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10THCEEFORUM

FacultyofLawofTheWestUniversityofTimișoara

3d-4thofMay2018

BOOKOFABSTRACTS

ConstitutionalIdentityandSocialMemoriesinCentralandEasternEurope

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LaurianneAllezardUniversityClermontAuvergneThe automatic mechanisms behind the construction of theConstitutionalIdentityIdentityisnotawordthatcanbefoundinallConstitutions.Onthecontrary, the noun and the adjective are present in just a fewConstitutions. However, identity exists implicitly in allConstitutions. Some categories like values, languages, nationalidentityetc.,arearealityinallConstitutionsandifthecontentschange,thecontainerremainsthesame.Allthemanifestationsofidentity could therefore be categorized. The notion of“Constitutional Identity” first appeared in the case law of theCourts, in a context where domestic and supranational legalorders met. Constitutional Identity was revealed by theconstitutionaljudgetopreventthechangeofconstitutionalorderand“protect”itagainstEuropeanlaw’sprimacy.But,accordingtous, the notion is just an expression of somethingwhich existsmoredeeplyinconstitutionaltexts.LegaldoctrineaswellastheCourts’case-lawdonotagreeaboutwhatconstitutionalidentitymeans.Forsomeauthors,ConstitutionalIdentityistheidentityofthe Constitution itself. For some others, it is something to bederived from national identity. Constitutional Identity issometimes seen as thewholeConstitution, sometimes as someparticularprovisionsintheConstitution.Thecircumstancesofthebirth of the notion of Constitutional Identity in Central andEasternEuropearenotverydifferentfromtheonesinWesternEurope. In France, the expression of constitutional identityappearedforthefirsttimein2004,asaprotectinginstrumentofthe French constitutional order and of the sovereignty of theconstituentpoweragainstEuropean integration.Theuse is thesameintheEasternpartofEurope.Althoughthecontentsarenotexactlythesame,wecanobservesomecommoncharacteristicsthatcanjustifytheexistenceofconstitutionalidentityandpermitittobeanargumenttobetakeninaccount.Theuncertaintyofthe

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notioninWesternaswellasinEasternEuroperepresentsforthemomentthestrengthoftheStates.Ourhypothesis isthattherearesomemechanismswhichenabletoestablishtheexistenceofconstitutional identity even if the judge had not revealed thisnotion explicitly. The comparative method enlightens someinvariablecontainers,whicharecommonforeachConstitutionallaw.Thiscontainerestablishesalinkbetweentheinstitutionsandthepeople.Thatiswhy,allaroundEurope,ConstitutionalIdentityisaninviolablecategory.StefanAndonovicandUrosBajovicUniversityofBelgradeThe role of independent control bodies in the shaping ofconstitutionalidentityThepurposeofthispaperistodefine,inthelightofconstitutionalidentity,theconceptofindependentcontrolbodies,asitappliesintheRepublicofSerbia.Thefocusofthispaperwillnotbekeptondomesticsolutionsexclusively,whileitwillbeusedasagoodstartingpointforcomparingdifferentmeanings,whicharegivento constitutional identity. We will examine the constitutionalidentityintwomaindirections:asfeaturesofthemainlegalactandasconstitutionaldemocraticcultureingeneral.Theconceptof constitutional identityneedsitself someclarification,but thequestionisnotonlyafeatureofacademicdisputes,whileitrangesfrommanySupremeCourtsandwasalsoaddressedbyArticle4,paragraph2of theTreatyonEuropeanUnion inanother form.One of theaspects of constitutional identity,as notedabove, isconstitutional reality – as built by different institutions andcitizens in society. In order to find a crossroad of theory andpractice, we will examine the roll of the Ombudsman, theCommissionerforProtectionofEqualityand theCommissionerfor Information of Public Importance and Personal DataProtection in shaping constitutional identity in the Republic ofSerbia.Thesebodiesarespecificbecauseoftheirnature.Theyareindependentandautonomousofotherbranchesofgovernment,

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eventhoughtheyareelectedbyParliament.Theirprimaryroleistoprotectthehumanrightsandfreedomsofeverycitizenandtotake care of the application of constitutional norms. Theircompetencesallowthemtocreateabettersocietyandtodirectcitizenstowardsgoodpracticewithrecommendation,warningsandothergentletools.Inthisway,theyseparatethemselvesfromgovernment bodies and are getting closer to ordinary citizens.Theyhavetoconnecttraditionandfutureintentionsofthesocietyintheirdecisions,shapingtheapplicationofconstitutionalnormsinpractice.Bearingthatinmind,wewillanalyzetheconnectionbetweenindependentcontrolbodiesandconstitutionalidentity,theconnectionbetweentheoryandpractice,andwewillofferapracticalperspectiveonveryimportantquestionofconstitutionalidentity.JacekBarcikUniversityofSilesiaRuleofLawasapartofPolishconstitutionalidentity.AComparisonwiththeEuropeanUnion’sRuleofLawOnaccountofthecontrolmechanismontheruleoflawinPoland,somebelievethattheEuropeanUniondoesnothavetherighttointerfere with Poland’s internal affairs. In their opinion, theseaffairsbelongsolelytothecompetencesoftheindependentstateofPoland.TheyclaimthatthePolishlegalregulationsassociatedwiththeorganizationofthejusticesystemdonotviolatetheruleoflawresultingfromtheConstitutionoftheRepublicofPoland,whiletheEuropeanRuleofLaw,specifiedinart.2oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnion,onlyreferstotheactivitiesoftheEuropeaninstitutions. Therefore, the European Union does not have thecompetencestodealwiththeissueofwhethertheruleoflawisfollowedinPoland,becausenoprovisionsoftheTreatyauthorizeittodoso.TheobjectiveofthisarticleistostudywhetherthereisadiscrepancyorsynergybetweentheunderstandingoftheruleoflawattheleveloftheEUandPoland.Atfirst,IwillpresenttheruleoflawundertheConstitutionoftheRepublicofPoland,and,

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then, forcomparative purposes, the rule of law in theEU legalsystem.Lateron,ananswerwillbeprovidedtothequestionofwhether theEUhas the competences to dealwith the issue ofwhether the rule of law is followed in that member state.Furthermore, Iwill present the consequences that PolandmaybearifitisfoundtobeviolatingtheEuropeanUnionvalues.MariusBălan“AlexandruIoanCuza”UniversityNational identity and constitutional patriotism - a matter ofunwrittenconstitutionallaw?Nationalidentityisantinomicaltotheuniversalistspiritofliberalconstitutionalism and human rights. Every concrete polityassumesthepresuppositionofapre-existingsenseofbelonging,based onwhich the peoplegives itselfa constitution. The veryexistenceofsuchapolity,thecriteriaandthelimitsofthepoliticalcommunity cannot be the subject of regulations by means ofabstractrulesaimingtoauniversalvalidity.Ontheotherhand,asenseofpoliticalattachmentcanemergeinrespecttonormsandvalues of a liberal constitution, as long as its procedures andinstitutionsareingrainedinandreinforcedbyaconstantandlongestablishedpolitical practice ofa nation. Basically, thenationalsenseofbelongingcanbeepitomizedinthemanifestorimplicitdictum“wearebetter”,pertainingtocultural,historical,religious,ethnic or even racial peculiarities, or –most frequently – to aspecific mixture thereof. It can also apply to political andconstitutional peculiarities, suggesting a superior ability indiscerning,respectingandenforcinguniversalnormsandvalues.This paper argues that both national (and/or constitutional)identityandconstitutionalpatriotismcanbebetterunderstoodanddescribedwithintheframeworkofunwrittenconstitutionallaw.Constantpoliticalpracticesandpersistentlegalconvictions,transcending changes of government and amendments ofconstitutionalandstatutorytextsarefarbettersuitedtograsptheelusiverealityof the identityofanyconcretepolity.This thesis

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will be substantiated by some illustrations drawn from theRomanianconstitutionalpractice.MartinBelovUniversityofSofia"St.KlimentOhriidski"Constitutional identity – Westphalian reflection of theconstitutional heritage of the nation state or post-westphalianalternative to sovereignty in the context of supranationalconstitutionalism?Constitutional identity is both a modern and a post-modernconcept. It is intellectual paradigmdeeply rooted in the nationstate’sconstitutionalism.Thus,constitutionalidentityisinvolvedintheconceptualnetworkcomposedofconstitutionaltradition,constitutional culture,constitutional consensusandentrenchedconstitutional provisions. Constitutional identity may beperceived as a product of the nation-state’s constitutionalismentrenched in the path-dependency of the axiological andinstitutional design of Westphalian constitutionalism. Here,Westphalian constitutionalism means the traditionalconstitutionalism of the nation state based upon sovereignty,closedstatehood,exclusiveterritorialityofthepublicpowerandabsolute constitutional supremacy over international andsupranational law. In the context of Westphalianconstitutionalism, constitutional identity is predominantly areflectionofthecommonconstitutionalpastofthenation.Itisapantheon of constitutional ideologies, principles, values andinstitutions serving a symbolic and constructive role in thecreationofthenationalconstitutionalismandbeingcornerstonesof the distinct national constitutional tradition. Hence,constitutional identity is a phenomenon of constitutionalanthropology.Itreflectstheconstitutionalculturewhichisdeeplyembedded in the specific national civilization and ispreconditioneduponthequalityoftheconstitutionperceivednotonlyasprescriptivesourceoflaw,butalsoasareflexivecharter

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for civilizational development. However, in the context ofEuropean constitutionalism, especially since the entering intoforce of the Lisbon Treaty, constitutional identity started todevelop an alternative content and functionality. TheconstitutionaldialogueoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEUandtheMember States’ constitutional courts and supreme courts hastransformed the constitutional identity fromWestphalian intopost-Westphalianconceptovercomingitsculturalembeddednessinthedistinctnationstate’straditions.Constitutionalidentityiscurrently used as a key element of open statehood andconstitutionalpluralismandasbothsafeguardandalternativetostate sovereignty. It is a pivotal concept for the emergence ofsupranational and global constitutionalism since it allows thedevelopment of relative primacy of the constitution, addressesthechallengesoffragmentationandtransferofsovereigntyandthe crisis of hierarchy as fundamental ideal and orderingparadigm of the Westphalian statehood. Thus, constitutionalidentityemergesasoneofthefirstpost-modernconceptsandisbecoming a central element of the ideology and institutionaldesign of the post-Westphalian constitutionalism andconstitutionallaw.ThispaperwillexposethetensionbetweentheWestphalian past and the post-Westphalian future ofconstitutionalidentity.ItaimsatdeconstructingtheWestphalianconcept of constitutional identity and at constructing a post-Westphalianconceptofconstitutionalidentitywhichshouldplaythe role of supportive ideology and cornerstone of theinstitutional design of the emerging supranational and globalconstitutionalism. This will be done by emphasizing thedependency of constitutional identity on both the rational andemotionalaspectsofconstitutionalism,beingaconceptallocatedon the point of interception between the prescriptiveandpro-active aspect of the constitution as source of law and itsdescriptiveaspectasproductandreflectionoftheconstitutionalcivilization.

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KarolyiBenkeConstitutionalCourtofRomaniaThe Romanian Constitutional Court’s approach towardconstitutionalidentityTheconstitutionalcourts’caselawisoftenseenastheinvisibleConstitution of a nation. While the Constitution itself containsrulesonthegeneralorganizationofthestateandenshrinesthefundamental rights and freedoms, the jurisprudence role is tosolvetheinherentconflictsbetweendifferentstateactorsandtodetermine the concrete sphere of protection provided by thefundamentalrightsandliberties.Inbothcases,theCourthastointerprettheconstitutionalnorminanevolvingmanner,as,likeother fields of law, the Constitution is a living law. A greatchallenge for every constitutional court is to interpret thenormative content of the national Constitution as much aspossible in line with the requirements derived from the EUaccession.Thisadaptationprocesshasitslimits,too,takingintoaccount that there is no such constitutional obligation. TheRomanianConstitutionalCourt’sapproachtotheEUlawisaeuro-friendlyone,asagreatnumberofitsdecisionsciteEUlaw/ECJcase law. But, at the same time, one can notice that there is acertainfearofthenationalcourttobaseitsrationaleexclusivelyor,inadecisivemanner,onEUlaw/ECJcaselawandusestheseEU instruments to legitimize the adopted solution. There aresomedecisionsinwhichtheCourtadoptstheEUapproach,butwarnsthatitwilldoitaslongasthequestionatstakedoesnotaffect thenational constitutional identity.As itmaybenoticed,there is no definition provided by the court concerning thisconcept,butstilltheCourtusesit.Thatmeansthatwewillbethewitnessesofastepbystepdevelopmentofthisconceptthatwillcomprise the hard core principles/ rights of a nation. In thiscontext, the next step that has to be analyzed is that such adevelopmentcanbecomeabarrier intheunitaryapplicationofthe EU law throughout the EU. The Romanian ConstitutionalCourt’scaselawofferssomeexamplesinwhichthisconcepthas

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been affirmed, but never explained. Consequently, the analysiswillfocusonthedecisionsthatimportedthisconceptinourlegalorder,alsoemphasizingtheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofsuchconstitutionaltransplants.RalucaBerceaTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraWhat’sinaName?Fully aware that well-established linguistic theories claim thearbitrarycharacterof linguisticsignsandwithoutdisputingthepopularunderstandingofoneofShakespeare’sbestknownlinesaccordingtowhichnamesofthingsdonotaffectwhattheyreallyare, the present paper will, however, undertake a semioticanalysisofthekeytermsindebate,“’constitutional’/‘identity’”.Firstly,thepapernotesthatnotonlydoesart.4(2)oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnionstatethattheEuropeanUnionshallrespecttheMember States’ “national identities”, but also that the veryprincipleofsupremacyoftheEuropeanUnionlawisborderedby“the national identity of the Member States”. Moreover, theprotection of “socio-cultural identity” of a Member State wasgrantedbytheECJ inmorethanonecase.Ontheotherhand,aDeclaration on “European identity” was signed within theEuropeansupranationalsystemalreadyin1973.Secondly,whilesomeconstitutionaljudgesofotherMemberStateshaveclaimedthe very competence to reviewwhether European Union legalacts are compatible with the state’s “constitutional identity”,otherconstitutionalcourtsareunexpectedlyreluctanttoevenusethe terms, let alone to give a (provisional) definition thereof.TakingasanexampletheRomanianconstitutionallegalorder,thepaperwill,therefore,haverecoursetoalinguisticapproachtotheconstitutionaltextitself,insearchofaconceptualframeworkforthe“constitutionalidentity”.

