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Boston Beer Equity Valuation Valuation Date: April 1, 2005
Jason Boney [email protected] Jordan Gristy [email protected]
Preston Madden [email protected] Heath Stanley [email protected]
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Boston Beer Co. Equity Valuation Table of Contents Executive Summary 4
Business and Industry Analysis 7 Competitive Advantages 8
Five Forces Model 9 Industry Competitive Analysis 15 Accounting Analysis 17 Key Accounting Policies 17 Degree of Accounting Flexibility 20 Evaluation of Accounting Strategy 22
Accounting Quality of Disclosure 23 Red Flags 23 Quantitative Analysis 25 Ratio Analysis 29 Liquidity 29 Profitability 31
Capital Structure 34 Forecasting 37 Balance Sheet 37 Income Statement 38 Statement of Cash Flows 39 Forecast Summary 40 Valuation Analysis 41 Method of Comparables 41 Valuation Tools 44 Discounted Free Cash Flow 45 Residual Income 46 Long Run Residual 47 Abnormal Earnings Growth (AEG) 48 Conclusion of Valuation 49 Work Cited 50 Appendix 52
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Boston Beer Co.
By Valuation Proclamation
Heath Stanley, Jordan Gristy, Preston Madden, Jason Boney Investment Recommendation: Buy, Undervalued 4-28-05
Stock Ticker and Exchange SAM-NYSE Current Price (4-1-05) $22.14 52 week price range $18.52 - $27.95 Revenue (2004) $239,680,000 Market Capitalization $313,130,000 Shares Outstanding 14,300,000 3-month Avg. Daily Volume 40,450 Percent Institutional Ownership 25% Book Value Per Share $5.52 ROE 15.95% ROA 11.64% Est. 5yr EPS Growth Rate 2% Cost of Capital Est. Beta Ke R2
Estimated 5.29% 5-year -0.201 5.29% .012 3-year 0.098 3.67% .003 2-year 0.434 5.24 .031 Published Beta 0.35 Kd 3.61% WACC 4.79%
Debt Risk Altman Z-Score 3.49-Company considered safe EPS Forecast FYE (12/31) 2004(A) 2005(E) 2006(E) 2007(E) EPS $0.86 $0.69 $0.71 $0.72 Valuation Ratio Comparison SAM Comp.’s Avg. Forward P/E 25.7 16 Forward P.E.G. 2.5 1.55 Trailing P/E 23.8 20 M/B 3.82 6.715 Valuation Predictions Actual Share Price (7 April 2005) $22.14 P/E Forward $13.76 PEG Forward $17.75 M/B $12.62 Ford Epic Valuation $12.01 Intrinsic Valuations Free Cash Flows $41.25 Residual Income $15.78 Abnormal Earnings Growth $38.51 Long-Run Residual Income Perpetuity $42.92
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Executive Summary Recommendation- Buy, Undervalued
After reviewing Boston Beer’s financial statements and data we believe the company
to be undervalued. Using four forecasting models we found that three prices put
Boston Beer’s value at around $40.00 which is well above the price of $22.14 on the
date of April 1, 2005.
Due to the recent growth in the better beer market and the low amount of debt the
company has, we see a positive future for the company and believe that over time it
may be able to grow and become a dominant player in the beer industry. Yet, as a
whole, the beer market in general has been declining over the past few years which
causes some alarm (though we do realize that declines come and go many times in
this industry). Therefore, we believe if managed right the company may be able to
grow substantially in their better beer market or at least maintain the hold of loyal
customers that is has acquired over the years.
Industry Demand Drivers
Boston Beer’s demand in the past has come from drinkers who prefer higher quality
beer with higher quality ingredients. As the better beer market continues to grow
within the alcoholic beverage industry, Boston Beer will be able to attain a larger
presence than what it once enjoyed. We believe that heavy advertising and the
continued pursuit of better ingredients will allow new drinkers to emerge who enjoy
the kind of quality that Boston Beer has to offer.
It is understood that the beer market fluctuates over time, but it has not seen quite a
growth within itself as it has with the “better beers”. Within the last few years the
growth has maintained a stable average of approximately 3% within the alcoholic
beverage industry and sees no looking back. As long as Boston Beer maintains its
status as a premium beer there should be no reason that it can not take advantage
of this stable growth.
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Light Beer Introduction and Expansion- Boston Beer has just unveiled their newest
product of Samuel Adams Light to the better beer market. In 2004, the light Samuel
Adams out sold the original for the first time in the company’s history. We believe
that this will be the key to Boston Beer’s success to maintain its hold in the better
beer industry and bring in new demand for Boston Beer.
Financial Stability
Boston Beer’s financials are impressive as compared to the big names in the beer
industry. One of the more impressive areas is the lack of debt and the ability to
leverage the company to new heights. In 2000, Boston Beer had no actual long term
debt on the books and since has brought on very little. This is mainly due to the
strategy of contracting to other brewers to maintain low risk for the well being of the
company.
The profitability, capital structure, and liquidity for Boston Beer all appear to be
stronger than the averages in the alcoholic industry which shows the strong stability
of the firm. Boston Beer’s Altman Z-score is at 3.49 which is considered safe and
good investment grade quality.
In conclusion, Boston Beer has many choices on where to take the company in the
21st Century. With overall high quality in its financial structure, Boston Beer has the
ability to one day grow and become a dominant force within the beer industry as a
whole.
Valuation
Models such as the free cash flow, long-run residual income, and abnormal earnings
growth showed Boston Beer to be undervalued, but the residual income showed
them as slightly overvalued. By examining these forecasting models we believe that
each one has some degree of truth, but based on three of the four models and
financial quality in the firm we believe Boston Beer is undervalued.
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Risks
Lack of growth overseas and the recent spike in imported better beers shows many
risks that Boston Beer is facing. We see Boston Beer being able to maintain its loyal
customers but it is a tough market to gain any new loyal customers. Also, the mega
brewers are beginning new strategies to break into the better beer market. With the
mega brewers entering there might be less opportunity for Boston Beer to maintain
its growth in the market.
Industry Analysis The Boston Beer Company is in an interesting situation to define its market status. It
is known as the largest microbrewery in the United States as well as being able to
compete with the mega brewers on a product differentiation competition. They
compete in the domestic better beer industry that is defined by increased price and
superior tastes. This has created a loyal customer base that has launched the
company to be able to compete nationally with companies such as Anheuser-Busch,
Heineken, Constellation Brands, and Adolph Coors. Boston Beer Company’s
customer loyalty can be seen in the decrease in sales in The Samuel Adams Boston
Lager and an increase in Sam Adams Light during the rollout in 2002, therefore
cannibalizing sales. Their real major competitors in the better beer industry are
Heineken and Corona, but being foreign firms reduces accounting reliability and
information sources. Therefore we have identified Molson Coors and Anheuser-Busch
as major competitors. This “better beer” market comprises of 15% of the total
domestic beer industry consumption. The following chart from finance.yahoo.com
compares Boston Beer Company to the leaders in the alcoholic beverage industry.
Statistic Industry Leader SAM SAM Rank
Market Capitalization DEO 42.06B 337.70M 11 / 18
P/E Ratio (ttm) KNBWY 30.84 25.85 3 / 18
PEG Ratio (ttm, 5 yr expected) KNBWY 2.91 2.31 2 / 18
Revenue Growth (Qtrly YoY) CEDC 39.09% -1.46% 12 / 18
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EPS Growth (Qtrly YoY) CEDC 37.95% -25.00% 9 / 18
Long-Term Growth Rate (5 yr) LQU 20.0% 12.0% 4 / 18
Return on Equity (ttm) AED 89.75% 19.95% 5 / 18
Long-Term Debt/Equity (mrq) AED 4.059 0 N/A
Dividend Yield (annual) DEO 4.45% N/A N/A
Last year 26 beverages were produced under the company and Boston Beer was the
sixth largest producer in the nation. Boston Beer Company is mostly known for the
Samuel Adams line and newly introduced Sam Adams Light in 2002. They also brew
specialty, seasonal, and extreme beers. This allows a new taste for the Sam Adams
loyalists year round that increases their product differentiation among competitors.
In addition to these products they also make Hardcore Crisp Hard Cider and three
differentiations of Twisted Teas.
Competitive Advantages
The main factor to Boston Beer Company’s success is its product differentiation. The
brewery relies on a unique product taste with a loyal customer base. Consumers
appreciate Samuel Adams distinct brand image and what they consider to be a
superior taste at a price that is not too outrageous compared to cost advantage firms
such as the mega brewers (i.e. Coors, Anheuser-Busch). Boston Beer Company also
delivers variety to its customers in several fashions, including seasonal beers, hard
iced teas, and hard ciders. This investment in research and development offers
consumers varieties in the alcoholic beverage market.
Their final competitive advantage is the established distribution channel with bases
in Cincinnati and Boston. This distribution system allows delivery for fresh beer, in a
timely manner, to a national audience.
Boston Beer Company can sustain these competitive advantages due to their distinct
role in the market. It is difficult to copy their product in a costly manner without
sacrificing quality. This allows the brewer to hold onto their market niche. Also,
Boston Beer Company consistently offers new choices to consumers in the alcoholic
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beverage industry that attracts new customers with new tastes. Finally, Boston Beer
Company is the only microbrew to distribute nationally, in addition to their well
developed distribution channels.
Five Forces Model Rivalry Among Existing Firms
Boston Beer is in one of the highest competitive fields within the realms of the
alcoholic beverage market. Unlike Anheuser Busch or Coors who compete nation
wide with volume, advertising, and standard tastes for the public, Boston Beer is part
of a much more competitive field of specialty brewers or what is known as the “Better
Beer” category of the beer industry. Better Beers are determined by higher price,
quality, image and taste, as compared with regular domestic beers. They are much
smaller in size as well as distribution but are able to hold on to a small but vital part
of the industry. Though they are at the top of what is considered “Better Beers” firms
based in the U.S., they still come third when imports are considered. Companies
such as Heineken and Corona have taken hold of the Better Beer share leaving
Boston Beer in third as far as sales and volume.
Degree of differentiation:
Alcoholic Beverages as a Whole- The “Better Beer” category of the beer industry,
which includes craft or specialty beers and most imports, mainly focuses on product
differentiation. Boston Beer’s main strategy to keep itself in the market for alcoholic
beverages is by differentiation of tastes to the customer. By offering distinct tastes
of many kinds, Boston Beer holds a small but strong share in the overall market
(*2%) of beverages that are sold.
Specialty Brewers (“Better Beer”)- Founder-chairman C. James Koch, a sixth-
generation brewmaster who crafted an old-family blend of hops into Sam Adams, has
created one of the best-selling specialty labels ever in the U.S. The numbers for
Boston Beer have been impressive (net sales up 2.6% to $161.4 million, operating
income up 49% to $15.2 million) and could be interpreted as leading to another
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profitable year that has landed Boston Beer in Forbes 200 Best Small Companies.
The wide variety of product choices based on taste has allowed Boston Beer to target
many different markets, including the specialty market. This has allowed Boston Beer
to maintain the highest percentage share in that market than any other U.S. firm in
their market.
Because of a steep learning curve in the industry for beer, Boston Beer cannot count
on size nor volume, but only on their differentiation from the larger firms, and their
ability to maintain and grow their niche in the market.
