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Charlie Dunbar Broad

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Charlie Dunbar BroadFirst published Fri Sep 3, 2010

Charlie Dunbar Broad (18871971) was an English philosopher who forthe most part of his life was associated with Trinity College, Cambridge.Broad's early interests were in science and mathematics. Despite beingsuccessful in these he came to believe that he would never be a first-ratescientist, and turned to philosophy. Broad's interests were exceptionallywide-ranging. He devoted his philosophical acuity to the mind-bodyproblem, the nature of perception, memory, introspection, and theunconscious, to the nature of space, time and causation. He also wroteextensively on the philosophy of probability and induction, ethics, thehistory of philosophy and the philosophy of religion. The ample scopeand scale of Broad's work is impressive In addition he nourished aninterest in parapsychologya subject he approached with thedisinterested curiosity and scrupulous care that is characteristic of hisphilosophical work.

Broad did not have a philosophyif by that phrase is meant highlyoriginal philosophical theories, and a highly original way of approachingphilosophical problems. He writes: I have nothing worth calling a systemof philosophy of my own, and there is no philosopher of whom I shouldbe willing to reckon myself a faithful follower (1924, p. 77). The readeris nonetheless likely to reap philosophical insights from Broad's mannerof meticulously setting out and carefully assessing the theories that primafacie provide solutions to a given philosophical problem. This feature ofhis writings is aptly described by A. J. Ayer: The subject is discussedfrom every angle, the various possibilities judiciously set out, theprecedents cited, the fallacious arguments exposed: nothing is skimped:looking for reason, we are not fobbed off with rhetoric (Part of my Life,1977, pp. 1178). Broad combines fairness, astuteness as well as rarepowers of observation.

1

powers of observation.

Philosophers who influenced Broad were (apart from the greatphilosophers of the past) his teachers at Cambridge, Russell and Moore,and J. M. E. McTaggart and W. E. Johnson; at St. Andrew's he receivedimportant additional influence from G. F. Stout and A. E. Taylor. Thediversity of their thought is mirrored in Broad's own exceptional range ofinterests.

Broad led a relatively uneventful lifenot unlike, he says in hisAutobiography, that of a monk in a monastery (1959b, p. 67). Hehadn't been out of the British Isles until 1946 when he visited Swedenacountry he fell in love with, and returned to nearly every year. On aprofessional level he made acquaintances with several Swedishphilosophers (such as Konrad-Marc Wogau at Uppsala University). In theacademic year 19534 Broad visited the University of Michigan at AnnArbor and the University of California at Los Angeles. He writes withgreat warmth of the kindness and hospitality with which he wasreceived, and adds with characteristic modesty: It was good fun to betreated as a great philosopher (1959b). Broad was a homosexual, andnever married.

1. Brief Chronology of Life and Works2. Perception

2.1 Nave Realism Delineated2.2 Prehension: the Core Notion of Perceptual Immediacy2.3 Nave Realism Dismantled2.4 Rivalling Accounts of Perceptual Sensations2.5 The Theory of Representative Perception

3. Time4. Free Will5. Emergentism


2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

5.1 The Concept of Emergence5.2 The Reality of Emergence5.3 Broad's Knowledge Argument

6. Metaphilosophy7. Other Philosophical WorkBibliography

Primary Literature: Broad's WorksSecondary Literature

Other Internet ResourcesRelated Entries

1. Brief Chronology of Life and Works1887, born in Harlesden, now a suburb of London, on December 30.1905, wins a science scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge.1911, elected to a fellowship at Trinity; assistant to G. F. Stout, atthe University of St. Andrew's.1914, lecturer at Dundee (at the time a part of St. Andrew's); duringWorld War I combines lecturing duties with work in a chemicallaboratory for the Ministry of Munitions; publication of Perception,Physics, and Reality.1920, elected Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol.1923, Fellow and Lecturer in Moral Science at Cambridge;publication of Scientific Thought.1925, publication of The Mind and Its Place in Nature.1930, publication of Five Types of Ethical Theory.1933, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge;publication of Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. I.1938, publication of Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.II.1953, retires from Knightbridge Professorship; publication ofReligion, Philosophy and Psychical Research.

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Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research.1962, publication of Lectures on Psychical Research.1971, dies age 83 on March 11 in his rooms in Trinity College,Cambridge.

2. PerceptionBroad dealt with perception in several works. He is well known as anadvocate of The Theory of Representational Realism, according to whichour perceptions are indirect cognitive transactions with the world: aperceptual experience of a worldly object is not an immediate awarenessof the object itself, but mediated by an immediate awareness of a sensum.For example, when we see a coin from a certain angle we are immediatelyaware of an elliptical sensum.

2.1 Nave Realism Delineated

Broad's treatment of perception in The Mind and Its Place in Nature setsoff with a careful description of Nave Realism. And this seems a suitableplace to begin our exposition of his theory of perception. What, then,does Nave Realism say? To pre-philosophical reflection perception seemto provide us with some sort of immediate cognitive contact with aphysical object, for example a bell. Consider a situation where weperceive a bell. Compare this situation with one where we are merelythinking of a bell. There is a deep difference between the situations. Wecould vaguely express one part of this difference by saying that in theperceptual situation we are in more immediate touch with the bell thanin the thought-situation (1925, p. 144).

This rough and ready picture of the Nave Realist view must, however, beslightly modified. Suppose we visually perceive an apple. Clearly there isa sense in which we do not perceive all of the apple. There is a sense inwhich we are aware of only a part of its surface; and we are (in that



which we are aware of only a part of its surface; and we are (in thatsense) aware only of the sensible colour of that part but not of its sensibletemperature. Thus perception provides us with a cognitive contact a partof the apple, but no more. It is, then, strictly speaking only a part of theapple with which we are acquainted; it is only a part of the apple that issensuously manifested to us. (1925, pp. 14850.)

Broad does not equate or identify the perception of a worldly object withthe sort of immediate acquainting awareness we have (or seem to have)with its facing surface (pace Chisholm, 1957, p. 154). He is, on thecontrary, careful to point out that the experience features more than thisawareness: it also has an intentional content. Broad designates this theexternal reference of the experience. By virtue of its external referencethe experience of the apple represents the sensuously manifestedconstituent as an integral part of a larger spatio-temporal whole, having awhole array of properties not sensuously manifested to us. (1925, pp.1504.)

What is the nature of the external reference? Broad warns against the riskof unduly intellectualising perception. The external reference is notreached by inference from what is sensuously manifested; nor is it a beliefor judgement simply accompanying the awareness of the manifestedconstituent: At the purely perceptual level, people do not have thespecial experience called belief or judgment (1925, p. 153).[1]

2.2 Prehension: the Core Notion of Perceptual Immediacy

When we visually perceive the apple we have an experience in which itsfacing red surface is a sensuously manifested objective constituent; weperceive the apple but are, strictly speaking, only acquainted with aportion of it.[2] Broad sometimes prefers to say that we prehend thefacing surface (or ostensibly prehend the surface). Now the notion ofprehension is fundamental for an understanding of Nave Realism as well

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prehension is fundamental for an understanding of Nave Realism as wellas Representational Realism, so it seems advisable to briefly take asomewhat closer look on Broad's account of it.

Broad does not think it is possible to give a strict definition of phrasessuch as S prehends x as red or the equivalent phrase x sensiblypresents itself to S as red.[3] What one can do is to contrast the notion ofprehension with other notions: The meaning of these phrases cannot bedefined, it can only be exemplified. One thing that is certain is that toprehend x as red is utterly different from judging that it is red or knowingthat it is red (1952a, p. 13; italics in original). For example, in the darkand with my eyes shut I may very well judge (or know) that the apple isred. But in such conditions I am not prehending anything as red, or, whatis precisely equivalent, nothing is sensibly presented to me as red (ibid,p. 14). Broad notes that this is substantiated by the fact that a cat or a dogthat lacked concepts might, it seems, have a prehension of something asred even though it cannot (lacking the requisite concepts) literally knowor judge that it is red.

Prehension is, however, intimately related to knowledge. Broad asks us toconsider a subject which has appropriate general concepts and is capableof making judgements and knowing facts. Suppose this subject prehendsa certain particular object as red. Then this suffices to enable him toknow the fact that it is red. Whether he does or does not actuallycontemplate this fact at the time depends on various contingentcircumstances (1952a, p. 14; Broad's emphasis).[4]

2.3 Nave Realism Dismantled

Nave Realism, properly articulated, says that when we perceive aphysical object it is only a part of the apple that is sensuously manifestedto us: this, and only this, is an objective constituent in the perceptualsituation. Now can this view be defended? Broad does not think so. He



situation. Now can this view be defended? Broad does not think so. Helevels several arguments against Nave Realism, two of which will receiveattention here.

