management Com-mittee of the Assembly.Pages: 36, 53, 59, 63, 68, 90

VLR I Dirk BrengelmannBorn 1956Head of Division 211, USA, Canada, Security and Disarmament Policy, West and South European States and Nordic Countries, Turkey, Fed-eral Chancellery, Berlin.

Former positions: Deputy Director, Private Office of NATO Secretary General, Brussels; Political Coun-selor, German Embassy, Washington D. C.; Deputy

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Selected writings: Reconstructed Lives: Women and Iran’s Islamic Revolution (book 1997), Iran After the June 2005 Presidential Election (2005); A Troubled Triangle: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan (2005); The Status of Women in the Middle East (2005); Post-Khatami Iran (2004).Pages: 44, 52, 61, 68, 88, 104

Joschka Fischer, MdBBorn 1948Fmr. German Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany; Member, German Bundestag, Alliance 90/The Greens, Berlin.

Former positions: Spokesman, Alliance 90/The Greens Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag; Minister of the Environment and Energy, Land Hesse; Deputy Minister-President, Land Hesse.Selected writings: Die Rückkehr der Geschichte: Die Welt nach dem 11. September und die Erneuerung des Westens (2005); Die Weisheit der Mitte: Deutschland, Nationalstaat und europäische Integration (2002).Pages: 30, 31, 32, 41, 52, 59, 77, 79, 83, 98, 99

MDg Dr. Horst FreitagBorn 1955Director General, Near and Middle Eastern Affairs and the Maghreb, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin. Former positions: Director, Special Task Force Iraq, Director, Head, De-

fense and Security Policy Division, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Postings abroad: German Representa-tive Office, Ramallah/Palestinian Authority, German Embassy, Washington D. C./USA; German Embassy Tegucigalpa/Honduras.Pages: 77, 89, 93

European Correspondent, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Political Counsellor, German Embassy, Lon-don; Deputy Charge de Mission, Port-au-Prince. Pages: 52, 59, 66, 84

Dr. Patrick O. CohrsBorn 1973Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Research Fel-low, Institut für Geschichtswissen-

schaften der Humboldt-Universität, Berlin.Frühere Positionen: Post-Doctoral Fellow, Center for European Studies, Harvard University; Senior Asso-ciate Member, St Antony’s College, Oxford; Scholar, German Historical Institute, London. Selected Writings: The Unfinished Peace after World War I. America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919 –1932 (2006); The Quest for a New In-ternational Equilibrium. British Pursuits of German Rehabilitation and European Stability in the 1920s (2004); “The First ‘Real’ Peace Settlements after the First World War”, Contemporary European History, 12,1 (2003). Pages: 47

Dr. Haleh EsfandiariBorn 1940Director, Middle East Program, Wood-row Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D. C.Former positions: Near Eastern Studies Department, Princeton

University, Princeton; visiting Fellow, Woodrow Wil-son International Center for Scholars, Washington D. C.; Journalist in Iran; Deputy Director Women’s Organization of Iran.

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Dr. Werner Hoyer, MdBBorn 1951Deputy Chairman and Spokesman for Foreign Affairs, Free Demo-cratic Party (FDP) Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin; Member, German Bundestag, FDP,

Berlin; Deputy Chairman of the German-Ameri-can Parliamentary Group; Board Member, German Council on Foreign Relations.Former positions: Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; General Secretary, FDP, Berlin. Pages: 50, 51, 70, 80, 82, 91

Dr. Saad Eddin IbrahimBorn 1938Chairman of the Board, The Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies (ICDS), Cairo; Professor of Political Sociology, American Uni-versity, Cairo; Secretary General,

Egyptian Independent Commission for Electoral Re-view (ICER), Cairo; President, Cairo’s Union of Social Professions, Cairo; Trustee, Arab Thought Forum, Amman; Member, Club of Rome, Paris.Former positions: World Bank’s Advisory Council for Environmentally Sustainable Development, Washington D. C.; Board of Minority Rights Group, London; Middle East International Forum, Terra Media; Transparency International’s Council on Governance. Pages: 43, 50, 60, 70, 89, 95, 96, 104

Dr. Mohamed M. KamalBorn 1965Member, Committee on Education and Youth, Shura Council, Cairo; Assistant Professor of Political Sci-ence, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University,

Cairo; Deputy Director, American Studies Center, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University. Former positions: Scholar in Residence, Middle East Institute, Washington D. C.; Congressional Fellow with the American Political Science Association, U. S. Congress, Washington D. C.Pages: 50, 53, 63, 64, 68, 72, 83, 89, 105

Hisham Kassem Born 1959Vice Chairman and CEO, El-Masry El-Youm, Cairo; Vice-President, For-eign Affairs, Al Ghad Party, Cairo; Chairman, Egyptian Organization for Human Rights; Member, Egyp-

tian Council for Foreign Affairs.Former positions: Convenor and Board Member, International Free Expression Exchange.Pages: 34, 38, 42, 47, 48, 54, 57, 60, 62, 64, 66, 69, 72, 81, 92, 94

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Professor Dr. Gilles Kepel Born 1955Chair, Middle East and Mediterra-nean Studies, Institut d’Etudes Poli-tiques, Paris; Director of Research, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris.

Former positions: Director, Doctoral Program on the Muslim World, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris; Visiting Professor, Columbia University, New York; Researcher, Egyptian-French Center for Scientific Cooperation (CEDEJ), Cairo.Selected writings: The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (2004); Bad Moon Rising: A Chronicle of the Middle East Today (2003); Jihad/The Trail of Political Islam (2002); Muslim Extremism in Egypt (1993).Pages: 36, 70, 71, 90, 91, 104

Hans-Ulrich Klose, MdBBorn 1937Vice Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, German Bundestag, Berlin; Member, German Bundes-tag, Social Democratic Party (SPD), Berlin; Chairman, German-Ameri-

can Parliamentary Group.Former positions: Vice President, German Bundes-tag, Berlin; Chairman, SPD Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin; First Mayor, Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg; Senator of the Interior, Hamburg Senate.Pages: 24, 32, 35, 40, 53, 57, 58, 67, 69, 80, 81, 83, 87, 98

Professor Dr. Elahee KoolaeeBorn 1956Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran; Deputy Director General and Member of Central Committee, Participation Front of Iran, Tehran.

Former positions: Director, Central Eurasia Program, Center for Graduate International Studies, Tehran; City Representative of Tehran, Iranian Parliament; Representative of the Parliament, Commission on Islamic Human Rights; Director General for Educa-tion, University of Tehran; Advisor, Center for Stra-tegic Studies, Presidential Office, Tehran.Selected writings: Myths of Colour Revolutions (2005); Sources of Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia (2005); Globalization and Islamic Democracy (2004); Neither East nor the West (2000).Pages: 49, 51, 55, 58, 62, 68, 81, 87, 88, 91, 92

Professor Dr. Ernest MayBorn 1929Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univer-sity, Cambridge.Former positions: Consultant, Of-fice of the Secretary of Defense and

the National Security Council; Senior Advisor to the 9/11 Commission; Dean, Harvard College; Associate Dean, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard Univer-sity; Director, Institute of Politics, Harvard University; Chair, Department of History, Harvard University.Selected writings: The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy, Volumes 1–3, The Great Crises (co-author, 2001); Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (2001); The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the United Nations, 1944–1994 (co-editor, 1998).Pages: 25, 33, 36, 46, 82, 91, 92, 96

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Ghassan MoukheiberBorn 1958Member, Lebanese Parliament, Bei-rut; Member, opposition “Change and Reform” Parliamentary Bloc; Rapporteur, Human Rights Com-mittee; Member, Finance Commit-

tee; Founding Steering Committee member of the following two organizations: the Arab Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (“ARPAC”) and the Arab Chapter of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (“PnoWB”); University lecturer and a longtime civil society activist. Pages: 24, 25, 51, 56, 58, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 90, 94, 95, 102, 103

Dr. Marina S. OttawaySenior Associate, Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace, Wa-shington D. C.Former positions: Lecturer, African Studies, Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies,

Johns Hopkins University, Washington D. C.; Lec-turer, University of Addis Abeba, the University of Zambia, the American University, Cairo, and the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.Selected writings: Uncharted Journey: Democracy Promotion in the Middle East (co-editor, 2005); Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authori-tarianism (2003); Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, (co-editor, 2000); Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction ? (1999).Pages: 25, 33, 51, 63, 69, 96

Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, MdBBorn 1955Parliamentary State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Defence, Ber-lin; Member, German Bundestag, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Berlin; CDU Lead-Candidate for the

Berlin State Election 2006.Former positions: Foreign Policy and Disarmament Policy Spokesman, CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group; Chairman, Committee on the Affairs of the Euro-pean Union, German Bundestag, Berlin.Selected writings: A New World War ? The Challenge of Islamism (2004); Wake-Up Call for Europe — Con-stitution, Unification, Defence (2002); The Threat to Peace exists — European Security Policy in the 21st Century (1998).Pages: 34, 37, 40, 42, 46, 51, 56, 73, 76, 80, 82, 85, 91, 94, 96, 97, 101, 106

Professor Dr. James PiscatoriBorn 1958Fellow, Wadham College and Ox-ford Centre for Islamic Studies, Ox-ford University, Oxford; Member, Faculties of Social Studies and Ori-ental Studies, University of Oxford.