Threat of New Entrants:
Specialty Threats- One of Boston Beer’s biggest threats is that of new specialty
brewers entering the marketplace. Nationally, Boston Beer is one of the most well
known specialty beers firms, but it faces regional threats much higher than those
faced nationally. This is mainly due to local businesses brewing beverages that aim
towards local tastes with lower costs to the consumer. Although the learning curve is
steep for breweries, low barriers to entry based on price make it even more difficult
for Boston Beer to maintain its status due to the wide variety of tastes and prices
that are offered across the country and around the world.
Relationships and Distribution Channels- The company sells its products to a network
of approximately 440 wholesale distributors, who then sell to a variety of retailers
such as pubs, restaurants, grocery chains, package stores, stadiums and other retail
outlets. The good news is that Boston Beer has and will be able to maintain existing
relationships with their distributors due to their prestige standing in their industry.
Newer and smaller firms will have a difficult time obtaining the same kind of
relationships based on the marketability of their products. High taxation on alcoholic
beverages and strict laws that prohibit the sale to companies without license make it
even harder for new companies to gain portions of the market share.
Legal Barriers- Boston Beer is also able to maintain its market share because of high
legal barriers that the state and federal government sets for companies to begin
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constructing breweries. As mentioned above, high taxation is another legal barrier
that must be overcome by new firms to the market. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) also sets strict guidelines enforcing a clean and healthy environment
for the workers and for the land that the brewery is built on.
Threats of Substitutes
In the industry of alcoholic beverages, there is always a threat of substitute products.
One of the biggest threats originates from wine and spirits. During 2003, the total
beer industry in the United States experienced a decline in volume of less than 0.5%
as compared to the prior year of 2002. This decline has been attributed to certain
negative economic factors, but mainly to the increase in market share of wines and
spirits. Although total light beers grew, they grew at a lower rate than in previous
years.
Also the substitution among types and brands of beers has been a huge threat
regionally as well as internationally. Boston Beer must compete with smaller regional
brewers with very low cost entry barriers, and international brewers in the Better Beer
market with tremendous volume capabilities.
Boston Beer has attempted to neutralize this threat by developing their own
substitutes (shown in Figure 1A) such as Hardcore and Twisted Tea malts to battle
the substitutes that infiltrate the market. Yet, Boston Beers main strength in
marketing is the loyalty that comes from being in business for a long period of time.
Boston Beer customers have not based their purchases on the lowness of the price
but on the quality and distinctiveness of the taste and the image that it portrays. This
loyalty has decreased the threat of substitutes as well as the buyers’ willingness to
switch. Below is a list of all Boston Beer products.
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Samuel Adams Boston Lager® Sam Adams Light® Samuel Adams® Pale Ale Samuel Adams® Boston Ale Samuel Adams Cherry Wheat® Samuel Adams® Weiss Bier Samuel Adams® Vienna Style Samuel Adams® Cream Stout Samuel Adams® Triple Bock Seasonals: Samuel Adams® Spring Ale Samuel Adams® Double Bock Samuel Adams® Summer Ale Samuel Adams® Octoberfest Samuel Adams® Winter Lager
amuel Adams UtopiasS TM
HardCore® Crisp Hard Cider
Twisted Tea® Hard Iced Tea Twisted Tea® Raspberry Twisted Tea® Half & Half
Power of the Customer
Boston Beer has maintained a solid niche for many years that bases their purchases
on taste, image, and quality. Boston Beer competes on these prime factors and not
on price as the three large beer firms do. Yet, if Boston Beer took advantage of the
niche they have there are many substitute products regionally, nationally, and
especially internationally that may take away their main customer base. Therefore,
the power of the customer is relatively high because of the increasing competition in
the “Better Beer” market.
Power of the Suppliers
Since the amount of breweries in the country is so large in number, there are just as
many suppliers. This leads to many different substitutions that Boston Beer can deal
with that allow them to find the better buy for the better beer. This obviously leads to
the power of the supplier being very low.
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Five Forces Summary
The alcoholic beverage market consists of many different types of companies that
deal in different sectors of the market. Each one has different strategies to gain their
share of the market domestically and internationally. While some companies base
their marketing on volume and price, Boston Beer bases theirs on product
differentiation. Through different tastes and substitutes, they have created the
largest Better Beer firm in the United States and created a strong niche in the public
based on loyalty. By being in one of the most competitive areas of the alcoholic
beverage industry, Boston Beer must continue to reinforce their loyalty and to create
new innovative products to help them grow in the 21st century.
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Five Forces Table
Rivalry Among Existing Firms -Heavy competition in industry -More firms in specialty market -Regional threats and international threats extremely high
Threat of Substitutes -Wines and Spirits main substitute over past two years -Many specialty beers enter market constantly -Loyalty, taste, and image are advantages -Largest niche in “Better Beer” market
Threat of New Entrants -Legal entry barrier is high -Regional entry much lower than national distribution -Have solid distribution channels -Imports are an extreme threat
High Relatively Low High
Power of Buyers
Relatively High Low
Power of Suppliers -Many different suppliers allowing stiff competition -Large amounts of substitutes that go into making the product, therefore increasing price competition
-Boston Beer has strong niche not based on price -Able to maintain slightly higher prices based on loyalty -If taken advantage of though could loose major portion of the market -Many substitutes keeps Boston Beer competitive
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Industry Competitive Analysis
Strengths-The Company believes that their current strategy of consolidating brewery
ownership with contract brewing, which helps utilize the excess capacity of other
breweries, provides the Company with lots of flexibility as well as quality and cost
advantages over its competitors. They carefully select breweries with the capability of
utilizing traditional brewing methods and first rate quality control capabilities
throughout brewing, fermentation, finishing, and packaging. Furthermore, by brewing
in multiple locations, the Company reduces its distribution costs and is better able to
deliver fresher beer to its customers than other craft brewers with broad distribution
from a single brewery.
Success at the Boston Beer Company is in large part due to the Samuel Adams brand
of beers which was first brewed by the Chairman of the Company Jim Koch back two
decades ago. Currently there are nine different permanent styles and six seasonal
flavors of the Samuel Adams beer on the market. While the Samuel Adams brands
may get all the attention, HardCore Crisp Hard Cider and three varieties of Twisted
Iced Tea have recently emerged on the scene with improving annual sales since their
release. Malt beverages only bring in less than ten percent in overall annual sales,
yet the Boston Beer Company optimistically sees this as a growing opportunity to
expand in the future.
Weaknesses- Boston Beer Company feels its present strategy to price above the
three mega titans for beer production is fairly justified due to its high quality brewed
beer. For the most part the highly competitive beer market in the United States is
consumed in large quantities with high sensitivity to price. Unfortunately, a large
percentage of beer sales rely on the younger more price conscience age drinkers.
The Company sells its products mainly in the United States, but also has markets in
Canada, Europe, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Rim. In 2003, the Company’s major
distributor accounted for approximately 5 percent of the Company’s net sales, and
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the Company’s second largest distributor accounted for approximately 3 percent of
the Company’s net sales. There was no other distributor accounting for as much as 3
percent of the Company’s net sales. In some states, the terms of the Company’s
contracts with its distributors may be affected by laws that restrict the enforcement
of some contract terms such as in California.
Opportunities- The idea to continue to grow in the already overcrowded market of
specialty brewers is critical to the success of this company. There are currently over
thirteen hundred micro-brewers in the United States with The Boston Beer Company
ranked number one in overall sales and sixth in the overall domestic market.
Currently the Heineken and Corona brands rank ahead of Samuel Adams in this
category in the world market. In the near future the company is leaning towards
owning more breweries and cutting back on the contract brewers. Currently the
different cost associated with contract brewing involves raw materials, excise taxes
and deposits for pallets and kegs and specialized equipment required for beer
production. Brewery ownership would involve significant capital investment which
could easily exceed $50 million for the combination of purchase, expansion and
improvement, or for original construction.
Threats- In recent years, all brewers have had to contend with a stagnant beer
market and per-capita consumption that is on the decline. The reasoning behind this
ongoing trend are attributed to underlying factors such as the low carbohydrate diet
crave that has taken off in recent years, the unstable economy, and an increase in
market share of wines and spirits. In the past ten years, domestic light beers, which
are beers with fewer calories than the brewers’ traditional beers, have experienced
significant growth within the category, and now have a higher market share than
traditional beers. The Boston Beer Company is a fairly new competitor in the beer
market today. The three major brewers (Anheuser-Busch, Inc., SAB Miller PLC, and
Coors Brewing Company) comprise over 90% of all United States domestic beer
production, excluding imports. In addition, these mega-brewers have also entered
the “better beer category” by either developing their own beers, acquiring, in whole or
part, existing craft brewers or by importing and distributing foreign brewers’ brands.
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Accounting Analysis
Key Accounting Policies
Boston Beer’s financial conditions are based on their financial statements, which are
prepared in accordance with FASB. Preparing these statements requires
management to make significant estimates and judgment decisions considering the
accuracy of their assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses. These policies allow the
firm to accurately follow the competitive advantages mentioned earlier, and operate
as the largest microbrewer in the nation. The firm is required to use some different
policies because of their unique position, but for the most part has the accounting
strategy in place to compete with the industry powerhouses.
• Revenue Recognition: Boston Beer practices accrual accounting and
recognizes revenue when an invoice is presented to the customer and the
product is received. Many of the firm’s sales are through contracts so future
sales can be easily recognized. Additionally, the company records an
allowance for estimated returns, in compliance with SFAS No. 48.
• Principal of Consolidation: Boston Beer’s consolidated financial statements
include the accounts of the company and its wholly-owned subsidiaries. All
inter company transactions have been eliminated in consolidation.
• Cash: Cash and cash-equivalents include cash-on-hand, as well as highly
liquid tax-exempt and taxable money market instruments.
• Short Term Investments: Short term investments are accounted for in
accordance with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS), No.
115, classifying investments on their nature and intent of use.
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• Intangible assets and Goodwill: In accordance with SFAS No. 142, Goodwill
and other Intangibles, which the company adopted December 30, 2001, no
amortization related to Goodwill was recorded in fiscal 2002 or 2003. The
company tests for impairment the fourth quarter of every year, and a cost
benefit analysis of contract versus in-house brewing is conducted.
• Inventories: Inventories, which consist mainly of hops, bottles and packaging,
are stated at the lower of cost, FIFO basis, or market. The company’s policy
for inventory and purchase commitments is to recognize a loss by establishing
a reserve to cover forecasted needs, which is material to ensure the freshest
ingredients. Work in process and finished goods inventory tend to be low
because of sales contracts to sell products that are not even produced yet
and efficient operating procedures.
• Property, Plant & Equipment: Property, Plant and Equipment are stated at
cost. Expenditures for maintenance and repairs are expensed as incurred.
Major renewals extending the life of property are capitalized. Depreciation is
computed using the straight-line method based on the useful lives of the
individual assets. All of the property, plant and equipment owned by the
company are capitalized.
• Long-lived Assets: From time to time, the company enters into production
agreements with other companies. Through these agreements payments are
made, which are classified as assets and amortized over the life of the related
agreement. These capitalizations have been deemed cheaper to operate with
instead of operating leases because of cost benefit analysis mentioned by the
10-K, but no official numbers were released.
