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BLUE JAY MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY

MANUSCRIPT (ROUND 1)

Abstract

Consumers often find themselves in situations where they are tempted to lie in order to gain

otherwise unattainable outcomes and financial rewards (e.g. when refunding or exchanging a

product, qualifying for discounts and promotions, negotiating with a salesperson etc.). This

research examines how lying during the acquisition of a product or service influences the

consumer’s satisfaction with the outcome obtained. Four studies demonstrate that because lying

is cognitively taxing, liars are less able to use diagnostic cues offered during an exchange with a

service provider, to update their outcome expectations. Consequently, liars are less prepared for

the final outcome, which in turn, leads to more polarized satisfaction judgments. Liars are more

satisfied than truth tellers following a successful outcome, and less satisfied than truth tellers

following an unsuccessful outcome. This work suggests that lying may not only have financial

ramifications, but that there are affective implications as well.


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People lie every day. By the time an individual reaches 60 years of age, he or she will

have told an average of 88,000 lies (Norman 2008). Although the majority of lies are told to

facilitate social relationships (DePaulo and Kashy 1998) such as the recipient of a gift telling the

gift giver that the present was exactly what he or she wanted, lies are also told to acquire

something that would otherwise be unobtainable such as a child telling his mother that his father

said it was OK to have another cookie. Consumers also tell lies. They lie to other consumers

(Argo, White, and Dahl 2006; Sengupta, Dahl, and Gorn 2002); they game their emotions

(Andrade and Ho 2009); and they misrepresent information to marketers in pursuit of better

outcomes. And why not? The marketplace provides ample opportunities for consumers to lie in

order to gain better outcomes and financial rewards. For example, the temptation to withhold or

distort information may be particularly attractive to consumers when making warranty and

insurance claims (“Someone hit my car in the parking lot”), refunding and exchanging products

(“No, I didn’t drop the toaster”), qualifying for discounts or promotions (“That was the worst

meal ever, so can I get that free dessert you promised now?”), or when negotiating with a

salesperson (“I saw a much better deal online, will you match it?”).

When consumers tell lies in pursuit of better outcomes they may end up better off

financially, but the transgression may have consequences for their satisfaction with the obtained

outcome. To illustrate, consider the case of a consumer seeking a refund, knowing the reason for

returning the product falls outside of the refund policy, but wanting the refund anyway. Does the

consumer keep the unwanted product or lie about why a refund is requested? If the lie pays off,

how will this influence the consumer’s satisfaction with the outcome?

This research examines how consumers’ satisfaction with the outcome of an interaction is

affected by their telling a lie in the process of obtaining the product or service. We examine lies,

in the form of explicitly stating false information as true, to gain a better outcome. We

hypothesize that lying will have a polarizing effect on consumer satisfaction judgments, such that

liars will be more satisfied than truth tellers following a successful outcome and more

dissatisfied than truth tellers following an unsuccessful outcome. We assert that because

executing a lie is cognitively taxing, liars will be unable to effectively use outcome relevant cues

offered during the exchange to update their outcome expectations, leaving them less prepared for

the final outcome. The lack of outcome preparedness results in more polarized satisfaction

responses to the outcome obtained (studies 1 and 2). By manipulating the need to update

expectations to prepare for the outcome, we demonstrate that liars, relative to truth tellers, are

less able to correct their initial outcome expectations, and that the absence of updating is the

cause of polarization (study 3). We also test alternative explanations for the effects including the

role of self-selection (study 2), arousal (studies 3 and 4), perceived norm violation and duping

delight (study 4). We then discuss the theoretical implications of our research and explore the

practical ramifications of our findings for marketers and future research. We find our effects to

be robust and generalizable across a range of stimuli and contexts, including fabrications

requiring a simple affirmation to a prompted question, to more complex lies involving the

construction of a false representation of an event.

In the next section, we first explore the link between lying and reduced cognitive

resources and then examine the interplay of reduced cognitive resources and the updating of

outcome expectations during a social interaction. We then discuss the consequences of outcome

preparedness, or the lack thereof, on outcome satisfaction evaluations. Finally, the current

research paradigms are outlined, before presenting four studies in support of our hypotheses.


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LYING CONSUMES COGNITIVE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO UPDATE

OUTCOME EXPECTATIONS

Telling a lie is not easy. Several theoretical perspectives support the assertion that

executing a lie is more cognitively taxing than telling the truth (Buller and Burgoon 1996;

DePaulo et al. 1996; DePaulo, LeMay, and Epstein 1991; DePaulo et al. 2003; Ekman and

Friesen 1969; Lane and Wegner 1995; Mohamed et al. 2006; Vrij et al. 2006, 2008; Vrij et al.

2010; Walczyk et al. 2003; Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal 1981). After all, the liar must

craft and communicate a plausible message while actively concealing the truth. Both of these

activities are a drain on mental resources. Not only has research investigating the detection of

lies evidenced the substantial cognitive resources used when formulating false versions of an

event (DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter 1985; Mohamed et al. 2006; Vrij 2008; Walczyk et al.

2003), but research on keeping secrets also demonstrates that the omission of the truth involves a

conscious, constant, and effortful process of inhibitory control, requiring considerable access to

cognitive resources (Lane and Wegner 1995).

Given that lying is more cognitively taxing than truth telling, it follows that fewer

attentional resources will be available for other tasks (Ellis and Ashbrook 1989). To this effect,

previous research has found that people busy with regulatory functions process incoming

information less systematically (Gilbert and Krull 1988; Gilbert, Krull, and Pelham 1988;

Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull 1988; Richards and Gross 1999) and perform worse on concurrent

cognitive tasks (Kanfer and Stevenson 1985). For example, people immersed in the preparation

of their own behavior were less able to attend to other information in the environment, as

evidenced by poorer memory for the behavior of others (Bond and Omar 1990; Brenner 1973;

Lord and Saenz 1985; Saenz and Lord 1989; Swann, Pelham, and Roberts 1987). Additionally,

Richards and Gross (1999, 2000) found that the effortful regulation of one’s own emotional state,

not only impaired monitoring of the external environment, but fewer cognitive resources reduced

the ability to update existing mental representations on the basis of new information.

In the context of lying, a potential implication of fewer available cognitive resources is

that liars may fail to notice the target’s reactions to their deceptive message (Butterworth 1978).

