Beyond Abu Sayyaf 2002

8/11/2019 Beyond Abu Sayyaf 2002

1/7

Beyond the Abu Sayyaf: The Lessons of Failure in the PhilippinesAuthor(s): Steven RogersSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 15-20Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033825

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2/7

Beyond the Abu Sayyaf

The

Lessons of Failure

in thePhilippines

Steven

Rogers

On October

i8,2003,

President

eorge

W.

Bush stood before thePhilippineCon

gress and declaredthat thePhilippines

and the

United

States

are bound

by the

strongest ies that two

nationscan share.

The statement as not just the sortof

rhetorical

lourish

hatoften dominatesa

U.S. leader's ddress o a former

olony.

The

long-simmering uslim separatist

rebellion n the southern

Philippines

has

been identified

as a

critical

battle

in

thewar

on

terror,

nd the

Philippinegovernment

has become a key U.S. ally as a result.

In

January 002,6ooU.S. soldiers ere

sent to

supportPhilippine

forces

ighting

theAbu Sayyaf,a loosely rganized ang

of

Islamist

anditsentrenched n the

southern

hilippine

slands f

Basilan

and

Jolo. The operation was a failure: a year

afterthe

deployment, .S.

forceshad

withdrawn

with

theirenemy still

in

place

and the

Philippinegovernment uffering

froma damagingscandal.Since then,

the focusof U.S. assistance as

changed:

military and developmentaid to the

Philippines

has soared owell more

than

$100

million a

year,

andPresidentBush

hasurgedthePhilippineCongress to

increase

ts

own

military appropriations

tomeet the separatistMuslim threat.

The

need for action

is

real.

The chaos

andcriminality

own

by

theAbu

Sayyaf

and theMoro IslamicLiberation

ront

(MILF)

ave createdan

environment

ripe

for

exploitationby

international

terrorists,

nd

Philippinegovernment

attempts

to address he situationhave

been ineffective.

But

Washington's

flawed

understanding

f the

problem

has hamstrung hemission and lowered

its chancesof success.Policymakers

treat

the

conflict as a case of a violent

Muslim population terrorizing ts

Christian

neighbors

under the influence

of radical slamist

agitators.They

em

phasize reports

of al

Qaeda support

and

thepresenceof operativesfromthe

SoutheastAsian

Jemaah Islamiyah

network.

They

have

failed

to

recognize,

however,

hat terrorists id not create

the conflict in the

southern

Philippines

and do not control

any

of the combatants.

The troubles

re rooted in

specific

ocal

issues

that

predate

the

war on terror

by

centuries,

and neither

soldiersnor

money will endMindanao'swar.

STEVEN ROGERS is a journalist based in the

Philippines.

[15]


3/7

Steven

Rogers

MINDANAO'S WAR

Conflicthasplagued the southern slands

of thePhilippines ince1566, hen Spanish

forces, resh romcenturies fwar against

Muslims

in

theirhomeland, ound their

traditional nemies

in

theirnew colony.

Muslim

ferocity

nd

Spanishtorpor

om

bined

to

leaveMindanao

unconquered,

but the reflexive

panishhostility

toward

Muslims was passed

on to

Christian

Filipinos, andMuslims respondednkind.

American forces finallysubdued the

Muslim

chieftains n theearly wentieth

century ut ruledMindanao as an entity

separate

romthe rest

of thePhilippines.

The dividedpopulations ere joinedonly

with

Philippine independence

n

1946.

Ethnic

tensions

plagued

thisunion

fromthe start.Separatist entiment lared

intoconflict

in

1970,afteryears

of

gov

ernment-sponsored

hristian

migration

into

Muslim

regions,

nd

Libyastepped

n

to

support

the

Muslims, serving

as

midwife to theMoro NationalLiberation

Front

(MNLF).

s fightingground

to a

bloody stalemate,

uslim

leaders

rged

Philippinepresident

erdinand arcos to

negotiate

withMuslim rebels.

ependent

on oil

imported

rom

Muslim

countries,

Marcos complied,and apeaceagreement

was concluded n

1976.

With the

truce

signed,

Marcos left

controlofMindanao to

his

subordinates,

who looked

after

their

own interests.

Military

forces

n the

areawere

virtually

abandoned.Soldierswent

into

business,

by

themselves

or

with local

political

overlords.

Former rebels

took

to

crime,

often receivingofficialprotection in

return

for a cut

of the

profits.

Manila's

influence verMindanao

dwindled,

and

the

style

of

governance

embraced

by

the

region's eudal lordsquickly inspireda

new roundof rebellion.

In 1978,disgruntledMNLF embers

under the

leadership

f

aCairo-educated

clericnamedHashim Salamat ormed he

MILF.

alamat's trongreligious dentity

and

non-negotiable oalof an independent

Islamic

tateprovedmore

compelling han

the

MNLF s

Libyan-influenced

ocialism.

