Battle Analise

8/8/2019 Battle Analise

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The Battle of El Alamein

By CPT Orlando de Oliveira Marin(BRAZIL)

ECCC 4-10, Team D


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ATSE-DOT-DI

20 september 2010

Battle Analysis

SUBJECT: Battle Analysis of the Battle of El Alamein.

On 23 October of 1942, the 8th British Army, commanded by General Montgomery, and

the Axis Forces (German and Italian), commanded by General Stumme, fought the battle which

helped change the course of the World War II: the Battle of El Alamein. This battle took place

near a small train station in the northern part of Egyptian desert, near the Mediterranean Sea

(See Map 1 and 2). The British Army was trying to prevent the arrival of the axis Forces in

Cairo, which would allow to the Germans access to Middle East oil and the opening of another

front of attack on the Union Soviet by the south. This also would cut the British communication

lines with Africa and Asia.

This analysis will cover 2140 on 23 October to 0915 on 24 October 1942, first phase of

the battle (Operation Lightfoot) and it will focus only on the forces that fought in the 6th

Brigade/2nd

New Zealand Division/XXX Corps sector. Forces fighting in this sector, beyond the

6th

New Zealand Brigade, commanded by Brigadier William Gentry, were the 382nd

Panzer

Grenadier Regiment/164th

Leicht Afrika Division, commanded by Colonel Hirsch, the 61st

Infantry Regiment/102nd

Trento Division, commanded by Colonel Menzio and the 62nd

Infantry

Regiment/102nd

Trento Division in his opposite side (Schneck, William, 2006, p. J-15, I-16, I-36)

(See Map 6 and 7).

The 6th

Brigade played an important role in the battle, since they reached its objective

(Miteiriya Ridge) early on the first day of operations. This enabled the British Army to exploit

this weakness, forcing the withdrawal of Axis Forces 4 days later and preventing the possibility

of Axis Forces getting to Cairo.

The success of the 6th

Brigade was due to the use of concepts already internalized in

Army Field Manuals. Among them, the most important were the use ofartillery fires to

suppress the enemy in support to breaching operations , allowing the triggering of a series

of actions without significant interference from the enemy. On the other hand, the Axis forces,

taken by surprise and shock, and having their communications affected, failed to observe

several other concepts. One of them was the lack of adequate protection of obstacles by

direct fire. However, the forgotten concept that had more weight wasnot to counterattack

when it was possible, since they were on the defensive . This is part of the purpose of the

defense as highlighted in the FM 3-0 Operations: to create conditions for a counteroffensive

that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. (United States, 2008, p. 3-10)

Phases of the Battle


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The Battle of El Alamein can be divided into three distinct phases: Phase 1 From line

of departure to phase lane Red, Phase 2 From Phase Line Red to Phase Line Oxalic, and

Phase 3 Consolidating on Miteiriya Ridge and attempt to exploit success.

Phase 1: From line of departure to phase lane Red

In the previous battles, which were fought primarily with tanks, the type of operation

chosen by the 8th

Army, was the defense, just to trying to stop the advance of its enemy.

However, the 8th

Army every time permitted to the enemy to gain terrain. Nevertheless, in the

last battle, the history started to change and for the first time the Axis Forces advance was

totally stopped near El Alamein. Then the Axis Force established a defense in depth with

employment of two minefields in the first line of defense (The Devils Garden) (See Map 3).

At this point of the war, both sides started the preparations waiting for the best moment

to regain the offensive. While the Axis Force had problems with its logistics support in all

classes of supply, the 8

th

Army was reinforced in personnel and equipment (reaching the ratio of2:1) and had the time to refresh and training its forces. The most important change in the

scenario to the 8th

Army was the transition from a defensive to an offensive posture, since they

planned the Operation Lightfoot (See Map 5).

The assigned 6th

Brigades objective was the Miteiriya Ridge (just 5 to 6 meters high),

which was the only ridge in the sector and it allowed observation over the terrain around it and

over the avenue of approach from east to west at its foot (See Map 8). Lucas (1982) stated that

the seizure of those high points would allow Eighth Army to dominate the ground up to a native

track, the Abd el Rahman track; once across it and the Battle of El Alamein was as good as

won, for behind it lay open desert (32).

To this phase, the 6th Brigade established an intermediate objective: the Phase Line

Red. The 6th

Brigade chose reach this Phase Line with just one Battalion moving forward (24th

Battalion), followed by two companies (C and D) from the 28th

Infantry Battalion to clear possible

position bypassed by the 24th

Battalion. Two battalions were in reserve, the 25th

and 26th

Battalion (See Map 4).

At 2140 on 23 October, the 8th

Army started a fifteen minute artillery barrage (planned

by General Montgomery that assumed the command on august) focused on artillery positions of

the Axis Forces. Ford (2005) described the barrage like the largest artillery barrage yet seen in

the war (12). After a pause of 5 minutes to the divisional field regiments returned to divisional

control, the artillery started fire again for approximately 20 minutes against selected targets.Schneck (2005) asserts these fires would serve to suppress the defenders while XXX Corps

began to breach the first minefield belt (62). In the 6th

Brigade sector, the barrage fired in a

scheme in which it moves forward at each 3 to 5 minutes (See Map 10). These fires were

synchronized with the advance of the 24th

Battalion.