Noting the listener’s reaction is critical to the updating process because it may provide important

information regarding the likelihood of attaining a successful outcome. Providing some

preliminary support for this idea, Butler and colleagues (2003) found that participants instructed

to deliberately conceal their true feelings during a conversation with an exchange partner were

more distracted and less responsive, and therefore, unable to complete the basic processes

required for conversational maintenance. Additionally, DePaulo et. al (2003), found evidence of

reduced immediacy and involvement during deceptive conversation, suggesting that liars are not

particularly adept at recognizing or responding to target cues.

Even if liars are able to attend to cues sent by the receiver, they may fail to use the

information to update their outcome expectations as they lack the necessary attentional resources

required for correcting and refining their original evaluations. This assertion is based on previous

research demonstrating that cognitive demands during an interaction damage the ability to use

situational information in an updating process, even if it has successfully been garnered from the

environment (Bassili and Smith 1986; Butler et al. 2003; Gilbert, Jones, and Pelham 1987;

Gilbert and Osborne 1989; Gilbert et al. 1988; Lieberman and Rosenthal 2001; Lupfer, Clark,

and Hutcherson 1990; Osborne and Gilbert 1992; Quattrone 1982; Uleman 1987). According to

Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988), cognitive busyness largely impairs efforts at evaluative


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correction because correction demands significant attention and the conscious weighing and

integration of environmental information (Baron 1988; Bassili and Smith 1986; Lupfer et al.

1990; Uleman 1987; Winter and Uleman 1984; Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff 1985). In addition,

Gilovich, Savitsky and Medvec (1998), demonstrated a tendency for liars to overestimate the

detectability of their lies. The authors attributed the bias to an illusion of transparency which

occurs when individuals anchor their estimates of detectability on their own internal states and

insufficiently adjust for the perspective of others. Therefore, independent of the ability to

monitor the environment for outcome relevant cues, cognitive busyness prohibits the updating

process. In summary, previous research supports the idea that; 1] lying is cognitively taxing and

2] that a reduction in cognitive resources weakens the ability to use new information to

sufficiently update outcome expectations during a social interaction. We propose that this

inability to update outcome expectations will leave the liar unprepared for the impending

outcome.

REDUCED OUTCOME PREPAREDNESS AND EVALUATIVE POLARIZATION

When a consumer’s outcome expectations have not been sufficiently updated, the

consumer will obviously be less prepared for the impending outcome. The consequence of this

lack of outcome preparedness is that the obtained outcome should appear more surprising (Fisk

2002; Teigen and Keren 2003). Moreover, previous research shows that the more unprepared the

consumer is for an outcome, the stronger the emotional response to the outcome obtained (Elster

1998; Kahneman and Miller 1986). This hedonic amplification has been demonstrated across a

variety of economic and psychological domains, including emotional reactions to the outcomes

of monetary gambles (Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov 1999; Mellers et al. 1997), medical tests

(Shepperd and McNulty 2002), academic grades (Mellers and McGraw 2001; Van Dijk,

Zeelenberg, and Van der Pligt 2003), unexpected Olympic outcomes (McGraw, Mellers, and

Tetlock 2005) and unanticipated dieting and pregnancy results (Mellers and McGraw 2001). This

research demonstrates that surprising outcomes evoked more intense feelings than expected

outcomes. Surprising positive outcomes were evaluated more favorably than expected positive

outcomes, and surprising negative outcomes were evaluated more negatively than expected

negative outcomes. Consumer researchers have also documented similar amplification effects in

response to unexpected store coupons (Heilman, Nakamoto, and Rao 2002), unexpected

advertising claims (Lee 2000) and unexpected product or service performance (Berman 2005;

Chitturi, Raghunathan, and Mahajan 2008; Oliver, Rust, and Varki 1997).

Building on these findings, we argue that lying will result in polarized satisfaction

judgments to the outcome obtained. Further, we develop and test an account based on reduced

outcome preparedness to account for the demonstrated polarization effect. Specifically, we

propose that because executing a lie consumes cognitive resources, liars will not have the

opportunity to update their outcome expectations using cues provided during the exchange.

Consequently, liars will be less prepared for the outcome which, in turn, will result in more

polarized satisfaction responses to the outcome obtained. Liars’ satisfaction judgments should be

more favorable than truth tellers following a successful outcome, and more unfavorable than

truth tellers following an unsuccessful outcome.

THE CURRENT RESEARCH


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We test the proposed polarization effects and the underlying process across four

empirical studies. First, we demonstrate the polarization effect after lying to a salesperson during

an online negotiation of a cellular phone package deal (study 1) and during a persuasive attempt

to refund a product (studies 2-4). We extend the generalizability of our findings by examining

both simple lies (study 1) and complex lies (studies 2-4) and demonstrate the robustness of our

effect by providing verbal cues from the salesperson during an online negotiation (study 1) and

non-verbal cues during a conversation with the service provider (studies 2-4). Second, the studies

test our proposed underlying mechanism. We examine the mediating role of outcome

preparedness (study 2). Additionally, we manipulate the need to update outcome expectations

(study 3) with conditions which vary in the difference between the consumers’ initial

expectations about the outcome and the valence of incoming feedback cues such that they are

either congruent (i.e. there is no need to update outcome expectations to be prepared for the

outcome) or incongruent (i.e. there is a need to update outcome expectations to be prepared for

the outcome). Finally, we rule out alternative explanations that self-selection, increased arousal,

duping delight, and perceived norm violation by the liar could account for the polarization effect

observed (study 4). Across four experiments, we find consistent and robust evidence for our

proposed theoretical model, where lying is conceptualized to be cognitively taxing, reducing liars

ability to update their outcome expectations and consequently, resulting in polarized outcome

satisfaction judgments.

STUDY 1: THE LYING POLARIZATION EFFECT

Study 1 provides an initial examination of the proposed lying polarization effect. We

tested our hypotheses using a negotiation paradigm in which participants were required to

negotiate with a salesperson via an interactive messaging system. We manipulated the

favorability of current competitor offers to induce either lying or truth telling. Strong competitor

offers encouraged truth telling because participants were able to achieve a good deal by

communicating honestly. Weak competitor information induced lying because participants had

to lie about competitor offers to negotiate a good deal. Lying was directly prompted via a

scripted question from the salesperson regarding the expiry date of the claimed competitor offer.

The outcome was also manipulated such that half the participants successfully negotiated a deal,

and the other half did not (an impasse). We predicted an outcome by message strategy

interaction, such that liars would report more polarized satisfaction ratings in response to the

outcome obtained.

Method

Participants and Design. One hundred and forty two students participated in the study in

exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of

a 2 (competitor information: strong, weak) × 2 (outcome: deal, impasse) between-subjects

design. Participants worked alone on a computer terminal for the negotiation task.