The

MILF

uickly

grew

to include ome

12,000

armed

men--concentratedmostly

onMindanao-and claimedthemantle

ofMuslim

resistance. ince

then,despite

twodecades fwarfare

and

negotiation,

government orces avebeenunable

to

es

tablish

asting

ontrol verMILF

erritory.

In

1990,

contactbetween a

young

militant named

AbdurajakJanjalani

and

Osama bin

Laden's

brother-in-law

Mohammed

al-Khalifa

ed to

the

found

ingof anotherMuslim

separatist roup,

the

Abu

Sayyaf,

hich

quickly

ntrenched

itself on the islands of Basilan and

Jolo,

west ofMindanao. The new

group pro

claimed a radical Islamist

ideology

and

gainedearlynotoriety

ith

grenade

ttacks

on Christian

argets.

efore

long,however,

it had diverted

its

energy

to

ransom

driven

kidnapping.

oon,

membersof

the criminal

nderground

ad

emerged

inkey leadershippositions, and the

group's

slamic

dentity

was subordinated

to the

quest

for

profit.

After

Janjalani's

death

in

1998,

theAbu

Sayyaf

deteriorated

into

a loose federation f bandit chiefs

bound

mainly by

convenience.

Despite

the Islamist oundations f

both the

Abu

Sayyaf

and the

MILF,

the

extent

of their inks

to

global

terrorisms

debatable. MILF fighters have trained in

Pakistan and with the Taliban and

have

had

contact

with members

of

al

Qaeda

and

Jemaah Islamiyah.

There

is

no

evidence,

[16]

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS-

Volume83No.z


4/7

Beyond

theAbuSayyaf

however,

that

the MILF

is

directed

by

outside powers, and

its

limited

arsenal

corroborateshisindependence.tsnew

chief,

Al-Haj Murad,

who took

over

after

Salamat's

death earlier

this

year,

is

not

considereda religious

extremist.

The

Abu Sayyaf

similarly

shows no

sign

of significant

utside

support,despite

having

initially

received aid and

military

training rom

foreign

errorists.

Widely

circulated

rumors

of Iraqi

funding spring

froma

single,unreliable

source.)

The

group's

ost

importantutside

onnections

are

not terrorists at all;

they

are

police,

military,

and

government

officials,

who

sell

firepower

and

immunity

to

the

brig

ands for

a

share of the

spoils.

COLLISION COURSE

In

March

2000,

the

Abu Sayyaf

took

51hostages

on

Basilan.

A

month later

they

kidnapped 30 more,

of varied

nationalities,

from

a

Malaysian resort.The

tactic

proved

lucrative:heyexchanged ostages or large

ransom

ayments,

ncluding

$25

million

from the

Libyan government.

As

cash

flooded he

impoverishedslands,

men

flocked

to the

group, attracted less by

ideology

than

by

the

promise of

large

guns

and

fast boats.

In

May

2001,

an

Abu

Sayyaf group seized several Filipinos

and two

American missionaries

in an

other

resort raid, setting

the group on a

collision course

with

Washington.

In the

first

months of this

minor

cri

sis,

the

Bush

administration viewed the

hostages

as victims

of crime.

There

was

no

talk

of

terrorism

and

little enthusiasm

for

military action,

or

even

for

restoring

much military aid to the Philippines.

After

September i1, however, theUnited

States

rapidly

reversed

its

position. Manila

was

suddenly reclassified

as a

staunch ally

in the war

on

terror,

and

Washington

rediscovered

he

tiesbetween

Mindanao

and jihad.The Abu Sayyafwas tagged a

terrorist

rganization,

nd in

January

2002,

6oo

U.S.

soldiers

joined 4,000

Filipino troops

n

Basilan.

Philippine

aws

restrict

oreign roops

o training

oles,

but

the

Americans,

thoughdesignated

as

trainers,

nteredhostile

territory ith

explicit

authorization o

fire

f

attacked.

Critics

immediately isputed

Wash

ington's

claim that the

Abu

Sayyaf

was

a

terrorist

rganization,

ather

han

a

crim

inal

syndicate.

hey argued

hat

theMILF

posed a far

greater

danger and that

the

size of the

operation

against

the

Abu

Sayyaf

as

disproportionate

o

the

threat.

Many

Filipinos

suggested

that

the

exer

cise was

intended to

secure

a

U.S. base

in

Mindanao or

prepare

for

a

later

move

against

the MILF and the

communist

New People'sArmy.

Although

U.S.

soldiers

ained

local

approval

y

building

oads

nd

bridges,

he

military

outcome

was

ambiguous

at

best.

The

American

hostages

turned

p else

where, discovered

by Filipino

troops

unconnected o the

operation;

heir

aptors

had

apparently lipped

through

a

U.S.

