Baseline Report on Greece’s - Εθνική Αρχή ΔιαφάνειαςThe purpose of this Baseline Report is to provide an overview of the process for revising Greece’s National

MANUAL ON STANDARD PROCEDURES FOR THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN CYCLE IN GREECE

Greece-OECD Project:

Technical Support on Anti-Corruption

Baseline Report on Greece’s

National Anti-Corruption

Action Plan: Revision and

M&E Processes

This document is prepared by OECD for the General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC) in Greece. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries.

This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

About the OECD

The OECD is a forum in which governments compare and exchange policy experiences, identify good practices in light of emerging challenges, and promote decisions and recommendation to produce better policies for better lives. The OECD’s mission is to promote policies that improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world. For further information, please see www.oecd.org.

About the Greece-OECD Project

The Greek government is prioritising the fight against corruption and bribery and, with the assistance of the European institutions, is committed to taking immediate action. Under the responsibility of the General Secretariat Against Corruption, Greece’s National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) identifies key areas of reform and provides for a detailed action plan towards strengthening integrity and fighting corruption and bribery. The OECD, together with Greece and the European Commission, has developed support activities for implementing the NACAP. This project is scheduled for completion in 2018 and is co-funded by the European Commission and Greece. For further information, please see the project webpage.

http://www.oecd.org/

http://www.oecd.org/corruption/greece-oecd-anti-corruption.htm

TABLE OF CONTENTS – 3

BASELINE REPORT ON GREECE’S NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN: REVISION AND M&E PROCESSES

Table of contents

I. Introduction ............................................................................................. 5

1.1 Purpose .......................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Background .................................................................................................... 5

II. Procedures for Revising the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan ............ 9

1.2 Revision process 2015 .................................................................................... 9 1.3 Revision process 2017 .................................................................................... 9

III. Monitoring & Evaluation ........................................................................ 11

3.1 Monitoring ................................................................................................... 11 3.2 Evaluation .................................................................................................... 12 3.3 Indicators ..................................................................................................... 13 3.4 Information Management Systems ............................................................. 17

IV. Conclusions ........................................................................................... 18

Glossary ..................................................................................................... 19

References ................................................................................................. 20

I. INTRODUCTION – 5


I. Introduction

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Baseline Report is to provide an overview of the process for revising Greece’s National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACAP), and the associated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms utilised between 2015 and 2017. This report should be read in conjunction with the Manual on Standard Procedures for the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan, which provides step by step guidance on how to improve the process in the future.

1.2 Background

The General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC), Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights; the Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS), European Commission; and, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are key stakeholders in the Greece-OECD Technical Support Project on Anti-Corruption. The project spans 18 months and addresses 10 components.

This Baseline Report pertains to the third component that focuses on strengthening the capacity of the General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC). It was prepared on the basis of two workshops held in May and June 2017 as well as a consultation meeting with GSAC and semi-structured interviews with EC and Institutions representatives between November 2016 and July 2017.

In March 2013, Greece adopted its national strategy against corruption called “Transparency – A National Anti-Corruption Action Plan”, prepared by the Ministry of Justice. This initial strategy broadly included the actions identified in the Anti-Corruption Road Map for Technical Assistance in the Field of Anti-

Corruption, agreed in October 2012 between the European Commission Task Force and the Greek authorities. In the preamble, the role of the Task Force for Greece (now the Structural Reform Support Service, SRSS) is mentioned, showing its membership for the first action plan.

The National Anti-Corruption Plan is linked to Greece’s obligations derived from the relevant MoU. As per Law 4336 (Government Gazette 94/08.14.2015) "Pension provisions; Ratification of the Draft Financial Assistance Convention by the European Stability Mechanism and arrangements for the implementation of the Funding Agreement", and specifically under C.5.3 Fighting corruption, it is provided that:

6 –I. INTRODUCTION


As a prerequisite the authorities will update and publish a revised strategic plan for the fight against corruption and implement it according to schedule, and that complete activation of this strategy requires the immediate securing of relevant resources […].

Further to this, GSAC’s Action Plan Unit (established as per Law 4320/2015) became an Office inside GSAC, dedicated to the implementation of the Transparency national strategy and the development of coordinated action programs for the fight against corruption and within the framework of the national strategy (as provided by Law 4446/2016, art. 54, par. 3). A new draft law is expected in 2018, which will indicate in detail the competences and duties of each GSAC official.

According to Law 4320/2015, GSAC falls under the authority of a new Minister of State. Under Article 12 of the law, this entity drafted a national anti-corruption strategy and ensures its coherence and effectiveness, with an emphasis on coordination between control, audit and anti-corruption bodies and within various ministries and agencies, including the Financial Police Division (FPD), the Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE), the Ministries’ Internal Control Units, and the Inspectorate Body for Health and Welfare Services Inspection Body (SEYYP). Based on Law 4320/2015, two major control and anti-corruption bodies, the Inspectors-Controllers Body for Public Administration (SEEDD) and the Inspectors Body for Public Works (SEDE), were moved to be under the jurisdiction of GSAC.

Box 1. GSAC’s competences

GSAC is responsible for taking the necessary steps and actions to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of the national strategy, with particular emphasis on coordination of audit bodies and the efficiency of their operations and provide relevant instructions and recommendations.

More specifically, according to Law 4320/2015 (as amended by ν.4446/2016) the General Secretariat against Corruption:

Shall take the necessary initiatives and steps to ensure coherence and effectiveness of the national strategy, with a special focus on the coordination of inspection bodies and the effectiveness of their actions and provide instructions and recommendations.

Is appointed as the competent authority for the coordination of the fight against fraud (AFCOS) in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 3 of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 (OJ L248).

Cooperates with international organisations and the institutions and bodies of the European Union or other countries for the preparation and implementation, –of strategic plans, exchange of best practices and technical assistance for combating corruption and fraud.

Removes conflicts and resolves matters of overlapping responsibilities between departments or agencies involved in the fight against corruption, by proposing appropriate solutions for the effective resolution of those matters.

I. INTRODUCTION – 7


Receives complaints on cases of corruption in the public and the private sector, and cases of irregularities, and suspected fraud in EU structural funds.

Proposes, develops and plans programmes and actions to be funded through EU funds and other, transnational programmes GSAC or the bodies supervised by it. (Article 53 of law 4446/2016).

Exercises operational control of the Financial Police, the Financial Crime Unit (SDOE), Internal Audit Services of the Ministries, and the Inspectorate of Health and Welfare Services (SEYYP).

II. PROCEDURES FOR REVISING THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN – 9


II. Procedures for Revising the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan

As mainly a strategy document, “Transparency’’ was operationalised in January 2014 in the form of a National Anti-corruption Plan with specific objectives and actions in an Excel spreadsheet. While the original strategy document has not been revised, the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan in Excel is in principle revised annually, and has in fact been revised in 2015 and 2017. Revisions are negotiated between the Greek authorities, SRSS and the Institutions, through an exchange of emails and verbal discussions. This could be described as informal and ad hoc process.

1.2 Revision process 2015

Following a new MOU in 2015, the first revision process that year was based on an initial identification of actions that GSAC found, vague and ambiguous and thus difficult to implement as well as areas containing errors or gaps. For example, there were instances of authorities involved who need to be added, and errors in deadlines that needed to be corrected. The revisions were negotiated back and forth over a two month period.

Although it was considered that stakeholder inputs in the revision process would be beneficial, this step was not taken due to time considerations. Due to the fact that the action plan was not consulted, GSAC confirms the agreement of all stakeholders including the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Parliament, political parties and others, on an annual basis, through the presentation of an annual report. This report provides GSAC’s review of progress on the plan’s implementation.. In particular, there is a specific objective in the current Action Plan, which defines that the relevant report is submitted to the Prime Minister and to the competent Ministers regarding the implementation review of "Transparency."

1.3 Revision process 2017

The 2017 revision process was based on an ‘’internal non-paper’’ prepared by GSAC’s Action Plan Office. In January 2017, the Action Plan Office submitted to the GSAC Secretary General, amendments and improvements to the Action Plan, which were then agreed as a Service. After informing the Alternate Minister of Justice, the proposed revisions were submitted to SRSS and the Institutions. The process was not broadly consulted with stakeholders, as the changes were minimal.

10 – II. PROCEDURES FOR REVISING THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN


The first draft of the 2017 revision included: (1) the extension of the ending dates of the actions in order to be aligned with the timetable of the provided technical assistance by the OECD including the provision of time needed for their implementation, (2) the replacement of the "Minister of State" by the "Alternate Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights ", (3) the correction of the ending dates of Objective no. 3, (4) The integration of the MoU commitment that requires the assessment of the implementation of the Code of Conduct of members of Parliament and (5) the proposal of certain actions that were already concluded, as “continuous”.

GSAC, in close cooperation with the Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) in Greece, is developing a second draft of the 2017 revision in late 2017 and early 2018, to update the Action Plan, taking into consideration the new needs in the field of anticorruption.

III. MONITORING & EVALUATION – 11


III. Monitoring & Evaluation

This section discusses the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan. Its purpose is to support decision makers in the identification of areas requiring improvement. A suggested approach with guidelines for monitoring and evaluation is provided in the Manual on Standard Procedures for the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan, produced in September 2017 as part of the Greece-OECD technical assistance project.

3.1 Monitoring

The 2013 Transparency Anti-Corruption Action Plan refers briefly to "Monitoring and Control" as well as "Evaluation and Self Evaluation", however the action plan and its 2015 revision do not include specific guidelines for doing so. In the absence of such guidance, GSAC considers the Monitoring and Evaluation section of the UN Guide for Anti-Corruption Policies (UNODC 2003) as a guide for the monitoring and evaluation of the Greek national plan. The UN Guide has a 1.5 page summary of different types of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems, including a mention of ad hoc monitoring which is similar to GSAC’s. No specific procedure or mechanisms are given.

Since GSAC was established, it has organised and participated in a number of meetings, in order to coordinate and promote the implementation of the action plan. On an ongoing basis, it collects information from the services it coordinates and other relevant authorities, sends comments, and verifies information. In most cases these activities are followed by a number of letters or email exchanges that establish evidence of the implementation of the plan’s actions.

There is not an established focal point at each of the services GSAC coordinates or collaborates with, for communicating with GSAC or reporting on the Action Plan progress. The responsible GSAC staff person depends on the action area. GSAC has four liaison officers that are considered as relevant focal points in the following action areas:

1. Office for action, coordination and operational planning of the Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE)

2. Office for action, coordination and operational planning of the Economic Police Directorate.

3. Office for action, coordination and operational planning of the internal audit units of the Ministries.

12 – III. MONITORING & EVALUATION


4. Office for action, coordination and operational planning of the Body of Inspectors of Health Services and Welfare (SEYYP).

On a quarterly basis, GSAC provides the Institutions with the Greek authorities’ assessment of the implementation of each action in the National Anti-Corruption Plan. It does this by updating the ‘’Authorities’ assessment’’ and ‘’Authorities’ comments’’ columns for each action on the spreadsheet. This update is sent to the representative of the Institutions who is responsible for monitoring the plan. This is followed by a back and forth communication between the Institutions and GSAC, with consultation of the relevant Greek authorities for clarifications and further information or evidence. There is no specific time frame for authorities to reply to GSAC’s information requests or queries.

As an example, the assessment of Q4 of 2016 was concluded at the end of March 2017, with close to half of the 112 actions considered to be done. The classification system for the assessment of the status of each action is shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Assessment of Actions

Status Description

N/A Not yet overdue and no work started Started Not yet overdue and work started Under assessment Action is overdue, Institutions need to reply to

authorities’ proposal Pending Action is overdue and authorities need to make proposal

to institutions or reply to comments Done Agreement that action has been done and observed Done and replaced Replaced by another action due to change in policy

3.2 Evaluation

It was envisioned in “Transparency’’ that the implementation of the action plan would be evaluated at the end of each calendar year. Furthermore, it was proposed that an independent evaluation be carried out “to determine the progress in all strategic objectives and identify all areas that require special attention” (112). However, it was not agreed as a commitment to carry out an independent evaluation. Rather, the evaluation process is based on law no. 4336/2015 (Gov. Gaz. 94/08.14.2015).

The box below summarises different types of evaluation according to the stages of action plan implementation, and their uses.



Box 2. Evaluation in Relation to Policy Implementation Stages

While monitoring is carried out regularly, evaluations are carried out periodically at particular stages of policy implementation. Depending on the implementation stage there may be different evaluations carried out, including a baseline survey, mid-term evaluation, summative evaluation, or ex-post evaluation.

1. Baseline survey: A baseline survey is a formative evaluation that is carried out before implementation of an action plan begins, to establish the starting point and inform future evaluations. The same tools and methodologies used for a baseline survey may be repeated in mid-term or final evaluations, and may include the collection and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data according to set indicators.

2. Mid-term evaluation:. A mid-term evaluation or review is carried out midway through an initiative, in order to measure to what extent the goals and objectives are being met. This is used to inform management and control decisions, to either build confidence in the direction taken, or consider a change of implementation strategies.

3. End-term evaluation: The end-term evaluation is carried out when the action plan is completed, to establish outputs and immediate outcomes of the actions. The results of the evaluation are compared to the results at baseline, using the pre-established indicators. This is used to inform stakeholders on the project success and to document success stories and lessons learnt.

4. Ex-post evaluation: This evaluation is also carried out after the action plan is completed, but it is more rigorous and done by external evaluators for the purposes of independent assessment. This type of evaluation often takes place a longer time after the end of the actions, because it aims to capture impacts that can often only be measured after some time has passed.

The progress of the Action Plan’s implementation was discussed among Greek authorities, SRSS and the Institutions on a quarterly basis, and this informed the drafting of a revised Action Plan in 2015. The strategy part of the Transparency document was not revised however the Action Plan was revised and restructured upon the existed strategy.

A formal evaluation of the Action Plan’s implementation has not been carried out, and would require specific and measurable indicators, as discussed below.

3.3 Indicators

The current National Anti-Corruption Action Plan does not have indicators to provide measures to inform whether an objective - or a specific action under each objective - is fulfilled or not. Ideal indicators are specific, measurable, and realistic. An ideal indicator measures only one variable unambiguously at a reasonable effort. Such indicators are not found in the original Transparency or the subsequent revision and should be considered in the next revision. On the one hand, it could be difficult to reach agreement on these indicators, but on the other hand, their inclusion would virtually eliminate the need for Greek



authorities to negotiate the progress reported in quarterly updates to the Institutions.

As shown in Box 3 below, the ‘’Efficiency Evaluation Indicators” in “Transparency” are not specific and measurable.

Box 3. “Efficiency Evaluation Indicators” for TRANSPARENCY Objectives

Strategic Objective 1: Efficient political leadership in the fight against corruption

Consistent political pledges and actions

Adoption of Codes of Conduct by the Parliament and the Government

Adoption of Codes of Conduct by all Local Authorities

Voting of anti-corruption statutes

Action taken by the Parliament based on the reports of the National Coordinator

Voting of law for the funding of politicians and parties

Strategic Objective 2: Increased public demand for accountability and rejection of corruption

Alertness of society for political anti-corruption actions

Implementation of PPSSAC plans in all sectors of increased corruption

Joint actions with all anti-corruption non-governmental bodies

Comprehensive annual reports

Strategic Objective 3: Efficient enforcement of anti-corruption measures

Voting of legislation

Operation of internal structures for controlling transparency in General Government bodies

Full compliance of Greece with international obligations within the period of “TRANSPARENCY”

Development of joint legal initiatives for mutual support with at least six other countries

Time required for reducing corruption cases by 50%

Strategic Objective 4: Increased compliance with sound management regulations and increased accountability of public and private bodies

Reporting of anti-corruption cases in bodies, services and Local Authorities

Individual / sectoral anti-corruption actions



Identification of high risk areas for corruption

Annual reports on integrity / accountability issues

Assessment of integrity of public bodies (National Integrity Survey)

Implementation of the public sector reform

Strategic Objective 5: Reinforced implementation of the “TRANSPARENCY” anti-corruption plan

Systems for collecting information, installed and in operation

Strategic decisions relating to the coordination of the fight against corruption

Anti-corruption research programme, in operation

Detailed reports and work plans submitted for annual joint review

Activated mechanisms for the control and assessment of “TRANSPARENCY”

Joint policy on education and plan for the joint use of resources, in operation

Information and communications systems in operation

Resources allocation planning

Further, the indicators above do not correspond directly to the actions contained in ‘’Transparency’’, or in the subsequent Action Plans. As seen in Table 2 below, there is for example, an objective to strengthen capacity and skills of state

internal audit units.1The actions listed to achieve this objective are a description of the actions that more capable and skilled units or department might take, but they are not actions that will directly lead to greater capacity and skills. As a result, and in the absence of specific, measurable and realistic indicators to report against, the achievement of the objective is open to wide interpretation, as seen in the Authorities Comments column.

______________________

1. The Excel document in English refers to ‘’control units’’; however, it is audit

units.



Table 2. Excerpt from NACAP with 2016 Q4 Assessment

Objectives Actions Responsible

authority Start End

Authorities assessment of

action Authorities comments

Strengthening of capacity and skills of state internal control units or departments in Anti-Corruption.

Internal control units will regularly report cases of suspected corruption and submit proposals for developing Anti-Corruption activities to the General Secretariat against corruption and to the Minister of State. Regular consultation among the Minister of State, the General Secretariat against corruption and internal control units is achieved through the competent Liaison Officer. Minister of State, General Secretariat against corruption

Minister of State, General Secretariat against corruption

1.10.2015

Continuous

Done for 2016 GSAC has a) carried out meetings with senior executives of Internal Audit and Internal Affairs Units, b) been informed in writing by them, c) included a relevant chapter in the annual report of the Deputy Minister of Justice in June 2016. Based on the above, GSAC will proceed to the necessary steps for the strengthening of the abovementioned services. This action is being implemented through the Liaison Officers which operate under the auspices of the General Secretariat against corruption. A working Group has been established to the GSAC working on the mapping of the Greek internal audit system and its development. Its work will be concluded at the end of 2016. More specifically, GSAC received 18 reports of suspected corruption and 16 with proposals for 2016. The above reports have been taken into consideration and their conclusions have been incorporated in our annual report. Moreover GSAC developed guidelines for the effective function of Internal Audit Units of all the Ministries. In parallel, for the implementation of the National Strategic Plan to combat and prevent Corruption, a contract for the provision of technical assistance was signed with the OECD, in August 2016.The project, which is in progress, proposes a set of 10 outcomes. One of them matches this objective of the National Strategic Plan, regarding the modernisation of internal and external audit mechanisms in Public Administration.



3.4 Information Management Systems It was envisioned in the “Transparency’’ plan that an agreement between the relevant bodies such as the Hellenic Statistical Authority would establish a specialised programme for the management and use of collected information and data.

For monitoring NACAP progress, GSAC collects information through letters, emails and meetings, and consolidates that information and manages it on an Excel spreadsheet that contains the National Anti-Corruption Plan actions and corresponding progress and status of each action (see excerpt above, in Table 2).

GSAC also collects quantitative and qualitative data regarding corruption (cases, controls, actions etc.) from a number of bodies. These data are sent to the Bank of Greece which collects the necessary statistical information that allow it to fulfill its duties and abide by its obligations in respect to the provision of data to the European Central Bank under article 5 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks.

GSAC’s annual report covers the corruption data collection by GSAC, which is also uploaded to its website. The bodies with which GSAC has collaborated and collected data are given in the following table:

Table 3. Bodies from which GSAC collects data regarding corruption

SUPREME COURT’S PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE

GENERAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE

THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE AGAINST CORRUPTION (ATHENS)

THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE AGAINST CORRUPTION (THESSALONIKI)

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ATHENS

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THESSALONIKI

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PIRAEUS

HELLENIC FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (FIU)

THE GREEK OMBUDSMAN

INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC REVENUE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

CUSTOMS SERVICE

GENERAL INSPECTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

HELLENIC POLICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

HELLENIC POLICE, FINANCIAL POLICE DIVISION

CYBER CRIME DIVISION OF THE HELLENIC POLICE

THE INSPECTORS-CONTROLLERS BODY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION –I.C.B.P.A. SEEDD

SPECIAL SECRETARIAT OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRIME UNIT (SDOE)

MINISTRY OF FINANCE/INTERNAL AUDIT UNIT

HEALTH AND WELFARE SERVICES INSPECTION BODY

SERVICE FOR THE CONTROL OF HEALTH EXPENDITURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES (YPEDYFKA EOPYY)

INSPECTORS – CONTROLLERS BODY FOR PUBLIC WORKS (SEDE)

INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE OF THE HELLENIC MINISTRY OF SHIPPING AND ISLAND POLICY

http://www.minfin.gr/web/guest/monada-esoterikou-elenchou

18 – IV. CONCLUSIONS


IV. Conclusions

During the 2015 to 2017 period under consideration in this report, the process of revising the National Anti-Corruption Plan was carried out in close cooperation with the Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) in Greece. The Action Plan was not based on specific, measurable and realistic indicators which would allow for effective monitoring and evaluation of its implementation.

In order for GSAC to be able to systematically review and update Greece’s National Anti-Corruption Action Plan annually, and to create, review and update indicators for quarterly monitoring, it is suggested that the plan’s actions be grouped, coordinated and drafted in ways that use those actions as a framework for ministry and agencies reporting and thus for measurement, reporting, review and updating of the Action Plan. The Action Plan’s activities and initiatives should also be directly linked to its objectives in every instance. A suggested approach for how to do this with step by step guidelines is provided in the Manual on Standard Procedures for the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan, as part of the Greece-OECD technical assistance project.

GLOSSARY – 19


Glossary

Evaluation The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed initiative, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

Monitoring A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing initiative with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.

Review An assessment of the performance of an intervention, periodically or on an ad hoc basis. Reviews are usually less comprehensive and/or in-depth than evaluations. They tend to emphasize operational aspects.

20 – REFERENCES


References

Hellenic Republic (2012), Anti-Corruption Road Map for Technical Assistance in the Field of Anti-Corruption, 1 October 2012.

Hellenic Republic (2013), “Transparency” – A National Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights.

Hellenic Republic (2014), National Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights.

Hellenic Republic (2015), National Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2015, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights.

Hellenic Republic (2017), National Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2016, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights.

Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission Acting on Behalf of the European Stability Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece, August 2015.

OECD (2017), ‘’Monitoring and Evaluating Integrity Policies”, document GOV/PGC/INT(2017)4, presented to Working Party of Senior Public Integrity Officials, 14 March 2017.

UNOCD (2003), "The Monitoring and Evaluation of Anticorruption Strategies” in UN Guide for Anticorruption Policies, pp. 97-102.

ANNEX D - 21

ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, HEALTH AND TAX AND CUSTOMS

oecd.org/corruption




Manual on Standard

Procedures for the

National Anti-Corruption

Action Plan Cycle in

Greece



About the OECD








Table of contents

Executive summary ................................................................................................................ 5

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 7

Stage 1: Rationalising the strategy/action plan - The process ............................................ 9

Stage 2: Developing ministry/department institutional action plans - The process ....... 17

Stage 3: Developing indicators - The process .................................................................... 19

Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating - The process .......... 21

Annex A Explanatory notes ................................................................................................ 24

Reports on monitoring, review and evaluation.................................................................. 53

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - 5


Executive summary

Objective

To identify standard procedures for the anti-corruption plan cycle and to explain the step-by-step procedures for:

1. the annual review and updating of the action plan, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the plan

2. the procedures for monitoring and reporting on the plan on a quarterly basis.

Stage 1: Revising and rationalising the current strategy/action plan

Drawing on standard approaches to the policy and review cycle for updating strategies and action plans (see the bibliography of relevant material at the end of this manual), this manual specifically uses the approaches for the Greek context. The existing strategy (“Transparency”, hereafter, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, or NACS) and the National Action Plan (NAP) is not fully suitable for annual review and updating, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP. The references in the NACS to the responsibility of ministries and departments – E4.A1-4, for example - needs to be systematically revised in terms of ministry and department action plans (APs), and their responsibilities – and thus those of the GSAC under E5.A1.5(5.4) - within the NAP. This manual suggests a practitioner approach to linking and rationalising the existing NACS and NAP and then integrating ministries’ and departments’ APs. Given the comprehensive nature of the Strategy and Action Plan, this manual focusses on prevention; it also uses UNCAC to provide a framework within which to rationalise and revise the NACS and NAP to make it more amenable for: 1) the development of indicators; and 2) for monitoring and reporting on a quarterly basis. It is specifically intended to facilitate the role of GSAC as the supervisory or oversight agency for the NACS and NAP.

Stage 2: Developing ministry/department institutional action plans

Once reframed as the preventative dimension of the NAP, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs can be drafted by individual ministries and departments. These are mainly management tools in the sense that they define objectives, measures, timelines, responsibilities, and indicators of success. To achieve this, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs undertake an approach within the following steps: risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicators and monitoring processes; and reporting.

6 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MAPPING OF CORRUPTION COMPLAINTS MECHANISMS IN GREECE

Stage 3: Developing indicators

Ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs will be monitored and reviewed by the GSAC. The APs will address the above steps as indicated by the template, which will provide guidance on their implementation by individual ministries and departments. The implementation of an AP by individual ministries and departments requires a number of means to measure implementation and progress. These will include indicators which, at the basic level, are quantitative indicators that allow assessment of output as a quantitative measurement of implementation, while other indicators, for both internal and external purposes, will allow a review of relevance, acceptability and effectiveness. The AP approach allows GSAC to receive, collate and compare APs indicators on a common or uniform platform and thus monitor, review and update the NACS and the NAP as well as APs, and report on evidence-based progress.

Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating

Regular monitoring, reviews and reporting ensures that the NACS and NAP follow a grounded strategic approach enabling continuous learning with four core purposes: judging the results of official actions and decisions in order to check their conformity with the set of objectives set out in the NACS and NAP; learning to improve the effectiveness of the interventions; accountability to programme stakeholders and taxpayers for the use of public resources; and overall anti-corruption progress. The stages apply to the areas addressed by UNCAC Chapter II – prevention – but may be replicated for the other areas addressed by UNCAC: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery.

The process

The process has five components:

Why: Proposes the reasons and purpose for the changes.

What: States what has to be done.

How: Suggests the procedural aspects of revision and review.

Who: Determines responsibility and ownership.

When: Indicates the timetable for the changes.

INTRODUCTION - 7


Introduction

The objective of this manual is to identify standard procedures for the anti-corruption plan cycle and to explain the step-by-step procedures for:

1. the annual review and updating of the action plan, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the plan

2. the procedures for monitoring and reporting on the plan on a quarterly basis.

This manual covers four stages: Stage 1: Revising and rationalising the strategy/action plan; Stage 2: Developing sectoral and institutional action plans; Stage 3: Developing indicators; and Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating.

This manual is specifically intended for the Greek context, and thus its four stages are directed toward that context. It, therefore, does not address all aspects of standard procedures for an anti-corruption plan cycle but draws on them to facilitate work on the existing Greek NACS and NAP (as at June 2017), focusing on the specific UNCAC-related topic of prevention.

Each stage is supported by explanatory notes (Annex A) and a bibliography of relevant material.

STAGE 1: RATIONALISING THE STRATEGY/ACTION PLAN – THE PROCESS - 9


Stage 1: Rationalising the strategy/action plan - The process

Why?

Before the purposes of the manual can be delivered, a practitioner approach to linking and rationalising the existing NACS and NAP is proposed, focussing on the topic of prevention within the UNCAC international standard as a template for similar approaches to other parts of the NACS and NAP.

The NACS serves as the framework against which more specific and detailed Action Plans (AP) can be developed, and the development of a revised NAP will promote common approaches across ministries and departments. The GSAC will draft guidance/ template/format that will indicate how ministries and departments should develop their individual APs - including steps that address risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicators and monitoring processes, and reporting – so that each develops an AP, with indicators, to fulfil their requirements under the NACS (E4.A1-4) and NAP framework (III, 14, 1-3). The AP approach allows GSAC to receive, collate and compare APs indicators on a common or uniform template/format platform and thus monitor, review and update the NAP as well as APs, and report on evidence-based progress.

What?