• Income Taxes: The company provides for deferred taxes using an asset and
liability approach that requires the recognition of deferred assets and
liabilities for the expected future tax consequences of events that have been
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recognized in their financial statements. The tax rate for Boston Beer has
been decreasing due to some short term investments that are tax deferred as
well. There is a large allotment for these taxes because of large
implementations on the alcohol industry by the government, such as
extensive permits and taxes.
• Stock: Boston Beer issued both Class A and B common stock which is
common stock and preferred stock. Both classes are eligible to receive
dividends, yet to this date none have been paid and none are planning on
being paid in the foreseeable future. Additionally, under terms of an existing
credit agreement, Boston Beer is prohibited from paying dividends.
• Advertising and Promotional Costs: Shipping costs are included in advertising
and promotional costs, which are all charged to expense during the period in
which they incurred. Advertising expenses are recognized when the ad is
completed
• Stock-based Compensation: Boston Beer accounts for stock-based
compensation using the intrinsic-valuation method prescribed in the
Accounting Principals Board Opinion No. 25.
Boston Beer’s key accounting practices should not all be weighed equally. Inventory
and revenue recognition should have more emphasis placed on them, because these
are very important to operations. Much of Boston Beer’s revenue is in accounts
receivable because a lot of their sales are through contracts, which is a competitive
advantage for the firm. Another competitive advantage in the accounting procedures
is Boston Beer’s ability to efficiently use operating leases with contract brewers to
create and distribute products cheaper than producing by the company.
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Degree of Potential Accounting Flexibility
The company’s financial statements agree that there is potential for a large degree of
flexibility in Boston Beer’s accounting policies, as with all alcoholic industry firms.
The main flexibility arrangements are concerning inventory. Managers must predict
the amount of hops consumed in operation, work in process and how much will be
consumed in future production. Accounting for grains, and oats is different than a
traditional inventory in that there are different qualities received, and cannot be
counted in units like a typical production company does. The product mixes
continually change according to the quality of the supplies received, therefore
changing the amount of inventory consumed for each barrel of beer. Inventory also
changes because of the return of stale supplies, and how many hops they will receive
due to purchase contract obligations. Boston Beer must also estimate a reserve for
bad supplies received or supplies that turn stale while in inventory. The firm simply
reimburses the contract brewing firm for stale supplies which has been an average of
$1.75 million over the past two years. This estimate is made at the beginning of the
year and inaccurate approximations could lead to changes in income, cost of goods
sold, and inventory. The company’s financial statements do a fair job in justifying all
estimates because estimated numbers have only varied slightly over the past several
years.
Further estimates include defined benefit payments to employees for pension plans.
These approximations grow slightly over the next few years indicating that they have
appropriated sufficient amounts for future payments.
They have pension plans for both non-union employees and union employees.
Boston Beer Co. had its own 401k plan that it introduced to most all non-union
employees in 1993. All fulltime non-union employees that are 21 years of age or
older, are allowed to participate in this 401k plan. After the sixth month of
employment the company matches the employee’s contribution dollar for dollar up to
$1000. Also for non-union workers is a health care plan that the company
contributes to.
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For union workers the company offers a defined contribution plan to eligible
employees under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Under this
defined contribution plan, employees can contribute up to 60% of their annual salary.
Under the plan though, the company does not make any matching contributions but
does incur immaterial administration costs.
Another plan for union employees is the defined benefit plan. Eligible participants for
this defined benefit plan according to the collective bargaining agreement, include
employees that have at least twelve consecutive months and at least 750 hours of
employment with the company. In the previous three years, 2002-2004, Boston Beer
Co. has $100,000 to this plan. The projected benefit obligation of these plans are
$847,000 for 2004, $707,000 for 2003, and $559,000 for 2002. These projected
numbers were calculated by accounting for the maintenance costs of the plan.
Goodwill was estimated in 2001 according to GAAP standards and is evaluated in the
fourth quarter of every year to see if necessary adjustments from impairments are
needed. No adjustments have been needed since 2001 and there seems to be no
need for changed to goodwill in the future do to steady asset numbers and no current
need for more assets.
All of the estimates seem to be appropriate even when compared to industry leaders.
Boston Beer’s numbers of course are much lower than competitors but this is due
sheer size differentiations as well as differing operating procedures because most
firms produce their own beer instead of contracting it out.
Summary of Flexibility
Although there is potential for large flexibility in approximations of inventory and
pension plans, the numbers they allocate in the company’s financial statements do
not seem too outlandish or vary greatly from years before, implying that they do not
abuse their flexibility.
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Evaluation of Accounting Strategy
Boston Beer’s accounting strategy is well defined in that they have very few
significant changes to policies and following industry norms. The company follows
the alcoholic beverage industry in allowance for large taxes, inventory estimations,
and accounting for union employees. They have diversified accounts receivable risk
by selling to a large number of distributors and individual buyers. Thousands of sales
beer stores and individual companies take away the risk of not collecting on some
invoices.
The company strays from the sector in several other strategies, but is acceptable
because of their significantly smaller size compared to competitors. The largest
difference is that Boston Beer has contracted some of their brewing to Miller and
High Falls Brewing Company. They have decided that by doing this they save an
estimated ten million dollars in capital costs and even more on the smaller
distribution costs by not brewing their own beer. Miller decided to close down its
plant in Tumwater, Washington and illegally tried to terminate its contract with
Boston Beer. This has recently been arbitrated and ruled in favor of Boston Beer in
which Miller must continue to brew for them until their contract expires. The cost
benefit analysis of contracting their own beer to other brewers is done at the end of
every year to ensure that the costs of contracting remains profitable as compared to
adding expensive capital and higher distribution costs.
The company uses the first in-first out inventory method while most alcoholic
beverage companies use last in-first out. The company also has large contract
agreements for sales and purchasing supplies. Operating leases are used for most
assets in the Boston Beer company while other beverage companies capitalize their
assets. Even with these leases they have estimated a fair amount for future rental
payments up to 2010.
In summary, Boston Beer uses industry norms by incorporating their own business
strategies that are beneficial to the company because of their size in comparison to
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the competitors. By having less capital and more contracts they are able to compete
better with price and distribution than others in the specialty beer market.
Quality of Disclosure
There are aspects of Boston Beer’s financials that are very well disclosed and others
that need more information to be completely transparent. First, there is an in-depth
view of how they configure many balance sheet and income statement line items.
These items are disclosed for current terms and changes from the previous terms as
well. Taxes, inventories, and assets are well laid out throughout the 10-K to provide
different information on why they have certain numbers for several topics and what
items these topics entail.
An area of concern is the lack of information for choosing different strategies. Only
FIFO numbers are mentioned in regards to inventory. There is no mention to how
income would change if LIFO or weighted average were used. Furthermore, with
several estimates needed to complete the financial statements, differences in
separate estimations could be disclosed to see how current estimates reflect income
as compared to other possible assessments. In conclusion the company could
disclose how much income changes with different accounting procedures and
estimates.
Potential Red Flags to Accounting Distortions
When looking for “Red Flags” in financial statements of a company, it is important to
look at the percent changes in sales and expense diagnostic ratios. Manipulation of
sales ratio’s from year to year can be done to show higher revenues than the actual
revenues. Manipulation of expense ratios can be done to show lower expenses,
which in turn falsely increases net income or some kind of earnings report.
24
Boston Beer Co.’s sales and expense ratio’s seem to be fairly sporadic. When looking
at the percent change in Net Sales/Accounts Receivable ratio from 2000 to 2001 we
see nearly a 60% decrease (from 39.06% to -35.77%). Reasons for this could range
from not reporting enough sales to avoid tax rates, not collecting their accounts
receivables properly, or a natural major decline in sales.
Another potential problem with the sales ratio’s lies within the Net Sales/Inventories
ratio. We notice pretty dramatic percent changes from year to year with this ratio.
From 2000 to 2001 we see nearly a 58% increase (from 7.22% to 65.48%) and then
sharp decreases to the point at which 2003’s percent change is -18.55%. Possible
reasons for this are, Boston Beer may not be reporting enough inventory, less sale
orders were received therefore clogging up inventory with unsold inventory, or
possibly sales were slightly overstated in 2001.
Some final potential “Red Flags” include pretty drastic percent changes in Cash Flow
from Operating Activities ratio’s. These ratio’s are considered core expense ratio’s
and the main purpose for manipulating these numbers are to show less expenses.
When examining Cash Flow from Operations/Operating Income, we see a severe
increase and then drastic decreases in the percent changes between 2000 and
2002. Possibilities for an increase in this number might include reporting more cash
flow than actual. A potential reason for falsely stating this number to show a
decrease might be to show higher operating income than a company actually has.
In order for these potential errors in financial information to be proven correct or
wrong, Boston Beer’s overall operations have to be investigated more. Looking at
certain market trends in the adult beverage industry might give a reason why there
are changes in sales ratios. Perhaps Boston Beer spent less money and time on
advertising their products in sales decreasing years, and that caused a legitimate
decrease in sales. Investigating certain events and operating activities will be able to
give a clearer picture on why certain ratios seem to have drastic changes from year to
year.
25
The final red flag could be could be the loss of contract breweries. This is very
unlikely because of legal contracts, yet detrimental to the company that it could bring
operations in all but two breweries (Cincinnati and Boston are the plants that the firm
owns) to a halt.
Quantitative Analysis
Manipulation ratios were used to show the relationship between net sales, cash
equivalents, accounts receivables and inventory. Expense manipulation diagnostics
were used to show the earnings relative to expenses.
Sales Manipulation Diagnostics
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Net Sales/CFS 1.05 1.09 1.11 1.07 1.10
Net Sales/AR 19.93 12.08 9.72 15.13 10.88
Net Sales/Inv 21.03 25.82 20.03 12.11 11.29
Net Sales / Cash From Sales
1.021.031.041.051.061.071.081.091.1
1.111.12
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Sam Bud
26
Net Sales / Accounts Recievable
05
1015202530354045
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Net Sales / Accounts Recievable
Sam Bud
Net Sales / Inventory
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Sam Bud
These ratios show that net sales-to-cash from sales remained constant. On the other
hand, net sales-accounts receivable increased, showing an improvement between
the amounts of sales made and the amount of money actually collected. From 1999
to 2002, Boston Beer showed great improvement in their inventory turnover,
although it decreased slightly in 2003. Overall, these results seem fairly favorable.
Core Expense Manipulation Diagnostics
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Sales/Assets 2.63 2.23 1.93 2.15 1.75
CFFO/OI 1.24 1.18 1.68 1.08 0.82
CFFO/NOA 0.43 0.24 0.34 0.36 0.23
27
Sales / Assets
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Sam Bud
Cash Flow From Operatins / Operating Income
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Sam Bud
Cash Flow From Operations / Net Operating Assets
00.050.1
0.150.2
0.250.3
0.350.4
0.45
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Sam Bud
Sales to assets have shown an increase over the past few years, meaning sales have
increased relative to the amount of assets. Cash flow from operations-to-operating
28
income increased greatly in 2001, due to smaller operating income relative to CFFO.
However, it took a nosedive in 2002 due to a drop in cash flow from operating
activities. The last ratio remains relatively unchanged until 2003, when it increased
sharply, which could mean they were generating more cash flow with less working
capital.