Navy

cordon. One

hostage

was killed

during the rescue.The operafion halted the

Abu

Sayyaf's

dramatic

expansion,

but

most

of the

group's

leaders and

troops escaped.

In

February2003,

American

and

Filipino officials

announced

nother,

larger

exercise

directed

at theAbu

Sayyaf

presenceon

Jolo.As

forces

prepared or

the

operation,

an

unnamed

Pentagon

spokesman

eclared,

This

is

an

actual

combinedoperation,and it isU.S. forces

accompanying

nd

actively articipating

in

Philippine-led

offensive

operations.

The next

day,

White

House

spokesman

F

O

R E I

G

N

A F FA

I R

S

January

/February

2004

[17]


5/7

Steven

Rogers

Ari Fleischeradded, The

Armed Forces

of the

Philippineswill conduct

operations

supported by U.S. troops against theAbu

Sayyaf group.

The Armed Forces of the

Philippines has the

lead, and U.S. forces

will assist them.

In the

Philippines,

this

was

interpreted

as

a

declaration that U.S.

troops would be

illegally deployed

in

a

combatrole.The

subsequent utcry

forced he

cancellation f

the exercise.

Days

later,

a

bomb

exploded outside

an

airport

in

the

primarily Christian

city

of

Davao.

The next month, another

explosion

hit

a

crowded

Davao wharf,

and

just

before

Philippine President

Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo

left for a

visit

to

Washington

in

May

a

blast

in

the

Christian

town of

Koronadal

raised the

combined

toll

to

50

dead and

zoo

wounded.

Arroyo

has

blamed the

recent

bombings

on

the

MILF,

without

citing any

convincing

evidence. heMILF,hichhadnotprevi

ously designed attacks

to

maximize

civilian

casualties,

as

denied

nvolvement.

Arroyo

returned rom

Washington

with a

substantial

aid

package,

but the

MILF

has not been

added

to

Washington's

list

of

terrorist

organizations,

despite

suggestions

from

Manila officials that

the

designation

was

inevitable.

Negotiations

brokered byMalaysia and encouraged by

the

United States

are in

progress.

The

focus of turmoil has sincemoved to

Manila,

underscoring

he connection

between

Mindanao's conflict and

the

fragile

state

of

Philippine

democracy.

In

July,

convicted

Indonesian

terrorist

Fathur Rohman

al-Ghozi and

two

Abu

Sayyaf

members

walked

out

of Manila's national

police

headquarters. The escape,which clearly

had inside

help, provoked

outrage

in

American

andAustralian

ounterterrorism

circles and

severely

embarrassed

Arroyo.

Two

weeks later,

everal

hundred

soldiers

seized a

commercial

complex in a

1g-hourmutiny,accusing eniormilitary

officials of

selling

arms to the

rebels and

stagingthe

recent

bombings to

encour

age

American

support.Arroyo

called

the

rebellion

an

attempted

coup, but the

participants

claimed

that they

were only

trying o

publicize egitimate

rievances.

The

al-Ghozi

escape,

the

mutiny,

and

subsequent

attempts to

capitalize

on

allegations f corruption ithinArroyo's

family appear

to

be

coordinated

moves

aimedat

undermining he

Philippine

administration

nd

its

generally

pro-U.S.

policies.

Arroyo

is

running

n

the

2004

election, and

opposition

figures till

consider

her a

leading

ontender.

everal

other

candidates

are

prominent

allies of

Joseph

Estrada,

Arroyo's

spectacularly

inept

predecessor.

Estrada built his suc

cessful

campaign

around

quasi-populist

demagoguery, allying

iscontent

with

the

existing

political

order

without

offering

any

practical

alternative. His

administration

had

few definable

poli

cies

beyond

the

pursuit

f

self-interest,

and it

oversaw a

precipitous

decline in

political,

economic,

and

security ondi

tions,

particularly

on

Mindanao.

There

is no shortage of grounds on which to

criticize

Arroyo's

administration,

ut if

her

successor

adopts

the

Estrada

model,

the

consequences-for

Mindanao,

for

the

Philippines,

and

for

the

struggle

against

terrorism

in

Southeast Asia

will be severe.

TREATING

CAUSES,

NOT SYMPTOMS

The situation in the Philippines isnot an

international

crisis

demanding

immediate

intervention.

But if

it is

ignored

or

sub

jected

to

simplistic

short-term

solutions,

[18] FOREIGN

AFFAIRS*

Volume83No.i


6/7

it could

easilybecomeone.Discussions

of a constructive

U.S.

role

typically focus

onpromotingsecurity nddevelopment,

but this

approach

fails

to

recognize

a

simple

truth: he traditional rerogatives

of power

in

the

southern Philippines

are

fundamentallyncompatible

ith either.