Monitoring is a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress while a review is an assessment of the performance of an organisation, periodically or on an ad hoc basis. Reviews are usually less comprehensive and/or in-depth than evaluations. They tend to emphasise operational aspects. For the NACS and the NAP, this will require guidance to ministries and departments on what to report, by when and in what format to fulfil their requirements under the NACS and the NAP to the GSAC.

How?

This manual draws on UNCAC to collate and shape existing NAP initiatives into a framework within which to draft AP templates. Given the scope of the NACS and NAP, the manual focuses on the public sector and on prevention within the guidance of UNCAC Chapter II. This will also act as a template for similar approaches for other UNCAC areas: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery. Table 1 identifies

10 – STAGE 1: RATIONALISING THE STRATEGY/ACTION PLAN – THE PROCESS


those components in the NACS and NAP that would fit into a preventative framework. Table 2 presents a revised NAP using UNCAC Chapter II.

Who?

The work for this stage would be undertaken by GSAC, with confirmation sought from individual ministries and public sector organisations that the revised NAP provides a realistic and realisable basis for proceeding towards Stage 2. The GSAC will then draft guidance/template/format that will indicate how ministries and departments should develop their individual APs, including guidance on how ministries and departments address ministry- and department-specific risks and threats.

When?

The revised NAP should be completed, circulated and confirmed within one month, to allow for the substantive stages to be undertaken as soon as possible thereafter.



Table 1. The existing NAP

Objective Current strategy Current NAP

Implementation of "Transparency” Ensure ownership of all stakeholders and political backing for the national strategy by approval of the Parliament

Update the strategy on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate



Detection of risk areas of corruption Detection of risk areas of corruption Internal control units will regularly report cases of suspected corruption and submit proposals for developing anti-corruption activities

Enhancing of integrity in all processes in the public service, municipal district areas and local governments

The General Secretariat Against Corruption in co-ordination with relevant key stakeholders will submit concrete proposals on what kind of actions can be implemented in enhancing the integrity of public service, municipal district areas and local government

Consideration of the particular needs in high-risk topics and sectors vulnerable to corruption

Vulnerable areas for corruption inside the general government`s structures will be identified. Development of risk-assessment strategies and concrete action plans will be made to improve the situation by using co-ordinated and agreed approach to methods and evaluation procedures.

Establishment of the standards and principles on which the specific administrations or institutions should base their own efforts to enhance the fight against corruption regarding their own activities

Establishment of sector-specific strategies is a part of this action plan, and they are implemented independently by relevant authorities

Establishment of sector-specific strategies is a part of this action plan, and they are implemented independently by relevant authorities

Development of a training policy to support long-term anti-corruption strategic planning and capacity development

A common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for anti-corruption agencies and other relevant authorities will be provided

Monitor controlling of corruption Strengthening of internal control mechanisms relating to anti-corruption

The General Secretariat Against Corruption will strengthen co-ordination of the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption; authorities will increase co-ordination and information sharing mechanisms for investigations of financial and economic crime

Compliance of ministries and agencies with observations and proposals formulated by inspection bodies and the Ombudsman in case the compliance is obligatory by the law

Specific measures and actions to enforce compliance of ministries and agencies



Objective Current strategy Current NAP

Measures to ensure transparency of public expenditure, public contracts and budgetary process

Identification of relevant anti-corruption measures and actions for public expenditure, public contracts and budgetary processes will be made

Publicity of all processes of public expenditure, public contracts and budgetary will be increased Public procurement rules and procedures will be set fully in line with international requirements and recommendations

Improvement of legislation Assess how to tackle corruption and related fraud issues specifically linked to the use of EU funds

The General Secretariat Against Corruption, as the Greek Anti-Fraud Co-ordinator Service, will monitor the implementation of the identified measures

Integrity codes of conduct Codes of conduct and ethics for all public and local officials have to be established

General government bodies integrity codes of conduct will be improved by the Ministry of Public Administration Necessary anti-corruption information will be made regularly available and training for newcomers, key middle-management groups and individuals in general government bodies

An enhanced system for detection and monitoring of declaration of assets, conflicts of interest and incompatibilities by public and elected officials

A general information system will be established introducing the electronic monitoring of declaration of assets and conflict of interests for all general government bodies

New legislation For declaration of assets, effective monitoring of declarations and implementation of further actions will be done by independent bodies with investigative power through risk-based audits

Development of a training policy to support long-term anti-corruption strategic planning and capacity development

A common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for anti-corruption agencies and other relevant authorities will be provided



Table 2. Revised NAP focussed on prevention components and setting forth a framework for ministry and department APs

UNCAC Chapter 2 and articles as basis for ministry/department anti-corruption

action plans NACS/NAP [prevention component]

Main components of a revised NAP for public sector, focussing on prevention

Responsibility

Art

icle

5

Co-ordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability

II. Implementation of the "Transparency" III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [10] III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [14]

Annual reports of actions against corruption are submitted to the GSAC by ministries and departments to allow GSAC to review and update the NACS and NAP on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate.

Ministries and departments; GSAC

Effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption

Vulnerable areas for corruption inside the general government’s structures will be identified. Development of risk-assessment APs will be made to improve the situation by using co-ordinated and agreed approach to methods and evaluation procedures with GSAC as supervisory and oversight body.

Ministries and departments; GSAC

Evaluate relevant legal instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to prevent and fight corruption

The General Secretariat Against Corruption, as the Greek Anti-Fraud Co-ordinator Service, will monitor the implementation of the identified measures relating to legislation. The GSAC will update the strategy on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate

GSAC

Art

icle

6

Body or bodies, as appropriate that prevent corruption by such means as: (a) Implementing the policies referred to in Article 5 of this Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and co-ordinating the implementation of those policies (b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption.

I. Tasks and duties of the Alternate Minister of Justice, General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC)

Annual reports of actions against corruption are submitted to the GSAC by ministries and departments to allow GSAC to review and update the NACS and NAP on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate.

Ministries and departments






Responsibility

Art

icle

7

Systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants

Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to recruiting and profiling staff, promotion and discipline


Selection and training of individuals for public positions considered especially vulnerable to corruption

Tasks and duties of the Alternate Minister of Justice, General Secretariat Against Corruption [4 Action 1]; III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption IV. Educational Actions [18]; VIII. Integrity Codes of Conduct [38]

Vulnerable areas for corruption inside the general government`s structures will be identified. Development of risk-assessment APs will be made to improve the situation. Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to recruiting and profiling staff in posts vulnerable to corruption.


Education and training programmes IV. Educational Actions [18]; VIII. Integrity Codes of Conduct [38]

Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to training and supporting staff A common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for anti-corruption agencies and other relevant authorities will be provided

Ministries and departments GSAC

Code of conduct III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [13;14]; VIII. Integrity Codes of Conduct [37]

Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to codes, conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, and disclosure


Conflict of interest III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [16]

Art

icle

8

Reporting acts of corruption by public officials

VII. Improvement of Legislation [28] Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to internal reporting, whistleblowing and professional standards


Declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits

III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [16] Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to codes, conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, and disclosure


Disciplinary measures VII. Improvement of Legislation [30] Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators







Responsibility

relating to recruiting and profiling staff, promotion and discipline

Art

icle

9

Appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision making

I. Tasks and duties of the Alternate Minister of Justice, General Secretariat Against Corruption [3 Action 2 & 3]

Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to procurement, transparency, access to information and communications policies


A system of accounting and auditing standards and related oversight

III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [12] V. Monitor Controlling of Corruption [19]

Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to auditing, monitoring and performance measurement


Systems of risk management and internal control

III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [12;14] V. Monitor Controlling of Corruption [19]

Vulnerable areas for corruption inside the general government’s structures will be identified. Development of risk-assessment APs will be made to improve the situation. Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to auditing, monitoring and performance measurement. Internal control units will regularly report cases of suspected corruption and submit proposals for developing anti-corruption activities

Ministries and departments GSAC

STAGE 2: DEVELOPING MINISTRY/DEPARTMENT INSTITUTIONAL ACTION PLANS – THE PROCESS - 17


Stage 2: Developing ministry/department institutional action plans - The process

Why?

Ministry/department institutional anti-corruption Action Plans (APs) should be drafted as part of the process of reviewing and updating the NAP, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP, as well as monitoring and reporting on the NAP on a quarterly basis. The GSAC will draft a template/format that will indicate how ministries and departments should develop their individual APs. This provides ministries and departments with both general and ministry- and department-specific guidance to fulfil their requirements under the NACS and NAP, establishes a uniform approach to APs and sets the baselines from which GSAC can monitor performance and progress, and lead on monitoring and oversight roles assigned to it by the NACS and NACP.

What?

Using Table 2, the GSAC will develop a policy framework, template and reporting procedure that will seek to ensure that:

The intentions of the NAP are cascaded to sector and ministry level, who in turn take responsibility for implementation and reporting through their own APs, which will also have quantitative indicators.

As the approach is largely common and uniform, as will be the indicator data, the GSAC will be able to: 1) take a cross-cutting perspective; 2) take an interventionalist role where there are outliers in terms of implementation of the AP; 3) map emerging and identified risk areas, sectors and activities; and 4) become the source for dissemination of good practice.

GSAC will revise the NAP and NACS on the basis of AP evidence and give direction to ministries and departments on updating APs, reporting back to GSAC on a regular basis.

GSAC will focus on its primary role and responsibility as a supervisory and oversight agency, able to report on overall progress and take the lead on co-ordination (such as co-ordination of the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption), areas of common purpose (such as common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for bodies with anti-corruption responsibilities and other relevant authorities) and reporting to government.

18 – STAGE 2: DEVELOPING MINISTRY/DEPARTMENT INSTITUTIONAL ACTION PLANS – THE PROCESS


To achieve this, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs should undertake an approach within the following steps: risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicator and monitoring processes; and reporting.

How?

The NAP sets the basic requirements. The AP completed by the ministry and department within the guidance provided by the GSAC has two responsibilities; one is to guide the translation of the NAP requirements into individual ministry and department management and operational policies and procedures and the second is to expand, adapt, emphasise and prioritise both responsibilities in terms of the risks faced by drafting within the AP. Using Table 2 (see above, in Stage 1) and Table A.2 (see Annex A), with the support of GSAC, ministries and departments will develop APs and develop relevant and appropriate indicators within 3 levels – identification of the risks and the commitment of the ministry or department to address them (Level 1), the policies and procedures to deliver this (Level 2) and the parts of the ministry or department with responsibility for implementation, compliance or monitoring (Level 3) ,

Who?

Following the successful approach developed by GSAC and the Ministry of Health, the same template may be adapted for other ministries and departments.

When?

The process can only begin once the draft NAP is available and developed in relation to the core components. If the NAP is revised in one month, the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational within six months.

STAGE 3: DEVELOPING INDICATORS – THE PROCESS - 19


Stage 3: Developing indicators - The process

Why?

Monitoring of APs and thus the implementation of the NAP by ministry or department individually and on a comparative basis, year-on-year, and over a given period of time, enables the GSAC to maintain the focus on the achievement of the NACS and the NAP throughout each step of implementation. Monitoring feeds back information from the implementation level to the strategy drafters and the planning and oversight units and thus enables effective steering, informed decision making, and improved strategy design. Without monitoring, GSAC cannot identify problems; nor can it guide ministries and departments to update their APs; nor can it assess and report on risks across the public sector; and nor can it update the NAP, and thus the NACS. Monitoring requires informed assessments and good indicators.

What?

In monitoring anti-corruption strategies and action plans, the use of good indicators for success play a vital role since they are the benchmark against which one can track progress. Indicators measure implementation and progress in putting each separate activity or initiative stated in the AP into practice. Good indicators should be realistic and amenable to quantitative data. Each policy at Level 2 and each unit of activity at Level 3 in Table A.2 (see Annex A) will be translated into specific indicators (for example, in relation to the code of conduct, how many staff have received a copy, how many have been trained by the HR department or training unit in its contents, etc.).

How?

Each ministry within their AP will determine a range of, preferably, quantitative indicators, guided by GSAC so that they are available for comparability and uniformity.

All Level 2 - Table A.2 (see Annex A) - activities, such as training, will be recorded, both as an activity and on the HR records of staff, providing the organisation with four types of indicators suitable for monitoring and review:

Activity or procedure indicator: Data on the existence of a policy and procedure.

Output indicators (workload or unit produced): Examples of quantitative data at the output level include the number of diagnostic studies performed, number of civil servants trained in anti-corruption measures, or the number of investigations performed.

Efficiency and productivity indicators: Cost-effectiveness, the ratio of input to output, unit costs.

20 – STAGE 3: DEVELOPING INDICATORS – THE PROCESS


Effectiveness indicators: Is the policy leading to change or enhanced awareness?

Who?

While the AP will designate responsibility and ownership, most ministries will have three sources to complete indicator data. Management will be responsible for the design and delivery of many of the Level 2 policies and procedures and, as part of the normal management information systems, be able to provide a number of indicator data. HR will also, particularly in areas of recruitment and training also able to provide indicator data. Finally, within their compliance role, internal control or internal audit can act as an organisation’s own watchdog on matters of propriety.

When?

As internal functions, most of the examples of indicator data should and could be collected, collated and returned on a six-monthly basis.

STAGE 4: MONITORING, REVIEWING, REPORTING, REVISING AND UPDATING – THE PROCESS - 21


Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating - The process

Why?

Monitoring seeks to check progress against NACS and NAP objectives or intentions. It can be defined as the formal reporting and evidencing1 that expenditure and outputs are successfully delivered, and milestones met. Monitoring data are frequently administrative and quantitative and are often not generated primarily for evaluation; analysis of monitoring data can more generally help those undertaking supervisory and oversight roles to identify where an AP component is not being implemented as expected, or in accordance with the NAP, and further action is required to ensure it can achieve its objectives. In particular, monitoring is the basis for a review of the functioning of the NAP and ministry and departmental level, allowing GSAC to report on progress and to make recommendations with regard to the revision and updating of both the NAP and the APs.

What?

The provision of AP information and data allows GSAC to revise the NAP and NACS, provide guidance to ministries and departments, and report on risk and progress because it has information on:

Context: Assessing the impact that the legal, organisational culture and political context may have on the effective implementation of the AP, and thus the NAP and NACS.

Assessing the corruption pool: Considering the risk, nature and types of corruption.

Confirming the current implementation landscape: Reviewing the actual and potential issues in delivering the AP at the ministry and department level.

Reviewing effectiveness: Considering the facilitators or inhibitors to an effective NACS and NAP at the ministry and department level, and how this is enhanced through joined-up action.

______________________

1. There are a number of ways to ensure uniform and comprehensive returns; in the first

instance, codified forms should be used to test and assess the process. Once completed an e-platform could be developed either through designed software or the adaptation of generic risk management software.

22 – STAGE 4: MONITORING, REVIEWING, REPORTING, REVISING AND UPDATING – THE PROCESS


Ownership: Considering measures and procedures that could ensure that organisations and stakeholders are fully engaged in the NACS and NAP.

Change: Proposing the parameters – structural, cultural, strategic and operational - for the review and revision to the NACS and NAP.

How?

The data – ministry and department reports, policies and procedures, internal reviews, indicators, etc., provide the basis for aggregated information and informed assessment on ministry and department performance in terms of the NAP and the AP. The basis of that information has three purposes. The first concerns an inter-ministry comparison against the NAP to assess progress. Secondly, it allows the GSAC to focus on undertaking reviews in terms of outcome or effectiveness indicators where effectiveness is about whether an AP has been designed taking into consideration the sector’s context and its specific corruption challenges. Thirdly it allows GSAC to identify good practice, map progress across sectors or in relation to specific areas or on a year-by-year basis.

Who?

GSAC is the lead agency in the process. Given that responsibility for developing, implementing and reporting on APs will fall on ministries and departments, GSAC undertakes monitoring for the purposes of a review of the functioning of the NAP at ministry and departmental level, allowing GSAC to report on progress and to make recommendations with regard to the revision and updating of both the NAP and the APs, mapping progress and issues for reform, etc. Monitoring should include consultation – and where appropriate - with all the main stakeholders, including Ministers, the leadership teams of the ministries and linked agencies, the main professional groups, unions and representative associations, companies in the industry and industry associations, civil society organisations, etc., to ensure a full understanding of and commitment to the process.

In terms of reviews and recommendations, GSAC should also seek to triangulate any report or recommendation with owners, staff and stakeholders. Once the data is compiled, the draft report should be discussed with management to ensure both factual accuracy and also to identify the underlying reasons for the weakness and it in turn helps the GSAC identify where to focus the capacity development response in order to treat the cause and not just the symptom. In many cases it is a good idea to organise a validation workshop or meeting before finalizing the assessment results and preparing the report, especially with operational staff. As well as providing an opportunity to validate the findings and/or identify and correct mistakes and misunderstandings, more importantly it provides an opportunity to share information and ensure buy-in and commitment from all staff, which is important for the future implementation of the capacity development response. Similar workshops could also bring together all relevant stakeholders or separate workshops for different stakeholder groups to ensure more open discussion. This process will increase trust among them and increase the credibility of the exercise, strengthening ownership over the results and laying a strong foundation for the way forward. Having validated the findings and made any necessary adjustments the primary client or assessment owner would normally give formal approval of the findings of the assessment.

STAGE 4: MONITORING, REVIEWING, REPORTING, REVISING AND UPDATING – THE PROCESS - 23


GSAC is also responsible for disseminating the final assessment report to stakeholders and partners.

When?

If ministries and departments are able to submit their returns to an agreed timetable then GSAC can produce quarterly progress reports and an annual review report. Revisions to the NAP and thus to APs should be undertaken annually or bi-annually. If the NAP is revised in one month, and GSAC’s guidance/template/format to ministries and departments three months after that, then the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational/published within six months. It would be expected that each ministry and department would produce the first report/review of their AP within one year of this. Thereafter reporting on the AP should be annual, although most of the examples of indicator data should and could be collected, collated and returned on a quarterly or six-monthly basis to allow interim reviews by GSAC.

24 – ANNEX A. EXPLANATORY NOTES


Annex A

Explanatory notes

Stage 1: Rationalising the strategy/action plan

Context

The manual is specifically intended for the Greek context, and thus its four stages are directed toward that context. It, therefore, does not address all aspects of standard procedures for an anti-corruption plan cycle but those intended to facilitate work on the existing Greek Transparency (National Anti-Corruption Strategy; NACS) and the National Action Plan (NAP, as at June 2017), focusing on the specific UNCAC-related topic of prevention..

Currently, the NACS and NAP are not fully suitable for annual review and updating, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP. Although this manual focusses on the NAP, the NAP itself is a combination of strategy, action plan and descriptive narrative. In order to achieve the purposes of the manual – reviewing and updating the NAP annually and review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP – the NAP itself has to be revised so that its activities and initiatives are grouped, co-ordinated and drafted in ways that use those activities and initiatives as a framework for ministry and departmental reporting and thus for measurement, reporting, review and updating.

The NACS serves as the framework against which more specific and detailed Action Plans (AP) can be developed, and the development of a revised NAP will promote common approaches across ministries and departments. The NAP should also be revised so that – acknowledging the different anti-corruption issues faced by sectors, and institutions within sectors – a baseline of preventative activities and initiatives is established. The public sector should be the first step for this work, in part because of the primary focus of UNCAC, and in part because evidence of implementation of, and progress in, is both the basic building block of the NAP and the NACS and the basis of demonstrating within government and to citizens effective anti-corruption initiatives.

While there are explicit references in the existing NAP to the responsibility of ministries and departments, these need to be systematically revised in terms of ministry and department action plans (APs), and their responsibilities – and thus those of the GSAC - within the NAP.

Before the purposes of the manual can be delivered, a practical approach to linking and rationalising the existing NACS and NAP is proposed. Given the comprehensive nature of

ANNEX A. EXPLANATORY NOTES - 25


both, from public engagement to asset recovery, this manual focusses on prevention as a template for similar approaches to other parts of the NACS and NAP.

The manual proposes using UNCAC to collate and shape existing NAP initiatives into a framework within which to draft AP templates. Given the scope of the NACS and NAP, the manual focusses on the public sector and on prevention within the guidance of UNCAC Chapter II. This will also act as a template for similar approaches for the other UNCAC areas: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery.

Using UNCAC to provide a framework within which to rationalise and revise the NACS and the NAP makes the NAP more amenable for: 1) the development of indicators; and 2) for monitoring and reporting on a quarterly basis. It also focusses on cascaded APs to ministries and departments to facilitate the supervisory and oversight roles of GSAC.

Why?

The NACS serves as the framework against which more specific and detailed action plans can be developed (see Table 1 above), and the development of a realistic general and specific NAP forces a degree of vertical integration within ministries and departments and the development of common approaches across ministries and departments if each develops an AP within the NAP framework. The responsibilities of ministries and departments are spelt out in the existing NAP - annual reports of actions against corruption are submitted to the General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC) by the general government authorities; establishment of sector-specific strategies is a part of this action plan, and they are implemented independently by relevant authorities – but not codified nor developed as coherent and integrated APs based on the existing NAP.

This approach allows GSAC to receive, collate and compare APs indicators on a common or uniform platform and thus monitor, review and update the NAP as well as APs, and report on evidence-based progress.

What?

Before the purposes of the manual can be delivered, a practitioner approach to linking and rationalising the existing NACS and NAP is proposed, focussing on prevention within the UNCAC international standard as a template for similar approaches to other parts of the NACS and NAP.

The OECD proposes three levels of assessment:1

Monitoring: A continuing function that uses a systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.

______________________

1. OECD (2002), “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management”,

OECD, www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf.

http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf



Review: An assessment of the performance of an intervention, periodically or on an ad hoc basis. Reviews are usually less comprehensive and/or in-depth than evaluations. They tend to emphasise operational aspects.

Evaluation: The systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project or programme, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

Monitoring clarifies what is being done; it links activities and resources to objectives; it translates objectives into performance indicators process and sets targets; routinely collects data on these indicators; results compares actual results with targets; and reports progress. Reviews assess performance in terms of operational performance, organisational productivity and organisational effectiveness2 in terms of delivering the NACS and the NAP.

This will require guidance to ministries and departments on what to report, by when and in what format to fulfil their requirements under the NACS and the NAP to the GSAC. The scope of the current NACS and NAP is significant; much of the work is also ongoing. It is important that ownership, particularly in terms of prevention and particularly in terms of the roles and responsibilities of ministries or departments, is a management responsibility. NACS and the NAP cannot be delivered in silos and nor can they be the sole responsibility of the GSAC; they need to be mainstreamed into human resources, regulatory, and performance management systems and practices within ministries and departments (see Figure A.1). They should also be embedded in broader public administration’s anti-corruption efforts, aligned to the NACS.

Figure A.1. The strategic framework and action plans

STR

ATE

GIC

FRA

MEW

OR

K

Define mission (fundamental purpose) and core values (qualities to be upheld throughout all its activities)

Draw up hierarchy of aims (goals - general in nature] and objectives (targets - specific for achievement) for organisation and defined operational departments, sections and teams or units

Draw up hierarchy of aims (goals) and objectives (targets) for organisation and defined support departments, sections and teams or units

Draw up agreed level action plans between operational and support areas to deliver objectives

______________________

2. Barnes, Daniel W. et al. (2012), “Public office, private interests: Accountability through

income and asset disclosure”, Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) initiative, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/734201468152086402/ Public-office-private-interests-accountability-through-income-and-asset-disclosure.

Stages 1 and 2

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/734201468152086402/Public-office-private-interests-accountability-through-income-and-asset-disclosure

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/734201468152086402/Public-office-private-interests-accountability-through-income-and-asset-disclosure



Establish quantitative, financial, qualitative and time-related factors in delivering objectives to ensure that resource availability supports delivery

Establish means of objective assessment (quantifiable performance indicators)

Establish mechanisms for objective assessment

Establish mechanisms for altering priorities or practicability of objectives

Source: Doig, A., Moran, J. and Watt. D. (2001), “Managing Anti-corruption Agencies”, Forum on Crime and Society 1adapted from Audit Commission (1995), “Paying the Piper…Calling the Tune”, HMSO, London.

An AP should have clear goals and timelines which set the context for both owners, or those responsible for implementation, and those undertaking monitoring, review and evaluation work. Clear plans of action can and should be made public, ensuring overall transparency and helping to mobilise popular support and pressure to achieve the expected outputs and outcomes.

Clarifying what actions must be taken, at what time and by whom, assists in planning future actions and evaluating past or ongoing AP deliverables. The exercise of developing and drafting APs assists in planning, by encouraging planners to consider issues such as how to implement each element, the timing and sequencing of various elements and a realistic assessment of what can be achieved within the specified timeframe within ministries and departments, and across sectors. This approach is central to revising and updating the NAP.

A redrafted NAP should, therefore, identify activities and initiatives that allow themselves to be measured or at least a means to provide quantitative indicators. Good indicators will allow for monitoring the implementation process by demonstrating that proposed activities or initiatives are taking place along the planned timeline. Without indicators, action plans are only declarations of intent.

By working from the bottom up in terms of delegating much of the translation of the NAP into institutional APs, with the same indicators, there will be vertical integration between the ministry and departmental APs, the NAP, and the NACS. Further, much of that responsibility will lie with management, HR departments, internal control or internal audit, all of whom will be involved in identifying, understanding and adapting the main preventative components in the revised NAP for their own APs. They will also be best placed to identify, record and report on relevant and appropriate indicators.

Finally, this adds an additional dimension in that it offers the means for horizontal integration in that both institutional APs and indicators may be compared, so that annual review and updating of the NAP, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP, and the procedures for monitoring and reporting on the NAP on a quarterly basis, can be shared, and work to a common and uniform approach, allowing the GSAC to act in a supervisory and oversight role.

How?

The manual proposes using UNCAC to collate and shape existing NAP initiatives into a framework within which to draft AP templates. Given the scope of the NACS and NAP, the manual focusses on the public sector and on prevention within the guidance of

Stage 4

Stage 3



UNCAC Chapter II. This will also act as a template for similar approaches to the other UNCAC areas: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery. Table 1 identifies those components in the NACS and NAP that would fit into a preventative framework. Table 2 presents a revised NAP using UNCAC Chapter II.

Who?

The work for this stage would be undertaken by GSAC, with confirmation sought from individual ministries and public sector organisations that the revised NAP provides a realistic and realisable basis for proceeding towards Stage 2.

When?

The revised NAP should be completed, circulated and confirmed within one month, to allow for the substantive stages to be undertaken as soon as possible thereafter.

Stage 2: Developing ministry/department institutional APs

Context

Focussing on preventative dimension of the revised NAP, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs can be drafted. These are mainly management tools in the sense that they define objectives, measures, timelines, responsibilities, and indicators of success. To achieve this, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs undertake an approach within the following steps: risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicator and monitoring processes; and reporting.

Why?

Ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs should be drafted as part of the process of reviewing and updating the NAP, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP, as well as monitoring and reporting on the NAP on a quarterly basis. This provides ministries and departments with a template to fulfil their requirements under the NACS and NAP, establishes a uniform approach to APs (as well as policies, procedures and indicators) and sets the baselines from which GSAC can monitor performance and progress, and lead on monitoring and oversight roles assigned to it by the NACS and NACP.

What?

Using Table 2 (above, in Stage 1: Process) and Table A.1 (below), the GSAC will develop a policy framework, template and reporting procedure3 that will seek to ensure that:

______________________

3. There are a number of ways to ensure uniform and comprehensive returns; in the first

instance codified forms should be used to test and assess the process. Once completed, an e-platform could be developed, either through designed software or the adaptation of generic risk management software.



The intentions of the NAP are cascaded to sector and ministry level, who in turn take responsibility for implementation and reporting through their own APs, which will also have quantitative indicators.

As the approach is largely common and uniform, as will be the indicator data, the GSAC will be able to: 1) take a cross-cutting perspective; 2) take an interventionalist role where there are outliers in terms of implementation of the AP; 3) map emerging and identified risk areas, sectors and activities; 4) become the source for dissemination of good practice, and 5) take an overview of progress..

GSAC will revise the NAP and NACS on the basis of AP evidence and give direction to ministries and departments on updating APs, reporting back to GSAC on a regular basis.

GSAC will focus on its primary role and responsibility as a supervisory and oversight agency, able to report on overall progress and take the lead on co-ordination (such as co-ordination of the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption), areas of common purpose (such as common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for bodies with anti-corruption responsibilities and other relevant authorities) and reporting to government.