The Argument from Hallucination. Consider a veridical perception andcompare it with a subjectively indistinguishable delusive or hallucinatoryperception, for example that of a drunkard hallucinating a pink rat.Neither a pink rat nor a part of a pink rat could be a sensuouslymanifested constituent in the delusive situation.

It might be held that the subjective indistinguishability of a veridicalperceptual and a hallucinatory situation entails that the experiences havean identical constitution (and that, therefore, no material object is aconstituent even in the veridical situation). That is, however, not Broad'sposition: it could be that a material object is an objectively manifestedconstituent in a veridical situation (whilst not in the indistinguishablehallucinatory situation). He holds, however, that that is not the morereasonable view of the matter.

The Argument from Illusion. Consider a person perceiving a penny from aseries of slightly different angles and distances. He would unhesitatinglyassume that in each of the slightly differing perceptual situations thefacing brownish surface of a certain penny is sensuously manifested tohim. But in Broad's view this could not be so: If he carefully inspects theobjective constituents of these perceptual situations he will certainly findthat they seem to be of different shapes and sizes (1925, p. 158). Theobjective constituent will in most of the situations seem elliptical rather

And, since there is no relevant internal difference between theveridical and the delusive perceptual situation, it is reasonable tosuppose that in no case does a perceptual situation contain as aconstituent the physical object which corresponds to itsepistemological object, even when there is such a physical object.(1925, p. 156; italics added.)

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objective constituent will in most of the situations seem elliptical ratherthan circular. This indicates, Broad claims, that in each perceptualsituation, the constituentthe sensuously manifested itemcannot be thetop of the penny. What happens is that instead of being immediatelyaware of the circular surface of the penny (as he takes himself to be) he isimmediately aware of an elliptical item, an elliptical sensum. Hence it isan elliptical sensum rather than the circular surface of the penny that ismanifested to the subject. The same holds mutatis mutandis when weperceive a white sheet of paper dimly lit by a candle. On carefulconsideration it seems clear that the paper looks yellowish to us. So whatwe are immediately aware of is a yellowish sensum rather than the whitesheet of paper we are looking at.

In order to bring out at least some of the facets of Broad's theory it seemsadvisable to turn to a few of the many objections that have been raisedagainst it.

(1) It has sometimes been objected that the argument from illusion isflawed from the start since there is usually no risk of anyone being takenin by the situation. Broad's response to this objection is clear. When welook at the penny from an oblique angle it appears elliptical, but not in thesense that anyone is taking in by the situation, and mistakenly comes tobelieve or judge that the penny is elliptical. He is explicit on the point:looking elliptical to me stands for a peculiar experience, which,whatever the right analysis of it may be, is not just a mistaken judgementabout the shape (1923, p. 237). The penny sensibly appears elliptical.And it is this rather than any supposed tendency to be deceived whichcreates problem for Nave Realism (pace Austin 1962, p. 26).

(2) It has often been objected that philosophers who have made use of theargument from illusion that they neglect the fact of perceptual constancy.In his later works Broad admits that this complaint is justified. However,the recognition of the phenomenon of constancy merely shifts the point



the recognition of the phenomenon of constancy merely shifts the pointof application of the argument (1947b, p. 112). There is a class ofperceptual experiences of a material object, X, where constancy holds;there is also a class of experiences of X where constancy breaks down. Intheory it is logically possible to hold that the facing surface of X issensuously presented in the perceptual experiences belonging to the firstclass but not in the experiences belonging to the second class. But, inview of the continuity between the most normal and the most abnormalcases of seeing, such a doctrine would be utterly implausible and could bedefended only by the most desperate special pleading (1952a, p. 9).

What I just said might create the impression that Broad's phenomenologyis rather unsophisticated or crude. On the whole that is certainly not thecase. For example, he points out that the visual field is three-dimensional: A sphere does look different from a circle, just as a circlelooks different from an ellipse (1923, p. 290; Broad's emphasis). And thesame holds, mutatis mutandis, for the intimately related characteristicsdistance and depth; these are also purely visual characteristics of thevisual field (pp. 295300).[5]

(The constancy objection to any argument of illusion that appeals to casessuch as the penny seen obliquely is a compelling one, to say the least. Inspite of that I will, for convenience of exposition, occasionally make useof the example below.)

(3) A stock objection to sense-data theories has been that they invitescepticism with regard to the external world. Broad regrets the scepticalconsequences butgiven the strength of the case for the sense-datumtheorydoes not consider them sufficient grounds for dismissal. Seekingto preserve as much as possible of the common sense notion of materialobjects he argues for the existence of such objects conceived of as havingprimary qualities such as shape, size, and position (apart from suchproperties as electric charge and mass). (1925, pp. 195204.) Not

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properties as electric charge and mass). (1925, pp. 195204.) Notsurprisingly, he rejects the idea that material objects have secondaryproperties such as (phenomenal) redness or (phenomenal) hotness. Broadis perfectly clear that it does not follow from the fact that such propertiesare never sensuously manifested in our perceptual experiences that thematerial objects causing our experiences lack these properties: it doesremain possible that there are red and green, hot and cold material objectseven though they are not objects of acquaintance. He argues, however,that there is no reason to believe that material objects have theseproperties. (1925, pp. 2056.)

2.4 Rivalling Accounts of Perceptual Sensations

Now Broad is perfectly clear that the sensum analysis of perceptioncannot be established simply by pointing to such phenomena as the pennyseen obliquely. He does not for a moment suppose that it is possible tologically infer that there is an elliptical sensum from the proposition thatsomething sensibly appears elliptical (pace Barnes 1945, p. 113). What heclaims is that there are considerations that can be adduced in support ofthe sensum analysis. When we look at the penny from the side wecertainly seem to be aware of something elliptical. So we certainly seemto have before our minds something that is elliptical. Obviously we canquite well mistakenly believe a property to be present which is reallyabsent, when we are dealing with something that is only known to usindirectly, like Julius Csar or the North Pole (1923, p. 241; Broad'semphasis). But there are phenomenological differences betweenperception and belief (or thought) that seem to call for different accountsof their nature. In perception we seem to be dealing with properties thatare presented to us. Consider the case of perceiving a stick half immersedin water. Here

we are dealing with a concrete visible object, which is bodilypresent to our senses; and it is very hard to understand how we



I believe that what Broad is driving at here is that perceptualconsciousness has a presentational nature, and it is this that makes itplausible to regard it as involving the literal presence of objects withvarious qualities, such as colours in the case of visual perception, soundsin auditory, etc.

Broad's theory of perception employs an act-object analysis of sensations.Lest it should be thought that he should be incapable to think of anyalternative account it should be noted that he examines such an analysisas early as in 1921. G. F. Stout and H. A. Prichard defended such analternative (both of whom Broad held in the highest regard). Theiraccount could be considered an early version of the adverbial analysis ofsensations. Broad asks us to consider a headache. It is by no means clearthat a headache means a state of mind with a headachy object [i.e. an actwith a certain object]; it seems on the whole more plausible to say thatthat it is just a headachy state of mind (1921b, p. 392). To have aheadache is not to be aware of a headachy object but to feel in a certainway.[6] The alternative account claims that this holds mutatis mutandisfor any type of sensation. Thus what is described as a sensation of red isa unitary state of mind, and strictly speaking not a state whichdecomposes into an act of sensing and a sensed red patch.

Broad provides a fairly thorough discussion of the relative merits of theadverbial and the act-object analysis. In a nutshell, his conclusion is thatalthough the adverbial analysis is highly plausible regarding such mentalphenomena as bodily feelings; but it is implausible when it comes tothose of visual and auditory experiences: the act-object analysis is the

present to our senses; and it is very hard to understand how wecould seem to ourselves to see the property of bentness exhibitedin a concrete instance, if in fact nothing was present to our mindsthat possessed that property. (1923, p. 241; Broad's emphasis; seealso pp. 2445)

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those of visual and auditory experiences: the act-object analysis is themore plausible account of such experiences, in Broad's opinion. (SeeBroad 1923, pp. 2527.)[7]

So much for sensations. What about sensa? What are they on Broad'saccount? A brief answer must suffice here. Sensa are a certain kind oftransitory particulars, which in the case of visual perception have suchproperties as shape, size, colour, etc (1925, p. 181f.).[8]

2.5 The Theory of Representative Perception

The position Broad reaches is the following. A perceptual experience hasa certain intentional content. It differs from thought- and belief-episodesby including a sensory phase, and it is primarily this that is responsiblefor the distinctive phenomenology of perception. The sensory phaseconsists of sensations. These decompose into acts of sensing and objectsensed, sensa. A sensum has the phenomenal properties that the perceivedobject (sensibly) appears to havered or warm or squeaky. An act ofsensing a sensum constitutes an immediate acquainting awareness of thesensum in question. Although our perceptual experiences seem to grant usan acquaintance with the facing surfaces of material objects, sensa are theonly items we are acquainted with.