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Dan-AdrianCărămidariuTheWestUniversityofTimișoaraBetween Perestroika and the Washington Consensus. Romania´stransitionandtheeconomicdoctrineofthe1991ConstitutionRomaniawas one of the Central andEasternEurope countriesthat did not accept theWashington consensus until late in the1990s,when thesecond transformationcrisis (the first1990–1993, the second 1997 – 1999) hit the country strongly andmarketreformswereimposedbytheIMFandtheEU.Romaniaadoptedatransitionprogrammedrawnupbylocaleconomistsin1990 with the aid of some South American, Swiss, French,Yugoslav and Soviet experts. The authors proposed a so called“thirdway”: a gradual dismantling of the planned economy, inorder to keep social tensions low and to avoid a highunemploymentrate,butalsoestablishingarelativelyfunctionalmarketeconomywithina timespanof three to fouryears.TheprogrammewasfullyabandonedbySeptember1991,whentheformer Communists who had taken power in December 1989wereconfrontedwithmajorsocialunrest.AccordingtothepostCommunistConstitution,adoptedin1991andamendedin2003,the Romanian economy is a market economy, based on freeenterprise and competition, the State ensuring free trade,protection of fair competition and a favourable framework inordertostimulateandcapitalizeeveryfactorofproduction.Thispaper argues that the Constitutional provisions regarding theRomanianeconomyarenothingelsebuttheresultofthedoctrinalconfusionofbothRomanianeconomistsandlegalscholarsofthetimeandoftheirunwillingnesstoacceptthenecessityofafullymarket-orientedcapitalisteconomy.Thisisthereasonwhy,whendesigning theConstitutionof1991, theydealtonlybrieflywitheconomicmatters, drafted rather general provisions and reliedheavily on the third-way-doctrine, thereby concealing theirstrong reluctance to implement genuine market reforms. Inconclusion, as the neoliberal approach gained momentum(especiallyduringthecrisesof1997–1999and2009–2010),the

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ConstitutionalprovisionsregardingRomania´smarketeconomycould be interpreted quite differently from the originalunderstandingof1991.AgataCeberaandJakubFirlusJagiellonianUniversityPublic administration in post-soviet era – remarks on so-called‘proceduralrelicts’inpolishadministrativeproceedingsThe main aim of our paper is to discuss some selected issuesrelated to the public administration in post-soviet era. For thesubject of these considerations, it is necessary to discuss‘procedural relicts’ in polish administrative proceedings.Phenomenasuchasglobalisation, thecreationofaccountabilitynetworksandthedemocratisationandprivatisationofpubliclaware not irrelevant to the institutional setting that provides theprocedural framework for the functioning of publicadministration. The effective management of public affairsrequires effective procedural instruments. In this context, thequestionregardingtheplaceofseveralproceduralinstitutionsinadministrativeproceedings(i.e.internalreview,theprosecutor’sparticipation in proceedings, ex officio [extraordinary]investigationsconductedbypublicauthorities) inademocraticstate ruled by law in the 21st century becomes increasinglyimportant.Inparticular,itisnecessarytoestablishwhethertheproceduralframeworkforadministrativeactionsdatingbacktotheearlyyearsofthe20thcentury,slightlymodifiedinthesovietera,becameoutdated(obsolete)?ItmustbestressedoutthatthePolishCodeofAdministrativeProcedureestablishedmorethanfiftyyearsago–on14thJune1960–isstillinforce.However,apositiveanswertothisquestionseemstobereductiveinnature.Generallyspeaking,mostoftheproceduralinstitutionsacquiredthroughoutthepastthreedecadesnewmeanings.Thatistosaythat institutions such as the prosecutors’ participation orreconciliationproceedingswerenotonlyadoptedbythemodern

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state but also correlated with challenges coming from urbandevelopment, social welfare or environmental law. A furthertrend may be drawn. It is commonly known that the sovietapparatusdidnotacceptawidejudicialreview(verification)ofthepublicadministration’sactions.InPoland,until1980,theonlyredressavailable for individualswas theadministrativeappeal.After the administrative courts were re-established, one maystate that the internal control ismerely a procedural ‘relict’ ofsymbolicsignificance;yetinthe21stcentury,theadministrativeappealbecameausefultoolforbothpublicadministrationandthecourts for the internal verification proceedings became asignificant factor which optimizes the case flow and createsproper factual basis for adjudication. To conclude the abovediscussionwewilltrytoanswerthequestionofknowingwhatisthe value, role and future of „post-soviet relicts” in Polishadministrativelaw.Canitbesaidthatthose„relicts”areapartofoursocialmemory?ŁukaszChylaJagiellonianUniversityThe critical analysis of the current Polish constitutional identitycrisis in a comparative perspective with Central and EasternEuropeancountriesAbstract: Last month, the European Commission has launchedproceedings against Poland for breaching European commonvalues and rule of law under Article 7 of the Treaty on theEuropeanUnion.Thisresultedinoneofthemostunprecedentedeventsin thehistoryof theEuropeanUnion,andits immediatereasonwas theadoptionby thePolish legislatureofa seriesoflaws abolishing the principle of the separation of powers, bychanging the judicial system in Poland in order to de factosubordinatetheindependentcourtsandjudiciarytotheexecutiveand the legislature. The said changes included constitutionallyquestionableexchange of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal,subordinating the SupremeCourt to the parliament after prior

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exchangeofitscomposition,subordinatingthejudgesofcommoncourtstotheexecutivebranchandthetotalmarginalizationofthejudges’ self-governments. Thus, the fragile balance of power inPolandhasbeenundermined,aswellastheconstitutionalorderthathasbeeninoperationsince1997.Themainargumentinuseofthegoverningpartyandparliamentarymajoritywastheneedtodemocratizethe“all-powerfuljudiciary”,deprivedofallegedlyadequateciviccontrol.Despite these moves, a specific constitutional “coup” did notresultinanyspecialsocialrepercussions.Surprisingly,therulingparty, politically responsible for the reform, recorded a recordincreaseinpopularityinallpoliticalsurveysafterthesechanges.Could thatmean, that despite the centuries-long constitutionaltraditionsinPoland,asignificantpartofsocietynotonlydoesnotidentifywith its values,but even considers themdefectiveandincoherent?Howisthatpossible,thatthemajorityofthesocietyisnotfamiliarordoesnotembracetheConstitution’sspirit,basicprinciplesandassumptions?Interestingly,mostoftheparties,almostsincetheadoptionoftheConstitution in 1997, postulated the need to change theConstitution. In many countries with a long legal tradition,questioning theconstitution in forcewould amount topoliticalsuicide, while in Poland the norm is to publicly question itscurrentwordingandsense.Thequestionthenarises-whatisthesocial significance of the Constitution, which is publicly andnotoriouslycriticizedorcalledexplicitlyas“post-communist”bymost political options, and the only narrow social group thatseems to defend the integrity and sense of its existence is anarrowclassofjudgesandlawyers.Therefore,what is (if there isone) thecollectiveconstitutionalidentityofPolishcitizenscomparedtootherCentralandEasternEuropeancountries?Whatisthegeneralcauseoflackofrespectand understanding for certain important constitutional pillarsandvaluesandwhataretheunderlyinggroundsforsuchastateofaffairs?Howdidthehistoryofthe20thcenturyandothernon-

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legal aspects formed the social perception of the legal systemitself?Theaimofthispaperwillbetopresentthepotentialreasonsforthisveryspecificweaknessofconstitutionalidentityandvaluesin modern Poland compared to other Central and EasternEuropeancountriesandtheattempttounderstandvariousnon-legal norms that may serve the constitutional order to becommonlyandpermanently inscribed in thecollectivenationalconsciousnessofasociety.MattiaCostaUniversityofGenoaConstitutional identitiesv.commonvalues inCentralandEasternEurope: Is there a regionalization of rightswithin the Europeanlegalframework?Therespectandpromotionofcommonvalues–asstatedbyart.2oftheTreatyoftheEuropeanUnion(TEU)–hasbeenakeystoneoftheEuropeanlegalframeworksincetheirintroductionwithinprimarylawalmosttwodecadesago.Moreover,itisnoteworthythattheyarelargelyinspiredfromthe1993Copenhagencriteria,settingabenchmarkforeverynon-memberStatewishingtojointhe European Union (EU). Altogether with the enforcingmechanism provided by art. 7 TEU, their ultimate role is toenforceliberalvaluesineveryMemberState.However,accordingtoart.4,para.2oftheTEU,theEUiscalledtorespectthenationalandconstitutionalidentityofeachofitsmembers.WhileitseemsprimafacieratherdemandingtobalancesuchprovisionsinordertofindtheoreticalequilibriumtobeappliedtothewholeEU,duetothepeculiarcharacteristicsofthemanifoldlegalandpoliticaltraditions, thereareseveral issuesopeningdeepgapsbetweentheEU-15andmostoftheStateswhoappliedformembershipinthe last two decades. The aim of this article is to scrutinizewhether the national identity of Central and East Europeancountries(CEE)iscapabletoreadaptthecontentofart.2TEU,

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readinconjunctionwithart.4,para.2oftheTEU,tothespecificissuesoftheregionanduptowhatextenta“regionalization”ofcommon values should be admitted. In particular, the balancebetweentherespectandpromotionofminorityrights–arelevantelementofthecommonvalues–andthepromotionofnationalidentities will be considered as a benchmark. The followingquestions shall be addressed: Should a recently formed Staterestrict the access to citizenship to large national minoritiesresiding in its territory? Should the safeguard of the nationallanguage prevent large national minorities to spell personalnamesinofficialdocumentsaccordingtotheirphoneticalphabet?Should the preservation of institutional stability restrict theenjoymentofpoliticalrightstoaremarkableshareofcitizens?MichałCzykierdaUniversityofWarsawSocialmarketeconomyinPolandandtheEuropeanUnionInmyspeech,Iwouldliketopresentthearticle20ofthePolishConstitution, which should be analyzed in connection withArticles1and2of theConstitution.Thisarticle talksabout thesocialmarketeconomy,whichisdetermined,ontheonehand,bythebasicelementsofmarketfunctioning(economicfreedomandprivate property) and, on the other hand, by social solidarity,social dialogue and cooperation among social partners. Thisconceptisalsocalledordoliberalismandwasformulatedforthefirst time at the end of the 1940s in Germany. The concept ofsocio-economicdevelopmentwaslinkedfromtheverybeginningtoChristiandemocracy (CDU). Inpractice, itwas incarnatedbythe German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. From the content ofArticle 20, one could say that the model of the social marketeconomyisbasedontwopillars,economicfreedomandprivateproperty,aswellassolidarity,dialogueandcooperationamongsocialpartners.Thefirstpillar iscoupledwithArticle22oftheConstitution.Thesecondpillarisconnectedwitharticle1and2ofthe Constitution: “Collaboration is very important for labor

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relations. It follows from these provisions that both employersand employees are obliged to devote, if necessary and to theextentappropriatetotheirabilities,someself-interestorgroupinterest for thecommon good” (K 17/00 - Ruling of the Polishconstitutionalcourt).Thisstatementexpressestheconceptofthebalanceofinterestsofthemarketparticipantsandtherespectfortheir autonomy. The consequence of thisway of solving socialconflictsistheincorporationofinstitutionsthatexpresstheideaofsolidaristcorporatismintothestatesystemandthatimposeonthe state the obligation to enable real participation of socialpartners. In addition, Article 20 prohibits the government toshapethesocio-economicsystemaccordingtoitsownwill.Iplantodividemyspeechintofourparts.Inthefirstpart,Iwouldliketotalkaboutthebeginningoftheideaofordoliberalism.Inthenext one, I would like to talk about article 20 of the Polishconstitution and about several judgments of the ConstitutionalTribunal.Inthethirdpart,Iwillbrieflypresenttheconstitutionaldeterminants of the socialmarket economy in other countries,especiallyinGermanyandGreatBritainandwillshowhowtheirsolutionsinfluencedthePolishsystemandhowtheideaofasocialmarketeconomyisperceivedbyPolishsociety.Attheend,Iwillemphasize how this ideaworks in theEuropeanUnion, on thebasisofarticles119,121,152,53,155oftheTFEU.DanaDiaconuTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraLegalReasoningAnew?Romania’spost-1989legalcultureThefalloftheCommunistregimeinRomaniain1989ledtothemultiplicationoflawfaculties,whichwereorganizedinonlythreeuniversities(Bucharest,ClujandIași).Atapopulationofover22million people, in Romania only 100 jurists graduated in laweveryyear. Inaddition, their statuswasambiguous,due to thewayinwhichjusticeandthelegalsystemweregenerallyregardedby thepolitical regime.Beingconsidereda supportof thestateandtheparty,thelawpracticedbytheCommuniststate'sjurists

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wasdevoidof itsnaturalpurpose.The jurists themselveswerelookeduponwithsuspicion,beingwell-knownthatanyofthemcouldbeforcedbythestateorthepartyauthoritiestomakeanincorrect, unlawful or even immoral decision. Thus, holding amarginalrole,withoutanydecisionalattributes,couldpotentiallyrepresentashelteragainsttheseinterventions.EvenifthedirectauthorityoftheStateandoftheCommunistPartywereremovedby the change of regime, this has not changed much in thereceptionofthelawintheRomanianlegalculture,neitherinitsconceptualizationbylawyers,norintheconcretewayofaffirmingthelawinthecourtsofjustice.Althoughrelieved,theRomanianjudgeshaveoperatedalongtimeafterthecollapseofCommunismwithoutanyguidance,lackingthelegaleducationnecessarytoactotherwise. In this situation, some judges have "privatized" thechannels of intervention in their judicial decisions, becomingcorrupt. Itwas "normal" for these decisions, at the time, to begivenmostoftenbyothercriteriathanthelawor justice.Otherjudges have found appropriate to retire. The few who haveconsiderednecessarytofightfortheirprofession,fortherights,forthelawandfortheideaofanindependent justicearethosewithwhomitwaspossibletobuildwhatRomaniahavetoday,ajusticewithasatisfactorydegreeof independence.Whatisthatjuristshadtoovercome,afterthefalloftheCommunistregimeInRomania? The paperwill find three questions whose answershave fundamentally changed in the Romanian legal culture,althoughrelativelyslowly,inabout20years:Mustarulehaveasingle form or source? Is the judge a valid source for legalargument? Are the rights (so) important? To these questions,indeed, the answers are now different in the Romanian legalculture.Whathascontributedtothisremovalofmemory?Inthisrespect, the article analyses some aspects that had positiveinfluence (adherence toECHRandEU legal systems, somenewandprogressivestatutesoftheRomanianlaw,anewapproachinthelegaleducationarea)andthosethathaddelayedtheremovalof old ideologies about thecontent andpurpose of the Lawor

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about thestatusof the judge (questionablenewstatutesof theRomanianlawandthedogmatismofRomanianlegalscience).BogdanDimaUniversityofBucharestThe concept of integrity in the Romanian Constitutional Court`scaselawThepaperfocuseson theRomanianConstitutionalCourt`s caselawregardingtheconceptofintegrityforpublicofficesinpost-communistRomania.First,Ishallmakesomegeneralcommentsontheconceptofintegrityinconnectionwiththecontemporarydebate about the best methods to fight against corruption inpublicoffices.Second,IshallselectfromanarrayofConstitutionalCourt`sdecisionswhattheCourttellsusaboutthesocialvaluesprotectedbytheprovisionspromotingintegrityforpublicoffices.Third, I shall present the most relevant case law of theConstitutionalCourtconcerningprovisionsregulatingtheconflictof interest, incompatibilities and asset declarations for publicofficials.An in-depthanalysisof theConstitutionalCourt`s caselawon integrity forpublicofficesallowsus to findout if thosespecific provisionswere orwere notconstitutionally protectedand developed over the years. As the paper will show, theConstitutionalCourthasbeenhighlyprotectivewithandhassetouthighstandardsformostoftheprovisionsaimingatpromotingintegrity in public offices, mostly seen as a preventive andnecessary method within the many-sided process of fightingagainstcorruption.

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SorinaIoanaDorogaTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraUnderstandingconstitutionalidentitythroughthelanguageoftheCourts.TheCaseofRomaniaWith increasing centrifugal forces putting pressure on thefunctioning(andseemingly,attimes,ontheveryexistence)oftheEuropeanUnion,thenotionof‘constitutionalidentity’hasgainednew significance in recent years. Legal doctrine hasmetaphoricallyreferredtothisgeneralconcepteitheras‘ashield’or ‘asword’, thuscapturingtheambivalenceofbothitscontentanditsusebynationalandEuropeancourts.Thepresentpaperaims to describe this spectrum of meanings by relying on ananalysis of case-law (and language) of the RomanianConstitutionalCourt, read in relation to the use of the termbyinternationalcourtssuchastheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsand the Court of Justice of the European Union. The role ofconnectednotionssuchas‘marginofappreciation’indeterminingthesphereofconstitutional identitywillalsobediscussedfromtheperspectiveofitsusebystateauthoritiesinsafeguardingthenationalconstitutionalidentity.PiotrEckhardtCentre for Legal Education and Social Theory / JagiellonianUniversityDissidents’ idea of Central Europe and today’s constitutionalidentityoftheregionAbstract:CentralEuropeisnotjustageographicalregion,itisanimportant political concept designed by anti-CommunistdissidentsfromCzechoslovakia,HungaryandPoland.TheideaofCentralEuropewascreatedbyexceptionalintellectuals,notonlybypolitical thinkersandactivistsbutalsobywriters, essayists,historiansandpoets.Andalthoughmanyauthorscontributedtothe idea of Central Europe, nevertheless Václav Havel, MilanKundera,AdamMichnik,GyörgyKonrádandCzesławMiłoszwere

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the most influential. Their manifesto was presented by MilanKunderainhisfamousessay“akidnappedWestorthetragedyofCentralEurope”, inwhich theregionwas treatedasagroupofcountrieswith common history, common culture and common(tragic) political situation during the period of really existingsocialism. After the Autumn of Nations many of theaforementionedformerdissidentsbecameevenmoreinfluential.VáclavHavelbecamepresidentofCzechRepublic,AdamMichnikaneditor-in-chiefofaprominentnewspaper.HavetheycontinuedusingtheirpreviouslyvoicedideasofCentralEuropesomehow?Theaimofthepaperistoanswerthequestioniftheintellectualheritageoftheanti-CommunistoppositionhasinfluencedthenewdemocraciesinCentralEuropeinpractical,oratleastsymbolic,dimension.Thepresentationwillconsistoftwoparts:first,mostimportantfeaturesofthedissidents’ideaofCentralEuropewillbereconstructed.Second,thepaperwillinvestigatewhethertheanti-Communistdissidents’ideaofCentralEuropewasreflectedsomehowintheconstitutionalidentityofthecountriesofCentralEuropeafterthepoliticalandeconomictransformation(focusingparticularly on Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Theconstitutionalidentityishereinunderstoodaswidelyaspossible– as the backbone of democracy, which includes constitutionallaw, activities undertaken by constitutional tribunals, politicalinstitutions, public discourse on constitutional matters, etc.Presentationwillincludeanalysisofcurrentsituationin2018andthemostimportantprocessesafterthecollapseofreallyexistingsocialism in 1989. The author will also describe, analyze andexplaindifferencesbetweenparticularcountries.JánosFazekasEötvösLorándUniversityCentralizationofPublicAdministrationintheCEECountriesNationaladministrationshavebeenfacingnewchallengesduetoglobalizationinthelastdecadesinCEEcountriesandallovertheworld.Thesechallengesareasfollows:theglobalfinancialcrisis

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in2008anditseffects,internationalmigration,amuchmorerapidflow of information than before, broadening international freetradeandtheemergenceofgloballargecorporations.Earlier,inthepost-warperiod (afterWorldWarTwo), theorganizationalstructure of the public administration in Western Europeancountries was mainly transformed due to the principle ofdecentralization: lots of public administration tasks weretransferredtoindependentbodies(oncentralandlocallevel,e.g.agenciesandlocalgovernments).Inmanycases,privatizationofpublicservicesandtheimplementationofprivatesectorsolutionswere very popular in the field of performance of public tasks(within the theoretical framework ofNewPublicManagement,NPM). This process reached central administration, too:autonomous central agencies and regulatory authorities wereestablished in the postwar period in the Western Europeancountries. These tendencies started in Hungary and other CEEcountries after the regime changes in the 90s: separation ofpowers has been built up in the whole governmental system.Moreover,localgovernmentshavebeenseparatedfromthestateadministrative system, and autonomous central agencies andregulatory authorities were established within the stateadministration. The outsourcing of public services began, too:numerousadministrativetaskswerecarriedoutbynewformsofpublicbodiesandprivateorganizations(companies)andNGOs.After the above mentioned tendencies, a significant wave ofcentralizationstartedinHungaryin2010.ThePrimeMinisterandits direct executive apparatus became stronger, theministerialstructure and the level of non-departmental agencies has beenbecomemuchmoreconcentrated.Inaddition,localgovernmentshavebecomeweaker:alotofpublictaskshavebeentransferredtostateadministrativebodies,andtheirfinancialautonomyhasbeenlimited,too.Thepurposeofthepaperistoexamine:whetherthe above mentioned trends fit to an international trend,includingtheCEEregion.Inparticular:whethercentralizationhasconstitutional foundations inHungary and other CEEcountriesandwhethercentralizationfitsintotheirconstitutionaltraditions.