To achieve this, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs should undertake an approach within the following steps: risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicator and monitoring processes; and reporting.

How?

The NAP sets the basic requirements. The AP has two responsibilities; one is to guide the translation of the NAP requirements into individual ministry and department management and operational policies and procedures and the second is to expand, adapt, emphasise and prioritise both responsibilities in terms of the risks faced by drafting within the AP. Using Table 2 and Table A.1, with the support of GSAC, ministries and department will develop APs and develop relevant and appropriate indicators.

Thus the steps in drafting an AP are two-fold. First is the assessment of the main corruption risk and threats a ministry or department may face. The main objective of risk analysis is to point out where in the AP framework from Figure A.1 corruption might potentially arise. AP drafters will need to identify under each of those activities where the key decisions points are and whether their respective decision-making processes suffer from monopoly, discretion, lack of transparency and/or lack accountability.

Risk and corruption: Institutional context and operating environment

This may be undertaken by a small group looking at Corruption Pattern Analysis - summarising the nature and scale of current and potential corruption by activity or function within the ministry or department, looking at the types of corruption, number of offences, perceptions, etc., remembering that the scope may include – in addition to bribery - abuse or misuse of office, breaching confidentiality, nepotism, favouritism and patronage, to influence-peddling, post-employment offers,



lobbying, etc., and seeking to identify typical characteristics to identify patterns, types, sectors and trends.

The assessment will identify: 1) what types of corruption have occurred; 2) are occurring and 3) may occur. This provides the context between the organisation and its risk environment and is often established, among assessment techniques, using SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) and PEST (political, economic, social and technological) frameworks. Understanding the external and internal threats means understanding and assessing:

Who: Internal or external; corruption; influence; senior or junior; etc.

What: What types of corruption are most likely.

Where: Where are the vulnerable parts of the organisation in its processes, functions, etc.?

How: How will the corruption occur?

Why: Why may staff become involved?

Means: How will they do it and how easy is it for them to conceal their actions from scrutiny and detection?

Opportunity, Incentive and Risk: What would encourage or discourage the likelihood of corruption occurring?

Prevention and Deterrence: what could be the more effective ways of dissuading staff from being involved in corruption and being willing to report its presence?

The risk assessment allows the organisation to do three things: set standards for organisational integrity and translate them into appropriate policies and procedures based on the NAP; identify its intentions to its staff, customers and stakeholders; and identify who within the organisation will be responsible for implementing and monitoring compliance.

One example of how ministries and departments can demonstrate identification of risk – and thus policies and procedures to mitigate, prevent, manage or displace that risk – is in the area of public procurement as outlined in Table A.1.



Table A.1. AP risk indicators for procurement

Procurement process risk area

Indicators to confirm risks identified and addressed

Pre

-te

nd

erin

g p

has

e

Needs assessment and market analysis

Lack of adequate needs assessment

Influence of external actors on officials decisions

Informal agreement on contract

Planning and budgeting Poor procurement planning

Procurement not aligned with overall investment decision-making process

Failure to budget realistically or deficiency in the budget

Development of specifications/ requirements

• Technical specifications are tailored for a specific company • Selection criteria is not objectively defined and not established

in advance • Requesting unnecessary samples of goods and services

Buying information on the project specifications.

Choice of procurement procedure

• Lack of proper justification for the use of non-competitive procedures

• Abuse of non-competitive procedures on the basis of legal exceptions: contract splitting, abuse of extreme urgency, non-supported modifications

Ten

der

ing

ph

ase

Request for proposal/bid • Absence of public notice for the invitation to bid • Evaluation and award criteria are not announced • Procurement information isn’t disclosed and isn’t made

public

Bid submission • Lack of competition or cases of collusive bidding (cover bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation, market allocation)

Bid evaluation • Conflict of interest and corruption in the evaluation process through:

o Familiarity with bidders over time o Personal interests such as gifts or future/additional

employment o No effective implementation of the “four eyes-

principle”

Contract award • Vendors fail to disclose accurate cost or pricing data in their price proposals, resulting in an increased contract price (i.e. invoice mark-ups, channel stuffing)

• Conflict of interest and corruption in the approval process (i.e. no effective separation of financial, contractual and project authorities)

• Lack of access to records on the procedure



Procurement process risk area

Indicators to confirm risks identified and addressed

Po

st-a

war

d p

has

e

Contract management/ performance

• Abuses of the supplier in performing the contract, in particular in relation to its quality, price and timing:

o Substantial change in contract conditions to allow more time and/or higher prices for the bidder

o Product substitution or sub-standard work or service not meeting contract specifications

o Theft of new assets before delivery to end-user or before being recorded

o Deficient supervision from public officials and/or collusion between contractors and supervising officials

o Subcontractors and partners chosen in an on-transparent way or not kept accountable

Order and payment • Deficient separation of financial duties and/or lack of supervision of public officials leading to:

o False accounting and cost misallocation or cost migration between contracts

o Late payments of invoices • False or duplicate invoicing for good and services not

supplied and for interim payment in advance entitlement

Source: OECD. 2016. Preventing Corruption in Public Procurement. Paris: OECD, p9.

One good example of how the risk assessment is translated into a number of identified areas of risk and vulnerability and thus amenable for preventative policies and procedures is the 2017 Plan for Higher Integrity and Reduced Corruption in the Health Sector, drafted by the Ministry of Health in conjunction with GSAC and OECD.

Institutional action planning

The AP identifies a number of risks and the commitment of the ministry or department to address them – see Table A.2, Level 1 - against which a number of measures are proposed. These would be addressed in two approaches in the AP. One would seek to design out the opportunity and incentive for dishonest practices by having a number of practical policies and procedures. These are intended to streamline services and functions while improving the efficiency and transparency of the ministry or department. The other would directly address the risks and threats by specific policies intended to mitigate, displace or ban those activities or areas most prone to corruption.

For the first approach, in management terms, the organisation’s leadership develop an AP that reflects the requirements of the revised NAP in Table 2, but is shaped by the risk assessment and which will describe in detail what the organisation will do to implement anti-corruption as an organisational objective; see Table A.2. Thus the identified areas in the NAP will, at Level 2, each have a stated policy and procedures.



Table A.2. The AP framework

Level 1 Risk profile Standards/values of the organisation Level 2 Recruitment, promotion, performance and conduct, and disciplinary procedures Professional standards/whistleblowing policy Conflict of interest and declaration policy Asset recording and protection policy Gifts, travel and hospitality policy Staff rotation policy Service delivery Complaints and investigations Financial regulations Procurement procedures Code of integrity/conduct IT use policy Asset use policy Level 3 Ethics or integrity advisers Human resources department Complaints unit Purchasing or contracts department Internal audit Training unit Professional standards or compliance unit

For the second approach, there will be specific policies and procedures, which would in turn include processes and procedures that would facilitate addressing allegations of corruption (for example, contracts and supplies staff may, in addition to the standards requirements on gifts and hospitality may also, if they are determined to be staff in “at risk” posts, also any contact or meetings they have in an official capacity with contractors/suppliers, where these take place outside of working hours or relate to gifts and hospitality or relationships they have in a private or domestic capacity).

For both, the AP will also indicate the allocation of resources and internal ownership to implement the AP and complete the process by stating: 1) what milestones and indicators will allow the organisation and others to measure awareness, performance and progress; and 2) what internal review arrangements will be in place to monitor and report on the working of the AP. In terms of Level 3, it is the responsibility of each ministry or department to identify which existing units or sections will be responsible for implementation, monitoring or compliance (and it is recognized that not all ministries and departments will have all the units or sections noted for Level 3 in Table A.1).

For the purposes of this manual, two examples are given.

The first example involves a code of conduct. A code of conduct is not primarily an anti-corruption tool but a general statement of public sector organisational integrity. It is intended to explain the principles of public service and thus the conduct associated with such service. It is framed in a statement of the values and standards of the organisation, followed by specific requirements to deliver those standards. A code is primarily intended as a preventative process, and one that fosters transparency and



accountability, and thus trust, in the conduct of public officials as part of their democratic commitment to working in the public interest and for the common good. These reflect, for example, the Council of Europe’s Model Code for Public Officials,4 whose Articles 4–11 set out:

… the public official’s general obligations to act lawfully, obediently, ethically and loyally. He or she is expected to be honest, impartial, conscientious, fair and just, and to act politically neutral, only in the public interest and with courtesy to all with whom he or she has contact. He or she must not allow his or her private interests to affect, or appear to affect, his or her public position nor take undue advantage of that position.

Public servants are required to ensure that their official powers and position are not used improperly, and in particular, they are required to refrain from conduct that uses public office for private gain or partisan advantage. This reflects ethical principles and behaviour that stem from two inter-related roots: first, standards of morality and moral behaviour that reflect - and culturally accepted to be the right way to exercise public office, and second, the rules or standards governing the conduct of members of a service or profession, here a public service ethos and public service ethics.

The purpose of a code is to present expected standards, from which it would be assumed that those who subscribe to the code would not wish to become involved in unethical or corrupt conduct and who also wish to report those who do. The design of a code would be ministry- or department-specific but would build on standards, requirements and implementation (see Table A.3).

Table A.3. Code of conduct in practice

Components Implementation Implementation/enforcement

Principles of public office and values of the organisation; conflicts of interests; gifts and benefits

Bribes

Discrimination and harassment

Fairness and equity

Making public comment about the organisation

Handling confidential information

Use of resources – facilities, equipment

Senior public officials support the code and lead by example

Staff are involved in all stages of code development and implementation

Support mechanisms are in place to encourage the use of the code

Compliance with the code taken into account in relation to career progression, etc.

Code of conduct (and general corruption awareness) training is ongoing

The organisation continually promotes its ethical culture (a code of conduct is

The introduction of a core statement of standards, values and principles, and a code code of conduct, set of standards with variations for different categories of public officials

Requirements and procedures on assets, hospitality and gifts

The related processes for awareness, guidelines, training, and reporting

The responsibility for and capacity to enforce compliance

Provide staff with a way to raise concerns within the organisation

Investigatory procedures

______________________

4. Other sources include: International Code of Conduct for Public Officials contained in

the annex to the UN General Assembly Resolution 51/59 of 12 December 1996; the Council of Europe Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials [Resolution (97)] and the OECD’s Recommendation of the Council on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service Including Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service [1998 - C(98)70/FINAL].



Components Implementation Implementation/enforcement (including email, Internet, PCs, fax, etc.); secondary employment

Political involvement

Involvement in community organisations and volunteer work

Reporting corrupt conduct, maladministration and serious waste

Post-employment

Sanctions

an important tool in this)

The code is enforced when necessary

The code is regularly reviewed for currency, relevance and accessibility

The code is devised with a style and structure that meets the particular needs of their organisation

The code becomes an integral aspect for influencing decisions, actions and attitudes in the workplace (see UNCAC Article 10)

Adjudication procedures

Exchange of information between investigative and other relevant agencies and the official’s institution

Evidence for and procedures for disciplinary, civil or criminal sanction routes

Whether decisions made where conflict of interest is involved, should be voided

Should undeclared assets be confiscated

Appropriate sanctions

Links between the declaration of assets and illicit enrichment

The second example concerns procedures and known risk areas relating to procurement. If this is an identified risk from the small group looking at Corruption Pattern Analysis (see above) then the policies and procedures would be as much intended to prevent a known risk and explicitly address potential threats as part of those policies and procedures (see Table A.4).



Table A.4. Institutional anti-corruption procurement procedures1

Procedures, whether manual or electronic, for all purchases, contracts and external commitments above the

level of petty cash and minor allowable personal expenses, identify and record

the following procurement steps

Risk assessment red flags to be recorded Misconduct issues to be formally recorded

internally

• The originator of the requirement • The purpose for which the

requisition was made • The route by which the requisition

was approved • The methods adopted in

accordance with the procedures below (or any variation from procedure, with reasons) to procure the requirement, with all relevant documentation (for example requests for quotation, tender documents and so on) and the reasons for decisions made

• The source of supply • The compliance or otherwise of the

goods or service, and of the supplier or contractor, with the requirement as specified in the contract or other agreement

• All actions are taken to remedy any defect as recorded above, and the results

• The route by which payment was authorised, and when, to whom and in what sum any payment(s) are made

“Product familiarisation” visits and associated hospitality

• Acceptance of samples, demonstration models and so on outside of a contract

• Payments to become or be retained on a list of approved suppliers or similar (or in retail buying, payments by suppliers to secure favourable shelf positions); similarly, payments towards joint projects/ ventures. (Such payment demands must be related to tangible benefits accruing or expected to accrue to the supplier, and should not have the effect of excluding other businesses, especially small businesses, from consideration, and must not be, or appear to be, the “price paid” for winning business.)

• Reciprocal or countertrade, where being a customer of the organisation is a condition for becoming a supplier

• Imposition - of a nominated supplier by an internal or external customer

• Any actual or potential unethical approach or inducement, evidence of restrictive practices

• Possible conflicts of interest • Information on illegal or unacceptable

practices by a supplier which could be to our discredit if we were known to be a customer

• Failure by a supplier to meet our requirements, in terms of quality, quantity or delivery

• All requests by a supplier to vary the terms of a contract after it has been agreed

• Occasions where the prices or other terms offered by a preferred supplier or under a call-off contract appear to be less favourable than is available elsewhere in the marketplace

• Reluctance or refusal by a preferred supplier to bid for a contract, or to enter a realistic bid; reluctance or refusal to supply under the terms of an existing framework or call off contract

• Warranties, guarantees, service agreements and so on must be lodged with the Purchasing Department

1. Drawn from Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (2013), “Purchasing Policy and Procedures”, CIPS, Stamford, England. See also UNODC (2013), Guidebook on Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement and the Management of Public Finances: Good Practices in Ensuring Compliance with Article 9 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNODC, Vienna.

At the same time, the ministry or department where there is an ongoing risk of corruption, should not only establish additional requirements for staff in “at risk” posts, but also ensure contractors and suppliers are aware of a specific policy and set of procedures designed as a robust internal deterrence through a published and resourced investigative plan (see Figure A.2 below).

Who?

Following the successful approach developed by GSAC and the Ministry of Health, the same template may be adapted for other ministries and departments, as follows:

Risk assessment

Meet and talk with all the main stakeholders (the minister, the leadership team of the ministry, heads of linked agencies [like hospital CEOs, if the health sector, or colleges for the education sector]), the main professional groups, unions and representative associations, companies in the industry and industry associations, etc.



Ask them what the main corruption issues are. There are probably 20-30 different sorts of corruption issues. This is what makes an AP different from a NAP; the former will vary according to each ministry or department while the NAP offers a baseline from which each ministry or department should expand according to their particular environment. Each AP will be at a more detailed level than any NAP, and the solutions will similarly be ministry or department specific.

As GSAC and the specific ministry or department develops an understanding of the main corruption issues it faces, go back and have second meetings with the more informative interviewees, to test that understanding on them.

Sometimes there is already guidance on what the typical ministry or department corruption issues are (e.g. defence, health, education); use this material as a framework to test in the meetings.

Draft a risk assessment profile.

Developing the AP I

Once the profile is available, discuss with all those involved in the risk profile whether the NAP provides preventative guidance, whether the AP should develop the NAP baselines further or whether new solutions to each issue are needed.

Develop Level 2 and Level 3 recommendations that build on existing policies, procedures and resources - choose the practical recommendations and not hopeful ones like “more staff”, or “a better prosecution system”, but things like using administrative sanctions, or implementing small public focused transparency ideas, like publishing waiting lists, or publishing procurement bidders and winners.

Speak to those making the plans for the other ministries to get more ideas. Speak to GSAC experts.

Once the ministry or department has a range of possible practical reform measures, go and talk again to the interviewees. This will mean going back to the interviewees for a second time, or even a third time, trying out solutions for each corruption issue on them and getting their input on other possible solutions.

Read up what has been done in the same sector in other countries.

Developing the AP II

Using the NAP and available guidance, review and revise, or draft from new, policies and procedures relating to institutional action planning (see above).. The AP will be different from a NAP but only in terms of the detail or focus or nature or level of implementation; the NAP offers a baseline from which each ministry or department should expand according to their particular environment. Each AP will be at a more detailed level than any NAP, and the solutions will similarly be ministry or department specific.



Meet and talk with all the main stakeholders (the minister, the leadership team of the ministry, heads of linked agencies, heads of relevant units [HR, audit, etc.]), unions and representative associations, within the ministry or department.

Think through implementing the AP in terms of priorities, public perceptions and political risk. Should the focus be on tough measures, or on educative measures, or on measures visible immediately to the public, or on controls, or on public monitoring, or on strong action by the political leadership, or some combination? Speak with the minister and his/her political advisers, to see how the politics of it might work, or not work;

Think through how actions, etc., can be measured by what type of indicator that will be relevant, clear, and comprehensible to a range of stakeholders as well as suitable for ease of collection, collation and use by management and by GSAC, and amenable to regular updating without adding any additional burden to the roles and responsibilities of those who will compile them;

Draft the AP and circulate it among staff and management. GSAC will map against other APs and the NAP.

The final draft will include activity, output and outcome indicators against which the AP can be monitored and reviewed, internally and externally.

When?

The process can only begin once the draft NAP is available and developed in relation to the core components. If the NAP is revised in one month, the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational within six months.



Investigation ConsiderationsW

ho s

houl

d

lead

Evi

denc

eIn

terv

iew

sO

ther

Con

side

ratio

ns

Who

sho

uld

be

notif

ied HR to ensure

company policies are

followed.

Decision taken

regarding keeping

staff at work/suspend

Legal Department for

possible financial

recovery &

investigation

implications,

Head of Internal Audit,

Head of Fraud

department,

CEO, FD, Audit

Commission or board

Is this internal/

external.

Do the police need to

be involved?

Are there any conflicts

of interest?

These should be

recorded

Head of Audit

Head of Fraud/Fraud

investigations

Manager

Should an external

resource be

considered for

impartiality?

Primary documentary

evidence should be

seized when

examined to prevent

destruction/tampering

Electronic evidence of

e mails timely seized

in line with DPA and

Business Disclosures

Act

Ensure evidence is

logged including date

/time seized, from

where and by whom.

Ensure Securely

stored

Is there sufficient

expertise internally

to to deal

Witness should be

interviewed as soon

as possible

Potential suspects

interviewed. Is this on

tape,

contemporaneously.

With/without caution?

Ensure you have an

interview plan. Know

what you want to ask/

prove. Consider at

what point would you

consider a caution

Are there any conflicts

of interest?

These should be

recorded

Do you need external

resources e.g.

Commercial

Procuremnent,

independent Quantity

surveyor

Will there be any

Public Relations

issues?

What are the

timescales for the

report. Is this historic /

ongoing fraud?

Costs. Is there budget

for the enquiry?. Is the

enquiry cost effective?

Ensure all decisions

are recorded in a

decision log to justify

actions taken

Ensure that all

process weaknesses

are addressed as the

enquiry progresses.

Don’t wait until the

end

Ensure CCTV

evidence is retained.

Remember to

investigate how long

CCTV is kept

Source: Guile, P. (2012), “‘How to Investigate Procurement Fraud”’ in Doig, A. (ed.). 2012., Fraud: The Counter Fraud Practitioner’s

Handbook,. Farnham: Gower Publishing, Farnham.p202.

Figure A.2. Anticipating procurement fraud or corruption with a robust investigation response



Stage 3: Developing indicators

Context

Monitoring and reviewing the implementation of an AP requires a number of means to undertake both. At the basic level are quantitative indicators that allow assessment of output as a quantitative measurement of implementation. For monitoring and review purposes, further outcome and effectiveness indicators are necessary; impact indicators could be more relevant to evaluations.

Why?

Monitoring of APs and thus the implementation of the NAP by ministry or department individually and on a comparative basis, year-on-year, and over a given period of time, enables the GSAC to maintain the focus on the achievement of the NACS and the NAP throughout each step of implementation. Monitoring feeds back information from the implementation level to the strategy drafters and the planning and oversight units and thus enables effective steering, informed decision making, and improved strategy design. Without monitoring GSAC cannot identify problems; nor can it guide ministries and departments to update their APs; nor can it assess and report on risks across the public sector; and nor can it update the NAP, and thus the NACS. Monitoring requires informed assessments and good indicators.

In monitoring anti-corruption strategies and action plans, the use of good indicators for success play a vital role since they are the benchmark against which one can track progress. Indicators measure implementation and progress in putting each separate activity or initiative stated in the AP into practice. Good indicators should be both SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound) and FABRIC; (see Table A.5).



Table A.5. Designing indicators

Framework Making the framework effective Criteria for information and data

Focused on the organisation’s aims and objectives; any performance measures used should map clearly onto objectives and priorities. Appropriate to, and useful for, decision makers within the organisation, and meeting the needs of stakeholders outside the organisation. Balanced: Giving a picture of what the organisation is doing, covering all significant areas of work. Robust: For example to withstand organisational or personnel changes. Integrated: With the organisation's business planning and management processes. Cost-effective: Balancing the benefits of performance information against the costs.

Relevant to the purpose of the performance framework and to what the organisation is aiming to achieve. Able to avoid perverse incentives: Should not encourage unwanted or wasteful behaviour. Attributable: The activity measured must be capable of being influenced by actions that can be attributed to the organisation; with clarity about where accountability lies. Well defined: With a clear, unambiguous definition so that data will be collected consistently, and the measure is easy to understand and use. Timely: Producing data quickly and frequently enough for the intended purposes, and informing timely decision making. Reliable: Reflecting stable and consistent data collection processes across collection points and over time. Comparable with either past periods or similar programmes elsewhere. Verifiable with clear documentation behind it, so that the processes that produce the measure can be validated.

Accurate: Providing a fair picture of performance, with sufficient accuracy for the intended purpose. Valid: Recorded and used in compliance with relevant requirements, including the correct application of any rules or definitions. Complete with processes to monitor for, and act on, incomplete, missing or invalid data.

Source: Drawn fromNational Audit Office (2013), “Choosing the right FABRIC”, National Audit Office, London, and National Audit Office (n.d.), “Performance measurement: Good practice criteria and maturity model”, National Audit Office, London.

What?

In monitoring anti-corruption strategies and action plans the use of good indicators for success play a vital role since they are the benchmark against which one can track progress. Indicators measure implementation and progress in putting each separate activity or initiative stated in the AP into practice. Good indicators should be realistic and amenable to quantitative data. Each policy at Level 2 and each unit of activity at Level 3 in Table A.1 will be translated into specific indicators (for example, in relation to the code of conduct, how many staff have received a copy, how many have been trained by the HR department or training unit in its contents, etc.). The next section provides the detail of how this may be achieved.

How?

Each ministry within their AP will determine a range of, preferably, quantitative indicators, whose compilation, collection and collation should be within existing management roles and responsibilities, and will be guided by GSAC so that they are available for comparability and uniformity. Indicators can be used to identify positive procedures or activities or

All Level 2 - Table A.1 (see Annex A) - activities, such as training, will be recorded, both as an activity and on the HR records of staff, providing the organisation with four types of indicators suitable for monitoring and review:



Activity or procedure indicator: Data on the existence of a policy and procedure.

Output indicators (workload or unit produced ): Examples of quantitative data at the output level include the number of diagnostic studies performed, number of civil servants trained in anti-corruption measures, or the number of investigations performed.

Efficiency and productivity indicators: Cost-effectiveness, the ratio of input to output, unit costs.

Effectiveness indicators: Is the policy leading to change or enhanced awareness?

In the case of a code of conduct, the data from the ministry or department would, using a binary system (Yes/No = 1/0) or numeric (or percent) information, address the components outlined in Table A.6.

Table A.6. AP indicators for code of conduct

Activity1 Output Efficiency and productivity

The code contains both open guidelines about desirable behaviour (value orientation) and closed guidelines pointing at prohibited behaviour (compliance orientation)

The code relates both to the behaviour of individual employees and to the collective behaviour of the organisation as a whole

The code identifies the main risks from the corruption profile

The code contains specific components for “at risk” staff’

The code includes reference to relevant Level 2 policies and procedures relating to gifts, hospitality and conflict of interest

The code indicates how responsibility is distributed within the organisation

The code is used as an instrument enhancing public integrity

Number of staff who have received a copy of the code

Number of staff trained in the code

Number of “at risk” staff trained in the code

Number of promotions of staff trained in the code

Number of staff who have completed requirements of the code, including those relating to gifts, hospitality and conflict of interest

Number of reports on potential corrupt conduct by staff

Number of breaches of the code; the number of disciplinary cases brought in breach of the code

Cost of giving all staff a copy of the code

Cost of training staff in the code

Cost of training staff in the code including for “at risk” staff

Cost of maintaining requirements of the code, including those relating to gifts, hospitality and conflict of interest

Cost of verifying asset and income declarations

Cost of staff dealing with breaches of the code and disciplinary cases brought in breach of the code

1. Drawn from Nijhof, A. et al. (2003), “Measuring the Implementation of Codes of Conduct: An Assessment Method Based on a Process Approach of the Responsible Organisation”, Journal of Business Ethics 45, 1-2; 65-78.

In terms of outcome indicators, the process can be developed to triangulate organisational intent, compliance practice and staff perceptions of implementation and relevance. For example, Table A.7 indicates the inter-related nature of questions to staff on one aspect – a code of conduct - of the organisational integrity framework.



Table A.7. Outcome indicators for code of conduct

Component – code Management

response Compliance questions

Compliance response

Staff questions Staff

response

Method:

Focus group

Method: Document &

interview

Method: IT survey

Does it exist? Yes/No Does it exist? Yes/No Do you know if the organisation has a code?

Yes/No

Does it cover main areas?

Yes/No Does it cover main areas? Yes/No Is it relevant to your work?

Yes/No

Is it updated annually?

Yes/No Can you confirm it is updated annually?

Yes/No Are you made aware that the code is updated annually?

Yes/No

Is it given to all staff individually?

Yes/No Do staff sign for receipt? Is this recorded on the HR file?

Yes/No Yes/No

Have you received a copy? Did you sign for it?

Yes/No Yes/No

Is training provided in code?

Yes/No Is there a training programme? How many staff have been trained in code?

Yes/No Number

Have you been trained in the code? Is the training relevant to your work?

Yes/No Yes/No

Is there an ethics advisor to answer questions?

Yes/No Can you confirm there is an ethics advisor? How many staff have contacted them this year?

Yes/No Number

Do you know the name of the ethics advisor? Have you visited the advisor? Do you trust the advisor?

Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No

Are there registers? Yes/No Are there registers? How many staff have submitted returns?

Yes/No: Number

Do you know if there is a register? Have you completed a form for the register?

Yes/No Yes/No

In terms of productivity and effectiveness of the AP, the indicators are intended to demonstrate value for money and some evidence that the anti-corruption activities have some impact on staff:

Organisational productivity: Indicators are expressed as ratios, making it possible to collect comparable data across compliance, sanctions, content verification, investigations, information access (for example, if this lies with the ministry or department, what is the ratio of personnel to declarations regarding content verification? What was the average number of working days required to check one declaration for completeness? What is the percentage of cases that were subject to internal inquiry due to suspicious findings?).

Organisational effectiveness: Because performance is based on a combination of design and capacities, it is important to take all components of the AP into consideration when establishing goals and their tracking mechanisms; for example, information on the resources (personnel, facilities, technology, and so forth) for training; the quality of those resources (for example, types of technology employed, quality of staff, and so forth); and staff surveys on questions of awareness of ethics, willingness to follow procedures, or report wrongdoing, etc.



Looked at another way, the indicators will demonstrate the following in terms of the NAP:

Output indicators (workload or unit produced): Examples of quantitative data at the output level include the number of diagnostic studies performed, number of civil servants trained in anti-corruption measures, or the number of investigations performed.

Outcome indicators (effectiveness in meeting objectives): Correlated with particular functions, examples include the quality and impact of developed policies and procedures. Outcomes should also be compared to studies and measurements conducted by other organisations.

Efficiency and productivity indicators: Cost-effectiveness, ratio of input to output, unit of assessment costs; levels of compliance with the policies and procedures, or levels of trust among staff tracked in surveys.

Who?

