Boudon Beyond Rational Choice Theory

7/22/2019 Boudon Beyond Rational Choice Theory

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/boudon-beyond-rational-choice-theory 1/23

Beyond Rational Choice Theory

Author(s): Raymond BoudonReviewed work(s):Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 29 (2003), pp. 1-21Published by: Annual ReviewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036958 .

Accessed: 06/06/2012 17:58

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of

Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs

http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036958?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036958?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs





Annu.Rev.Sociol.2003.29:1-21doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100213

Copyright 2003byAnnualReviews.Allrights eservedFirstpublishednline saReviewnAdvancen June , 2003

BEYONDRATIONALCHOICETHEORY

RaymondBoudonUniversityfParis-Sorbonne,niversitearis V, SHA, 6 boulevard aspail,75006Paris,France; mail:[email protected]

Key Words beliefs,cognitivism, pistemology,methodologicalndividualism,

values

U Abstract Skepticismoward ociology hasgrownoverrecentyears.Theatten-tion grantedo rational hoicetheory RCT) s, to a largeextent,a reactionagainstthis situation.Withoutdoubt,RCT s a productivenstrument,utit fails signally nexplainingpositivenontrivial eliefsas well as normative onconsequentialeliefs.RCT'sfailuresare due to its move to use too narrowa definitionof rationality.Amodelcanbe developed hatcombines headvantages f theRCT(mainlyprovidingself-sufficient xplanations),without allingvictimto its shortcomings. hismodel simplicitlyusedin classical and modemsociologicalworksthatareconsideredo be

illuminating ndvalid.

RCT:A SOLUTIONTOTHECRISISOFSOCIOLOGY?

It is evident that sociology has not achievedtriumphscomparable o thoseof the several older and more heavily supportedsciences. A varietyof in-

terpretations ave been offeredto explain the difference-most frequently,

that the growth of knowledge in the science of sociology is more random

thancumulative.The true situationappearsto be that in some partsof the

discipline.. .therehas in fact taken place a slow but acceleratingaccumula-

tion of organizedand testedknowledge. In some otherfields the expansion

of thevolume of literaturehas not appeared o havehadthisproperty.Criticshaveattributedhe slow pace to a varietyof factors.

EncyclopaediaBritannica

The evaluation s fair.Some evaluatorsare morecritical:Horowitz(1994) evokes

the decompositionof sociology, whereasDahrendorf 1995) wonderswhethersocial science is witheringaway.Tomanysociologists the stateof the disciplineis unsatisfactory.

One reasonfor the peculiarstateof sociology is that,while its mainobjective

mightbe to explainpuzzlingphenomena, ust like other scientificdisciplines, infact it follows other directions.As I have tried to show elsewhere (Boudon &

Cherkaoui1999, Boudon2001b), sociology has alwayspursuedcameral,critical,

0360-0572/03/0811-0001$14.00 1



2 BOUDON

andexpressivedirectionsas well asitscognitiveapproach.Whilesomesociologicalworksaim atexplainingsocial phenomena,othersproducedatafor the benefitof

public policy, critical analysesof society for the benefitof social movements,or

emotionaldescriptionsof society in the spiritof realisticnovels or movies for thebenefitof the generalpublic.

Anothersourceof thisparticularitys thatthenotionof theoryhasa muchmore

uncertainmeaning n sociology thanit does in the othersciences. Thus, labeling

theory,a theoryoftenreferred o overrecentdecades,doesnothingmorethan abel

familiarphenomena.Muchis writtenaboutsocial capitaltheorytoday.But social

capital is just a word for well-knownmechanisms.As AlejandroPortes (1998)

writes, Current nthusiasmfor the concept of social capital.. .is not likely to

abatesoon (...) However, . .theset of processesencompassedby the concept are

not new andhavebeen studiedunderother abels in the past.Callingthemsocial

capitalis, to a largeextent, just a meansof presenting hemin a more appealing

conceptualgarb.So, explanation s not always the main aim thatsociologists seem to pursue,

andthey sometimesgive the impressionof takingthe idea of explanationdowna

particular aththathas nothingto do withthemeaningof the wordin other,more

solidly establishedsciences.I see the attentioncurrentlygranted o rationalchoice theory(RCT)as being,

to a largeextent,a reactionagainstthis stateof affairs.

RATIONALACTIONISITSOWNEXPLANATION

The motivationsof RCT contendersare reminiscentof the discussions about

physics that ookplacein theViennaCircle n theearlytwentiethcentury.Physical

theories,Carnap ontended, ncludeobscurenotions(suchas force);a trulyvalid

theory should be able to eliminate such notions. Once expressed in an entirelyexplicit fashion,it shouldhave the propertyof constituting, n principle,a set of

uncontroversial tatements.RationalChoice theorists,along the same line of argument,contendthatex-

plaining a phenomenonmeansmakingit the consequenceof a set of statements

thatshouldall be easily acceptable.They assumethata good sociological theory

is one that interpretsany social phenomenonas the outcomeof rational ndivid-

ual actions. As Hollis (1977) puts it, rationalactionis its own explanation. To

Coleman(1986, p. 1), Rational ctionsof individualshaveauniqueattractiveness

as thebasis for social theory.If an institutionora socialprocess canbe accounted

forin termsof

the rationalactions of individuals, henandonly then

canwe

saythatit has been 'explained.'The very concept of rationalaction is a conception

of action that is 'understandable,' ction that we need ask no more questions

about. To Becker (1996), The extensionof the utility-maximizingapproach oincludeendogenouspreferences s remarkablyuseful in unifying a wide class of

behavior, ncludinghabitual, ocial andpoliticalbehavior. donotbelievethatany

alternative pproach-be it foundedon 'cultural,' biological,' or 'psychological'




forces--comesclose to providingomparablensightsandexplanatoryower.Briefly, s soonas a socialphenomenonanbe explained s theoutcome f ra-tional ndividualctions, heexplanationnvitesno further uestion:t contains

noblackboxes.Bycontrast,rrationalxplanationsecessarilyntroducearioustypesof forces hatraiseeven urtheruestions stowhetherheyarerealand, fso,which s theirnature.

As Becker ightlymaintains, theoryappearsess convincing s soonas it

evokespsychologicalorces(as whencognitivepsychologistsxplain hatpeo-ple tend ogive a wronganswer o a statistical roblem ecauseof theexistenceof some cognitive ias ),biologicalorces[aswhensociobiologists,.g.,Ruse(1993),claim hatmoral eelingsareaneffectofbiological volution],rculturalforces(aswhensociologists laimthata given collectivebeliefis theproduct

of socialization).ncontrastorationalxplanations,lltheseexplanationsaisefurther uestions: hey ncludeblackboxes.Moreover,heseexplanationseavethefeeling hatt is easytoelicitdata hatare ncompatiblend/orhat hefurtherquestionsheyraisehave ittlechance f everbeinganswered. hus,oncewehaveexplainedhatmostRomansntheearlyRomanEmpire elievedn the raditionalRomanpolytheisticeligionbecause heyhadbeen socializedo it, we arecon-frontedwith hequestion stowhyRoman ivilservantsndcenturions,lthoughtheytoohadbeensocializedo the oldpolytheisticeligion, ended athero be

attractedy monotheisticeligions uchastheMithraultand henChristianity[Weber 988 1922)].Moreover,henotionof socializationenerates blackboxthatseemshard o open:Nobodyhasyetbeenableto discoverhemechanismsbehind ocializationn theway,say,that he mechanismsehinddigestion avebeenexplored nddisentangled.amnotsaying hat ocializations a worthlessnotion,nor hat here reno such hings ssocializationffects,butmerelyhat henotions descriptiveatherhan xplanatory.tidentifies ndchristenshevariouscorrelationshatcan be observed etween hewaypeoplehavebeenraisedandeducatednd heirbeliefsandbehavior;tdoesnotexplainhem.