The intentional contentthe external referenceof a perceptualexperience is in a certain sense based upon sensa (thought not in the sensethat there is a train of swift inference leading from the presence of asensum to the mind to a certain perceptual belief). (1923, pp. 2467.) It isthis content which represents the environment as featuring a physicalobject so-and-so. Sensa are clearly incapable of carrying such content.Furthermore, from the very nature of the case the general notion ofphysical object cannot have been derived by abstraction from observedinstances of it, as the notion of red no doubt has been.[9] In fact,general concept of a physical object is not got out of experience until it



general concept of a physical object is not got out of experience until ithas been put into experience. It is best described as an innate principleof interpretation which we apply to the data of sense-perception (1925,p. 217).

3. TimeIt is possible to distinguish roughly three different phases in Broad'sphilosophy of time.

In his (1921a) Broad defends a Russellian theory of time. On thisEternalist view past, present, and future are equally real. There is nothingontologically special about the present: the present is no more real thanthe past or the future. Accordingly Broad rejects Presentismthe viewthat only the present is realas mere rhetoric rooted in confusion(1921a, p. 226). Presentism has its roots in two errors. One of these errorsis to equivocate between two different senses of co-existence. In onesense the parts of any related whole co-exist; in another only those eventsthat occupy the same moment of time co-exist. The whole course of thehistory obviously cannot co-exist in the latter sense, but this does notprevent it from co-existing in the first. The other error is to believe thatpast, present, and future are essential characteristics of objects in time inthe same way as before and after are, instead of being analysable into thetemporal relations of states of mind and their objects (p. 337). ThusBroad rejects the view that past, present, and future are characteristicspossessed by objects in time. These characteristics are a mere reflectionof our subjective perspective on objects. Some of our mental states areessentially contemporary or simultaneous with their objects, e.g. ourimmediate awareness of sense data. Other states are essentially later thantheir objects, e.g. memories. (Cf. p. 336.) A related, and perhaps moreimportant facet of Broad's (1921a) position here, is his adoption of aRussellian analysis of tensed discourse. According to this analysisversions of which were later to become orthodoxthe function of tensed

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versions of which were later to become orthodoxthe function of tensedverbs or temporal adjectives in tensed statements is performed in theanalysans by a tenseless copula, IS, and a temporal relationearlier than,simultaneous with, or later than. Thus It is raining (or It is rainingnow) is unpacked as It IS raining at a moment simultaneous with myassertion that it is raining; It has rained (or It rained in the past) isanalysed as It IS raining at a moment earlier than my assertion that it hasrained; It will rain (or It will rain in the future) is read as It ISraining at a moment later than my assertion that it will rain. (Cf. p. 331.)

In Scientific Thought (1923) Broad rejects the Eternalism he had defendedin his (1921a) article. He now advances a theory that accepts the realityof the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing atall (1923, p. 66). An all-important corollary of this Growing BlockTheory is the thesis that temporal passage is a fundamental feature ofreality. This feature is accounted for in terms of what Broad holds is themost fundamental form of change, becoming. Becoming is the cominginto existence of events.

An event is present by virtue of being the most recent increment ofreality; when the event is present there is, as Broad says, nothing to whichit stands in the relation of precedence. The event becomes past by virtue

Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except thatfresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of theworld. The past is thus as real as the present. On the other hand,the essence of a present event is, not that it precedes future events,but that there is quite literally nothing to which it has the relationof precedence. The sum total of existence is always increasing,and it is this which gives the time-series a sense [i.e. direction] aswell as an order. A moment t is later than a moment t* if the sumtotal of existence at t includes the sum total of existence t*together with something more. (1923, p. 667; Broad's italics.)



it stands in the relation of precedence. The event becomes past by virtueof acquiring new relations, and it acquires these relations because the sumtotal of existence has been increased by the addition of fresh slices ofreality. Temporal passage is the continual growth of the sum total ofexistence.

One of the rivalling views on time Broad discusses is a theory that mightbe labeled The Moving Spotlight Theory. The Moving Spotlight Theoryaccepts the eternalist view that the past, the present, and the future areequally real; it regards the history of the world as existing eternally in acertain order of events. But it differs from the Russellian theory in that itaccepts presentness as an irreducible feature of reality. So the fact that theleaf is falling now is not to be analysed as the fact that the event issimultaneous with an utterance or a specific type of mental state. Thetheory claims that presentness is a characteristic moving along the orderof events: Along [the order of events], and in a fixed direction, [] thecharacteristic of presentness [is] moving, somewhat like the spot of lightfrom a policeman's bull's-eye traversing the fronts of the houses in astreet. What is illuminated is the present, what has been illuminated is thepast, and what has not yet been illuminated is the future (1923, p. 59).

Broad is critical of this theory. To understand the nature of time, TheMoving Spotlight Theory makes use of a spatial analogy. Such analogiesmay be useful for some purposes, but it is clear that they explainnothing. Firstly, Broad asks us to consider the successive lighting ofpresentnessnow on one event and now on another, and so on. This isitself an event (or a series of events), and ought therefore to be a part ofthe series of events, and not simply something that happens to the latterfrom outside (1923, p. 60). If we suppose (as we seem compelled to) thatit is not a part of the original series of events, we are launched on avicious regress of time-dimensions. For then the successive lightning oflater events would have to be conceived of as an event of the secondorderhappening in a time-dimension different from the original one

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orderhappening in a time-dimension different from the original oneformed by the series of first-order events. Secondly he presents a relatedline of reasoningsometimes termed The Rate of Passage Argument: Ifanything moves, it must move with some determinate velocity. It willalways be sensible to ask How fast does it move? But since the seriesalong which presentness is supposed to move is itself temporal, thisquestion becomes: how great a lapse of time 1 does presentness traversein a unit of time 2? Again, a regress of time-dimensions is imminent.(Both of these arguments receive a clearer formulation and moreextensive treatment in Broad (1938).)[10]

Broad's later account of time differs in some significant respects fromboth of the earlier accounts. He now views what he calls absolutebecoming as the rock-bottom peculiarity of time. Absolute becomingmanifests itself as the continual supersession of what was the latestphase by a new phase, which will in turn be superseded by another newone. This seems to me to be the rock-bottom peculiarity of time,distinguishing temporal sequence from all other instances of one-dimensional order, such as that of points on a line, numbers in order ofmagnitude, and so on (1959, p. 766).

This theory has, in Broad's opinion, various advantages. One advantagementioned is that it seems to avoid the difficulties with the rate of timespassagedifficulties which besets the Moving Spotlight Theory, butarguably also the Growing Block Theory. The proposed theory alsoavoids presupposing that what has not yet supervened and what hasalready been superseded in some sense co-exist with each other andwith what is now occurring, which he views as a defect of the MovingSpotlight Theory. More interestingly, it avoids what Broad now regards asa defect of the Growing Block Theory, viz. that of presupposing thatphases, which have already supervened and been superseded, in somesense co-exist with each other and with that which is now happening(1959, p. 767).



(1959, p. 767).

4. Free WillBroad discusses the topic of free will in his inaugural lectureDeterminism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism (1934). In this ratherdense lecture he approaches the issue by associating free will with moralresponsibility. More specifically, he frames it in terms of the conditionsnecessary and sufficient for the applicability of ought and ought not toactions. Everyone admits, he says, that there is some sense of could inwhich ought and ought not entail could. The question revolvesaround the sense of could involved here: in precisely what sense ofcould is it that if you to ought to perform an action you could performthat action?

Let us introduce a couple of Broad's stipulative definitions. An action isobligable if and only if it is an action of which ought to be done orought not to be done can be predicated. An action is substitutable ifeither it was done but could have been left undone, or was left undone butcould have been done.