A thin veneer of

democratic

institutions

covers

a

society that remains essentially

feudal,

onforming

ess to

democratic

ideals than to the

style

of the

datus, the

warrior-chiefs of old. Leadership is

personal

and

paternalistic and functions

largely

above the

law;

power

flows from

guns

and

money.

President Bush

has

lauded

Arroyo's

commitmentto

bringing

terrorists o

justice.His praise

is somewhat

ustified,

but

terrorism

and

banditry

cannot

really

be controlled

until the

members of the

political and military elite who

cooperate

with terrorists

and

turn

the

powers

of

the state

to

their

own ends are

brought

to

justice

aswell.

The

Philippine govern

ment

has

the

capacity

to do so-it

controls

the

money,

the

justice system,

and the

armed forces-but it

lacks

the will.

Manila's elites

seem

reluctant

to start a

trend that

might

eventually

result

in

restrictions n

their

own power.

Military action alone is not sufficient

as a

strategy.

There

is no

central terrorist

cell

or

evil

genius

in

Mindanao

to

provide

a

discrete

target

forAmerican

action. In

the

face of

overwhelming force

guerrillas

simply

disperse

and take

refuge;

if

one

leader

is

removed,

several

others

emerge.

Military

force

is

nonetheless

a

necessary

component

of

any solution,

because

security

is a prerequisite for progress in other

spheres

of

life.

Development

aid is neces

sary

aswell: Mindanao's

enduring poverty

is

an

effective incubator for

violence. Neither

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_

-.

.19

S

'_

[19

]


7/7

Steven Rogers

militarynordevelopment

idwill succeed,

though, ntil the

problems f collusion

andcorruptionredecisively ddressed.

Washington

cannotrootout corruption

in

thePhilippines.The

Philippines'des

perate need for

U.S. aid, however, could

providean incentive

or reform. .S.

policymakers

ustmake clear, ccordingly,

that theUnited States

will

discontinue

aid

if

Manila does

not

take sustained, ag

gressive action against the abuse

of power.

Such demands might draw protest

from

Manila's

political elite, but,

if

presented

effectively,

hey

would

gain

considerable

sympathy among most

of the

population.

There

is a

growing

constituency

for

change

in

the

Philippines.

ublicdiscontent

s

high,

focused

on a

governing class that

has traditionallyunctioned bove

he law.

Issues that

for

decades

had

only

been

dis

cussed

in

private-such

as

cooperation

betweengovernmentfficials ndterrorist

leaders-have inally

ntered ublicdebate.

Such

discontent

is a

powerful

and

unhar

nessedforce.With

effective eadership,

t

could

bring

greatbenefits; xploited y

self-interested

emagogues,

t

could

do

great

damage.

Washington

cannot

lead

a

movement

to

reform the

Philippine

system

of

justice,

but

it

can

at

least

align

itself

with the right side.

ACTING

LOCALLY

Applying

the

simplistic

terms

of the

war

on terror

to

the

fight against

the

Philip

pines'

Islamic

extremists

obscures

the

enormous

complexity

of the

situation.

But continued

fighting

on

Mindanao

could

indeed

generate

the kind of chaos

that terrorists are apt to exploit, channel

ing

the

anger

and lawlessness

of

a cen

turies-old

ethnic

and

political

conflict

to

their

own

ends.

ForU.S.

policymakers,

herefore,

Mindanao is both an

object lesson and a

testcase.As open sponsors f terrorism

fall

topolitical

pressure r

military action,

the focusof

Washington's efforts

will

shift to terrorist

roupsoperating

ithin

countries

hat,

like

the

Philippines,

are

at

least

nominally riendly.

especting

the laws and

political processes of

foreign

governments,

ven

when seriously

lawed,

can

be frustrating.

he answer,

owever,

is

not to ignore

constraints but to

findways

of

operating

ffectively ithin

them.

The

conflict

in the

Philippinesdefies

the

moral

clarity

and

aggressive rhetoric

that the Bush

administration

has

favored

since

September 11, and

recognizing

that

is

the

key to progress. In

the end, only the

Philippine

government

an

bringpeace.

If

negotiations

are

unaccompanied

by

real

change

and

Mindanao

returns

to

the

status quo, as in past attempts to secure

an

end

to

violence,

the

rebellion will

surely

resume.

At

best,

the

United States

can

help suppress

the rebels

militarily

while

encouraging egotiations

and

boosting Manila's

political will

to

achieve

the

meaningful

reform

necessary

for

lasting peace.

Such

a

strategy

will not

assure

success,

but neither will

it

make

the conflict worse. Moreover, it is the

only course

available,

since the

conflict

in

the southern

Philippines

is not

some

nefarious

external

conspiracy

or a

clash

of civilizations but the internal

problem

of

an

allied

sovereign

state.0

[20]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Volume83No.1

Documents

Beyond Abu Sayyaf 2002