While the AP will designate responsibility and ownership, most ministries will have three sources to complete indicator data. Management will be responsible for the design and delivery of many of the Level 2 policies and procedures and, as part of the normal management information systems, be able to provide a number of indicator data. Individual ministry and department personnel or human resources departments should also produce quantitative information on recruitment, training and disciplinary matters. Finally, within their compliance role, internal control or internal audit can act as an organisation’s own watchdog on matters of propriety. In particular, auditors may develop a general appreciation of the framework of governance and standards of conduct within which the entity conducts its activities from their work to gain an understanding of the overall control environment. Other procedures that may bring such impropriety to the auditors’ attention include:

reviewing documentation of the decision-making processes at the senior level

assessing the entity’s control environment, particularly the absence of policies and procedures in relation to areas where there are significant risks of fraud, corruption or other impropriety

reviewing organisational culture, whistleblowing arrangements and so on

reviewing the results of internal audit examinations

performing substantive tests of details of transactions or balances.

Each ministry and department should submit agreed data monthly, if possible. It would be sensible to develop a self-assessment checklist (or, as noted, consideration be given to an e-portal reporting process) which would request ministries and departments to submit data in relation to each provision of the AP and to provide or attach detailed information to substantiate their responses. If ministries and departments report partial or non-compliance with a given provision, they would be requested to explain why. They are further requested to explain what action should be taken to achieve full compliance, and whether technical assistance would facilitate greater compliance. By responding to



this set of questions, ministries and departments are stimulated to analyse implementation gaps and their underlying causes and identify the most suitable forms of technical assistance that can support implementation.

When?

If the NAP is revised in one month, and GSAC’s guidance/template/format is provided to ministries and departments three months after that, then the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational/published within six months. It would be expected that each ministry and department would produce the first report/review of their AP within one year of this. Thereafter reporting on the AP should be annual, although most of the examples of indicator data should and could be collected, collated and returned on a six-monthly basis to allow interim reviews by GSAC.

Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating

Context

Regular monitoring, reviews and reporting ensures that the NACS and NAP follow a grounded strategic approach enabling continuous learning with four core purposes: judging the results of public actions in order to check their conformity with the set of objectives set out in the NACS and NAP; learning to improve the effectiveness of the interventions; accountability to programme stakeholders and taxpayers for the use of public resources; and overall anti-corruption progress. The stages may be developed for the other UNCAC areas: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery.

The procedures for an annual review and updating of the AP and thus the NAP, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of both, is based on the revised NAP.

The procedures are based on a standard OECD approach. The OECD proposes three levels of assessment:1

Monitoring: A continuing function that uses a systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.

Review: An assessment of the performance of an intervention, periodically or on an ad hoc basis. Reviews are usually less comprehensive and/or in-depth than evaluations. They tend to emphasise operational aspects.

______________________

1. OECD (2002), “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management”,

OECD, www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf.




Evaluation: The systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or

completed project or programme, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

Reviews are distinct from evaluation and more closely associated with monitoring. They are periodic or ad hoc, often light assessments of the performance of an initiative and do not apply the due process of evaluation or rigour in methodology. Reviews tend to emphasise operational issues. Unlike evaluations conducted by independent evaluators, reviews are often conducted by those internal to the subject or the commissioning organisation.2

Reviews3 are appropriate if the project or the programme is analysed in order to, e.g. interpret already existing results, work out lessons learnt together, or develop future strategies, which result from lessons learnt. Reviews fall within a standard policy cycle (Figure A.3).

Figure A.3. The policy cycle

Source: HM Treasury (2011), The Magenta Book: Guidance for Evaluation, HM Treasury, London, p. 15.

Why?

Monitoring seeks to check progress against NACS and NAP objectives or intentions. It can be defined as the formal reporting and evidencing that expenditure and outputs are

______________________

2. See UNDP (2009), Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating For Development

Results, UNDP, New York, p. 9.

3. See Austrian Development Agency (2009), Guidelines for Project and Programme Evaluations, Austrian Development Agency, Operational Unit of the Austrian Development Cooperation, Vienna.



successfully delivered, and milestones met. Monitoring data are frequently administrative and quantitative and are often not generated primarily for evaluation; analysis of monitoring data can more generally help those undertaking supervisory and oversight roles to identify where an AP component is not being implemented as expected, or in accordance with the NAP, and further action is required to ensure it can achieve its objectives.4

In particular, monitoring is the basis for a review of the functioning of the NAP and ministry and departmental level, allowing GSAC to report on progress and to make recommendations of the revision and updating of both the NAP and the APs. Monitoring thus is the basis for reviews in that it clarifies the institutional anti-corruption preventative framework, links activities and their resources to AP intensions, translates intentions into practice into performance indicators, establishes the routine collection of data relating to the indicators and thus reports progress to managers and alerts them to problems.

For GSAC, this, in turn, allows them to review and assess why intended objectives results were or were not achieved, specific causal contributions of activities to results, examines implementation processes, explores unintended results, compares actual results across ministries and departments, highlights significant concerns or achievements, and offers recommendations for improvement.5

Specifically:

The NAP framework is delegated to ministries and departments to implement, both at a base level and developed to reflect corruption risks of their sector.

As the AP approach is largely common and uniform - and thus the indicator data - the GSAC is able to collect, collate and aggregate the data to indicate implementation, output and outcome by ministry and department. Collectively the data allows GSAC to:

take a cross-cutting perspective

take an interventionalist role where there are outliers in terms of implementation of the AP

disseminate good practice.

The GSAC can use the feedback and the data to give direction to ministries and departments on updating APs, reporting back to GSAC on a regular basis, and to revising and updating the NAP.

______________________

4. Developed from HM Treasury (2011), The Magenta Book: Guidance for Evaluation, HM

Treasury, London; see also National Audit Office (2013), “Choosing the right FABRIC”, National Audit Office, London.

5. Adapted from Kusek, J.Z. and R.C. Rist (2004), Ten Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System: A Handbook for Development Practitioners, World Bank, Washington, DC.



The GSAC can focus on its primary role and responsibility as a supervisory and oversight agency, revising the NAP, providing guidance on drafting APs, requiring monthly reports in order to undertake progress reports by sector and collectively, report on overall progress and update the NAP. The oversight role will also facilitate the lead on co-ordination (e.g. GSAC will strengthen co-ordination of the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption) and areas of common purpose (common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for anti-corruption agencies and other relevant authorities).

What?

The provision of AP information and data allows GSAC to revise the NAP and NACS, provide guidance to ministries and departments, and report on risk and progress because it has information on:

Context: Assessing the impact that the legal, organisational culture and political context may have on the effective implementation of the AP, and thus the NAP and NACS.

Assessing the corruption pool: Considering the risk, nature and types of corruption.

Confirming the current implementation landscape: Reviewing the actual and potential issues in delivering the AP at the ministry and department level.

Reviewing effectiveness: Considering the facilitators or inhibitors to an effective NACS and NAP at the ministry and department level, and how this is enhanced through joined-up action.

Ownership: Considering measures and procedures that could ensure that organisations and stakeholders are fully engaged in the NACS and NAP.

Change: Proposing the parameters – structural, cultural, strategic and operational - for the review and revision to the NACS and NAP.

How?

The data – ministry and department reports, policies and procedures, internal reviews, indicators, etc., provide the basis for aggregated information and informed assessment on ministry and department performance in terms of the NAP and the AP. The basis of that information has three purposes. The first concerns an inter-ministry comparison against the NAP to assess progress. Secondly, it allows the GSAC to focus on undertaking reviews in terms of outcome or effectiveness indicators where effectiveness is about whether an AP has been designed taking into consideration the sector’s context and its specific corruption challenges. Thirdly it allows GSAC to identify good practice, map progress across sectors or in relation to specific areas or on a year-by-year basis.

Undertaking a number of such reviews will enable GSAC to review both the NAP and APs and also provide reports on the overall progress of a ministry or department, by means of the AP, toward the objectives of, for example, Article 5 of UNCAC in achieving “effective, co-ordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of



society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.”

Thus GSAC can report on ministries and departments along the lines of Table A.8; it can also produce reports along the lines of the 2017 Plan for Higher Integrity and Reduced Corruption in the Health Sector.

Table A.8. Institutional Integrity audit

• Sound risk management plans that address corruption risks? • A clearly stated and understood code of conduct? • Sound corporate, strategic and business plans that are consistent with the organisation’s purpose and values? • Clearly stated and understood roles and responsibilities? • A commitment to, and strategies in place for, open and honest communication? • Effective awareness programmes for staff, clients, contractors, suppliers and the community (such as practical ethics training for staff, guarantees of service for clients, publicity on rights and responsibilities for clients, contractors and suppliers)? • Clearly stated and understood policies, systems and procedures that enable individual staff, clients, community members to have their concerns resolved without reprisals or detriment to themselves (including internal/external reporting, grievance handling, complaints handling)?

• A commitment to recruiting the right people (those that most closely share the values of the organisation) and developing them so that they continue to provide high-quality, ethical contributions and services (for example, recruitment policy and procedures, individual performance management, ongoing training and development)? • Sound internal boundaries to behaviour which reflect core values (policies and procedures for the organisation’s operations such as gifts and benefits, conflicts of interest, procurement, contracting out, revenue collection) and that are conducive to high ethical performance (flexible and efficient, not rigid and overly bureaucratic)? • Sound audit processes? • A commitment to and policies and procedures that encourage learning and enable continual improvements to the organisation’s corruption resistance and ethical performance (monitoring and evaluation, participative decision making, training and development)?

The messages you are sending about ethical behaviour are being received and accepted by staff, contractors, suppliers or clients? • The strategies your organisation decides to use to promote ethical behaviour and enhance corruption resistance are effective?

Source: Independent Commission Against Corruption. 2001. The First Four Steps: Building Organizational Integrity. Sydney: ICAC, p12.

How GSAC conducts its institutional reviews is for GSAC to determine but it has, in addition to the provision of an AP on a monthly or quarterly basis, the potential to balance APs with:

reviewing complaints procedures from the public, reports from those bodies responsible for anti-corruption investigations, audit reports, parliamentary proceedings, undertaking public opinion surveys, and other sources

holding hearings into aspects of the institutional activity

subject to prior agreement and an arranged agenda, undertaking monitoring or compliance visits to institutions

publishing league tables or “corruption-prone” reports on the public sector

undertaking research into legislation and administrative procedures



taking evidence on and hearings for an annual review of progress on the strategy or action plans

taking evidence on and hearings for systematic review of progress on the AP or any aspect of the work and responsibilities of the ministry or department.

The review would present the quantitative data from ministries and departments. The narrative part of the report then uses this information to explain, confirm, qualify the compliance, partial compliance and non-compliance with the NAP generally and in specific areas. The review would aim to report on the presence, implementation and operational effectiveness of the AP as follows:

conducting an analysis of trends of causes and consequences of corruption and thus an objective assessment of risks and thus the purpose of an AP and NAP

assessing the impact that the legal, organisational culture and political context may have on the effective implementation of an AP, generally and by sector

undertaking the collection and collation of adequate information or statistical data on variations in the implementation of the APs, in terms of both outliers and successes

reviewing the ownership of the AP and its integration into wider prevention and organisational integrity arrangements

reviewing the intended and actual processes involved in the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption

reviewing the monitoring and review processes to update an AP

proposing the parameters – structural, cultural, strategic and operational - for improved effectiveness and impact of an AP.

Based on an amended OECD framework, the report would provide an evidenced assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of APs in terms of:

Relevance/context/environment: What are the main types of corruption and does the existing AP approach address the main types of corruption in public office, and does its structure achieve this? Does it encourage trust? Does it fit within other anti-corruption arrangements?

Efficiency/productivity/performance: Are the objectives being achieved economically and efficiently? Does it have appropriate management and operational arrangements?

Effectiveness/communication: Is the AP useable and useful? Is it recognised in terms of management roles and purposes?

Delivering objectives: Does the data indicate improvements year on year? Is it used by other agencies and civil society? Does the AP provide functioning prevention anti-corruption arrangements?

Comparison: Do the APs highlight different approaches and consequences across sectors?



Sustainability: Is the implementation of the AP sustainable? How is the sustainability or permanence of AP and its effects to be assessed, monitored, revised and resourced? Does the AP demonstrably contribute to reaching higher level development objectives in the, for example, NAP or NACS?

Finally, the report will develop recommendations both for revising the APs and the indicators, as well as the NAP. It will also include areas where the GSAC has responsibility as lead agency.

In terms of reporting - the communications of results of monitoring and reviews - this helps maintain support for the strategy, not only by keeping stakeholders and citizens abreast of progress but also by disclosing obstacles and explaining what is being done to overcome them. Periodic reporting helps citizens hold government accountable for strategy results and provide opportunities for citizen input into strategy execution.

Who?

GSAC is the lead agency in the process. Given that responsibility for developing, implementing and reporting on APs will fall on ministries and departments, GSAC undertakes monitoring for the purposes of a review of the functioning of the NAP at ministry and departmental level, allowing GSAC to report on progress and to make recommendations with regard to the revision and updating of both the NAP and the APs, mapping progress and issues for reform, etc. Monitoring should include consultation – and where appropriate - with all the main stakeholders, including Ministers, the leadership teams of the ministries and linked agencies, the main professional groups, unions and representative associations, companies in the industry and industry associations, civil society organisations, etc., to ensure a full understanding of and commitment to the process.

In terms of reviews and recommendations, GSAC should also seek to triangulate any report or recommendation with owners, staff and stakeholders. Once the data is compiled, the draft report should be discussed with management to ensure both factual accuracy and also to identify the underlying reasons for the weakness and it, in turn, helps the GSAC identify where to focus the capacity development response in order to treat the cause and not just the symptom.

In many cases, it is a good idea to organise a validation workshop or meeting before finalising the assessment results and preparing the report, especially with operational staff. As well as providing an opportunity to validate the findings and/or identify and correct mistakes and misunderstandings, more importantly, it provides an opportunity to share information and ensure buy-in and commitment from all staff, which is important for the future implementation of the capacity development response.

A similar workshop could also bring together all relevant stakeholders. In some cases, it can be preferable to organise separate workshops for different stakeholder groups to ensure more open discussion. It generally starts with a presentation of the data, followed by a discussion of the results and the rationale for the scores assigned, and to build consensus on priorities in moving forward.

During the workshop, all stakeholders should be given an opportunity to express their views openly. This will increase trust and increase the credibility of the exercise, strengthening ownership over the results and laying a strong foundation for the way



forward. Having validated the findings and made any necessary adjustments, the primary client or assessment owner would normally give formal approval of the findings of the assessment. GSAC is also responsible for disseminating the final assessment report to stakeholders and partners.

When?

If ministries and departments are able to submit their returns on a monthly basis, then GSAC can produce quarterly progress reports. Revisions to the NAP and thus to APs should be undertaken annually or bi-annually.

If the NAP is revised in one month, and GSAC’s guidance/template/format to ministries and departments three months after that, then the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational/published within six months. It would be expected that each ministry and department would produce the first report/review of their AP within one year of this. Thereafter reporting on the AP should be annual, although most of the examples of indicator data should and could be collected, collated and returned on a quarterly or six-monthly basis to allow interim reviews by GSAC.

REPORTS ON MONITORING, REVIEW AND EVALUATION - 53


Reports on monitoring, review and evaluation

Asian Development Bank (2016), Evaluating and Monitoring Anti-Corruption Reforms and Programs, Reports on a High-Level Panel Discussion and Training Workshop, Asian Development Bank, Manila.

Austrian Development Agency (2009), Guidelines for Project and Programme Evaluations, Austrian Development Agency, Operational Unit of the Austrian Development Cooperation, Vienna.

GRECO (2016), “Fifth Evaluation Round. Questionnaire: Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies”, GRECO, Strasbourg.

HM Treasury (2011), The Magenta Book: Guidance for Evaluation, HM Treasury, London.

Huther, J. and A. Shah (2000), “Anti-corruption policies and programs: A framework for evaluation”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2501, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Independent Commission Against Corruption. 2001. The First Four Steps: Building Organizational Integrity. Sydney: ICAC.

Johnson, J. (2014), “Cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis of governance and anti-corruption activities”, Issues Paper 10, CMI/U4, Bergen.

Johnson, J. and T. Soreide (2013), “Methods for learning what works and why in anti-corruption: An introduction to evaluation methods for practitioners”, Issues Paper 8, CMI/U4, Bergen.

Johnson, J., N. Taxell and D. Zaum (2012), “Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption”, Issues Paper 7, CMI/U4, Bergen.

Johnson, J. (2012), “Theories of change in anti-corruption work a tool for programme design and evaluation”, Issues Paper 6, CMI/U4, Bergen.

Kusek, J.Z. and R.C. Rist (2004), Ten Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System: A Handbook for Development Practitioners, World Bank, Washington, DC.

National Audit Office (2013), “Choosing the right FABRIC”, National Audit Office, London.

National Audit Office (n.d.), “Performance measurement: Good practice criteria and maturity model”, National Audit Office, London.

ODS (2016), External Evaluation: Evaluation Report of the Open Governance Project at Transparency, ODS, Brussels.

OECD (2014), “Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan: Manual for Monitoring Experts”, OECD, www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/IAP-Manual-Monitoring-Experts-EN.pdf.

http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/IAP-Manual-Monitoring-Experts-EN.pdf

54 - REPORTS ON MONITORING, REVIEW AND EVALUATION


OECD (2010), “Evaluating Development Co-operation: Summary of Key Norms and Standards”, Second Edition, OECD, www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/ dcdndep/41612905.pdf.

OECD (2008), The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan: Progress and Challenges, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264055094-en.

OECD (2005), Public Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264010604-en.

OECD (2002), “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management”, OECD, www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf.

Public Accountability Mechanisms (PAM) Initiative (2013), “World Bank Governance and Public Sector Group: Methodology Paper”, February 2013, World Bank, Washington, DC.

U4 (2013), “Methods for learning what works and why in anti-corruption: An introduction to evaluation methods for practitioners”, U4, Bergen.

UNDP (2014), Anti-Corruption Strategies: Understanding What Works, What Doesn’t and Why? Lessons learned from the Asia-Pacific Region, UNDP, Bangkok.

UNDP (2011), Capacity Assessment of Anti-Corruption Agencies, UNDP, New York.

UNDP (2011), “Methodology for Assessing the Capacities of Anti-Corruption Agencies to Perform Preventive Functions”, Bratislava Regional Centre, UNDP, Bratislava.

UNDP (2010), “Guidance Note: UNCAC Self-Assessments: Going Beyond the Minimum”, UNDP, Bangkok.

UNDP (2009), Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, UNDP, New York.

UNDP/Global Integrity (2015), User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption and Anti-Corruption, UNDP, New York.

UNODC (2013), “Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-Corruption Strategies”, www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/2013/10/corruption/Kuala_Lumpur_Statement_on_Anti-Corruption_Strategies_Final_21-22_October_2013.pdf.

USAID (2015), Practitioner’s Guide for Anticorruption Programming, USAID, Washington, DC.

http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/41612905.pdf

http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/41612905.pdf

http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264055094-en

http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264010604-en


http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/2013/10/corruption/Kuala_Lumpur_Statement_on_Anti-Corruption_Strategies_Final_21-22_October_2013.pdf

http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/2013/10/corruption/Kuala_Lumpur_Statement_on_Anti-Corruption_Strategies_Final_21-22_October_2013.pdf

REPORTS ON MONITORING, REVIEW AND EVALUATION - 55


oecd.org/corruption




Technical Guidelines

on Capacity

Self-Assessments



About the OECD







TECHNICAL GUIDELINES ON CAPACITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS

Table of contents

Introduction .................................................................................................... 5

Purpose of capacity self-assessment tools .............................................................. 6

Use of capacity self-assessment tools .............................................................. 7

Tool 1: Line Minister and State Agency Corruption Prevention Self-Assessment Reviews .................................................................................................................... 9 Tool 2: Inter-Organisational Review Methodology for Joint Mapping .................. 12 Tool 3: Organisational Capacity Self-Assessment Tool .......................................... 17

Resources .......................................................................................................24

INTRODUCTION – 5


Introduction

Strong institutional arrangements are crucial for co-ordinating integrity and the fight against corruption in the public sector. To this end, the General Secretariat against Corruption (GSAC) has been established as the institution responsible for co-ordinating the efforts to fight corruption in Greece. In order to support GSAC in fulfilling its mandate, the Greece OECD Technical Assistance Project on Anti-Corruption has an outcome area with the objective of strengthening the annual monitoring, assessment and update of the strategic anti-corruption action plan, including the assessment of the quality and the impact of the programmes and activities of GSAC’s programmes and activities.

This outcome involves four activities:

1. Technical support on anti-corruption indicators and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan.

2. Strengthening the organisational capacity of GSAC.

3. Enhancing institutional relations in the field of anti-corruption.

4. Building co-operation and information-sharing among relevant public bodies when detecting, investigating and prosecuting corruption and bribery.

The technical guidelines on capacity self-assessments presented in this report fall under the second activity: strengthening the organisational capacity of GSAC. This involves identifying GSAC’s needs for capacity development and creating an action plan to address these needs.

The internal technical workshop “Methodology for Institutional, Organisational and Individual Capacity Development” held at GSAC’s headquarters on 30 November 2016 was part of this support. OECD presented GSAC with different assessment models such as High-Performance Organisational Assessment Models; ISO Family of Quality Assessment Models; and OECD Member Country Assessment Models.

The workshop brought together GSAC’s leadership as well as heads of relevant departments to assess their institutional, organisational and individual capacity development. It concluded with an open consultation on key questions such as GSAC’s organisational objectives and type of organisational assessments that would best fit GSAC’s needs.

It is important to note that at that time, GSAC determined that it did not require OECD experts to carry out an assessment but instead would carry out a self-assessment, using tools adapted to the Greek context by the OECD team. Two capacity self-assessment tools were presented for discussion to GSAC in an internal capacity building workshop held in Athens on 22-23 May 2017, and a third tool was developed based on the workshop feedback and outcomes.

6 – INTRODUCTION


Purpose of capacity self-assessment tools

The tools contained here have been developed for GSAC to conduct capacity self-assessments. These will support GSAC in diagnosing and identifying priorities and potential actions for organisational improvement by assessing critical elements, and identifying areas that need strengthening or further development.

If used correctly, they will help GSAC’s management in creating a capacity-building development plan, based on self-assessed needs. The use of these tools are also an opportunity to enable organisational learning, foster team sharing, and encourage reflective self-assessment within GSAC.

It is important to notice that, recognising that organisational improvement is a process, the use of these tools should translate into a concrete action plan to provide GSAC with a clear organisational development roadmap to address the identified needs.

USE OF CAPACITY SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOLS – 7


Use of capacity self-assessment tools

These tools may be adapted as needed to GSAC’s changing environment and can be repeated periodically (for example, on an annual basis) to monitor the effectiveness of previous actions, evaluate progress in capacity improvement, and identify new areas in need of strengthening.

Checklist for planning a capacity self- assessment

1. Preparation

Review the mandate, scope of functions performed and outline the main capacity issues that need to be assessed.

Select the tool or tools to be used, in consideration of human and financial resources.

Mobilise internal and external stakeholders and ensure political support and buy-in.

2. Clarification of objectives and expectations

Clarify intentions of those promoting the assessment, within GSAC.

Who wants the assessment?

What are the related short-, medium- and long-term objectives?

How will the results of the assessment be used?

Secure agreement to provide all the necessary data.

Obtain a commitment that the identified needs will be addressed.

Review the expertise, time, funds available, and clarify the scale and scope.

3. Identification and engagement of stakeholders

Identify all relevant stakeholders.

State institutions.

Civil society.

Private sector.

Other.

8 – USE OF CAPACITY SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOLS


Agree on terms of stakeholder input.

4. Determining data collection and analysis approach

Identify the types of data needed for evaluating the range of capacity issues.

Correlate available data sources against data needs.

Review feasibility of generating needed data.

Compile an overview of qualitative and quantitative data that will be collected or generated, and review data analysis requirements.

5. Defining how the assessment will be conducted

Define the assessment team.

Determine participants.

Decide on location.

Define in detail the following:

Steps/tasks of the assessment and their sequence.

Human and financial resources needed for each step/task.

Persons responsible for each step/task.

Timeline for each step/task.

Plan how the results will be used.

One of the main benefits of conducting an organisational capacity self-assessment is that it promotes ownership and reduces organisational resistance. Institutions can tailor the assessment methodology to their concrete needs using their own available internal knowledge and data. Furthermore, being familiar with the specificities of organisational operations can yield results that are more relevant and practical.

However, self-assessment may be affected by the subjectivity of those in charge within the institution under scrutiny. Their own views, beliefs and feelings about their competences might alter the objectivity of the assessment results. Experience shows that many public institutions find it challenging to objectively identify areas of improvement within their own operational procedures and practices. They may also be resistant to publishing or underestimate certain findings that do not present their organisation positively and/or overstate other that do. There is thus the danger that organisational strengths and weaknesses are not properly identified, or if they are, they are not objectively assessed. Therefore for a capacity self-assessment exercise to be successful institutions need to honestly open to critical self-reflection and learning.

Another challenge is that the institution conducting the self-assessment may not have the technical knowledge, capacity or resources to conduct proper research. To address this challenge, the institution may conduct a joint assessment, combining internal and external expertise, such as consultants. While this approach requires good planning and sufficient resources, it can serve to strengthen the impartiality of the assessment while



also diminishing organisational resistance and ensuring ownership of the results. An alternative is to use standard self-assessment framework which is applied internally. To this end, examples of self-assessment tools are provided here.

Tool 1: Line Minister and State Agency Corruption Prevention Self-Assessment Reviews

This is a tool for GSAC to ask for a ministry’s self-assessment relating to compliance with the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan in terms of the prevention component of UNCAC (Article II).

Self-assessment and the GSAC role

The objective is the establishment of a process to institutionalise the question of ownership within the public sector for delivery of the NACS within the UNCAC framework where line ministries and state agencies provide information on compliance or intended reforms to address non-compliance.

The process facilitates the management, co-ordination and monitoring the anti-corruption approach by allowing the GSAC to:

undertake analysis of trends of causes and consequences of corruption and thus an objective assessment of risks

undertake the collection and collation of adequate information or statistical data concerning how far line ministries and public sector agencies comply with the UNCAC framework through the NACS

oversee systematic analysis by sectors of risk factors

develop a better knowledge of the vulnerable sectors and develop relevant policies and practices for better prevention and detection of corruption

receive reports from line ministries and public sector agencies on progress to addressing risks in terms of compliance with the UNCAC framework through the NACS

maintain a database of, and disseminating information, that may facilitate the work of the sectors in preventing, detecting and investigating alleged corrupt activity

monitor and report on the progress of the implementation of the NACS by reviewing responsibilities and requirements for action plans line ministries and public sector agencies, and monitoring performance delivery

reporting to the legislature on the progress of the implementation of the NACS.

The starting point is to gain an understanding of line ministry and public agencies’ approaches to the prevention of corruption and delivery of the NACS. This is achieved by self-assessments using the attached questionnaire followed by GSAC reviews focusing on:

a gap analysis of compliance with the UNCAC framework through the NACS



variations in practice between line ministry and public agencies across selected areas

assessment and dissemination of risk and good practice.



QUESTIONNAIRE: MAPPING UNCAC AND NACS TOWARD PUBLIC SECTOR LINE MINISTRY AND STATE AGENCY SELF ASSESSMENT

UNCAC Chapter II, (Article 5–14) NACS REQUIREMENTS REFLECTING UNCAC ARTICLE

MINISTRY RESPONSE: DO YOU COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT – YES/NO

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE; LAW, POLICY, PROCEDURE

WHAT ARE THE MAIN RISKS IN TERMS OF (a) COMPLIANCE AND (b) PROPOSED REFORMS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE

WHAT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO ADDRESS (a) AND (b)

Article Mandatory [shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system]

Optional [shall endeavour; shall consider; shall promote]

Potential Mandatory [shall, where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, endeavour]

5: Prevention 5(1) Development, implementation, maintenance of co-ordinated anti-corruption policies 5(4) Collaboration of States Parties with each other and international/regional organisations

5(2) Establish and promote effective anti-corruption practices 5(3) Periodic evaluation of legal instruments and administration measures

7: Public sector

7(2) Prescribing criteria for candidature for and election to public office 7(3) Transparency in funding for candidates/political parties

7(1) Establishing systems for civil servants 7(4) Transparency in general and prevention of conflicts of interests

8: Codes of Conduct

8(1) Promotion of integrity, honesty, and responsibility among public officials

8(6)(O) Disciplinary measures for public officials

8(2) Codes/Standards of Conduct 8(3) Note relevant initiatives of regional, interregional, multilateral organisations 8(4) Reporting of corruption 8(5) Reporting of outside activities, employment, investments, assets, etc.