Procedure. Upon arrival, participants were informed that they would be negotiating a

package deal for a cellular phone on the basis of price, warranty duration, and free messaging,

and that a successful negotiation outcome would be rewarded with tickets in a draw for a $300

cash prize. The draw was included to provide an incentive to lie in the weak competitor


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information condition. Participants were told that they would be negotiating with another student

(acting as the service provider) via an interactive messaging system. Participants were then given

a payoff chart complete with the number of lottery tickets assigned to each successfully

negotiated potential outcome. Failure to reach an agreement with the salesperson within the

given time would result in no tickets for the prize draw.

Participants were informed that the salesperson would endeavor to match currently

available competitor offers. Participants were also told that the salesperson did not have access to

the competitor information. To induce lying or truth telling, participants were provided with

competitor information to use during the negotiation. Participants in the strong competitor

information condition received three currently available favorable competitor offers and three

expired unfavorable competitor offers. The favorable offers had low prices, long warranty

periods and free messaging. With this information, there was very little incentive for participants

to lie because they were in a strong bargaining position. In the weak competitor information

condition, the three favorable competitor offers were expired, and the three unfavorable

competitor offers were currently available. The unfavorable offers had high prices, short

warranty periods and no free messaging. In this condition, participants could only earn an

inconsequential amount of tickets if they truthfully disclosed their unfavorable competitor offers,

and were therefore, encouraged to lie by claiming that a favorable but expired offer was currently

available. Accordingly, the manipulation of competitor information encouraged either truth

telling (strong competitor information) or lying (weak competitor information).

During the negotiation salesperson asked the consumer “What’s the best competitor offer

you’ve seen?” to provide an opportunity to lie and “Is this deal currently offered?” to confirm the

lie. After several rounds of negotiation, the outcome of the negotiation was manipulated as a deal

or an impasse. In the deal condition, participants were asked to clarify their requests and were

eventually told that they had successfully negotiated a deal. Participants were notified of the

number of tickets they had earned for the prize draw. In the impasse condition, the salesperson

continued to ask for more details about the competitive offer and did not offer a deal before the

session timed out. Participants were notified that they had failed to earn any tickets for the prize

draw. The negotiation task took five to eight rounds of questions and comments from the service

provider. After the negotiation task, participants were asked to indicate their extent of

satisfaction (0 = not at all satisfied, 100 = very satisfied) and happiness with the final outcome (0

= not at all happy, 100 = very happy). These measures were highly correlated and combined to

form an overall measure of outcome satisfaction (r = .82, p <.001; a = .90). Participants were

then fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Results

Truthtelling and Lying Compliance Rates. The compliance rate was 77% overall which is

higher than previous studies in which deception is an unsanctioned independent variable or

dependent variable (Aquino and Becker 2005; O'Connor and Carnevale 1997; Schweitzer and

Croson 1999). We included only the participants who complied with the intention of the

competitor information manipulation in the analysis. In addition, six participants were omitted

from the sample; three experienced computer problems and three did not follow instructions.

Therefore, one hundred and five participants were included in the analysis.


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Outcome Satisfaction. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for outcome (F(1,

101) = 265.77, p < .001) indicating that participants in the deal condition (Mdeal = 75.77) felt

more satisfied than participants in the impasse condition (Mimpasse = 20.76). As hypothesized, the

results also revealed a significant message strategy × outcome interaction (F(1, 101) = 8.93, p <

.005). Follow-up simple effects indicated that liars felt more satisfied than truth tellers following

a deal (Mlie = 81.02 vs. Mtruth = 70.52; F(1, 101) = 4.99, p <.05) and less satisfied than truth

tellers following an impasse (Mlie = 15.93 vs. Mtruth = 25.60; F(1, 101) = 3.97, p < .05). Refer to

figure 1.

Insert figure 1 about here

Discussion

Study 1 provides an initial demonstration of the proposed polarization effect. Participants

reported more extreme satisfaction judgments in response to the obtained outcome following the

communication of a deceptive message. Liars were more satisfied than truth tellers with a deal,

and more dissatisfied than truth tellers following an impasse. We assume that, truth tellers used

the cues provided during the negotiation to update their outcome expectations regarding the final

outcome. Liars, on the other hand, busy executing the lie, insufficiently updated their outcome

expectations on the basis of the feedback cues provided, resulting in exaggerated affective

responses to the outcome. However, we have not provided evidence of the informational value of

the feedback cues provided by the salesperson.

Therefore, a follow-up study (n = 49) was conducted to examine the diagnosticity of the

feedback cues provided to consumers during the negotiation task and the ability to update

outcome expectations of the basis of this information. Participants were provided with one of the

transcripts of a conversation between the consumer and the salesperson with the final outcome

undisclosed (impending deal vs. impending impasse). Participants indicated the likelihood that

the consumer would obtain a deal at the beginning, middle and end (but prior to knowing the

outcome) of the conversation. A mixed ANOVA with undisclosed outcome (impending deal,

impending impasse) as a between-subjects factor, and outcome expectancy at each time period

(time 1, time 2, time 3) as a repeated measure revealed a significant interaction (F(2, 94) = 13.49

p < .001). Follow-up simple effects analyses confirmed that in the impending deal condition,

participants expectations that the consumer would obtain a deal incrementally increased over

time (Mtime1 = 43.92 vs. Mtime3 = 64.64, F(2, 46) = 7.72, p < .001). In the impending impasse

condition, participants expectations that the consumer would obtain a deal progressively

decreased over the course of the conversation (Mtime1 = 43.17 vs. Mtime3 = 29.58, F(2, 46) = 4.60,

p < .05). The results confirm that the feedback from the service provider clearly provided

information that informed expectations about the impending outcome.

STUDY 2: THE MEDIATING ROLE OF OUTCOME PREPAREDNESS

Study 1 demonstrated the polarizing effect of lying on consumer’s outcome satisfaction

judgments when the lie was a simple affirmation of incorrectly communicated competitive

information. In study 2, we examined whether the polarization effect would occur in a situation

where the consumer needed to create an elaborate falsification of a situation. We also sought to


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provide evidence of the mediating role of outcome preparedness in the polarization effect to

support our argument that because lying is cognitively more taxing than truth telling, liars’

ability to update their outcome expectations on the basis of the cues provided during the

conversation is reduced leaving liars less prepared for the outcome. The lack of outcome

preparedness will foster more polarized affective reactions to the obtained outcome.