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TomasGabrisComeniusUniversityinBratislavaCitizens preceding their state: Trans-Atlantic views on SlovakpoliticalidentitiesWhile Slovakia was a part of the Hungarian Kingdom, Slovakpopulationwasbasically inactive in thepolitical sense.Slovakslackedpropereducationandanymasspoliticalawarenessatall.However, due to massive migration to the US, this hasdramatically changed – under the influence of US societal andpoliticalsystem,Slovakimmigrantswerepoliticallyreborninto“Slovakcitizens”evenbeforeCzechoslovakiaandSlovakiawereestablished as independent states. The immigrants thensubstantially–bothpoliticallyandfinancially–contributedtotheliberation of their European co-nationals in 1918. Still,immediately after the establishment of Czechoslovakia, manySlovak Americans, unsatisfied with the status of Slovaks inCzechoslovakia,keptdevelopingtheSlovakpoliticalideafurther–towardsindependence,thisbeinganevidenceparexcellenceastoexistenceofanindependentSlovakpoliticalidentity.Thisideagrew even stronger after WWII, upon an influx of Slovakimmigrants from the defeatedNazi-sponsoredwar-time SlovakState(1939-1945).TheSlovakpoliticalideamighthavetherebyalsoservedasanimportantfactorforpreservinganindependentSlovak American identity in the US, during the times ofCzechoslovakia, hoping to re-claim the lost Slovak politicalindependenceinthefuture.Inthemeanwhile,inEurope,priorto1993, the official Slovak political identity was traditionallyconceived rather as a part of broader Czechoslovak politicalidentity,especiallyafterWWII,tryingtosuppressandrefuseanymemoriesoftheSlovakStateexistingunderNazicontrolin1939-1945. Even the current independent Slovak constitutionalidentity (formed as of 1993 upon peaceful disintegration ofCzechoslovakia) keeps silent on the anti-Czechoslovak andilliberal traditionwithin the history ofSlovakpolitical identity.

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However,italsofailstoexplicitlyrefusetheilliberalvaluesandtorecognize the positive aspects of Czechoslovak tradition…Thereby, currently the two Slovak traditions and identities –illiberalandliberal–seemclashinginthecontextofrisingilliberalmovementinSlovakia,wheretheilliberalSlovaktraditionisbeingstrongly emphasized. The suppressed lore of Slovak politicalidentitypreviouslycultivatedmostlyamong theUS immigrantsresurfacedinthepoliticaldiscourseofradicalpoliticalpartiesinmodern day Slovakia. The answer as to where this clash ofpolitical discourses and identities – one liberal and the otherilliberal–willleadinthefuture,probablydependsontheoverallCentral and Eastern European political evolution on the scalesbetweenliberalismandilliberalism.Inthemeanwhile,ourpapercancontributetothedebatesbyatleastprovidinganinterestinginsightintomutualpoliticalinterdependence(andfluidpoliticalidentities)betweenthe“OldWorld”andthe“NewWorld”,whichsofarseemedtobereservedonlytomajornationsandcolonialpowers.GyörgyGajduschekandBalázsFeketeHungarianAcademyofSciences,SocialSciencesResearchCentreLackofrightsconsciousnessinthelegalculturesofCentral-EuropeandBalkans.Mythorreality?AcomparativestudyDuringthe1980s,AndrásSajó,aleadingscholaroflegalsociology,arguedthattheHungarianlegalcultureisdeeplypervadedbythelackof‘rightsconsciousness’,namelythatpeoplerelyoninformalpractices, personal networks and emotional ties instead ofreferring to their formally recognized rights and liberties inconflictualsituations.Thelackofrightsconsciousnessseemedtobe a distinctive feature of the legal culture in Hungary, and,presumably, in most CEE countries, a feature greatly differentfromWesterncountries.However,empirical research from the1980s have not provided convincing evidence that this featurepersistsintheHungarianlegalculture.Moreover,thesurveyitem

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devoted to this issue in a general survey on Hungarian legalculture carried out in 2015 indicated rather counter-intuitiveresults.Inotherwords,acontroversyispresentherebetweenaplausible theoretical statementand theempiricalevidence.Theauthorsfindthemselvesatthebeginningofaresearchprojectthataddresses this issue. The present papermaybe conceived as aconceptualpaperattacking theabovecontroversy. In thisearlystageof theprojectwesuppose that the reasonof controversybetween theory and empirical data is largely due to theinsufficient validity of research findings. The methodologyapplied provided an inappropriately simplifiedoperationalization of rights consciousness, a complex andsituated attitude. Firstly, solely questionnaire surveywas used,with closed questions; a most rigid social sciences method ofgatheringdata.Secondly,onlyonequestionaddressedthisissuedirectly. Thirdly, this key question was too simplistic, andseeminglywronglyformulated.Thissuggeststhatamorecomplexmethodologyneedstobeapplied,includingpotentiallysituationalquestions,interviews,focusgroupsandothermethodsprobablyincludingexperiments.Moreover,aone-country-caseapproach,i.e. mapping solely Hungarian citizens’ rights consciousnessattitudewithoutan international comparativeperspectivedoesnotempowerustomakesubstantivelyvalidfindings.Thisimpliesaninternationallycomparativeapproach,preferablywithatleastoneotherCEEcountryandinevitablyincludingatleastoneWestEuropean country.We plan to present these issues in a muchgreaterdetailinthepapertobepresentedatthe10thCEEForum,while looking forward to further suggestions and experience(data?)formtheparticipants.

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LauraGheorghiuTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraThetraditionallegalcultureinBanatThe region of Banat has acknowledged several kinds ofgovernance under domestic and foreign rulers. Each of thesestratahassculpturedacertainapproachtotheideaoflaw,totheunderstandingofone’srightsaswellastoperformingone’sdailyor long-termduties.Within thecontextofpreparing thecityofTimisoaratobecomethe2021Europe’sculturalcapital,itisabouttimetodiscussthelegalorderthatemergedhereaswellasthephilosophy that backs it. Above all, it is a matter of regionalidentity aswell as of the roots of present values acting for ordenyingpoliticaldecisions.Iseektotracetherouteofthislegalculture, from the main inherited issues of the Ottoman milletsystemthroughthe18thcenturyEnlightenmentandlatertotheeras successively unveiled, in order to give the profile of thepresentcomplexcase.Witheachstep,Iamgoingtoemphasizetheinfluences,demandsandsolutionsformulatedbytheleadersandthe multicultural society living here, in order to argue for apluralistic but interconnected legal culture in the region. Inadditiontothevarioushistoricalnovelties,(actingvertically),onehastoremarkthehorizontalcomplexityduetothemultilinguistic,multiconfesional,latermultiethniccharacterofthesociety.Whilsteach of the groups has preserved the essential issues of itsdescription, their dialogue as well as their reciprocal legaltransplantshavetriggeredamultilayeredlegalculture,somehowcomparabletoEhrlich’sBukovina,butbyfar, luckierforhavingextendeditsactiveinfluencelongaftertheincorporationoftheprevious into the Soviet Weltanschauung. Should myargumentationcorrelatewell, the conclusionwouldencompassinstitutionsas ruleof law,senseof contract,autonomy, respectand multiculturalism, human rights, open economy, that is abunchofimperialinfluencesassimilatedinafertilelocalground.Elements from the German customary law, from the Ottomanmillets,fromtheAustrianBGBaswellasfromtheHungarianlegal

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traditionhavemeltedtoofferBanatahealthylegalsystemaswellasamultifacetedlegalculture.AleksandraGliszczyńska-GrabiasInstituteofLawStudiesofthePolishAcademyofSciencesConstitutional identity, community belonging and constitutionalreferenda–thecaseofPolandUntil recently, the constitutional identity that had coalescedaround the current Polish Constitution appeared to be firmlyanchoredinPolishsociety,despitelegitimatecriticismlevelledatsome of its provisions (the criticism never went as far as toquestiontheveryfabricofthebasic law).However,supportfortheConstitutionturnedouttobefragile,asonlyapartofPolishsociety protested against obvious violations of its principles,demanding respect for the country’s constitutional order.Adoptedin1997asasymbolofsocialconsensusforthebuildingof a free democratic state that respected the rule of law andindividual freedoms, the Polish Constitution appears to be tooweaktowithstandanassault fromthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesofthegovernment.Itisstillunclearwhatkindofnewconstitutionalidentitymightemerge,shouldtheConstitutionbechanged. President Andrzej Duda has already announced aconstitutional referendum scheduled for November 2018, inwhichPoleswillspeakoutonthedirectionofchangetheywishtoseeinthenewConstitution.Meanwhile,emphasisinbothpublicdiscourse in Poland and in the country’s new laws and billsappearstobeonsettlingissuesfromthepastandstrengtheningtheprotectionof thegoodnameof thePolishstateandnation.Settling thepast takes the formof laws intended to reduce thesocialbenefitsgrantedtoformercollaboratorsofthecommunistregime (even those who successfully passed the vettingprocedures at the time Poland began its transition towardsdemocracy),whereasthegoodnameofPolandandPolesistobeupheld by laws that enhance the protection of Poland’s

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reputation.Inmypresentation,IwouldliketoexaminewhetherandhowtheabovetrendscouldendupbeingincorporatedintoPoland’snewConstitution,andwhateffectthiswouldhaveontheconstitutionalidentityderivedfromthesenewprinciples.Judgingfromtheproclamationsmadeintherun-uptotheconstitutionalreferendumof2018, suchprincipleswouldbeaimedmainlyatbringing Poles closer together as a community, strengtheningtheirsenseofnationaldignityandprideandtheirassociationwithChristianity, while dismissing the community that includes all,regardless of their religion and ethnicity. Simultaneously, assuggested in the rationale behind the adoption of lawsestablishing decommunisation mechanisms, the communityshouldbecomprisedmainlyof individualswithno links to theformercommunistauthorities,notevenveryremoteorresultingfrom coercion. The question is whether such an approach tocommunityiscompatiblewiththeprinciplesofequalityandnon-discrimination,whichinfactareattheheartofallconstitutionsofdemocraticstatesthatrespecttheruleoflaw.Ibelievethatthisquestionisworthconsidering.EwaGórskaJagiellonianUniversityWhenmemoriescollide:memoryactivismandconflictingmemorynarrativesinformerYugoslaviaThepaper looksata fewchosenexamplesofmemoryactivismandattheconflictingmemorynarratives(officialandalternative)inthecountriesofformerYugoslavia.Inthosecountries,activistsand NGOs right now engage in vast memory work, raisingawarenessaboutthepastandpresentandcommemoratingfactssuppressed from hegemonic collective memory. Collectivememory of the past of the nation—like battles, atrocities,victimhood, and braveness—are connected to national identityandareoneofthemostimportanttoolsofshapingsocialbonds.AsGillis(1994)shows,the“notionofidentitydependsontheideaofmemory, and vice versa“. Butwhat is important is that this

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collectivememory is not still and stable, it is dynamic, sociallyconstructedandsubjective.Societiesarebondedbytheirsharedcollectivememories,and inmostnations there isadominatingpolitical elite view on the past – a master collective memory(Zerubavel, 1997). Most of the time, it is at the same time anofficial,statesponsoredmemory,producedbystatesto“maintainsocialcohesionanddefendsymbolicborders”(Jelin,2003).Itisexpressed in national calendars, legal regulations and officialdocuments (especially preambles), monuments, museumsfinancedby thestate,aswellas in theeducational system.Buthegemonic,state-sponsoredcollectivememories,astheyareusedtobuildacertaindominantnarrativeandnationalidentity,oftenexcludecertainevents–especiallythosethatthenationorstatecannotbeproudof.Insuchcases,memoriesofthevictims,state-sponsored atrocities, and other acts of violence are beingsuppressed and removed from official commemoration andmemorydiscourse.Nevertheless,thepastisrarelyforgotten,andwhileinofficialnarrativessomefactstendtobeexcludedorevendenied,usuallysomemembersofthesociety–memoryactivists– takeitupon themselves to raiseawareness, introducecriticalthinking, and try to widen public memory discourse. Memoryactivism often takes shape as commemoration, as a form ofpolitical protest against official narratives and the forcedforgetting or silencing of certain events in official memorypractices(Gutman,2015).Inthispaper,Iwilldescribetheactionsof chosen memory activists and NGOs: a Batajnica Memorialinitiative in Serbia, Serbian Women in Black movement andactivist group Four Faces of Omarska, which is focused oncommemorating Omarska camp in northern Bosnia andHerzegovina,amongothers.TheanalysisofthememoryactivisminsocietiesofFormerYugoslaviacanalsopointouttheongoingpowerstruggles,themarginalizationofcertaingroups,aswellashow contemporary identities are built in relation to collectivememory.