THE SYSTEMOF AXIOMS DEFINING RCT

RCTcanbedescribedya set ofpostulates. willpresenthem nageneralwayinorderotranscendhevariantsf thetheory.Thefirstpostulate, 1,states hatanysocialphenomenons theeffectof individual ecisions,actions,attitudes,etc.,(individualism). secondpostulate, 2, states hat, n principle tleast,anactioncanbe understoodunderstanding).s some actionscanbe understood

withoutbeingrational, thirdpostulate, 3, states hatanyaction s causedbyreasons n themindof individualsrationality). fourthpostulate, 4,assumesthat hesereasonsderive romconsiderationytheactorof theconsequencesfhisorheractionsasheorshesees them consequentialism,nstrumentalism).fifthpostulate, 5,states hatactors reconcernedmainlywith heconsequencesto themselves f theirownaction egoism).A sixthpostulate, 6,maintainshatactors reable odistinguishhecostsandbenefits falternativeinesofaction nd

3



4 BOUDON

thattheychoose theline of actionwiththemostfavorablebalance(maximization,

optimization).

The Importanceof RCT

ThatRCT is the adequate rameworkof many successfulexplanations s incon-

trovertible.Why did the cold war last so many decadesandwhy did it come to

a suddenconclusion?Why did the Soviet Union disappear?Why did the Soviet

Empirecollapsesuddenly n theearly1990sandnot 20 yearsbefore orafter?Suchgeneralcausesaslow economicefficiencyandtheviolationof humanrightscannot

explainwhy it collapsedwhen it did orwhy it collapsedso abruptly.RCT canhelp

in answeringthese questions. The WesternWorldandthe Soviet Union became

involved in an armsrace shortly afterthe end of WorldWarII. Now, an arms

race presentsa prisoner'sdilemma (PD) structure: f I (the U.S. government)

do not increasemy militarypotentialwhile theotherparty thegovernmentof theU.S.S.R.) does,Irunadeadlyrisk.Thus,Ihave to increasemilitaryspending,even

though,as agovernment, would prefer o spend ess moneyonweaponsandmore

on, say, schools, hospitals, or welfarebecause these would be more appreciated

by the voters.In this situation, ncreasingone's arsenal s a dominantstrategy,al-though ts outcome s notoptimal.TheUnitedStatesandtheSoviet Union played

this gamefor decadesandaccumulated o manynuclearweaponsthateachcoulddestroy the planet several times over. This foolish outcome was the product

of rational trategies.The two superactors, he two governments,played their

dominantstrategyand could not do anybetterthanmarginallyreducing theirar-

senals throughnegotiations.The game stoppedwhen the PD structure hathad

characterizedhedecades-long nteractionbetweenthe two powerswas suddenly

destroyed. twas destroyedby thethreatdevelopedby thenU.S. PresidentReagan

of reachinga newthresholdn thearmsraceby developing heSDI project, heso-

called StarWars.The initiativecontaineda certainmeasureof bluff.Technically,

theprojectwas nowherenearripe.Even today,theobjectiveof devising defensivemissiles to interceptanymissile launchedagainstterritoriesprotectedby the SDI

appearsproblematicat best. Economically, he projectwas so expensivethatthe

Sovietgovernment awthattherewasno wayto follow withoutgenerating erious

internaleconomicproblems.Hence, it didnot follow andby not so doing, lost its

statusof superpower,which hadbeen uniquely grounded n its militarystrength.

Of course, thereareothercausesunderlying he collapseof the Soviet Union,but

a fundamentalone is thatthe PD game thathad hithertocharacterized elations

between the two superpowerswas suddenlydisruptedby Reagan'smove. Here,

an RCT approachhelps identifyone of the main causes of a majormacroscopichistoricalphenomenon.It providesan explanationas to why Gorbachevmoved

in a new direction hatwould be fatalto the U.S.S.R., andwhy the U.S.S.R. col-lapsedat preciselythatpointin time. In this case, we get an explanationwithoutblack boxes as to why the stupid armsrace was conducted,and why it sud-

denly stoppedat a given point in time, leaving one of the protagonists n defeat.




Although heRCTgame-theoretical pproachuses averysimplerepresentationf

the actors,it providesa convincing explanation.The explanationworksbecause

the RCT axioms, thoughreductionist,are not unrealistichere:It is truethat any

governmenthas to be egoist, .e., has to takecare of its own national nterests.Consideras anotherexample Tocqueville'sexplanationof the stagnationof

Frenchagriculture t theendof the eighteenthcentury[Tocqueville1986 (1856)].

The administrativeentralization haracteristicof eighteenthcentury France

is the cause of the fact that thereare many positions of civil servantsavailable

(statement l) inFranceand hat heyaremoreprestigious han n England a2); the

causes expressedby statementsal anda2 provokea rateof landlordabsenteeismmuchlarger han n England(statementb); landlordabsenteeism s thecauseof a

low rateof innovation c); the low rateof innovation s thecauseof the stagnation

(d) (Figure 1).To eliminateall blackboxes fromthis explanation,one has to explain further

why al and a2 are causes of b, why b is the cause of c, andwhy c is the cause

of d. The answertakesthe formof individualistic tatements,namely,statements

explainingwhy the ideal-typical ndividualsbelonging to relevantcategoriesbe-

havedthewaytheydid. Whyareal anda2 thecausesof b?Because(al) landlords

see thattheycan easily buy a positionof civil servantandthat(a2), by so doing,

they increasetheirpower, prestige,and possibly income. In England,there are

fewer civil servants,andtheirpositionsareless accessibleor rewarding,whereasthe gentleman-farmers offeredmanyopportunities or interestingsocial rewards

through ocal politicallife. Moreover,a good strategy orgentlemenfarmerswith

al

al

Sb 3 c y d

a2a2

a2

Figure1 Tocqueville'sxplanationf the stagnationf Frenchagriculturettheend

of theeighteenth entury, l (manypositionsof civil servants reavailablenFrance)

anda2 (beinga civil servants moreprestigiousn France han n England) auseb(therateof landlord bsenteeism); causesc (alowrateof innovation); is thecause

of d (agriculturaltagnation). l (buyinga positionas a civil servants easy)anda2

(increasingpowerandprestige)describes he French andlords' easons or leaving

their and; f (landownersent heir and o farmers); (reasonsorfarmersocultivatetheland n anoninnovativeashion).

5



6 BOUDON

nationalpoliticalambitions o get elected to Westminsters to appearactiveand

innovative ocally.Thus,French andlordshavereasons(describedby al and a2)

to leave theirlandandserve the king thattheirEnglishcounterparts o not have

to the samedegree.Suchstatementsdealwith the questionas to why the relevantcategoryof landlordsbehavedthe way they did.Why is b thecause of c? Whyis

landlordabsenteeism nimmical o innovation?Because landowners enttheir and

to farmers f6). Why is c the cause of d? Why do farmersnot innovate?Because

they donothavethecapacity o do so. Hence,theyhavereasons(y) to cultivate he

landin a noninnovative ashion.The theorythusexplainswhy the relevantsocial

categories, andlordsand farmers,behaved heway theydid.Tocqueville's heory

gives the impressionof being final;first,becauseits empiricalstatementsappear

congruentwith observationaldata,andsecond,becauseits statements those de-

scribedby the Greek etters) on the reasonswhy farmers,andlords,etc., behavedthe way they didareevident,not in the logical butin thepsychological sense.