Former positions: Professor, Department of Interna-tional Politics, University of Wales; Associate Profes-sor, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washing-ton D. C.; Research Fellow, Royal Institute of Inter-national Affairs, Chatham House, London; Islam Team Director, Fundamentalism Project, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge.Selected writings: Monarchies and Nations: Globali-sation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (2005); Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principle

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(2000); Transnational Religion and Fading States (co-author, 1997).Pages: 68, 105

Ruprecht Polenz, MdBBorn 1946Chairman, Foreign Affairs Com-mittee, German Bundestag, Berlin; Member of the CDU/CSU Faction of the German Bundestag; Head, TV Council, ZDF-German Television;

fmr. Secretary General, CDU, Berlin.Selected writings: Eine faire Chance für die Türkei (2004); Das faule Versprechen — Die Türkei gehört in die EU (2003); Sicher nur mit Amerika: NATO, Ter-rorismus und eine neue Weltordnung (2002).Pages: 25, 28, 39, 47, 49, 53, 56, 58, 69, 72, 77, 84, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 106

Ambassador Janusz ReiterBorn 1952Ambassador, Embassy of the Re-public of Poland, Washington D. C.Former positions: President and Founder, Center for International Re-lations (CIR), Warsaw; Ambassador,

Polish Embassy, Berlin; Co-Founder, Foundation for In-ternational Initiatives and the Independent Center for International Studies, Warsaw; Co-Chairman, Polish-German Forum; Board Member, National Council for European Integration; Columnist, Rzeczpospolita.Selected writings: Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union. Und was kommt danach ? (2003); Das Wei-marer Dreieck. Die französisch-deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen als Motor der Europäischen Integration (2000); Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen — eine Interessen- und Wertegemeinschaft ? (1999).Pages: 42, 56, 61, 97, 106

Ambassador Eric RouleauBorn 1926Independent Author, Writer, Con-sultant.Former positions: Visiting Profes-sor, Princeton University; Executive Director, Centre for Global Dia-

logue, Nicosia; Guest Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D. C.; Ambassador, French Embassy, Turkey; Ambassador-at-Large, French Government and President of the Republic; Ambassador, French Embassy, Tunisia; Visiting Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Visit-ing Professor, University of California, L. A.; Editorial Writer, Special Correspondent, Le Monde, in Arab states, in North Africa and the Middle East, over and above Iran, Israel, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. Selected writings: Middle East: Arab Nationalism is a Misnomer (2005); European Union and French Views of the Islamic Republic, in Eric Hooglund: The Twenty Years of Islamic Revolution. Political and Social Transition in Iran Since 1979 (co-author, 2002); Iran’s “referendum” for democracy (2001); Gulf States: Ambivalent Allies (2001).Pages: 32, 41, 47, 49, 52, 57, 77, 78

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Ambassador Dr. Klaus SchariothBorn 1946Ambassador, German Embassy, Wash-ington D. C.Former positions: State Secretary, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Political Director and Head of the

Political Directorate-General, Federal Foreign Of-fice, Berlin; Head, International Security and North America Directorate, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Head, Defense and Security Policy Division, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Chef de Cabinet to the NATO Secretary-General, Brussels; Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations, New York; Vice-Chairman, United Nations Legal and Charter Committees, New York.Pages: 68, 93

Dr. Peter W. Singer Born 1974Director, Project on U. S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, Saban Center at The Brookings Institu-tion, Washington D. C.; Senior Fel-low in Foreign Policy Studies, The

Brookings Institution, Washington D. C.; Founder and organizer of the U. S.-Islamic World ForumFormer positions: Doctoral Fellow, Harvard Univer-sity; Action Officer, Balkans Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Special Assistant, Interna-tional Peace Academy, New York.Selected writings: Children at War (2005); The War on Terrorism: The Big Picture (2004); Corporate Warri-ors (2003); America and the Islamic World (2002).Pages: 32, 33, 38, 45, 50, 59, 96, 102, 106

Professor Dr. William R. SmyserBorn 1931Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Uni-versity, Washington D. C.Former positions: U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for Refugees, As-sistant Secretary-General, United

Nations; Deputy U. N. High Commissioner for Refu-gees; Political Counselor, U. S. Embassy, Bonn; Senior Staff, National Security Council, Special Assistant to General Lucius Clay, Berlin.Selected writings: The Humanitarian Conscience: Caring for Others in the Age of Terror (2004); How Germans Negotiate (2002); From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (2000).Pages: 31, 34, 35, 54, 100

Dr. Theo SommerBorn 1930Editor-at-Large, DIE ZEIT, HamburgFormer positions: Editor-in-Chief and Publisher, DIE ZEIT, Hamburg; Chief of Planning Staff, German Ministry of Defence, Bonn; Mem-

ber, International Independent Commission on the Balkans; Deputy Chairman, Commission on the Fu-ture of the Bundeswehr; Lecturer, Political Science Department, University of Hamburg; Council Mem-ber, International Institute for Strategic Studies.Selected writings: Phoenix Europe. The European Union: Its Progress, Problems and Prospects (2000); Toward the Future (1999); Journey to the other Ger-many (1986).Pages: 24, 25, 30, 37, 39, 40, 44, 47, 51, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 64, 66, 69, 71, 73, 75, 76, 81, 86, 89, 91, 94, 95, 99, 103

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Kurt Volker Born 1974Principal Deputy Assistant Secre-tary for European and Eurasian Affairs, U. S. Department of State, Washington D. C.Former positions: Acting Senior Di-

rector for European and Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council, Washington D. C.; Director for NATO and West Europe, National Security Council; Deputy Director of the Private Office of then-NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson; First Secretary at the U. S. Mission to NATO, Brussels; Assistant to U. S. Senator John McCain on Foreign Policy Matters; Deputy Political Counselor and Political-Military Of-ficer, U. S. Embassy, Budapest; Special Assistant to the Counselor and Special Assistant to the U. S. Spe-cial Envoy for Bosnia negotiations, U. S. Department of State, Washington D. C.; Analyst at the CIA. Pages: 31, 43, 44, 46, 53, 55, 57, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 93, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102

Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker Born 1926Fmr. President of the Federal Re-public of Germany (1984–1994); fmr. Governing Mayor of Berlin (1981–1984); fmr. Vice Presi-dent of the German Parliament

(1969–1981); fmr. Member of the Federal Executive Board of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); fmr. President of the German Lutheran Church Council; Laureate of the Heinrich Heine (1991) and Leo Baeck Awards (1994); Chairman of the Bergedorf Round Ta-ble of the Körber Foundation.Selected writings: Was für eine Welt wollen wir ? (2005); Drei Mal Stunde Null ? 1949–1969–1989 (2001); Vier Zeiten. Erinnerungen (1997); Richard

von Weizsäcker im Gespräch (1992); Von Deutsch-land nach Europa (1991); Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter (1983).Pages: 23, 41, 83, 97, 107

Professor Dr. Samuel F. WellsBorn 1935Associate Director, Woodrow Wil-son International Center for Schol-ars, Washington D. C.Former positions: Director, Wilson Center’s Working Group on Global

Finance and International Security Studies Program; Consultant, Office of the Secretary of Defense; As-sociate Professor of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.Selected writings: The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe (2006); The Quest for Sustained Growth: Southeast Asian and Southeast European Cases (1999); New European Orders, 1919 and 1991 (1996); The Helsinki Process and the Future of Eu-rope (1990).Pages: 36, 86, 99

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Recommended Literature

Sadik J. Al-Azm, Is Islam Secularizable?, in: P. Ko-slowski / P. Schenk (eds.), Jahrbuch für Philosophie des Forschungsinstituts für Philosophie Hannover, Wien: 1996, pp. 15–24.

Sadik J. Al-Azm, Islam, Terrorism, and the West, in: Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 25(2005), pp. 6–15.

Samir Amin / Ali El Kenz, Europe and the Arab World, London: 2005.

Ronald D. Asmus, A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East, in: The Washington Quarterly 2 (2005), pp. 7–21.

Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century, New York 2004.

Thomas P. M. Barnett, Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating, New York 2005.

Ian Bremmer, The Saudi Paradox, in: World Policy Journal, 21 (2004) 3, pp. 23–30.

Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington: 2006.

Thomas Carothers / Marina S. Ottaway (eds.), Unchar-ted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, Washington D. C.: 2005.

Tamara Cofman Wittes (eds.), Transatlantic Perspec-tives on the Broader Middle East and North Africa: Where are we? Where do we go from here? Rom: 2004.

Ivo H. Daalder / Nicole Gnesotto / Philip H. Gordon (eds.), Crescent of Crisis: U. S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East, Washington, D. C.: 2005.

European Union: European Neighborhood Policyhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/index_en.htm

Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Demo-cracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, New Haven / London: 2006.

The Greater Middle East Initiative: Sea Island and Be-yond (Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Re-lations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, June 2, 2004), Washing-ton D. C.: 2004.http : / / f r webgate .acces s .gpo .gov/cg i -b in/ge tdoc .cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:96429.pdf

Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge / New York: 2005.