9: Procurement and Management of Public Finances

9(1) Systems of procurement 9(2) Management of public finances

9(3) Integrity of accounting records

10: Public Reporting

10 Transparency in public administration



Tool 2: Inter-Organisational Review Methodology for Joint Mapping

This is a tool for GSAC to take forward the development of an action plan aimed at enhancing institutional co-ordination. The mapping exercise looks for groupings or potential groupings of institutions with co-ordination, and explores any facilitators or inhibitors to this.

Connectedness: Managing, joining-up and monitoring the sectors through joint mapping

Within each sector or ministry the potential for connectedness, co-operation, information-sharing and communication should exist in terms of the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of corruption and related offences. There are, as noted in the Joint Mapping Brief, obvious areas of connecting, co-ordinating and communicating between sectors and agencies and ministries, to promote inter-organisational activity. This should be achieved by a formalised regular intra-sector and inter-sector approach to co-ordinating activities, discuss cross-cutting issues, share information, joint intra- and inter-sector working, and so on.

In order to achieve this it should be done by both activity and by sector, since it may be assumed that agencies and ministries within sectors will have as many, if not more, reasons to promote joint working.

Purpose: Mapping the landscape and reviewing the potential for reform

In order to understand how far organisations currently work together, what are the facilitators and inhibitors to joint working, a review should be undertaken to:

Confirm the current landscape: Reviewing the actual and potential co-ordination and interaction of organisations and mechanisms to achieve an effective anti-corruption approach in its organisational and inter-organisational dimensions.

Evaluate a joined-up approach: Considering how far the identified organisations, envisage their anti-corruption work would be enhanced through joined-up action (and how far the anti-corruption work of others may be enhanced through joined-up action).

Assess the context: Consider the impact that the legal, organisational culture and political context may have on the effective implementation of an effective joined-up corruption approach.

This would then allow the GSAC to take a lead role as co-ordinator and facilitator to joint working in terms of:

Change: Proposing the parameters – structural, cultural, strategic and operational - for increased co-ordination and co-operation in anti-corruption work.

Ownership: Considering measures and procedures that could ensure that organisations and stakeholders are fully engaged in the processes toward an inter-organisational approach to combating corruption.

Review questions are presented in the following table.



INFORMATION TYPE RESPONDENT RESPONSE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

CORRUPTION

What are the main risks/threats of corruption involving your organisation?

What is the perceived extent of shared or potentially-shared pool of corruption types, or corruption causes, from the perspective of your organisation?

Which organisations have you contacted or collaborated with as part of anti-corruption case-work or initiatives?

What proportion of your collaborations with other organisations on individual cases or initiatives involves working with more than one other organisation?

Are you a member of any forums or committees outside your organisation where the issue of inter-organisational corruption or co-operative arrangements are discussed?

WORKING TOGETHER: MAIN EXISTING ISSUES

What are the strengths and weaknesses of information, or technical expertise, or resources of your organisation in terms of co-ordination and co-operation?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of any existing or potential inter-organisational policy, legal and operational environments?

What is the level of, and reasons for, existing inter-organisational co-operation/absence of inter-organisational co-operation?

What are the facilitators for you to pursue co-ordination and co-operation (including:



enhanced performance, complementary strategies, a wider range of investigation options and sanctions, cost-effectiveness, greater potential for prevention, shared expertise and resources)?

What are the inhibitors for you to pursue co-ordination and co-operation (including: organisational objectives, performance measurement, perceived asymmetry of relationship, political context, resourcing implications)?

WORKING TOGETHER: OPERATING CONTEXT

Which laws most help your work?

Which laws most hinder your work?

Which databases of other organisations do you have automatic access to?

Which databases of other organisations do you wish to have automatic access to?

Organisations with whom you have to work?

Organisations that have to work with you?

Organisations from which you receive most support?

Organisations to which you give most support?

Those organisations from which you require most support?

Those organisations from which you require most support?

Those other organisations to which you perceive that you provide most help?

Those other organisations whom you would like



to work with?

Those other organisations whom you would like to share information with?

What is the effectiveness of, or hindrance by, those organisations that monitor or inspect your work?

What are the overlaps or conflicts in terms of operational jurisdiction and activity, resource allocation, dealing with complaints/allegations?

Where are the potential frictions between organisations?

Are there are known areas of good practice policy transfer across organisations or means for examining the scope for cross-organisational synergy that organisations have identified?

What does each organisation envisage you will require from each other organisation to enhance your anticorruption work?

What does each organisation envisage you will provide to each other organisation to enhance that organisation’s anti-corruption work?

Are there any formal ground rules or protocols /SLAs/MLAs for co-ordination and co-operation?

Are there any formal ground rules or protocols /SLAs/MLAs for sharing information?

What are the overlaps or conflicts in terms of legislative context

What are the overlaps or conflicts in terms of policy development?

What are the overlaps or conflicts in terms of policy development?



What means exist to assess the impact of government policy and/or intended legislation on those levels and patterns of corruption which are the responsibility of your organisation?

What organisational means are in place to share best practice, training, etc.?

Are you participating in any action against corruption involving co-operation with other organisations where you provide information and / or resources but get little or no information or resources in return?

Are there any areas (including those in which joint action is currently advocated or practised) you can think of where joint action to tackle corruption is not appropriate or not practical given (a) current resources, (b) even if some more resources were forthcoming; and (c) if there were efforts to resolve any issues identified above?

What organisational activities are compromised or potentially compromised by issues/weaknesses elsewhere in terms of government policy or the delivery of public services?

What wider aspects of society or culture facilitate or inhibit the joined-up or joint detection, investigation, prosecution and prevention of corruption?

OTHER



Tool 3: Organisational Capacity Self-Assessment Tool

This tool is to assist GSAC in assessing the critical elements for effective organisational management, and identifying those areas that may need strengthening or further development.

ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY SELF-ASSESSMENT

PART I Enabling Environment Objectives: Review the set of interrelated conditions – such as social, organisational, and political– that impact on the capacity of GSAC’s development as an anti-corruption actor in Greece.

Social context Sample questions: 1. In what areas is political will strongest to fight corruption in Greece, and why? 2. What types of corruption that most affect Greek citizens? 3. What actions would most help reduce corruption, that GSAC could influence? 4. What have been the biggest changes to the types and patterns of corruption over the past 10 years in Greece, and why?

Institutional arrangements and co-ordination mechanisms

Sample questions: 1. Who are main institutions with whom GSAC works most frequently? (Focus on a few, e.g. three.) 2. Who are the three institutions with whom GSAC has limited or no work relations, but where improved relations would be useful? 3. When does GSAC reach out to these stakeholders and how often (give some examples)? Are stakeholders actively involved in GSAC’s initiatives? 4. How does GSAC seek stakeholder views? Does GSAC have clear channels of communication (v.gr. through focal points, periodical meetings, etc.) that stakeholders can use to raise issues? Describe the communication channels. Can you describe some examples in which stakeholders used these communication channels and what were the results? 5. Does GSAC consistently collect baseline data from key anti-corruption stakeholders? What are the main constraints to collecting data from them? What could be the solutions? 6. Does GSAC share studies, plans, and evaluations with key stakeholders? How, and how often? 7. What are GSAC’s strengths in stakeholder involvement? How does GSAC plan to build on stakeholder involvement in the future (e.g. informal meetings, training, sharing information, potential networks etc.)? 8. What are GSAC’s weaknesses in stakeholder involvement? How can it improve stakeholder involvement, and in what specific areas (e.g. revision of action plan, co-ordination, etc.)? 9. Do there exist active and functioning interagency co-ordination committees or structures composed of representatives from the executive, judiciary, legislature, and civil servants in key departments (such as customs, procurements, revenue collection and law enforcement and from local governments)? 10. To what extent does GSAC engage with them, and what benefits are there to them for GSAC to be involved? 11. Do they also include members from civil society such as business representatives, civil society and academia? 12. Do they have sufficient power, resource and capacity?



Accountability Sample questions: 1. How does GSAC report to the Ministry of Justice, Transparency, and Human Rights (i.e. in writing/verbally)? How often? 2. Who reviews GSAC’s activities and how in-depth is this review? 3. Do GSAC’s staff members have clearly-defined work procedures and routines for reporting to superiors, either on a periodic basis (e.g. weekly staff meeting) or on particular decisions or activities? 4. How often is GSAC audited by an external audit body?

PART II Governance and Legal Structure Objectives: Review GSAC’s vision and mission statements, organisational structure and succession planning

Vision and mission Objectives: Assess the clarity of GSAC’s statements of its purpose and values and how they have been shared and applied

Sample questions: 1. Describe in a few sentences GSAC’s vision and mission. 2. Are the current vision and mission statements written? If so, are they periodically reviewed? When were they last changed? 3. To what extent do GSAC’s staff feel the vision and mission remain relevant? 4. How are the vision and mission statements included in staff orientation? 5. How are the vision and mission statements included in public communication materials? 6. Are the vision and mission statements consistently used to guide priorities and actions?

Organisational structure Objectives: Assess whether the organisational structure is appropriate

Sample questions: 1. Is there a documented organisational chart or structure within GSCAC? 2. Is the organisational structure appropriate for current GSAC’s priorities? 3. Does it support clear direction for staff? 4. Is the organisational structure updated as needed? When was it last revised? 5. Are GSAC’s departmental or functional responsibilities and lines of authority clear and appropriate?

Succession planning Objectives: Assess the organisation’s ability to continue smooth operations and program management in the event of a loss or change in leadership.

Sample questions: 1. Could GSAC continue existing activities without the current leadership? 2. Could other current managers take on the leadership role without major transitional problems? 3. Are changes in the leadership expected over the next two years?

PART III Financial Management and Internal Control Systems Objectives: Review the financial management systems, financial controls, financial documentation, financial statements and financial reporting, audit experience, and cost-sharing capacity.

Budgeting Objectives: Assess the ability to budget and plan financial resources

Sample questions: 1. Is there a comprehensive annual master budget? Is it realistic and well documented? 2. If there is no annual master budget, is there a core cost budget for administrative costs? 3. How does GSAC budget and plan for core costs? 4. Does the budget process involve program and financial staff in a participatory and transparent manner? 5. Are project budgets realistic, clear, and well documented without external assistance? 6. What is the overall decision- making and budget allocation structure of GSAC?



7. What is GSAC’s annual budget? 8. Who funds GSAC? 9. Is there any legal protection to the level of funding? 10. Are the funds paid on time? 11. What is the budget estimate process and how are decisions made over competing requests for funding? 12. What is the expenditure of GASC by division? 13. What is the overall staff cost? 14. What activities absorb most funds? 15. What is the process for proposing and agreeing on division budgets?

Audit Objective: Assess whether GSAC undergoes routine audits and has a system for addressing audit findings.

Sample questions: 1. Does GSAC have an internal audit system? If so, describe it. If not, how does it assess and manage risks? 2. Have the organisation’s financial statements or procedures been audited or reviewed by a third party within the last two years? If so, when? 3. Is GSAC legally required to have an external audit? 4. Within the past two years, has GSAC received a qualified opinion, adverse opinion, disclaimer of opinion, or deficiency in an audit? If so, when? Why? 5. How does GSAC ensure it responds audit findings and recommendations?

PART IV Administration Objectives: Review the operational policies, procedures, and systems, as well as management and the degree of management and staff understanding and compliance with these policies, procedures, and systems.

Operating policies, procedures, and systems Objectives: Assess the soundness of operating policies and procedures and the degree of staff understanding and compliance

Sample questions: 1. Describe GSAC’s operating policies and procedures in the following areas: Management of office supplies, phones, communication systems, equipment, consultants and staff, client support and confidentiality, and safety and security. 2. Are operating policies and procedures written and regularly updated? When were they revised last? 3. Are there areas where the policies and procedures need to be clarified or expanded? 4. Are the operating policies and procedures consistently followed? Are there any areas where greater consistency is needed in following policies and procedures?

Information technology Objectives: Assess the soundness of IT policies and procedures and systems and staff compliance.

Sample questions: 1. Are IT systems adequate for the current staff size, including expected growth over the next year? 2. Are IT systems networked? Are IT systems backed up? 3. What risks are there to the IT system (e.g. unreliable electricity, malware and viruses)? 4. Do IT staff and users have the skills to use the systems effectively? What additional IT skills are needed or wanted? Is training available on IT equipment use, software, and security?

PART V Human Resources Objectives: Review GSAC’s systems for recruiting qualified staff, structuring staff positions, and developing and updating job descriptions to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, understood, and relevant.



Adequacy of staffing and job descriptions Objectives: Review GSAC’s systems for recruiting qualified staff, structuring staff positions, and developing and updating job descriptions to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, understood, and relevant.

Sample questions: 1. Are there written policies on job descriptions and delegations of authority that are complete and appropriate? When were they last reviewed? 2. Do job descriptions include position titles and clearly specify roles and responsibilities, required qualifications and skills, and reporting? 3. Are the policies consistently applied? 4. Do all staff have written job descriptions, delegations of authority, and re-assignments that are up to date? 5. Have the needed management, technical, and finance positions been established? 6. Are all key management, technical, and finance positions currently filled by people with the appropriate qualifications and skills?

Recruitment and retention Objectives: Assess GSAC’s systems for recruiting and retaining staff

1. How does GSAC recruit new staff? 2. Is there a human resource division within GSAC? 3. What does GSAC do to retain existing staff? 4. Is the recruitment and hiring process open and transparent? How are positions announced or advertised? 5. Who is involved in screening applications and interviewing and selecting candidates? 6. How satisfied are staff with the organisation and their positions? 7. Are staff professional development needs regularly identified? What training and staff development opportunities are available? Are these opportunities relevant, appropriately designed, and well used? 8. Is there a GSAC training strategy? 9. Who trains new staff? 10. Who provides specialist training? 11. Is any joint training undertaken? 12. Are the training programmes linked to the strategy or action plans, and if so, how?

Staff profile 1. How many staff are currently working for GSAC? 2. What technical capacities are GSAC’s current staff strengths? 3. What technical capacities are currently missing among GSAC staff? 4. Based on current staff strengths, what priorities will GSAC focus on?

PART VI Organisational Management Objectives: Assess GSAC’s ability to do effective strategic planning, use annual work plans, manage change; generate and share knowledge and develop linkages; and foster effective internal communications and decision making.

Strategic planning Objectives: Assess GSAC’s ability to review its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; the external environment and competition; and stakeholder needs in preparing and using an effective strategic plan.

Sample questions: 1. How is the GSAC’s annual strategy agreed? 2. What are GSAC main priorities for the next 12 months? 3. Does GSAC have a good, written strategic plan based on its priorities? What time period does it cover? 4. How did you develop the strategic plan? Is the strategic plan based on a comprehensive review of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; and realistic resource requirements and availability? 5. How often does the leadership meet to discuss strategic planning? 6. Is the strategic plan clear and specific on priorities, measurable objectives, and targets?



7. Is the strategic plan regularly reviewed? 8. Is the strategic plan consistently used in guiding management decisions and operational planning? 9. What types of performance indicators are included in the strategic plan? 10. Is there an annual review of the strategy and action plans in terms of performance?

Leadership Sample questions: 1. How GSAC’s leadership style could be defined? Is there more of a “task focus” or “relationship focus” and how does that affect internal & external communications? 2. Does the leadership teamwork as a “team” or a collection of individuals – how does that impact interpersonal relationships and trust within GSAC? 3. What is senior management’s protection against dismissal? 4. Are members of GSAC protected when undertaking official duties? 5. How does the protection or lack of protection affect GSAC’s effectiveness and what can be done to address this?

Monitoring and evaluation Objectives: Review GSAC’s ability to carry out regular, internal monitoring of activities and outputs.

Sample questions: 1. Describe how GSAC monitors its work and results. 2. Does GSAC have adequate policies and procedures for the organisation to have a good sense of how it is doing and what it is accomplishing? 3. Does GSAC consistently set realistic targets and quantitative and qualitative performance indicators? 4. Do staff have sufficient expertise in baseline data collection and monitoring? 5. Are project monitoring data consistently timely and reliable? Are gaps between performance and targets adequately analyzed? 6. Are monitoring data used to design effective remediation measures? 7. Have lessons learned from monitoring been incorporated into the design of subsequent projects? 8. Does GSAC have Manuals for core functions? 9. What are the work and workload progress review procedures? 10. Who reviews progress? What records are kept? 11. How are the activities of the anti-corruption agency being evaluated?

Annual work plans Objectives: Assess the organisation’s ability to prepare, follow, and monitor annual work plans containing goals, measurable objectives, strategies, timelines, and responsibilities

Sample questions: 1. Are annual work plans based on GSAC’s strategic plan? 2. Describe how GSAC produces annual work plans. Who is involved in developing annual work plans? Are they timely? Are they modified as needed? 3. Do annual work plans contain clear and specific goals, activities, timelines, responsibilities, or performance indicators and targets? 4. Are the work plans linked to GSAC’s budget? 5. How are annual work plans used (e.g. management decisions, operational planning, monitoring and evaluation)? How often are work plans monitored? 6. What are GSAC’s management processes for overseeing operational activities, notably in terms of work allocation and progress, staffing levels, budget expenditures and performance? 7. What performance measures are used at the institutional and sub-institutional level and staff levels? Are they publically available?



8. How are they reviewed, and by whom and how often? 9. What are the consequences of failure to meet the targets? 10. For each function, what are the procedures involved and volume of activity?

Change management Objectives: Assess GSAC’s ability to respond to change in the internal and external environment

Sample questions: 1. Have major changes in leadership, staffing, budgets, government policies, and donor funding occurred in the last 2 years? How did GSAC respond to these changes? 2. Has GSAC demonstrated a good capacity to identify and adapt to changes in the internal and external environment? Give examples. 3. How does GSAC’s leadership team deal with risk, and how does that impact decision-making and direction to seize opportunities? 4. Is there an ability to develop creative solutions to problems or opportunities? 5. Has GSAC experienced major setbacks, problems, or delays in response to internal or external changes? What happened and why?

Knowledge management Objectives: Assess GSAC’s ability to identify good practices and lessons learned, develop linkages with other anti-corruption stakeholders and networks to improve the enabling environment, plan sector strategies and approaches, and share knowledge internally and externally

Sample questions: 1. How does GSAC identify good practices in the field of anti-corruption and public integrity? What are the most important sources of learning? 2. Does GSAC have a regular internal process for sharing and thinking about good practices and lessons learned? If so, how often is this done? 3. Is the organisation an active member of any formal networks with other Greek stakeholders active in anti-corruption and public integrity stakeholders? If so, which ones? Do they also cover civil society, academia and the private sector? What role does the organisation play in these networks? 4. Does GSAC participate in discussions with other Greek anti-corruption stakeholders on approaches, lessons learned, and good practices? If so, how often? Have these discussions been mutually beneficial? Why or why not? 5. How often does GSAC present its approaches and results at external events?

Record keeping 1. Does GSAC have clear rules for the management of records and files? 2. Does the anti-corruption agency operate a LAN, databases, analysis software and other software? 3. Are these available on request, by a business case process, or on an ad hoc basis? 4. Are individual decisions recorded and filed according to clear rules and for a clearly defined and binding minimum period? 5. Who has access to these files, who is authorised to amend them or review them? 6. What degree of freedom of information exists with respect to GSAC’s files and documentation, both in terms of which decisions/files/documents are made public automatically (and how), and which ones are available on request? To what extent is such access guaranteed in practice?

Internal communications and decision making (within GSAC) Objectives: Assess the effectiveness of GSAC’s internal communications within and across departments or functions and the decision-making process

Sample questions: 1. Are there good two-way communications between GSAC’s management and staff? Give examples of good and bad communications. 2. Are there regular structured ways to exchange ideas, discuss problems or opportunities, address administrative or technical issues, and provide staff input? If so, how often? If not, is this needed? 3. How good are communications within GSAC’s departments or functions? How good are communications across departments or functions?



4. Are staff consistently involved in decision-making on major issues? Do they feel free to raise challenging issues? Do staff initiate discussions with management?

External communications Objectives: Assess the effectiveness of GSAC’s external communications (media, the general public, government, , and civil society organisations)

Sample questions: 1. Who are the key external audiences for GSAC? How does GSAC communicate with them? 2. How are external communication messages determined? What types of communication have been most effective? What types of communication have been least effective? 3. Does GSAC have an effective strategy for external communications? When was it revised last? 4. Does GSAC pre-test external communication messages and materials? 5. Does GSAC have templates or a style guide for the website and publications? 6 How, how often and through what media GSAC communicates externally? 7. Are citizens involved in the management of the anti-corruption agency? 8. Are there any management committees dealing with education, prevention, investigation, awareness involving citizens? 9. Does GSAC relies on traditional media or is willing to try new channels (v.gr. social media)? If yes, give some examples.

Anti-corruption advocacy and influence Objectives: Assess the strategies and effectiveness of the organisation’s work on advocacy of policies and issues

Sample questions: 1. Has GSAC carried out significant activities in public integrity and anti-corruption advocacy over the past two years? How often? Discuss examples of the types of activities. 2. How effective is GSAC as an advocate? Give examples. 3. Has GSAC developed alliances with other stakeholders for advocacy? Explain how. 4. Has GSAC influenced the formulation or implementation of government policies at the national or local level? Explain how. 5. Has GSAC influenced the general public’s views? Explain how.

24 – RESOURCES


Resources

UNDP Capacity Assessment of Anti-corruption Agencies

USAID Organizational Capacity Assessment (OCA)

ANNEX D - 25

ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, HEALTH AND TAX AND CUSTOMS

oecd.org/corruption



Mapping of

Institutional Relations in

Anti-Corruption in Greece



About the OECD







MAPPING OF INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION IN GREECE

Table of contents

Introduction: The creation of an Institutional anti-corruption network .................. 5

I. Newly established anti-corruption institutions .................................................... 7

1. Committee for Fighting Corruption ........................................................................... 7 2. General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC) ......................................................... 8 3. Anti-Fraud Co-ordinator Service (AFCOS) .................................................................. 8 4. Single Public Procurement Authority (SPPA) ............................................................. 8 5. Financial Police Division (DOA) .................................................................................. 9 6. Anti-corruption prosecutors ...................................................................................... 9 7. Financial crime prosecutor ....................................................................................... 10 8. Investigative judges for corruption cases ................................................................ 11

II. Strengthening the anti-corruption competences of existing institutions ........... 13

1. General Inspector of Public Administration (GIPA) ................................................. 13 2. Body of Inspectors Controllers of Public Administration (SEEDD) ........................... 13 3. Health and Welfare Services Inspection Body ......................................................... 14 4. Inspectors-Controllers Body of the Ministry of Transport ....................................... 14 5. Body of Inspectors of Public Works (SEDE) .............................................................. 15 6. General Directorate for Financial Control ................................................................ 15 7. Special Secretariat for Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE) ......................... 17 8. Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) ............................................................................... 18 9. Court of Audit ........................................................................................................... 19 10. The Ombudsman .................................................................................................... 19

III. Co-ordination within the anti-corruption network ........................................... 21

1. GSAC: The key co-ordinator ..................................................................................... 24 2. Co-ordination in inspecting corruption .................................................................... 25 3. Co-ordination in corruption complaints management ............................................ 27

Annex A. Tables of authorities, services and bodies participating in the anti-corruption network .............................................................................. 29

INTRODUCTION: THE CREATION OF AN INSTITUTIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION NETWORK – 5


Introduction: The creation of an institutional anti-corruption network

“Clarifying institutional responsibilities across the public sector to strengthen the effectiveness of the public integrity system, in particular through the promotion of mechanisms for horizontal and vertical co-operation between such public officials, units or bodies and where possible, with and between subnational levels of government, through formal or informal means to support coherence and avoid

overlap and gaps, and to share and build on lessons learned from good practices”1 is a

major, yet challenging, task for anti-corruption agencies.

Institutional co-ordination is crucial to the successful implementation of an anti-corruption strategy. Therefore, the first objective of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) assigns to the General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC) the “co-ordination of the anti-corruption efforts at a national level and the establishment and commencement of operation of the governance structure for the co-ordination of the anti-corruption authorities by the effective co-ordination between inspection bodies including prosecutors under the same umbrella, including both co-ordination of criminal investigations and co-ordination of administrative inspections to avoid overlapping and enhance co-operation.” More specifically, among other actions supporting this objective, GSAC is obliged to annually update the responsibilities of the institutions involved in fighting corruption that have already been mapped (for a detailed list of these institutions, see Annex A).

Within this framework, the envisioned institutional anti-corruption co-ordination is two-dimensional. In the short term, GSAC’s responsibility is to advance institutional co-ordination by following the implementation of the respective actions set out by NACAP. These are expected to set the foundations of a system that will be further enhanced in the long term, leading to the establishment of a solidly centralised anti-corruption machine where institutional relations are well framed. In other words, co-ordination is a dynamic, evolving process that requires time, rather than a static outcome. Consequently, as NACAP’s implementation advances, the communication channels among the various anti-corruption stakeholders deepen. Since forming a solid anti-corruption network is a progressive process, the forms of collaboration captured by this mapping are expected to transform and improve in order to guarantee efficiency.

______________________

1. OECD (2017), “Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity”, OECD,

www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/recommendation-public-integrity.htm.

http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/recommendation-public-integrity.htm

6 – INTRODUCTION: THE CREATION OF AN INSTITUTIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION NETWORK


The mapping intended here aims primarily to familiarise and inform citizens regarding the various actors and stakeholders of the Greek anti-corruption network, as well as their functioning and the different types of collaboration they have developed. Among these various actors, several are attributed particular responsibilities by NACAP, and others find in NACAP their establishment’s origin. This is because, in the recent past, the Greek governments have proceeded to reforms of the justice system aiming to ensure the efficient application of the new anti-corruption legislation by setting up the necessary anti-corruption structures and creating new institutions.

For this reason, the description of the different channels of communication and collaboration among the institutions that form the Greek anti-corruption network (as presented in Section III), is preceded by the presentation of the institutions in question. More specifically, not only a series of new specialised anti-corruption institutions have been established (discussed in Section I), but also, already existing institutions have been equipped with new anti-corruption competences (as presented in Section II).

I. NEWLY ESTABLISHED ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS – 7


I. Newly established anti-corruption institutions

The fight against corruption has led to the creation of several new anti-corruption institutions in order to cover the previous limited action against corruption phenomena. These institutions vary in legal and functional nature since they cover a large spectrum, from specialised political bodies to independent administrative authorities, and specialised prosecutors.

1. Committee for Fighting Corruption

The Committee for Fighting Corruption was established by decision of the Prime Minister. This decision sets out as the objective of the committee the elaboration and the monitoring of the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP). The committee frequently submits a report of its activities to the Prime Minister. The competent bodies and services are obliged to provide to the committee all information requested.

The committee is composed of:

1. Alternate Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights as President

2. Minister of State

3. Alternate Minister of Finance

4. Secretary-General of the General Government

5. Secretary-General of the Ministry of Interior

6. Secretary-General for Anti-Corruption.

The committee is competent to:

1. form the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and assume initiatives that aim to successfully implement its objectives

2. co-ordinate the co-competent ministries and services in order to implement the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and contribute by guaranteeing every means and resource necessary to implement the NACAP

3. suggest legislative initiatives in order to improve the functioning of Error! Reference source not found.

4. suggest measures to face issues arising from overlapping competences of audit and controlling mechanisms

5. supervise the action of auditing and controlling mechanisms and suggests which controls to prioritise.

8 – I. NEWLY ESTABLISHED ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS


2. General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC)

GSAC was established in 2015, replacing the post of the Anti-Corruption Co-ordinator established in 2013. The co-ordinator was assigned the task of co-ordinating anti-corruption measures across the state agencies and locating loopholes in Greek criminal legislation. GSAC is a new centralised anti-corruption agency under the Ministry of Justice.