% Changes in Ratios
2003 2002 2001 2000
Net Sales/CFS -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.03
Net Sales/AR 0.65 0.24 -0.36 0.39
Net Sales/Inv -0.19 0.29 0.65 0.07
Sales/Assets 0.18 0.16 -0.10 0.23
CFFO/OI 0.04 -0.29 0.56 0.31
CFFO/NOA 0.82 -0.31 -0.05 0.54
29
Financial Statement Ratio Analysis
By restructuring the data give in the financial statements we are able to reorganize it
in such a way that allows us to interpret the data in an easier fashion. The benefits of
manipulating the data are that of more transparency to valuate the financial wellness
of the company. All of the tables below enhance the transparency so that we may be
able to value the firm more accurately. Here we are able to trace trends and see how
the numbers coincide and interact with each other in positive or negative fashions.
With these charts we are mainly looking for the quality of liquidity, profitability, and
capital structure of the firm in comparison to competitors in their industry.
Liquidity Analysis 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Current Ratio 3.50 3.35 3.30 3.36 3.10
Quick Asset Ratio 2.58 2.33 2.75 2.83 2.43
Accounts Receivable
turnover 12.15 16.84 10.78 12.08 19.93
Days Sales Outstanding 30.05 21.67 33.85 30.22 18.31
Inventory Turnover 5.01 5.34 8.76 10.59 8.66
Days supply Inventory 72.89 68.34 41.56 34.36 42.17
Working Capital Turnover 3.01 3.97 3.33 3.67 4.53
Liquidity
Boston Beer’s liquidity overall is very good and very stable to include more debt
leverage. Things such as current ratio and working capital turnover have been slowly
decreasing over the past five years, but the accounts receivable turnovers and days
that the sales are outstanding have gradually begun to become better and more
positive looking over the years. Reasons for the fall of current ratio are because cash
and short-term investments decreased to $42.9 million for the year 2003 from
$52.6 million as of 2002. This is primarily due to cash used in financing activities to
30
purchase treasury stock to increase investments within the company. Yet in
comparison to some of Boston Beers competitors, Boston Beer maintains a very high
current ratio in the industry (as seen below).
*Industry includes Coors and Anheuser-Busch
00.5
11.5
22.5
33.5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Current Ratio
Boston BeerIndustry
You can see that Boston Beer is about three times the norm in their industry
(norm=1.0). The same goes also for the quick asset ratio in which Boston Beer is
well above its competitors. The only problem with the quick asset ratio is that it is
very sporadic and not predictable. There is not a predictable pattern seen on the
diagram below but, it does appear to be stable over the past 5 years.
Qucik Asset Ratio
2.432.832.75
2.332.58
0.460.460.450.450.40
0.51
1.52
2.53
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Boston Beer Industry
A very positive sign is that the accounts receivable turnovers are slowly becoming
larger while the days sales outstanding ratio has been almost cut in half over the
past five years. These ratios prove, quite convincingly, that Boston Beer is a very
31
liquid company and heading in a positive trend. With fewer days for collection, it
enables Boston Beer to maintain good credit by being able to pay off its obligations
faster. Moving along, we see that the inventory turnover is also increasing at high
percentages. From these ratios we can conclude that Boston Beer has become more
efficient in keeping more of their current assets out of inventory, and allowing them
to stay more liquid with further investing opportunities. Finally, another true sign of
Boston Beer’s liquidity in comparison to competitors is their working capital turnover.
Also in this category we see that Boston Beer is well above competitors such as
Anheuser-Busch who has been falling in this category for the past five years.
Therefore, overall, Boston Beer is a very liquid company for its industry with positive
signs for the future.
Profitability
Boston Beer, in all categories of profitability, is showing steady increases. In every
ratio calculated for the measurement of profitability it shows Boston Beer as still one
of the front runners in their industry.
Profitability Analysis 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Gross Profit Margin 55.7% 55.9% 56.3% 59.0% 58.8%
Operating Expense 46.1% 47.4% 50.1% 53.5% 51.2%
Net Profit 6.3% 5.9% 4.2% 4.0% 5.1%
Asset Turnover 1.57 1.93 1.89 2.02 2.38
Return on Assets 9.8% 11.4% 7.3% 8.0% 12.1%
Return of Equity 9.4% 15.3% 10.0% 10.8% 16.9%
The gross profit margin has made minute stages of increase over the past five
years which show, simply, the stability of Boston Beer to keep gross profit and sales
building. With these small gains, Boston Beer shows their ability to be a very efficient
32
company in comparison to many of its competitors in their industry. Below is a
comparison of the gross profit margin to its competitors.
*Industry Includes Coors and Anheuser-Busch
0.00%10.00%20.00%30.00%40.00%50.00%60.00%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Gross Profit Margin
Boston BeerIndustry
While their gross profit margin is growing due to gains in gross profit and sales, the
operating expenses are also growing slightly as well, but at a slightly faster pace in
comparison. They had risen up to 53.5% in 2002 from 46.1% in 1999, but seemed
to have leveled off back down to 51.2% in 2003. This increase is caused by a
number of different reasons, which vary from an increase in advertising to an
increase in general and administrative expenses. The advertising expenses though,
follow more closely the increases and decreases over the past five years with the
operating expense ratio. Therefore, this shows a true value of where most of the
expenses accumulated by Boston Beer are going towards.
While the gross profit margin is growing and operating expenses seem to be leveling
off, the net profit margin has taken quite a hit over the past five years causing some
alarm. In 1999, Boston Beer was able to retain 6.3 cents for every dollar of profit.
This is only about half of what Anheuser Busch’s net profit margin is at, which sets at
about 13 cents on the dollar in 2003. After four years of decreases Boston Beer was
able to regain only a few points back up to 5.1 cents, which still remains well below
some of its competitors. This is mainly caused by the increase in expenses in
advertising and less operating income to show for it. Yet, the return on equity and
return on assets are both firm increases for Boston Beer.
33
The ROE, which has almost double during the past five years despite taking a hard hit
in 2001 that decreased it by about 33%, appears to be remaining strong. Yet, in this
category more than the others, Boston Beer is lagging extremely in comparison to
Busch (who seems to be well ahead of the industry norm as well). With only roughly
one fifth by comparison it begins to show the lack there of in returns on equity. Many
other companies such as Coors and Miller are more around the industry norm as
well, therefore, not putting Boston Beer out of the run, but still not an industry leader.
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Return on Equity
Boston BeerIndustry
The return on assets is not doing quite as well as ROE but still maintains a positive
looking trend after the hit of bad sales in 2001. In 2000 Boston Beer’s assets had
climbed up to around 107 million, yet, the ROA still lagged because of poor net
income performance. Not until 2003 did net income increase largely causing the
return on equity to rise along with it, as well as a large decrease in current assets. As
a result, it appears that ROA will continue to rise as long as net income keeps
increasing out of the recession in 2001 (which it has done so for the last two years).
34
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Return on Assets
Boston BeerIndustry
In general, Boston Beer is and appears that it will continue to be a very profitable firm
with positive trends. As long as the “Better Beer” market continues to grow as it has,
it should be fairly easy to predict that sales and net income will rise along with it.
Capital Structure
Boston Beer’s capital structure by and large is very strong. The firm is in an
especially good position because of its lack of debt and debt financing. Here below
are the ratios to better determine the quality of Boston Beer’s capital structure.
Capital Structure Analysis 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Debt to Equity ratio .35 .34 .37 .35 .40
Times Interest Earned 61.14 N/A 1043.91 174.15 236.87
Debt service margin 0.59 0.85 0.79 0.68 0.81
Unlike most firms in the alcoholic beverage market, Boston Beer has a debt to
equity ratio that is well under one. Their total liabilities have had a steady decrease
over the past five years causing a decrease in the debt to equity ratio until 2003
when the stockholder’s equity 16 million dollars or approximately 20%. This is
mainly due to the purchase of treasury stock that decreased owner’s equity by more
35
than 30 million in the year of 2003. Below is the comparison to competitor’s debt to
equity ratio.
0
2
4
6
8
10
Boston BeerIndustry
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
As you can see, Boston Beer has a considerably less liabilities in comparison allowing
their capital structure to be much more firm.
Boston Beer’s times interest earned shows how little of debt they have. Their
numbers vary from over 1000 down to 61 during the past five years. In the year of
2000, during the peak of prosperous economic times, there was no data because
there was no debt at all. The only problem this creates is trying to forecast future
times interest earned ratios because the debt is so minute. This also my bring the
question to the table that Boston Beer could (if taken on some debt) be a high growth
rate company in the future. Yet, the main cause of such low debt in capital is
because of Boston Beer’s strategy of contracting many brewers through out the
United States instead of investing into more of their own breweries.
The debt service margin has been increasing over the last five years. Most of the
current notes payable go to paying these brewers through out the United States to
brew the beer and in turn continue to increase their margin. Therefore, this is the
switch-off between the times interest earned ratio and the debt service margin.
Boston Beer says that it is always evaluating its strategy of maintaining contracts as
opposed to brewing more of their own, but still feels that it is more cost effective and
safer at this time continue to build upon their tactic that they have been using for
36
many years. As of right now, it appears to be more efficient in cutting cost such as
distribution costs and other costs as well.
In close, Boston Beer has maintained a strong and secure business by keeping its
debt to a minimum. They do have plenty of capital already built formally and believe
that to grow anymore, at this point in time, is better suited by contracting out rather
than going into heavy debt.
Summary
In conclusion, it is easy to assess that Boston Beer is strong in all three categories of
the financial statement ratio analysis. They have proved to be efficient by being
keeping their liquidity above the norm, by maintaining positive trends in profitability,
and by using strategic capital structuring in the firm. With the lack of debt their
appears to be enormous opportunity for growth in the firm as long as the better beer
market continues to rise without the threat of new substitutes that may come from
overseas.
37
Forecasting To forecast Boston Beer’s financial statements through the year 2013 the
group used conservative valuing numbers consistent with industry standards and
estimated rates of growth for the alcoholic beverage sector and Boston Beer. Several
different methods were used for each line item and statements as a whole and are
explained below. See appendix for the full financial statement forecasted
spreadsheets.
Balance Sheet
Balance sheet numbers were estimated according to total growth in the company.
For example, line item numbers were configured to meet with a two percent growth in
total assets per year which filtered down into liabilities and owner’s equity to equal
assets. Percentage quotes are listed with the use of a pro-forma balance sheet and
then converted into actual numbers in the forecasted data. An explanation for how
these numbers were conceived follows:
Assets Total Assets: Sales times approximately two, according to the asset
turnover ratio. Cash: Held at about 35% of total assets per prior period’s numbers.
Short-Term Investments: Held at 75% of current year’s cash. Accounts Receivable: Started at 12% of total assets, but declining percentages over time due to an increase in accounts receivable turnover ratio. Inventories: Held at 10% of total assets and declining to 8% in 2013 because of an increasing inventory turnover ratio, and improving operating efficiency ratios. Prepaid Expenses: Forecasted at an average of 1.5 million dollars that will
stay constant over the company’s current procedures. Deferred Income Tax: Reported at 10% of total assets for that year. This number could increase if Congress passes a bill that would increase taxes to breweries, which could be set in motion by the end of 2005. Property, Plant, and Equipment: An average of the past five years of 20% of total assets. Goodwill: $1,377,000 is the amortization of goodwill for an unidentified period.