It would be easy to list manymodem works thatowe theirscientificvalue to

the fact thattheyuse this RCTmodel. The worksof economists andsociologists

such as Olson (1965), Oberschall 1973, 1994), Coleman(1990), Kuran 1995),

Hardin(1995), among others,come to mind, as well as historianssuch as Root(1994) orpoliticalscientistssuchas Rothstein 2001). Withoutquestion,RCThas

indeedproduceda substantialnumberof genuinelyscientific contributions n the

pastor

morerecently.

RCT:A POWERFUL OR A GENERALTHEORY?

AlthoughRCT is a powerfultheory, t appearspowerlesswhen confrontedwith

manyphenomena.Animpressive istcanbecompiledof allthefamiliarphenomena

it is unableto explain.This combinationof success andfailure s worthstressing

inasmuchas the social sciences communityseems to be dividedinto two parties:

those who treatRCT as anew Gospel (Hoffman2000) andthose who do not

believe in this gospel. Furthermore,his mixtureof success andfailureraises theimportantquestionas to its causes.

The Voting Paradox

The effect of a singlevote on turnout oranyelectionis so small,claimsRCT,that

rationalactorsshouldactuallyrefrain romvoting:Thecosts of voting arealways

higherthanthe benefits.As one of these voters,I shouldpreferresting,walking,

writingan article, or operatingmy vacuumcleaner to voting. Nevertheless,like

manypeople, I vote.

Many solutions o this paradoxhave been proposed,severalof them even

brilliant,yet they fail to be really convincing.People like to vote, says a theory;

peoplewouldfeel suchstrongregret f theirballotwouldhavemadethedifference

thattheyvote eventhoughtheyknow thatthe probabilityof thiseventoccurring s

infinitesimally mall,saysanother Ferejohn&Fiorina1974).IfI donotvote,Irun



BEYONDRATIONALHOICE HEORY

the riskof losing my reputation Overbye1995). Sometimes,RCTis mademore

flexible by the notion of cognitiveframes. Thus,Quattrone& Tversky(1987)

proposeconsidering hatvotersvotebecause theysee theirmotivation o vote as a

sign thattheirparty s going to win, in thesameway thattheCalvinists,accordingto Weber,are success-orientedbecausethey think this attitude s a sign thatthey

areamongtheelected. Such a frame ppears,however,not only as adhoc, but

as introducinga black box. Schuessler(2000) startsfromthe idea thatthe voter

has anexpressiverather han aninstrumentalnterest n voting.

None of these solutions hasbeenwidely accepted.Some, likeFerejohn'sand

Fiorina's,displaya highintellectualvirtuosity.However, heyhavenoteliminatedthe paradox.

Other Paradoxes

Otherclassical paradoxes esidevoting canbe mentioned.Allais' paradoxesshow that,when they are proposedto bet in some types of lotteries,people do

not makechoices in conformitywith theprincipleof maximizingexpectedutility

(Allais & Hagen 1979, Hagen 1995). Frey (1997) has shown that people will

occasionallyaccept some disagreementmore easily if thereis no compensationofferedthanwhen thereis. As a case in point,a study conducted n Switzerland

and Germanyshowed thatpeople accept the presenceof nuclearwaste on theircity's landmore easily when they arenot offeredcompensation hanwhen theyare.

Psychologistshavedevised manyotherexperiments, orexample,theclassicalultimatum ame (Wilson1993,pp.62-63; Hoffman& Spitzer 1985), thatresist

the RCT. Sociology also has producedmany observationsthat can be read as

challengesto theRCT.Thus,thenegativereactionof social subjectsagainstsome

given stateof affairshas often nothingto do with the costs they are exposed to

by this particular tate of affairs.On the other hand, actions can frequentlybe

observedwherethe benefitto the actor s zero or even negative.In WhiteCollar,C.W. Mills (1951) identifiedwhat could be called the overreactionparadox.

He describeswomen clerks workingin a firmwhere they all sit in a largeroom

doing the same tasks, at the same kind of desk, in the same work environment.Violent conflicts requentlybreakoutoverminor ssues suchasbeingseatedcloser

to a sourceof heat or light. An outside observerwould normally considersuch

conflicts as irrationalbecause he or she would implicitlyuse RCT:Why such aviolent reaction?As the behaviorof the women would appearto be strangein

termsof this model, he or she would turnto an irrationalnterpretation:hildish

behavior.By so doing, he or she would be confessing that RCT cannot easilyexplaintheoverreactionparadoxobservedby Mills.

Many observationswould lead to the same conclusion: They can be inter-

preted satisfactorily n neitheran irrationalnor an RCTfashion.To mentionjusta few of them,corruption n normal onditions-by which I mean the condi-

tions prevailing n most Westerncountries-is invisible to the common man or

7



8 BOUDON

woman; he or she does not see or feel its effects. He or she neverthelesscon-

siders corruption o be unacceptable.Plagiarismis, in most instances, without

consequences.Indeed,in some circumstances t may even serve the interestsof

the personbeingplagiarizedsince it attractspublicattention. t is looked on withapprobrium,however.On some issues like the deathpenalty,I can have strong

opinionseven thoughthe likelihoodthatI mightbe personallyaffected is zero. Inotherwords, n manycircumstances,peopleareguidedbyconsiderations hathave

nothing o dowith theirowninterests,norwith theconsequencesof theiractionsorreactions.

On the whole, psychologists, sociologists, and economists have producedahuge numberof observationswhich cannoteasily be explainedwithin the RCT

frame.This situationraises two questions. Why does the RCT fail so often? Is

there a model thatwould satisfy the scientificambitionunderlyingRCT, namelytryingto provide explanationswithoutblackboxes, andat the same time get rid

of its defects?

The Sourcesof the Weaknessesof the RCT

It is not very hardto determinethe reasonsfor RCT's failures.The social phe-

nomena thatRCTis incapableof accounting or sharemanyfeatures n common.

Threetypes of phenomena hatslip RCT'sjurisdictioncanbe identified.

The first ypeincludesphenomena haracterized ythefactthatactorsbasetheir

choices on noncommonplacebeliefs. All behavior nvolvesbeliefs. To maximizemy chances of survival, n accordancewith RCT, I will look both ways before

crossingthestreet.Thisbehavior s dictatedby abelief:Ibelievethat f I don'tlook

bothways I'm takinga seriouschance.Here,thebelief involved s commonplace,

notworththeanalyst'swhile to look at moreclosely. Toaccount orother temsofbehavior,however, t is crucialto explainthe beliefs uponwhich they rest. Now,

RCThasnothing otellus aboutbeliefs, aweaknessthat s oneof the mainreasons

for its failures.We can postulate hatanactorholdsa givenbeliefbecausethatbelief is aconse-

quenceof atheoryhe orsheendorses.We canpostulate urthermorehatendorsingthe theory is a rationalact. But herethe rationality s cognitive,not instrumental:

It consistsof preferringhetheory hatallowsone to account orgiven phenomena

in the most satisfyingpossibleway (in accordancewithcertaincriteria).Theactorendorsesa theorybecausehe or she believes that the theoryis true.Conversely,

it is precisely becauseRCT reducesrationality o instrumental ationality hat itrunsinto troublewhenconfrontedwith a whole varietyof paradoxes.