Additionally, in study 1, participants were encouraged to lie or tell the truth with a

manipulation of the strength of competitor information. Although the compliance rate was high

compared to previous research, 23% of participants did not comply. To eliminate self selection

as a possible alternative explanation, in the current study we explicitly instructed participants to

lie or tell the truth. For study 2, we created a new paradigm where consumers lied to a

salesperson in pursuit of a refund for an unwanted product. Participants were explicitly instructed

to truthfully convey information consistent with a refund policy or to lie to the service provider.

Furthermore, to enhance convergent validity, the complex lies were orally communicated to the

service provider.

Finally, whereas in study 1 we provided feedback from the salesperson to the consumer

via a purely verbal channel of communication (e.g. words only), in the current study we

presented participants with non-verbal feedback cues (DePaulo et al. 1985). Feedback from the

salesperson was provided in the form of affirming or disconfirming auditory cues to the

consumer’s responses during the course of the conversation. The variation in the complexity of

the lie and the cues from the target provides the opportunity to test for the generalizability of the

polarization effect across lying situations.

Method

Participants and Design. Eighty students participated in the study in exchange for course

credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (message strategy:

truth, lie) × 2 (outcome: refund, no refund) between-subjects design. Each participant was seated

at a separate cubicle with noise reduction panels on either side of the desk. Two of the

participants experienced technical difficulties with the audio equipment, and were therefore,

removed from the analysis. Therefore, 78 participants comprised the analyses.

Procedure. When participants arrived to the laboratory they learned that they would

receive a free gift for their participation in the study. Participants’ first task was to choose their

desired gift from an assortment of products. In the process of selecting the gift, participants

narrowed down the set of choices in five stages. Participants were asked to choose between: 1] a

large and small assortment size, 2] prices from a grocery store or a convenience store, 3] recent

or older ratings of the products, and 4] as the target decision, adding a new product to the choice

set or not, and 5] finally identifying their most preferred product. During each decision round,

participants eliminated their least preferred option(s). In the final round, participants ranked their

remaining options in terms of favorability.

Once participants had indicated their favorite product, they were notified that the product

was out of stock, and were offered one of the options they had eliminated in the first round

instead. Participants rated their disliking of the product. Shortly after providing this rating,

participants were informed that their favorite option had become available. However, the only

way they would be eligible to receive their preferred gift is to get a refund for the undesired gift

they had been awarded. A refund meant convincing a service provider – who was unaware of the


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decisions they had made during the selection process – that they had made a decision consistent

with the terms of the refund policy (i.e. the selection or non-selection of an additional product,

#4 above). For example, if a participant asked for an additional product during the selection

process, in the truth condition they were informed that this decision was consistent with the

refund policy, therefore, they needed to convince the service provider that they had in fact made

this decision. In the lie condition, participants were told that this decision was inconsistent with

the refund policy and that they needed to convince the service provider that they had in fact

asked for an addition to the choice set, otherwise they would not be entitled to a refund. All

participants communicated the message to the service provider as instructed.

Using a pair of headsets, participants recorded a two-minute message for the service

provider. Participants were informed that the service provider would be listening on the other

end. The outcome of the interaction was manipulated such that half the participants received a

refund, and could, therefore, attain their preferred product, whereas the other half did not receive

a refund. During the ‘conversation,’ participants were provided with a series of four positive (e.g.

“Mmm! uh-huh” noises with a rising intonation in the refund condition) or negative (e.g. “Hmm,

nuh-uh” noises with a falling intonation in the no refund condition) non-verbal cues. Therefore,

cues were available to update outcome expectations during the recording of the message. A post-

test (n = 20) was conducted to ensure that the valence and informational value of the cues were

in the direction of the impending outcome as intended. Post-test participants were provided with

a description of the context of the conversation and asked to listen to the feedback provided by

the service provider during the main study. Post-test participants rated the positiveness or

negativeness of the cues and the likelihood the consumer would receive a refund on the basis of

the salesperson’s non-verbal reactions. A one-sample t-test revealed that in the positive cues

condition the valence of the cues was perceived as significantly more positive (M+ cues = 81.20)

than the scale midpoint of 50 (t(9) = 8.12, p < .001). In the negative cues condition the valence of

the cues was perceived as significantly more negative (M - cues = 18.20) than the scale midpoint

of 50 (t(9) = -11.39, p < .001). Importantly, participants in the positive cue condition reported a

higher likelihood (M = 80.20) of successfully obtaining a refund on the basis of the service

provider’s reactions (t(9) = 7.29, p < .001). Whereas participants in the negative cue condition

reported a significantly lower likelihood of obtaining a refund based on the responses they heard

(M = 18.30; t(9) = -7.56, p < .001).

Following the conversation, we measured the extent of outcome preparedness by asking

for a rating of surprise with the obtained outcome (0 = not at all surprised, 100 = very surprised).

The measure is consistent with previous research showing that people are more surprised if they

are less prepared for an outcome (Teigen and Keren 2003), and that disconfirmed outcome

expectations can be expressed cognitively as a retrospective measure of surprise (Fisk 2002;

Teigen and Keren 2003). Next, participants indicated the extent of their satisfaction and

happiness with the outcome obtained. These measures were combined to form a single index of

outcome satisfaction (r = .51, p <.001; a = .66). Following completion of the experiment,

participants received their gift and were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Outcome Satisfaction. An ANOVA revealed a main effect for outcome (F(1, 74) = 55.26,

p < .001) indicating that participants in the refund condition were significantly more satisfied

with the outcome (Mrefund = 60.03) than participants in the no refund condition (Mno refund =


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24.65). More importantly a significant outcome × message strategy interaction emerged (F(1, 74)

= 4.78, p < .05). Replicating the polarization effect found in the previous study, liars were more

satisfied than truth tellers following a positive outcome, in this case a refund, and less satisfied

than truth tellers when no refund was obtained.

Outcome Preparedness as a Mediator. To test the process underlying the polarization

effect, we conducted a mediated moderation analysis following the procedures outlined by

Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt (2005). First, consistent with earlier results, a regression with outcome

satisfaction as the dependent variable and outcome, message strategy, and their interaction as

independent variables revealed a significant main effect of outcome (β =-.45, t(74) = -3.62, p <

.001) and a significant interaction (β =-.33, t(74) = -2.19, p < .05). Next, a regression with

outcome preparedness as the dependent variable and outcome, message strategy and their

interaction revealed a main effect for outcome (β =-.30, t(74) = -2.02, p < .05) and a main effect

for strategy (β = .30, t(74) = 2.11, p < .05). Consistent with our conceptualization, liars were

significantly more surprised with the outcome than truth tellers regardless of outcome valence.

