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Economics of Security Working Paper Series Economics of Security is an initiative managed by DIW Berlin Benedikt Goderis and Mila Versteeg Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints April 2009 Economics of Security Working Paper 11

Benedikt Goderis and Mila Versteeg - DIW Berlin: Startseite · Economics of Security Working Paper Series Economics of Security is an initiative managed by DIW Berlin Benedikt Goderis

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Economics of Security Working Paper Series

Economics of Security is an initiative managed by DIW Berlin

Benedikt Goderis and Mila Versteeg

Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints

April 2009 Economics of Security Working Paper 11

Economics of Security Working Paper Series

Economics of Security is an initiative managed by DIW Berlin

The Economics of Security Working Paper Series combines outputs of European Security Economics (EUSECON), a research project supported by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme, with outputs of the Network for the Economic Analysis of Terrorism (NEAT), which is funded by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Justice, Freedom, and Security. Papers not funded by EUSECON or by NEAT can still be submitted for inclusion in this Working Paper Series. Correct citation: Goderis, B. and Versteeg, M. (2009). “Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints”. Economics of Security Working Paper 11, Berlin: Economics of Security. First published in 2009 © Benedikt Goderis and Mila Versteeg 2009 ISSN: 1868-0488 For further information, please contact: Economics of Security, c/o Department of International Economics, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Mohrenstr. 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany. Tel: +49 (0)30 89 789-277 Email: [email protected] Website: www.economics-of-security.eu

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