Some sociologists have soughtto reducecognitiverationality o instrumentalreality.Radnitzky 1987) proposesthatendorsinga scientifictheory results from

a cost-benefitanalysis. A scientist stops believing in a theory,writes Radnitzky,

as soon as the objectionsraised against it make defendingit too costly. It is

indeeddifficultto explainwhy a boathull disappears romthehorizonbeforethe

mast,why themoontakesthe shapeof a crescent,why a navigatorwho maintains



BEYONDRATIONALHOICE HEORY 9

constantdirectionreturns o his startingpointif we acceptthetheorythattheearth

is flat.But whatdoes it get us to replacethe worddifficultwith the wordcostly?

Defendinga given theory s morecostly preciselybecauseit is moredifficult.We

must thenexplainwhy this is so; andfrominstrumental ationalitywe come backto cognitive rationality.

RCTis powerlessbeforea secondcategoryof phenomena: hosecharacterized

by the factthatactorsarefollowingnonconsequentialist rescriptivebeliefs. RCT

is comfortablewith prescriptivebeliefs as long as theyareconsequentialist.RCT

has no troubleexplaining,for example, why mostpeoplebelieve thattraffic ights

are a good thing:Despite the inconveniencethey represent o me, I accept them

because they have consequencesthat I judge beneficial. Here, RCT effectively

accounts for both the belief and the attitudesand behaviorinspiredby thatbe-

lief. But RCTis mutewhen it comes to normativebeliefs thatcannotreadilybe

explained n consequentialist erms(Boudon2001a). The subject n the classical

socio-psychologicalexperiment ultimatum ame actsagainsthis orher ownin-

terest.Thevotervotes, even though thatvote will have virtuallyno effect on the

electionresult.Thecitizenvehementlydisapprovesof corruption ven thoughnot

affectedpersonally.The plagiaristgives rise to a feeling of disdain,even when

no one is hurtand theplagiarizedwriter'srenown s actuallyenhanced.Wepoint

anaccusingfingeratimposters, houghtheirmachinations reateproblems or no

onebut

themselves.RCT s powerlessbeforeathirdcategoryof phenomena, hat nvolvingbehaviorby individualswhom we cannot in any sensible way assume to be dictatedby

self-interest.Regardlessof whetherSophocles' Antigoneis being acted in Paris,Beijing, or Algiers, the viewer of the tragedyunhesitatinglycondemns Creon

andsupportsAntigone.ThereasonRCTcannotexplain this universalreaction ssimple:The spectators' nterestsare n no way affectedby thematterbeforethem.We thereforecannotexplain thatreactionby anypossible consequences on them

personally;norby anyconsequencesat allbecausethereareno suchconsequences.

The spectators notdirectly nvolved n thefateof Thebes;thatfatebelongsin thepast,andno one has anycontrol overit anymore.Thusthe consequentialismand

self-interestpostulatesaredisqualified pso facto.

Sociologists often findthemselvesconfrontedwith this kind of phenomenon,inasmuch as the social actorsareregularlycalled upon to evaluatesituations n

which they are not personallyimplicatedat all. Most people are not personally

implicated nthedeathpenalty; t touches either hem,their amilies,orfriends.

This hardlymeanstheycannothave a strongopinionon the issue. How can a set

of postulates hatassumesthemto be self-interestedaccountfortheirreactions n

situationswhere their interestsare not at stake andthereis no chance thattheyeverwill be?Theseremarks ead to a crucial conclusionfor the social sciences as

a whole; namely,RCT has little if anythingto tell us about opinionphenomena,which area majorsocial force andhence a crucialsubjectfor sociologists.

In sum, RCT is disarmedwhen it comes to (a) phenomenainvolving non-

commonplacebeliefs, (b) phenomena nvolvingnonconsequentialistprescriptive



10 BOUDON

beliefs, and(c) phenomena hatbringinto play reactions hatdo not, by the verynatureof things,springfromanyconsiderationbasedon self-interest.

OPENING THE RCT AXIOMS

Theseconsiderations uggestthataxiomsP4,P5, andP6arewelcomeinsomecases

but not in all. Reciprocally, he set of axioms P1, P2, andP3 appearto be more

generalthanthesetP1 to P6. Now,P1 defineswhatis usuallycalledmethodologi-

cal individualism MI),whereas hesetof postulatesmadeupof P1 andP2 defines

interpretive ociology (in Weber's ense). As tothesetP1toP3, it definesaversion

of interpretiveociology whereactionsaresupposed oberational n thesense that

theyaregroundedonreasons ntheactor'smind.I identify heparadigmdefinedby

postulatesP1toP3 as thecognitivist heoryof action(CTA). t assumes hatanycol-

lectivephenomenon s theeffect of individualhumanactions(individualism);hat,

in principle,provided he observerhas sufficient nformation,he actionof an ob-

servedactor s alwaysunderstandableunderstanding);hat hecausesof theactor's

actionarethe reasonsforhim orherto undertaket (rationality) Boudon 1996).RCT'sfailuresaredue to its move to reduceall rationality o the instrumental

varietyand neglect cognitive rationalityas it appliesnot only to descriptivebut

also toprescriptive roblems axiologicalrationality).Conversely, t is essentialfor

sociology as a disciplineto be aware hatmanyclassicalandmodem sociologicalstudiesowe theirexplanatory fficacyto the use of a cognitiveversionof MI, as

opposed to the instrumental ne, primarily epresentedby RCT.

A BROADERNOTIONOFRATIONALITY

CTA has the main advantageof RCT (i.e., offering explanationswithoutblack

boxes), but not its disadvantages, hanksto a broadernotion of rationalitythat

is commonly accepted not only by philosophers but also by prominentsocial

scientists,suchas AdamSmithindirectlyor MaxWeberdirectly.I do not see why sociologists shouldnot pay attention o distinctions repeat-

edly recognizedbyphilosophersaswell asby classicalsociologists.Thus,Rescher

(1995,p.26) states, rationalitys initsvery nature eleologicalandends-oriented,

making mmediately learthat teleological houldnot bemadesynonymouswith

instrumental r consequential.Hegoes on, Cognitive ationalitys concerned

withachieving ruebeliefs.Evaluative ationalitys concernedwithmakingcorrect

evaluation.Practicalrationality s concernedwith the effective pursuitof appro-priateobjectives. All these formsof rationalityaregoal-oriented,butthe nature

of thegoals canbe diverse.By creatinghis notion of axiologicalrationality or evaluative ationality

(Wertrationalitiit) s complementary o, but essentially differentfrom instru-mental rationality Zweckrationalitdt),Max Weberclearly supportedthe the-

sis that rationalitycan be noninstrumental,n otherwords, that rationality s a

broader onceptthan nstrumentalationality ndafortiori han he specialformof

instrumentalationality P1to P6) postulatedby RCT.As to AdamSmith'snotion





12 BOUDON

Paretohassaid,withreason, hat hehistoryof scienceis thegraveyard f allthe

falseideas thatoncewereendorsedunder he authority f scientists.Inotherwords,

scienceproduces alseideasbeside trueones.Now,nobodywouldacceptthenotion

that hesefalseideasareendorsedby scientistsunder heeffectof irrational auses,because theirbrainswould have to have been wiredin an inadequate ashion,or

because theirmindswould haveto havebeen obscuredby inadequate cognitive

biases, frames, habitus, by class interestsor by affectivecauses-in other

words,by the biological, psychological, r culturalorces evoked byBecker

(1996). Scientistsbelieve in statements hatoften turnoutto be false becausethey

have strongreasonsforbelieving in them, given the cognitivecontext.