International Atomic Energy Agency, In Focus: IAEA and Iranhttp://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

The Next Iraqi War?: Sectarianism and Civil Conf lict, Middle East Report N° 52, 27. February 2006.http://www.crisisgroup.org/

Dietrich Jung (ed.), Democratization and Development: New Political Strategies for the Middle East, New York: 2006.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=9&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme

http://www.crisisgroup.org/

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Flynt Leverett (ed.), The Road Ahead: Middle East Policy in the Bush Administration’s Second Term, Brookings Institution Press: Washington D. C.: 2005.

Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terror-ism in the Service of Jihad, New Haven / London: 2006.

Thierry de Montbrial, The Greater Middle East, the United States, and Europe, in: The Future of US-EU-NATO Relations: After the Cold War and Beyond the War in Iraq (CSIS Think Tank Summit), Washington/D. C.: 2005.

Yitzakh Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World, Princeton, NJ: 2006.

Volker Perthes, America’s “Greater Middle East” and Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue, in: Middle East Policy (Washington D. C.), 11 (2004) 3, pp. 85–97.

Samir Radwan et al. (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 10 Years after Barcelona: Achievements and Perspectives, Femise Report, February 2005.

Helen Mary Rizzo, Islam, Democracy, and the Status of Women: The Case of Kuwait, New York: 2005.

Barry M. Rubin, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East, Hoboken, NJ: 2006.

Amin Saikal / Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Democratiza-tion in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Chal-lenges, Tokyo: 2003.

Bassam Tibi, Islam, Freedom and Democracy in the Arab World, in: Emerson, Michael (ed.), Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood (Center for Euro-pean Policy Studies), Brussels: 2005, pp. 93–115

United Nations Development Programme (ed.), Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World, New York: 2004 http://cfapp2.undp.org/rbas/ahdr.cfm?menu=1

United States Department of State: Middle East and North Africa http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/middle_east_north_africa/forum_for_the_future.html

http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?SC=Author&SEQ=20060420072949&PID=22947&SA=Rubin,+Barry+M.

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Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative(BMENA)The BMENA is a multilateral initiative for develop-ment and reform, initiated by the US launched to support economic growth and democratization in Arab and non-Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa.

In November 2003, US President George Bush announced an offensive strategy for peace in the Middle East that resembled US policy in Eastern Eu-rope. More than six decades of forbearance towards the regimes of the Middle East because of security considerations had failed to stabilize the region, said Bush. A “Greater Middle East Initiative” would com-plement America’s military operations against ter-rorism with political, social, and economic reforms, he said. The Initiative was supposed to be unveiled at the 2005 G-8 summit, but a working paper on the project was leaked in early 2004. Together with NGOs, European and Arab governments criticized that the Initiative disregarded the distinctions within the region (i. e. between Arab and non-Arab, and Islamic and non-Islamic populations) as well as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that it did not include sufficient initiatives for reform from the region it-self. European governments also objected that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was not, in their opinion, given sufficient recognition. In March 2004, Arab civic activists formulated their own re-form program, the “Alexandria Statement,” which included among its demands modern constitutions, independent media, and freedom to demonstrate. At the G-8 summit on Sea Island in the US state of Georgia, the US government presented its initiative in the presence of representatives from Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Bahrain (Egypt (Arab Republic of Egypt), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia declined to attend). After extended con-

sultations, a text was approved that referred to the Arab-Israeli conflict and recognized the significance of the EMP.

The Initiative expands the geographical defi-nition of the Middle East to include the non-Arab Islamic states of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey (now considered a “partner” of the initiative, not a part of the BMENA region), but not Israel. In these states, the Initiative seeks to provide a catalyst for reform in cooperation with governments and civic actors. At the BMENA’s first “Forum for the Future” conference in Rabat in December 2004, ministers met from the G-8 countries, 21 regional states, as well as the so-called “partner states” of Turkey and the Netherlands. The second Forum in Manama, Bahrain, in which Sudan also took part, established the “Foundation for the Future” (meant to finance democratic development and public participation in political systems) and the “Fund for the Future,” which will provide credits for regional businesses. The meeting also announced that two centers for training and promoting entrepreneurs would be founded. At conferences of the BMENA Initiative’s Democracy Assistance Dialogue in Istanbul, Ven-ice, Sana’a, and Rabat, Western experts met with hundreds of civic activists from the region to offer support on elections and women’s rights, teaching people to read, and facilitate relations between gov-ernments and NGOs.

Critics say the BMENA initiatives will achieve only cosmetic results because the United States can-not apply the pressure necessary to force through real reforms. The US, say these voices, is dependent on these authoritarian regimes for support in its

“war on terrorism.” These regimes would most prob-ably fall from power under the reforms proposed by BMENA. For that reason, say the critics, BMENA conferences focus on issues such as education and

Glossary

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economic reforms, instead of more sensitive topics as constitutional change.

Egypt (Arab Republic of Egypt)Egypt became a presidential republic in 1953. Since 1981 its president has been Hosni Mubarak. The parliament (“People’s Assembly”) has 444 directly elected representatives and 10 appointed by the president. Every six years it nominates a candidate (through a 2/3 parliamentary majority) who is then directly elected by the people. Ever since the assas-sination of President Sadat in 1981 the country has been under emergency law. The country’s popula-tion is growing rapidly (1900 c. 12.5 million; 2000 nearly 68 million; 2006 est. 79 million).

With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Egypt became a focus of great-power politics. Brit-ain, seeking to secure its maritime trade routes, gradually gained control of Egypt, which nominally remained part of the Ottoman Empire until 1914. The country was granted autonomy in 1922 and independence in 1952. After the fall of King Farouk a republic was proclaimed. Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the officers who overthrew the king, became president in 1954. He combined modern reforms with pan-Arab nationalism to become a leader of the international non-aligned movement. Egypt fought three unsuccessful wars against Israel (1948, 1967, and 1973) but became the first Arab country to seek a settlement with the Jewish State. In 1979, Anwar al-Sadat (president since 1970) signed a peace treaty with Israel. This led to Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League until 1989. Sadat was murdered by Islamic extremists in 1981.

His successor Hosni Mubarak has maintained a foreign policy based on mediation between the United States and other Arab states while taking a moderate line domestically. Since his election, Mu-

barak has based his rule on the emergency laws that were extended most recently in April 2006. Some observers therefore refer to Egypt as a democracy in name only. Among 167 states ranked according to press freedom by Reporters Without Borders, Egypt comes in 143rd place. However, some democratic re-forms have been enacted in recent years, due largely to US pressure. In September 2005 for the first time, voters were able to choose among candidates for the presidency, albeit with some restrictions. In the parliamentary elections, the most important opposi-tion group in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, was permitted to put up its candidates as independents only. So as not to provoke the government, the or-ganization nominated only 150 candidates. Mubarak won re-election with 88.6 % of the vote, yet the Mus-lim Brotherhood took 88 of parliament’s 444 seats. Secular opposition parties gained only 15 seats.

Euro-Mediterranean Partnerhip / Barcelona ProcessIn 1995 the EU launched a regional policy frame-work for the Mediterranean region which it called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, often known as the Barcelona Process after the confer-ence venue). The EMP encompasses the 25 EU states and 10 “Mediterranean third countries” (MTCs): Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt (Arab Republic of Egypt), Israel, Lebanon (Republic of Lebanon), Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian Autonomous Areas, and Tur-key. Libya has had observer status since 1999. The EMP’s goals are the establishment of a common space of peace and stability (security, democracy, and human rights), economic cooperation and a free trade zone (by 2010), cultural exchange, and the promotion of civil society. Regional actors are supposed to be the engines of the process. Similarly to the Helsinki process, regional progress in the

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region is to be accomplished in dialog within the region through economic incentives and political cooperation.

The EMP’s instruments are, on the one hand, bi-lateral association agreements between the EU and the respective MTCs, and multilateral initiatives on the other. Association agreements are in force with Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and the Pal-estinian Authority. Negotiations have also been com-pleted with Syria, but the agreement is currently on ice. Since 2004, the MTPs have also been included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Its action plans are meant to supplement the associa-tion agreements. The EMP is also institutionalized through regular meetings at the ministerial level, in EUROMED committees, and in a committee of senior officials. A parliamentary assembly of all EU-ROMED countries has been in existence since 2004, which includes 240 representatives. To strengthen the civic component, the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediter-ranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cul-tures was established in 2005.

Whereas economic ties have constituted the focal point from the beginning (more than half the region’s trade is conducted with the EU), objectives such as security and political reform have risen on the EU’s agenda since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Re-forms were supposed to be the focus at the confer-ence in Barcelona in 2005 to mark the ten-year an-niversary of the EMP’s founding, to which the EU for the first time invited the partner countries’ heads of state and government. Yet only two partner states were represented by such leaders: Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. The conference’s joint com-muniqué on fighting terrorism was diluted into a weak compromise, as even the mere definition of terrorism was bitterly disputed, with the EU and Israel on one side and the remaining states on the

other. The lack of participation at the senior level and the disappointing declaration were regarded as evidence of the EMP’s lack of success. Reasons given included the reluctance of some the region’s state- and government heads to shift the accent toward political reforms. Critics have pointed out that the EMP does not give the EU any mechanisms for applying pressure because, with the exception of Turkey, none of the states is even considering seeking EU membership.