An action is obligable if and only if it is, in a certain sense, substitutable.There are several different senses of could and hence of substitutability.Initially Broad focuses on a sense of could which he calls voluntarysubstitutability. Consider an action A that was not performed. Supposethat if the agent had willed (chosen, decided) to do A she would have doneit. In that case A is voluntarily substitutable. Suppose, however, that shewould not have done A even if she had willed to do it. If that's the case, Ais not voluntarily substitutable. Broad takes it as evident that voluntarysubstitutability is a necessary condition for obligability. That is, he takesit as evident that,

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But is it also a sufficient condition? Is it also true that,

Broad presents an argument in favour of a negative answer, i.e. in favourof the answer that it could very well be true that someone would havedone an action if he had willed to do it, while it is nonetheless false thatthe action is obligable (and hence false that it is voluntarily substitutable).We are asked to consider a person who gradually becomes addicted to adrug like morphine. At the earlier stages he could have willed withsufficient strength to ensure that the temptation would have been resisted.At the later stages he could not. Now at every stage, from the earliest tothe latest, the hypothetical proposition would be true: If he had willedwith a certain degree of force and persistence to avoid taking morphine,he would have avoided taking it. Yet we would say at the earlier stagesthat he ought to have resisted, whilst at the final stages we should beinclined to say that ought and ought not have ceased to apply (1934,p. 200). In other words, in the later stages we are inclined to hold that theaction of abstaining from morphine has ceased to be obligable, in spite ofthe fact that it remains true that if he had willed with sufficient force andpersistence to abstain he would have abstained.

This is Broad's version of an argument sometimes raised against theclassical compatibilist conditional analysis of S could have doneotherwise.[11] According to the classical compatibilist analysis this is tobe understood simply as if S had willed to act differently S would haveacted differently. The argument shows that this will not do: there aresituations where an agent would have acted otherwise if she had willeddifferently but nonetheless could not have acted differently simplybecause she could not have willed to act differently.[12]

A is obligable only if A is voluntarily substitutable.

If A is voluntarily substitutable then A is obligable.



So voluntary substitutability is not sufficient for obligability: for an actionto be obligable it is not sufficient that the agent would have actedotherwise if she had willed otherwise. It is also clear that a furthercondition must be fulfilled, viz. that she could have willed to actotherwise. This leads us to the question as to the correct analysis ofcould have willed differently. Broad examines a conditional analysisaccording to which this means:

Can we perhaps claim an action to be obligable if (a) it is voluntarilysubstitutable, and (b) the agent could have willed to do it, in the specifiedconditional sense of could have willed? In other words, is the jointcondition of (a) and (b) sufficient for obligability? Broad rejects thisproposal. Suppose the agent could not have willed differently in the past(say six months ago). It is surely irrelevant to say that, if he had done sohis conative dispositions would have been different at a later stage fromwhat they in fact were then, and that he would have willed otherwise thanhe then did (1934, p. 204). As he points out, at this juncture it istempting to refer to still earlier volitions (say twelve months ago). Hecontends, however, that this is useless since the very same difficulty willreappear.

Broad holds, then, that neither could have acted differently nor couldhave willed differently can be given a conditional analysis. Havingdiscarded conditional types of substitutability he turns to categoricalsubstitutability. If an action is obligable it must be substitutable in acategorical sense. We must be able to say of an action, which was done,that it could have been avoided, in some sense of could which is notdefinable in terms of would have, if (1934, p. 204). Note that the

If S had willed differently in the past S's conative-emotionaldispositions and knowledge about S's own nature would have beenso constituted that S, at the time when S acted, would have willeddifferently.

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definable in terms of would have, if (1934, p. 204). Note that thequoted passage merely states that categorical substitutability is anecessary condition of obligability. It is clear, however, that Broad alsotakes it to be a sufficient condition. Thus, his position is that,

Now precisely what is categorical substitutability? As we shall presentlysee, Broad claims that this notion is only partly intelligible.

Categorical substitutability involves a negative and a positive condition.These are necessary and jointly sufficient for obligability. The negativecondition says that the agent's willing of a certain action was notcompletely determined by the nomic and singular conditions whichexisted at the time of willing. Not surprisingly, Broad regards an actionthat merely fulfils this condition as an accident, lucky or unlucky as thecase may be. Neither the agent nor anything else in the universe canproperly be praised or blamed for it (1934, p. 212; Broad's italics).

The positive condition (which must also be fulfilled) says that the willingof the action is literally determined by the agent or self, considered as asubstance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factorsevents in and dispositions of the agent (1934, p. 2145; Broad's italics).Thus a free action is an action that is caused by the agent.

(Note that the view that there are agent-caused effects is a form ofindeterminism, since it says that there are certain events which, althoughthey are indeed caused, are not fixed as a matter of natural law.)

Broad rejects the idea of agent-causation as unintelligible.

A is obligable if and only if A is categorically substitutable.

Now it is surely quite evident that, if the beginning of a certainprocess at a certain time is determined at all, its total cause mustcontain as an essential factor another event or process which enters



If an agent wills to perform an action at a certain time there must be aprocess or event that occurs at that time (or the moment before). Thusthere must be something about the agent that explains why the willing ofthe action started precisely at that time rather than at a slightly earlier orlater time. The agent per se will not do.

The position Broad reaches is a version of what is sometimes called freewill pessimism: free will is incompatible with determinism, but there is noviable form of indeterminism which leaves room for free will, either;therefore, free will does not existindeed could not exist.

5. EmergentismIn the last chapter of his monumental The Mind and Its Place in NatureBroad defends an Emergentist position with respect to the relationbetween mind and matter: mental properties are, in his opinion, distinctfrom physical properties; they are properties that emerge whenneurophysiological processes have attained a sufficiently high degree ofcomplexity. His discussion and defense of Emergentism features twochief elements. Firstly, there is a meticulous examination of the conceptof emergence as such; secondly, there is a discussion of whether there isreason to think that emergent phenomena actually exist.

contain as an essential factor another event or process which entersinto the moment from which the determined event or processissues. I see no prima facie objection to there being events whichare not completely determined. But, in so far as an event isdetermined, an essential factor in its total cause must be otherevents. How could an event possibly be determined to happen at acertain date if its total cause contained no factor to which thenotion of date has any application? And how can the notion ofdate have any application to anything that is not an event? (1934,p. 215; Broad's emphasis.)

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reason to think that emergent phenomena actually exist.

5.1 The Concept of Emergence

Chapter Two of The Mind and its Place in Nature is devoted to athorough discussion of the notion of emergence. In this chapter Broad isprimarily interested in the notion or concept of emergence per se. Thus heis there not so much interested in the actual existence of emergentphenomena.

An emergent property of an aggregate or a whole is, very roughly, aproperty that is something over and above the properties of its parts andthe way they are arranged in the aggregate. Broad prefers to capture thisin epistemic terms: an emergent property of a whole is a property that it isimpossible to logically infer from even the most complete knowledge ofthe properties of the parts of the whole. A property that can be so inferredis a reducible property. He captures the contrast between emergent andreducible properties in the following passage.

The mechanistic theory is Broad's label for the theory that today istermed physicalism.

Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there arecertain wholes composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in arelation R to each other; that all wholes composed of constituentsof the same kind as A, B, and C in relations of the same kind as Rhave certain characteristic properties; that A, B, and C are capableof occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not ofthe same kind as R; and that the characteristic properties of thewhole R(A, B, C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced from themost complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C inisolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A, B, C).The mechanistic theory rejects the last clause of this assertion.(1925, p. 61)



termed physicalism.

Suppose a certain biological feature, e.g. the capacity for nutrition, is anemergent property. This means that the property is not a mere result of animmensely high degree of organisational complexity at the chemicallevel. The property is, to be sure, nomically dependent on the chemicallevel, but it is not a mere resultant of the properties, relations, and lawsoperative at that level. If nutrition were a mere resultant property it wouldbe a reducible property; it would be a property that theoretically can beinferred from features at the chemical level (i.e. the properties, relationsand laws which characterise the constituents in isolation or in otherwholes than the one in question).

Broad's concept of emergence is weakly epistemic; his notion is at heartmetaphysical: the epistemic predicament that we are in vis--vis anemergent property reflects an important metaphysical fact about theproperty in question, viz. that it is neither identical with nor constituted bythe properties and relations of the constituents of the whole in question.Thus Broad's notion of emergence contrasts with a strongly epistemicnotion which, very roughly, says that a property is emergent for a finiteepistemic subject when provided with fairly extensive information aboutthe properties and relations of the constituents the subject is still unablelogically to infer that property from the information in question althoughthe property in fact is reducible to the features of the constituents.

Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) raise several objections to Emergentism.Brief attention to two of their objections will help bring out at least acouple of the many facets of Broad's subtle account. Firstly, to assumethat emergent phenomena exist is to assume that there are certainphenomena that have a mysterious quality of absolute unexplainability.They confidently assert that emergence [] is not an ontological traitinherent in some phenomena; rather it is indicative of the scope of ourknowledge at a given time (p. 119). This objection in effect implies that

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knowledge at a given time (p. 119). This objection in effect implies thatthe metaphysical notion of emergence is dismissed in favour of a stronglyepistemic notion.

Broad stresses that it is an empirical question whether a certain biologicalor chemical phenomenon is emergent or not. It is always possible thatwhat strikes us as an emergent property of a biological of chemicalphenomenon is due to our imperfect knowledge of microscopic structureor to our mathematical incompetence (1925, p. 81). He also emphasisesthe practical importance of seeking to devise reductions for as manyproperties as possible: that ambition is the natural and proper ambitionof the scientists (1933, p. 268).

It should perhaps also be added that although emergent properties areindeed unexplainable in the sense that that they are not susceptible to areductive explanation, this does not mean that they are unexplainable inevery sense: the inherence of an emergent property in a particular wholedoes admit of an explanation by nomic subsumption. We can explain itsinherence in terms of the nature of the whole and an emergent law. Thelaw of course remain a brute fact. But surely, so do some laws on anyaccount of the world.

Hempel and Oppenheim also object that Emergentists are erroneouslycommitted to regard the mass or weight of a whole as an emergentproperty. (Weight is, of course, a reducible characteristic if there ever wasone!) The reason they give for this is that not even the weight of a wholecan be logically inferred from premises that solely contain propositionsabout the weight of the parts; in addition a law is needed which expressesthe weight of the whole as some specific mathematical function of theweight of the constituent (1948, p. 119). However, Broad's accountclearly anticipates the objection. He provides the reason why a propertysuch as weight (or mass) should not be conceived as an emergentproperty. To explain the behaviour of any whole in terms of its structure



property. To explain the behaviour of any whole in terms of its structureand components we always need two independent kinds of information.(a) We need to know how the parts would behave separately. And (b) weneed to know the law or laws according to which the behaviour of theseparate parts is compounded when they are acting together in anyproportion and arrangement (1925, p. 61; Broad's italics). So to knowabout the mass of a whole X we need to know the mass of X's parts andthe principle according to which the mass of a whole is determined by themass of the parts. It is through experience that we have found that themass of a whole is the mathematical sum of the mass of the parts; and it isthrough experience we have found that the very same principle (or law ofcomposition) is applicable to any type of whole. To see this, consider thelast clause of Broad's characterisation of emergent properties above. Theclause says that an emergent property of a certain whole cannot, even intheory, be logically inferred from the most complete knowledge of theproperties of the parts in isolation or in other wholes which are not of theform to be found the whole in question. Is this applicable to the mass of acertain whole? Is it applicable to the mass of X? No, certainly not: we areable to logically infer the mass of any whole, including X, fromknowledge of the masses of parts in isolation or in wholes other than X.

5.2 The Reality of Emergence

It is one thing to delineate the contours of the notion of emergence,another to argue that emergent phenomena actually exist. A wide varietyof phenomena have been held to be emergent. Apart from consciousness,various chemical and biological phenomena have been held to beemergent. Broad is not willing to rule out a physicalistic reduction ofchemistry and biology to physics: chemical and biological phenomenamight, he believes, very well be reducible to complex microphysicalprocesses. In his opinion, however, consciousness is a different matter.We will turn to consciousness in a moment. When it comes to biologyand chemistry he declares that he does not see any a priori impossibility

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and chemistry he declares that he does not see any a priori impossibilityin a mechanistic biology or chemistry (1925, p. 72). He stresses that it isin practice enormously difficult to know whether, say, a certain biologicalfeature such as nutrition is emergent or not. It is evident from what Broadsays that he recognises that the Emergentist stance has its dangers in thatit tends to encourage acceptance of laws and properties as ultimate andirreducible. There is a danger in this because, as he notes, reductiveexplanations have proved remarkably successful in the past, and there isthe possibility that what we take to be an emergent phenomenon is in factreducible.

5.3 Broad's Knowledge Argument

In the last chapter of his book Broad presents a taxonomy of no less thanseventeen different theories which are possible theoretically on therelation between Mind and Matter (1925, p. 607). By a process ofelimination Broad arrives at a more wieldy number of theories. Two ofthe remaining rivalling theories are Physicalismin Broad's terminology,Mechanismand Emergentism. Let us now take a closer look at hiscase for Emergentism.

Broad adduces a version of what has come to be known as TheKnowledge Argument in favour of an Emergentist position with respect tothe place of consciousness in nature. He asks us to assume that there is amathematical archangel. The archangel's mathematical and logicalcapability is unlimited; in addition he is gifted with the capacity toperceive the microscopic structure of atoms as easily as we can perceivehay-stacks. Now would there be any limit to the archangel's knowledgeof the world? Broad's answer is Yes.

Take any ordinary statement, such as we find in chemistry books;e.g, Nitrogen and Hydrogen combine when an electric dischargeis passed through the mixture of the two. The resulting compound



The archangel knows all the physicalistic (mechanistic) truths. There are,however, some truths that he does not know. But if Physicalism were truethe archangel should know all truths. Physicalism is, therefore, false.

If sound, Broad's argument establishes the negative conclusion thatmental phenomena are distinct from neurophysiological processes. Byitself it does not establish the Emergentist position, since the conclusion isconsistent with the truth of, say, Substance Dualism (or what Broad callsDualism of incompatibles). Broad's overall argumentation forEmergentism, however, also includes a fairly thorough discussion thatseeks to undermine various lines of argument to the effect that mentalproperties and physical properties are incompatible, i.e. arguments to theeffect that a material whole such as a nervous system could not possible

is passed through the mixture of the two. The resulting compoundcontains three atoms of Hydrogen to one of Nitrogen; it is a gasreadily soluble in water and possessed of a characteristic smell. Ifthe mechanistic theory be true the archangel could deduce fromhis knowledge of the microscopic structure of atoms all these factbut the last. He would know exactly what the microscopicstructure must be; but he would be totally unable to predict that asubstance with this structure must smell as ammonia does when itgets into the human nose. The utmost that he could predict on thissubject would be that certain changes would take place in themucous membrane, the olfactory nerves and so on. But he couldnot possibly know that these changes would be accompanied bythe appearance of a smell in general or of the peculiar smell ofammonia in particular, unless someone told him so or he hadsmelled it for himself. If the existence of the so-called secondaryqualities, or the fact of their appearance, depends on themicroscopic movements and arrangements of material particleswhich do not have these qualities themselves, then the law of thisdependence are certainly of the emergent type. [1925, p. 712]

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effect that a material whole such as a nervous system could not possiblehave mental properties. These are arguments that, if successful, wouldrule out Emergentism (which is a form of property dualism) in favour ofsubstance dualism. Broad's case for Emergentism, then, includes morethan his knowledge argument and the simple methodological point thatEmergentism is a more ontologically economical position than substancedualism.

6. MetaphilosophyBroad distinguishes two chief aspects of philosophical thinking. He labelsthese critical philosophy and speculative philosophy. Critical philosophyhas two chief tasks, one of which is to analyse certain very generalconcepts such as number, thing, quality, change, cause, etc. (1924, p.82). We make use of these and a whole host of other concepts in scienceand ordinary life. Although we are typically able to apply them fairlyconsistently, we are not able to analyse them. Nor are we able to statetheir precise relations to each other. One task of critical philosophy is toprovide analyses of such concepts. It becomes evident that this is animportant task as soon as it is realized that when we seek to apply theseconcepts to odd or exceptional cases we are often uncertain whether theyare applicable. For example, it might be unclear whether a certainindividual with a multiple personality disorder is a person or not.[13] Suchdifficulties arise because we are not clear as to what we mean by beinga person (1924, p. 83). There is, therefore, a need for an intellectualdiscipline that seeks to analyse and define this and many other concepts.