The believersin phlogiston,in ether,or in the manyotherentitiesand mecha-

nismsthatnow appearpurely maginary o us hadin theirday,given thecognitive

context, strongreasonsto believe in them. It was not immediatelyrecognizedasimportant hatwhen a piece of oxide of mercury s heatedunderan empty bell-

glass, the dropof water hatappearsonthebell's wall shouldbe taken ntoaccount:

Thatthis dropof waterappearsregularlyescapedimmediateattention,norwas it

clearlyperceivedthatthisresultcontradictsphlogistontheory.

Why shouldthe false beliefs producedby ordinaryknowledgenotbe explained

in the same fashionas false scientificstatements,namely based in the minds of

the social subjectson reasonsthattheyperceiveto be strong,given the cognitive

contextin whichthey

move?I am not saying thatfalse beliefs shouldalways be explainedin this fashion.

Even scientistscan hold false beliefs throughpassionor otherirrationalcauses.

WhatI am sayingis thatbelief in false ideascanbe causedby reasons n the mind

of the actors,andthatthey areoftencausedby reasons n situationsof interest osociologists. Eventhoughthesereasons appear alse to us, theymaybe perceivedto be rightandstrongby theactors hemselves.Toexplainthatwhattheyperceive

as right is wrong, we do not have to assume that their minds are obscuredby

some hypotheticalmechanismsof the kind Marx( falseconsciousness ),Freud

( theunconscious ),L6vy-Bruhl(the mentaliteprimitive),andtheirmany heirsimagined,norby themore prosaic frames voked by RCT.Inmostcases, expla-

nationsaremoreacceptable f we makethe assumption hat,given the cognitive

context in which they move, actors have strongreasons for believing in false

ideas.I haveproducedelsewhereseveralexamplesshowingthattherationalexplana-

tion of beliefs thatwe considernormal nthecase of false scientificbeliefs canalsobe applied o ordinary nowledge.I haveexplored ntensively nstancesof belief in

magic(Boudon1998-2000) andfalsebeliefs observedby cognitivepsychologists

(Boudon1996).HereI limitmyself to oneexample(inspired romKahneman&Tversky,1973)

fromthe second category.Whenpsychiatristsare askedwhetherdepression s a

causeof attempted uicide,they agree.Whenaskedwhy,theyanswer hat heyhavefrequentlyobservedpatientswith both features:Manyof theirpatientsappeared

to be depressedandtheyhave attempted uicide.Of course,the answer ndicates

thatthe psychiatristsareusing one piece of information n the contingencytable



BEYOND RATIONALCHOICETHEORY

TABLE1 A causal resumptionanbederivedrom hesinglepieceof informationif a is

muchargerhan xgli

Suicideattempted Suicidenotattempted Total

Depressionymptoms a b e = a + b

Nodepressionymptoms c d f= c + d

Total g=a+c h=b+d i=a+b+c+d

above (Table 1): Theirargument uns, a is high, hence depression s a cause of

attempted uicide.

Now, anyfreshman n statisticswould knowthatsuch an arguments wrong:To concludethatthereis a correlationbetween depressionand suicide attempts,

one has to considernot one, but four pieces of information,not only a, but the

differencea/e-c/f.

Thepsychiatrists'answer shows thatstatistical ntuitionseems to follow rules

thathavenothingto do with thevalid rules of statistical nference.But it does not

provethatwe shouldassume, na L6vy-bruhlianashion, hat hephysicians'brainsareill-wired.Thephysiciansmayverywell havestrongreasonsforbelievingwhat

they do. Theiranswersmay even suggestthat statistical ntuition s less deficient

than t seems.Suppose,forinstance, hate in thetable below equals20%, n other

wordsthat20%of the patientsof the physicians havedepressionsymptoms,and

thatg also equals 20%(20%of thepatientshave attempted uicide).Admittedly,

higherfigureswouldbe unrealistic.Withthese assumptions,n thecase where the

percentagea of people presentingthe two characters s greaterthan 4, the two

variableswouldbe correlated,andthus causalitycouldplausiblybe presumed.Aphysicianwhohas seen,say,10people outof 100presentingwiththetwocharacterswould havegoodreason obelieveintheexistenceof acausalrelationshipbetween

the two features.In thisexample, hebelief of thephysicians s notreallyfalse.Inother nstances,

the beliefs producedby cognitivepsychology appear o be unambiguously alse.

In most cases, however,I found that these beliefs could be explainedas being

grounded n reasonsperceivedby the subjectsas strong,which the observercan

easily understand.

Obviously, hesereasonsarenotof the benefitminuscost type.Theyarerather

of the cognitive type. The aimpursuedby the actor s not to maximizeutility,but

rathercredibility, o determinewhethersomething s likely, true,etc. In addition

to its instrumental imension,therefore,rationalityhas a cognitivedimension.

CANRELIGIOUS ELIEFS EANALYZEDASRATIONAL?

Weberdefinedhis Verstehendeociology as foundedon MI: Interpretive o-

ciology (as I conceive it) considersthe isolated individualandhis activityas itsbasic unit,I would say its 'atom' (Weber1922). In his view, sociology, like any

13



14 BOUDON

science, has to bringthe macroscopicphenomena t is interested n downto their

microscopiccauses. He believed thatthe cause of an actor'sactions andbeliefs

consists in themeaning heyhadforthatactor.Andherejected heideaof reducing

rationality o instrumental ationality.His whole sociology of religionis foundedon the methodologicalprinciplethatthe causes of religiousbeliefs andof the ac-

tions inspiredby these beliefs reside in the meaningattributedo them by theirsocial subjects, and more exactly, that the reasonsthose subjectshad for adher-

ing to thosebeliefs couldnotbe reduced o RCTreasons.Inotherwords,whereas

Weber's interpretiveociology s, strictlyspeaking,definedbypostulatesP1-P2,

inpractice,Weberuses thesetof postulatesP1 toP3:theCTA.Itexcludesthesup-

plementarypostulatesP4-P6 that defineRCT.On this pointWeber'stheoretical

texts areperfectlyconsistentwith his empiricalanalyses.

Why were functionaries,militarypersonnel,andpoliticiansin Ancient Romeand modem Prussiaattracted o such cults as MithraismandFreemasonry, achcharacterizedby a vision of disembodied ranscendence ubjectto superior aws

anda conceptionof thecommunityof thefaithfulas a group o be organizedhier-

archically hrough nitiationrituals?Becausethearticlesof faithin suchreligions

were consistentwiththe social andpoliticalphilosophyof these social categories.

Theirmembersbelievedthata social systemcouldfunctiononly if under hecon-

trol of a legitimatecentral authorityand that that authoritymust be moved by

impersonalrules.