Iran Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran, Nuclear Program With US support, Iran started a program for the ci-vilian use of nuclear energy as early as 1959. 23 reac-tors were planned to be in service by the year 2000. In 1974 in Bushehr, a West German consortium led by the Siemens subsidiary KWU began construc-tion of the first reactor. Iran ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, having signed it two years before. Construction was halted during the Islamic revolution; Siemens withdrew from the project. Subsequent Iranian requests to resume building were rejected. In 1995, Iran commissioned a Russian company to complete the power plant. An-other, underground installation — which was secret until 2002 — was built in Natanz to enrich uranium with the use of gas centrifuges. Another facility was constructed in Isfahan to produce nuclear fuel rods and convert uranium into gaseous uranium hexa-flouride. With this dual-use technology, Iran laid the technological foundation for producing both lower-enriched uranium to operate nuclear power plants, and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

These secret activities have raised strong doubts among international observers that the country’s nuclear program is civilian in nature. While Iran

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insists on its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, these observers point out that the coun-try will not require enriched uranium for energy production for the foreseeable future. The goal of its nuclear program, they say, is to produce nuclear warheads.

In 2003, under international pressure, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Addi-tional Protocol (without, however, having yet ratified it). The Protocol mandates unannounced monitoring checks. In September 2004, additional activities relating to uranium conversion in Iran became known. After the United States threatened Iran with international sanctions and the possibility of mili-tary action, Tehran took up negotiations with the EU, represented by the “EU-3” (Britain, France, and Germany) in late 2004. The Europeans, who since the beginning of the conflict have emphasized eco-nomic and political incentives, offered Iran support in technology transfers, including in the civilian use of nuclear power, if Iran provided “objective guaran-tees” that its program was peaceful in nature. Iran pledged to suspend uranium conversion in Isfahan and stop enrichment activities in Natanz, to accept the emplacement of IAEA seals in the facilities, and to ratify the Additional Protocol. Russia and China, both permanent members of the UN Security Coun-cil, criticized the United States’ hard-line stance.

In March 2005 Washington declared its support for the European effort and gave up its principal ob-jections to Iranian membership in the WTO, among other issues. In return for this support, the EU agreed to US demands that Iran’s case be referred to the Security Council should the country be unwill-ing to compromise.

The nuclear dispute with Iran has escalated since Mahmud Ahmadinejad became Iranian Presi-dent in August 2005. Using provocative rhetoric,

the Iranian government turned down both the European compromise package and Russian offers to transfer uranium enrichment to Russia. Saying it had a right to use nuclear energy peacefully, which included the right to enrich uranium, in January 2006 Iran resumed operation of the facilities that had been sealed by the IAEA. Subsequently, the IAEA Governing Council decided to take the matter to the Security Council.

In June 2006 the EU-3, the United States, China, and Russia (the so-called “Group of Six” or 3 + 3) made a new offer. By forswearing uranium enrichment, Iran would be given technological and economic support, including a modern light-water reactor and guarantees for supplying Iranian reactors with fuel rods, as well as, for the first time in 27 years, modern replacement parts for Iran’s fleet of Boeing airliners. Additionally, Washington held out the offer of join-ing the direct negotiations for the first time. In case of rejection, the Group of Six threatened to pass a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would clear the path for inter-national sanctions. On July 31, the Security Council ordered Iran to stop enrichment activities. Answer-ing on August 22, Iran said it would actually expand enrichment whenever this was deemed necessary, in direct defiance of the resolution.

IraqIraq was occupied from March to May 2003 after an invasion by the United States and its allies, preceded by US allegations that the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hus-sein was partially responsible for the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks and had been stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Despite intensive diplomatic efforts, the Americans failed to gain the backing of the UN Security Council for an invasion. Without an international mandate, the US military

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and its allies invaded Iraq in March 2003, overthrow-ing Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party regime.

After the invasion, an interim administration set up by the United States governed Iraq. Since June 28, 2004, the country has been again nominally fully sovereign, even though the US-led coalition has con-tinued to maintain a large military presence there. According to the interim constitution of March 8, 2004, Iraq is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious parlia-mentary republic that respects fundamental human and civil rights, including those of free expression and freedom of assembly. On January 30, 2005, the Iraqi people elected an interim national assembly of 275 representatives (of whom at least a quarter had to be women), charged with drafting a constitution. The charter was approved in a referendum on Octo-ber 15, 2005, by a majority of the population. The subsequent parliamentary elections in December 2005 were won by the Shi’ite “United Iraqi Alliance.” On June 4, 2006, parliament elected the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani president (with one Shi’te and Sunni deputy each) and Nuri al-Maliki, a Shi’ite, prime minister. In June 2006, parliament approved the cabinet, the various portfolios of which had long been the subject of dispute among the Kurdish, Shi’ite, and Sunni factions, and in so doing com-pleted Iraq’s democratically elected government.

Iraq has a population of 27 million (2006), three-quarters Arab, one-fifth Kurdish, and the remaining 5 % consisting mainly of Turkmen and Assyrians. 97 % of the people are Muslim, of which two-thirds are Shi’ites and one-third Sunni. About 3 % of the population is Christian. Its official languages are Arabic and Kurdish (in the northern province).

After its rapid military campaign, the US-led coa-lition has had to contend with a violent insurgency. For months the US leadership has tried to adapt its strategy to the conditions in the country as attacks

on the US military, the Iraqi population, and inter-national aid organizations continue. Many experts claim that the violence has escalated to the brink of open civil war along ethnic and sectarian lines, especially between the formerly dominant Sunni minority and the majority Shi’ites.

Islamic Republic of IranIran has a population of about 68 million (2005), half of which is ethnic Persian, one quarter Azeri, 7 % Kurdish, 8 % Gilaki and Mazandarani, about 3 % Arab, 2 % Turkmen, 2 % Lurs, and 2 % Baluchi. The overwhelming majority (89 %) are Shi’ite Muslims, 9 % Sunni, and 2 % Christian.

The head of state and commander-in-chief of the military is the “Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution” (since 1989 Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khame-nei). The Supreme Leader also sets policy in the ar-eas of external security, defence policy, and foreign affairs. He is appointed for an indefinite term by the Assembly of Experts, a body of 86 clerics. The Assem-bly of Experts is elected every eight years by the peo-ple, whereby candidates must be approved by the Council of Guardians. Since 1989, the 12-member Council of Guardians has ensured the conformity of all laws passed by parliament with Sharia law. Six of its members are clerics appointed directly by the head of state, the other six are members of parlia-ment subject to the approval of the head of the judi-ciary, who is also appointed by the Supreme Leader. The president (since 2005 Mahmud Ahmadinejad) is directly elected to a four-year term; all candidates must be cleared by the Council of Guardians. The parliament, or Majlis-e-Shura (Islamic Consultative Assembly), has 290 seats, five of which are reserved for religious minorities.

After the Shi’ite clergy took power in Iran in 1979 and Revolutionary Guards occupied the US em-

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bassy in Tehran, the United States broke off relations with Iran and imposed economic and political sanc-tions that remain in force today. Since then Iran has been considered the leading sponsor of Islamic ter-rorist groups in the region, including the Shi’ite Hiz-bollah militia in Lebanon ( Republic of Lebanon). Border disputes and Iraqi claims to the resource-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan led to the outbreak of the first Gulf War in 1980, which lasted eight years with Iraq receiving Western support.

In 1997, with the election of the reformist president Mohammed Khatami, Western hopes for a gradual improvement in relations grew. These hopes were finally buried, however, with the Au-gust 2005 presidential election. Only seven of 1014 applicants were allowed to stand for office, which was won by the hard-line mayor of Tehran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad. He has since pushed forward Iran’s nuclear program and provoked outrage in the West with his anti-Semitic remarks about Israel, which he says has no right to exist.

Lebanon, Republic of The Republic of Lebanon has a population of appx. 3.8 million (2006). Some 95 % percent of the peo-ple are Arabs, 4 % Armenians. Also, some 360,000 Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon. The country includes 17 recognized religious communities, of which 60 % are Muslim (Shi’ites, Sunnis, Ismaelis, Alevites, and Druze). Whether the Druze — a sect founded in the 11th century — can properly be called Muslims is a matter of dispute. About 40 % of the population is Christian (Maronites, Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and Eastern Rites).

The 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament are reserved half each for Christians and Muslims. Its deputies elect the president every four years (since 1998 Emile Lahoud), who must be a Maronite Chris-

tian. Religious affiliations are also predetermined for the prime minister (Sunni Muslim) and speaker of parliament (Shi’ite).

The territory of modern Lebanon has been a crossroads of important trade routes between east and west since ancient times, leaving its mark on the country’s still-active maritime and commercial traditions. Another distinguishing characteristic is Lebanon’s large Christian community which, in con-trast to those in all other Arab lands, survived the spread of Islam in the 7th century largely intact.