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PetraGümplováMaxWeberKolleg,UniversityofErfurtTheunfinishedconstitutionalizationofthepermanentsovereigntyovernaturalresourcesThe focus of the paper is the international law principle ofpermanentsovereigntyovernatural resources (PSONR)and itsunfinished constitutionalization. The paper argues for thenecessityofthereinventionofsovereigntyovernaturalresourcesconsistentwithinternationallaw’sglobalconstitutionalizationofstatesovereigntyandwithnotionsofdomesticandinternationaljustice inherent to it – and outlines the contours of thisconstitutionalization.Thefirstpartofthepapertracestheoriginof PSONR to the process of decolonization in the 1960s duringwhichithasbecomeafirmprincipleofinternationallawgrantingsovereignrightstonaturalresourcesequallytoallstatesandtheirpeopleonthebasisofthecollectiverighttoself-determination.Seeking to correct the profound injustice of colonialappropriationofnaturalresourcesinforeignterritories,PSONRgranteditsholdersanextensivebundleofpowers,privileges,andimmunities and a considerable discretion in making decisionsaboutwhattodowiththeirnaturalenvironmentinaccordancewiththeirdomesticlawandnationaldevelopmentstrategy.Thepointofthefirstpartistoidentifyaparadox:despitethefactthatPSONR is the outcome of this emancipatory process, ituniversalized the system which perpetuates injustices notdissimilar from those produced by colonial appropriation ofnature–e.g.politicalinjusticeofusingresourcesfortheexclusivebenefitofthesovereignandthemaintenanceofher(unjust)ruleandtheinjusticeofexclusionandinequalityinthedistributionofbenefits and burdens flowing from the use of resources. ThesecondpartofthepaperlocatestheemergenceofPSONRinthebroadercontextoftheprofoundtransformationofinternationallaw in the post-WW II period. This transformationwas tied toeffortstosubstantiallyreinforcethesafeguardsforpeace,toendcolonialism,andtosubstantiallylimitabusesofsovereignpower

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andconcernedboththemethodofinternationallawmakinganditscontent.Thetransformation,Iargue,consistedmainlyinthetwinprocessoftheuniversalizationofsovereigntyandgrantingsovereignequality to all statesand their peopleand the globalconstitutionalization of sovereignty, domestically andinternationally,bypublicinternationallawanditsnormssuchashumanrights,self-determination,andtheprohibitionoftheuseof forcewhich redefined and limited the legal prerogatives ofsovereignstates.Thispartidentifiesanotherparadox:despitethefactthatPSONRemergedaspartofthistransformativeprocess,neither theory nor practice of PSONR has reflected on theemergence of a new constitutionalized sovereignty regime (forexample by stipulating that the conditions of legitimacy of theexercise of sovereign rights to natural resources have to bederivedfromrespectforhumanrights).Inthelastpart,thepaperoutlines what a systematic account of PSONR from theperspective of sovereignty globally constitutionalized byinternational law would look like. Invoking human rights, therighttoself-determination,aswellasothernormsandprinciplesof international law (indigenous rights, common heritage ofmankind, or sustainable development), I argue that a new,constitutionalizedPSONRregimeisbetterequippedtorespondtodemandsofbothdomesticandinternationaldistributivejusticeandglobalenvironmentaljustice.JohannaHaseWZBBerlinSocialScienceCenterTheenigmaticnotionofconstitutionalidentityConstitutional identity is one of the most contested terms inconstitutional theory and in European politics. As the 21stcentury comes of age, countries in Central andEasternEuropecontinuethepoliticalrollercoasterrideoftheprevious100years:Whilesomestatesfurtherconsolidatetheiryoungconstitutionaldemocracies, others seem to be taking a U-turn on this road,frequently invoking constitutional identity as a justification for

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theirharshchangeofcourse.Thissituationurgentlycallsonlegal,political and social theorists to clarify the enigmatic notion ofconstitutional identity and to determine the essence andlimitations of its meaning. Since first introduced intoconstitutional theory in the 1990s by legal theorists,constitutional identity has remained a debated and vagueconcept. More clarity shall be brought into the discussion byexploringwhat–ifanything-setsitapartfromotherconceptionsofcollectiveidentitythathaveemergedsincetheEnlightenmentand the beginning of constitutionalism, ranging fromMontesquieu’s esprit général and Hegel’s Volksgeist to recentconceptions such as Smith’s national identity and Kymlicka’ssocietal culture. The article will discuss these theoreticalapproachesalongseveraldimensions:(1)Theoriginsofidentity;(2) the subject of identity; (3) the content of identity; (4) theempirical sources expressing identity; (5) the changeability ofidentity;and (6) the intrinsicor instrumentalvalueof identity.Thisapproachwillallowasharpertheorizationofconstitutionalidentity and provide the basis for a discussion of the(dis)advantagesthatthisconceptionofcollectiveidentityholdsincomparisontoearlierapproaches.Theinsightsofthisarticlecanthus contribute both to the academic debate about collectiveidentityinconstitutionaltheoryandofferanewperspectiveonthebuzzwordthathasthepowertoshapethepoliticalfutureofmanyCentralandEasternEuropeancountries.MichaelHeinUniversityofGöttingenDo constitutional entrenchment clauses matter? A study onconstitutionalpoliticsandconstitutionalreviewinEurope(1945–2016)Mostmodernconstitutionsareentrenched,inotherwords,theyare harder to amend than ordinary laws. In addition, manyconstitutionscontainso-called‘entrenchmentclauses’.Theseare

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provisions that further raise the hurdles for amending certainconstitutional subjects or for amendments under certaincircumstances.Severalclausesevendeclareselectedprovisionsunamendable (so-called ‘eternityclauses’).Thevastmajorityofsuch clauses aim to protect essentials of modernconstitutionalism,suchasdemocracy,humanrightsortheruleoflaw.Recently,entrenchmentclauseshavebecomeahotlydebatedtopicinconstitutionalresearch.However,therelevantstudiesarerestrictedintworespects.First,theyalmostexclusivelyfocuson‘eternityclauses’,leavingthevariousothertypesofentrenchmentclauses aside. Second, most studies predominantly discussnormativematters,suchastheappropriatenessofentrenchmentclauses,theproblemsoftheirinterpretation,andtherelationshipof explicit entrenchment clauses and implicit limitations onconstitutionalamendments(suchasa‘basicstructuredoctrine’).Incontrast,westillknowverylittleabouttheempiricaleffectsofconstitutional entrenchment clauses. Do they substantiallyconstrain constitutional amendment processes, in otherwords,dotheyallowforajudicializationofpoliticsbyConstitutional(orSupreme) Court decisions? And if so, do entrenchment clausesfunctionas intendedby theconstitutionframers?Iwill answerthesequestionsbyanalyzing thecase lawof theConstitutionaland Supreme Courts of all European countries (except formicrostates) from1945until2016(114decisions).First, Iwillshow thatentrenchmentclauses domatter: in 43 cases, courtsinvalidated amendments (at the drafting stage, beforepromulgation or after coming into force)with reference to anentrenchmentclause.ThevastmajorityofthesejudgmentswereissuedinCentralandEasternEuropeafter1990,particularlyinMoldova (elevencassations),Ukraine (ten),Romania (five)andKosovo(four).Second,Iwilldemonstratethatabouttwothirdsofthese 43 court rulings can be assessed as dysfunctionalinterventionssincetheydidnotprotectanyessentialofmodernconstitutionalism.Finally,Iwilldiscusstheimplicationsoftheseresultsforthenormativedebateonentrenchmentclauses.

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BogdanIancuUniversityofBucharestConstitutional identity - the ‘dead hand of the past’ inconstitutionalismandconstitutionallawConstitutional identity is one facet of awider tension betweenlocalismanduniversalism,past-boundandfuture-oriented,viewsof constitutionalism. This is a resilient theme in constitutionallaw, whose roots go back to the famous dialogue betweenJefferson andMadison. The former advocated the position that‘the earth belongs in usufruct to the living’ and thus thatconstitutions(andevenrunofthemilllegislation)oughttolapseorbereplacedinthetimelineofonegeneration,19yearsatthemost.TomPaine‘extended’theideallifelineofconstitutionstoaterm of 30 years. The general dichotomous problematics(past/future, parochialism/universalism) are compounded inmodern constitutions, which, as a rule, contain unalterableeternityclausesand sometimesalso expressive renvois to pastcommon experiences or to shared, presumably eternal, values(appealstoDivinity,formativepaststruggles,commontraditions,andvarioushistoricalexperiencesormythologies).Inthecontextof the recent resurgence of conservative constitutionalism inPoland and Hungary, accusations were implicitly or explicitlymadetotheeffectthatappealstoidentityandilliberalproclivitieswould be somehow fused at the hip. This accusation can bejustified in the context where ‘memory politics’ isinstrumentalizedforimmediatepoliticalpurposes.Iwillhoweverhypothesize that a tradition-driven, historically boundeddefinition of identity, although its expressions might embracecruder overtones in the region, is an inescapable feature ofconstitutionalismandconstitutional law.Otherwiseput,as longasconstitutionalismistiedtothenationstate,the‘deadhandofthe past’ (values, traditions, understanding of history andcommonality)willremainaninescapablefeatureofconstitutionallawandpolitics.MypaperwilluseasabackdroptheEurope(i.e.,

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EU)-relatedjurisprudenceofconstitutionalcourts,comparingtheidentity-relatedpositionsofconstitutionalcourts inestablishedWesterndemocracieswiththoseoftheircounterpartsintheNewEurope.IwoJaroszJagiellonianUniversityPolish Constitution and Polish collective consciousness onownershipandlimitedrightsinremTheConstitution of theRepublic of Poland (the “Constitution”)requiresthatownershipandotherpropertyrightsbeprotectedequally,withrespecttoanyandallentitledpersons(beitnaturalorcorporate).Anystatutoryrestrictionsorlimitsthereofneedtopass a proportionality test. The Constitution disallows thelegislatureandotherpublicauthorities (actingpursuant toandwithintheconfinesofthelawasstipulatedunderArticle7oftheConstitution) to disproportionately or unjustifiably restrict theright of ownership or other property rights. It will be argued,however, that the law has effected certain restrictions in thisregard that do not pass both relevant tests, but followwhat isdeeply ingrained in the prevalent collective beliefs of Polishsociety. Apart from the restrictions mentioned above, theConstitutionplacesuponthelawmakerapositiveburdentoenactlawsandprocedures thatgrantproper legalprotection tosuchrights.Itwillbesubmittedthattheinadequacyandinefficiencyofsuchmeasures – somewhat contrary to the Constitution – alsoresultsfromthewayinwhichthePoles’dominantsentimentsareshaped. The above means also that the Constitution bars thelawmaker and other public authorities from distinguishingbetween different instances of ownership, regardless of theirobjectorsubject,timeofestablishmentoracquisition,ororigin.The text of the Constitution only ostensiblymirrors the Poles’sharedbeliefs.InrealitythePolishcommunisopinionispronetodifferentiate between different categories or examples ofownershiprightspursuanttowithwhomsuchrightsarevested

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(i.e. approaching ownership rights of public bodies differentlythanownershiprightsofprivateentities).Tracesofsuchbeliefsare to be found in ordinary legislation. The sameprinciples asindicatedaboveshouldapplytolimitedpropertyrights(limitedrightsinrem).Itisnotsure,however,howtheseprinciplesaffectthe relation between these separate categories of rights (i.e.ownership vs. other property rights). ThePolishConstitutionalTribunal argued that the notion of equal protection is nottantamounttoapplyingidentically intensiveprotectiontotheseparticularcategoriesofrights.Itwillbeargued,however,thatanydifferentiationthereofmustcaptureandmimictheveryessenceofthesecategoriesofpropertyrights,keepingthedifferencesastotheintensityofprotectionproportionaltothedifferencesoftherights themselves. The law, itwill be noticed, seems to favourcertainrightsoverother,inamannercloselyrelatedtohowthecollective consciousness perceives them. All in all, it will beargued,theideasofownershipaswellaslimitedpropertyrightstend to operateas local ones,embedded in theEuropean legaltradition,butdeeplyrelatedtothecollectiveconsciousnessandthepopularbeliefs.JustynaJezierskaUniversityofWrocławResponsibilityforthepast.Settlementswiththeprevioussystem-dutyofthelaworhistory?Memoryandideologyhavegotalotincommon:botharefocusedonbuildingtheidentity(ofnations,individuals,community),bothcan use power, violence or domination to succeed. During thetransition of political systems, usually there is a change of thecollective memory. Furthermore, the new ideological orderalwayswantstorebuildthecollectivememory-theeasiestwaytostartthisisbyusinglegaltools.Legalinstitutionsarealsousedtomakesettlementswiththepast,buttheygotsomelimitations:for example, law cannot impose collective responsibility onindividuals.Thebasic ideaofthepaperistousePaulRicueur’s

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comparisonbetweenlawyerandhistorian.Theybothjudgethepast using their own languages, narrations. What kind ofsettlement should they make to overcome the past deeds?AccordingtoaresearchcarriedoutbyP.T.Kwiatkowski, inthememoryofcontemporaryPoles, thePolishPeople’sRepublic isperceivedasastatethatusedviolenceandrestrictedthefreedomofitscitizens.Buttheresearcherunderlinesthattherearestrongsocial tendencies to idealise the past system. Whilesimultaneously there is visible criticism of today’s democraticstateandthefreemarketeconomysysteminallpost-communistcountries.Isitpossiblethatthenewideologycannotestablishitsown socialmemories about the past?Whose fault is it? Inmypaper, Iwill analyse the problemof responsibility for the past,past deeds, previous system. In which discourses/narration -legal,historiographicalshoulditbemade?MarinKerśićUniversityofSplitLegal principles in the discourse of Croatian legal science:Whatqualifiesanormasaprinciple?Legalprinciplesstillremainanintenselydiscussedtopicinlegaltheory,asitwasthecasewhenthetopichadjustemergedinthesecondhalfofthepreviouscentury.Arisingfromthediscussionaboutthenatureoflegalnormsandsourcesoflaw,andthewell-knowndistinction between legal rulesand legal principles, putforward and elaborated by Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy,amongothers,thetopicstillremainsofinterestforcontemporaryauthors.Setting the framework forabroaderresearchon legalprinciples Iplan toconduct, thispaper firstanalyzeshow legalprinciples are understood in the discourse of Croatian legalscience.Approachingtheissuefromtheanalyticalpointofview,using themethod of logico-linguistic analysis of discourse, themainquestionposedinthepaperisthefollowing:whataretheconditions under which Croatian legal science characterizes anormasaprinciple(asopposedtoarule)ortheconditionsunder

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whichstatementsaboutprinciples,suchas‘NormNisaprinciple’,aretrue.Tothisend,theinquirystartsbyanalyzingthediscourseabout legal principles in some of the fundamental parts ofCroatian legal doctrine, ranging from the doctrine of civil andcriminallaw(bothsubstantiveandprocedural)tothedoctrineofadministrativelaw.Afteridentifyingtheconditionsunderwhicha norm is considered a principle and the statements aboutprinciples are considered true in Croatian legal doctrine, thepaper makes an overview of the contemporary views of legalprinciples in Croatian legal theory, determining the degree inwhichCroatianlegaltheoryisbasedonthediscourseofCroatianlegal doctrine and the degree inwhich Croatian legal doctrineuses the analytical tools developed by Croatian legal theory.Finally,thepaperevaluatestheusefulnessofthetheoreticaltoolsthattheCroatianlegaldoctrineusesindescribingCroatianlawinforce.JanBazyliKlaklaJagiellonianUniversityThe(memoryof)customarylawasapartofcollective identity incontemporaryCEEcountriesCustomary law is a very peculiar normative system at theinterfaceoftwoothersystems–lawandcustom.Ontheonehand,itismorethanacustom,and,ontheotherhand,inthedominatinglegalsciencepositivisticparadigm,itisdeniedthevalueofbeinglawinthefullsenseoftheword.It iscommonlyperceivedasarelict of the past and analyzed mostly in a historical context.Societiesthatstillfollowcustomarylawareseeninthebestcaseas anthropological curiosities. It happens frequently that onefacesthereasoningaccordingtowhichinordertomodernizeacommunityinwhichcustomarylawisstillpresent,itisnecessaryto completely displace customary law as a regulator ofinterpersonal relationships, as thiswould be a backward legalsystem.Itissaidthatthetransitionfrominformalsocialcontrol

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executedbynon-professionalsintoformalsocialcontrolexecutedby state authorities and professionals represents an imminentandpositivechangethatisconnectedwiththegeneralevolutionofsociety,beinganexpressionoftheprogressivedifferentiationoflaborthatoccursinmodernizingsocialsystems.Althoughitistrue that in modern Europe we encounter situations wherecustomarylawcanbedescribedasanormativesystemlessandlessoften,customarylawremainsanactualregulatorofapartofsocial life, and, as such, it is not yet a forgotten concept. Eventhoughwecannotassumethatparticularcustomarylawnormsarevalidinsocialreality–notonlythatpeopleknowabouttheirexistence,butthattheyalsoknowtheexactregulatingcontentofthenorms, thepatternsof conduct theypropose,and that theyperceivethispatternasappropriateanddesirable–therearestillsocietieswheremakingreferencetocustomsandtraditionsasawholelegacyisstillakeyelementofaself-createdidentityforthecommunitymembers.Inmypresentation,Iwouldliketoarguethat the shared collectivememory of once followed customarylawisstillusedasanelementofcollectiveidentityamongsomegroups in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. For thatpurpose,IwillusetheexamplesofAlbaniansandtheirmemoryofKanun, as well as Romani community and their memory ofRomanipen/Romaniya. Both cases will be treated as anopportunitytoreflectonaprogressivechangethathappensinthestatus of customary law in the social order among manycommunities.KarolinaKocembaUniversity ofWrocław / Centre for Legal Education and SocialTheoryGenderandConstitution.TheCaseofPolandDuringthelastfewyears,wecouldobserveanincreasedinterestaboutthechangesin“feminist law”,especiallywithintheleftistandconservativecircles.Byobserving themediadiscourse,wecould notice that people, who were against pro-feminist law,

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would argue that for example anti-violence convention is notcompliant with the constitution and constitutional spirit.Interestingly,themediadebatespretendedthatphenomenasuchasviolenceagainstwomenandabortiondonotoccurinPoland.Whatismore,Internationallawwastreatedasforeign,insteadaspart of the Polish law system. Looking at the discussions, wecannotsayifthelegalconstitutionalidentityisrepresentativeforthewholesociety.Theconceptofconstitutionalidentityisuseddifferentlyindifferentcircles.But,theessenceofconstitutionalidentity should be the same for every citizen, something likeacore.Theproblem is that thecurrentgovernmentbehaves likeonly they – the conservative and Catholic community - canrepresentandsaywhatconstitutionalidentityis,despitethefactthat the constitution is still compatible with feminist law,including European Law, which is actually part of our legalsystem. In my paper, I would like to show understanding ofconstitutionalidentitybyanalyzingmediadebatesabout“genderlaw”,constitutionandConstitutionalCourtjudgements.Iwillalsotry to answer if there is a place for feminism and women’sprotectioninPolishconstitutionalidentity?LukaszKoltuniakandPiotrEckhardtJagiellonianUniversityWhy"Radbruch formula"wasnota "philosophyof transition" inCentralandEasternEuropeGustav Radbruch was one of the most important legalphilosophersoftheXXthcentury.Hisphilosophy,perceivedasthe"German divorce" with positivism, was a very importantcontributiontotheEuropeandiscourseabouttotalitarianism.Hisformula,whichexplainedthat,insomecircumstances,totalitarianlaw "is not a law", was the main argument to justify theNuremberg process. However, when communism collapsed in1989,themajorityofMiddleEuropeanstatesdecidedtoapplytheprincipleofcontinuityand,ingeneral,thesecountriesrefrained