The first enemy elements encountered were from the 382nd

Grenadier Regiment. The

enemy artillery started response fire only at 2250 (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 127). This delay


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was due to the Axis Forces were taken by surprise and shock. In addition, it was because they

had cut his communications between outposts and commanders. Ten minutes later, the

engineers in the 6th

Brigade sector started to open lines through the minefields. The barrage in

the 6th

Brigade sector ceased at 2305, moment in which the 24th

Battalion seized Phase Line

Red. The Route through the first minefield to the 6th

Brigade was completed at 2330. Five

minutes later, the 164th reported to headquarters of the Axis Forces two major axis of attack in

its sector (Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1). However, at midnight the 382nd

Grenadier Regiment

erroneously reported that the attack had been forced back (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 140). At

0050, the lifting barrage was resumed on the line just beyond the phase line Red, marking the

end of this phase (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 141).

The lesson here is that it is important to have an adequate suppressing fire to support

breaching operations. Suppress decrease the number of casualties usually increased in a

context of attack with breach operations. The concept of Combined Arms capabilities with each

warfighting function is used to increase the combat power. The use of the artillery to suppress

the enemy while friendly forces approach to destroy it is an example of complimentary an

reinforcing capabilities as seen in FM 3-0 (Operations). In the Battle of El Alamein, the

description of artillery preparation given by the FM 1-02 (Operational Terms and Graphics) was

reached in totally, because the artillery fires suppressed the enemys defense, disrupted their

communications, and disorganized them. These preparatory fires (fire support) are written in

the FM 3-90 (Tactics) below the title the basics of the offense. Also in the FM 3-34.2 (Combined

Arms Breaching Operations) the use of friendly artillery to suppress the enemy is highlighted as

important when developing Courses of actions. This lesson had affected all the rest of the

battle.

Phase 2: From Phase Line Red to Phase Line Oxalic

At 0055 on 24 October, the artillery barrage begins again in favor of the 6th

Brigade,

marking the beginning of this phase (Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1). The 6th

Brigade, to this

phase, made a forward passage of lines with two infantry battalions (25th

Infantry Battalion on

the left and the 26th

Infantry battalion on the right) through the 24th

Battalion and the 28th

Battalion. The 6th

Brigade final objectives (Miteiriya Ridge) were located in the Phase Line

Oxalic.

About 0100 the Royal Engineers from the 10thArmoured Division completed the breach

of the first Axis minefield in the 6th

Brigade sector (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 130). At 0140,

the barrage was halted again for 15 minutes to fire preplanned concentrations on Miteiriya

Ridge (Lucas, James, 1982, p. 168). Twenty minutes later the 25th

Battalion reached the first

slope of Miteiriya Ridge and began to dig, with the belief that was in the second slope (Latimer,

Jon, 2002, p. 189). This was because the 25th

Battalion received fires from the left plus the

confusion in the navigation due to the dust and to the fires. At this moment, the Royal

Engineers from the 10thArmoured Division had begun the breach in the second Axis minefield


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(near the Miteiriya Ridge) in the 6th

Brigade sector (Schneck, William, 2005, p. 130) (See Map

9).

Around 0222 the last artillery fires were fired (Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1). At 0300,

the 26th

Battalion was dug in on Miteiriya Ridge (Latimer, Jon, 2002, p. 189). At this moment,

the artillery fires from the Axis Forces increased, although General Stumme still had no idea

about the front of the main effort of the 8 th Army attack.

Like stated earlier, what happened in this phase was also affected by the artillery fires

from the 8th

Army. So that the Axis Forces were suppressed, which allowed to the 8th

Army

trigger a series of actions without significant interference from the enemy. They reached their

objective and were able to start to open lanes in the minefields.

Phase 3: Consolidating on Miteiriya Ridge and attempt to exploit success.

The infantry and the sappers from the 6th

Brigade entered the minefield without much

danger as the Axis forces were unable to put more anti-personnel mines, due to lack of

logistical support. Moreover, the few men of the Axis forces present were unable to protect the

minefield with direct fire ( they were in a reverse slope defense and they were suppressed by

artillery fire). So at 0330, the 26th

Battalion consolidated on the Miteiriya Ridge (Phase Line

Oxalic) in the sector of the 382nd

Grenadier Regiment, at 0500 the breaches for the 6th

Brigade

were completed, and about 0600 the breaches for the 10th

Armoured Division were completed

(Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1). The countermine and combined arms training and use of new

breaching procedures and new equipment (and Pram Scorpion mine detector) were important

to this phase.

As soon the breaches for the 10th

Armoured Division were completed, the leading

squadrons crossed the crest at north of Miteiriya Ridge in the 5th

Brigade/2nd

New Zealand zone,

but they didnt have success in the attempt of exploitation (Schneck, William, 2006, p. K-1).