After decades of French domination, Lebanon gained independence in 1943. After World War II the country became the region’s commercial center and, not least for this reason, maintained a policy of neutrality during the Cold War. During the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon was regarded as the

“Switzerland of the Orient.” In the 1970s, the Middle East conflict and growing political demands among Muslims destroyed the delicate political balance between the Christian minority and the Muslim majority which was politically underrepresented in telation to their share of the population. A civil war broke out that continued to escalate, prompting the intervention of outside actors Syria, Israel, and the United States. After Israeli troops crossed into Leba-non in 1982, Shi’ite Muslims founded the radical Islamic Hizbollah militia to fight the Israelis.

The civil war ended in 1989 with the signing of the Taif Accords, in which religious parity and a spe-cial relationship with Syria was agreed. After Israeli troops withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, Syrian forces remained in the country to secure the influence of Damascus. In February 2005, the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a central figure in the political and economic reconstruction of Lebanon and an outspoken opponent of the Syrian military presence, many Lebanese demanded Syria’s with-

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drawal. Anti-Syrian demonstrations that attracted up to 1.5 million people at a time (the “Cedar Revolu-tion”) and international pressure forced Syria to pull its troops out in April 2005. Parliamentary elections in May and June 2005 resulted in a two-thirds major-ity for a bloc led by Hariri’s son Saad. In February 2006, one year after Harari’s murder and the “Cedar Revolution” (known in Lebanon as the “Uprising for Independence”), people took to the streets once more against Syrian influence.

In July 2006, the Shi‘ite Hizbollah militia ab-ducted two Israeli soldiers and fired missiles at israeli territory. Israel then launched retaliatory air strikes followed by a land offensive. In heavy fighting be-tween Israeli troops and the militia, which is widely believed to have received support from Iran and Syria, numerous people were killed on both sides, in addition to hurdreds of Lebanese civilians. The West initially hesitated to pressure Israel for a cease fire, citing Israel’s right to self-defense as a sovereign state. After the UN agreed to strengthen international peacekeeping troops in Lebanon, Israel agreed to a truce and began to gradually withdraw its army from southern Lebanon, to be replaced by the Lebanese army — which, supported by the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL, composed largely of troops from EU countries — is supposed to disarm Hizbollah.

Madrid Peace Conference (1991)Sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, the Madrid Conference in October and November 1991 was an early attempt at beginning a peace proc-ess between Israel and its Arab neighbors through bilateral and, later, multilateral talks. No Arab state except for Egypt ( Arab Republic of Egypt) had ever conducted such talks before. The Palestinians could participate only as part of the Jordanian delegation, represented by figures without open PLO affiliation,

yet who were in constant communication with the PLO leadership in Tunis.

The purpose of the conference was to serve as an opening forum for the participants and had no power to impose solutions. Still, the Israeli-Palestinian talks led to secret negotiations in Oslo that would result in the signing, by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn, of the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, in which the two sides recognized each other as negotiating partners. The Israelis acknowl-edged for the first time the PLO as the official repre-sentative of the Palestinian people, while the PLO re-moved the destruction of Israel from its charter. The multilateral talks began in Moscow in 1992 and, after being broken off for several years — resumed in 2000. They were divided into five forums on the issues of water, the environment, arms control, refugees, and economic growth. Twelve bilateral talks in Washing-ton included the signing of an Israeli-Lebanese peace accord among their results.

Saudi ArabiaThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Islamic, absolut-ist monarchy. Its name derives from the al-Saud dy-nasty, which founded Saudi Arabia in 1932 and still rules the country today. The king (since August 2005 Abdullah ibn Abd al-Aziz, the 15th of the founding monarch’s 37 sons) is also spiritual leader (“Guard-ian of the Holy Sites”). He appoints the National Con-sultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) every four years. Of the country’s 27 million inhabitants (2006), 5.5 % do not hold Saudi citizenship. 90 % of the citizens are Arabs. The country is almost entirely Muslim. 73 % are Wahhabi Sunnis, 5–10 % Shi’ite, the rest belong to other Sunni groups.

Saudi Arabia’s significance for international pol-itics is mostly due to its immense crude oil reserves,

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which are estimated at 25 % of the world’s total. It is the world’s largest oil exporter and therefore the leading member of OPEC.

Politically Saudi Arabia is traditionalist and un-compromisingly Muslim. Immigration restrictions for non-Muslims remain strict. Therefore, the deci-sion during the 1990 Gulf War to accept not only Kuwaiti refugees but also Western soldiers was highly controversial. Continuing protests led to the nearly complete withdrawal of foreign forces to neighboring Qatar in 2003. After two terrorist attacks in December 2004, Saudi Arabia escalated its fight against terrorist groups. However, foreign observers believe that significant elements within the domestic security apparatus secretly sympathize with the Islamists.

Both repressive measures and compromises in domestic politics seek to keep a lid on tensions within the country. The compromises have mainly been in the area of press freedom and political participation among the population, which had previously been restricted to submitting petitions. Elections of municipal assemblies, announced in October 2003 but repeatedly postponed, took place between February and April 2005. Only Saudi males could vote; women’s suffrage is scheduled for 2009 at the earliest. Also, only half of the seats were directly elected, even though the municipal assemblies have only very limited powers. All these reforms were en-acted under significant US pressure.

Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the West is an ambivalent one. The country is one of the region’s most important Western allies, yet fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 terrorists were Saudis. Sermons at Friday prayer services are often venues for anti-West-ern propaganda. Saudi adherents of the conservative Wahhabi sect of Islam support the spread of Islam and the building of mosques worldwide. Recipients

of their support include groups banned in other Arab countries, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, the lifestyles of many members of the ruling family, widely regarded as antithetical to Muslim principles, polarize the population. Some Western observers have therefore been warning for some time of the possibility of a religiously moti-vated coup attempt.

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Afghanistan 23–24,31, 39, 42, 43, 45, 49, 81, 98- Taliban 31, 106

Africa 34, 43, 50Al-Arabiya 73, 91Al-Hurra 72Al-Jazeera 72, 73, 91Albania 34, 72Algeria 66, 96, 9898Arab-Israel Conflict 23, 43, 52, 53, 56, 58, 60, 71,

76, 79, 80–81- Geneva Conference (1973) 79- Madrid Peace Conference (1991) Glossary

83, 85- Oslo Agreement 77–80- Roadmap 77–78

Arab League (AL) 80Asia 50, 62Axis of Evil 76, 87Bahrain 40Balkans 27, 100Basra 44Beirut 76, 80, 103Bosnia and Herzegovina 49Broader Middle East Initiative (BMENA) Glossary

24, 33, 93- Forum for the Future 24, 93, 102- Foundation for the Future 94- Fund for the Future 93

Cairo 26, 51, 53, 76Caliph, Caliphate Glossary 56, 66, 104Cartoon Controversy 24, 38, 39, 51, 52, 101China 26, 84–85“Clash of Civilizations” 55, 58Cold War 26, 27, 32, 33, 51, 83–84, 87, 97, 101

- Containment policy 26, 33- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 28, 37- Conference for Security and Co-operation in

Europe (CSCE) 36, 93, 102

colonialism 29, 32, 38, 41, 42color- and flower-revolutions 67democratization

- civil Society 24, 30, 35, 65, 68, 71, 88, 90, 93, 95, 102

- conditionality 89–90- Far East 68- Good Governance 43, 71- human rights 28, 38, 40, 49, 61–62, 73, 75, 90,

95, 101- liberal consensus 65- media 70–73, 88, 91- Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

35, 38, 69, 71, 88–89, 94- Westminster-Democracy 60, 67, 91- women’s rights 44, 62, 92

East Timor Conflict 50Eastern Europe 24, 28, 51, 74, 93

- transformation 42, 56, 74Egypt Glossary 24, 43–44, 48–49, 53, 57, 59, 62,

66–67, 70, 74, 83, 89, 95–96- Alexandria Judges Club 73- freedom of the press 72- Nasserism 63- secular parties 63

European Union (EU) 23, 29, 32, 48–49, 51- Association Agreement with Egypt 48- Association Agreement with Lebanon 90- enlargement policy 30, 33, 75, 106- Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)/

Barcelona-Process Glossary 29, 32–33, 30, 39, 50, 89, 93, 100, 102

- European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 29–30, 74, 89

- perception in the Middle East 51–54, 59, 89–90- strategic approach 29–30, 32–34, 37–38, 101

Failing States 43France 32, 48, 54, 68, 85

Index

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G-8 24–25, 29, 89, 93Gaza 36, 76, 80Germany 41, 50, 59, 67, 69, 80, 85, 96–97, 100

- German Democratic Republic (GDR) 36, 74- postwar democratization 61, 67, 93

Gulf States 40, 65, 92- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

globalization 54, 58Great Britain 33Greece 33Haiti 27Holocaust; Shoah 51, 82, 86Hungary 74India, nuclear program 82–83International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