Theirvision was of

afunctional,

hierarchically rganizedsoci-ety, andthathierarchyhadto be foundedon abilities andskills to be determined

in accordancewith formalizedprocedures--as was the case in the Roman and

Prussian states.Takentogether,these principlesfor the political organizationof

a bureaucratic tatewere, in their eyes, the reflectionof a valid political phi-

losophy. And they perceived the initiation ritualsof Mithraism, n the case of

the Roman officers and civil servants,or Freemasonry,n the case of Prussian

civil servants,as expressing those same principles in a metaphysical-religiousmode.

Tocite another xample,Weberexplained hatpeasantshaddifficultyacceptingmonotheismbecausethe uncertainty haracteristic f naturalphenomenadidnot

seem to themtobe atall compatiblewiththeideathattheorderof thingscouldbe

subjectto a single will, a notionthatin andof itself implieda minimaldegreeof

coherenceandpredictability.

AxiologicalRationality

Weber's axiologicalrationality s oftenunderstoodas synonymouswith valueconformity. would proposerather hatthe expression dentifiesthe case where

prescriptivebeliefs aregrounded n the mind of social actors on systems of rea-sons perceived by themas strong, n exactly the same way as descriptivebeliefs

(Boudon 2001a). This important ntuitioncontainedin Weber'snotion (thoughimplicitlyrather hanexplicitly)was apparently lreadypresent n AdamSmith'smind.



BEYOND RATIONALCHOICETHEORY

An Illustration romAdamSmith

Althought is recognizedhatSmith'sTheory fMoralSentimentsoesnotrestonRCT,tis

sometimeseld hathisbetter-knownorkontheWealthfNations

does.The ollowing xample hows,however,hat his snotthecase.Even nthisbook,whichhadatremendousnfluence neconomicheory, mithdoesnotuseRCT,butratherhecognitive ersion f MI:CTA.

Why, sksSmith, owe(i.e.,eighteenthentury nglishmen)onsidertnormalthat oldiers repaid essthanminers? mith'smethodologynhisanswer ouldbe appliedomany imilarquestionsoday:Whydowe feel it fair hat uchandsuchoccupations paidmoreorless thananotherSmith1976(1776),book1,chapter 0]?Hisanswer s asfollows:

(a) A salary s the retributionf a contribution.b) To equalcontributionsshould orrespondqual etributions.c)Several omponentsnternto hevalueof acontribution:he nvestmentequiredoproduce given ypeof competence,therisksnvolvedntherealizationf thecontribution,tc. d)The nvestmentimeiscomparablen thecaseoftheminer ndof thesoldier.ttakesabout smuch imeandefforto train soldier s toproduce miner.The wo obsarecharacterizedysimilar isks.Both nclude heriskof death. e)Nonetheless,hereare mportantdifferencesetween he wotypesofjobs.(f) Thesoldierervesacentralunctioninsociety.This unction reserveshe dentity nd heveryexistence f thenation.

Theminer ulfillsan economicactivity mongothers.Heis notmorecentralothesociety han,say,thetextileworker.g) Consequently,hedeathof thetwomenhas a different ocialmeaning.Thedeathof the minerwillbe identified sanaccident,hedeathof the soldieronthebattlefield s a sacrifice. h)Becauseof thisdifferencen thesocialmeaning f theirrespective ctivities,hesoldierwill be entitled o symbolic ewards, restige, ymbolicdistinctions,ncludingfuneral onorsn caseof deathonthebattlefield.i) Theminer s notentitledothesame ymbolic ewards.j) As thecontributionf thetwo categoriesntermsnotablyof risk andinvestment s the same, the equilibriumbetweencontributionand retribution an only be restoredby makingthe salary of the mineworkers

higher. (k) This system of reasons is responsiblefor our feeling thatthe minershould be paid a higherwage thanthe soldier.

First, Smith's analysis does not use RCT. People do not believe what they

believebecause thiswouldmaximize some differencebetweenbenefitsandcosts.

Theyhave trong easonsorbelievingwhat heybelieve,but hesereasons renot

of the cost-benefit ype. They arenot even of the consequential ype. At no point

intheargumentre heconsequenceshatwould ventuallyesultrom heminersnotbeing

paidmore han he

soldiersvoked.Smith's rgumentakes

ratherheformof a deductionromprinciples. eoplehave hefeeling hat t is fair opayhigher alaries o minershan oldiersbecausehefeeling s groundednstrongreasonsderivedromstrongprinciples,laimsSmith.He doesnotsay that hesereasons reexplicitly resentneveryone's ead,butclearly ssumeshat heyarein an intuitiveashion esponsibleortheirbeliefs.Ifminerswerenotpaidmorethansoldiersthis wouldperhapsgenerateconsequences(a strikeby miners,say);

15



16 BOUDON

but these eventualconsequences are not the reason why most people thinktheminersshould be paidmore;people do not believe in this statementout of fearof

these eventualconsequences.

Weberprobablyhad such cases in mind when he introducedhis distinctionbetween instrumental nd axiological rationality.

A contemporary heoristof ethics proposes analyses of some of our moral

sentimentsthat are similarto Smith's (Walzer1983). Why, for instance,do we

considerconscription o be a legitimaterecruitmentmethod for soldiers but not

for miners,he asks? The answeragain is thatthe functionof the formeris vital

whereas hatof thelatter s not.Ifconscriptionweretobeapplied o miners, tcould

be appliedto any andeventuallyto all kindsof occupations,hence it would lead

to a regime incompatiblewith the principles of democracy. n the same fashion,

it is readilyacceptedfor soldiersto be used as garbagecollectorsin emergencies,although t wouldbe considered llegitimateto use themfor suchtasksin normal

situations.In all these examples, as in Smith'sexample,collective moralfeelings

aregroundedon solid reasons,butnot on reasonsof thetypeconsidered n RCT.

I am not sayingof coursethata notion such as fairnesscannotbe affectedby

contextualparameters.Thus, it has been shown that in the ultimatumgame the

50/50 proposal s morefrequent n societies wherecooperationwith one's neigh-

bors is essentialto currenteconomic activitythanin societies wherecompetitionbetweenneighborsprevails(Henrichet al. 2001). Suchfindingsarenot incompat-

ible with a rational nterpretationf moralbeliefs. Theyrather howthata system

of reasons is more easily evoked in one context than in another.In summary,whereascontextualvariation n moralbeliefs is generally nterpreted s validating

a cultural-irrationaliew of axiologicalfeelings, thecontextual-rationalaradigm

illustratedby thepreviousexamplesappears o be moresatisfactory: fferingself-

sufficientexplanations, .e., explanationswithoutblackboxes.

The Validity of ReasonsWhy does an actor consider a system of reasons to be good? Kant wrote that

looking for generalcriteriaof truthamountsto tryingto milk a billy goat. Weshouldrecognizewith Popperthatthereareno generalcriteriaof truth,butalso,

againstPopper's heoryof science,that herearenotevengeneralcriteriaof falsity.A theory is consideredfalse only from the moment when an alternative heory

is found that is definitelybetter.Priestleyhad strongreasons for believing the

phlogistontheory was true.It becamedifficultto follow him only afterLavoisier

showed thatall the phenomenathatPriestleyhad explained in accordancewith

his phlogiston could also be explained without it and with his own theory.In

othercircumstances, he relative strengthof alternative ystems of reasons willcorrespond o other types of criteria.In otherwords,we hold a theoryto be true

or false because we have strongreasonsof considering t as such, but thereare

no general criteriaof the strengthof a system of reasons.More generally, et us

assumefora momentthatwe wouldhavebeenableto identifythegeneralcriteria




of truthor rationality, hen the next questionwould be: On which principles do

you ground hecriteria,andso on adinfinitum.