Finally, a regression with outcome satisfaction as the dependent variable and outcome, message

strategy, outcome × message strategy, outcome preparedness and outcome preparedness ×

strategy as predictors revealed a significant outcome preparedness × message strategy interaction

effect (β = .46, t(74) = 2.06, p < .05). Importantly, the outcome × message strategy was reduced

to non-significance when controlling for the effects of the mediator (p =.27). These analyses

confirm that the mediating role of outcome preparedness in the polarization effect was

moderated by message strategy. Specifically, follow-up simple effects analyses run within each

message strategy condition, demonstrated that outcome preparedness significantly mediated the

effect of outcome valence on outcome satisfaction for liars (β = .39, t(38) = 3.23, p < .005), but

not for truth tellers (β = -.02, t(34) = -.12, p = .91). Refer to figure 2.


Discussion

This study adds to our previous findings in a number of important ways. First, we

replicated our results within a different lying paradigm, with more complex lies and when non-

verbal feedback was provided from the service provider. This suggests that the pattern of results

is convergent across stimuli and generalizable across two different contexts. Second, the current

study allowed deeper insight into our proposed theoretical mechanism. Consistent with our

theorizing, liars reported more polarized satisfaction judgments, and reduced outcome

preparedness mediated the effect of message strategy on outcome preparedness. Finally, by

instructing participants to lie or tell the truth, we ruled out the rival possibility that self-selection

could have accounted for the observed polarization effect.

STUDY 3: MANIPULATING REQUIREMENT FOR UPDATING OF OUTCOME

EXPECTATIONS

Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence in support of the lying polarization effect in a simple

lie of affirmation to a prompted question during a negotiation and in a more complex lie when


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recounting the decision process for a refund. We claim the polarization effect occurs because

liars are unable to update their outcome expectations and the mediation in study 2 provided

results consistent with the assertion. However, we have yet to provide explicit evidence of the

absence of updating outcome expectations for liars. To address this deficit, in study 3 we

manipulated the need to update expectations during the conversation. Participants in the

‘updating not required’ condition were provided outcome expectations before the conversation

that matched the outcome received. Specifically, half the participants in the ‘updating not

required’ condition were told that historically a refund is given, they received positive feedback

cues during the conversation and were given the refund. The other half of the participants in the

‘updating not required’ condition were told that historically a refund is not given, they received

negative feedback cues and were not given a refund. Therefore, updating was not required to be

prepared for the outcome. Participants in the ‘updating required’ condition were provided

outcome expectations before the conversation which did not match the outcome they received.

Specifically, participants that were told that historically a refund is given, received negative

feedback cues during the conversation and were not given the refund, while those told that

historically a refund is not given, received positive feedback during the conversation and were

awarded the refund. Therefore, updating was required to be prepared for the outcome.

We hypothesized that the updating requirement manipulation would moderate the effect

of message strategy on the polarization effect. We expected that when updating of outcome

expectations was required (i.e. prior expectations did not match the feedback cues and outcome),

we would replicate the results of our previous studies. Liars would have more polarized

satisfaction responses as they would be less able to update their expectations in preparation for

the outcome, whereas truth tellers would correctly update their outcome expectations and

therefore would not report polarized responses. However, in the updating not required

conditions, when incoming feedback would not change outcome expectations (i.e. prior

expectations matched the feedback cues and outcome), the polarization effect would be

eliminated because updating was not required to be prepared for the outcome.

A yet untested alternative account for our findings is that liars may have felt more tense

than truth tellers during the task (Zuckerman et al. 1981), and that this residual physiological

arousal may have polarized subsequent affective and evaluative responses (Reisenzein 1983).

According to work by Schachter and Singer (1962) and Zillmann’s (1971) excitation transfer

hypotheses, it is possible that individuals may transfer residual arousal from a prior task to a

subsequent target evaluation, which would result in the expression of more polarized judgments

in response to the outcome. We included a measure of arousal felt during the conversation to test

whether polarization effects explained the liar’s polarized satisfaction ratings.

Method

Participants and Design. Eighty eight undergraduate students participated in the study in

exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions of

a 2 (message strategy: truth, lie) × 2 (updating: required, not required) × 2 (outcome: refund, no

refund) between-subjects design. Four participants encountered recording problems, three

participants failed to follow instructions during the conversation, and one participant accidentally

revealed the truth. Data for these eight participants were excluded from the analysis. Therefore,

80 participants were included in the analyzed sample.


12

Procedure. As in study 2, participants first completed the gift selection task and were

subsequently instructed to lie or tell the truth to a service provider to get a refund. To manipulate

the requirement for updating of outcome expectations, participants were either told that

historically one out of four of the previous participants completing the study had successfully

received a refund (i.e. unlikely to receive refund) or that three out of four of the previous

participants completing the study had successfully received a refund (i.e. likely to receive

refund). Those in the no updating required conditions received feedback and an outcome that

was consistent with these expectations: negative feedback and no refund when told they were

unlikely to receive a refund, and positive feedback and a refund when told they were likely to

receive a refund. Those in the updating required conditions received feedback and an outcome

that was inconsistent with these expectations: negative feedback and no refund when told they

were likely to receive a refund, and positive feedback and a refund when told they were unlikely

to receive a refund.

In order to ensure that we induced different prior outcome expectations, participants were

asked immediately before commencing the conversation to indicate the likelihood of receiving a

refund (0 = unlikely, 100 = very likely). After the conversation, participants indicated the extent

of their satisfaction and happiness with the obtained outcome. Scores on these measures were

highly correlated and combined into an overall measure of outcome satisfaction (r =.72, p <

.001; a = .83). Additionally, to measure arousal participants reported the extent to which they felt

tense and calm during the conversation (0 = not at all, 100 = very much). The measures were

significantly negatively correlated and were, therefore, subtracted to derive a single index of

arousal (r = -.61, p < .001). Following completion of the experiment, all participants received

their gift and were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Prior Outcome Expectations Manipulation Check. As expected, a message strategy ×

expectations ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for expectations (F(1, 76) = 4.15, p <

.05) only. Participants told that three out of four participants had received the refund reported a

significantly greater likelihood of receiving a refund (M = 68.59) prior to commencing the

conversation with the service provider compared to those participants told that only one out of

four participants had received the refund (M = 56.06). No other main or interaction effects were

significant.

Outcome Satisfaction. We collapsed across outcome valence to provide an overall

measure of polarization by reverse coding the scores of participants in the no refund condition.