38
Liabilities and Owner’s Equity Total Liabilities: Held at 27% of assets as per the average of liabilities over
assets over the past five years. Accrued Expenses: Held at the past five year average of $14,000,000. Deferred Income Taxes: Forecasted at 8% of that year’s total liabilities consistent with previous years allocation. Common Stock: Reported at average numbers over the past five years. Additional Paid-in Capital: Average of past five years at $58,000,000. Unearned Compensation: Average of $200,000 over the past five years. Retained Earnings: Forecasted by adding the forecasted Net Income to last year’s Retained Earnings.
Income Statement Income statement forecasts were based on a stable increase of 2% in net revenue
per year. Such a conservative number was used because the alcoholic beverage
industry is such a stable and mature market with the better beer category declining
in market share. The industry as a whole only grows steadily over time without many
large growth increases. Boston Beer will grow steadily, but slowly because of the
loyal customer base and the maturity of the market for alcoholic beverages. The
group does not expect a significant growth in the market or company, so this
accounts for such a small growth rate in net revenue. The two percent number is
also the average percent increase in sales figures over the past five years. Boston
Beer expected to grow much more with the rollout of Sam Adams Light in 2002, but
ended up cannibalizing sales of Sam Adams instead. A sustainable growth rate is
equal to Return of Equity, which is about 15%, due to the lack of dividends paid by
the company. This number is expected to decrease because of the large amount of
room available in debt financing, which may be necessary in the future to grow
substantially. Some expense numbers are manipulated for the company trying to
compete with mega-brewers in the future, which is indicated in the forward looking
statements in the 10-K. A pro-forma income statement was used to accumulate
actual forecasted data. An explanation for line item forecasting is defined below:
Revenue: A two percent increase every year because of the mature
market and lack of reaching new customers. Excise Taxes: 11% of net revenue every year, as for the average tax rate.
39
Advertising, Promotional and Selling Expense: Steady at 42% of Net Revenue for three years increasing to 45% after that to try and compete with mega-brewers. General and Administrative Expense: Reported at 7% of net revenue which is the average over the past five years. Operating Income: Consistently reported at 75% of Net Revenue. Interest Income: .8% is the average of Net Revenue over the past five years and forecasted at this percentage. Other Income: Reported at .5% of Net Revenue because of the five year average. Income before Provision for Income Taxes: Stated at the two percent growth rate as per the company’s approximated growth. Provision for Income Taxes: Always calculated at 35% of Net Revenue. Net Income: Calculated by subtracting Provision for Taxes from Income before Taxes.
Statement of Cash Flows
When forecasting the statement of cash flows it is important to know what your
company needs to forecast. Not everything on the statement of cash flows needs to
be forecasted for every company. Determining key numbers to forecast is important.
Inventories, depreciation, purchases of plant property and equipment, and the net
cash flows for each activity on the statement of cash flows are important for Boston
Beer. Operating Activities Depreciation: Averaged the percentages on the pro forma statement and used that to forecast; then took that percent and applied it operating income. Inventories: Applied changes in previous years’ balance sheet and forecasted inventory numbers. Net Cash from Operating Activities: Summed all figures in operating activities. Investing Activities Purchases: Applied changes in dollar amounts for how much the company is investing into Property, Plant and Equipment. Sale of Securities: Held at 20% of cash as per previous year’s assessment of sales of short term investments. Net Cash from Investing Activities: Summed all figures in Investing activities. Financing Activities
40
Net Cash from Financing Activities: Took the average of the past three years and used that number as the forecast because of such volatile historical numbers
Summary
The forecasted financial statements for Boston Beer have been conservatively
evaluated according to prior sales percentage increases and the mature market they
participate in. In creating these forecasts we recognized earnings per share declining
but immediately increasing at about the two percent growth rate. This is due to
forecasting conservatism of not increasing assets and income too aggressively. This
conservatism leaves room in the forecasting for errors and large increases in revenue
or expenses the company may expect and will not make the company look more
attractive than it is just because of its profitability, liquidity and capital structure
ratios.
41
Valuation Analysis The purpose of doing a valuation analysis of Boston Beer Co. is to help in making
future operational and financial decisions. Using the different valuation tools you can
predict future performance of a certain company. The methods used in the valuation
of Boston Beer Co. were the discounted free cash flow model, abnormal earnings
growth model, residual income model, and the long run residual income model.
Along with these four models we also used the multiples in the method of
comparables to help with the valuation.
The main purpose of these valuation methods is to determine whether the share
price of Boston Beer Co. is overvalued, undervalued, or fairly valued. Because each
method and model uses a different set of numbers there will be a bit of conflicting
information among the valuations. For example, the method of comparables use
ratios that are not very detailed which doesn’t make them very indicative of actual
performance. Other models are better methods for valuing a company because they
require the computation of numbers such as the cost of equity (Ke) and the weight
average of cost of capital (WACC) which are much more indicative of actual company
performance.
Method of Comparables Valuation
As of April 7, 2005 EPS BPS PPS SPS P.E.G.
Anheuser-Busch 2.77 0.64 46.1 19.22 1.6Molson Coors 5.19 0.86 79.5 49.26 1.5Boston Beer Co. 0.86 1.88 22.14 16.9 2.5
The method of comparables is a widely used valuation tool for analysts because of its
simplicity. The reason for its simplicity is that unlike other valuation models, the
method of comparables doesn’t require detailed multi year forecasts for items such
as growth, profitability, and the cost of capital. The method of comparables allows us
to take Boston Beer Co.’s two biggest competitors, Anheuser-Busch and Molson
Coors, and use their numbers to determine the best share price of Boston Beer Co.
42
Price/Earnings (Forward)Anheuser-Busch 16.6Molson Coors 15.4Average 16
Boston Beer Valuation 13.76
The forward price/earnings multiple did not end up being very close to Boston Beer
Co.’s actual share price, but proved to be the closest among all of the multiples that
we calculated. To get the price/earnings multiple we took the average of Anheuser-
Bush’s and Molson Coors’ price/earnings and multiplied that by Boston Beer Co.’s
EPS. That ended up equaling $13.76. Boston Beer Co.’s actual share price as of
April 7, 2005 was $22.14. A possible reason for why the price/earnings multiple
valuation wasn’t very close to Boston Beer Co.’s actual share price is the fact that
Boston Beer Co.’s price/earnings multiple was quite larger than the other two
competitors. Boston Beer Co.’s price/earnings multiple ended up being $25.70
which is much closer to the actual share price of Boston Beer Co.
Price Earnings (Trailing)Anheuser-Busch 23Molson Coors 17Average 20
Boston Beer Valuation 17.2
The trailing price/earnings multiple ended up being closer to Boston Beer Co.’s
actual share price than the forward price/earnings multiple.
Price/BookAnheuser-Busch 11.61Molson Coors 1.82Average 6.715
Boston Beer Valuation 12.62
The next multiple that we calculated was the price/book multiple. The price/book
multiple proved to be less valuable to use because of the very large discrepancy
43
between Anheuser-Busch’s ($11.61) and Molson Coors’ ($1.82) price/book
multiples. We could have decided to throw one of the numbers out but that would
mean we would only have one company’s multiple to use for the valuation. After
taking the average of the two competitors and then multiplying them by Boston Beer
Co.’s price/book multiple, we came up with a valuation of $12.64. This valuation
came out to be much less than the actual share price of $22.14.
Price/SalesAnheuser-Busch 2.4Molson Coors 1.61Average 2.005
Boston Beer Valuation 33.88
The final multiple that we calculated was the price/sales multiple. To calculate this
multiple we took the average of Anheuser-Bush’s and Molson Coors’ price/sales
multiple and multiplied it by Boston Beer Co.’s SPS. That ended up equaling $33.88.
Boston Beer Co.’s actual share price is $22.14. A possible reason for the big
discrepancy in the actual share price and the valuation model’s share price is the
fact that both of the competitors had a very large spread between their two
price/sales multiples. Anheuser-Busch had a price/sales multiple of $2.40 (for every
dollar of sales, it has to pay $2.40). Molson Coors ended up having a price/sales
multiple of $1.61. Unfortunately, we can’t throw out one of the competitors because
that would leave only one multiple to use to make the valuation.
Another multiple that is usually used when analysts calculate the method of
comparables is the dividends/price multiple. However, we did not use this multiple
for Boston Beer Co. because they do not pay dividends. Overall, the method of
comparables multiples seemed to be far off from Boston Beer Co.’s actual share
price. The main reason for this problem was the fact that we were only able to use
the multiples of two competitors, which in essence turned out to be very volatile
between each other. To get more accurate information when using the multiples, you
need to be able to use more companies than just two or three so that you can throw
out outlying numbers.
44
Introduction to Valuation Models
The purpose of this next section in our valuation of Boston Beer is to convert
forecasted data into information that can be used to evaluate and assess what we
believe to be the true value. Because so many decisions are based on the valuations
and the forecasting of data, it is important that the estimations must be as accurate
as possible as it pertains to the future of the firm. Every estimate that is made by any
analysis or company accountant is very important to ensure the information is
accurate and realistic.
To properly and accurately value Boston Beer, our valuation models considered
forecasts over two different time periods. Each of our forecast models went out ten
years in the future till we then considered the terminal value by estimating the firm
infinitely. Using our WACC we were able to discount the values to a present value for
the year 2004. Here we were able to come up with a clearer picture of what the
company’s worth is.
The valuation methods used in our assessment of the firm’s value were the method
of comparables model, the discounted free cash flow model, the long-term residual
income model, abnormal earnings growth model, and the discounted residual income
model. (All used WACC for discounting) To implement the various models, we
forecasted financial data based on abnormal earnings and book value, as well as
free cash flows. When each model is completed a sensitivity analysis is performed to
test any sensitivity of the price when the growth rate or WACC are changed. By
changing these variables we are able to compare our prices to that of the markets
and also able to see how the market is interrupting the free flow of data. Yet, most
importantly, we will be able to see how small interpretations of the data and
estimations by us have created the valuation given by these models.
45
Cost of Equity
Boston Beer has an estimated cost of equity of 5.241%. This percentage was
generated by using a risk free rate 3.2%, which is the rate for the seven year Treasury
bond. The beta used was calculated using a data regression for the previous 24
months, which came up to .434. There were three and five year regression done as
well but both of those posed unlikely and unrealistic numbers. The market risk
premium was estimated at about 4.69%.
Cost of Debt
The cost of debt for Boston Beer came to 3.61%. This was calculated by using a
weighted average of short and long term debt. This was pretty limited due to the fact
that Boston Beer has no real high debt as other companies in the industry do. The
short term debt represented around 90% of the total debt in the firm. The other ten
percent come from the long term debt which is only their pension fund obligations.
As of end of year 2004 Boston Beer has no long term liabilities on the books.
Weighted Average Cost of Capital
The weighted average cost of capital for Boston Beer was estimated to be
approximately around 4.79% (BT). With as the estimated value of debt and value of
equity we were able to calculate the WACC before and after tax (assuming a tax rate
of 35%). The after tax WACC was 4.44%.