In science and in daily life we do not merely use unanalysed concepts.We also assume uncritically a number of very fundamental propositions.In all our arguments we assume the truth of certain principles ofreasoning. Again, we always assume that every change has a cause. Andin induction we certainly assume somethingit is hard to say whatabout the fundamental make-up of the existent world (1924, p. 84).



about the fundamental make-up of the existent world (1924, p. 84).

The second task of critical philosophy is to examine these and otherfundamental assumptions; it is to take these propositions which weuncritically assume in science and daily life and to subject them tocriticism (ibid.).[14]

In order to analyse a proposition we must seek to attain a clearer grasp ofthe concepts featured in the proposition. Thus the analysis and criticism ofa proposition depends on the analysis of concepts. And vice versa: byreflecting on the propositions in which a certain concept occurs we clearup the meaning of it.

Now, critical philosophy is one part or aspect of philosophical thinking.But critical philosophy does not include all that is understood byphilosophy. It is certainly held to be the function of a philosopher todiscuss the nature of Reality as a whole, and to consider the position andprospects of men in it (1924, p. 96). This aspect of philosophicalthinking is speculative philosophy.

Speculative philosophy seeks to work out a view of reality as a whole bytaking into account the whole range of human experiencescientific,social, ethical, sthetic, and religious: Its business is to take over allaspects of human experience, to reflect upon them, and to try to think outa view of Reality as a whole which shall do justice to all of them (1924,p. 96).

Broad's idea is that the various aspects of human experience and(putative) facts linked to these provide a point of departure forphilosophical reflectionan exceedingly important sort of reflectionaiming at a reasoned view of Reality as a whole.

As can be gathered from the above, philosophical thinking features,according to Broad, a distinctive type of birds-eye view. He calls it

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according to Broad, a distinctive type of birds-eye view. He calls itsynopsis. Let us take a somewhat closer look at this. The plain man aswell as the professional scientist or scholar

On reflection it is clear that the synoptic stance is necessary for thediscovery of various inadequacies in our picture of reality, inadequaciesresulting from a far too insular perspective on reality. The synoptic stancewill, in effect, lead to the discovery of latent philosophical problems: Itis synopsis, revealing prima facie incoherence, which is the main motiveto philosophical activity (1958, p. 121; cf. 1947a, p. 16). And it is clearlyonly after we have discovered and successfully addressed these problemsthat we may lay claim to a satisfactory picture of reality as a whole.

Broad gives several examples of how synopsis is featured in philosophicalthinking. One of these is taken from the free will problem (1947a, pp. 811). In a very condensed form the main facts germane to the problem arethese: (i) When we consider a situation in which we did a certain action,we are quite convinced that we could have done otherwise: we could haveperformed an alternative action. On reflection it seems clear that couldis used in some sense that is not analysable in terms of would have, if.(ii) Our moral judgments seem to presuppose that a person who in fact

conduct various parts of their living and their thinking in relativelywatertight compartments; turn blind eyes to awkward, abnormal,or marginal facts; and skate successfully on the surface of thephenomena. But the desire to see how the various aspects ofexperience hang together does arise from time to time in mostintelligent men, and philosophers are persons in whom it isespecially strong and persistent. Now I understand by synopsis thenecessary preliminary towards trying to satisfy this desire, viz. thedeliberate viewing together of aspects of human experience whichare generally viewed apart, and the endeavour to see how they areinter-related. (1947a, p. 4)



(ii) Our moral judgments seem to presuppose that a person who in factwilled to do a certain action could have willed otherwise. (iii) Given thepast, the actual situation and the laws of nature it seems impossible thatanything other should have happened than what in fact did happen. If so,how can our volitions be other than completely determined? (iv) It isdifficult, then, to reconcile the notions of moral responsibility with theview that our volitions are completely determined.

The problem of free will is discovered when we look at (i) and (ii) in thelight of (iii) In other words, the very problem is discerned only becausewe have envisaged these facts together, i.e. because we have taken asynoptic view of the facts.

7. Other Philosophical WorkProbability and Induction. Broad dealt with problems regarding inductionthe glory of science and the scandal of philosophy[15] in a numberof papers. A sample of his work on the subject is the two early papersentitled The Relation Induction and Probability (1918, 1920). Broad'sfocus is on the nature and justification of inductive inferences. He arguesthat unless the conclusions of such inferences are cast in terms ofprobability they all involve a formal fallacy. However in order to arrive atjustified inductive conclusions we cannot simply place our confidence inany of the known principles of probability theory (such as those weemploy in reasoning with regard to artificial situations with bagscontaining red and white balls, and the like): we need some furtherpremise. Unfortunately, this premise is extremely difficult to state []so that it shall be at once plausible and non-tautologous (1918, p. 389).Broad attempts to articulate the supreme principle needed. He argues atlength that the principle needed says not simply (and crudely): there isuniformity in nature. It also says that the particular things or substancesin the world subject to uniformity belong to a variety of natural kinds.Indeed, on closer reflection it is clear that [t]he notions of permanent

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Indeed, on closer reflection it is clear that [t]he notions of permanentsubstances, genuine natural kinds, and universal causation are parts of ahighly complex and closely interwoven whole and any of them breaksdown hopelessly without the rest (1920, p. 44). Notable also is the logicof conditions that Broad's formulates in The Principles of DemonstrativeInduction (1930b). He may quite well be the first who gave systematicattention to this topic.[16]

The Unconscious. Broad examines issues surrounding the unconsciousat some length in The Mind and Its Place in Nature. His objective is tocapture a (literal) sense in which an experiential mental state may be saidto be unconscious. Although he rejects the view that the notion ofunconscious experience is incoherent he argues that there is nocompelling reason to assume that such actually exist. The assumption thatthere is a pure neural state with causal properties that are similar to thoseof a certain mental state is sufficient to explain the facts.

Time Consciousness. Broad gave two different accounts of temporalexperience.[17] Consider an experience of a succession of notes:DoReMi. The earlier account claims that what one is aware of istemporally extended; it includes the present note as well as the immediatepast ones: what is sensed at any moment stretches a little way backbehind that moment (1923, p. 348). What you are aware of when Mi ispresent extends to, and so includes the past notes Re and Do. On the lateraccount we are strictly speaking aware only of the present note, Mi. Butthis awareness is coupled with a representation of the past notes under adistinctive mode of temporal presentation. Broad introduces the notion ofpresentedness. When you are aware of the present note Mi it isapprehended as possessing the maximum degree of presentedness, whilethe note Re is represented as possessing a less degree of presentedness,and Do a still lesser degree.



The Philosophy of Parapsychology. Parapsychology is the study ofapparently paranormal events. Broad seeks to capture the nature andimportance of the subject. A paranormal event is an event that seemsprima facie to conflict with what he terms a basic limiting principle, i.e. aprinciple that we unhesitatingly take for granted as the framework withinwhich all our practical activities and our scientific theories are confined(1953, p. 7). There are a number of such principles. One says that anevent cannot begin to have any effect before it has occurred; another thatknowledge of the future is impossible except in certain familiar manners,such as by inference from present facts. The basic limiting principlesseem to cover very satisfactorily an enormous range of well-establishedfacts of the most varied kinds. We are therefore naturally inclined tothink that they must be all-embracing (p. 8). And for that reason theseprinciples are of immense importance to our overall view of the universeand our place in it. But just in proportion to this importance is thephilosophic importance of any well-established exception to them (p. 9).

The Philosophy of Religion. Broad's writings on this subject have thevirtues characteristic of everything he wrotethoroughness, lucidity andfairness. Broad rejects the traditional arguments for the existence of God.His essay Arguments for The Existence of God (1939) features asearching critique of the cosmological argument and the ontologicalargument (regarding the argument from design, Broad states that he hasnothing to add to the critique of Hume and Kant). He argues inter aliathat the conclusion of the cosmological argument has a consequence thatfew would stomach, viz. that there are no really contingent facts, althoughmany facts seem contingent relative to our ignorance. As to theontological argument Broad claims that the notion of the greatest possiblebeing is meaningless verbiage unless the properties that are essential tothe notion of God admit of an intrinsic maximum. He argues that thatcondition is not satisfied. Therefore, the argument is wrecked beforeever it leaves port. In the latter part of his essay Broad turns to theargument from religious experience (in what might quite well be the first

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argument from religious experience (in what might quite well be the firstsystematic treatment of the argument). The position he takes is, in anutshell, this. If a person has an experience that she takes to be anexperience of an X, it is reasonable to conclude that she did experience anX unless there is some positive reason to think otherwise. To refuse toapply this principle to religious experiences is not reasonable. Thequestion then is whether there is some positive reason to think thatreligious experiences are delusive. But on reflection it turns out there is nosuch reason. We may therefore conclude that religious experiences areprobably veridical.