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from punishing communist crimes. Many supporters of the“stronger” divorce with communism remembered the GermanexampleandalsoquotedRadbruch.Accordingtothesupportersof “strong” decomunization, political factors led to the lack ofradical lustration and decomunization. However, our shortanalysis of Middle European legal discourse showed thatcommunistlawwasperceivedas“notsuchiniustissima”.Wemustremember that after 1956, the communist system wasundemocraticandauthoritarian,but rathernot totalitarian.WewouldliketocomparethediscourseinMiddleEurope(ineveryMiddle Europe countries, including such publications like thebooksbyJerzyZajadłoorCsaboVarga)andanswerwhetherthismore“moderate”characterofcommunistdictatorshipinfluencedfuture transition. What can we say about the common MiddleEuropean perception of “iniustissima” of the regime's law? Ormaybethisissomethinginfluencedbythedifferencesofvariousnationalregimes?Forexample,weknowverywellthatthemoremoderate regime in Poland or inHungarywas not comparablewith Czechoslovakia’s “soft Stalinism” or Romanian “newStalinism”.TheregimesinthemajorityofstatesinMiddleEuropeimplemented many elements of “traditional” European legalculture and the longer communism existed the less “socialistsvoluntarism”waspresentinthelegalsystem.Inthelastpartofourspeech,wewouldliketotrytofindananswertothequestionofknowingwhatcouldbe themodelofa future“divorce”withpotentiallyfutureregimesinMiddleEuropeoranywhereelse.SergiejKorolyovStateandLawInstituteoftheRussianAcademyofSciencesDoestheterm‘legalidentity’makesenseinthefirstplace?“Thefirstplace”alludedtointhetitleistobeunderstoodliterally,or in Aristotelian terms as the place “nearest to nature” and,subsequently, the place “remotest from us - humans”. ComingbacktotherootsofWesterncivilization,weareconfrontedwiththepreponderanceofCosmos,especially intheteachingsofthe

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threeMilesians(Thales,AnaximanderandAnaximenes)andthevirtual nonexistence of the human Self as a special object ofscientificinquiry.Thus,‘inthefirstplace’theword“identity”,hasan utterly objective dimension and means “natural, or holisticidentity”,wherean‘anthropos’isunderstoodasa‘micro-cosmos’,as a subordinate and almost irrelevant instance of the ‘macro-cosmos’anditsparadigmsinthetermsofLogosandNomos.This‘natural,orholisticidentity’ofhumanbeingswasfirstchallengedand then almost disgraced by the Greek sophists. The famousProtagoras’maxim(“theman is themeasureofall thingsetc.”)maybecelebratedasanobvious‘human(individual)twist’oftheAncient Greek philosophy and the birth of philosophicalanthropology.Thus,duetoGreeksophistsahumanexistentiawasdivorcedfromthehuman(=micro-cosmic)essentia.Afterwards,theSocraticthemeofpersonalmoralintegrityandresponsibilitybecame an obligatory philosophical inquiry not to be thoughtawayfromtheworksofPlatoandAristotle.ThefamousSocraticmethod of inquiry may be regarded as an algorithm ofsystematicallyexposetheanswererasanimpostorwhoseallegedself-identity eventually turns out to be false and self-contradictory. If we are to preserve this Socratic heritage, theword ‘identity’ becomes dialectic and procedural outcome ofsocially relevant communication, rather than a monotonic anddecisionalactofideologicalembracementorchallenge.Thefact,thatmyself-imposedidentitymaybedeniedbymyinterlocutors,cannot be simply shrugged off, if the socially relevantcommunicationistobecontinued.Moreover,itis“myfoe”,ratherthan“myfriend”–muchinthesenseofCarlSchmitt–whocanmercilessly reveal the darkcorners andeven corruption ofmycharacter and thus show me the way to better (self-)identity.Comingtotermswith‘legalidentity’,wehavetosimultaneouslybear inmind the following interrelated features of this notion.Firstly,wehavetosubdivideitintoa legal identity ‘ofus,byusandforus’(=Selbstidentität)andalegalidentity‘ofus,bythemandforthem’(=Fremdidentität).Thus,theRussianself-viewfromSiberiahashardlyanythingtodowithaCNN-viewof“Russiansas

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theyare” tobedisseminatedamongaverageAmericans.Aswesee,thisdualitymaybeeasilytranslatedintobiasedpropagandatools:alegalidentity‘ofus,byusandforthem’(=Selbstidentitätforsaleabroad)andalegalidentity‘ofus,bythemandforus’(=Fremdidentität imposed as Selbstidentität). Secondly, therecomes the pair of ‘diachronic (vertical, or historic) identity vs.synchronic(horizontal)identity’.Thus,thehistoriclegalidentityvirtuallymergeswithlegaltraditioninitsbroad(inclusive)sense.Itisanotherbigproblem,whethermodernGermans,forexample,mayideologicallyconvergetheSecondReichwiththeThirdoneand the latteragainwith the “era ofAngelaMerkel”. Thus, thesynchroniclegalidentitymayclash-andoftendoesso-withthediachronic (historical) legal identity. Again, this circumstanceleadsustothethirddualityoftheterm“legalidentity’,wheretheMarxistanalysismaybenotoutofplace.InthisMarxistveinwehavetodifferentiatebetweenalegalidentityofthepoliticaleliteand a legal identity of the ‘silentmajority’, i.e. thosewho onlyoccasionallyexercise-orprefernotto-theirvotingrights.‘Legalidentityofproletarians’issupposedtobeanimpossiblething.Ifweequate ‘legal identity’and ‘bourgeois legal identity’,asMarxdid, then we are doomed to dismiss lots of marvelous things:sociology of law, psychology of law and legal anthropology,inventedbyGreeksophists,amongthem.Comingtotermswith‘constitutional identity’, we have to conclude that the MarxistclasstheorymaybeagoodstartbutmustbecleanedofMarxistbiasto-wardslegalscienceandlegalprofession.Theintegrativefunctionofanational constitution is impossible, ifweregard itonly as amanifestation of the bourgeois lip service topeople’sdemocracy. This circumstance brings us to the fourth duality:syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic constitutional identity. Thesyntagmatic constitution-al identity embraces the values ofplurality in the sense of give-and-take. The paradigmaticconstitutionalidentitymeanstheforceofteleologicalunity,ortheunityofnationalgoals.

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MarioKreśičUniversityofZagrebLegalconsciousnessand(de)constitutionalisationofthelegalorderTheconstitutionalizedlegalordercanbedefinedasthetypeoforderinwhichlegalandpoliticalpracticesarebasedonseveralimplicitlyorexplicitlypositedpostulatesonthecharacteristicsofconstitutional norms and one of these is their influence onpoliticalrelations(Guastini).Thismodelofthelegalordercanbeopposedtothemodeloflegislativelegalordercharacterizedbytherejectionofthethesisonconstitutionalnorms.Somespecificordercanbeplacedonthemeasuringlinebetweentwopolesonwhich the opposite models are placed and the process ofconstitutionalisationordeconstitutionalisationofthelegalordercan be described as its movement on that line. Although theconcept of (de)constitutionalisation of the legal order is animportantterminpoliticalandlegaldiscourse,itisstillsurprisingthat systematic empirical research on this process in specificorders is still missing. In this paper, we will present how theconcept of legal consciousness developed in the theory of lawcouldbeusedasatoolforbetterunderstandingandresearchingof the process of (de)constitutionalisation. We will especiallypoint out the usefulness of the distinction between formal andmaterial legal consciousness (A. Ross) for describing andmeasuringchangesinthelegalorder.MilosMarkovicUniversityofBelgradeThree questionable assumptions and a critique of globalconstitutionalismAbstract:Internationalconstitutionallawconstitutesanunusualtopic for many readers. The debate about the content andstructureofconstitutionshasbeendevelopingsofarwithintheborders of domestic states. In recent years, however, a newconstitutionaldiscoursearoseattheinternationallevel.

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Theglobalconstitutionalismdiscoursestartsfromtheideathataconstitution may exist beyond the scope of the domestic legalsystem,bothaboveandbeneathstatelevel.Thereisfurthermoreasufficienthomogeneityintheinternationalsphereastospeakofinternationalcommunity.Finaly,theideaofaglobalconstitutionhasitselfaglobalcharacter,whichmeansitisalreadyuniversallyaccepted.Theseclaimsconstitute three importantpillarsof thecontemporarydiscourseaboutaglobalconstitution.Theadducedassumptions are rather questionable and require preciseelaboration and critical analysis. For the sake of clarity andprecision, a critical analysis of global constitutionalismnecessitatesapriorterminologicaldiversificationprimarilywithregard to the notions of constitution, constitutionalism andconstitutionalisation.Furthermore,Iwillpayparticularattentionto thedifferencebetweenconstitution ina formalandmaterialsense. A distinction between micro- and macro-constitutionalisation as well as the primary and secondaryfunctions of global constitutionalisation shall be taken intoaccount.Afterelaboratingonthethreeassumptions,Iamgoingtoinvestigate three problemsunderlyingglobal constitutionalism.On the one side, international law doesn’t represent an all-embracing normative system, but is rather fragmented andlimitedtocertainareaswhereaninterstatecompromisecouldbeachieved. On the other side, soft law plays a more and moreimportant role in the international sphere, in spite of itsdisputable legal character. Apart from the legal questions,political difficulty is incorporated in the potential hegemonialelements of the global constitution. In the light of the presentgeopoliticalsituationitisstillimplausibletoclaimtheexistenceoftheglobalconstitutioninaformalsense.Nonetheless,itwouldbe plausible to say that some fundamental norms exertconstitutional functions in international law. Globalconstitutionalismstrivestoachievethehighestpossibletoleranceofdifferenceinthecontemporaryglobalworld.Themaingoalofthe paper is to provide a clear overview of globalconstitutionalismandacriticalanalysisof itsdiscursivepillars.

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Theoutcomeshoulddemonstratethattheideaofaninternationalconstitutionrequirespermanentelaborationwhichwouldfollowthedevelopmentofinternationallegalandpoliticalrelations.MartonMatyasovszky-NemethEötvösLorándUniversityParallelsocialidentities:TheHumansrightsdiscourseinthe1980’sinEast-CentralEuropeThroughout the ColdWar, the socialist blocand theWest tookadvantageoftherightsdiscourse,butinaverydifferentmanner.While the Soviet Bloc found socio-economic rights as a usefulinstrumentintheglobalpoliticalbattlefield,theWestappearedastheguardianof classical liberal rights. In the1970’s, asSamuelMoynwrote in his bookThe LastUtopia, human rights spreadaroundtheworldandgrewintothestrongestsocialmovement.After 1975, when the European socialist countries signed theHelsinkiAccord,humanrightsbecamethestrongest identifyingideologyofthedissidentpolitics.Arrivingtothe1980’s,inmostEast-Central European countries, human rights discourse wasdeveloped into one of the most divisive topics between theofficialsandthedemocraticopposition.Theofficialpropagandahaileditselfasthedefenderofthesocialrights,whichguaranteedwidesocialstabilitybutwithahugecost:thecurtailmentofcivilliberties.On the other hand, prominent dissidents, for instanceSakharov, Michnik, Orlov or Kis, drew up an alternativeperspective:ademocracywheretheruleoflawandhumanrightsprevailed. JánosKis, a dissidentmoral philosopher inspired byDworkin, developed one of themost unique examples for thisvisioninhismoraltheoryofhumanrights.Hisbook,DoWeHaveHumanRights?,was published asa samizdat copy in 1985.Kiscomposedanideaofclassicalhumanrights,theso-calledmoralrights,whichmustbeguaranteedtoallhumanbeingsinamoralcommunity.ThetheoryofKisprovidedafirmgroundforawell-functioning network for the protection of civil liberties in theyoung democracy, which filtered into the mainstream

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constitutional concept after 1989. During the 1980’s, thedivergent views on human rights evolved into separateconstitutionalandsocialidentities,whichwereexplainedalsoinpre-andpost-transitorylegaltextsandscholarship.However,therejectionofsocialrightsintheyoungdemocracy,whichcametolight in the new legislation and the Constitutional Court’sdecisions,demandedatremendouscostforthesuccessofhumanrights.Ontheotherhand,agreatobstaclesurfacedfollowingthedemocratizationoftheregion:theincorporationofcivillibertiesfailedthehopesforthemajority,becauseitdidnotbecomepartof the social identity. The imagined democratic identity of thedissident intellectuals remained merely imagination, since itdisregardedtheregion’ssocio-culturalaptitudes.Inthelastthreedecades, the growing inequality paved the way for a counter-hegemonicpathforpopulist,repulsiverhetoriconhumanrights,and a nostalgic view on the former dictatorship. In mypresentation,Iwillillustratetheformationofthedivergentviewson rights during the time of the regime change in East-CentralEurope.ThediscussionwillfocusmainlyonthecaseofHungary,and, with the help of Kis’ theory, it will try to draw up analternative,criticalapproachforrights,wheresocialtheoryplaysamuchgreaterrole.AlexandraMercescuTheWestUniversityofTimișoaraThe comparative double-binds of Central and Eastern EuropeanCountriesOne’s identity, one’s legal identity, is constructed through anumberofdiscoursesheldbyanumberofactors:politicians,themedia,actorsperformingonthe“stage”ofpopularculture,andcertainlynotleast,scholars.Inthelatter’sworld,thedisciplineofcomparativelawoccupiesaspecialplaceasregardsthequestionofnationallegalidentityorconstitutionalidentityinsofaritaimsatrevealing“theself”inadialogicalmanner,bycontrastingitwith“the other”, the outcome being, however, never more than a

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relativeanalysis.InthecaseofcountriessuchasthosebelongingtotheregionalspacecommonlyreferredtoasCentralandEasternEurope(CEE),thequestionof identityismoreproblematicand,therefore, comparative scholarship evenmoreneeded, Iwouldsuggest, since the status of law seems to be trapped ininauthenticityastheexpressionofadifficultnegotiationbetweenanolderlegalpastheavilymarkedbylegaltransplants,arecentlegalpastconventionallyconceptualizedasanomalous(orevena-legal) and a present, equally “foreign”, for under the strictguidanceoftheWest.Inthiscontextandgiventhatcomparativelaw inevitably has its own politics, Iwant to explorewhat thepurposeofcomparativelegalstudiesinvolvingthelegalculturesfromtheCEEregionshouldbe,whetheritshouldbeanydifferentthancomparativelawingeneralandwhatitcanachieveintermsof legalcritique.Inansweringthesequestions,IarguethatCEEcountriesfindthemselvesinadouble-bindsituationfromatleasttwo points of view: first, epistemologically speaking, assertingdifference from the West can be problematic in light of the“generic constitutional law” and “global constitutionalism”discourses prevalent nowadays; second, linguistically speaking,asserting identity (be it in the language of differences orsimilarities), in English, through English, in order to achieve awidervisibilityandthustoresistthestatusofperiphery,raisesthe complicated matter of the authenticity of the other’srendering.MiklósMerényiCorvinusUniversityofBudapestHabermasvs.CastoriadisontheconstitutionofmodernityInhisThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,HabermasoffersacriticalexcursusonCastoriadis,placinghiminsidethebranchofphilosophies of consciousness, presuming an interior worldseparate and prior to intersubjectivity. Through imaginaryinstitution, this pre-linguistic unconscious is constantly

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generatingradicallydifferentpatternstonew’words’.Habermascannot accept this radical political openness as the novelty ofmodern democracy, allowing no law that can be fixed, whosearticlescannotbecontested,whosefoundationscannotbecalledinto question. This supposedly sidesteps the normativedimension that Habermas draws from intersubjectivity andcommunicativeaction,sincethereisnogeneralconsensusoverthe process of rationalization. For Castoriadis however, theconstitutionofmodernityispresentinanimaginaryinstitutionthatbringsaboutaradicaltransformationofthesocial-historicalbeing.Themembersofa collectivitydeliberatelyconstitute thepolitical forms of authority in order to institutionalize theircommon life. During this process, spontaneous and creativepower of the imagination is not and should not be completelyrationalized: the core of its constitution should be constantlybroughtbacktoitsactualbasis–theactualhumanbeing–andestablishedasthepeople’sownpraxis.Forhim,intersubjectivityisanarrowangletolookatthesocial-historicalfield.Basedontheexisting literature on this intersection (Whitebook, Bernstein,Arnason, Kalyvas, Arato, and, more recently, Blokker), Ireconstructtheactualpositionsofthetwophilosophersnotasasharp distinction between communicative and subject-centredreason,butasaconstructivedialogue. Insteadofdetaching theCastoriadiancritiqueoftheempireofcalculability(thecontinualrepetitionofthesameheteronomicdivisionsandhierarchies)andtheHabermasianfearofaestheticizingthepolitical,Iexposethistensionastheonebetweenmasteryandautonomy,twoultimatemarkers of themodern political and constitutional horizon. IntracingthepathwaysoftheprojectoftheEnlightenmentandtheproject of autonomy, I also draw some general conclusions forconstitutionalism in the post-socialist context, where theunfinishedprojectofmodernityhascomeoutasanever-endingcatchinguprevolution.