Among its competences, GSAC is responsible1 for the co-ordination of institutions’ assigned tasks related to the fight against corruption. In addition, a whole series of measures and actions are attributed to GSAC by NACAP. These actions cover a wide range of activities and sectors. Namely, GSAC is active, among others, in proposing legislative measures that will facilitate the fight against corruption, in programming initiatives that contribute to the maintenance of the coherence of the Anti-Corruption Policy, as well as in collaborating with international organisations in order to enhance its technical efficiency.

3. Anti-Fraud Co-ordinator Service (AFCOS)

EU member states are required to designate an AFCOS to facilitate effective co-operation and exchange of information, including information of an operational nature, with the European Anti-Fraud Office (commonly known as OLAF). AFCOS is a distinct and independent service from other relevant authorities in the field of protection of the European Union’s financial interests. In Greece, GSAC has been appointed as the Greek AFCOS that monitors the implementation of the identified measures. More particularly, Error! Reference source not found. as AFCOS, apart from ensuring the co-operation with OLAF, co-ordinates legislative, administrative and investigative obligations and activities related to the protection of the European Union’s financial interests as appropriate. In addition, the AFCOS monitors measures falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Development and Economy as well as other parts of the government that also hold responsibility for the implementation. Under this capacity, GSAC-AFCOS has become the point of reception of complaints related to the fight against fraud in Structural Funds.

4. Single Public Procurement Authority (SPPA)

The mission of this recently established independent authority is the development and advancement of the National Strategy and political action in the sector of public procurement, the assurance of transparency, efficiency, coherence and the harmonisation of tenders according to national and European law. The authority oversees the continuous improvement of the legal framework concerning public procurement, as well as controls the implementation of the former by the actors of the public sector and the contracting authorities. The authority enjoys functioning,

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1. Law 4320/2015 as amended by Law 4446/2016.



administrative and financial autonomy, and is not subject to control or surveillance from other government bodies. Only the Hellenic Parliament assesses the work of the Single Public Procurement Authority.

Within the NACAP framework, the Single Public Procurement Authority is responsible for monitoring the implementation of possible secondary legislation that can be included in the enacted laws, and therefore, works in close collaboration with GSAC. At the same time, it works in close collaboration with key public institutions and has issued the National Strategy for Public Procurement 2014-20, which includes a specific sectoral action plan.

5. Financial Police Division (DOA)

The mission2 of the Financial Police Division (DOA) is to prevent, investigate and repress financial crimes committed against the interests of the state and the national economy in general, and are related to organised criminal activities. In addition, DOA is equipped to investigate, prevent and repress undeclared and uninsured labour and evasion of social security contributions, even cases that do not constitute criminal offences per se. DOA monitors, studies, analyses and evaluates important financial events and movements, both nationally and internationally, and takes on cases within its remit while collaborating, operationally and by circulating information, with other co-competent services, authorities and stakeholders.

Additionally, DOA receives complaints from citizens and supervises a telephone centre with officers who provide advice and guidance, in particular in circumstances where immediate or special assistance is required. Even though the Directorate of the Financial Police is separate from the Hellenic Police Headquarters, since it is the police, it conducts preliminary investigations for criminal activities within its remit.

6. Anti-corruption prosecutors

Two anti-corruption prosecutor positions were established3 in 2011, one serving in Athens and one Thessaloniki. The main task of these specialised prosecutors is to tackle acts of corruption committed by politicians and high ranking officials, as well as treat cases that present a special social and public interest. The provisions of this law are applicable to the felonies mentioned in Article 1 of this law, in particular:

1. Felonies that do not fall under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 86 of the Constitution and are committed by ministers or alternate ministers, as well as felonies committed by members of the Parliament, during their time in office, or after the end of it, if these felonies fall under the jurisdiction of a three-member Court of Appeal.

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2. Article 24 of Law 4249/2014.

3. Law 4022/2011 as amended by Law 4139/2013.

10 – I. NEWLY ESTABLISHED ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS


2. Felonies that are committed, during their time in office or in the exercise of their functions, by general and special ministerial secretaries, governors, deputy governors or presidents of board councils or executive or delegated counsels of legal persons of public law, of public enterprises, public organisations and legal persons of private law the administration of which is directly or indirectly determined by the state, elected one-person organs of local government entities, as well as civil servants in the sense of Articles 13a and 263A of the Criminal Code, if these felonies fall under the jurisdiction of a three-member Court of Appeal.

3. Felonies of particular social interest or crucial public interest, if these felonies fall under the jurisdiction of a three-member Court of Appeal. The qualification of a case demonstrating a particular social interest or crucial public interest is done via an act of the Supreme Court Prosecutor.

These prosecutors are attributed powers to prosecute and supervise investigations of crimes involving public officials and persons assigned to public organisations. They supervise all preliminary inquiries related to corruption acts and main investigations. The positions are awarded to a higher ranking prosecutor from the Court of Appeal in Athens or Thessaloniki. The anti-corruption prosecutor is responsible for co-ordering and initiating investigations concerning acts of corruption. These prosecutors are supported by special investigative agencies, such as the Financial and Economic Crime Unit (see Section II.7) and the Financial Police (see Section I.5 above). The anti-corruption prosecutors have extensive powers, may request any information from any authority and have access to privileged information (e.g. bank accounts, tax records). Each of the two anti-corruption prosecutors is assisted by assistant prosecutors against corruption crimes, but can also assign to any other public prosecutor of Athens or Thessaloniki, respectively, to carry out a preliminary investigation on a corruption case (usually of minor importance).

7. Financial crime prosecutor

A newly established institution assigned4 the investigation and prosecution of cases involving financial damages to the Greek state (including corruption cases). This prosecutor is entitled to prosecute and review any economic crime case either alone or in co-operation with any other investigative authority (police, special task forces, investigative judges, prosecutors). Moreover, the financial crime prosecutor has the power to prosecute and supervise investigations that aim to verify the existence of fiscal and financial crimes, since the latter are committed against the interests of the Greek state, local government entities, legal persons of public law, legal persons of the broader public sector and the European Union, or they cause a serious damage to the national economy. The personnel of this institution are properly trained in order to support the long-term strategy against corruption, and participate in training held by the National School of Judges so as to build capacity in anti-corruption investigations.

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4. Law 3943/2011.



8. Investigative judges for corruption cases

These judges are responsible for investigating serious fraud, corruption and relevant crimes, involving public officials.

II. STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPETENCES OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS – 13


II. Strengthening the anti-corruption competences of existing institutions

This section is dedicated to the main institutions whose general competences might lie beyond anti-corruption, but are important anti-corruption stakeholders.

1. General Inspector of Public Administration (GIPA)

GIPA, established in 2002, is responsible for preventing and monitoring maladministration (such as undue delays or discrimination affecting citizens) and corruption in the wider public sector, including state-owned enterprises. The GIPA’s role is threefold, as it includes inspecting administrative staff, procedures and units, taking disciplinary action against public employees violating the law and co-ordinating different Bodies of Inspection and Audit. GIPA, within the framework of its co-ordination role, chairs the Inspection and Audit Co-ordination Committee (SOEE). It is an independent public authority, and the person who becomes head of GIPA is selected by the government but must be approved by the Parliament. GIPA includes in its annual report recommendations that are obligatory for the general government to follow. In addition, GIPA is also entrusted with the monitoring of whether the aforementioned recommendations are followed, as well as their results.

2. Body of Inspectors Controllers of Public Administration (SEEDD)

The mission of SEEDD is to safeguard the orderly and efficient functioning of public administration, by labelling phenomena of maladministration, corruption, procedures lacking transparency, ineffectiveness, low productivity and low quality of provided services. According to the provisions of Article 8 of Law 4320/2015, SEEDD, including its competences, services and structures has been transferred to GSAC.

The main objectives of the SEEDD are:

1. to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of administration

2. to improve the quality and quantity of the provided public services

3. to contribute to the economisation of administrative functions and reduce wasting of resources

4. to protect the principle of legality and guarantee transparency of administrative acts.

The Body is competent to audit the state services, municipalities, regions and their enterprises, legal persons of public law, state legal persons of private law, public

14 – II. STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPETENCES OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS


enterprises or enterprises the management of which is exercised by the state. SEEDD is, in principle, responsible for complaints related to the detection of phenomena of corruption, mismanagement and proceedings lacking transparency, among others.

Within the framework of NACAP, representatives from the Body of Inspectors - Controllers of Public Administration alongside GSAC form a working group in order to strengthen the administrative and legal framework regarding sanctions by reviewing the necessity of raising administrative sanctions in order to reduce pressure on the judicial system.

3. Health and Welfare Services Inspection Body

The Health and Welfare Services Inspection Body was established under Law 2920/2001 and is a service of the Ministry of Health, reporting directly to the minister. It performs administrative and financial control in the Ministry of Health and, according to the law, maintains full audit independence. The Health and Welfare Service Inspection Body team’s mandate is the development and operation of central and regional systematic inspections and checks in all institutions and bodies, under the responsibility or supervision of the Ministry of Health, as well as any other health service provider, including the private sector (for example, pharmacies, and private hospitals). The aim is to improve the productivity and effectiveness of these health-related agencies and bodies, improve the quality of healthcare and welfare, and eliminate administrative wrongdoing.

4. Inspectors-Controllers Body of the Ministry of Transport

The Inspectors-Controllers Body of Transport, in accordance with Article 19 of Law 2671/1998 and Presidential Decree 338/2002, has the mission to ensure the smooth and effective functioning of the services, bodies, organisations and legal entities or people providing services in the name of the ministry.

The purpose of the inspections carried out throughout the country by the Inspectors-Controllers Body is to: ensure the consistency of the legal system; ensure compliance with the existing provisions of national and community legislation; identify incidents of lack of transparency, corruption and inefficiency; prevent corruption and statement suppression contrary to the public interest; better serve citizens; and upgrade the quality of service.

The Inspectors-Controllers Body of Transport has jurisdiction to conduct regular and special audits, inspections and investigations at the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks; in the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA); the Greek Post (ELTA); the Organisation of Athens Urban Transport (OASA); the Thessaloniki Urban Transport Organisation (SASTH); vehicle inspection centres; urban and intercity buses; and any private organisation, natural or legal person who has assumed transportation work falling under the responsibility of the ministry.



5. Body of Inspectors of Public Works (SEDE)

The Body of Inspectors of Public Works was established1 in 1984 and was attached to the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport. As of 20162 the Body of Inspectors of Public Works is part of GSAC in the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights.

The role of the office is the ordinary or extraordinary inspection of projects carried out by public sector bodies, as defined each time.

As of 2014, the legal framework that defines the conduct of inspections, the obligations and duties of Inspectors of Public Works when carrying out inspections, the respective obligations of the operators of services of construction projects, issues related to the communication of inspection results, the necessary conditions of confidentiality and secrecy and, generally, all matters relating to basic and general principles of inspection and the effectiveness of checks have been reinforced. Therefore, the authorities or bodies of public sector, to which the reports of the inspectors are addressed after inspection concerning any findings regarding public works monitored that have emerged, are required to inform the Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights as well as the Public Works Inspectorate, of any measures undertaken to deal with the problems revealed during the inspection.

6. General Directorate for Financial Control

Co-ordination Committee of Controls (ESEL)

Under the General Directorate for Financial Control (GDDE), the Co-ordination Committee of Controls (ESEL) is set up, whose composition is established by decision of the Minister of Finance and is composed of:

1. the Head of GDDE as president

2. the Heads of the Directorates:

a) Control of Ministries, Legal Persons of Public Law and LGEs (municipalities and regions)

b) Control of Agencies Providing Health and Social Solidarity Services, Public Enterprises and Organisations (DEKO), Legal Persons of Private Law and Other Agencies

c) Support and Communications

d) Extraordinary Financial Audits

e) Co-ordination and Implementation of Public Accounting Provisions

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1. Article 22 of Law 1418/1984.

2. Article 179 of Law 4412/2016.



3. two physical persons from the public or private sector experienced in issues of auditing expenditure and management systems.

Financial Audit Committee (EDEL)

EDEL is an independent audit authority, responsible for the control of the rational and effective function of the management and control system. EDEL is responsible for controlling, among others:

1. all the operational programmes of the NSRF 2014-20 και NSRF 2007-13

2. the operational programme, “Fishery 2007-13” and the operational programme “Fishery and Sea 2014-20”

3. the funding mechanism (FM) of the European Economic Area (EEA) for the periods 2009-14 and 2014-21

4. the general programme, “Solidarity and Management of Immigration Flows” for the periods 2008-13 and 2014-20.

Its mission is to guarantee the principle of good management of public finance when integrating co-funded programmes.

EDEL is a collective body, subsumed to the Ministry of Finance. This collective body is composed of:

1. the General Director of Public Finance Audits, as president

2. the Heads of the Directorates of the Ministry of Finance:

a) Planning and Evaluation of Audits

b) Audit of Management of Co-funded Programmes

c) Extraordinary and Special Audits

3. two consultants experienced in issues of implementation of EU law and auditing of co-funded programmes or public works or state subventions.

EDEL is competent to:

1. audit the systems of managing authorities, intermediary bodies and the certification authority, using a sufficient sample of acts realised by the beneficiaries and the accounts of the certification authority

2. monitor and evaluate the measures and the corrective actions undertaken by the competent authorities following the audits

3. compose an annual audit report and an annual opinion regarding the functioning of the management and control systems

4. certify the validity of the payment requests submitted to the European Commission by taking into account the audit results provided by all the national and European competent bodies



5. co-operate with the European Commission services in order to co-ordinate the audits of the operational programmes and the methods used and exchanges opinions on the results of the audits of the management and control systems

6. evaluate the establishment of management and control systems.

7. Special Secretariat for Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE)

SDOE is a special secretariat subsumed to the Ministry of Finance. SDOE’s competences include:

1. the investigation, identification and repression of financial offences of a certain importance, such as the legalisation of income received via illicit activities (money laundering), fraud and irregularities, offences related to procurement and subsidies, illegal stock and credit exchanges, and in general, financial fraud at the expense of the interests of the Greek state and the European Union, regardless of where they were committed

2. the gathering, analysis and evaluation of data and information and the investigation and controls in order to identify, reveal, justify, fight and repress financial offences and crimes, as well as other illegal financial activities at the expense of the European Union’s interests

3. the gathering, analysis and evaluation of data and information and the investigation and controls in order to identify, reveal, justify, fight and repress financial offences and crimes related to the illicit origins of private funds, transactions and activities, that are the product of civil servant corruption and other persons that gain interests from offences of passive or active bribery, as well as from policy capture, fraud and offences against the financial interests of the Greek state and the national economy in general, other cases of illegal activities, omissions of a particular nature or financial interest against the country’s interests

4. the conduct of controls and verifications in collaboration with the European Anti-Fraud Service (OLAF), according to the legislation of the European Union

5. dealing with issues related to transactions and activities that are the product of civil servants’ corruption and other involved parties related to economic crime

6. investigate, reveal and fight against illegal transactions, fraud and activities that are operated with the use of electronic means, the Internet and new technologies

7. prevention, prosecution and fight against other offences, such as trafficking of illicit substances, guns and explosive and psychotropic substances, toxic and dangerous substances (radioactive and nuclear materials, toxic waste, etc.), antiquities and cultural goods

8. following orders from prosecutors within the framework of its jurisdiction



9. protecting, in co-operation with the competent services, the seashore and the beach, as well as the exchangeable and public domains under the protection of the Ministry of Finance, from the arbitrary abuses and constructions on them.

8. Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)

The FIU is a national unit that aims to combat the legalisation of proceeds from criminal activities and terrorist financing, assisting in security and sustainability of fiscal and financial stability. Its mission3 is to collect, investigate and analyse suspicious transactions reports (STRs) that are forwarded to it by legal entities and natural persons, as well as all other information related to the crimes of money laundering and terrorist financing.

The authority has been restructured since 2011 into three individual units, as follows:

1. The Investigation of Financial Information Unit. In addition to its president, this unit comprises seven members. At the end of each year, the unit submits an activity report to the Institutions and Transparency Committee of the Hellenic Parliament and the Ministers of Finance, Justice, Transparency and Human Rights and Citizen Protection.

2. The Financial Sanctions Against Suspects of Terrorism Unit. In addition to its president, this unit comprises two members. At the end of every year, the unit submits an activity report to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Transparency and Human Rights and Citizen Protection.

3. The Asset Declaration Investigation Unit. In addition to its president, this unit comprises four members. At the end of every year, the unit submits an activity report to the Institutions and Transparency Committee of the Hellenic Parliament and the Ministers of Finance and Justice, Transparency and Human Rights.

The president is an acting public prosecutor to the Supreme Court, appointed by a Decision of the Supreme Judicial Council.

The FIU focuses on examining suspicious transactions by natural persons and legal entities, asset declarations of public officials, including ministers, members of Parliament, and advisors to ministers, as well as of journalists. It is also in charge of monitoring money laundering and terrorist financing. In addition, the FIU receives reports on suspicious transactions related to money laundering linked to the corruption of financial institutions.

Within the framework of NACAP, the FIU submits its annual report against corruption to GSAC (see Section I.2), participates in a GSAC-led working group in order to form anti-money-laundering typologies and its staff receive specialised training to support long-term anti-corruption strategic planning and to develop capacity in anti-corruption investigation.

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3. Law 3691/2008, as amended by Law 3932/2011.



9. Court of Audit

The constitutionally established Court of Audit is attributed several primordial responsibilities:

1. the control of state expenditure and that of local government entities or other legal persons subsumed to this legal regime

2. the control of grand economic value conventions where the public sector is a counterpart or another legal person of equivalent status

3. the control of the accounts of public accountants and local government entities or other legal persons

4. the submission of a report to the Parliament regarding the state budget

5. the judgement of disputes related to Points 1 and 3 in this list.

In addition to the aforementioned responsibilities, the Court of Audit receives complaints related to civil and fiscal responsibility and relating to financial management and damages to the detriment of the public interest by its agents.

10. The Ombudsman

The Ombudsman is an independent authority whose overall mission is to mediate between the concerns of citizens and the relevant public services in order to resolve administrative disputes. The mediation, preceded by a verification of the legality of administrative action, aims to address possible maladministration and restore legality, among other competences. The Ombudsman receives a large number of reports from citizens for different types of alleged maladministration from all fields of public administration, many of which might suggest corruption cases. The authority also submits proposals, within its remit, to the competent organisational and legislative bodies that envision enhancing transparency in the action of the administration and creating conditions that prevent the development of corruption. As of 2016,4 the independent authority has been designated as the National Emergency Investigation Mechanism in the staff of the Greek Police, the Greek Coast Guard, the Fire Brigade, and the staff of the detention facilities. Within the framework of NACAP, the Ombudsman alongside Inspection Bodies formulates and reports to GSAC (see Section I.2 and Figure 1 in Section III), proposals for specific measures and actions aiming to enforce compliance by ministries and agencies.

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4. Law 4443/2016.

III. CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION NETWORK – 21


III. Co-ordination within the anti-corruption network

The fight against corruption can be divided into four essential steps: prevention, inspection, reporting and repression. This explains the variety and multiplicity in the number of services and institutions involved in the fight against corruption. All these stakeholders form the anti-corruption network. As the term “network” implies, the services do not remain isolated in their activities, but they rather have developed a series of channels for communication. In more than one case, their collaboration is inevitable in order to efficiently stamp out corruption. This whole network is gradually coming under the wings of GSAC, whose primary task is to effectively co-ordinate these various activities.

However, this multitude of services and institutions active in the anti-corruption field under different mandates often results in unclear and overlapping roles and responsibilities. Therefore, a clear distinction is needed to avoid a waste of efforts and resources, and thus ensure the efficiency and implementation of the anti-corruption strategy. Given the large number of stakeholders and the hugely complex legal framework that determines their competences, there are certain challenges that need to be overcome in order to achieve the level of co-ordination that will lead to smooth co-operation between them.

First of all, it is impressive that even within the institutional framework of several stakeholders, there is confusion between the phenomena of maladministration and corruption. Maladministration is about poor governance that is often identified as mismanagement of public resources, unprofessional conduct of public officers, etc. It entails behaviours and practices that might be described as incompetent or negligent, but do not constitute a criminal act.1 Corruption, on the other hand, is defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”.2 This definition is used to describe a series of criminal offences, which include bribery of public officers, abuse of public office and others. The key distinction between maladministration and corruption is detected in the criminal nature of corruption, which is always described as a criminal offence and is sanctioned as such, whereas maladministration is not punishable by law.

However, maladministration, mostly in the form of bureaucratic impediments and mismanagement, may often be conducive to corruption. On the institutional co-ordination front, it is unclear how stakeholders that are exclusively responsible for maladministration are supposed to handle cases that harbour corruption incidents. For

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1. For more information, see https://icac.sa.gov.au/content/what-maladministration.

2. For more information, see www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define.

https://icac.sa.gov.au/content/what-maladministration

http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define

22 – III. CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION NETWORK


example, the Ombudsman, according to its founding law (Law 3094/2003), does not have explicit responsibility to detect and deal with corruption incidents. More specifically, under Article 1 of Law 3094/2003, the Ombudsman’s mission is the mediation between citizens and public services, local government entities and legal entities of public and private law regarding the protection of citizens’ rights, the fight against maladministration and compliance with the principle of legality. The framework of its roles and responsibilities, focusing on safeguarding and defending citizens’ rights and ensuring the regular function of the public administration, inevitably leads to the disclosure of corruption incidents, which however do not fall under the Ombudsman’s mandate to investigate. How the Ombudsman should deal with citizen reports about delays of public services, for example, that after further investigation reveal cases of extortion (which is an indirect form of corruption), remains vague. Law 4320/2015 states that the GSAC co-operates with the Ombudsman to fight corruption in the public and private sector, but does not describe the specific terms of this co-operation.

A similar confusion, in terms of responsibilities and mandates, also arises in the group of stakeholders responsible for improving the operation of public services. This group of stakeholders mainly involves internal audit units, which do not per se investigate corruption but aim to enhance the productivity, the efficiency and the qualitative upgrade of public services. According to the laws indicating their responsibilities, the units are supposed to detect cases of maladministration, mismanagement, fraud or corruption, but it is not specified how their consulting role aiming to improve the quality of the provided services conforms with their role as a body for the detection of fraud and corruption cases.

Secondly, the responsibilities of the following groups of institutions seem to intersect with each other, resulting in contradictory and overlapping jurisdictions:

sector-dedicated inspectorate bodies and ministerial audit units active in the same sector (e.g. Inspectorate Body of Health and Welfare Services and the Internal Audit Unit of Ministry of Health)

inspectorate bodies - ministerial internal audit units on the one hand, and the General Inspector of Public Administration and the Inspectors Controllers Body of Public Administration on the other.

Regarding the first case, it is evident that there is more than one agency responsible for detecting fraud and corruption cases within a specific sector. Taking into consideration the respective legal provisions describing the competences of these two entities, it remains unclear how they co-ordinate with each other – if at all - in the fight against corruption. For example, when a corruption incident arises in a public hospital, should this be reported to the Internal Audit Unit of Ministry of Health or to the Inspectorate Body of Health and Welfare Services? Moreover, when the internal audit unit detects a case of corruption is the inspectorate body active in this specific sector notified, and who is responsible for further investigating the case and making recommendations to the public agency concerned? The main reason for this ambiguity is the lack of clear regulatory frameworks, which would define a prevailing hierarchy between the institutions of internal audit and those of inspection, in terms of their jurisdiction to deal with corruption.



At the same time, the General Inspector of Public Administration is responsible for ensuring the efficient function of the public administration, monitoring and evaluating the control and audit bodies of the public administration and detecting cases of corruption. For the detection of corruption cases, the General Inspector can conduct the controls and inspections on its own capacity or give a relevant order to the Inspectors Controllers Body of Public Administration or other inspectorate, control and audit bodies of ministries, prefectures, local government entities or the broader public sector. The issue arising here concerns once again the question of who is responsible for taking action in the context of a specific case. Will it be the GIPA and the Inspectors Controllers Body of Public Administration, under their responsibility to detect corruption in the spectrum of the whole public sector, the sector-specific inspectorate bodies or the ministerial internal audit units? There is no clear answer to this question since the very institutional set up of this network of stakeholders seems to confuse the steps of prevention and inspection, regarding the relationships between ministerial internal audit units and sectorial inspectorate bodies, while establishing overlapping mandates within one and the same policy field. It follows, thus, that there needs to be some clarification to determine the interaction of these key actors.

A similar problem also emerges with regard to the financial controls of the General Directorate of Financial Audits of the Ministry of Finance. The General Directorate controls the management and control systems to identify their adequacy and takes appropriate measures to improve the management and control systems in order to protect the financial interests of the agencies, the efficient management of their expenditures according to the law and to fight fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity that might be harming their interests. At the same time, it controls the legality and regularity of expenditures, the appropriate management of resources, the appropriate collection of income and the management of assets of the bodies falling under its jurisdiction, in order to detect and deter cases of maladministration, abuse or waste of resources, fraud and corruption. The phrasing of this provision appears rather generic and creates a certain confusion as to where the controls of the General Directorate of Financial Audits intervene with and co-relate to the controls of the ministerial internal audit units and the inspectorate bodies, who also have an explicit mandate to safeguard and control the proper management of the public services, or even the Court of Auditors, which is also responsible for the control of public expenditures.

The institutional anti-corruption network also involves stakeholders that are only indirectly active in the fight against corruption. These stakeholders are mainly regulatory authorities, which should not be overlooked, as usually is the case when examining the co-ordination of the relevant institutions. Such authorities with regulatory powers play a key role in shaping the market and preventing monopolies, which are areas prone to corruption of public officials favouring private interests. Therefore, these authorities should not only be actively included in the dialogue on how to minimise the opportunities for corruption and reduce its economic and social impacts but also closely collaborate with other anti-corruption stakeholders to leverage their expertise and knowledge in matters of anti-corruption when shaping regulatory policies.

Another important field that should be the focus of the institutional co-ordination is the relationships developing between audit/inspection bodies, law enforcement and judicial



authorities. These three categories represent three different stages of the fight against corruption, namely prevention, detection and repression, which although distinct, clearly interact with each other. Relevant stakeholders have identified this lack of co-ordination multiple times, and it is one of their constant requests to find ways to overcome it. For audit and inspection bodies, for example, it is very important to have some feedback on the outcome of judicial cases that were initiated by their own investigations, so as to be able to make appropriate recommendations and explore solutions on how to improve the agency’s efficiency. Accordingly, law enforcement authorities can benefit from the findings of audit and inspection bodies in order to detect cases of fraud and corruption and bring them to court. For these reasons, it is essential to establish and institutionalise the terms of co-ordination between these authorities.

1. GSAC: The key co-ordinator

GSAC, under its capacity as the main anti-corruption co-ordinator, has designed, alongside its main anti-corruption stakeholders, guidelines for common action against corruption. To that end, GSAC, under the command of the Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights competent for the fight against corruption and financial crime, exercises the operational control of DOA (see Section I.5), SDOE (Section II.7), the Audit Services of Ministries (see Table 1), the Body of Health Inspectors (Section II.3), co-ordinates and monitors their actions and sets out the conduct of co-ordinated or individual controls.

In addition, GSAC is responsible for removing conflicts and resolving matters of overlapping responsibilities between departments or agencies involved in the fight against corruption, by proposing appropriate solutions for the effective resolution of these matters. GSAC is the receiving point of reports on corruption composed by the different anti-corruption stakeholders (regions and municipalities included, FIU, SDOE, GIPA, Financial Economic Police, Internal Affairs of Police, etc.). For this reason, liaison officers are appointed in order to strengthen its capacity to that end (see Figure 1 below). As a result, the bundling of information is facilitated among the various inspection and investigation authorities.

Considering the nature of the fight against corruption in the public sector, a collaboration between GSAC and the Ministry of Interior is inevitable for a successful result to be achieved. This collaboration has taken several different forms within the framework of the implementation of the NACAP Strategy and Plan. For example, the elaboration of a Code of Conduct and Ethics for public officials is advanced via the collaboration of the two institutions. To that end, different working groups have been established that focus on the overall picture of corruption in LGEs and the development of a subsequent specific strategy to fight it with the participation of LGE representatives. In addition, senior ministry staff are discussing the possibility of an award scheme for exemplary service related to anti-corruption with GSAC.

Finally, efforts to deal with the difficulties concerning the circulation of information are undertaken by the co-operation between the Governor of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue, the Head of Financial Intelligence Unit and the Chief of Financial Police, who are examining ways to improve exchange and circulation of information.