Ethics. In writings up to, and including Five Types of Ethical TheoryBroad assumes that ethical sentences express judgements. He favours anintuitionist or non-naturalist analysis. In later works, however, he isundecided: it could be that ethical sentences express judgements; but,alternatively, they may express emotions or commands. Notwithstandingthis, Broad fruitfully (and indefatigably!) classifies alternative types ofethical theories, uncovers their underlying assumptions, and draws outtheir logical consequences. As to normative ethics, Broad does not thinkthe utilitarian view that there is one and only one criterion of right actioncan be sustained. Neither did he accept hedonism. There are, he argues,other bearers of intrinsic value and disvalue than pleasure and pain.

Broad made many specific contributions to the subject of moralphilosophy that could be mentioned. Here are three of these. (i) There is afine discussion of psychological egoism (a discussion where he, as hequite correctly says, gives the psychological egoist the longest possiblerun for his money).[18] After Butler there is hardly need of further nailsin the coffin of that theory. But because of its shrewd and perceptivetreatment of human motivation Broad's essay is nonetheless of remaininginterest. (ii) In Five Types Broad tentatively suggests a version of what iscurrently known as the The Fitting Attitude Analysis of value. He writeswith characteristic cautiousness: I am not sure that X is good could not



with characteristic cautiousness: I am not sure that X is good could notbe defined as meaning that X is such that it would be a fitting object ofdesire to any mind which had an adequate idea of its non-ethicalcharacteristics (p. 283).[19] (iii) In an early paper[20] Broad anticipatesideas gaining currency much later among moral and politicalphilosophers. He suggests that the goodness of a complex state of affairsis not merely a function of the value of its parts. Its goodness is restrainedby a condition which says, roughly, that the best possible state of affairsis one where the producers of some good is as nearly as possible identicalwith the enjoyers of that good. The principle Broad suggests is an earlyversion of the Principle of Fairness (later to be found in the work of H. L.A. Hart and John Rawls).

The History of Philosophy. Broad wrote on a variety of scattered figuresin the history of philosophy, e.g. Bacon, Butler, Berkeley, Newton,Leibniz and Kant. A notable work is Five Types of Ethical Theory that(alongside careful discussions of such philosophers as Spinoza andHume) includes a pioneering study of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods ofEthics (1874), written at a time when Sidgwick's work had passed intonearly complete oblivion.[21] Noteworthy here also are the twoposthumously published book length studies on Leibniz and Kant,respectively. Both of these contain shrewd philosophical comment that areof general philosophical interest.

BibliographyPrimary Literature: Broad's Works

[1914] Perception, Physics, and Reality, Russell and Russell, NewYork, 1973; this edition is a reissue of the work, originallypublished by Cambridge University Press in 1914.

[1915] Phenomenalism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 15:22751.

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22751.[1918] The Relation between Induction and Probability (I) Mind, 27:

389404. Reprinted in Broad (1968); page references to theoriginal publication.

[1919] Is there Knowledge by Acquaintance? Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 2: 206-20.

[1920] The Relation between Induction and Probability (II) Mind, 29:1145. Reprinted in Broad (1968); page references to theoriginal publication.

[1921a] Time, in Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion, J. Hastings, etal. (eds.), Vol. 12, Edinburgh and New York: Charles Scribner'sSons.

[1921b] The External World, Mind, 30: 385408.[1923] Scientific Thought, London: Kegan Paul.[1924] Critical and Speculative Philosophy, in Contemporary British

Philosophy (First Series), ed. by J.H. Muirhead, London: Allenand Unwin.

[1925] The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London: Kegan Paul.[1928] Time and Change, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,

Supplementary Volume 8: 17588.[1930a] Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Kegan Paul.[1930b] The Principles of Demonstrative Induction, I and II, Mind, 39:

30217, 42639. Reprinted in Broad (1968); page references tothe original publication.

[1933] An Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (Volume I),Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[1934] Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism, inaugurallecture delivered at Cambridge in 1934. Reprinted in Broad(1952); page references to this.



[1938] An Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (Volume II, Part 1),Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938.

[1939] Arguments for The Existence of God, I and II, in Broad(1953); originally in Journal of Theological Studies, 40: 1630,15667.

[1942] Berkeley's' Argument about Material Substance, Proceedingsof the British Academy, 28: 119138; page references to thereprint by Haskell House Publishers, New York, 1976.

[1945] Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 45: 13166.

[1947a] Some Methods of Speculative Philosophy, Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 21: 132.

[1947b] Professor Marc-Wogaus Theorie der Sinnesdata (I and II),Mind, 56: 130, 97131.

[1949] The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy, in Broad(1953); originally in Philosophy, 24: 291309.

[1952a] Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception,Philosophy, 27: 317.

[1952b] Ethics and The History of Philosophy, London: Routledge.[1953] Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research, London:

Routledge.[1954a] Berkeley's Denial of Material Substance, The Philosophical

Review, 63: 15581.[1954b] Emotion and Sentiment, Journal of Aesthetics and Art

Criticism, 13: 203214.[1958] Philosophy, Inquiry, 1: 99129.[1959a] A Reply to My Critics, in Schilpp (1959).[1959b] Autobiography, in Schilpp (1959).[1968] Induction, Probability, and Causation. Selected Papers by C. D.

Broad, Dordrecht: Reidel.

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Broad, Dordrecht: Reidel.[1971] Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy, edited by D. R.

Cheney; New York: Humanities Press.[1975] Leibniz, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.[1978] Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Secondary Literature

Barnes, W.H.F. (1945). The Myth of Sense-Data, Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, 45: 89117.

Beckermann, A. (1992). Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction, inBeckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds. (1992).

Beckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds. (1992). Emergence orReduction?, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Blake, R.M. (1925). On Mr. Broad's Theory of Time, Mind, 34: 41835.

Braithwaite, R.B. (1928). Time and Change, Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 8: 16274.

Campbell, C.A. (1938). In Defence of Free Will, inaugural lecture;reprinted in Campbell (1967).

. (1967).In Defence of Free Will and Other Philosophical Essays,London: Allen & Unwin.

Chisholm, R.M. (1964). Human Freedom and the Self, The LangleyLecture, University of Kansas; reprinted in Chisholm's OnMetaphysics, 1989.

. (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press.

Dainton, B. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity inConscious Experience, London and New York: Routledge.

. (2001). Space and Time, Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press.Ducasse, C.J. (1959). Broad on the Relevance of Psychical Research to

Philosophy, in Schilpp (1959).



Philosophy, in Schilpp (1959).Feigl, H. (1958). The Mental and the Physical, Minneapolis,

Minnesota University Press, 1967; originally in Minnesota Studies inthe Philosophy of Science, 2: 370497.

Frankena, W.K. (1959). Broad's Analysis of Ethical Terms, in Schilpp(1959).

Gustavsson, K. (2002). Emergent Consciousness. Themes in C. D.Broad's Philosophy of Mind, Gteborg: Acta PhilosophicaGothoburgensis.

Hare, R.M. (1959). Broad's Approach to Moral Philosophy, in Schilpp(1959).

Hempel, C.G. & Oppenheim, P. (1948). The Logic of Explanation, inReadings in Analytical Philosophy, H. Regnell (ed.), Lund:Lromedelsfrlagen, 1971; originally in Philosophy of Science, 15:132-75.

Krner, S. (1959). Broad on Philosophical Method, in Schilpp (1959).Kyburg, H. E. (1960). Demonstrative Induction, Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, 21: 8092.Mabott, J.D. (1955). The Specious Present, Mind, 64: 37683.Marc-Wogau, K. (1959). On C. D. Broad's Theory of Sensa, in Schilpp

(1959).. (1943). Die Theorie der Vernderung bei C. D. Broad, Theoria, 9:

91123; translated as C. D. Broad's Theory of Change in Marc-Wogau (1967).

. (1967). Philosophical Essays, Gleerup: Lund.Markosian, N. (1993). How Fast Does Time Pass? Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, 53: 82944.Maund, B. (2003). Perception, Bucks: Acumen, 2003.McLaughlin, B.P. (1992). The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism, in

Beckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds. (1992).Merricks, T. (2006). Good Bye Growing Block Oxford Studies in

Metaphysics (Volume 2), D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford

Kent Gustavsson


Metaphysics (Volume 2), D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Mundle, W.C.K. (1954). How Specious is the Specious Present?Mind, 63: 2648.