81, 82, 85- Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 82–83, 85

Iran (see glossary) 24, 42, 49, 53, 62, 83, 85, 88, 91, 95

- nuclear program glossary 23, 81–82, 84–87- Mykonos Affair 87

Iraq Glossary 24, 31–32, 40, 44, 50, 53, 70, 77, 81- Abu Ghraib prison 29, 44, 46, 94- Civil War 23, 28, 36, 41–42, 98- free elections 43, 49, 96- US invasion 29, 31, 39–40, 97- US retreat 97–99

Ireland 33islamism/islamists 43–44, 52, 59, 63, 65–67,

94–96, 105–106- Muslim Brotherhhod 45–46, 63, 65–66, 95–96,

103, 105islamophobia 52, 55, 101Israel 31, 36, 42, 48, 50, 57, 78, 80, 82, 104

- nuclear program 83- Likud 27, 36- Yom Kippur War (1973) 79

Italy 48, 59

Japan 61Jerusalem 80Jordan 40, 42, 55Kashmir Conflict 49Kurds 40, 87Kuwait 53, 76Latin America 27, 34, 51, 61, 70Lebanon Glossary 24, 39–40, 49, 58, 64, 68,

70–71, 73, 103- Amal Party 74- Cedar Revolution 47, 67, 71–73, 96- freedom of the press 24, 70- Hizb Allah 49

Libya 24, 48–50Mexico 26, 33, 37Middle East

- definition 24–25- demographics 43, 59, 64, 90- education 26, 41, 87, 90- secularism 44, 65–67, 104

Morocco 40, 63, 71, 96Nation Building 34New Delhi 83North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA) 33, 37North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

31, 34North Korea 43, 49, 86Oman 24Pakistan 34, 49, 83Palestine 44, 54, 57, 76–77, 79

- Fatah 44, 78- free elections 43–44, 59, 66, 70, 77–79, 96- Hamas Glossary 44, 50, 57, 59, 66, 70,

76–80, 96- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 79

Peace of Westphalia 35Poland 74

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Portugal 33, 61Qatar 40, 73Qur’ran 24, 44, 66, 92, 101Rabat 24Romania 74Russia/Soviet Union 27–28, 36–38, 42, 45, 50,

61–62, 65, 70, 81, 84–85Saudi Arabia Glossary 24, 38, 49, 59, 64, 76, 80,

83–84- Wahhabism 59- Saudi National Commission for Relief and

Charity Work Abroad 60Sharia Law 44, 66, 91–92, 95, 105Shiites 40, 74Somalia 39, 98Spain 26, 33, 43Sunnites 77Syria 24, 44, 58, 66, 68, 74, 95–96, 103Tehran 86Terrorism 30, 39, 48, 52, 55, 58–59, 78, 80–81

- Al-Qaeda 31, 40, 52, 59, 76, 91, 96- September 11th, 2001 27, 31, 39–40, 55, 58, 66,

76, 94, 96Turkey Glossary 24, 31, 34, 42, 61–62, 83

- EU accession 75, 106- Ottoman Empire 26, 61, 104–106- role model 34, 103–106- Tanzimat-Reforms 61–62

Tunisia 43, 54United Arab Emirates (UAE) 54, 69, 73, 99

- Dubai Ports World 54–55United Nations (UN) 57, 61, 67–68, 78

- Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) Glossary 39, 43, 64

- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 61

- Oil for Food program 53- Security Council 31, 78–79, 82, 84–85

USA- Guantanamo Prison Camp 44–46, 94- McCain-Amendment 44, 46- Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 92- Monroe Doctrine 28- National Democratic Institute 35- Neo-Cons 36- Open Door policy 26, 33- perception in the Middle East 29, 51–54, 56, 59,

89–90, 94- rogue states 32, 49- strategic approach 25–29, 31–32, 34–38, 101–102- War on Terror 54–55, 58

World Bank 35, 80, 103World Trade Organization (WTO) 50, 84

- Doha-Conference (2001) 50World War II 27, 62Yemen 24, 80Yugoslavia 98

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Persons

Abbas, Mahmud 44, 79Abdullah ibn Abd al-Aziz 81Ahmadinejad, Mahmud 51, 66, 83–85, 86Albright, Madeleine 35Al-Assad, Bashar 47Al-Quadafi, Muammar 48Al Whalid ibn Talal Al Saud 54Arafat, Jassir 57, 79Barnett, Thomas 34, 35Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine 43, 89Berlusconi, Silvio 48Bin Laden, Osama 73Bismarck, Otto von 100Bremer, Paul 71Burns, R. Nicholas 85Bush, George W. 24–26, 28, 34, 44–45, 47, 54–55,

82, 84–85, 104, 107Carter, James Earl (“Jimmy”) 28, 37Charles Mountbatten-Windsor 87Chirac, Jacques 48Churchill, Winston 101Clinton, William Jefferson (“Bill”) 27d’Estaing, Valéry Giscard 106Douste-Blazy, Philippe 85Eisenhower, Dwight D. 46Erdogan, Recep 103–106Fukuyama, Francis 36Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 53Goldmann, Nahum 79Gorbachev, Mikhail 36Hamilton, Alexander 26Hariri, Rafik 67, 70Haniyeh, Ismail 44Hoagland, Jim 98Hussein, Saddam 27, 30, 41–42Khalilzad, Zalmay 86, 98

Keynes, John Maynard 27Kissinger, Henry 28Lovett, Robert 46Lugar, Richard 84Marshall, George C. 46McCain, John 35, 44–46Mossadeq, Mohammed 87Mubarak, Hosni 43, 67, 72, 89Murtha, John 99Naboulsi, Sheik Afif 74Nasser, Gamal Abdel 95Nixon, Richard 28Olmert, Ehud 77, 79Pahlewi, Mohammad Reza 26Patten, Christopher Francis (“Chris”) 71Putin, Vladimir 36Rabin, Yitzhak 78Reagan, Ronald 36–37, 55, 94Rice, Condoleezza 34, 67, 85Roosevelt, Franklin D. 27Roosevelt, Theodore 28Rumsfeld, Donald 40, 46, 54Sakharov, Andrei 37Sadat, Anwar 57, 62Schröder, Gerhard 84Sharon, Ariel 79Steinmeier, Frank-Walter 85Stiglitz, Joseph 35Tocqueville, Alexis de 26Weissglas, Dov 57Wolfensohn, James 80Wilson, Woodrow 26–27, 37–38, 68

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

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1961 1

2

3

4

1962 5

6

7

8

1963 9

10

11

12

1964 13

14

15

16

1965 17

18

19

Schwächen der industriellen Gesellschaft

Kulturkrise in der industriellen Gesellschaft

Glanz und Elend der Entwicklungshilfe

Gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Osten

Die Fragwürdigkeit der Bildungspolitik

Die Erziehung zum Europäer

Die Bewältigung des Preis-Lohn-Problems

Die Preis-Lohn-Dynamik in der BRD

Maschine — Denkmaschine — Staatsmaschine

Kybernetik als soziale Tatsache

Westliche Gesellschaft und kommunistische Drohung

Wohin treibt die EWG ?

Planung in der freien Marktwirtschaft

Wohin Deutschland in Europa ?

Entwicklungshilfe — Mittel des Aufstiegs oder des Verfalls ?

Industrielle Gesellschaft — menschlich oder unmenschlich ?

Vermögensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand

Hemmen Tabus die Demokratisierung ?

Automatisierung — eine gesellschaftliche Herausforderung ?

F. W. Schoberth

Erik von Sivers

Fritz Baade

Helmut Gollwitzer

Rüdiger Altmann

Stéphane Hessel

Theodor Pütz

Hans-Constantin Paulssen

Pierre Bertaux

O. W. Haseloff

Winfried Martini

U. W. Kitzinger, Roland Delcour

Edgar Salin

Alfred Grosser, Karl Theodor Frhr. zu Guttenberg

Walter RauE. F. Schumacher

Raymond Aron

Helmut MeinholdH. J. Wallraff

Alexander Mitscherlich

Gottfried BombachGünter FriedrichsKurt Pentzlin

H. B. Tolkmitt

Fritz Voigt

Günther Buch

Eugen Kogon

Josef Müller-Marein

François Bondy

Gottfried Bombach

Fritz Voigt

Arnold Gehlen

Freiherr von Stackelberg

Th. Eschenburg

Eugen Kogon

Gottfried Bombach

François Bondy

Edgar Salin

Ralf Dahrendorf

Eugen Kogon

Hellmut Becker

Hans Wenke

Previous Round Tables*

*A complete list of all participants since 1961 is available at www.bergedorf-round-table.org


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20

1966 21

22

23

24

1967 25

26

27

1968 28

29

30

31

1969 32

33

34

1970 35

36 Leningrad

37

1971

Ein Dilemma der westlichen Demokratien

Die “unterentwickelten” hochindustrialisierten Gesellschaften

Muss unsere politische Maschinerie umkonstruiert werden ?

Wissenschaftliche Experten und politische Praxis — Das Problem der Zusammenarbeit in der heutigen Demokratie

Ist der Weltfriede unvermeidlich ?

Bedroht die Pressekonzentration die freie Meinungsbildung ?

Neue Wege zur Hochschulreform

Beherrschen die Technokraten unsere heutige Gesellschaft ?

Freiheit als Störfaktor in einer programmierten Gesellschaft

Fördern die Bündnissysteme die Sicherheit Europas ?