To sumup,a systemof reasonscanbe strongerorweakerthananotherandwe

canexplainwhy;but tcannotbe saidtobe strongorweak inanabsolutesense. Likeall evaluativenotions,truthandrationalityarecomparative,not absolutenotions.

A theory s nevertrue or false, buttruerorfalserthan another, f I may say so. We

consider t truefromthe momentwhenwe findit hard o imaginea bettertheory.

The criteriausedto decide thatone systemof reasons s stronger hananotherare

drawn roma huge reservoirandvaryfromone questionto another.

Borrowing xamplesfromthehistoryof sciencehastheadvantage f clarifying

thediscussionabout hecriteriaof rationality.Buttheconclusiontobe drawn rom

the aboveexample(that herearenogeneralcriteriaof rationality)appliesnotonly

to scientific,butto ordinarybeliefs aswell. Andtheyapplynotonlyto descriptive,

butalso to prescriptivebeliefs.

This latterpoint often meets someresistancebecauseof a wronginterpretationof Hume'suncontroversialheorem that no conclusion of the prescriptive ype

can be drawn roma set of statementsof the descriptive ype. But a prescriptive

or normativeconclusioncan be derivedfroma set of descriptivestatements hat

are all descriptive,except one, so thatthe real formulationof Hume's theorem

shouldbe . . .a set of statementsall of thedescriptive ype. I havedeveloped his

pointmore

fully inBoudon

(2003).It

isan

essentialpoint since it shows thatthegap betweenprescriptiveand descriptivebeliefs is not as wide as manypeople

think.Itgives aclearmeaningto Weber'sassertion hataxiologicalrationalityand

instrumental ationalityarecurrentlycombinedin social action, thoughthey are

entirelydistinct romoneanother.As impliedbytheCTAmodel,cognitivereasons

groundprescriptiveas well as descriptivebeliefs in the mindof individuals.

CONCLUSION

I have triedto makesome crucialpoints:thatsocial actiongenerallydependsonbeliefs; thatas faras possible, beliefs, actions,andattitudesshouldbe treatedas

rational,or moreprecisely,as the effect of reasonsperceived by social actorsas

strong;andthatreasonsdealingwithcosts andbenefitsshouldnotbe given more

attention hantheydeserve.Rationality s one thing,expectedutilityanother.

Why shouldwe introduce his rationalitypostulate?Because social actorstry

to act in congruencewith strongreasons.This explainswhy theirown behavior

is normallymeaningfulto them.In some cases, the context demandsthatthese

reasons are of the cost-benefit ype. In othercases, they are not: Even if we

accept thatthe notions of cost and benefit are interpretedn the most extensive

fashion, what are the costs andbenefits to me of minersbeing better paid than

soldiers if I haveno chanceof everbecomingeithera soldieror a miner?

On the whole, to get a satisfactory heory of rationality,one has to accept the

idea thatrationality s not exclusively instrumental. n other words, the reasons

motivatinganactordo notnecessarilybelongto theinstrumentalype.Inthecases

17



18 BOUDON

of interestto sociologists, people's actions are understandable ecause they are

moved by reasons.But these reasonscan be of severaltypes. Action can rest onbeliefs or not;the beliefs can be commonplaceor not;they can be descriptiveor

prescriptive. n all cases, the CTAmodel assumesthataction has to be explainedby its meaningto theactor; t supposeshence that t is meaningful o the actor,or,

in otherwords,that t is grounded n the actor's eyes on a systemof reasonsthathe or she perceivesto be strong.

The CTA model is also more promisingthanthe program-based ehavior

model(PBBM)proposedbyevolutionary pistemologists,notablyVanberg2002),

for the lattermodel unavoidablygeneratesblack boxes. As the generalizedver-

sion of RCT obtainedby supposingthatactorsareguidedby frames oses themainadvantageof RCT itself (providingself-sufficientexplanations), he PBBM

generates urtherquestionsof thetype wheredoes theprogram ome from?Whydo some actors endorseit while others do not? Because the CTAmodel has an

answerto suchquestions, t is capableof generatingself-sufficientexplanations.

ConsideringRCTto be a specialcase of MI has the advantageof allowing the

main advantageof RCT (producingblack-box-freeexplanations) o be extended

to amuchwidersetof socialphenomena.ButI muststressagain that, f theCTA s

more generalthanRCT, t cannotbe applied o allphenomena. rrationalityhould

be given its rightplace. Traditional ndaffectiveactionsalso exist. Moreover,all

actionsrest on thebasis of instincts.I

lookto my rightandleft beforecrossinga

streetbecause I wantto stayalive. Reason s theservantof passions,as Humesaid.

ButpassionsneedReason:themagician'scustomersaremotivatedby thepassionto survive,to see theircropsgrow;butnobodywouldconsiderthatthispassionin

itself is an adequateexplanation or their magicalbeliefs.

The theoryof rationality hatI have sketchedraisessome importantquestions

thatI will contentmyself withmentioning.Does thefactthatbehaviorandbeliefs

arenormally nspiredby strongreasons,eventhoughthesereasonsmightbe false,

meanthatanybehaviororbelief can bejustified?Certainlynot.Priestleybelieved

in phlogiston;Lavoisierdid not. The two had strongreasons for believing whatthey believed, andthey both saw theirreasonsas valid.The latterwas right, the

formerwrong,however.The strengthof reasons is thusa function of the context.

Today,ourcognitivecontextis suchthatPriestley's reasonsarenow weak for us

becausewe know thatLavoisier'sreasonswere stronger.But Lavoisier'sreasons

hadto be thoughtup andpublicizedbefore therecould be anyconclusionthathe

was right.Thenhe becameirreversibly ightasopposedtoPriestley.No relativismfollows fromthe contextualityof reasons.

Just as with cognitive reasons, axiological reasons can become strongeror

weakerovertime,mainlybecausenewreasonsareexpounded.Whenitwas shownthattheabolitionof capitalpunishment ouldnotbe heldresponsible or any sig-

nificant ncrease n crimerates,theargument capitalpunishment s good because

it is aneffectivethreatagainstcrime becameweaker.Thisprovokedachange-anirreversible ne-in ourmoralsensibilitytowardcapitalpunishment.Thereareno

mechanicallyapplicablegeneralcriteriaof the strengthof the reasonson which

eitherprescriptiveor descriptivebeliefs aregrounded.Still, irreversible hanges




in prescriptives well as descriptiveeliefsarefrequentlybserved ecausenthenormal ourseof events,a systemof reasonsR' eventually ppearedo bebetter han hesystemR, as in thedescriptiveaseof Lavoisier ndPriestley r

as in the prescriptiveaseof Montesquieuwhodefendedhe ideathatpoliticalpowerwouldbemoreefficientf it is notconcentrated)ndBodin whocouldnotimagine hatpoliticalpowerwouldbe efficientwithout ts beingconcentrated).Montesquieu'sndBodin'sbeliefsas towhatagoodpolitical rganizationhouldbeweregroundednreasons hat hetwoof themperceivedobestrong.Clearly,Montesquieuasright.