. (1959). Broad's Views about Time, in Schilpp (1959).Nielsen, K. (1994). Broad's Conception of Critical and Speculative

Philosophy, Dialectica, 48: 4754.Oaklander, L.N. (2004). The Ontology of Time, Amherst, New York:

Prometheus Books.O'Connor, T. (1994). Emergent Properties, American Philosophical

Quarterly, 31: 91104.Price, H.H. (1932). Perception, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., second

revised ed., 1950.. (1959). The Nature and Status of Sense-Data in Broad's

Epistemology, in Schilpp (1959).Redpath, Th. (1997). Cambridge Philosophers VIII: C. D. Broad,

Philosophy, 72: 571594.Robinson, H.M. (1994). Perception, London: Routledge.Rowe, W.L. (1982). Religious Experience and The Principle of

Credulity, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13: 8592.

Savitt, S.F. (2002). On Absolute Becoming and The Myth of Passage,in Time, Reality, and Experience, Craig Callender (ed.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Schilpp, P.A., ed., (1959). The Philosophy of C. D. Broad, New York:Tudor Publishing Company.

Segelberg, I. (1953). Studier ver medvetandet och jagidn, [Studies ofConsciousness and The Idea of The Self], Stockholm, SvenskaTryckeriaktiebolaget; translated in Segelberg (1999).

. (1999). Three Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology, Stockholm,Thales, 1999; contains Segelberg's three books, including Segelberg(1953), translated by Herbert Hochberg and Susanne Ringstrm



(1953), translated by Herbert Hochberg and Susanne RingstrmHochberg.

Smith, A. D. (2002). The Problem of Perception, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

Stace, W.T (1959). Broad's Views on Religion, in Schilpp (1959).Stephan, A. (1992). EmergenceA Systematic View on its Historical

Facets, in Beckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim (eds.) (1992).von Wright, G.H. (1959). Broad on Induction and Probability, in

Schilpp (1959).

Other Internet ResourcesPhilosophical Alternatives from C.D. Broad, an extremely valuableresource, with a full bibliography of C. D. Broad's writings, as wellas many online texts.

Related Entriesconsciousness: temporal | emergent properties | incompatibilism:arguments for | induction: problem of | perception: the problem of |qualia: knowledge argument | religion: philosophy of | sense-data | spaceand time: being and becoming in modern physics | time | value theory

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Jan Almng, Jens Johansson and the anonymousreferees for helpful comments.

Notes to Charlie Dunbar Broad1. Cf. also Broad 1923, pp. 246-7 and 1938, p. 66.

2. The relation of acquaintance is, as Broad says, the converse of therelation of manifestation (1925, p. 634).

Kent Gustavsson


relation of manifestation (1925, p. 634).

3. Even though Broad does not think it is possible to strictly define thenotion of prehension he points out a number of key features (1952a, pp.14-15). The most important of these are the following: (a) prehension is arelation holding between a type of experience and particulars of such kindthat adjectives like red and hot can be predicated of them; (b) it islogically possible that a particular that was prehended as having a certainquality could have had that quality regardless of whether anyone everprehended it.

4. It might be suggested that prehending is itself a form of knowing. Ifwe use know in such a way that what is known must be a fact, it iscertain that prehending would not be a form of knowing. For, if weprehend anything, it is particulars (1952a, p. 14). On the other hand, hepoints out that, since there is a usage such that, for example, Broadhimself could say I knew McTaggart, but I did not know Sidgwick thereis nothing in the usage of the word to rule out the suggestion thatprehending might properly be described as a form of knowing (ibid).

5. In addition he provides phenomenologically sensitive descriptions ofthe type of experience we have when we are feeling an external body.He carefully notes that apart from the qualitative aspect the experience,i.e. the experience of the body as rough or smooth and warm or cold thereis also its dynamical aspect, which is the experience of actively pushingor pulling it and making it move or stay still in spite of its varyingdegrees of resistance to one's efforts 1952a, p. 6. The terminology isBroad's.

6. Cf. 1923, p. 255.Broad gives more persuasive examples in Broad1959a. Consider such feelings as feeling tired and feeling sick. As hesays, it would be extremely strained and unnatural to express these interms which imply the act-object analysis (1959, p. 798).



7. See also Broad 1959a pp. 797-801; 1954a, pp. 164, 169; 1942, pp. 10-11.

8. Are sensa mental entities? This question is thoroughly examined inScientific Thought. Broad points out that the question is ambiguous,distinguishing no less than five different meanings. See Broad 1923, p.253-66.

9. The reason is that the objective constituents of perception are not perse instances of the concept of physical object, and it is also only by virtueof the concept physical object that we can hold they are parts of ormanifestations of instances of this concept 1925, p. 217.

10. Broad could be the first who suggested the Rate of Passage Argument.Cf. Ned Markossian, 1993, p. 836.

11. The argument is typically associated with Chisholm (1964). Broadwas, of course, earlier than Chisholm; he was, however, not the first topresent the argument. As an anonymous referee pointed out to me, it canbe found in Moore's Ethics (1912) and in Sidgwick's The Methods ofEthics (1907). Andif I'm not mistakenSchopenhauer somewherehints at it.

12. This is of course not how Broad phrases the conclusion of theargument. He phrases it, in effect, as: there are situations where S couldhave done A if she had willed to do A but where A, in spite of that, is notobligable. There is, then, some other sense of could and could notsuch that the fact that S could not (in that sense) have done A entails thatA is not obligable.

13. Broad mentions the case of Sally Beauchamp.

14. In Broad 1958, he adds: Here we shall have to extend the phraseanalysis of propositions to cover the attempt to show that certain kinds

Kent Gustavsson


analysis of propositions to cover the attempt to show that certain kindsof sentences in the indicative, e.g., moral ones such as Lying is wrongand People ought to pay their debts, do not in fact express or conveypropositions at all. This extension can easily be made by substituting forthe phrase analysis of propositions the phrase analysis of what isexpressed by sentences in the indicative (p. 114).

15. I cannot resist quoting the amusing passage from which this is drawnin full: [D]id Bacon provide any logical justification for the principlesand methods which he elicited and which scientists assume and use? Hedid not, and he never saw that it was necessary to do so. There is askeleton in the cupboard of Inductive Logic, which Bacon neversuspected and Hume first exposed to view. Kant conducted the mostelaborate funeral in history, and called Heaven and Earth and theNoumena under the Earth to witness that the skeleton was finallydisposed of. But, when the dust of the funeral procession had subsidedand the last strains of the Transcendental Organ had died away, the coffinwas found to be empty and the skeleton in its old place. Mill discretelyclosed the door of the cupboard, and with infinite tact turned theconversation into more cheerful channels. Mr Johnson and Mr Keynesmay fairly be said to have reduced the skeleton to the dimensions of amere skull. But that obstinate caput mortuum still awaits the undertakerwho will give it Christian burial. May we venture to hope that whenBacon's next centenary is celebrated the great work which he set goingwill be completed; and that Inductive Reasoning, which has long been theglory of Science, will have ceased to be the scandal of Philosophy?1952b, p. 142-3. These are the concluding words of his commemorativeaddress on the occasion of The Bacon Tercentenary, 5 October 1926.

16. In his illuminating contribution to the Schilpp volume, Georg Henrikvon Wright writes: as far as I know [Broad] is the first to have givensystematic attention to the logic of the various notions of condition(1959, p. 341). He also claims that Broad ought to be regarded as the



(1959, p. 341). He also claims that Broad ought to be regarded as thefounder of confirmation theory by virtue of his mathematical treatment ofthe probability-relation between a generalization and its confirminginstances. Broad did this in his early articles On The Relation betweenInduction and Probability,1918 and 1920.

17. The earlier account is in Scientific Thought, the later in the SecondVolume of Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy.

18. The essay is Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives. It is reprintedin Broad (1952b) as well as in the extremely valuable 1971 collection.

19. Broad was not, however, the first philosopher to formulate an analysisalong these lines. Brentano had done so in 1889.

20. The paper is his On the Function of False Hypothesis in Ethics,published in 1916. It is reprinted in Broad (1971).

21. And more generally, as Broad says, moral philosophy in England andthe USA might fairly be described as dormant and apparently moribund1959, p. 816.

Copyright 2010 by the author Kent Gustavsson

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