An ANOVA revealed the hypothesized message strategy × updating requirement interaction

(F(1, 76) = 4.32, p < .05). Follow-up simple effects revealed that when updating of outcome

expectations was required, liars reported more polarized satisfaction judgments (Mlie = 85.65)

relative to truth tellers (Mtruth = 70.13; (F(1, 76) = 5.00, p < .05), replicating the effect found in

the previous studies. In contrast, and as predicted, when updating was not required the

polarization effect was eliminated (Mlie= 74.35 vs. Mtruth = 78.26; F < 1). Refer to figure 3.



13

Additionally, we note that while we have presented the two-way interaction results above

with satisfaction ratings collapsed over outcome in the interest of parsimony and clarity, the

results also hold when analyzed as a 2 message strategy × 2 updating requirement × 2 outcome

ANOVA. The 3-way interaction on the outcome satisfaction scores with outcome valence

included as a separate variable, supported the hypothesized effect (F(1, 72) = 4.40, p < .05). In

the updating required condition, significant outcome × strategy interaction emerged (F(1, 32) =

4.49, p < .05), replicating the polarization effect found previously. Liars were more satisfied than

truth tellers given a refund, and less satisfied than truth tellers in the no refund condition.

However, as predicted, the polarization effect was eliminated when updating was not required (F

< 1).

Excitation Transfer as an Explanation of Polarization Effects. When we included arousal

as a covariate in an ANCOVA predicting the interactive effects of message strategy × updating

requirement on outcome satisfaction, arousal emerged as a significant covariate (F(1, 75) = 4.97,

p < .05). However, more importantly, the polarization effect for liars remained significant (F(1,

75) = 6.43, p < .02). Thus, although liars reported more arousal as has been shown in previous

research, we can be confident that the polarization effect observed cannot be accounted for by

differences in the extent of physiological arousal experienced during deceptive communication.

Discussion

The results of study 3 supported our proposition that liars’ inability to update their

outcome expectations in preparation for the outcome, underlies the polarization effect. When

incoming feedback cues were inconsistent with participants’ prior outcome expectations and

therefore updating was required, liars reported more extreme satisfaction responses to the

outcome relative truth tellers because they were unable to refine their outcome expectations

using the cues provided. When incoming feedback cues were consistent with participants’ prior

outcome expectations and therefore updating was not required, the polarization effect was not

observed. We also found that increased arousal via a process of excitation transfer, did not

explain the polarization effect.

STUDY 4: A CASE OF NORM VIOLATION OR DUPING DELIGHT?

The previous studies have provided convergent evidence for the role of reduced outcome

preparedness in the polarization effect, and provided some insight into a boundary condition for

our effect. However, an unanswered question from the prior experiments is whether our effects

are due to perceptions of norm violation when lying. Previous research indicates that actions are

perceived to be abnormal and thus more mutable, whereas inactions are perceived to be the status

quo, and therefore, less mutable (Kahneman and Miller 1986; Kahneman and Tversky 1982;

Landman 1987). Importantly, actions have been linked with more extreme affective reactions

such as increased regret or elation (Baron and Ritov 1994; Epstein et al. 1992; Gleicher et al.

1990; Kahneman and Miller 1986; Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Landman 1987; Zeelenberg,

van der Pligt, and de Vries 2000; Zeelenberg et al. 1998; Zeelenberg et al. 1998; Zeelenberg et

al. 1998). Therefore, it is possible that lying represents an action (i.e. doing something that is

normal), whereas truth telling is perceived as an inaction (i.e. not doing something that is not


14

normal). In which case, the results from studies 1-3 could be explained by a ‘lying as an action’

explanation. To test this alternative explanation, we explicitly manipulated the normality of the

message strategy, such that the message strategy was depicted as normal in the treatment

condition, and was not specified in the control condition. If we observed a similar effect in the

treatment condition, then we could be confident that our effect was not explained by differences

in the degree to which lying was perceived to be an action or violation of a norm.

An additional alternative explanation for the pattern of affect observed in studies 1-3 is

Ekman’s (1985, 1992) “duping delight” hypotheses. Duping delight is described as the

excitement derived from the challenge of lying and the thrill felt when a liar successfully outwits

the target. Feelings of pleasure can be gained from exercising power and supremacy over people

especially those who are perceived to be in a position of superiority, hard to fool, typically in

control of the situation, or whom often take advantage of others (French and Raven 1959; Frieze

and Boneva 2001; Ng 1980; Van Dijke and Poppe 2006). Successful lying may signal to the liar

that they are more intelligent, socially skilled and powerful than the person duped (Burgoon,

Buller, and Guerrero 1995; Feldman, Tomasian, and Coats 1999; Riggio, Tucker, and

Throckmorton 1987) and thereby promote downward social comparisons and positive affect.

Upward social comparisons (i.e. comparisons to someone better than self) may occur when the

liar fails to dupe the salesperson as this may signal to the liar that the salesperson is superior as

they did not fall for the lie. Hence, it is possible that liars may have felt better than truth tellers

after successfully obtaining a refund, having experienced the ‘mocking’ pleasure of gaining the

‘one up’ over the salesperson. Liars may have felt worse than truth tellers in the no refund

condition, because they failed to get the better of the salesperson. To test the explanation we

included a measure of the enjoyment experienced due to tricking, or duping, the service provider

when lying.

Finally, rather than arousal exerting a direct effect on subsequent evaluations as predicted

by the excitation transfer hypotheses, it is also possible that arousal reduces processing capacity

and that these simpler perceptions lead to more polarized judgments. If this is the case, the

dynamic complexity hypotheses (Paulhus and Lim 1994), would predict that liars should report

(a) fewer thoughts in response to the task and (b) a higher proportion of valenced to nonvalenced

thoughts. In study 4 we included measures of arousal (as in study 3) and free-response thought

protocols to eliminate arousal as an influence on processing capacity explanation.

Method

Participants and Design. Fifty eight students participated in the study in exchange for

course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (message

strategy: truth, lie) × 2 (perceived norm: norm, control) between-subjects design. Two

participants failed to follow the instructions, and one participant did not record a message. Fifty

five participants were included in the analysis.

Procedure. As in studies 2 and 3 participants were instructed to lie or tell the truth to the

service provider in pursuit of a refund. Prior to the conversation participants in the norm

condition were informed that the large majority (99%) of the previous participants completing

this study considered the message strategy to be the normal course of action to take in this

situation. In the control condition they were not provided this information. The manipulation was

adapted from Blanton, Stuart, and Vanden Eijnden (2001). Following the conversation, all


15

participants were offered a refund for their favorite product and completed a questionnaire

regarding the task they had just performed. As in previous studies, participants then indicated the

extent of their satisfaction and happiness with the obtained outcome. Scores on these measures

were significantly correlated and combined into an overall measure of outcome satisfaction (r =

.43, p <.001); a = .58). To assess the effectiveness of our norm manipulation, participants

indicated the extent to which they perceived their message strategy to be a normal thing to say to

the service provider in that situation (0 = not at all normal, 100 = very normal).