2. Co-ordination in inspecting corruption

Co-ordination of Inspection Bodies

When it comes to the co-ordination of anti-corruption stakeholders, GSAC is legally bound to take all the necessary initiatives and steps to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of the national strategy, with a special focus on the co-ordination of inspection bodies and the effectiveness of their actions, and provide instructions and recommendations.

To this end, GSAC has posted several liaison officers as contact points from the Financial Police, the Internal Affairs Service of the Police, SDOE, SEEDD, SEYPP, SEDE, Customs, and Home Affairs of IAPR. These liaison officers are expected to contribute to the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Inspection Bodies, aiming to strengthen their effectiveness. At the same time, the liaison officers (see Figure 1 below) are responsible for informing GSAC about the work of their base services and, in particular, the publication of their annual reports. Eventually, liaison officers operating in GSAC render the latter “a point of transmission” for complaints, via which any complaints received by GSAC are sent to the competent investigative authorities for further treatment.

Figure 1. GSAC liaison officers

1. Special Secretariat for Financial and Economic Crime Unit(SDOE)

2. Financial Police (DOA)

3. Internal audit units of ministries1

4. SEYPP

1. See Table 1.

Co-ordination of audit units within the ministries

According to Objectives 12 and 19 of NACAP, the internal audit units of ministries need to be strengthened in their fight against corruption. An internal audit unit is an independent controlling-consulting service that provides verification on the sufficiency of the management and control system of a body. Each internal audit unit is responsible for:

1. controlling the implementation and efficiency of the procedures and functions of the services of the organisation

2. identifying problems and dysfunctions, analysing their causes and proposing measures for addressing them, while monitoring the implementation of the latter

3. evaluating the general principles (productivity, efficiency, economy) and the implementation of the goals set by the organic units of the organisation.

Bodies with liaison officers

in GSAC



GSAC is responsible for the co-ordination of the aforementioned units (see Table 1). In addition, GSAC ensures the coherence and effectiveness of the actions undertaken by audit bodies within the framework of NACAP and beyond by providing guidelines regarding the auditing procedure, the relation between internal audit units and inspection bodies, access to data, confidentiality and the professional certification of their personnel. As far as the relationship between internal audit units and inspection bodies is concerned, the development of the former will contribute to the efficiency of the latter. More specifically, the inspection bodies will economise resources that will now exclusively be used in order to inspect cases of corruption horizontally, instead of sporadic controls with minor effect.

GSAC is aiming to establish good practices based on the collaboration between internal audit units and inspection bodies, which will actively contribute to the reduction of corruption.

Table 1. Internal audit units

Office of Co-ordination of Action and Planning of Internal Audit Units within GSAC Permanent Central Audit Committee (under construction)

Ministry Internal audit unit

Ministry of Finance Internal Audit Unit Ministry of Economy and Development Autonomous Internal Audit Division Ministry of Shipping and Island Policy Internal Audit Units Ministry of Interior Internal Audit Unit Ministry of Health Internal Audit Unit Ministry of National Defence Internal Audit Unit Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs Autonomous Internal Audit Unit Ministry of Foreign Affairs Internal Audit Unit Ministry of Tourism Internal Audit Unit Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights Internal Audit Unit Ministry of Culture and Sports Autonomous Internal Audit Division Ministry of Environment and Energy Autonomous Internal Audit Division Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport Internal Audit Division Ministry of Rural Development and Food Internal Audit Unit Ministry of Administrative Reform Autonomous Internal Audit Division Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity Internal Audit Division Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Information

Autonomous Internal Audit Division

Joint control teams for combatting smuggling

These teams are groups of a control mechanism in charge of joint action tackling smuggling and corruption.3 Its participants are personnel from:

1. Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE)

2. Financial Police (DOA)

3. Directorate of Internal Affairs of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue

______________________

3. For a detailed analysis of the actions undertaken by the joint teams, see the GSAC

Annual Report 2015-16, pp 145-150.



4. Service of Internal Affairs of the Greek Coast Guard

5. Customs.

These joint groups carry out checks and controls on Greek territory, with the aim of efficiently tackling smuggling and relevant offences. The main objectives of these joint groups are:

1. to improve the efficiency of the controls in order to tackle smuggling

2. to control corruption phenomena that appear because of the segmentation of competences and the locality of the personnel

3. to increase the tax revenues of the state.

3. Co-ordination in corruption complaints management

Reporting corruption is one of the most important tools in the fight against corruption. Reporting corruption forms a link between the two branches, preventive and repressive, of anti-corruption policies. Most importantly, reporting corruption engages citizens in the amelioration of public administration and gives them the opportunity to participate in this fight actively.

The Greek anti-corruption institutional landscape covers a wide range of agencies competent to receive corruption-related complaints. Among these agencies, several are exclusively competent, and others may also receive complaints beyond corruption-related ones.

The role of GSAC is to co-ordinate the different complaints mechanisms, but also to be actively involved in these mechanisms by receiving complaints itself. More specifically, the National Anti-Fraud Co-ordinating Service (AFCOS) in Greece operates within GSAC and serves as central point for receiving complaints related to the management of EU funds in the form of NSFR 2014-20. But GSAC’s competence to receive complaints goes beyond that of AFCOS. Given the large number of corruption complaints receivers, several channels of collaboration are flowing among the various institutions. In most cases, GSAC participates in the management of complaints, even when GSAC is not the receiver of the complaint. This is necessary, particularly when one institution receives complaints outside its remit, and the complaint has to be referred to the competent institution. It is not uncommon in practice that the institutions in question send the complaint ex officio to the appropriate institution.

For example, complaints submitted to the Court of Auditors (see Section II.9) that may be outside the competence of the Court are referred to the competent authority, e.g. the Inspectorate Body for Public Administration (Section II.2). If issues arise during the processing of evidence related to the commission of criminal offences, the data is transmitted to the Prosecutor’s Office for further action. Similarly, the Ombudsman (Section II.10) receives petitions, which, often, explicitly denounce corruption acts. These complaints are then referred to the audit mechanisms or to the public



prosecution authorities. Furthermore, the Ombudsman may, during the investigation,4 request the assistance of the Inspector Auditors of Public Administration (SEEDD) or other Audit and/or Inspection Bodies.

In its turn, SEEDD (Section II.2) receives reports of corruption from GSAC, GIPA, other audit bodies, ministries and citizens. In case the complaint is outside the scope of SEEDD, the former is referred to the competent body such as the Greek Police Internal Affairs Directorate, the General Directorate for Financial Control, Ministry of Finance, and independent authorities. After the inspection is conducted, its results are communicated to the competent public prosecutor or to the relevant disciplinary bodies if the infringements constitute a criminal or a disciplinary offence, respectively. The appointed prosecutor may order the SEEDD inspectors to investigate or proceed to a preliminary enquiry.

______________________

4. Article 4 of Law 3094/2003.

ANNEX A. TABLES OF AUTHORITIES, SERVICES AND BODIES PARTICIPATING IN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION NETWORK - 29


Annex A

Tables of authorities, services and bodies participating in the anti-corruption network

Table A.1. Audit agencies, inspection bodies and enforcement authorities

Table A.2. Administrative and auditing authorities and services

Supervisory body Authorities and services

Ministry of Finance

Internal Audit Unit under the Minister of Finance

Directorate of Human Resources and Organisation - Division D: Disciplinary Procedure

Directorate of Financial Policy - Division C: Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

General Directorate of Treasury and Public Accounting General Directorate of Public Finance Controls

Directorate of Extraordinary and Special Controls Directorate of Internal Affairs

Directorate of Internal Audit Central Co-ordinating Agency to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing, to evaluate and strengthen the effectiveness of relevant mechanisms and to co-ordinate action by competent authorities Policy and Strategy Committee for Countering Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism of the Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Economy and Development


Directorate of Approval and Monitoring of Investment

General Secretariat for Public Investments and National Strategic Reference Framework

Authorities for the Management and Control of the OP of NSRF 2014-20

General Secretariat for Trade and Consumer Protection General Directorate of Public Contracts and Procurement

Support and Planning Directorate Directorate for Management and Conduct of Tenders

General Directorate for Consumer Protection and Monitoring of the Market

General Inspector of Public Administration Inspectors-Controllers Body of Public Administration Inspectors Controllers Body of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport Inspectors Body for the Environment, Construction, Energy and Mines Inspectors Body for Health and Welfare Services Inspectors-Controllers Body of Detention Centres Body of Labour Inspection Special Secretariat for Financial and Economic Crime Unit Centre for the Co-ordination and Operations against Smuggling of Products Subjected to EFK

30 - ANNEX A. TABLES OF AUTHORITIES, SERVICES AND BODIES PARTICIPATING IN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION NETWORK


Supervisory body Authorities and services Directorate for Consumer Protection

Directorate of Institutional Regulation and Monitoring of the Market of Products and Services

Co-ordination Centre for Tackling Illicit Trade

Ministry of Interior

Directorate of Human Resources Management

Internal Audit Division (Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace) Internal Audit Division (Ministry of Interior)

Autonomous Service for the Supervision of LGEs

Controller of Legality Council of Legality Controllers

Observatory of Financial Autonomy of LGEs Ministry of Administrative Reform Internal Audit Division

Ministry of Health

Internal Audit Unit National Organisation Providing Health Services

Service of Control of Health Expenditure of Social Security Organisations

Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights

General Directorate for Administration of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights

General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights Internal Audit Unit

Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Information


Ministry of Culture and Sports Autonomous Internal Audit Division

Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change


Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport Internal Audit Division Directorate for Human Resources Management

Ministry of Rural Development and Food Directorate of Financial Audit and Inspection Internal Audit Unit

Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity

Internal Audit Division

Ministry of Shipping and Island Policy Internal Affairs Service Internal Audit Units

Coast Guard Directorate

Hellenic Police

Internal Affairs Division

Financial Police Division

Forensic Science Division Cyber Crime Unit

Financial Audit Division

Table A.3. Judicial authorities

Court of Audit Anti-corruption Prosecutor and Investigators Financial Crime Prosecutor



Table A.4. Independent public authorities

The Ombudsman Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Single Independent Authority for Public Procurement Independent Authority for Public Revenue Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy Hellenic Data Protection Authority Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission Regulatory Authority for Energy Greek National Council of Radio and Television

Table A.5. Co-operation between GSAC and other stakeholder agencies in the context of the NACAP

Category NACAP reference

Objective Stakeholder agencies

Po

licy

13 Enhance integrity in all processes in the public service, municipal district areas and local governments

GSAC

Minister of State


Ombudsman

Local government entities

Central Union of Municipalities (KEDE)

Hellenic Agency for Local Development and Local Government (EETAA)

14 Develop sector-specific strategies for high-risk areas vulnerable to corruption

Tax administration GSAC

Ministry of Finance

Independent Authority of Public Revenues (IAPR)

Health GSAC

Ministry of Health Defence GSAC

Ministry of Defence Public and private investments

GSAC

Ministry of Economy and Development: General Secretariat of Public Investments and NSRF

Ministry of Finance: Financial Audit Committee

Local government GSAC


Local government entities across the country

Central Union of Municipalities (KEDE)

Hellenic Agency for Local Development and Local Government (EETAA)

23 Improve timeliness of justice, both in terms of duration of proceedings and statute of limitations

Improve the legal framework of prosecutorial proceedings

More effective use of administrative actions as a mechanism to reduce pressure on judicial system

GSAC

Ministry of Justice

Judicial and prosecutorial authorities





31 Strengthen asset recovery mechanisms GSAC

Ministry of Justice

Ministry of Finance

Court of Audit

Financial and Economic Crime Unit

Judicial and Prosecutorial authorities

Law enforcement agencies 32 Improve the mutual legal assistance agreements

(MLA) with relevant partner countries to guarantee effective MLA

GSAC

Ministry of Justice

Judicial and prosecutorial authorities 36 Develop an effective framework for transparency,

supervision and sanctioning of political party financing

GSAC


44 Inducement prizes to identify innovative solutions to reduce corruption (national awards to recognise integrity and exemplary services)

GSAC

Ministry of Administrative Reform

Co

ntr

ol a

nd

ove

rsig

ht

4 Strengthen law enforcement institutional capacities and resources to investigate and prosecute corruption and economic crime-related offences

GSAC

Ministry of Justice

Financial and Economic Crime Prosecutors

Anti-Corruption Prosecutors

Special Secretariat for Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE)

Financial Police

Independent Authority of Public Revenues (IAPR)

12 Strengthen the capacity and skills of state internal control and audit units or departments in anti-corruption

GSAC

Minister of State

Internal Audit Units

Internal Affair Units 19 Strengthen internal

control and audit mechanisms relating to anti-corruption by strengthening the circles of defence in four levels

Level 1: Ministerial inspection bodies and ministerial internal audit units

GSAC

Ministerial Inspection Bodies

Ministerial internal audit units

Level 2: General inspection

GSAC

General Inspector of Public Administration Level 3: Law enforcement, prosecution and judiciary

GSAC


Financial Police

Financial and Economic Crime Prosecutors

Anti-Corruption Prosecutors

Law enforcement agencies Level 4: Parliament GSAC

Parliament 25 Active collaboration in financial matters such as in

identifying the link between corruption and money laundering and the use of the registry of bank accounts

GSAC

Anti-Money Laundering Co-ordination Committee

Financial Intelligence Unit


Financial Police

Independent Authority of Public Revenues 26 Strengthen the exchange of practical experience and

information of financial crime and bribery investigations

GSAC

Internal control and audit mechanisms

Law enforcement agencies

All ministries 42 Establish a central place or unit where reports on

corruption can be received and analysed GSAC


Minister for State





16 Provide an enhanced system for the detection and monitoring of asset declarations, conflicts of interests and incompatibilities by public and elected officials and members of the government, including sufficient deterrent penalties for misreporting

GSAC

Ministry of Justice

General Inspector of Public Administration


Internal Affairs Directorate of Hellenic Police

Parliament

Financial and Economic Crime Prosecutor

General Secretariat of Information Systems

Hu

man

res

ou

rces

18.1 Training policy and programme to support long-term anti-corruption strategic planning and capacity development

GSAC

General Inspector of Public Administration

General Commissioner of the State

Inspection bodies

Ministerial internal audit units


Financial Police


Judicial authorities

18.2 Training programme in anti-corruption investigations

37 Codes of conduct and ethics for all public and local officers

GSAC


Ministry of Administrative Reform 38 Integrity tests

Ass

essm

ent

and

mo

nit

ori

ng

2 Monitoring of all anti-corruption controls and related legislation

GSAC

Ministry of Justice

Prosecutorial authorities

Inspection bodies

Internal audit units

General Inspector of Public Administration 27 Assess how to tackle corruption and related fraud

issues specifically linked to the use of EU funds with a view to improving Greek management and control systems

GSAC (AFCOS)

Ministry of Economy and Development (especially the Special Authority for Institutional Co-operation of the General Secretariat of Public Investment and NSRF)

41 Evaluate the reasons for the lack of implementation of necessary anti-corruption activities and make relevant proposals

GSAC


Local government agencies

Central Union of Municipalities

Hellenic Agency for Local Development and Local Government

Bu

dge

t

and

pro

cure

men

t 3 Develop measures to ensure transparency of public expenditure, public contracts and budgetary process

GSAC

Ministry of Economy and Development

Single Public Procurement Authority

Aw

aren

ess

rais

ing

17.3 Increased integrity awareness among young people

Monitor public attitudes to accountability issues and service delivery

GSAC

Ministry of Education

Institution of Educational Policy (IEP)

Source: www.gsac.gov.gr/attachments/article/121/2016_11_10_xartografisi.pdf and OECD research.

http://www.gsac.gov.gr/attachments/article/121/2016_11_10_xartografisi.pdf



oecd.org/corruption

Greece-OECD Project: Technical Support on Anti -Corruption

Gathering of Enforcement Data

Output 3.4: Law Enforcement Co-operation, Co-ordination and Information-

sharing

2017

This document is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries.


This document was produced with funding by the European Union. The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Union.

The present draft is for discussion at the workshops on Law Enforcement Co-ordination on Forum on 4-8 December 2017, in Athens.

About the OECD

The OECD is an international organisation in which governments compare and exchange policy experiences, identify good practices in light of emerging challenges, and promote decisions and recommendation to produce better policies for better lives. The OECD’s mission is to promote policies that improve economic and social well-being of people around the world. www.oecd.org About the Greece-OECD Project The Greek government is prioritising the fight against corruption and bribery and, with the assistance of the European institutions, is committed to taking immediate action. Under the responsibility of the General Secretariat against Corruption, Greece’s National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) identifies key areas of reform and provides for a detailed action plan towards strengthening integrity and fighting corruption and bribery. The OECD, together with Greece and the European Commission, has developed support activities for implementing the NACAP. This project is carried out with funding by the European Union and Greece. www.oecd.org/corruption/greece-oecd-anti-corruption.htm

https://portal.oecd.org/eshare/daf/pc/Deliverables/ACD-Phase-4/Horizontal%20Projects/www.oecd.org

https://portal.oecd.org/eshare/daf/pc/Deliverables/ACD-Phase-4/Horizontal%20Projects/www.oecd.org/corruption/greece-oecd-anti-corruption.htm

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 4

A. DEVELOPING CRIMINAL JUSTICE INDICATORS: WHY, WHAT AND HOW?.......................... 5

A.1. Why develop indicators? ................................................................................................ 5 A.2. What kind of indicators and statistics are typically collected? ................................. 6 A.3. How to develop criminal justice indicators and statistics ......................................... 6

B. INDICATORS AND STATISTICS IN THE GREEK CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ......................... 8

B.1. Statistics and indicators on the overall criminal justice system .............................. 10 B.2. Statistics and indicators on corruption-related misconduct ................................... 11

C. OTHER COUNTRIES’ STATISTICS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT ............................................................................................................................ 13

C.1. Other countries’ statistics on criminal justice systems ................................................. 14 C.2. Other countries’ statistics on anti-corruption law enforcement .................................. 15

D. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS FOR GREECE ....................................................................... 16

4

INTRODUCTION

1. Under the responsibility of the General Secretariat against Corruption, Greece’s National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) identifies key areas of reform and provides for a detailed action plan towards strengthening integrity and fighting corruption and bribery. Through its Greece Technical Assistance Project, the OECD has committed to supporting the Greek authorities and to provide technical guidance to implement the reform agenda in a series of pre-identified areas.

2. The purpose of this document is to advance Outcome 3.4.6 of the Technical Assistance Project. It aims to support GSAC’s efforts to improve data gathering processes in order to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of the law enforcement and the criminal justice system. In this context, the document takes stock of the statistics and indicators that are currently available on Greece’s criminal justice system. It then explores other countries’ statistics gathering and publication practices with a view to identifying useful ideas for Greece.

3. The paper’s structure is as follows:

Section A reviews what is known about the development of criminal justice indicators and statistics. It notes that this body of knowledge has already been formalised through guidance developed in international and European co-operation processes on criminal justice statistics, in which Greece participates.

Section B takes stock of Greece’s current position in relation to statistics on the criminal justice system as a whole and on anti-corruption law enforcement in particular. After noting that 3 organisations – the Council of Europe, OECD and UN Office on Drugs and Crime – have recommended that Greece improve its criminal justice statistics, the report documents: 1) the areas were Greek statistics already exist; 2) the areas where statistics need to be developed; and 3) the promising recent steps being taken by Greece to develop statistics on the judicial system in general and on anti-corruption law enforcement in particular.

Section C looks at what other countries collect and publish. This overview covers both general criminal justice statistics and reports by specialised anti-corruption law enforcement agencies.

Section D proposes next steps in the development of anti-corruption law enforcement indicators and statistics for Greece. The section notes the considerable progress that Greece has made in this area in recent years and proposes possible avenues for further improvement.

5

A. DEVELOPING CRIMINAL JUSTICE INDICATORS: WHY, WHAT AND HOW?

A.1. Why develop indicators?

4. Performance indicators are used by businesses, governments and other organisations – including many criminal justice systems – to improve their performance. Performance, in a broad sense, refers to whether and how the institution is living up to predetermined standards, as set by mission statements or policy declarations. In the area of criminal justice systems, performance indicators can help law enforcement authorities to protect and promote basic legal values -- such as transparency, due process and non-discrimination – and to make more efficient use of resources.

5. A performance indicator is a quantitative or qualitative measurement by which the performance, efficiency or effectiveness of an organisation can be assessed, often by comparison with an agreed standard or target. Since performance indicators are used to assist in the evaluation of how well the system is fulfilling its objectives, indicators for a given institution are usually keyed to the basic values and strategic objectives of that institution. Indeed, a system of indicators cannot exist independently of values and objectives (e.g. security for citizens, fairness and resource efficiency). Examples of standard performance indicators for criminal justice systems include clearance rates1 and disposition times2 in the court system and survey-based measures of citizens’ perceptions of their exposure to crime and attitudes toward the criminal justice system.

6. Performance indicators for the criminal justice system are generally built up from criminal justice statistics – that is from collections of data that are generated and collected by the individual institutions involved in the criminal justice system or through surveys (e.g. a public opinion poll). At times, surveys conducted by polling organisations are also used to create indicators that shed light on the public’s attitudes and experiences.

7. Performance indicators are designed to provide information that a variety of actors can use to evaluate the performance both of the system as a whole and of its component parts. In the context of criminal justice systems, different audiences will have different information needs. These include:

Inputs to the budgeting process and enhancing public sector efficiency. Indicators can help managers to make effective use of scarce fiscal resources by providing information on how the system is working and the volume of resources it is absorbing.

Responding to the information needs of the legal community. The defence bar, prosecutors, judges and others involved in the system need to understand how their part of the system contributes (or does not) to the proper functioning of the system as a whole. A perspective that encompasses both system-wide performance along with the performance of the component parts helps avoid fragmentation and helps individual actors in the system to keep focused on their contribution to system performance and become aware of how other components’ performance affects their own.

Enhancing transparency to the public. Indicators can also be used to enhance public sector transparency, since they communicate information to the public on how the criminal justice

1 This standard justice indicator measures whether the case load in the system is building up, steady or being drawn down.

2 This standard justice indicator measures how long it takes courts to handle cases.

6

system is working. As such, they can serve the needs of the broader community, including individual citizens and civil society organizations. These actors are likely to be interested in a wide range of issues; for example, does the criminal justice system succeed in deterring crime; are the rights of suspects, convicts and detainees being respected?

8. In order to meet all these information needs – for budgetary control, the efficient and effective management of the criminal justice system, and public sector transparency -- a process of reflection and consultation helps countries to identify the most relevant elements of a justice system’s performance, especially in relation to the system’s values, goals, standards, structure, and activities.

A.2. What kind of indicators and statistics are typically collected?

9. The major categories of justice indicators are:

Strategic or systemic level indicators. These system-wide indicators capture aspects of how the whole system working. For example, if a strategic objective is to reduce the level of day-to-day corruption that people or businesses encounter when they come into contact with public services, then a useful indicator might be a survey-based measure of the amount of corruption that people or businesses encounter when they come into contact with public services.

Institutional or policy objective Indicators. These are used to measure progress in meeting the specific objectives of various institutions, policies, or programmes, shedding light on how these may be advancing overall strategic objectives. For example, if there are concerns about the time it takes to process cases in the court system, then calculating disposition times for different courts will be useful.

Activity and resource indicators – These help to track how resources are allocated within the criminal justice system. Examples are budget figures by function and employment by role in the criminal justice system.

10. As will be seen in this paper’s review of countries’ practices in reporting justice indicators and statistics (Section C), statistics and indicators are often accompanied by qualitative analysis and more in-depth narratives on particular cases of misconduct. This is particularly true for statistical reporting on anti-corruption cases. Anti-corruption reporting deals, at least for some cases, on misconduct that has large societal and economic impacts that cannot be captured by a simple counting exercise. Although these cases may be few in number, their societal and economic impacts can very large indeed. In order to understand corruption and how it is deterred and sanctioned by the authorities, there is a need to understand the modalities of the misconduct, its purpose and impact and how the misconduct is handled and sanctioned through court proceedings or disciplinary actions. For this reason, qualitative analysis, narrative descriptions of cases and publication of supporting documentation (e.g. posting of decisions) provide useful complements to the statistics relating to, for example, prosecutions and resolutions.

A.3. How to develop criminal justice indicators and statistics

11. Criminal justice information systems start with basic statistics, which are then used to develop indicators that shed light on how the system and its parts are (or are not) realising the basic

7

objectives that are set for the system and its components part. Therefore, any system of performance indicators relies on a vision of what the purposes or missions of the system and its component are. It is for this reason that the annual reports of certain anti-corruption agencies (see entries for Singapore and New Zealand in Annex Table 4) begin with mission statements and lists of core values.

12. International guidance on how to set up processes for gathering and improving criminal justice statistics is already the subject of international guidelines. In 2003, the United Nations issued a Manual for the Development of A System of Criminal Justice Statistics. It identifies the primary requirements of a system of criminal justice statistics as:3

Obtaining and maintaining the commitment of stakeholders. National systems of criminal justice statistics require the participation and co-operation of many components of the system, including the police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections. Core data for the ongoing production of national statistical information are extracted from administrative records that are kept by these institutions. This activity by itself is resource-intensive, but it is further complicated by the need to have national standards, common data definitions and other desirable attributes expected of a credible and usable statistical series. In practice, those who keep records for operational purposes pay only rudimentary attention to the non-operational uses of those records. Without the commitment of senior managers, conversion of official records into usable statistical data becomes a difficult proposition.

Fostering the evolution of the statistical programme. Once a basic statistical programme has been established, the greatest challenge of a criminal justice statistics system is to adapt its outputs in response to the most pressing needs of data users. This capacity to adapt requires in turn a capacity for effective interactions with a wide range of client groups, a planning system that can translate these needs into specific projects, and the resources to achieve the desired outputs.

Maintaining political neutrality and objectivity. Given that in most cases criminal justice statistics programmes have been developed by Governments for the purposes of planning and monitoring the criminal justice system, establishing political impartiality may prove to be quite challenging. Making the statistical system independent of the criminal justice system may be beneficial in terms of increasing impartiality. For example, establishing a criminal justice statistics agency independent of any other criminal justice agency (police, prosecutors, courts and corrections) increases its autonomy, independence and, ultimately, its impartiality.

Using analytical and technical resources effectively. The knowledge and experience of subject matter specialists are invaluable in any statistical programme, and the field of criminal justice statistics is no exception. Much of the raw data for the statistics programme is generated within the operational justice system and therefore tends to reflect the policies and processes needed for the day-to-day administration of the system rather than a depiction of the substantive phenomena. The knowledge and experience of subject-matter specialists are essential to ensure that the data are competently analysed and

3 The bullet points are adapted from material presented on page 3-5 in the Manual for the Development of A System of Criminal Justice Statistics .

https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_89E.pdf



8

placed in a proper context. In addition, data processing and analysis require an infrastructure of computer technology specialists are essential to ensure that the data are competently analysed and placed in a proper context.

Articulating the scope and content clearly. A comprehensive programme of criminal justice statistics should describe the scope and structure of crime in society in the context of demographic, social and economic realities. It should also reflect the response to the problem of crime on the part of the criminal justice system including costs of administrative interventions.

Using an integrated approach. The ultimate goal – though few, if any countries have managed to achieve it -- is a fully integrated system of criminal justice statistics. An important step towards an integrated system of criminal justice statistics is the development and use of common concepts and classifications, both within and across components of the criminal justice system and, as much as possible, between criminal justice and outside agencies. Uniform classifications allow the linking of data from different components of the criminal justice system and between the criminal justice system and other agencies.

Maintaining a high public profile. A high public profile for the justice statistics system is advantageous from many points of view: it contributes to a higher level of awareness of statistical information and hence to its wider utilisation; it helps to achieve higher response rates and hence better quality data; it contributes to the effectiveness of feedback mechanisms with data users; and, very importantly, it enhances protection of the system from political interference.

B. INDICATORS AND STATISTICS IN THE GREEK CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

13. Three international organisations – the UNODC, the COE and the OECD – have recommended that Greece take steps to improve its statistics on the criminal justice system (see Box 1). These reports date respectively from 2015, 2013 and 2012. While acknowledging the importance of these three sets of recommendations, it is also worth stressing that the Greek criminal justice system is not starting “from scratch” when it comes to developing and publishing indicators and statistics. The Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) and the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights (MOJ) produce a variety of statistics on the functioning of all parts of the criminal justice system. In addition, GSAC has launched a process of collecting, improving and publishing statistics that are specifically focused on anti-corruption law enforcement.