Discounted Free Cash Flow Model
The free cash flow was the first method used to value Boston Beer Company’s
estimated share price. This model displays what the share price of the firm should
be considering operating and financing cash flows. First, a set of operating and
investing cash flows were used from the forecasting section of this document (see
Cash Flow Statement). The firm’s cash flows were then discounted by the WACC and
taken to a present value of 2004. We also took the 2014 estimated cash flow out to
perpetuity with a growth rate of two percent, per the forecasting mentioned in the
46
ratio analysis. The perpetuity adds value to the firm by configuring infinite cash flows
in the company and discounting it back to 2004 present values. By doing this we are
able to decide if Boston Beer is fairly valued in the market, compared to our valuation
considering free cash flows.
In constructing the Free Cash flows we valued the company at $41.25, compared to
the actual share price of $22.14. This large deviation is due to increases the
operating and investing cash flows over the forecasted life of the company. Boston
Beer has many funds in investing cash flows that really adds value to the firm.
According to this model Boston Beer is completely undervalued, assuming our cash
flow estimations are accurate. The sensitivity analysis showed moderate deviations
in the share price if growth or our WACC changed slightly. With incremental changes
in the growth rate the stock price changes significantly, which implies the firm is very
sensitive to change. This also means that if our forecasts are off by just a million
dollars then it changes our models enough to tell a difference in share price. The
changes in WACC change the price just as much because a .1% change in the WACC
estimation changes the price by a couple of dollars in some cases.
Sensitivity Analysis
g
1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50% WACC 4.70% $33.10 $37.15 $42.70 $50.78 4.80% $32.15 $35.95 $41.25 $48.71 4.90% $31.26 $34.82 $39.60 $46.38 5.00% $30.41 $33.75 $38.21 $44.44
Residual Income Model
The residual income model shows the level of income above and beyond the cost of
equity. In this model, we observe a stream of incomes over the next ten years, which
are all discounted back to 2004. The residual income is computed by adding the
book value of equity per share, and earnings per share, then usually subtracting the
dividends distributed per share, but Boston Beer does not pay dividends. This
number represents the book value of equity at the end of the year, which in turn is
used to calculate next year’s beginning equity. Next, the normal income is derived by
47
multiplying Ke times the previous year’s book value of equity. The residual income is
simply the difference between earnings per share and normal income. All ten
residual incomes are then discounted back to the present year, and added together,
which gives a value of future incomes. The perpetuity of a continuing terminal value
is then calculated using a sustainable growth rate, two percent, which is the other
variable in our sensitivity analysis. We then plug in our estimated cost of equity of
5.24%, calculated with a professionally estimated beta, to see how Boston Beer is
valued concerning residual income.
The estimated Residual Income value of the firm per share is $15.78, which makes
the firm overvalued in this model, because of the actual share price of $22.14. This
could be because of the firm’s book value of equity being much higher than debt, and
room for more debt financing. The sensitivity analysis shows deviations that are
expected in a model like this. The higher the cost of equity for the firm the lower the
stock price. Small deviations in our estimations are not as detrimental to this model
and changes to growth rates or the cost of equity can easily be computed with this
analysis.
Sensitivity Analysis G 0 1% 2% 3%
3% $22.52 $28.84 $47.80 N/A 4% $16.97 $19.55 $24.71 $40.19
Ke 5% $13.00 $14.06 $15.78 $19.03
6% $11.37 $12.02 $13.01 $14.65
7% $9.74 $10.10 $10.61 $11.37
Long Run Residual Income Model
This model is simply a perpetuity using the Residual Income Model to estimate the
price of the firm over an even longer period. This model yielded results of $20.57
and is another model that leaves the company overvalued. This model (shown
below) shows that the firm does not create much income other than normal from
year to year. This sensitivity analysis is much like the analysis for the Residual
48
Income Model. Growth changes greatly affect the price, while cost of equity changes
are reasonable for this firm.
*BVE + BVE (ROE + Ke / Ke –G)
Sensitivity Analysis G 0% 1% 2% 3% 3% 41.83 60.01 114.54 n/a Ke 4% 34.11 43.66 62.57 120.02 5% 28.63 34.09 42.92 59.62 6% 26.39 30.58 36.85 47.31
Abnormal Earnings Growth Model (AEG)
The Abnormal Earnings Growth model examines the benefit of the investment
opportunities to shareholders concerning the present value of dividends received and
earnings per share. This method is condensed because of Boston Beer’s lack of
dividend payments. Abnormal earnings are generated by taking earnings per share
divided by any positive investment opportunity and then subtracting the normal
earnings. These earnings are then discounted back to present time, which lets us
start a continuing perpetuity.
The value of the firm according to the Abnormal Earnings growth is $37.12, which
leaves the company undervalued again when compared to the actual share price.
This model is particularly unhelpful because it takes dividends into account greatly
and this firm does not pay dividends and we do not expect them to start paying in the
future. This sensitivity analysis also has large deviations in the growth rate. If the
sustainable growth rate for the firm changes these models will the worthless. The
costs of equity estimations change the models by several dollars but this is expected
with any firm.
49
Sensitivity Analysis g 0% 1% 2% 3%
Ke 3% $44.27 $55.85 $90.61 NA 4% $35.87 $41.27 $52.08 84.48 5% $30.45 $33.47 $37.12 $48.59 6% $26.54 $28.42 $31.25 $35.59
Valuation Models Conclusion These models leave us to conclude that Boston Beer is undervalued based on three
out of the four models. Therefore, we consider Boston Beer to be undervalued
because of our models and the degree of forecasting we have estimated for the
future of the firm. We have decided not to take the method of comparables into
much consideration because of industry competitor discrepancies that can hurt the
accuracy of the valuation. Even with sensitivity analysis the price of the firm still
seems to be undervalued and the reason why we put a recommendation of buy.
50
Works Cited
United States. Securities and Exchange Commission. Edgar Database.
Information initially retrieved: February 1, 2005
http://sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm
Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Edgarscan Database. Information initially retrieved:
February 1, 2005
http://edgarscan.pwcglobal.com/servlets/getCompanyDetail?Name=BOSTON+BEER
+CO+INC
The Boston Beer Company. Company Website. Information initially retrieved:
February 1, 2005
http://www.bostonbeer.com
Samuel Adams Beer. Beer’s Website. Information initially retrieved: February
1, 2005
http://www.samueladams.com
Moore, M. Chapter 3 – Overview of Accounting Analysis. Information initially
retrieved: February 1, 2005
http://mmoore.ba.ttu.edu/Fin3321-Spring-05/Lecture_Notes/Chapter-3.doc
Moore, M. Chapter 4 – Implementing Accounting Analysis. Information initially
retrieved: February 1, 2005
http://mmoore.ba.ttu.edu/Fin3321-Spring-05/Lecture_Notes/Chapter-4.doc
51
Moore, M. Chapter 6 – Forecasting. Information retrieved:
February 1, 2005
http://mmoore.ba.ttu.edu/Fin3321-Spring-05/Lecture_Notes/Chapter-6.doc
Moore, M. Chapter 7 – Valuation Basics and Theory. Information retrieved:
February 1, 2005
http://mmoore.ba.ttu.edu/Fin3321-Spring-05/Lecture_Notes/Chapter-7.doc
Moore, M. Chapter 8 – Prospective Analysis: Valuation. Information retrieved:
February 1, 2005
http://mmoore.ba.ttu.edu/Fin3321-Spring-05/Lecture_Notes/Chapter-8.doc
Yahoo Finance. Yahoo Financial Database and Information. Information
initially retrieved: February 1, 2005
http://finance.yahoo.com/
52
Balance Sheet