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JolitaMiliuvieneMyklosRomerisUniversityInfluentialvectorsshapingtheconstitutionaldoctrineBeing stable and almost unchanged, the Constitution of theRepublicofLithuania,adopted20yearsago,continuestodaytoprovide the answers for the dynamic changes of society andadaptstothepoliticalandlegalreality.ItisalivingConstitution.Its viability is manifest in the interpretation of constitutionalnormsandprinciplesprovidedbytheConstitutionalCourt,whichseeks its inspiration in various internal and external factors.Nowadays, national constitutional orders cannot be seen inisolation anymore, as they are part of a global constitutionalcontext.Therefore,internationallawisoneofthemostimportantsources of inspiration for the construction of constitutionalnorms,especiallywhenitisenshrinedintheConstitutionitself.The explicit wording of Art. 135 of the Constitution compelsLithuania to follow the universally recognized principles andnormsofinternationallaw.Intheofficialconstitutionaldoctrine,as developed by the Constitutional Court, international law isperceivedtobeaminimumconstitutionalstandardofthehumanrightsprotection.ThecaselawoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsandtheoneoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionare recognized both as the official source of interpretation ofnational Lithuanian law, including constitutional law. This issomethingthatwasconfirmedbytheConstitutionalCourtitself.Goingfurther,onemustadmitthatthedistinctivequalityoftheConstitutionisthatithasnotonlytobeeffectiveinthefuture,butalso tocreate the future.Therefore, the idea thatconstitutionalcaselawanddoctrinemaybeinfluencednotonlybytraditionalinternationallaw,butalsobynormsofsoftlaw,whicharecreatedby international constitutional organizations, also enjoys somelegitimacy. These norms created by law professionals at theinternational level (for instance, within the framework of thefamousVeniceCommission)arenotofficiallybinding,however,they deserve appropriate attention. Lithuanian Constitutional

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Court has already had such experience while construingconstitutional provisions and after consulting some of thesedocumentsitmanagedtoreachimportantconclusionsinitscaselaw.Theinternationalconstitutionalsoft lawnorms,promotingdemocracy, the ruleof lawand theprotectionofhumanrights,mighthelptoensurethatthefutureconstitutionaldoctrinewillbe developed incoherencewith the universally and commonlyknownconstitutionalprinciplesandwiththenewesttendencies.The usage of soft law norms while interpreting constitutionalprovisions,aremeaningfulinthecontextofmoderntimes,wheninsomestatesthenationalconstitutionalbackgroundseemstobeabitstaggeredandevenfaded,especiallywhenitisinfluencedbycertain political decisions. From time to time across Europe,constitutionalcourtsexperiencecrises,asenseofinsecurityandmenace to their independence and impartiality, thus comingunderpressurefromexecutiveandlegislativepowersofthestate.These soft lawnorms, tacitlyanduniversally accepted,but nottransformedintobindinglegalnormsbecauseoflackofpoliticalwill,couldbeasignpostfornationalconstitutionalsystemsandthus help to find the right solutions in the presence ofconstitutionalcrises.MaricaMišićUniversityofNišCollectiveMemoryofTotalitarianCommunistRegime:ShowTrialsinYugoslaviaAfterWorldWarII,newrevolutionaryauthoritiesdeclaredanewpolitical and legal system alongwith the declaration of a newstate,breakingthebondswiththeearlierKingdomofYugoslavia.The transition frommonarchy to republicmademany victims,besidesthoselivesthatthewarhadtakenaway.Therewerealotof political trials and convictions for high treason and othercrimesagainstthepeopleandthestate.Themostfamoustrialwasthe trial of Draža Mihailović and collaborators, the so calledBelgrade Process. The processwas controlled by the Yugoslav

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governmentandtheYugoslavCommunistParty.DražaMihailovićwassentencedtodeath,asweresomeothersofthetwenty-threeaccused. In the very beginnings of The Federal People’sYugoslavia,theYugoslavCommunistParty,asalegitimaterulingparty, based the political and legal system on Stalin’s view ofcommunism,socalledStalinism.Theperiodfrom1948/9to1953could be referred as the phase of state reforms. Anotherconsequence of the aggravation of the relations between theYugoslavCommunistPartyandCominformand theTito-Stalinsplit,apartfromthereforms,wereshowtrials.AlotofStalinists(thepoliticalopponentsofTitoandhisregime–Titoism)wereaccused.SomeofthemwereconvictedandsenttoprisonandtotheGoliotok(BarrenIsland)labourcamp,andsomeofthemwereevenfounddead.Accordingtotheofficialreports,thosewhowerefound dead committed suicide, but doubts regarding thosereports’credibilitycanberaised.Thesituationwasthesameinother countries of the Eastern bloc. The political opponents ofstateregime,andultimately,Stalin,werealsoprosecutedinshowtrials. After the Tito-Stalin split, Titoists were persecuted andtrialed,sincetheyweredeemedtobestateenemies.Intotal,275individuals were convicted in 41 proceedings. Among thoseprosecuted, 68 were sentenced to death and 207 toimprisonment.ThemostfamousaretheBudapestprocessandtheSofiaprocesses,againstLasloRajkinHungaryandTrajčeKostovinBulgaria.However,thereisasignificantnumberofpeoplewhowere“sentencedtodeath”withoutanytrialorverdict.Thosewhohavecommittedsuicideunderunclearcircumstanceswerenotanexceptioninthesatellitestates.Inconclusion,thisresearchwillbefocusingontotalitarianregimes,primarilyonthecommunistregimeinpost-warYugoslaviaand, inparticular,onshowtrialsfromthepointofviewoflegaltheoryandhistory.

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MagdalenaNazimekUniversityofLodzConstitutionalidentityandglobalmigration–ThePolishCaseAccordingtoM.Zirk-Sadowski,constitutionalidentityisbasedonthe recognition of one’s own cultural and national distinction,throughareflectiononfundamentalrightsacceptedinthesociety.But should the effect of this reflection be applied only to themembers of this nation, if itmay lead to treating non-citizensdifferentlyandeventodiscriminatingagainstthem?IntheageofEuropeanintegrationandglobalmigration,shouldconstitutionalidentitybeinterpretedinthistraditionalway,basedonnationalstates?Where is the fine line between taking care of nationalidentityanddiscriminatingagainstothers?ByusingtheexamplesofthePolishconstitutionandthedecisionsoftheconstitutionalcourt, Iwilltrytoshowhowconstitutional identityisbasedonnational identity in Poland and how this concept can lead todiscriminating procedures. In The Origins of Totalitarianism,HannaArendtdrewourattention to thesituationofa statelessperson.Shetriedtoshowthatwiththelossofstaterightsapersonwouldalsolosehisorherhumanrightsaswell,becauseoneiscontainedintheother.Asimilarideacanbeadoptedinordertoanalyze the situation of a foreigner in a given statewhere itsconstitutionprotectsmainlyitscitizensandwheretherightsofforeigners areminimized to the very basic human rights. Thatkindofissueisrelatedto,amongothers,thedifferencebetweendemocratic and liberal equality, which was the subject of acritique made by C. Schmitt. While a liberal perspective giveseveryone equality just by virtue of being human, democraticequality confers it only to the peoplewho are part ofa state’scommunity,withtheexclusionofothers.Constitutionalidentitybasedonthedemocraticconceptofequalitycanexcludesomeofthe new members of the community from constitutionalprotection,whichcanbedangerousintheageofglobalmigration,refugeecrisisinEuropeandpredictedincreaseinthenumberofclimaticmigrants.Mypaperwilldefinitelyargueforaprospective

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mannerofreadingandinterpretingtheconstitution,whichwouldaspiretocreateaconstitutionalidentitythatwouldguaranteethemaximum of rights for foreigners, starting with a differentunderstanding of citizenship and conception of themulticentricityofthelaw.LukaszNecioJagiellonianUniversityControversialapproachtotheconceptofnationinthenewestPolishlegislationDemarcationofanon-controversialborderbetweenPolandandUkrainehasalwaysbeenaproblematicissue.BeforetheSecondWorldWar,intheEasternterritoriesoftheformerPolishstate,thePolesandUkrainianslivedtogether.TodaythisareabelongstotheEasternterritoriesofPolandandtheWesternterritoriesofUkraine.AftertheSecondWorldWar,thecommunistauthoritiesof theUSSRandPoland,basedon theethnicconceptofnation,decided to solve the ethnic question through a series ofresettlements.PoleslivingEastofthenewPoland-UkrainianSSRborderwereresettledinWesternPoland.Inturn,theUkrainianpopulation,whichremainedontheWesternsideoftheBugriver,waspartlydisplaced.Firstly,theywereresettledintheareaoftheUkrainianSSR.TherestoftheUkrainiansonthePolishsideweredispersedthroughouttheareasofNorthernandWesternPoland(the“Vistula”operation).Theafter-effectsoftheseresettlementsareparadoxicallystrengthenedbythelatestPolishlegislationinthe field of migration policy. This affects particularly on theimmigrants fromUkrainewhohavecome towork toPoland inrecent years. One of the possibilities for obtaining the right ofpermanent residencewas toget iton thebaseofhavingPolishancestors.Before2018,theformulation“Polishancestors”meantthatoneshouldhaveancestorswhowerePolishcitizens.FromthisyearitmeansthattheyshouldprovethattheysimplywerePolish.AsimilarregulationwasintroducedintheActontheso-

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called Polish Charter, which was intended as a series offacilitations forcitizens of the EasternBloccountries (Ukraine,Belarus,Russia),whohavePolishorigin.Forexample,itprovidestuition-freestudiesinPoland.ApplicantsforthisdocumentmustsubmitastatementthattheirancestorswerenotresettledfromPolandafter theSecondWorldWaron thebasisofagreementsbetweencommunistPolandandtheSovietUnion.Theymustalsoprove Polish origin, not just citizenship. In my paper, I willdescribethelatestchangesinPolishlegislationandconsiderthecontroversy over them. Depending on the time limits ofpresentation,Iwillalsopresentcasestudiesfrommyprofessionalwork,whereIdealwithissuesrelatedtothelegalizationofstayofforeignersinPoland.RaduOdangiuTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraBetween collective memories of European territories and theconceptofstateunityintheconstitutionalorderThe purpose of this article is to extend the debate on theindependence and autonomy trends of European territories tosome of its constitutional implications. While trying to keep astrict border between independence (separatist) trends andautonomy trends, the article will focus on constitutionalprovisionsthatsparktensioninsuchmattersandseektoidentifysomecommongroundforaconstructivediscussion.Itisaknownfact that all over Europe, certain territories thrive forindependence,claimingautonomyortryingtoradicallyseparatethemselvesfromthepolitical,administrativeandfinancialholdoftheir centralgovernments.The trend isclear, sub-territoriesofEuropeanstateslikeCataloniaortheBasqueCountryinSpain,theNorth of Italy, Kosovo in Serbia, Transnistria territory of theRepublicofMoldaviaortheSzekelyterritoryinRomaniaandsoforth desire independence. Furthermore, talks of Ireland andScotlandleavingtheUKappeartrailingindependence,following

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the Brexit. In such circumstances are European constitutionalorders ready to face such challenges? Perhaps constitutionscannot provide mechanisms for self-determination to suchtraditional minorities, however certain provisions may ensureparticular instruments for regional autonomy and still upholdunitary and indivisibility principles. By way of literalinterpretation,moralreadingand“originalist”approachconflictsemergeandsuchapproachesofcorrespondingconstitutionswillreflectcategoricalanswersfromtheconservativeinterpreterandoftenevenfromthemostliberalcommentator.Theconstitutionalissuesrelatingtosuchsituationsareverydelicateandalthoughsomemaystressthatthereisnoplacefordebate,othermayarguethat basic and fundamental freedoms pertaining to minorityrightswoulddefinitely justifysuch talks.Theshortanswerandthemost probablemean of response, as depicted in the recenteventsrelatingtotheindependenceconflictinCatalonia, isthatstateswilltrytorepressandcontainanysuchchallenges,basedonthefundamentalideasofunity,sovereigntyandindivisibility.Nevertheless, other constitutional systems have foundways todealwithsuchclaimsforindependenceorautonomy.Therearequestionsthatareyettobeanswered,howevernostateanswerwill be identically applicable to another state and territory,consideringthevastelementsconcerningthespecifichistorical,social,culturalandpoliticalcorrespondingcontext.Tothisextent,the article will search for the essential questions and try toidentifyapathforfindingananswer.AndreasOratorWUViennaUniversityofEconomicsandBusinessTheriseofargumentsbasedonconstitutionalidentityinthejudicialdialogueoftheEuropeancompoundofconstitutionalcourtsThispaperaddressestheincreasingrolethatargumentsbasedonconstitutional identity play in the “judicial dialogue” ofconstitutional(orsupreme)courtsofEUMemberStates,andinparticularofCEEcountries.TheeffectivenessandprimacyofEU

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law, as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice of theEuropeanUnion(CJEU),relies,notleast,uponthecooperationofdomesticconstitutionalcourtstosetdomesticlaw,attimesevendomestic constitutional law, aside. To this end, the CJEU hasenteredintoacontinuousjudicialdialogueinwhatVoßkuhlecallstheEuropeancompoundofconstitutional(andsupreme)courts.Since the early days of European integration, Member States’constitutionalcourtshave,generallyspeaking,compliedwithEUlaw in general and the CJEU’s judicial pronouncements inparticular (with the notable exception of the GermanBundesverfassungsgericht’s Solange case-law, which the CJEUaddressed in time). In recent years, however, a number ofjudgments of the CJEU has been metwith more resistance bydomestic courts, and constitutional courts have been takingrecoursetoargumentsbasedonconstitutionalidentityortheliketocounterfullyeffectiveEUlawanditsinterpretationbytheCJEU.WhentheGermanBundesverfassungsgerichtfirstdevelopeditsidentity (andultra-vires) reviewcase-law in theearly1990s, itensureditsactivationwouldbesubjecttoasetofstrictconditions,makingithighlyunlikelyitwouldeverbeused.ThearguablyonlyGermancaseofareviewofconstitutionalidentitysofarrelatedtoa fundamental rights issue, which also amounted to a form ofSolangecase-lawandwasimmediatelyresolvedbytheCJEUitself(Aranjosi).Inothercases,however,thejudicialdialogueprovedto be less constructive (e.g. Landtová), culminating in theantagonist stancesin theTariccoandAjoscases:Inbothcases,national supreme courts took recourse to arguments ofconstitutional identity to shield their legal orders from theconsequencesofcertainCJEUjudgments.Inasimilarfashion,theHungarian identity decision introduced the notion of“constitutional self-identity” against EU law. The paper arguesthat cases involvingargumentsbasedonconstitutional identityandunsettlingtheEUruleof lawwill increase,especially inthewakeofamorecriticalperceptionofan“activist”CJEUandthereturn of more eurosceptic political majorities in many EUMember States; with Weiler, the new “constitutional identity”

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discourse often only is masked sovereignism in a fashionableconstitutionalistguise.WhiletheCJEUseemstobemoreopentoconstitutionaldialoguewithjudicialactorsinpreliminaryrulingsandtakeintoaccountconcernsofconstitutional identity,whicharealso recognized inArticle4(2)TEU, this contrastswith theseemingly“tougher”stanceshownininfringementorannulmentproceedings(cf.theCJEU’sdecisioninthePolishBialowiezacaseto grant penalty payments for non-compliance with interimmeasuresagainst aMember State). In doing so, the paper alsolinksupthedebateofconstitutional identitydoctrineswiththeerosion of the EU rule of law and stressing, in particular, itsjudicialperspective.TeodorPapucTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraTheinconstantessenceofthe“constitutionalidentity”intheareaoffundamentalrightsThe notion of “constitutional identity” is used in Germanconstitutional law to interpret Article 79 (3) of theBasic Law.Article79(3)providesthatconstitutionalamendmentsthataffecttheprincipleslaiddowninArticles1and20oftheBasicLawshallbeinadmissible.AsimilarclausecanbeidentifiedinArticle152oftheRomanianConstitution.AsopposedtotheGermanclause,whichprotectsonlythehumandignityandtherightofresistance,Article 152 prohibits, inter alia, revisions that result in thesuppressionofthecitizens’fundamentalrightsandfreedomsorof the safeguards thereof. This paper is limited to the issue ofsuppressing certain safeguards. The reader of the RomanianConstitution may notice that its Second Title contains rightswritten inageneralmannerandspecifiedrights.Thespecifiedrightsaredefinitiverules,suchasArticle30(2)(“Anycensorshipshallbeprohibited”)orArticle31(4)(“Publicandprivatemediashall be bound to provide correct information to the publicopinion”). Once specified, the rights become absolute, but their