Haben wir im entstehenden Europa eine Chance für die freie Marktwirtschaft ?

Mögliche und wünschbare Zukünfte

Die Biologie als technische Weltmacht

Verstärken oder verringern sich die Bedingungen für Aggressivität ?

Welchen Spielraum hat die Entspannungspolitik ?

Zugänge zur Friedensforschung

Europäische Sicherheit und Möglichkeit der Zusammenarbeit

Demokratisierung der Demokratie ?

Arbeitsgespräch : Aufgabenstellung und Verfahrensfragen einer internationalen Konferenz für Europäische Sicherheit

Leo H. Klaassen

Friedrich Heer

Rüdiger AltmannJoseph Rovan

Helmut SchelskyUlrich Lohmar

Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Helmut Arndt

Ralf Dahrendorf

Alfred Mozer

Jeanne Hersch

Wladimir Chwostow

Hans von der Groeben

Robert Jungk

Adolf Portmann

Friedrich Hacker

Alfred Grosser

Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. WeizsäckerRichard Löwenthal

Alfred GrosserNikolai E. Poljanow

Joseph Rovan

—

Edgar Salin

Hellmut Becker

Eugen Kogon

Hellmut Becker

Edgar Salin

Hellmut Becker

Hellmut Becker

Eugen Kogon


Alfred Grosser

Hans Peter Ipsen

Hellmut Becker

Hoimar von Ditfurth

Eugen Kogon

Theo Sommer

Karl Carstens

Nikolai E. Poljanow

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Franz Karasek


134 135


38

39

40

1972 41

42

43

1973 44

45

46 Vienna

1974 47

48

49

1975 Moscow

50

51 Bonn

Infrastrukturreform als Innenpolitik

Globalsteuerung der Wirtschaft ?

Der bevollmächtigte Mensch

Sprache und Politik

Arbeitsgespräch : Demokratie und Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD

Das erweiterte Europa zwischen den Blöcken

Wo bleiben die alten Menschen in der Leistungsgesellschaft ?

Die “neue Mitte” : Schlagwort oder Strukturwandel ?

Umsteuerung der Industriegesellschaft ?

Neutralität — Wert oder Unwert für die europäische Sicherheit

Revolution der Gleichheit — Ende oder Beginn der Freiheit ?

Rohstoff- und Energieverknappung

Entwicklungshilfe — eine Illusion ?

Arbeitsgespräch : Entspannungspolitik, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit

Kooperation oder Konfrontation — Stürzt die Wirtschaft in eine weltpolitische Krise ?

Welche Zukunft hat die parlamentarische Demokratiewestlicher Prägung ?

Helmut Kohl

Gottfried Bombach

Dennis Gabor

Hans Maier

Richard Löwenthal

R. DahrendorfJean-Pierre BrunetSir Con O’Neill

Helge Pross

Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Hans-Jochen VogelHugo Thiemann

Rudolf KirchschlägerGaston ThornJósef Czyrek

Ralf Dahrendorf

H. B. G. CasimirManfred Schäfer

Peter T. BauerKarl-Heinz Sohn

Ralf DahrendorfH. EhrenbergTheo SommerC.-F. Frhr. v. WeizsäckerG. ArbatowO. BogomolowSchalwa SanakojewGeorgij Shukow

Helmut Schmidt

Gaston Thorn


Herbert Giersch


Hellmut Becker

François Bondy

Rudolf Kirchschläger



Gottfried Bombach

Olivier Reverdin


Gottfried Bombach

Max Thurn

Kurt A. KörberLew Tolkunow

Gaston Thorn

Ralf Dahrendorf


134 135


52

1976 53

54

55

1977 56 Bonn

57 Luxemburg

58

1978 59

60

61

1979 62 Moscow

63

64

1980 65

66

67

Ordnungspolitik oder Verteilungskampf ?

Die Berufsgesellschaft und ihre Bildung

Nach der Wahl ’76 : Welchen Spielraum hat die deutsche Innenpolitik ?

Entspannungspolitik nach Helsinki

Ein anderer “Way of Life”

Europa und die Weltwirtschaft

Energiekrise — Europa im Belagerungszustand ?

Terrorismus in der demokratischen Gesellschaft

Arbeitsgespräch : Alternativenergien

Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit als Dauerschicksal

Wachstum und Lebenssinn — Alternative Rationalitäten ?

UdSSR und Bundesrepublik Deutschland — wirtschaftliche und politische Perspektiven in den 80er Jahren

Jugend und Gesellschaft

Weltrezession 1980 ?Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen

Der Westen und der Nahe Osten

Europas Sicherheit

Voraussetzungen und Ziele der Entspannung in den 80er Jahren

Kurt H. Biedenkopf

Hans Maier

—

G. ArbatowLeonard H. MarksTheo SommerRyszard Wojna

E. F. Schumacher

Claude CheyssonHerbert Giersch

Guido Brunner

Walter Laqueur

Joachim Gretz

Volker HauffGerhard FelsErich Streissler


Klaus von DohnanyiAlexander E. Bowin

Leopold Rosenmayr

Herbert Giersch Karl Otto Pöhl

Arnold HottingerHans A. Fischer-BarnicolH. Hobohm

Christoph BertramW. R. Smyser

W. A. MatweewStanley Hoffmann

Theo Sommer

Hellmut Becker

Ralf Dahrendorf

Ralf Dahrendorf

Hans K. Schneider

Gaston Thorn

Hans K. Schneider

Ralf Dahrendorf

Werner H. Bloss

Gottfried Bombach

Ralf Dahrendorf

K. A. KörberBoris A. Borrissow

Hans Maier

Hans K. Schneider

Udo Steinbach

Theo Sommer

Karl Kaiser


136 137


1981 68

69Washington

70

1982 71

72 Bonn

1983 73 Zurich

74 Berlin

1984 75 Moscow

76 Rome

1985 77

78 Bonn

1986 79 Brussels

Der Ausbau des Sozialstaates und das Dilemma des Staatshaushaltes

Europe and America facing the crises of the 80’s

Was bleibt noch vom staatsbürgerlichen Grundkonsens ?

Repräsentieren die Parteien unsere Gesellschaft ?

Wirtschaftspolitik in der Krise ? Zur Situation in den Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritannien, Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Ein Weg zur Erneuerung der Industriegesellschaft

Die deutsche Frage — neu gestellt

Zukunft Europas : Probleme der politischen und militärischen Entspannung.

Ist die Spaltung Europas das letzte Wort ?

Neue Strukturen für die soziale Sicherheit ?

10 Jahre Helsinki — die Herausforderung bleibt

Findet Europa wieder die Kraft, eine Rolle in der Weltpolitik zu spielen ?

R. DahrendorfAnke Fuchs

R. DahrendorfStanley Hoffmann

Hans-Jochen VogelE. Noelle-Neumann

Werner RemmersRichard Löwenthal

J. TobinM. FeldsteinSir Alec CairncrossA. A. WaltersP. E. UriP. SalinA. GutowskiH. Schulmann

Präsident Gaston Thorn

Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Horst TeltschikWadim W. Sagladin

Franz Kardinal KönigHelmut Schmidt

Helmut MeinholdUlf FinkOlaf Sund

R. BurtS. TichwinskijM. SzürösL. V. Graf FerrarisM. Dobrosielski H. Teltschik

Jacques DelorsLord CarringtonHelmut Schmidt

Armin Gutowski

Karl Kaiser

Ralf Dahrendorf

Hans Heigert

Herbert Giersch

Ralf Dahrendorf

Karl Kaiser

Karl KaiserJuri Shukow

Luigi Vittorio Graf Ferraris

Fides Krause-Brewer

Ralf Dahrendorf

Karl Kaiser


136 137


80

1987 81 Moscow

82 Geneva

83 Budapest

1988 84 Berlin

85 Munich

86 Bonn

1989 87 Dresden

88 Bonn

89 Prague

1990 90 Dresden

91 Moscow

1991 92 Moscow

93 Berlin

1992 94 Dresden

Bürger und res publica — die Zukunft der Verantwortung

Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Die Modernität in der Industriegesellschaft — und danach ?

Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Vertrauensbildung

Systemöffnende Kooperation ? Perspektiven zwischen Ost und West

Die ökologische Wende — hat sie noch Chancen ?

Das gemeinsame europäische Haus — aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Globale Umweltproblematik als gemeinsame Überlebensfrage

Auf dem Wege zu einem neuen Europa ? Perspektiven einer gemeinsamen westlichen Ostpolitik

Chancen für die europäische Kultur am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts

Wie geht es weiter mit den Deutschen in Europa ?

Europa im Aufbruch — auf dem Wege zu einer neuen Frieden-sordnung

Perestrojka : Kontinuität, Ende oder Wende ?

Nach dem “Sozialismus” : Wie geht es weiter mit den neuen Demokratien in Europa ?