Finally, he paradoxes entioned bovecanbe easily solved.Theyhaveno RCTsolutionbutdo haveaneasyCTAsolution: lagiarismndcorruption

provoke negative eaction otbecauseof theirconsequences,utbecauseheyareincompatible ithsystemsof reasons hatmostpeoplethinkof as strong.Thesame s trueof the otherparadoxes,owhich t is unnecessaryocomebackin detail:Peoplemake heirdecisionsbecauseof a moreor less conscious etof argumentshat heyfeel strong eason o believe n. Thus, n the ultimatumgame, heypick he50/50solution ecauseheywonderwhich olutionsfair, ndtheydotheirbesttodefine airnessn thiscase.Theydonotaskwhat s goodforthemselves. eoplereject orruptionhoughtseffectonthem s neutral ecausetheyendorse theoryromwhich heyconcludehattis unacceptable.nallthese

cases,theydisplay eleological ehavior: heywant oreacha goal.Butonlyinparticularases s thegoaltomaximize ne's nterestsrthe satisfactionf one'spreferences;hegoalmayalsobe finding hetrueorfairanswer o a question.Given hesevarious oals, heyarerationalnthesense hat hey ookforthebestoratleast ora satisfactoryystemofreasons apable f groundingheiranswer.

Thereadermaybepuzzledbythefactthat haveusedmanyexamples romclassical sociology in this paper.By so doing I wantedto suggest a thesis thatI

canformulateutnotdemonstratena short pace:hat rom hebeginningf ourdiscipline,hemostsolidsociological xplanationsmplicitly setheCTAmodel

or,whenadequate,tsrestrictedersion:RCT.

The AnnualReviewof Sociology s onlineat http://soc.annualreviews.org

LITERATUREITED

Allais M, Hagen O, eds. 1979. ExpectedUtility Boudon R. 1998-2000. tudes sur Les So-HypothesesandtheAllais Paradox:Contem- ciologues Classiques. I and II. Paris:

poraryDiscussionsof Decisions UnderUn- PUFcertaintyWithAllais' Rejoinder.Dordrecht: Boudon R. 2001a. The Origin of Values.New

Reidel Brunswick:TransactionBecker G. 1996. Accounting or Tastes.Cam- Boudon R. 2001b. Sociology. InternationalEn-

bridge:HarvardUniv.Press cyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sci-BoudonR. 1996.The 'RationalChoiceModel': ences. Amsterdam:Elsevier

a particular ase of the 'CognitivistModel.' BoudonR. 2003. Raison, bonnes raisons.Paris:

Ration.Soc. 8(2):123-50 PUF

19



20 BOUDON

Boudon R, CherkaouiM. 1999. CentralCur-

rents in Social Theory.London:Sage

ColemanJ. 1986.Individual nterestsand Col-

lective Action:SelectedEssays. Cambridge:CambridgeUniv.Press

ColemanJ. 1990.Foundations fSocial Theory.

Cambridge/London:HarvardUniv.Press

DahrendorfR. 1995. Whithersocial sciences?

Econ. Soc. Res. Counc. Annu. Lect., 6th,

Swindon,UK

FerejohnFJ, Fiorina M. 1974. The paradoxof

notvoting: a decisiontheoreticanalysis.Am.

Polit. Sci. Rev.68(2):525-36

FreyBS. 1997.NotJust or theMoney:anEco-nomic Theoryof PersonalMotivation.Chel-

tenham:EdwardElgar

Hagen 0. 1995. Risk in utility theory, n busi-

ness and in the world of fear and hope.

In RevolutionaryChanges in Understand-

ing Manand Society,ScopesandLimits,ed.

J. G6tschl,pp. 191-210. Dordrecht/London:

Kluwer

Hardin R. 1995. One for All: The Logic ofGroup Conflict.Princeton:PrincetonUniv.

PressHenrichJ,BoydR, Bowles S, CamererC, Fehr

E, et al. 2001. In searchof Homo economi-cus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Am. Econ. Rev. 91(2):73-78

Hoffman E, Spitzer ML. 1985. Entitlements,

rights and fairness.An experimentalexam-

inationof subjects' concepts of distributivejustice. J. LegalStud.14:259-97

HoffmanS. 2000. Le 'choix rationnel',nouvel

6vangile. Interview.Le Monde des Dibats,

May 25

Hollis M. 1977. Models of Man: Philosophi-cal Thoughtson Social Action. Cambridge:

CambridgeUniv.PressHorowitzI. 1994. TheDecompositionof Soci-

ology.New York:OxfordUniv.PressKahnemanD, TverskyA. 1973. Availability:a

heuristic orjudgingfrequencyandprobabil-

ity. Cogn.Psychol.5:207-32KuranT. 1995.PrivateTruths,PublicLies.The

Social Consequencesof PreferenceFalsifi-

cation. Cambridge:HarvardUniv.Press

Mills CW. 1951. WhiteCollar TheAmerican

Middle Classes. New York: Oxford Univ.

Press

OberschallA. 1973.Social Conflictand SocialMovements.EnglewoodCliffs: Prentice-Hall

OberschallA. 1994. Rbgles, normes, morale:

6mergence et sanction. L'Annie Sociol.

44:357-84

Olson M. 1965. The Logic of CollectiveAc-

tion;PublicGoodsandtheTheoryofGroups.

Cambridge:HarvardUniv.Press

OverbyeE. 1995. Makingacasefortherational,

self-regarding,ethical'voter... andsolving

the paradoxof not voting in the process.Eur J. Polit.Res. 27:369-96

PortesA. 1998. Social capital:its origins and

applicationsnmodem sociology.Annu.Rev.Sociol. 24:1-24

QuattroneGA, TverskyA. 1987. Self-decep-

tion and the voter's illusion. In The Multi-

ple Self, ed. J Elster,pp. 35-58. Cambridge:

CambridgeUniv.Press

RadnitzkyG. 1987.Laperspective6conomiquesur le progres scientifique:application en

philosophiede la science de l'analyse cotit-ben6fice.Arch.Philos. 50:177-98

RescherN. 1995. SatisfyingReason.Studies n

theTheoryofKnowledge.Dordrecht:KluwerRothsteinB. 2001. The universalwelfare state

as a socialdilemma.Ration.Soc. 13(2):213-33

RootHL. 1994. TheFountainof Privilege:Po-

litical Foundationsof Economic Markets nOldRegimeFranceand England.Berkeley:

Univ.Calif.Press

RuseM. 1993.Une d6fensede l'6thique6volu-tionniste.InFondementsNaturelsde L'Lthi-

que,ed.JPChangeux,pp.35-64. Paris:Odile

Jacob

SmithA. 1976 (1776).AnInquiry nto theNa-

ture and Causes of the Wealthof Nations.

Oxford:ClarendonSchuesslerAA. 2000. Expressivevoting. Ra-tion.Soc. 12(1):87-119

TocquevilleA de. 1986 (1856). L'AncienRig-

ime et la Revolution.In Tocqueville.Paris:

Laffont

Vanberg VJ. 2002. Rational choice vs.




program-basedehavior:lternativeheoret-ical approachesndtheirrelevanceorthestudy finstitutions.ation. oc.14(1):7-54

WalzerM. 1983.SpheresfJustice.ADefenceof Pluralism ndEquality.Oxford:MartinRobertson

WeberM. 1922. Aufsiitze ur Wissenschaft-slehre.Tibingen:Mohr

WeberM. 1988[1922].Gesammelteufsditze

zurReligionssoziologie.iibingen:MohrWilson Q.1993.TheMoralSense.NewYork:FreePress

21

Documents

Boudon Beyond Rational Choice Theory