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absolutism on the national level, which is an aspect of theconstitutionalidentity,canbecontrarytotheirdefactorelativism,asitmaybedetermined,forinstance,bytheconvergentpracticeofotherstatesorthroughthecase-lawoftheinternationalcourtsadjudicatinghumanrightsdisputes.Proportionality,aprinciplethat dominates the global constitutional law, requires thatlimitationsofrightsbejustified.Canwelimitthespecifiedrights,if the limitation is justified? Wouldn’t this limitation mean asuppressionoftheirabsolutecharacter?Isn’tthistantamounttoa suppression of the absolute right and a creation of another,relative one? This paper argues that a fixed doctrine of“constitutional identity” in the area of fundamental rightsmaypreventtheapplicationoftheprincipleofproportionality,whichis contrary to the primary purpose of the Constitution – theeffectiveprotectionofhumanrights–andwhichmaycontravenetotheinternationalobligationsoftheState.Infact,withregardtofundamentalrights,thereisaconstantlychanging“constitutionalidentity”,whichtheConstitutiondoesnotlaydown,butwhichisdeterminedbythejudges,throughthedecisionstheydeliver.FilipRakoczyUniversityofWrocławSocial justice as a base for constitutional identity and an axis ofpoliticalstruggleArticle 2 of the Polish Constitution states that“TheRepublicofPolandshall be ademocratic stateruledbylawand implementing the principles of social justice”. Thisprinciple is one of the most essential elements of Polishconstitutional identity. Our Constututional Tribunal, althoughhesitantly, throughout the years, had created a more or lessconsistentunderstandingofthisstatement.Inthefirstpartofmypaper, I will try to reconstruct this way of interpreting socialjustice. In this understanding, social justice is a goal to beachieved, also by implementing the rule of law into the Polishpolitical system. What is most important here, that is in the

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contemporarydecisionsoftheConstitutionalTribunal,isthattherule of lawwas themain tenet of Polish democracy,while theusageoftheideaofsocialjusticewasincidental,andwasratherconsideredanexceptiontogeneralrule.Thesecondpartofmypresentationwillbeanattempt to reconstruct themainaxisofmodernpoliticalconflictinPoland,wherethegovernmentanditssupporters try to use the idea of restoration of social andhistoricaljustice,asalegitimizationforcarryingunconstitutionalreformsandchanges in thebalanceofpowerswithin thestate.Their opponents, on the other side, have embedded theirargumentationontheruleof lawfundament,asopposedtothearguments based on social justice. In this perspective, bothprinciplesareautonomousandoftenevencontradictory.Inthefinal part of my presentation, I will try to compare those twoperspectivesonsocialjustice.Then,Iwilltrytoanalyzetheimpactof the juridicization of the concept of social justice by theprofessionallegalculture,which,inmyopinion,canbeviewedasacauseofthemodernPolishcrisisoftheruleoflaw.MiroslawMichałSadowskiUniversityofWrocławBánffy,Roth,Rankov,Kundera,Ash,Mikanowski–CEECountries’socialmemoriesrevisited,orwhatisleftofCEE100yearsafterthefirstfalloftheEmpiresAlbeitacliché,itistruethatwhenWWIstarted,peopleinBerlin,London, Paris, Vienna, Budapest and St. Petersburg actuallycelebrated.Onlyfouryearslater,notoneofthemainactorsinthewar was in celebratory mood. The three Central and EasternEuropeanempires,whichhavecontrolled theregion foroverahundredyears,laidinruins.Outoftheirrubble,severalcountrieshave reborn, trying to find their independent place on theEuropeanmaponceagain.However,geopoliticscaughtupwiththemquickly,leavingthemnotonlyindebris,butalsodependentagain.Anotherhalfacenturypassed,andtheymanagedtoresurgeoncemore,transformed,however,forperpetuity.Theaimofthis

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paper is to examine, through the eyes of six miscellaneousthinkers,whatisleftoftheCEEintermsofidentityandcollectivememory,andthentoapplythefindingstotheprimordiallegaltextofanycountry–theconstitution,inthiscasethe‘new’CentralandEasternEuropeanconstitutions,tryingtoestablishthetracesofpastanddistinctivenessinthem.Inthefirst,introductorypartofthe paper,M.M. Sadowski presents different theories on localidentityandoncollectivememory,andthentriestodefinetheseterms. The second part of the article is devoted to the criticalanalysis of works on CEE by six thinkers: Miklós Bánffy’s TheTransylvanian Trilogy, Joseph Roth’s Radetzky’s March andEmperor’s Tomb, PavolRankov’s ItHappened on September theFirst (or Whenever), Milton Kundera’s A Kidnapped West orCultureBowsOut,TheodorGartonAsh’sRevolutioninHungaryandPoland and Revolution: The Springtime of Two Nations, and,ultimately, Jacob Mikanowski’s Goodbye Eastern Europe. Theseworksspanalmostacenturyandareessays,articlesandnovels,buttheyhaveonethingincommon:theycapturetheevolvingandthe constant in the Central and Eastern European spirit. Theauthorfirstgivesanoverviewofthesetexts,then,onthebasisofthem,venturestoestablishwhetherornotthereissuchathingasacommonCEEidentityandsharedCEEcollectivememories,and,if theydoexist,howhave theyshiftedsince the first fallof theempiresonehundredyearsagouptothisday.Inthethirdpartofthepaper,M.M.SadowskifocusesontheconstitutionsofseveralCEE countries. Looking at the constitutions as ‘the mirrors ofnations’, theauthorsearches forCentralandEasternEuropeanpeculiaritiesandcollectivememoriesinthefundamentallawsofthesestates.The fourth, final part of the paper is devoted to amoregeneralsocio-legalreflectionofthepastonehundredyearsinCEEandisalsoanattempttorespondtorecentclaimsthatinCEEthe‘Empiresstrikeback’andthatweshouldsay‘Goodbye’toCentralandEasternEurope.

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AgnieszkaSkoraWarmiaandMazuryUniversityThecollectiverightsofnational,ethnicandregionalminoritiesinPoland.Theproblemofminoritiesinahomogeneousstate?Theaimofthisarticleistopresentthelegalsituationofnational,ethnicandregionalminoritiesinPoland.Therightsofminoritiesin Poland are above all guaranteed in Article 35 of the 1997Constitution of Poland. The legal situation ofminorities is alsoregulatedby theActonNationalandEthnicMinoritiesand theRegionalLanguageof2005.TheRepublicofPolandhasratifiedtheEuropeanCharterforRegionalorMinorityLanguageson12February 2009. This is a very significant problem, because thepopulation of Post-World War II Poland became nearlycompletely ethnically homogeneous as a result of theGerman-Nazi Holocaust, the radically altered borders, the deportationsorderedbytheSovietstateauthorities,whowishedtoremovethesizeablePolishminoritiesfromtheBaltics(todayLithuania)andEastern Europe (Western part of today’s Belarus andWesternpartoftoday’sUkraine).Itisworthemphasizingthatatthe2011national census, 1,44% of the 39million inhabitants of PolanddeclaredtobedescendentsofanothersingleancestrythanPolish.Nowtherearepresently3categoriesofminorities inPoland:9nationalminorities (Belorussians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slovaks,Germans, Armenians, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews), 4 ethnicminorities (Karaites, Lemkos, Roma, Tatars), and only oneregionallinguisticminority(Kashubians).However,Polandisnotfree from discussions about minority rights. The minorityproblemisimportanttousfortworeasons.Firstofall,latelytheinhabitants of Silesia (Silesians) also want to be a nationalminorityandfightforit.Silesia(Polish:Slask)isahistoricalregioninCentralEuropedividedbythecurrentnationalboundariesofPoland,GermanyandtheCzechRepublic.Therehavebeensomedebates on whether or not the Silesians constitute a distinctnation.Theproblemofminorityrightsisalsoimportantbecauseca.2millionemigrantsfromUkrainehavecometoPolandinthe

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lasttwoyears.Forthefirsttimesince1945,PolandisnolongeracountryofPolesonly.Inthisarticle,IwouldliketoshowthelegalandfactualactionsdonebyPolandtomanagethisnewproblem.ViktorijaSonecaTheMinistryofJusticeoftheRepublicofLatviaConstitutional identity fromtheperspectiveof thecaseC-673/16ComanandOthersTheConstitutionalCourtofRomaniasubmittedareferenceforapreliminaryrulingtotheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(caseNo.C-673/16Comanandothers).Thereferredquestionsconcernthedefinitionof“spouse”inArticle2(2)(a)and“familymember” in Article 3 (2) (a) of Directive 2004/38/EC inconjunction with Articles 7, 9, 21 and 45 of the Charter ofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion.Thepreliminaryreferenceconcernsthecaseofasame-sexcouple,Mr Relu Adrian Coman (a Romanian citizen) and Mr RobertClabourn Hamilton (an American citizen). The two have beenengagedinalong-termrelationshipandwerelegallymarriedinBelgiumin2010.TheyarechallengingtherefusalofthehostState,Romania,torecognizeandgiveeffecttothemarriagecontractedin Belgium. They argue that this impedes Mr Hamilton fromreceivingapermittoresidelegallyinRomaniaonthegroundsoffamilylife.Romaniadefinesmarriageastheunionofonemanandonewomanandspecificallyprohibitssame-sexmarriageandtherecognitionofsame-sexmarriageorcivilpartnershipsconcludedabroad. The question of this case is whether European UnionMemberStatesactingashostStatesareunderanobligation togivelegaleffecttocivilactsconcludedundertheconditionsandlegalorderofanotherMemberState,despitethefactthatsuchanactcouldnotbelegallyandvalidlyconcludedundertheinternallegal rules of the host State. This case askswhether EuropeanUnionMemberStates(includingMemberStateswhichspecificallyprohibitsame-sexmarriage)arerequiredbyEuropeanUnionlawto recognize cross-border marriages concluded between two

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personsofthesamesex.IncaseNo.C-673/16ComanandOthers,Advocate General Wathelet stated that literal, contextual andteleological interpretations of the term ‘spouse’ used inArticle2(2)(a)ofDirective2004/38 lead toanautonomousdefinition,independentofsexualorientation.Firstofall,itisarequirementof the uniform application of European Union law and of theprinciple of equal treatment that the terms of a provision ofEuropeanUnionlawthathasnotbeendefinedandthatmakesnoexpressreferencetothelawoftheMemberStatesforthepurposeofdetermining itsmeaningandscopeshouldbegivenuniformautonomousinterpretationthroughouttheEuropeanUnion.Next,ifthestructureofArticle2(2)ofDirective2004/38,inconjunctionwith Article 3(2)(b) of that directive, requires the concept of‘spouse’ to be associated with marriage, the legislaturedeliberately chose, moreover, to use a neutral term, withoutfurtherdetail.Last,boththedevelopmentoftheEuropeansociety– which is reflected in the number of Member States whoselegislationpermitsmarriagebetweenpersonsofthesamesexandinthecurrentdefinitionoffamilylifeinArticle7oftheCharter–and the objectives of Directive 2004/38, facilitating the freemovement of Union citizens while respecting their sexualorientation, lead to the concept of ‘spouse’ being interpretedindependently of sexual orientation. To the author’smind, thiscaseraisesquestionaboutnationalidentity(whichiscodifiedinthe Member State’s constitutions) and European Union’sobligation,which is set out inArticle 4(2)TEU, to respect thatidentity. Therefore, Iwill analyze the constitutional identity ofseveralMemberStates (forexample,Latvia andPoland) in thecontextofcaseC-673/16ComanandOthers.

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LauraStănilăTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraLegal acculturation and criminal law. Between uniformity andpreservationofidentityEuropean Union is a concept that, despite initial enthusiasmmarked by ambitious and inspiring goals, proved to raiseproblemsthatcouldnotbesolved,despitethebestintentionsofallinvolved.Thedisplayedslogan-“Unityindiversity”or“Unitywithout uniformity and diversitywithout fragmentation” - hasproven to be as logically difficult to accept as easy to use,wheneveraproblemofalignmentanduniformityofnationallawsoftheMemberStatesarises.Whatdoes“UnityinDiversity”mean?Howcomesuchadesideratumbecompatiblewiththeconceptofindependenceandnationalspirit,soprominentintheessenceoftheEuropeanpeople,especially of Central andEasternEuropeones?Isthisapracticalachievablegoal,orisitjustacontent-freeconceptthatisusedasauniversalkeyforover-solvinganykindof problems thatmight arise in the interaction of EU memberstates? The legislative area, the issue of aligning national lawswithEUlaw,theissueofconfiguringEUlegislationsoastotakeintoaccountallthenationalparticularitiesofthememberstates,arematters that, with all the good intentions of the EuropeanLegislator, are far from being solved. The European space isdramatically facing the phenomenon of legal acculturation, aphenomenonthatoccursnaturallywhenmultiplesocialgroups,eachwithitsownrulesandspecificity,interactforalongtime.Ifuniformity, a natural consequence of the phenomenon of legalacculturation,occurredeasily insomebranchesof law,suchasnational commercial law, other branches of law, namely thosebelonging to national public law, and in particular nationalcriminal andcriminal procedure law - continue to resist.Whatwould be the explanation for this fact despite the evidence ofuniformitysofar?Thisisthesubjectofthepresentstudy,whichdoesnotaimtofindtrenchantexplanations,butonlytoprovidearadiographyofthephenomenonofcriminallawresistancefacing

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the European legislative colossus. We also propose an honestanalysis of the long-term effects of the legal acculturationphenomenon on national criminal and criminal procedure lawandtrytoanticipateitslong-termpositiveornegativeeffectsintermsofpreservingnationalidentity,inaneutralkey.FlaminiaStârc-MeclejanTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraSocial responsability and legal consciousness: our less ecologicalcommonbequestAnyprincipleinvokedasabasisforrightsgainsvalueonlyifthecollective memory steps in to guarantee its application(Halbwachs,1950).Memoryandpresentexperiencecoincide,likeinEliot’sBurntNortonopeninglines”Timepresentandtimepast/Arebothperhapspresentintimefuture/Andtimefuturecontainedintimepast”,orhowwouldyouverifytheoriginalstateofaffairsif thegroupdidnot preservea remembranceof it (Halbwachs,1950)?AfterthefallofCommunism,neweconomicandpoliticalsystems have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)(ScrieciuandStringer,2008;BradshawandStenning,2004).Pastrealitieswereabandonedandpost-CommunistEuropeadoptedthe substantially different Western values and institutions.Previouslycentrallyplannedeconomicsystemsmovedawayfromstatecontrol,top-downdecision-makingandfive-yeareconomicdevelopment plans, towards liberalization, macro-economicstabilization,privatizationandinternationalization(ScrieciuandStringer,2008;Aslund,1995).CommunistgovernmentstypicallyembracedtheMarxistideologyonnaturalresources,whichwasalteredtofittheStalinistandpost-Stalinist ideologyadvocatingthattheenvironmenthasnointrinsicvaluebuttoservehumanneeds (Mazurski, 1991; Duțu and Duțu, 2014). On the whole,environmentaldegradationduringCommunismwasregardedasa necessary and logical approach to production (Chaistya &Whitefield, 2015). ”Doublethink” was the defining feature of

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Soviet-style totalitarianism, so that the fact that CommunistcountrieswerethefirstonestoentrenchintheirConstitutionsthecollective right to environmental protection should comeasnosurprise.UndertheauspicesofTheUnitedNationsConferenceon the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in June 1972,Romaniaofficiallyadoptedimportantenvironmentalregulationsand institutions (e.g. the Environmental Protection Act no.9/1973 that set up the National Environmental Council). Theseparationbetween thinkingandactionhoweverbringsoveradivided life, and isolates the individuality fromthecommunity.Theagewe leftbehindseems tobeone inwhichweendedupseparated fromtheother.Current literatureconcludesthat thepost-Communist region remains to this day distinctive in theattitudesofitscitizenstoenvironmentalissues,wideningthegapin environmental policy orientations between West and East(Chaistya &Whitefield, 2015). Should we look at our ”way ofbeing” when we search for the future effectiveness of theenvironmentallaws?PrzemyslawTacikJagiellonianUniversityPolishConstitutionalIdentityunderIlliberalTurnInmypresentation,IwouldliketoexaminetheevolutionofthePolish constitutional identity with particular reference to theilliberalturnafter2015.Polishconstitutionalidentitywasborninthe years 1989-1992,while the previousConstitution from theStalinistera(1952)wasstillinforce.The1952Constitutionwasamendedastothegeneralprinciples,althoughitdidnotformacoherent whole. It was creatively interpreted by theConstitutional Court, which relied heavily on the principle ofdemocratic state in order to deduce from it some detailedresolutions.Meanwhile,thenewconstitutionwasbeingpreparedin heated discussions and finally adopted in 1997. The 1997Constitution was a clear compromise between liberals, post-