Wege zur inneren Einheit

Hans Maier

Volker RüheWadim W. SagladinEgon Bahr

Hermann Lübbe

M. SzürösHelmut SchmidtR. BogdanowH. Sonnenfeldt

W. LeonhardHarry Maier

Frhr. v. LersnerAlois Glück

Wadim W. SagladinHorst Teltschik

W. MundtW. Haber

Lawrence EagleburgerSir Christopher MallabyHorst Teltschik

Valtr KomárekKurt Biedenkopf

Willy BrandtManfred StolpeLothar Späth

Wadim W. SagladinHorst Teltschik

W. WladislawlewF. W. Christians

Tadeusz MazowieckiSir Ralf Dahrendorf

Kurt Biedenkopf Wolfgang Thierse

Ralf Dahrendorf

Valentin FalinTheo Sommer

Luigi V. Ferraris

Karl Kaiser

Jürgen Engert

Hans Maier

Karl Kaiser

Max Schmidt

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Hans Heigert

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Hans Maier

Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt


138 139


95 Paris

96 Tallinn

97 Kiev

1993 98 Berlin

99 Ditchley Park

100 Dresden

1994 101St. Petersburg

102Friedrichsroda

1995 103 Oxford

104 Warsaw

105 Munich

1996 106 Jerusalem

Welche Antworten gibt Europa auf die neuen Einwanderungswellen ?

Zwischen Integration und nationaler Eigenständigkeit : wie findet Europa zusammen ?

Energiesicherheit für ganz Europa ?

Orientierungskrise in Politik und Gesellschaft ? Perspektiven der Demokratie

Will the West survive the disintegration of the East ?

Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht die liberale Gesellschaft ?

Russland und der Westen : Internationale Sicherheit und Reformpolitik

Zukunftsfähigkeit von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft

Die Verfassung Europas

Europa — aber wo liegen seine Grenzen ?

Ein neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag ?

Europe and the Future of the Middle East — an Agenda for Peace

Willy BrandtJacques Delors

Jim HoaglandDr. KrenzlerLennart MeriT. ÖrnB. Schmidbauer

Hermann KrämerW. SkljarowHelga SteegY. Rudenko

Antje VollmerWolf Lepenies

Bill BradleyW. F. van EekelenH.-G. Poettering

Kurt BiedenkopfAlbert O. Hirschman

A. A. KokoschinVolker RüheA. A. Sobtschak

Lothar SpäthLeo A. Nefiodow

Jean-Claude CasanovaTimothy Garton AshWolfgang Schäuble

Bronislaw GeremekAnders BjörckJ. François-Poncet

Horst SeehoferBarbara Riedmüller

Mahdi F. Abdul HadiHanan Bar-OnLeonard HausmanJean-Paul JesseHelmut Schäfer

Karl Kaiser



Jürgen Engert

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Dieter Grimm


Jürgen Engert


Karl Kaiser

Hermann Korte

Michael Stürmer


138 139


107

108 Moscow

1997 109 Istanbul

110 Berlin

111Amsterdam

1998 112 Leipzig

113 Baku

1999 114Magdeburg

115 Berlin

116 Moscow

2000 117 Berlin

Medien — Macht — Politik

Was bewegt Russland ?

At the crossroads of geo-politics — Turkey in a changing political environment

Wege aus der blockierten Gesellschaft

Wie ist Europa zu sichern ?

Wachsende Ungleichheiten — neue Spaltungen ?

Energie und Geostrategie im kaspischen Raum

Welche gesellschaftliche Wertigkeit hat der Sport ?

Neue Dimensionen des Politischen ? Herausforderungen für die repräsentative Demokratie

Russland in Europa : Zehn Jahre nach dem Kalten Krieg

Modell Deutschland :Reif für die Globalisierung ?

Wolfgang DonsbachWolfgang Hoffmann-RiemTheo Sommer

Sergej BaburinSir Rodric Braithwaite

Ilter TürkmenMorton AbramowitzHans-Ulrich Klose

André LeysenJürgen Rüttgers

Ulrich CartellieriSir Christopher MallabyWolfgang IschingerMarten van HeuvenFrits BolkesteinDavid P. CalleoMax KohnstammElmar Brok

Kurt BiedenkopfHeinz BudeWolfgang Huber

Terry D. AdamsVafa GoulizadePaul HaseldonckxHans-Friedrich von Ploetz

Hans LenkHerbert Riehl-HeyseJürgen Palm

Antonia GrunenbergSabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger

Wolfgang IschingerOleg MorosowUlrich CartellieriAndrej A. Kokoschin

Henning ScherfCarl Christian v. Weizsäcker

Thomas Kielinger


Curt Gasteyger


Michael Stürmer

Barbara Riedmüller


Hermann-Anders Korte

Jutta Limbach


Klaus v. Dohnanyi


140 141


118 Berlin

119 Beijing

2001 120 Berlin

121 Helsinki

122 Moscow

2002 123 Belgrade

124 Berlin

Ein föderatives Europa ?

China : Partner in der Weltwirtschaft

Verhandlungsdemokratie ? Politik des Möglichen — Möglichkeiten der Politik

The Baltic Sea — a Region of Prosperity and Stability ?

Russia’s European Dimension

The Future of Southeast Europe

Contours of a “New World Order” ?

Sylvie GoulardKlaus HänschJerzy Kranz

Yang QixianZheng SilinWang ChunzhengShen JuerenZhu MinShi MingdeSong JianKonrad SeitzHorst TeltschikMartin Posth

Dieter GrimmAnnette Fugmann-Heesing

Bertel HaarderArtur J. KuznetsovAlar J. Rudolf OlljumHans OlssonTimo SummaErkki TuomiojaChristoph Zöpel

—

Andy BearparkErhard BusekNebojša ČovićBozidar DjelićAlexandra JovičevićHerwig KempfGerald KnausWolfgang PetritschGoran Svilanović

Egon BahrJohn L. HirschPeter W. SingerPaul W. SchroederGeorges-Henri SoutouKarsten D. VoigtNorbert WalterSamuel F. Wells Jr.

Rudolf von Thadden

Mei ZhaorongKarl Kaiser

Robert Leicht

Jaako Iloniemi

Sergej W. JastrschembskijSergej A. Karaganow

Martti AhtisaariErhard Busek



140 141


2003 125 Hamburg

126 Florence

127 Isfahan

2004 128Wilton Park

129 Lviv

2005 130 Cairo

Reinventing Europe — Cultural Dimensions of Widening and Deepening

The Future of Democracy — European Perspectives

The Middle East and Western Values: A Dialog With Iran

Power and Rules — Elements of a New World Order

Frontiers and Horizons of the EU — ,The New Neighbors Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova

Forging a Just Global Order — Trade, Development, Political Strategies

Hélène AhrweilerÜstün ErgüderMonika GriefahnYudhishthir Raj IsarHywel Ceri JonesKarl SchlögelGary SmithGijs de Vries

Henri de BressonAndrea ManzellaGesine SchwanLarry SiedentopGijs de VriesHelen Wallace

Gilles KepelMichael McFaulHomayra Moshirzadeh Ahmad Nagheebzadeh Giandomenico PiccoJohannes Reissner Hossein Salimi

Paul SchroederDame Pauline Neville-JonesDavid RieffHeather GrabbeGhanim AlnajjarMichael SchaeferAvis Bohlen

Ian BoagGernot ErlerYaroslav HrytsakDanuta HübnerEvgenii M. KozhokinWolfgang SchäubleOleksandr O. TschalyJakub T. Wolski

Badria Al-AwadhiMark ChingonoLarry DiamondRainer ForstSheikh Ali Gom’aAmr HamzawyStefano ManservisiNorbert Walter

Otto von der Gablentz

Roger de Weck

Christoph BertramSeyed Kazem Sajjadpour

Christoph Bertram

Roger de Weck

Theo Sommer


131 Berlin

132 Dubai

Russia and the West

Stability in the Persian Gulf

Elmar BrokVladimir ChizhovVasili LikhachevDmitri RogozinWolfgang SchäubleManfred Stolpe

Ghassan AtiyyahRobert CooperRami George KhouriMichael McFaulHossein MousavianMichael Schaefer

Wolfgang Eichwede

Volker Perthes


The Bergedorf Round Table

Chairman Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Coordinator Dr. Klaus Wehmeier (Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board) Dr. Thomas Paulsen (Managing Director)

Program Manager Dr. Thomas Weihe

Conference Management Kristina Klein

Program Assistant Karen Pehla, M. A.

Address Bergedorf Round Table Berlin Office of the Körber Foundation Neustädtische Kirchstraße 8 D -10117 Berlin Phone : +49 -30-206267-60 Fax : +49 -30-206267-67 E-mail : [email protected] www.bergedorf-round-table.org

Imprint

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen BibliothekDie Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie;detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http ://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

© edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg 2006

Editor Dr. Thomas WeiheTranslations Jonna Meyer-SpaschePictures Marc DarchingerDesign Groothuis, Lohfert, Consorten | glcons.dePrinted in Germany by Offizin Andersen Nexö Leipzig

ISBN 10 3-89684-362-1ISBN 13 978-3-89684-362-3

All rights are reserved. These minutes may be reproduced upon request.www.edition-koerber-stiftung.de

The Bergedorf Protocols are also published in German. Both versionsare available for download and research at www.bergedorf-round-table.org

PCA gültig bis 2007

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