Brueckner Anthony - Debasing Skepticism

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cannot succeed in hitting both. In such cases, it is perfectly rational to for-mulate intentions that run counter to our expectations of success or failure.Thus, there is nothing arbitrary about understanding these cases as excep-tions to the usual requirement of consistency between our intentions and ourbeliefs about eventual success. Just the opposite: what is arbitrary is to insiston that consistency even when, as in Bratmans example, the requirementmakes no rational sense.

There is one last, rather remarkable error to clear up. In his conclusion,Di Nucci states that Bratmans example succeeds in showing that we do notalways act intentionally with the intention so to act, and that it succeedsby McCanns own admission (Di Nucci 2010: 485). I am dumbfounded.Let my fingers cleave to the keys of my computer if I have ever so much ashinted at such an admission.

Texas A&M UniversityCollege Station, TX 77843-4237, USA

[email protected]

References

Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.

Di Nucci, E. 2009. Simply, false. Analysis 69: 6978.

Di Nucci, E. 2010. Rational constraints and the Simple View. Analysis 70: 48186.

McCann, H. 1991. Settled objectives and rational constraints. American PhilosophicalQuarterly 28: 2536.

McCann, H. 2010. Di Nucci on the Simple View. Analysis 70: 5359.

Debasing scepticismANTHONY BRUECKNER

In this paper, I will clarify Jonathan Schaffers debasing scepticism, highlight-ing its logical structure.1

In many current discussions of scepticism, its scope is limited to propos-itions about the external world which, if known at all, are known a posteri-ori. The standard sceptical set-up goes as follows. The sceptic specifies asceptical hypothesis, or counterpossibility, that is incompatible with the

Analysis Vol 71 | Number 2 | April 2011 | pp. 295297 doi:10.1093/analys/anr005 The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust.All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]

1 See Schaffer (2010).

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atUniversityofArizonaon

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external-world propositions that I claim to know. The hypothesis e.g. that Iam a brain in a vat is claimed by the sceptic to be within the realm ofmetaphysical possibility. The sceptical argument, in a nutshell, runs as fol-lows. Choose some external-world proposition that I claim to know, sayH I have hands. By the principle that knowledge is closed under knownentailment, if I know H, then I know $SK I am not a handless brain in avat. My evidence does not enable me to know $SK. Hence I do not know H.The argument generalizes to all other external-world propositions that Iclaim to know (there are a few exceptions: that there are brains, that thereare vats. . .).

What about propositions that I claim to know which are such that if Iknow them, then I know them a priori? That is another matter, even trickierthan external-world-knowledge scepticism. After all, the hypothesis that I amsomehow deceived about the sum of 2 and 3 (it is 6, not 5!) does not seem tofall within the realm of the metaphysically possible. The hypothesis that I ambeing deceived in my arithmetic beliefs does not seem to be a genuine coun-terpossibility to the believed arithmetic propositions. Further, there is thedifficulty that logical principles used in constructing a sceptical argumentregarding propositions that I think I know a priori will themselves be castinto doubt by the sceptical argument.

Enter Schaffers debasing demon. He brings it about that the propositionsthat I claim to know a posteriori andthe propositions that I claim to know a

priori are improperly based, even though they seem to me to be perfectlyproperly based. For all that the debasing demon hypothesis says, all thesepropositions might well be true. It is just that if the hypothesis obtained, thennone of the propositions I claim to know would amount to knowledge, be-cause of my basing inadequacies. So the debasing demon hypothesis is plaus-ibly within the realm of metaphysical possibility, since it does not, forexample, contain the claim that 23 fails to equal 5. It does not containthe claim that modus ponens is not a valid principle of inference. Instead, itcontains the claim that my beliefs of those propositions are improperly based.

But what exactly is the sceptical reasoning based upon the debasing demonhypothesis? Schaffer discusses this only in a footnote, and the sceptical rea-soning needs highlighting.2 Here is my reconstruction of the debasing scep-tics reasoning, targeting the proposition T235:

(1) If I know T, then my belief of T is properly based. (Premiss)(2) If I know T, then I can know that I know T. (Premiss)(3) If I can know that I know T, then I can know that my belief of T is

properly based. (By (1) and a variant of the Closure Principle)

(4) If I know T, then I can know that my belief of T is properly based.(By (2), (3))

2 Schaffer (2010: 234).

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(5) I cannot know that my belief of T is properly based. (Premiss)(6) I do not know T. (By (4),(5))

Premiss (1) falls out of the concept of knowledge. Premiss (3) I leave to thereader. Premiss (5) comes from my inability to rule out the metaphysicallypossible debasing demon hypothesis. Premiss (2) is obviously the clunker!Nothing so strong is required by the standard sceptical argument regardingexternal-world propositions discussed above. The only epistemic principlefeatured in that argument was Closure, an eminently sensible principle(which is used in (3)). Premiss (2) is a version of the KK-principle. Buryingit in a footnote does not diminish its implausibility. Neither does restrictingthe premiss, as Schaffer does in the footnote, to believers who have the con-cept of knowledge and are possessed of infinite capacities (Schaffer 2010:234). I am pretty sure that I do not have infinite capacities; so what is thejustification for applying an argument employing the restricted KK-principleto my case?

I conclude that debasing scepticism has the virtue (at least by the scepticslights) of applying to my claims to a priori knowledge as well as to my claimsto a posteriori knowledge. But it has the drawback of requiring a strong andimplausible epistemic principle.

University of California Santa BarbaraSanta Barbara, CA 93106, USA

[email protected]

Reference

Schaffer, J. 2010. The debasing demon. Analysis 70: 22837.

Functionalist response-dependence avoids missingexplanations

D. J. BRADLEY

I will argue that there is a flaw in the way that response-dependence has been

formulated in the literature, and this flawed formulation has been correctlyattacked by Mark Johnstons Missing Explanation Argument (1993, 1998).Moving to a better formulation, which is analogous to the move from be-haviourism to functionalism, avoids the Missing Explanation Argument.

Analysis Vol 71 | Number 2 | April 2011 | pp. 297300 doi:10.1093/analys/anr004 The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust.All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]

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Brueckner Anthony - Debasing Skepticism