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communist centre-left and moderate right-wingers – bestepitomisedinthepreamble,whichaptlyjuxtaposesareferencetothosewhoperceiveGodas source of valueswith references tothose believing in other, non-religious sources. It mixed twoconceptsofthePolishpeople:apartfromallliberalreferencestothe people construed as “demos” (the community of personsholdingPolishcitizenship)itassumedalsotheexistenceofPolish“ethnos”,i.e.acommunitythathas“endured”historicalcalamities(partitions,wars and the real socialism). Nevertheless, despiteconciliatory formulas, the 1997 Constitution was at that timefiercelycontestedbyvariousright-winggroupsandorganisations(includingthe“Solidarity”tradeunion),whichlabelleditevenas“Bolshevik” for the alleged liberalism, atheism andcosmopolitanism. This initial split gave rise to surreptitiouscurrents that continued to delegitimise it. Since 1997, theconstitution lived two lives. The Constitutional Court, generalcourts and, to a lesser degree, public institutions used it asanchoringpointforbuildinguptheconstitutionaltraditionofthePolish Republic. Nevertheless, it has never produced a trulyresonatingconstitutional identity like, forexample, theGermanVerfassungsgesetz. For this reason it was relatively easy toextrapolate the initial right-wing criticism into fully-fledgedstrategiesofdelegitimisation.Theycameinhandyafterthe2015elections, inwhich the far-right populist Lawand Justice partygainedpower.Asitdidnotwinconstitutionalmajority,itcouldnot follow the path of the Hungarian Fidesz. Therefore theconstitutionwasnotamended,buteffectivelysuspendedbysub-constitutional laws. With the concurrent paralysis of theConstitutional Court, the Constitution became thus practicallyinapplicable in certain areas (e.g. the organisation of thejudiciary). Nevertheless, it remained crucial for some generalcourtsand theSupremeCourt,aswellas foravastmajorityofpracticing lawyers. Since 2015, the 1997 Constitution is onceagainasourceofpoliticalrift.Forthegoverningmajorityithasbeeneither completely neglected, dismissed as “elitist” andincompatiblewith“thewillofthesovereign”ormanipulatedin

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ordertojustifyillegalmoves.Inthelatterrespect,theunlawfullytaken over Constitutional Court has used the very sameConstitution in order to interpret it in an illiberalway (amongothers,strengtheningtheroleof“ethnos”).Fortheopposition,the1997 Constitution has been a source of new constitutionalidentityinresistanceagainsttherulingmajority.AndražTeršekUniversityofPrimorska&EuropeanFacultyofLawCEEconstitutional identitymustbeunderstoodasafoundationalconstitutionaldemocracyByvirtueofatheoreticalpresupposition,everypoliticalauthorityis founded on the sovereign decision and political self-determinationoftheNation.Itistheexpressionoftheunalienableright to the political self-determination andpolitical self-being.Theconceptof“Nation”isbroaderthantheconceptof“People”.“The People” as a concrete and present, politically organizedgroupofindividualsarenotsovereignintheCEEparliamentarianand representative democracies. The notion “authority of thePeople”, mentioned in the Article No. 3 of the Slovenianconstitution,doesnotmeanSovereigntyof thePeople.AnotheraspectoftheconceptofsovereigntyisrepresentedbythefactthattheStateortheGovernmentasitsauthoritativerepresentativeisonlymoreorlessautonomousorsuperioroveritsterritoryandcitizens,butnotinfactandgenuinelysovereign.Theconceptofsovereigntyasapoliticalandmoralqualityshouldbe recognized to the fundamental human rights and freedoms,constitutional principles, especially the rule of law and socialstate, and to the concept of humanity. These are the political,moral and normative presuppositions of sovereignty. CEEconstitutional democracies, like the Slovenian constitutionaldemocracy,mustbeunderstoodandaddressedasanexampleofthe (modelof)democracyof fundamental rights, freedomsandprinciples-s.c.foundationaldemocracy.Thefundamentalhuman

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rights and freedoms must be conceptually understood assovereign – as having such a political, legal andmoral quality.These definitional elements should have a direct, essential andpressing influence on defining CEE constitutional and generallegal (normative) identity, including the scope and conceptualunderstanding of legal formalism, pure legalism, statutorylegalism, the nature and authority of the decisions ofconstitutionalcourtsandECHR,therelationbetweenparliaments(asthemostdangerousbranch)andconstitutionalcourts(astheleastdangerousbranch)ortherelationbetweenordinarycourtsandconstitutionalcourt.StanislawToszaandDominikZajacUniversityofLiège/JagiellonianUniversityIndependentjudiciary,acornerstoneofaconstitutionalorder–buthowtodoit?AcomparativestudyinviewofthelatestreformsinPolandTheconstructionofthejudiciaryisoneofthecornerstonesofacountry’slegalidentity.Itstrongly,evenifsubconsciously,reflectsitshistoryaswellas its socialandpolitical texture.TherecentchangesintroducedinPolandhaveoccurredamidstarelativelyuninformedandhighlypoliticizeddebate.Onesideofthepoliticalspectrumpresentsthemastheendofjudicialindependencewhilethe other as a necessary reform and democratisation of thejudiciary.Whilenoconsensushasbeenbuiltaroundthecurrentchanges,onemayexpectthattherewillcomeapointwhenthejudiciary will have to be reconsidered and this study aims atcontributingtothisdebate.Thepaperwillexaminethepreviousandthecurrentdesignofthejudiciaryfromtheperspectiveofitsrelationshipwithotherpowers(executiveandlegislative).Itwill,inparticular,focusonthenominationofjudges,headsofcourtsatdifferent levels,rulesofpromotion,selectionsof judgestohearconcretecasesanddisciplinaryproceedings.Itwillcomparethese

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aspectswiththesolutionsfromthecommunistandthepre-warperiod. It will also contain a study of these issues in selectedcountries(US,UK,Spain,Belgium/theNetherlands).Againstthiscomparative setting, the Polish solutions will be criticallyanalyzed. The final aim of the study is to show the potentialparameters and core elements guaranteeing the independentfunctioningofthejudiciary.Bothbackgrounds–thehistoricalandthecomparative–shouldrevealtheinfluenceofthePolishsocialand political context and allow for the identification ofparticularitiesandessentialfeatures,whichshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenlookingforthenewconstructionofthejudiciary.GiventhattheprocessesthatoccurinPolandarenotforeigntoother Central and Eastern European countries, we believe thispaper tobeof interest foran internationalaudience,whileourworkcanhighlyprofitfrominspirationstemmingfromthelatter.NorbertTriblUniversityofSzegedThroughhardships tothe stars:HumanrightsandconstitutionalidentityHuman rights and constitutional identity. From these twoconcepts, fundamental rightshave longbeenknownasevidentsince they form the foundation of constitutional systems inEurope.Incomparison,constitutional identityisonlybeginningtoberecognized,eventhoughitisnolessanessentialelementofthe constitutional space of Europe and of the constitutionalsystemsthatcreateit.Aprotectionsystemoffundamentalrightshas been built up at both the international and the Europeanlevels and at the level of Member States as well; moreover,without the validation or enforcement of certain constitutionalvalues and fundamental freedoms, we cannot speak aboutEuropeanconstitutionalsystemsandaboutEuropeanintegrationeither.ByraisingtheCharterofFundamentalRightstotherankoftheFoundingTreaties,respectforhumanrightsasinthecaseofcommonconstitutionaltraditions,hasbecomeadecisiveforce

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behindintegration,bothfromaconstitutionallegalandasocial-ideological point of view. As Sulyok argues “since theConstitutional Charter of the Treaty of Lisbon, Europe isexperiencing a period of constitutional transition”. Raising theCharter of Fundamental Rights to the level of the FoundingTreatiescouldbeinterpretedasthedevelopmentof integrationfromaconstitutionalpointofview,whichwouldcontributetotheconsolidationofthestabilityofintegration.However,inpractice,wedonotreallyseeanyevidencetothateffect.Indeed,perhapsthe opposite is true.Despite growingefforts toconsolidate theintegrityofintegration,itbecomesincreasinglyunstable.Behindthis phenomenon lies the juxtaposition of the sovereignist andintegrationistapproachessincethecreationoftheUnion,butitisonlyaprojectionofamuchmoreelementaryphenomenon,whichcouldprimarilybedescribedasasearchforidentity.Ifwelookattheprocessofthisproblemof“seekingidentity”moreclosely,weconfrontadiversesystemofissues,whichencapsulatesEuropeancultural identity aswell as the existence (or non-existence) ofEuropean demos and the political-economic relationships thatdefine the European integration. One aspect of this search foridentityistheconstitutionalidentitydebateaspartofEuropeanintegration. Contrary to fundamental rights, constitutionalidentity does not have a clear-cut conceptual system and thecomponents of the national identity, constitutional identity ofsomeMemberStateshavenotyetbeen identified,althoughweonecouldarguethattheitemizeddefinitionoftheconstitutionalidentity of Member States may entail risks and can furtherstrengthenthepolitical(andconstitutional)tensionsinEurope.Keepinginmindthatthereisnoexactdefinitionforconstitutionalidentity perhaps an attempt can bemade to circumscribe it inorder toobtain insight into thesubtler substanceof theabove-mentionedintegrationist-sovereignistoppositionandthroughitwemightgetcloser to resolving the issuesat thebasic levelofdefining identity. One of the approaches to examining theconstitutional identity of Member States and the tensions

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betweenMemberStatesandtheIntegrationcanbeapproachingtheproblemfromtheaspectofcertainfundamentalrights.IonuțTudor“AlexandruIoanCuza”UniversityTheRuleofLawasstateofexceptionIncountrieslikeRomaniaorotheronesfromCentralandEasternEurope, onecan easily identifya disquiet regarding the rule oflaw, expressed either by officials from Western states or bycertain citizens from these countries.My inquiry tries to showhowfarthethreadstoruleoflawextendto,ifthethreadsaretrulyagainsttheruleoflaw,ifinpublicdiscoursesthenotionofruleoflaw is usedpredominantly from its formalist or its substantivemeaning,if theusesoftheconceptareinfact incorporableinalarger political strategy to imposean unreachable horizon thatworksasan“exception”.Forthelatter,IwillbeusingAgamben’sstate of exception to asses if in fact the rule of law is usedfallaciously precisely in order to maintain and reproducemechanisms of power that are denounced in the discoursespromotingtheruleoflaw.AndreeaVerteș-OlteanuTheWestUniversityofTimisoaraThe separation of powers principle under the RomanianConstitution(s)–constitutionaltransplant,chimeraorself-defencemechanism?The separation of powers represents one of the essentialprinciplesgoverningtheruleoflaw;asafundamentaldogmaofdemocratic societies, it is enshrinedwithin the architecture ofconstitutions throughout the world. The principle’s hard coreresidesinthedesiderateofnotleavingtheindividual,perceivedas a free being, exposed to an overwhelming concentration ofstatepower.Aswithotherpubliclawconcepts,thecrystallizationof a coherent notion of the separation of powers has occurred

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gradually, without pretending to have reached an unequivocalmeaning. Institutional theorists have always been preoccupiedwiththeexerciseofgovernmentalpower,vitaltotheachievementofsocietalvalues,and,moreexactly,itscontrol,sothatitshouldnot be destructive of the democratic purposes itwasmeant toprotect and promote. Among the various theories designed toofferasolutiontothisconundrum,thedoctrineoftheseparationofpowershasbeenthemostsignificant,bothfromthepointofview of the intellectual debate, and of its influence uponinstitutionalstructures.However,thedoctrineisbynomeansasimpleorunambiguouscollectionofconcepts.Onthecontrary,itrepresentsanareaofrelativeconfusionbothinitsdefinition,andintheuseofterms.Thepresentpaperaimsatdistinguishingthreemajor phases of the principle of the separation of powers inRomanianhistory:1)the1866Constitutionandtheconstitutionaltransplant of the principle into the Romanian governmentalorder,approachedfromanepistemologicalperspectivethroughthetheoriesof“synchronism”and“formswithoutsubstance”;2)the “myth” of applying the principle during the communistregime,despitethecommandeconomyandtheone-partyrule;3)thepost-communistConstitution,with the initialabsenceofanexplicitarticulationoftheseparationofpowersattheleveloftheconstitutionaltextand, lateron, itstransitionintoachecksandbalances approach, similar to the “shields and swords” theory,withafocusonthecurrentconstitutionaldevicesthataremeantto help the state institutions to simultaneously empower anddefendthemselves;towhatextentcanitbesaidthattheyprovedefficientandhowmuchoftheoriginalscopeandpurposeoftheseparationofpowersprinciplehasbeensustained?

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WojciechZomerskiUniversity ofWrocław / Centre for Legal Education and SocialTheory“AsYouSow,SoShallYouReap”:TheCrisisofRuleofLawinPolandasacrisisofalegaldiscourseAccordingtotheprevailingnarrativeamongPolishliberals, theRepublicofPolandhasbeenanexampleofahealthydemocraticstateruledbylawtill2015anditisLawandJusticetoblameforitsdismantle.Whenitcomestothequestionwhyithasbeensoeasy for populists to undermine the rule of law andsimultaneously keep the support of themajority of the voters,liberalstendtobelievethatordinary,often–astheywanttoseethem-notwell-educated,citizenswere“bribed”bysocialbenefitsintroducedbythegovernment.Limitationsofthisperspectiveareclear.Itdoesnotprovideasatisfyinganswertothequestionwhyithasbeensoeasytodoit,meanwhileanhonestanswertothisquestion might lead to a disturbing conclusion that the Polishconstitutionhasbeenseverelyviolatedbyformergovernments,atleastinthesenseoffailingtoimplementrulesof“socialjustice”,whichaccordingtotheArticle2ofthePolishConstitutionshallbeamaterial componentofdemocratic state ruledby law. Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthisperspectiveisveryattractivetolawyersandliberallegalscholars,asitcompletelyfreelawyersfromanyresponsibility for the crisis of rule of law and justifies theirreluctance to change anything within the judiciary or legaleducation.Inmyopinion,therearehoweversoundreasonstoseethisapproachasanunsatisfactoryoneandinsteadofit,Iproposeto see the crisis of rule of law in Poland as a crisis of legaldiscourse.Whyisthat?LegaldiscourseinPolandhasbeenheavilytainted by formalism and legal dogmatism. This is particularlyvisible in a style (culture) of justifying legal decisions by thecommon courts, which according to L. Morawski and M. Zirk-Sadowskiis“deductive, legalisticandmagisterial”.Moreover,asthequotedauthorsputit,onemayobserveadominationofthedeductivestyleoverthediscursiveone,whichalltogetherleads

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tothefactthatlegaldecisionsmaybeoftenincomprehensibletolaymen.Judicialdecisionsarepresentedasauthoritativeactsofastate and not as decisions of a concrete personwhich is evenstrengthenedbythefactthatthereis“tendencytoregardjudicialdecisionsratherastheonlycorrectsolutionthanasthechoiceofthe best alternative”. This, according to the authors, finds itsjustificationintheideologyoftheruleoflaw,acceptedinPoland,“whichseemstoassumethatthelawshouldgiveonlyonecorrectanswerforeverysituation”.AsL.Koczanowiczputit,alanguageusedinpracticemightbetreatedinaformalandabstractwayorasasocialrealmperse.Inthelatterperspective,thestyleoflegalreasoning disposed in legal decisions might be a proof thatbetweeninstitutionsimplementinglawanditscitizensthereisnodialogue,whichmightinturnmeanthattherootsofthecrisisofruleoflawrundeeperthanthelawyerswouldliketoadmit.Asaconsequence, the crisis of legal institutions can be seen as theresultofalackofdemocraticdialoguebetweenthejudiciaryandthecitizens.Thisshiftsourattentionfromlegalpracticetolegaleducation–theexistingcrisisoftherulelawmightbeseenastheresultofalackofsoftcompetencesoflawyers,whocannotengagewithcitizensinarobustdialogueonthedemocraticruleoflaw.Inmypaper,Iwouldliketoprovidesomeempiricalmaterialprovingvalidityoftheabove-statedhypothesis.Moreover,Iwouldliketoshowthat this formalistic styleof legal reasoning,being itselfathreattodemocracy,isaconsequenceofthestill-alivescientificambitionsoflegaldiscourse.Myfinalclaimisthatsincetheveryideaofdemocracyisasignof“confessiontoafailureofareason”(L. Koczanowicz, s. 200), if a legal discourse aims to meet theneedsofdemocraticchallenge,ithastoresignfromitsscientificclaimsandtransformitselfintoapracticaldiscourseofdialogicalnature.

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