At this moment, the 61st Regiment held the 25th Battalion and the 26th

Battalion started

to have problems in its sector. Lucas (1982) asserts that at 0615 hours, the Afrika Korps was

ordered to mount a series of assaults against the penetrations by XXX Corps, using elements

from the 15th

Panzer and Littorio Divisions (201). This late response was due to the lack of

communications between outposts and headquarters caused by the artillery barrage cutting the

telephone wires. When there was communication, it was wrong. Moreover, the centralized

command at the highest level denied the artillery support when needed and halted major

counter attacks.

Between 0640 and 0730 the Axis Forces began to react and to assemble for a late

counterattack (they had underestimated the attack). Nevertheless, around 0800, and helped by

the light of day, they were able of to halt the first tanks that reached Miteiriya Ridge, but the

destruction of the first line of defense was almost complete, which jeopardized the subsequent

actions. At 0915, General Montgomery issued his first orders to his corps commanders since

Operation Lightfoot had begun (Schneck, 2005, p. 191).


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The lesson here is that obstacles must be protected by direct fire. The FM 90-7

(Combined Arms Obstacle Integration) states that: obstacle effects occur because of fires and

obstacles, not just obstacles alone. (United States, 2003, p. 2-4). It also states that obstacles

integrated with fires can create a decisive battlefield effect.

Another lesson is that in a defense, early counterattack is important. The FM 3-0

describes defensive operations as combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack,

gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability

operations. Also states, Defending commanders use every opportunity to transition to the

offense, even if temporarily. In addition, it highlights that counterattack opportunities rarely

last long (United States, 2008, p. 3-10). The importance of a counterattack is also showed in

the FM 3-90: although on the defense, the commander remains alert for opportunities to attack

the enemy whenever resources permit. (United States, 2001, p. 8-4)

Summary

The use of artillery fires, by the 8th

Army, to suppress the enemy in support to breaching

operations caused the unbalance of the battle in its favor, since it allowed that a series of

actions were triggered without significant interference from the enemy. This proves that

preparatory fires (fire support) are one of the basics of the offense as written in the FM 3-90

(Tactics).

The Axis Forces, suppressed, were unable to protect adequately the obstacles with

direct fire, which goes against the FM 90-7 (Combined Arms Obstacle Integration) that states:

obstacle effects occur because of fires and obstacles, not just obstacles alone (United States,

2003, p. 2-4).

Finally, to the Axis Forces not to counterattack when it was possible was responsible for

its subsequent withdraw. This does not meet with the purpose of the defense as highlighted in

the FM 3-0 Operations: to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to

regain the initiative (United States, 2008, p. 3-10).

The outcome at El Alamein allowed to the 8th Army to exploit the break of the first line

of the Axis Forces defense, forcing its withdrawal 4 days later and preventing the possibility of

Axis Forces getting to Cairo. This was important to the course of the World War II, since the

Axis forces were unable to open another front of attack on the Union Soviet by the south.

Moreover, later it placed to the Battle of El Alamein a space in the history like the most

important battle of tanks already occurred.

ORLANDO DE OLIVEIRA MARIN

CPT, EN

ECCC 4-10 Student


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MAP 6 Operation Lightfoot, X Corps and XXX Corps Plan. Highlighted the 2nd Division zone (with entireline) and the enemy positions (dashed line)SOURCE: Schneck, William. Breaching the Devils Garden The 6th New Zealand Brigade in operation

Lightfoot: The Second Battle of El Alamein. Fort Belvoir: Night Vision and Eletronic Sensors Directorate; 2005 Jan,page 102.


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Works Cited

Ford, Ken. El Alamein 1942: the Turning ofthe Tide. Botley, Oxford, UK: Osprey Pub.; 2005;

ISBN: 1841768677.

Latimer, Jon. Alamein. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university Press; 2002

Lucas, James. War in the Desert: The Eighth Army at El Alamein. New York: Beaufort Books,

Inc.; 1982.

Phillips, C. E. Lucas. Alamein. Boston, NY: Little, Brown and Company; 1963.

Schneck, William. Breaching the Devils Garden The 6th New Zealand Brigade in operation

Lightfoot: The Second Battle ofEl Alamein, 23 October 1942, Appendices A-M. Fort Belvoir, VA:

Night Vision and Eletronic Sensors Directorate; 2006.

Schneck, William. Breaching the Devils Garden The 6th New Zealand Brigade in operation

Lightfoot: The Second Battle ofEl Alamein. Fort Belvoir: Night Vision and Eletronic Sensors

Directorate; 2005 Jan.

United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics.

Washington: GPO, 2004.

United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 3-0. Operations. Washington: GPO,

2001.

United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 3-34.2. Combined Arms Breaching

Operations. Washington: GPO, 2002.

United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 3-90. Tatics. Washington: GPO, 2001.

United States. Department ofthe Army. Field Manual 90-7. Combined Arms Obstacle

Integration. Washington: GPO, 2003.

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