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Current Assets: Cash and cash equivalents $6,256,000 $45,838,000 $20,608,000 27,792,000.00$ $35,794,000 $39,714,709 $40,596,541 $42,400,266 $40,480,953 $44,594,703 $45,574,136 $46,573,161 $47,592,163 $48,122,379 $48,172,365 Short-term investments $28,858,000 $2,031,000 $32,001,000 $15,098,000 $24,000,000 $21,052,440 $21,473,489 $21,902,959 $22,341,018 $22,787,838 $23,243,595 $23,708,467 $24,182,636 $24,666,289 $25,159,615 Accounts receivable $12,593,000 $19,219,000 $17,830,000 $10,432,000 12,826,000$ $10,429,684 $10,638,278 $9,946,790 $10,145,726 $9,407,855 $9,596,012 $9,787,932 $9,983,691 $10,183,365 $10,387,032 Inventories $15,739,000 $9,323,000 $8,342,000 $9,890,000 $12,561,000 $8,691,404 $8,865,232 $9,042,536 $11,155,907 $9,103,220 $9,285,285 $9,470,990 $9,660,410 $9,853,618 $10,050,691 Prepaid expenses $1,619,000 $925,000 $1,284,000 $1,126,000 $883,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 Deferred income taxes $2,415,000 $2,291,000 $1,959,000 $1,177,000 $1,474,000 $869,140 $886,523 $904,254 $922,339 $940,785 $959,601 $978,793 $998,369 $1,018,336 $1,038,703 Other current assets $927,000 $844,000 $1,513,000 $2,304,000 $2,300,000 $2,607,421 $2,659,570 $2,712,761 $3,689,355 $3,763,142 $3,838,405 $3,915,173 $3,993,476 $4,582,514 $4,674,164 Total current assets $68,407,000 $80,471,000 $83,537,000 $67,819,000 87,768,000$ $84,864,798 $86,619,633 $88,409,566 $90,235,298 $92,097,543 $93,997,034 $95,934,516 $97,910,745 $99,926,501 $100,982,570 Property, plant and equipment, $27,047,000 $23,897,000 $20,202,000 $17,059,000 $17,222,000 $17,382,807 $17,730,464 $18,085,073 $18,446,774 $18,815,710 $19,192,024 $19,575,864 $19,967,382 $20,366,729 $20,774,064 Other assets $1,671,000 $1,750,000 $1,690,000 $1,099,000 $1,095,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 Goodwill $1,477,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 $1,377,000 Total assets $98,602,000 $107,495,000 $106,806,000 $87,354,000 $107,462,000 $105,124,605 $107,227,097 $109,371,639 $111,559,072 $113,790,253 $116,066,058 $118,387,380 $120,755,127 $123,170,230 $125,633,634
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY Current Liabilities: Accounts payable $6,506,000 $11,201,000 $8,997,000 $6,395,000 $9,744,000 $7,055,231 $7,196,336 $7,340,262 $7,487,068 $7,636,809 $7,789,545 $7,945,336 $8,104,243 $8,266,328 $8,431,654 Accrued expenses $13,940,000 $13,196,000 $15,874,000 $15,504,000 16,494,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 $14,000,000 Total current liabilities $20,446,000 $24,397,000 $24,871,000 $21,899,000 26,238,000 $21,055,231 $21,196,336 $21,340,262 $21,487,068 $21,636,809 $21,789,545 $21,945,336 $22,104,243 $22,266,328 $22,431,654 Deferred income taxes $1,833,000 $3,583,000 $2,406,000 $2,191,000 2,085,000 $2,257,674 $2,302,827 $2,348,884 $2,395,862 $2,443,779 $2,492,654 $2,542,508 $2,593,358 $2,645,225 $2,698,129 Other long-term liabilities $2,634,000 $1,336,000 $697,000 $740,000 $769,000 $4,908,019 $5,286,180 $5,671,903 $6,065,342 $6,466,648 $6,875,981 $7,293,501 $7,719,371 $8,153,758 $8,596,833TOTAL LIABILITIES $24,913,000 $29,316,000 $27,974,000 $24,830,000 $29,092,000 $28,220,925 $28,785,343 $29,361,050 $29,948,271 $30,547,236 $31,158,181 $31,781,345 $32,416,971 $33,065,311 $33,726,617
Stockholders Equity: Class A Common Stock, $.01 par $165,000 $165,000 $166,000 $169,000 $101,000 $166,000 $166,000 $166,000 $166,000 $166,000 $166,000 $166,000 $166,000 $166,000 $166,000 Class B Common Stock, $.01 par $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 $41,000 Additional paid-in capital $56,859,000 $57,610,000 $59,144,000 $62,517,000 $66,157,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 $58,000,000 Other Equity $0 $0 $419,000 $45,000 ($203,000) $46,252,837 $31,881,149 $23,381,689 $14,712,240 $5,869,400 ($3,150,295) ($12,350,383) ($21,734,476) ($31,306,247) ($42,069,457) Retained earnings $47,814,000 $55,647,000 $64,200,000 $74,758,000 $12,554,000 $22,443,844 $32,531,484 $42,820,877 $53,316,058 $64,021,143 $74,940,329 $86,077,899 $97,438,221 $109,025,749 $120,845,027 Treasury stock ($31,034,000) ($35,072,000) ($44,949,000) ($74,777,000) ($78,370,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) ($50,000,000) Total stockholders equity $73,689,000 $78,179,000 $78,832,000 $62,524,000 $78,370,000 $76,903,680 $72,619,633 $74,409,566 $76,235,298 $78,097,543 $79,997,034 $81,934,516 $83,910,745 $85,926,501 $86,982,570 Total liabilities and $98,602,000 $107,495,000 $106,806,000 $87,354,000 $107,462,000 $105,124,605 $107,227,097 $109,371,639 $111,559,072 $113,790,253 $116,066,058 $118,387,380 $120,755,127 $123,170,230 $125,633,634 stockholders equity
Actual Data Forcasted Data
53
atement of Cash Flows
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014Cash flows from operating activities: Net income $11,080,000 $11,239,000 $7,833,000 $8,553,000 $10,558,000 $12,502,000 $9,889,844 $10,087,640 $10,289,393 $10,495,181 $10,705,085 $10,919,186 $11,137,570 $11,360,321 $11,587,528 Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash from operating activities: Depreciation and $5,907,000 $6,442,000 $6,658,000 $6,151,000 $7,106,000 $7,317,585 $7,463,936 $8,120,763 $8,283,178 $9,504,947 $9,695,046 $9,888,946 $10,086,725 $10,288,460 $10,494,229 amortization Accounts receivable ($3,865,000) $3,840,000 ($6,626,000) $1,325,000 $7,514,000 ($2,394,000) $3,869,596 ($208,594) $691,488 ($198,936) $737,871 ($188,157) ($191,920) ($195,759) ($199,674) Inventories $179,000 ($83,000) $6,416,000 $981,000 ($1,548,000) ($2,671,000) $3,869,596 ($173,828) ($177,304) ($2,113,371) $2,052,687 ($182,064) ($185,706) ($189,420) ($193,208) Deferred income taxes $1,874,000 ($763,000) $1,427,000 ($297,000) $604,860 ($17,383) ($17,731) ($18,085) ($18,446) ($18,816) ($19,192) ($19,576) ($19,967) Accounts payable ($343,000) ($4,153,000) $4,695,000 ($2,204,000) ($2,602,000) ($3,349,000) $2,688,769 ($141,105) ($143,927) ($146,805) ($149,741) ($152,736) ($155,791) ($158,907) ($162,085)Net Cash From Operating Activites $13,802,000 $17,336,000 $19,278,000 $13,820,000 $19,641,000 $11,108,585 $28,386,601 $17,667,493 $18,925,097 $17,522,930 $23,022,501 $20,266,359 $20,671,687 $21,085,120 $21,506,823Cash flows from investing activities: Purchases of property, plant ($3,765,000) ($5,602,000) ($3,271,000) ($2,336,000) ($1,729,000) ($163,000) ($160,807) ($347,657) ($354,609) ($361,701) ($368,936) ($376,314) ($383,840) ($391,518) ($399,347) and equipment Sale of Securities $20,470,000 $5,021,000 $10,238,000 $10,463,000 $0 $7,942,942 $8,119,308 $8,480,053 $8,096,191 $8,918,941 $9,114,827 $9,314,632 $9,518,433 $9,624,476 $9,634,473Other Investing Activities ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) Net cash from (used in) ($17,000) $3,612,000 $4,346,000 ($30,267,000) $14,995,000 ($2,220,058) ($2,041,499) ($1,867,604) ($2,258,418) ($1,442,760) ($1,254,109) ($1,061,682) ($865,407) ($767,042) ($764,874) investing activities
Forecasts
St
Actual Data
54
Income Statement
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014Revenue $212,105,000 $207,218,000 $238,335,000 $230,103,000 $239,680,000 188,772,471.00$ 192,547,920.42$ 196,398,878.83$ 200,326,856.40$ 204,333,393.53$ 208,420,061.40$ 212,588,462.63$ 216,840,231.88$ 221,177,036.52$ 225,600,577.25$ Less excise taxes $21,551,000 $20,435,000 $22,980,000 $22,158,000 $22,472,000 $23,331,429.00 $23,798,057.58 $24,274,018.73 $24,759,499.11 $25,254,689.09 $25,759,782.87 $26,274,978.53 $26,800,478.10 $27,336,487.66 $27,883,217.41 Net revenue $190,554,000 $186,783,000 $215,355,000 $207,945,000 $217,208,000 212,103,900.00$ 216,345,978.00$ 220,672,897.56$ 225,086,355.51$ 229,588,082.62$ 234,179,844.27$ 238,863,441.16$ 243,640,709.98$ 248,513,524.18$ 253,483,794.67$ Cost of goods sold $84,057,000 $81,693,000 $88,367,000 $85,606,000 $87,983,000 84,841,560.00$ 86,538,391.20$ 88,269,159.02$ 90,034,542.20$ 91,835,233.05$ 93,671,937.71$ 95,545,376.46$ 97,456,283.99$ 99,405,409.67$ 101,393,517.87$ Gross profit $106,497,000 $105,090,000 $126,988,000 $122,339,000 $129,225,000 127,262,340.00$ 129,807,586.80$ 132,403,738.54$ 135,051,813.31$ 137,752,849.57$ 140,507,906.56$ 143,318,064.70$ 146,184,425.99$ 149,108,114.51$ 152,090,276.80$ Operating expenses:Advertising, promotional and $77,838,000 $80,124,000 $100,734,000 $91,841,000 $94,913,000 89,083,638.00$ 90,865,310.76$ 92,682,616.98$ 94,536,269.31$ 96,426,994.70$ 105,380,929.92$ 107,488,548.52$ 109,638,319.49$ 111,831,085.88$ 114,067,707.60$ selling expensesGeneral and administrative $12,539,000 $13,483,000 $14,586,000 $14,628,000 $14,837,000 14,847,273.00$ 15,144,218.46$ 15,447,102.83$ 15,756,044.89$ 16,071,165.78$ 16,392,589.10$ 16,720,440.88$ 17,054,849.70$ 17,395,946.69$ 17,743,865.63$ expenses Total operating expenses $90,377,000 $93,607,000 $115,320,000 $106,469,000 $109,750,000 103,930,911.00$ 106,009,529.22$ 108,129,719.80$ 110,292,314.20$ 112,498,160.48$ 121,773,519.02$ 124,208,989.40$ 126,693,169.19$ 129,227,032.57$ 131,811,573.23$ Operating income $16,120,000 $11,483,000 $11,668,000 $15,870,000 $19,485,000 15,907,792.50$ 16,225,948.35$ 17,653,831.80$ 18,006,908.44$ 20,662,927.44$ 21,076,185.98$ 21,497,709.70$ 21,927,663.90$ 22,366,217.18$ 22,813,541.52$ Other income, net:Interest income, net $2,001,000 $1,468,000 $1,119,000 $1,085,000 $840,000 1,696,831.20$ 1,730,767.82$ 1,765,383.18$ 1,800,690.84$ 1,836,704.66$ 1,873,438.75$ 1,910,907.53$ 1,949,125.68$ 1,988,108.19$ 2,027,870.36$ Other income, net $929,000 $266,000 $1,304,000 $19,000 ($247,000) $1,060,520 $1,081,730 $1,103,364 $1,125,432 $1,147,940 $1,170,899 $1,194,317 $1,218,204 $1,242,568 $1,267,419 Total other income, net $2,930,000 $1,734,000 $2,423,000 $1,104,000 $593,000 2,757,350.70$ 2,812,497.71$ 2,868,747.67$ 2,926,122.62$ 2,984,645.07$ 3,044,337.98$ 3,105,224.74$ 3,167,329.23$ 3,230,675.81$ 3,295,289.33$ Income before provision for $19,050,000 $13,217,000 $14,091,000 $16,974,000 $20,078,000 17,313,480.00$ 17,659,749.60$ 18,012,944.59$ 18,373,203.48$ 18,740,667.55$ 19,115,480.90$ 19,497,790.52$ 19,887,746.33$ 20,285,501.26$ 20,691,211.28$ income taxesProvision for income taxes $7,811,000 $5,384,000 $5,538,000 $6,416,000 $7,576,000 7,423,636.50$ 7,572,109.23$ 7,723,551.41$ 7,878,022.44$ 8,035,582.89$ 8,196,294.55$ 8,360,220.44$ 8,527,424.85$ 8,697,973.35$ 8,871,932.81$ Net income $11,239,000 $7,833,000 $8,553,000 $10,558,000 $12,502,000 9,889,843.50$ 10,087,640.37$ 10,289,393.18$ 10,495,181.04$ 10,705,084.66$ 10,919,186.36$ 11,137,570.08$ 11,360,321.48$ 11,587,527.91$ 11,819,278.47$ Net income per common share - $620 $480 $530 $720 $890 734.40$ 749.09$ 764.07$ 779.35$ 794.94$ 810.84$ 827.05$ 843.59$ 860.47$ 877.68$ basicNet income per common share - $620 $470 $520 $700 $86,000 714.00$ 728.28$ 742.85$ 757.70$ 772.86$ 788.31$ 804.08$ 820.16$ 836.56$ 853.30$ dilutedWeighted average number of $18,056,000 $16,413,000 $16,083,000 $14,723,000 $14,126,000 15,907,792.50$ 16,225,948.35$ 16,550,467.32$ 16,881,476.66$ 17,219,106.20$ 17,563,488.32$ 17,914,758.09$ 18,273,053.25$ 18,638,514.31$ 19,011,284.60$ common shares - basicWeighted average number of $18,109,000 $16,590,000 $16,407,000 $15,000,000 $14,518,000 15,907,792.50$ 16,225,948.35$ 16,550,467.32$ 16,881,476.66$ 17,219,106.20$ 17,563,488.32$ 17,914,758.09$ 18,273,053.25$ 18,638,514.31$ 19,011,284.60$ common shares - diluted