We also included arousal measures as in the previous study. The measures were

significantly negatively correlated and subtracted to derive a single index of arousal (r = -.50, p

<.001). Participants were also asked to list all the thoughts and feelings that came to mind about

the task they performed. Finally, to assess the possibility that liars polarized affective responses

reflected a sense of duping delight, participants indicated the extent to which they enjoyed the

tricking or duping the salesperson (0 = not at all, 100 = very much). Following completion of the

experiment, participants received their chosen gift and were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Perceived Norm Manipulation Check. If the manipulation was successful then we would

expect that all participants in the treatment condition should have believed their strategy to be

normal. In the control condition, however, truth telling should have been perceived to be normal

and lying less normal. Therefore, we expected an interaction where all participants rated the

strategy as normal, except liars in the control condition. An ANOVA revealed a significant

message strategy × norm interaction (F(1, 51) = 4.77, p < .05). In the control condition, liars

indicated that the message strategy was less normal (Mlie =38.83) compared to truth tellers (Mtruth

= 65.13; F(1, 51) = 5.94, p <.05). However importantly, and as intended in the treatment

condition, there were no significant differences in perceived normality across message strategy

(Mlie = 62.43 vs. Mtruth = 55.79; F < 1). Therefore, the manipulation was deemed successful.

Outcome Satisfaction. We predicted that lying would result in polarization, regardless of

whether the message strategy was perceived as a violation of a norm. A message strategy ×

perceived norm ANOVA resulted in only the predicted main effect of message strategy (F(1, 51)

= 5.05, p < .05). Regardless of whether lying was perceived to be the norm or not, liars reported

more extreme satisfaction responses to the obtained outcome (Mlie = 88.55) compared to truth

tellers (Mtruth = 77.65). No other main effects or interactions were significant (F < 1).

Dynamic Complexity as an Alternative Explanation. The arousal measures revealed a

significant effect of message strategy (F (1, 51) = 6.31, p < .05). Liars felt significantly more

highly aroused during the conversation (Mlie = 25.74) relative to truth tellers (Mtruth = -3.38).

However, arousal failed to mediate the effect of message strategy on outcome satisfaction. A 2

message strategy × 2 perceived norm ANCOVA on outcome satisfaction, with arousal as the

covariate, revealed the same pattern of results. Also, arousal on its own was not a significant

predictor of outcome satisfaction (p = .09). These results suggest that the effects of message

strategy on outcome satisfaction were independent of differences in physiological arousal.

To eliminate the possibility of arousal reducing processing capacity, we followed the

procedures outlined by Gorn, Pham and Sin (2001), two independent judges coded the number of

thoughts and classified each thought or feeling as either positive, negative or neutral in valence.


16

Inter rater agreement was 94 % (κ = .77), and disagreements were resolved through discussion.

Counter to the predictions of a simplification mechanism, an independent samples t-test did not

reveal any differences in the number of thoughts across message strategy (Mlie = 2.96 vs. Mtruth =

3.10; t(52) = .37, p = .72). Furthermore, an analysis on the proportion of valenced thoughts did

not reveal any significant effects (Mlie = .44 vs. Mtruth = .59; t(52) = .16, p = .12). Thus, based on

the results of both studies 3 and 4, we can be confident that arousal does not directly or indirectly

explain the observed polarization effect.

Duping Delight. A regression analyses run on the outcome satisfaction reported by lying

participants, with tricking the service provider as the independent effect, confirmed that duping

delight was not a significant predictor of outcome satisfaction (β = .37, t(24) = 1.69, p = .10).

Therefore, the duping delight hypothesis does not appear to explain the demonstrated effects.

Discussion

In contradiction to the predictions made by a norm violation alternative account, liars felt

more satisfied with the outcome compared to truth tellers, regardless of the perceived normality

of the message strategy. Additionally, the rival predictions made by an arousal-based and duping

delight alternative explanation were not supported by the data. Thus, although liars may have felt

more psychologically activated when deceiving, this activated state does not appear to

subsequently transfer to participant’s reactions to the obtained outcome.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Prior research has examined the consequences of marketers lying to consumers.

To our knowledge, this research is the first to examine the lies consumers tell to marketers and

how lying during the acquisition of a product or service influences the consumers satisfaction

with the outcome obtained. Overall, the results demonstrated that executing a lie interferes with

liars’ ability to successfully update their outcome expectations using diagnostic cues provided by

the target during the deceptive communication. As a result, liars were insufficiently prepared for

the outcome, and reported more polarized satisfaction judgments when the outcome was

revealed.

Across four experiments, we provided evidence for our proposed effect and the

underlying theoretical mechanism. First, we demonstrated the lying polarization effect across a

variety of domains and situational factors. Liars reported more polarized responses when lying to

a service provider in an online negotiation and during a persuasive attempt to refund a product.

The effect was found to be quite robust, including more simple fabrications requiring a scripted

response to a prompted question, to more complex lies where consumers needed to create an

elaborate falsification of a situation. The effects were also replicated when both verbal and non-

verbal feedback cues were provided from the target.

Second, we found strong and consistent support for our proposed underlying mechanism.

We demonstrated that liars were significantly less prepared for the outcome relative to truth

tellers, and that this reduced outcome preparedness mediated the moderating effect of message

strategy on outcome satisfaction. Furthermore, the absence of updating of outcome expectations

by liars, was directly demonstrated by manipulating conditions under which updating would be

required. Supporting our framework, when prior expectations were inconsistent with target


17

feedback cues and therefore updating was required, the polarization was found, as liars were

unable to correct their initial outcome expectations using the incoming information. However,

the polarization effect was eliminated when prior expectations matched the direction of incoming

feedback cues because updating was not required.

The reported studies also permit us to systematically rule out a number of competing

alternative explanations. First, by replicating the polarization effect when participants were

directly instructed to lie (studies 2-4), we eliminated a possible self-selection bias in study 1

where participants were encouraged but not explicitly directed to lie. Second, by measuring

arousal we eliminated an arousal explanation as both a direct effect via excitation transfer and an

indirect effect via simpler perceptions. Although our results indicated that liars reported feeling

more aroused during the conversation relative to truth tellers, arousal was not found to be a

significant predictor of outcome satisfaction, nor a significant mediator of the polarization effect.

