BOOK REVIEW 455

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6: 455–458, 2003.

BOOK REVIEW

Thomas Pogge: World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: PolityPress, 2002, 284 pp. £16.99.

We are familiar, through charity appeals, with the assertion that it lies inour hands to save the lives of many or, by doing nothing, to let these peopledie. We are less familiar with the assertion examined here of a weightierresponsibility: that most of us do not merely let people starve but alsoparticipate in starving them. (p. 214) These words, which open theconclusion of the last essay in Thomas Pogge’s book, get to the heart ofthe author’s examination: In eight essays, written between 1990 and 2001,Pogge presents a committed defence of the idea that world poverty mustbe regarded as a question of negative duty: that we do not merely let peoplestarve but rather that we are responsible for their starving. The issue of thebook is not, however, a renewed discussion of Peter Singer’s argument,which denies a morally significant distinction between killing and lettingdie. What is at stake in Singer’s argument is the moral bindingness ofpositive duties, a highly controversial topic. Pogge argues to the contrarythat we are responsible for the global misery because of our concrete anddirect contributing to it, and that we should stop thinking about worldpoverty in terms of positive duties such as helping the poor. No-one deniesthat the poor need help – but according to the author they only need helpbecause of the terrible injustices they are being subjected to. The dreadfulinjustice of the distribution of goods is, of course, not new and well-knownto all of us (the reader is given quite an oppressive idea of the atrociousmisery by the empirical data about world poverty provided in the book).The main challenge thus is, in Pogge’s view, to investigate whether existingglobal poverty involves our violating a negative duty. The distinctionbetween negative and positive duties is controversial and has been drawnin various ways. Pogge defines any duty to ensure that others are not undulyharmed (or wronged) through one’s conduct as a negative duty and anyduty to benefit persons or to shield them from other harms as a positiveone (p. 130). Some believe that the mere fact of radical inequality showsa violation of negative duty if it is avoidable, meaning that the better-offcan improve the circumstances of the worse-off without becoming badly-off themselves. But the author doubts that the existence of radical inequality– however defined – suffices to invoke more than a merely positive duty,

BOOK REVIEW456

and it seems highly probable that most citizens of the developed West wouldalso find them insufficient. To illustrate this assumption Pogge presentswhat he calls the Venus-case in his eighth essay: Suppose we discoveredpeople on Venus who are very badly-off, and suppose we could help themat little cost to ourselves. If we did nothing, so the argument runs, we wouldsurely violate a positive duty of beneficence, but we would not be violatinga negative duty of justice, because we would not be contributing to theperpetuation of their misery. What must be shown, then, is that radicalinequality is not only avoidable, but that we are indeed contributing toworld poverty by our behaviour. Pogge mentions three different approacheswhich classify the existing inequality as highly unjust and as caused by aglobal order imposed by the wealthy nations, an order that could be changedby reforms of the status quo, which would mean a major step toward justice:World poverty is among other things (1) based on the effects of sharedsocial institutions, (2) the result of the uncompensated exclusion from theuse of natural resources and (3) the effect of a common and violent history.By putting the responsibility on the governments and institutions of thedeveloped countries, the author argues against explanatory nationalism, awidespread view in the developed countries, which holds that world povertytoday can be fully explained in terms of national and local factors. Manygovernments of the developing countries are indeed corrupt, brutal andunresponsive to the interests of the poor majority of their people. But thevital interests of the global poor are also above all neglected in internationalnegotiations, not only because their governments do not vigorouslyrepresent these interests, but because we support these regimes – and evenprofit from them, as Pogge tries to show with several examples in his fourthessay. As the author claims in our international order, for example, anygroup predominating over the means of coercion within a country isinternationally recognized as the legitimate government of this country’sterritory and people – regardless of how this group has come to power.Attributing such a group international recognition does not only mean thatwe engage it in negotiations, but also that we accept this group’s right toact for the people it rules and, in particular, grant it the privilege of freelyborrowing in the country’s name and of freely disposing of the country’snatural resources. These privileges – which are imposed by the wealthysocieties – are cherished by authoritarian rulers and corrupt elites in thepoorer countries. But it is exactly these privileges that provide powerfulincentives to attempts at coups and civil wars in the countries with manyresources and thus contribute substantially to the persistence of severepoverty. Another problem is globalization: Pogge’s complaint against theWTO regime is not, as one might suppose, that it opens markets too much,

BOOK REVIEW 457

but – on the contrary – that it opens our markets not enough and therebygains for us the benefits of free trade while withholding them from theglobal poor.

Pogge’s conclusion is therefore that we should not think of our individualdonations and of possible institutionalized poverty eradication initiativesas helping the poor, but as protecting them from the effects of global ruleswhose injustice we benefit from and is our responsibility. The point is thusnot to consider new remedial measures, but to analyse how the injusticeof the global order might be diminished by institutional reforms that wouldput an end to the need for such measures.

Against this conclusion it is sometimes argued that citizens andgovernments may, and perhaps should, show more concern for the survivaland flourishing of their own state, culture, and compatriots than for thesurvival and flourishing of foreign states. But the author convincinglyclaims that giving priority to the near and dear is quite dubious in the caseof negative duties. While it seems to be legitimate and sometimes evenmorally demanded to give priority to one’s family and friends in the caseof positive duties, the situation is different with negative duties. Injusticesand other wrongs committed against foreigners have the same weight asinjustices and other wrongs committed against compatriots. Even the ideaof a certain kind of nationalism is therefore compatible with the negativeduty of the developed countries not to contribute to a global order whichsustains the persistence of world poverty.

However reasonable this conclusion may seem, one perhaps doubts thevalidity of the premise that alleviating world poverty can be accounted forby negative duties. Pogge is therefore right in saying: Whether or not weaccept such a negative duty in regard to the justice of our global ordermakes a momentous moral difference. (p. 133) The entire argumentationof the book depends on the acceptance of such a negative duty, and thisacceptance in turn depends, among other things, on empirical facts, suchas economic, social and political examinations. Empirical data is sus-ceptible to misinterpretation and often highly controversial, which makesPogge’s argumentation vulnerable.

Apart from that difficulty it will be hard to prove that the fulfilment ofour negative duties will suffice to change global misery sustainably.According to Pogge each of us has the negative duty not to contribute to asystem which sustains global inequality. While it may be possible forgovernments and so-called global players to change the global order stepby step by not contributing to discriminating systems, there are only rarepossibilities for the ordinary citizen to change the rules of global marketmechanisms by not contributing to the imposed system. Not contributing,

BOOK REVIEW458

then, means that one should engage in investigating alternatives in politicaland economic life that have not been established yet, which seems to gobeyond the scope of negative duty.

In my opinion one should, then, not give up the idea of positive dutiestoo early. In a world where the assets of the top three billionaires are higherthan the combined GNP of all least-developed countries and their 600million people, Pogge is definitely right in concluding his book by saying:[W]e should work together across disciplines to conceive a comprehensivesolution to the problem of world poverty, and across borders for thepolitical implementation of this solution. (p. 215) Pogge’s work presentsan impressive contribution to this aim.

BARBARA BLEISCHPhilosophisches SeminarUniversität ZürichZollikerstrasse 1178008 ZürichSwitzerland