Income StatementActual Data Forcasted Data
55
Pro Forma Income Statement% of net revenue
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014Revenue 111.31% 110.94% 110.67% 110.66% 110.35% 113% 113% 113% 113% 113% 113% 113% 113% 113% 113%Less excise taxes 11.31% 10.94% 10.67% 10.66% 10.35% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% Net revenue 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%Cost of goods sold 44.11% 43.74% 41.03% 41.17% 40.51% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% Gross profit 55.89% 56.26% 58.97% 58.83% 59.49% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 61.00% 61.00% 62.00% 62.00% 62.00%Operating expenses:Advertising, promotional and 40.85% 42.90% 46.78% 44.17% 43.70% 42.00% 42.00% 42.00% 42.00% 42.00% 45.00% 45.00% 45.00% 45.00% 45.00%selling expensesGeneral and administrative 6.58% 7.22% 6.77% 7.03% 6.83% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00%expenses Total operating expenses 47.43% 50.12% 53.55% 51.20% 50.53% 50.00% 50.00% 49.00% 48.00% 48.00% 48.00% 48.00% 48.00% 48.00% 48.00%Operating income 8.46% 6.15% 5.42% 7.63% 8.97% 7.50% 7.50% 8.00% 8.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00%Other income, net:Interest income, net 1.05% 0.79% 0.52% 0.52% 0.39% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80%Other income, net 0.49% 0.14% 0.61% 0.01% -0.11% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% Total other income, net 1.54% 0.93% 1.13% 0.53% 0.27% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30%Income before provision for 10.00% 7.08% 6.54% 8.16% 9.24% 8% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10%income taxesProvision for income taxes 4.10% 2.88% 2.57% 3.09% 3.49% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50%Net income 5.90% 4.19% 3.97% 5.08% 5.76% 4.83% 4.99% 5.16% 5.34% 5.51% 5.69% 5.88% 6.06% 6.26% 6.45%Net income per common share - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%basicNet income per common share - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%dilutedWeighted average number of 9.48% 8.79% 7.47% 7.08% 6.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50%common shares - basicWeighted average number of 9.50% 8.88% 7.62% 7.21% 6.68% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50% 7.50%common shares - diluted
Actual Data Forcasted Data
56
Boston Beer Free Cash Flows 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10(in millions except per share data)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014Cash Flow From Operations 19.64 $11.11 $28.93 $17.67 $18.91 $17.52 $23.02 $20.67 $20.67 $21.09 $21.51Cash Provided (Used) by Investing Activities ($2.22) ($2.04) ($1.86) ($2.25) ($1.14) ($1.25) ($1.06) ($0.87) ($0.77) ($0.76)Free Cash Flow to Firm $8.89 $26.89 $15.81 $16.66 $16.38 $21.77 $19.61 $19.80 $20.32 $20.75PV Factor BT WACC 4.79% 0.954 0.911 0.869 0.829 0.791 0.755 0.721 0.688 0.656
Present Value of Free Cash Flows $8 $24 $14 $14 $13 $16 $14 $14 $13Perpetuity 743.728PV of Perpetuity 488.13
Total PV of Annual Cash Flows $131Continuing (Terminal) Value Growth 2% $743.73Present Value of Continuing (Terminal) Value $488.13Value of Firm (end of 2004) $619.15Book Value of Debt and Preferred Stock $29.23Value of Equity (end of 2004) $589.92
Estimated Value Per Share $41.25Book Value Per Share $4.13g 2%
Actual Price Per Share $22.14
Forecast Years
57
Boston Beer Residual Income
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014Beginning BE (per share) 5.48$ 5.38$ 5.08$ 5.20$ 5.33$ 5.46$ 5.59$ 5.73$ 5.87$ 6.01$ 6.15$ Earnings Per Share 0.69$ 0.71$ 0.72$ 0.73$ 0.75$ 0.76$ 0.78$ 0.79$ 0.81$ 0.90$ Dividends per share -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ Ending BE (per share) 5.48$ 6.07$ 5.78$ 5.92$ 6.07$ 6.21$ 6.36$ 6.51$ 6.66$ 6.82$ Ke 5.24%"Normal" Income 0.29$ 0.32$ 0.30$ 0.31$ 0.32$ 0.33$ 0.33$ 0.34$ 0.35$ Residual Income (RI) 0.40$ 0.39$ 0.42$ 0.42$ 0.43$ 0.44$ 0.45$ 0.45$ 0.46$
Present Value of RI 0.40$ 0.35$ 0.36$ 0.35$ 0.33$ 0.32$ 0.31$ 0.30$ 0.29$
BV Equity (per share) 5.48$ Total PV of RI (end 1987) 3.02$ Continuation (Terminal) Value 25.00$ PV of Terminal Value (end 1987) 7.28$ Estimated Value (end of 2004) 15.78$Capitalize 9 months value (april 1 2005 price) 16.39$
Actual Price per share 22.14$Growth 2%
Forecast Years
58
Abnormal Earnings Growth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 9
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014EPS 0.69$ 0.71$ 0.72$ 0.73$ 0.75$ 0.76$ 0.78$ 0.79$ 0.81$ 0.83$ DPS $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00Cum-Dividend Earnings $0.71 $0.72 $0.73 $0.75 $0.76 $0.78 $0.79 $0.81 $0.83Normal Earnings $0.73 $0.74 $0.76 $0.77 $0.79 $0.80 $0.82 $0.83 $0.85Abnormal Earning Growth (AEG) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02)
PV Factor 0.907 0.864 0.823 0.784 0.746 0.711 0.677 0.677 0.645
PV of AEG ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02) ($0.02)Core EPS 0.69$ Total PV of AEG ($0.14)Continuing (Terminal) ValuePV of Terminal Value 0.60$ Total PV of AEGAverage Perpetuity 1.16$ Capitalization Rate (perpetuity) 0.031Estimated Firm Value 37.12$ Value Per Share April 1 2005 $38.71
Ke 5%g 2%
Actual Price per share 22.14$
Forecast YearsPerp
$0.03
59
CAPM Models
DateFirm's Return SP500 Return
Monthly Yield Risk Free
Market Risk Premium Beta Estimate R-Squared
Average Risk Free Rate
Yahoo Published Beta
Historical Market Risk Premium
Feb-00Mar-00 0.0071 -0.0219 0.00522 -0.02713 2yr 0.434 0.031 0.032 0.35 0.0469Apr-00 0.0222 0.0239 0.00558 0.01836May-00 0.0571 -0.0163 0.00525 -0.02159Jun-00 -0.0270 0.0607 0.00515 0.05555 Estimated Ke 5.241%Jul-00 -0.1389 -0.0535 0.00505 -0.05853
Aug-00 0.0400 -0.0049 0.00494 -0.00989Sep-00 0.0931 -0.0801 0.00482 -0.08489Oct-00 0.0216 0.0041 0.00475 -0.00070 Estimated Cost of Debt 3.61%Nov-00 0.0889 0.0346 0.00431 0.03033Dec-00 -0.0255 -0.0923 0.00405 -0.09634
1-Jan -0.0366 -0.0642 0.00408 -0.06828 Short Horizon 0.4299 Estimated Ke 5.223%1-Feb 0.0761 0.0768 0.00387 0.072951-Mar -0.1293 0.0051 0.00397 0.001121-Apr 0.2262 -0.0250 0.00411 -0.029111-May 0.0889 -0.0108 0.00401 -0.014781-Jun 0.0217 -0.0641 0.00397 -0.068081-Jul -0.0094 -0.0817 0.00381 -0.08553 5yr -0.201 0.012
1-Aug 0.1845 0.0174 0.00343 0.01393 3yr 0.098 0.0031-Sep 0.2428 0.0760 0.00326 0.07270 2yr 0.434 0.0311-Oct -0.0991 0.0076 0.00331 0.004271-Nov -0.1489 -0.0156 0.00366 -0.01923 WACC BT 4.79%1-Dec 0.1483 -0.0208 0.00362 -0.02438 Value of E $78,370,0002-Jan -0.0397 0.0367 0.00358 0.03316 Value of D $29,092,0002-Feb 0.1372 -0.0617 0.00395 -0.06561 WACC AT 4.44%2-Mar -0.0358 -0.0088 0.00388 -0.012702-Apr -0.1195 -0.0725 0.00374 -0.076212-May 0.0214 -0.0790 0.00349 -0.082492-Jun -0.0280 0.0049 0.00318 0.001712-Jul 0.1281 -0.1100 0.00274 -0.11276
2-Aug 0.0000 0.0864 0.00245 0.084002-Sep -0.0880 0.0571 0.00246 0.054602-Oct 0.0280 -0.0603 0.00254 -0.062872-Nov -0.1122 -0.0274 0.00253 -0.029942-Dec -0.0375 -0.0170 0.00254 -0.019553-Jan 0.0334 0.0084 0.00242 0.005943-Feb 0.0924 0.0810 0.00232 0.078733-Mar 0.0155 0.0509 0.00244 0.048463-Apr 0.0535 0.0113 0.00210 0.009233-May 0.0415 0.0162 0.00189 0.014323-Jun 0.0076 0.0179 0.00239 0.015483-Jul 0.0741 -0.0119 0.00281 -0.01475
3-Aug 0.0760 0.0550 0.00265 0.052313-Sep -0.0141 0.0071 0.00266 0.004473-Oct -0.0601 0.0508 0.00274 0.048023-Nov 0.0411 0.0173 0.00273 0.014553-Dec 0.0377 0.0122 0.00260 0.009614-Jan 0.0347 -0.0164 0.00256 -0.018924-Feb 0.0021 -0.0168 0.00233 -0.019124-Mar 0.0545 0.0121 0.00283 0.009264-Apr 0.1410 0.0180 0.00321 0.014784-May -0.0531 -0.0343 0.00328 -0.037574-Jun 0.1581 0.0023 0.00308 -0.000794-Jul 0.0028 0.0094 0.00289 0.00647
4-Aug -0.1381 0.0140 0.00280 0.011214-Sep -0.0234 0.0386 0.00279 0.035804-Oct 0.1105 0.0325 0.00294 0.029524-Nov 0.0034 -0.0253 0.00300 -0.028294-Dec -0.0759 0.0189 0.00309 0.015815-Jan -0.0274 -0.0191 0.00314 -0.022265-Feb -1.0000 -0.0065
60
Boston Beer Balance Sheet Debt
2004/05/30 Percent of Total LiabilitiesComputed
Interest RateValue
Weighted Rate
LIABILITIESCurrent Liabilities: Accounts payable $9,744,000 33.49% 3.83% 1.28% Accrued Expenses $16,494,000 56.70% 3.83% 2.17% Total Current Liabilities $26,238,000 90.19% 0.00%Long-term Debt $0 0.00% 0.00%Deferred Income Taxes $2,085,000 7.17% 0.00%Other Liabilities $769,000 2.64% 5.80% 0.15%
Total Non-Current Liabilities $2,854,000 9.81% Total Liabilities $29,092,000 100.00%
Weighted Average cost of Debt 3.61%