Thus, consistent with our theorizing, the attempted control or active suppression of felt arousal

during deception may form part of the cognitive complexity of maintaining a lie, and contribute

to liars’ inability to simultaneously engage in other cognitive processes. Third, we ruled out an

account based on perceived norm violation by liars. Although lying was perceived as an action or

violation of a norm, whereas truth telling was considered the status quo, we were able to

replicate the polarization effect when lying was positioned as the norm. Finally, by measuring

the extent of pleasure in tricking the salesperson, we eliminated the possibility that the effects are

explained by duping delight. Liars did not appear to take pleasure in fooling the service provider

and more importantly duping delight did not predict outcome satisfaction.

Our research offers some important contributions to the current literature. First, our

studies provide novel insights into the effects of lying on outcome satisfaction. Previous research

has examined consumer motivations to lie (Argo et al. 2006; Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008;

Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Mazar and Ariely 2006; Sengupta et al. 2002) but has not

addressed the consequences of lying for the transgressor. Using two experimental paradigms that

directly simulate contexts in which consumers would benefit from lying to a marketer (i.e. when

negotiating a package deal with current competitive information and when seeking a refund for a

non-refundable good), we found that lying results in more extreme affective evaluations of the

outcome obtained. Second, our research contributes to the growing literature on social

interactions in consumption contexts (Andrade and Ho 2009; Buchan et al. 2004) and builds on

the limited social psychological research and communication literature examining the interactive

nature of deceptive communication (Buller and Burgoon 1996; Ekman and Friesen 1969; Levine

and McCornack 1996, 2001). We shed new light on how consumers respond to the strategic

communicative displays of the person being lied to during a transgression. Our results provided

direct evidence that liars insufficiently integrate feedback cues into their cognitions, because they

are preoccupied with executing the lie. Finally, the present research extends our knowledge of

the emotional consequences of deception. While previous deception research has examined the

negative feelings experienced during the process of lying, including guilt, apprehension and the

fear of detection (Ekman 1992; Ekman and Frank 1993) our research focuses on the satisfaction

experienced after communicating a lie. We demonstrated that liars’ reaction to the obtained

outcome does not appear to simply reflect a transfer of the physiological arousal experienced

while deceiving, but rather a cognitively mediated process of reduced outcome preparedness as a

consequence of the difficulty associated with executing the lie. Consequently, when a liar is

successful, this may ironically bolster the liars’ outcome satisfaction, raising interesting

implications for marketers and consumers alike.


18

Whereas previous social psychological research has examined lying as a behavior that

serves everyday functions, such as self-presentation and emotion regulation (Camden, Motley,

and Wilson 1984; DePaulo et al. 1996) or the pursuit of psychic rewards and for altruistic

reasons (DePaulo and Kashy 1998), this research has focused on instrumental motivations to lie

in pursuit of better outcomes and financial rewards. Future research would contribute to

knowledge by examining other motivations to lie and liars’ hedonic responses to the tangible or

psychic rewards attained. For example, consumers may be motivated to lie for self-presentational

reasons (e.g., lying about an exercise or a dieting regime when joining a gym), and such identity-

relevant concerns may provide an important boundary condition for our effects, as the deceptive

process may be more fluent, proficient, less cognitively challenging, given that lies of this nature

are often routinely practiced in everyday life (DePaulo et al. 2003; Fiedler and Walka 1993;

McCornack 1997).

It is also important to note that in our research, liars were unacquainted with the person

listening to the lie. Social psychological research suggests that cues to deception may be

moderated by the liar’s relationship with the target (Anderson, DePaulo, and Ansfield 2002;

Buller and Burgoon 1996; Ekman 1985; Levine and McCornack 1992; Stiff and Miller 1986).

Future research might examine conditions under which the consumer is acquainted with or has a

relationship the marketer. In these instances we might expect liars to habitually or strategically

attend to the target’s reactions as their focus in on protecting the recipient’s feelings (DePaulo

and Bell 1996; DePaulo and Kashy 1998; DePaulo et al. 1996). Alternatively, under these

conditions, the consumer may be more likely to harbor concerns over future interactions and the

consequences of detected deception, whereas in our research consumers were focused on

attaining short-term, self-serving benefits during a single interaction with the service provider.

Finally, it is also important to note that the lies told in this research were communicated in

private. It would be interesting to examine the effects if lies were told in public or as group, as

the effects of duping delight are more likely to occur when an audience, in particular allies of the

liar, are present to witness the liar’s skill in outwitting the target (Ekman et al. 1991).

We conclude by noting the implications of this research for marketers dealing with

consumers who lie or are suspected of deception. In particular, marketers not only need to

continue to consider ways to prevent consumers from contemplating and engaging in unethical

acts because it is the marketer that loses out financially when a deal or refund is awarded, but our

results show that when the consumer engages in a lie and is unsuccessful, they are very unhappy

with the outcome. However, if marketers set clear expectations about the nature of the

negotiation or claim process and accurately communicate the likelihood of attaining certain

outcomes, then the amplified reaction of the liar disappears. More controversially, if the

consumer lies and is successful, they end up happier than truth tellers, which raises the

interesting question of how much marketers should allow consumers to stretch the truth if they

don’t stand too lose too much financially, as this may provide an intuitive means of bolstering

outcome satisfaction. This research is the first step in examining the consequences of lying for

the deceiving consumer. In addition to the old adage ‘buyer beware,’ we suggest an addition,

‘marketers be aware’ because they control the outcome, but not the strategy a consumer uses.


19

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25

FIGURE 1

OUTCOME SATISFACTION BY MESSAGE STRATEGY AND OUTCOME (STUDY 1)

70.52

25.60

81.02

15.93

0

20

40

60

80

100

Deal Impasse

Outcome

Ou

tco

me S

ati

sfa

cti

on Truth

Lie


26

FIGURE 2

REDUCED OUTCOME PREPAREDNESS MEDIATES THE LYING POLARIZATION

EFFECT (STUDY 2)

-.30*

Me: Outcome

Unpreparedness

X: Outcome

Valence

Y: Outcome

Satisfaction

× Mo: Message

Strategy (XMo)

× Message Strategy

(MeMo)

-.33* (-.17n.s.

)

.46*


27

FIGURE 3

OUTCOME SATISFACTION POLARIZATION BY MESSAGE STRATEGY AND

UPDATING REQUIREMENT (STUDY 3)

70.13

78.26

85.65

74.35

50

60

70

80

90

100

Required Not Required

Updating

Ou

tco

me S

ati

sfa

cti

on

Po

lari

zati

on

Truth

Lie

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