14. Greece also participates in international co-ordination of the development of such statistics and indicators, under the auspices of the Council of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). CEPEJ’s objective is to promote “knowledge of the judicial systems in Europe and of the different tools which enable it to identify any difficulties and facilitate their solution.”4 Among other things, this means that CEPEJ helps to harmonise data concepts and to co-ordinate the collection and publication of data. It also publishes reports that provide comparative statistics on legal systems.

4 More details about CEPEJ can be found here.

https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/presentation/cepej_en.asp

9

Box 1. OECD, COE and UNODC Recommendations on Greece’s criminal justice statistics

Recommendation from the 2012 OECD Phase 3 Report on Greece (page 5)

Commentary: The lead examiners recommend that Greece strengthen its efforts to compile more detailed enforcement statistics for domestic and foreign bribery committed by natural and legal persons.

COE-CEPEJ recommendations

From the 2013 report on The functioning of judicial systems and the situation of the economy in the European Union Member States (page 238)

Data collection, monitoring and evaluating of the system should be strongly improved [in Greece].

Data collection, monitoring and evaluating of the system should be strongly improved.

ICT infrastructure should be extended, especially with the development of tools for the communication between courts and parties

Selected recommendations 2015 UNODC Country Review Report of Greece page 8.

Although Greece has established a solid criminal justice system and implements a large number of the provisions of the Convention, the reviewers identified a few challenges in implementation or grounds for further improvement. It is recommended that:

Greece take steps to collect more detailed statistics on the implementation of anti-corruption measures across institutions.

Greece consider establishing a national debarment or blacklisting register to reinforce the existing procedures (article 34).

The FIU ensure that statistics on suspicious transaction reports (including by offence/region) are collected; …. (article 36).

Greece enhance co-ordination among relevant agencies, clarify mandates in light of competing priorities, and establish a consistent practice of sharing case related information among institutions (article 38).

15. This section reviews the current state of Greece’s criminal justice statistics and of its statistics that focus on corruption-related crime. Before starting this review, it is worth noting that justice statistics for Greece are included in the 2016 World Justice Report, which is published by the World Justice Project5. The report presents high level performance indicators for 113 countries’ justice systems. The report’s findings for Greece are described in Box 2. The report uses various performance indicators to rank 113 countries’ justice systems with respect to 7 characteristics (e.g. due process, timely and effective adjudication and absence of corruption). The data place Greece close to the median for all 113 countries covered by the report, but below the average for “high

5 The World Justice Project is an independent non-profit organization.

https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Greecephase3reportEN.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepej_study_justice_scoreboard_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepej_study_justice_scoreboard_en.pdf

https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/publications/rule-law-index-reports/wjp-rule-law-index%C2%AE-2016-report

https://worldjusticeproject.org/

https://worldjusticeproject.org/

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income” countries6 in all seven data categories. Greece is shown to be comparatively strong (above the median for the 113 countries) for effective investigation, absence of corruption, absence of improper government involvement and due process. It is below the median for timely adjudication, effective correctional system and absence of discrimination.

B.1. Statistics and indicators on the overall criminal justice system

16. The Annex Tables 1 and 2 provide detailed lists of the indicators and statistics that are available on the Greek justice system. For Annex Table 1 the lists are taken from publications of Greece’s MOJ, ELSTAT, as well as from those of international (mainly European) criminal justice co-ordination processes in which Greece participates. Greece’s data is quite complete in such areas as budgets, institutional indicators of how the system works (e.g. tenure for judges), socioeconomic characteristics of offenders and a number of other data features. In other areas, the data could be filled out and extended (a process that Greece has already begun).

ELSTAT collects, processes and publishes statistics generated by the Hellenic Police, which is under the administrative control of the Ministry of Interior. This data includes: 1) offences (total for Greece and breakdown between felonies and misdemeanours); 2) offenders (total and by sociological categories such as gender, marital status, educational attainment and citizenship); and 3) offences by region.

The MOJ’s special unit in charge of justice system statistics collects, processes and publishes the following statistics: 1) the total number of decisions of the Court of First Instance, the Judicial Council of the Court of first instance, and the Court of Appeal (2014-2017; also by region); 2) court decisions by category (e.g. postponement decisions, decisions that lifted confidentiality, that ordered provisional detention, or dismissed a case under conditions); 3) the total number of judges or other court personnel (e.g. Presidents of Courts of First Instance, Judges of Courts of First Instance, Bailiffs), broken down by region; and 4) the total number of complaints received by the Prosecutor’s Offices of the Court of First Instance and of the Court of Appeal, broken down by region, including: the number of archived complaints, complaints examined by a single-judge court, complaints examined by a three-judge court, expedited complaints examined by courts cases where the accused was caught in flagrante delicto, as well as referrals for further investigation.

17. Some of these data feed into EU and COE publications. The following international publications are of particular interest in terms of providing indicators on the Greek justice system:

The 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard contains data on the Greek justice system as well as those of EU partners. Data featured in the report include: detailed budget data for the total system and for the component parts.7 It also gives comparative survey-based information on the perception of judicial independence among the general public. The Scoreboard does not cover case load and case handling statistics for the criminal justice

6 Greece is classified as a high income country for the purposes of the World Justice Report, which is in line with the World Bank’s rankings. Since Greece is on the low end of the ‘high income countries’ the fact that it is below the average for this group is perhaps not a surprising result.

7 See page 25 of the 2017 Justice Scoreboard. These data show that Greece spends about 3% of its GDP on its justice system, which is similar to the levels for Italy and Austria. They also show that Greece’s spending for “law courts” per inhabitant is very low.

https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups

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system, though it does report them for the other parts of the justice system (e.g. civil and administrative). Equivalent data for criminal cases would be of the utmost interest.

European judicial systems: Efficiency and quality of justice 2016. This study provides a wealth of data about various European judicial systems, including Greece’s system. Data categories covered for Greece include: budgets of the judicial system for 2014; Categories and number of judges (2014) and breakdown by gender;8 mandates of judges;9 average gross salaries of judges, in absolute value and in relation to the national average gross salaries10 (2014) Number of prosecutors; status of public prosecutors (2014); and mandates of public prosecutors; role of public prosecutors; gender breakdown of prosecutors. Number of prosecutors per head of prosecution office (average for country);11 salaries of prosecutors relative to average gross salary for the country;12 number of lawyers (2010, 2012, 2014); organisation of the court system (number by level of court; general versus specialised courts.

The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (2014) was published by a research consortium of criminal justice experts and was funded by the European Union. It is not clear that there was official involvement of the Greek government in this report.13 The data now appear to be superseded by data produced by the MOJ, which are described above and in Annex Table 1.

18. The European Sourcebook was the only publication in the list above to include separate statistics on the crime of corruption. The Sourcebook states: ‘The only countries with a significant level of convictions were Lithuania (9.4 per 100,000 population), Poland (6.9) and Estonia (4.9). …. Corruption convictions were over 80% male, except in Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine.’ (page 153). The report shows Greece as having zero convictions for corruption per 100,000 population in 2007 and as having no available data for 2008-2011 (page 172).

B.2. Statistics and indicators on corruption-related misconduct

19. GSAC has taken steps to improve statistics about corruption related misconduct. It has also published statistics in its 2016 report, Corruption Data Collection.

20. The statistics available in this report refer to the following categories of offences: 1) passive bribery of public officials; 2) active bribery of public officials; 3) non-prevention of public officials from active bribery; 4) foreign bribery; 5) bribery committed by a judge; 6) trading in influence; 7)

8 This statistic shows that Greece’s portion of female judges is much higher than the median for the countries covered in the report at all judicial levels, from first instance to Supreme Court.

9 Greece is shown to structure judges’ career paths with an initial probation period followed by appointment until retirement.

10 This data shows that judges’ salaries relative to national average salaries for Greece are slightly below the median at the beginning of their careers and quite a bit higher at the Supreme Court level, where salaries are 5.2 times average gross salary versus a median for countries covered in the report of 4.2.

11 At 3.1 prosecutors per head of prosecution office, Greece has the minimum among the 42 countries reporting this indicator.

12 Greece is at about the European median gross salary as a percentage of average gross salary for the country at beginning of career; well above median at the level of the highest instance.

13 For Greece, faculty members of the University of Athens are acknowledged as contributors to the report.

https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2016/publication/CEPEJ%20Study%2023%20report%20EN%20web.pdf

http://www.heuni.fi/material/attachments/heuni/reports/qrMWoCVTF/HEUNI_report_80_European_Sourcebook.pdf

http://www.gsac.gov.gr/attachments/article/142/%CE%91%CE%A0%CE%95%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%9D%CE%99%CE%A3%CE%97%20%CE%A3%CE%A5%CE%9B%CE%9B%CE%9F%CE%93%CE%97%CE%A3%20%CE%94%CE%95%CE%94%CE%9F%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%A9%CE%9D%20%CE%94%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A6%CE%98%CE%9F%CE%A1%CE%91%CE%A3.pdf

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bribery in the private sector; and 8) embezzlement in public service. Statistics provided include (for 2014-2015) the number of prosecutions and number of offenders for these categories of offence.

21. GSAC recognises that the creation of statistics on corruption-related misconduct in Greece is a challenge. In its Corruption Data Collection, it notes that the “main problems encountered … are the absence of information collected on a long term basis, … the variations in the primary data logging system, and the heterogeneity of the primary data. ... Factors contributing to the problems are a lack of: a) an accepted definition of corruption; b) delimitation of the crimes that fall in the field of corruption; and c) a consistent methodological approach” (page 2). Addressing these problems will require efforts over the long term and a process of continuous improvement in various data gathering procedures (all of which will depend on maintaining a spirit of collaboration and co-operation with the agencies that collect the primary data).

22. GSAC is also launching an initiative to improve the data generated by administrative law processes relating to the fight against corruption. It notes (page 19 of Corruption Data Collection) that the “operational weaknesses of the administrative services in producing statistical data were in evidence at the logistical level, at the planning level or at the level of human resources allocation. The aim and ambition of GSAC is to produce data in a uniform way through the provision of core guidelines for the production of reliable statistics, which will be the navigation map to design policy initiatives to strengthen the competent auditing bodies in their work.”



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Box 2. Greece and the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index

The World Justice Project’s (WJP’s) Rule of Law Index 2016 report measures how the rule of law is experienced by the general public worldwide. The country scores and rankings for the Rule of Law Index 2016 are derived from more than 110,000 household and 2,700 expert surveys. These are used to measure how the rule of law is experienced in practical, everyday situations by the general public worldwide. In the area of criminal justice, the index consists of 7 components: effective investigation, timely and effective adjudication, effective correctional system, no discrimination, no corruption, no improper government influence and due process of law. The red bar – the high income average sets a very high standard for achievement in each of these areas. The green bar gives the median value in each area for the 113 countries covered by the report. Generally, Greece is above the median value in 4 areas, but below the median value in 3 (timely and effective adjudication’’, ‘effective correctional system’ and ‘no discrimination’. These same areas also show the largest gaps with the high income group’s survey results. Interestingly, in the area of “no corruption” the survey finds relatively small gaps between Greece’s criminal justice system (score equals 0.67) and the other high income countries (score equals 0.76) and in ‘effective investigation’ (Greece’s score is 0.52, as compared with 0.6 for the high income average).

Graph 1. Sub-components of the Criminal Justice component of the Rule of Law Index, 2016

C. OTHER COUNTRIES’ STATISTICS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT

23. Many countries publish statistics on their justice systems and on anti-corruption law enforcement. This section reviews some of these data publication practices with a view to identifying practices that might be of interest to Greece. The publication practices of selected countries (Canada,

0.52

0.46

0.3

0.4

0.67

0.59 0.590.6

0.680.64

0.62

0.760.73 0.73

0.44

0.52

0.38

0.49

0.550.50 0.49

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Effectiveinvestigation

Timely andeffective

adjudication

Effectivecorrectional

system

No discrimination No corruption No impropergovernment

influence

Due process oflaw

Greece High income average Median for all 113 countries

https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016

14

France, the United Kingdom, the United States14 are summarised in Annex Table 3 for overall criminal justice systems and in Annex Table 4 for anti-corruption enforcement efforts.

C.1. Other countries’ statistics on criminal justice systems

24. The findings of the review of criminal justice statistics provided in Annex Table 3 include:

Independence of statistics-generating processes – who’s in charge? As noted before, Greece’s data collection system for the overall system divides responsibility between the ELSTAT and the MOJ (which has a special unit for this purpose). None of the countries reviewed have exactly this institutional set-up. France and the United States spread data collection and reporting across at least 2 separate agencies. For France, these are the MOJ and Ministry of the Interior and, for the United States, the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (both of which are under the Department of Justice). In contrast, Canada and the United Kingdom have a single data collection unit for all criminal justice statistics (from policing to detention). In Canada, criminal justice statistics are collected and published by a specialised unit within the STATCAN, the statistics ministry. In the United Kingdom, criminal justice statistics are collected and published by the Ministry of Justice.

Breadth of data collection and publication. The data collected by the countries covered in Annex Table 3 shed light on nearly all aspects of the criminal justice systems of the countries concerned. Although coverage varies somewhat across countries, it often includes budgets and staffing levels (total and by function), nature and number of offences, arrests, the sociological dimension of law enforcement (for offenders and police, prosecutors and judges) and numerous statistics and indicators about the functioning of courts. Greece’s current data collection and publication practices for the overall criminal justice system (including the outputs of the statistical unit in the Ministry of Justice) seem broadly comparable to those of the countries reviewed.

Near total absence of corruption-related law enforcement statistics in these publications. Although, as noted above, the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics – 2014 contains statistics on crimes of corruption. None of the national crime statistical publications reviewed here systematically include data on corruption as a separate data category. This could be because (as noted in the European Sourcebook) corruption offenses are often not a numerically important offense (though their societal and economic impacts may be large) and they may therefore be merged into broader data categories (e.g. fraud).

Reporting styles. A number of reporting styles for overall criminal justice statistics are in evidence in the survey (see links in the Annex Table 3). France produces a stand-along annual report for the justice system that contains statistics and indicators without providing narrative interpretation. The United Kingdom Ministry of Justice and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation issue reports that include both statistics and narrative accounts on recent developments. Canada and the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics post their large blocks of criminal justice statistics on their websites and also post reports

14 These countries were chosen because they posted their publications online and the publications were available in one of the two official languages of the OECD (English and French).

http://www.heuni.fi/material/attachments/heuni/reports/qrMWoCVTF/HEUNI_report_80_European_Sourcebook.pdf

15

on special topics (e.g. sociological characteristics of offenders and victims of crime and recidivism).15

C.2. Other countries’ statistics on anti-corruption law enforcement

25. Annex Table 4 reviews the statistics published by 5 anti-Corruption agencies (New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States). The findings of this review include:

Statements of mission, core values and/ or strategic objectives are contained in 3 of the 5 annual reports of agencies (New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom). As noted, these are relevant for performance indicators because they guide which indicators should be produced.

Liability of legal persons is an important aspect of the fight against corruption and of economic crime more generally. Three of the anti-corruption agencies provide information on cases involving legal persons (Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States). Generally, this information is in the form of case listings, which are not statistics per se but information which allows statistics on law enforcement activities targeting natural and legal persons to be calculated easily. The lack of separate information on how natural and legal persons are handled in an anti-corruption law enforcement practice would appear to be a serious shortcoming in data dissemination by some anti-corruption agencies, including in GSAC statistical information.16

Narrative reports on important corruption cases. As noted earlier, statistics and indicators need to be accompanied by other information in order to shed meaningful light on law enforcement. The annual reports of the anti-corruption agencies of Norway (OKOKRIM) and the United States (DOJ-Fraud Division) contain narrative reports on politically and economically significant corruption cases. These name the offenders (usually companies) and provide information on the background to and purpose of the corruption as well as on the nature and level of sanctions incurred. In addition, the United States (DOJ-Fraud Division) and UK Serious Fraud Office post on their websites supporting documents that shed further light about the cases (e.g. press releases and court documents). This information serves many purposes – it informs the general public, business managers, the legal community and civil society about how corruption offences are being handled by law enforcement agencies. Like Greece, neither New Zealand nor Singapore provide such narrative accounts in the publications of their anti-corruption agencies. Obviously, the ability to publish information on specific offenders is subject to each country’s laws governing disclosure of outcomes of enforcement actions, but publishing such information would seem to promote deterrence and to help external parties to understand their obligations under the law and the risks they run if they contravene the law.

15 See this list of special studies on the DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics website.

16 It is worth noting that all five of the countries covered in Annex Table 4 provide for liability of legal persons for corruption. See Liability of Legal Persons for Foreign Bribery: A Stocktaking Report for New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. For Singapore, see Norton Rose’s report on Corporate Criminal Liability of Corruption Offenses.

https://www.bjs.gov/latestreleases.cfm

http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Liability-Legal-Persons-Foreign-Bribery-Stocktaking.pdf

http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/125162/corporate-criminal-liability-for-bribery-offences#section6

http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/125162/corporate-criminal-liability-for-bribery-offences#section6

16

D. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS FOR GREECE

26. This report has shown that, especially in recent years, Greece has generated a considerable volume of performance indicators and statistics on its criminal justice system. In addition, it participates in European co-ordination process (e.g. under CEPEJ) to enhance the consistency and comparability of criminal justice statistics and to make available comparative data on justice systems. Some of Greece’s criminal justice data – for example, on budgets, police, judicial authorities’ staffing levels -- seem to be particularly comprehensive. In other areas, the data are sparse or non-existent; the data on sanctions (e.g. prison terms, fines, other penalties) are a case in point.

27. Three international organisations – the COE, OECD and the UNODC – have recommended that Greece improve its statistics. It would appear that the Greece is responding to these recommendations. Following a ministerial level mandate to improve judicial system statistics, a special statistical unit within the MOJ launched a collaborative process of developing and improving statistics on the judicial system in 201617. Now available on the internet, this data gives both regional and total court decisions starting from mid-year 2014 until first semester 2017. ELSTAT is also tracking data relating to the number and nature of offences. In addition, a number of surveys of citizens’ experiences with corruption in Greek life are available. These initiatives in the development of justice system statistics for Greece are to be welcomed. GSAC has also started to compile statistics on corruption-related cases. These encouraging developments should continue.

28. Greece may wish to seek additional improvements to its indicators and statistics in the following areas:

MOJ and ELSTAT are encouraged to further extend and improve criminal data in order to expand its coverage and enhance quality. Of particular interest would be more detailed statistics on sanctions (e.g. details of prison terms, fines, other penalties). Also, calculations of clearance rates and disposition times for criminal cases would be a useful input to Greece’s efforts to improve the timeliness and efficiency of its criminal justice system.

In doing so, MOJ and ELSTAT should continue the past practice -- especially in evidence in the MOJ’s recent work on justice system statistics -- of collaborating with key stakeholders, participating in international data co-ordination processes and contributing data to international publications (which, by allowing international comparisons to be made, provide useful benchmarks for assessing Greece’s criminal justice system).

GSAC has already made progress in developing corruption-related statistics for Greece and now aims to improve data collection techniques in the administrative control bodies.18 GSAC is encouraged to persevere in these efforts. In doing so, it may wish to consider the following:

17 Information communicated in telephone interview with the staff of the MOJ statistical unit.

18 Regarding data from administrative control bodies, GSAC has stated: “The operational weaknesses of the competent services during the production of statistical data became evident either at the logistical level, at planning level or at the level of human resources allocation. The aim and ambition of GSAC is to produce data in a uniform way through the provision of core guidelines and the production of reliable statistics, which will be the navigation map to design policy initiatives to strengthen the competent auditing bodies in their work.” Excerpt from GSAC’s report entitled Corruption Data Collection, 2016 (unofficial translation); see page 18.



17

‒ Using the guidance provided in the UN system and by COE-CEPEJ regarding the classification of offenses and the steps to follow in developing justice statistics will undoubtedly be useful inputs to this effort (see Annotated Bibliography).

‒ Co-ordinate, to the extent possible, with other statistical processes in the area of corruption with the broader statistics effort being undertaken in the MOJ and ELSTAT. Greater co-ordination would allow GSAC to benefit from the specialised expertise available in the other ministries. Also, GSAC may wish to sign MOUs or employ other coordination mechanisms with the administrative agencies with which it is working to improve justice statistics.

‒ Ensure that GSAC has adequate resources and expertise to carry out the important work of disseminating information about anti-corruption law enforcement in Greece.

‒ Follow other anti-corruption agencies (Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States) in providing narrative descriptions and/or other documentary information (e.g. press releases and court decisions) about important corruption cases. As noted in this document, some corrupt acts have far reaching political and economic impacts which cannot be captured in statistics. This additional information is essential for helping all actors understand corruption and the legal risks that it entails.

‒ Liability of legal persons is of the utmost importance in anti-corruption law enforcement. Yet, Greece (like several other countries surveyed) produces only limited data on anti-corruption enforcement actions against legal persons.19 LP liability is established under administrative or civil law in Greece, which means that different information channels (relative to criminal law channels) would need to be tapped in order to provide statistics on the handling of natural and legal persons in Greek anti-corruption enforcement actions. GSAC has already stated that it will try to improve data coming out of administrative agencies (see second bullet point in this list about the need to coordinate effectively with these agencies). Keeping separate track of natural and legal persons as distinct data categories would allow GSAC to produce particularly relevant statistics and indicators.

‒ Greece should consider compiling additional statistics that would be useful to measuring performance in areas identified in other reports prepared in the context of Greek-OECD Anti-Corruption Project. These include:

‒ Clearance rate of corruption cases. This would shed light on how long it takes to complete corruption cases and on whether Greece is addressing concerns that completion of such cases takes too long.

‒ Time spent handling each corruption case in the three main phases of the case development chain: 1) preliminary investigation / preparatory examination; 2) main investigation; and 3) trial. This is because there is some concern about possible duplication in phases 1) and 2), and data could help identify the extent to which this is a genuine problem.

19 The Greek Financial Intelligence Unit provides information separately on natural persons and legal persons.

18

‒ Sanctions and especially confiscation in corruption cases, as there is concern that the asset recovery rate is poor in corruption cases.

‒ Information on the number of cases in which detainees were set free (and their assets unfrozen) due to the expiration of the maximum 18 month period for temporary detention before trial.

‒ The statistics should, to the extent possible, be broken down into specific offences, or at least the types of crime (e.g. economic crimes).

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Annex Table 1. Reports or online postings of data on Greece’s criminal justice systems and anti-corruption enforcement

Report which is source of judicial system data

Type of data

Greek reports and online postings of data related to the criminal justice system

ELSTAT data, Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2006-2015, pp.147-150. (available in both English and Greek)

Data collected by ELSTAT come from the Greek police, which is under the administrative control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Data provided on line includes:

Offences. Total and breakdown between felonies and misdemeanours. Statistics cover offences committed during the year, either misdemeanours or felonies (prosecuted "ex proprio motu" or upon indictment) for which the Regional Departments of the Hellenic Police have conducted a preliminary investigation or submitted a lawsuit or indictment against the relevant offenders (principal perpetrators or accomplices). In the case of multiple offences, all the offences are stated separately and in the case of accomplices, abettors, etc. all those who participated in the offence are stated separately.

Offenders. Total and broken down by sociological categories (gender, marital status, educational attainment and citizenship). The total number of offenders includes the offenders who were identified in the month when the offence was registered and the offenders who were unknown during the same month and who were identified later during the year, principal offenders and accomplices, arrested or not. Data also cover criminal offences, including felonies and misdemeanours

Regional breakdown of offences. Data categories of relevance to corruption where data for Greece is missing: number of police officers.

MOJ data, 2014-2017 (available only in Greek)

Data categories provided online:

Total number of decisions of the Court of First Instance, the Judicial Council of the Court of first instance, and the Court of Appeal (2014-2017), broken down by geographical region, including the percentages of decisions by category (e.g. postponement decisions, decisions that lifted confidentiality, that ordered provisional detention, or dismissed a case under conditions).

Total number of judges or other court personnel (e.g. Presidents of Courts of First Instance, Judges of Courts of First Instance, Bailiffs), broken down by geographical region.

http://www.statistics.gr/greece-in-figures

http://www.ministryofjustice.gr/site/el/%CE%9F%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%9D%CE%A9%CE%A3%CE%97%CE%94%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%91%CE%99%CE%9F%CE%A3%CE%A5%CE%9D%CE%97%CE%A3/%CE%A3%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC%CE%A3%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%B9%CF%87%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1%CE%94%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%83%CF%8D%CE%BD%CE%B7%CF%82/%CE%A3%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%B9%CF%87%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%AC%CE%B2%CE%B1%CE%B8%CE%BC%CF%8C%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%B4%CE%BF%CF%83%CE%AF%CE%B1%CF%82.aspx

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Total number of complaints received by the Prosecutor’s Offices of the Court of First Instance and of the Court of Appeal, broken down by geographical region, including: the number of archived complaints, complaints examined by a single-judge court, complaints examined by a three-judge court, expedited complaints examined by courts cases where the accused was caught in flagrante delicto, as well as referrals for further investigation.

Data categories relevant to corruption that the MOJ is not currently reporting: Breakdown of budget allocated to courts, decisions of the criminal cases examined by the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos)

International reports that include statistics on Greece’s criminal justice system

2017 European Justice Scoreboard

Data categories for which Greece provided data: Efficiency of Justice System

Time needed to resolve (non-criminal) cases (2010 data only is provided for Greece; 2011-15 missing)

Average length of judicial review for certain types of law cases (2013-15). Quality of Justice System,

General government total expenditure on law courts (2010-15); total expenditure as a function of GDP is about the same as in Italy, Austria and the Czech Republic.

Training for judges (no date)

Quality standards on time limits, time frames and backlogs

Availability of ICT for case management and court activity statistics; also ICT use for communications between courts and lawyers (no date) shows Greece has acceptable ICT systems for case management, but low levels for ICT systems for producing court activity data. Statistics indicate comparatively low ICT use for lawyer-court communications.

Independence

Individuals’ perception of judicial independence (2016-2017; from Eurobarometer survey) this shows that Greece has about the same percentage of poll responses that assign a very good or fairly good rating for judicial independence as France and Romania.

Businesses’ perception of judicial independence (2016-2017); from Eurobarometer survey) much harsher judgement by companies. Greece at about the same level as Latvia and Lithuania for ‘Very good’ or ‘Fairly good’ ratings.

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index_en.htm



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Rules for appointment of judges; dismissals; transfers (no date given)

European judicial systems: Efficiency and quality of justice 2016 CEPEJ Study no. 23

Data categories for which Greece provided data:

Annual public budgets of the judicial system compared with the annual public budget of the whole justice system in 2014 ; Annual public budget of the whole justice system, as a percentage of the total public expenditures (2014); Budget of the judicial system per capita (2014) this shows that Greece is just 1 EUR below the median public expenditure per capita of EUR 45; Budget allocated to courts; Revenues from court taxes or fees in (2010-2014)

Categories and number of judges (2014) and breakdown by gender (page 101; this shows that Greece’s portion of female judges is much higher than the median at all judicial levels, from first instance to supreme court).

Mandates of judges (Greece is shown to have probation period and then appointment until retirement)

Average gross salaries of judges, in absolute value and in relation to the national average gross

salaries (2014) This data suggests that judges’ salaries are slightly below the median at the beginning of the career and quite a bit higher at the Supreme Court level (5.2 times average gross salary versus a median of 4.2 times). Page 110.

Number of prosecutors; status of public prosecutors (2014); and mandates of public prosecutors (probation period followed by appointment until retirement) ; role of public prosecutors; gender breakdown of prosecutors. upward trend in the number of prosecutors for prosecutors over the period 2010-2012-2014

Number of prosecutors per head of prosecution office (average for country). At 3.1 prosecutors per head of prosecution office, Greece has the minimum among the 42 countries reporting this indicator (page 139).

Salaries of prosecutors relative to average gross salary for the country (at about the European median at beginning of career; well above median at the level of the highest instance. Page 143)

Number of non-judge staff per professional judge (2010-2014)

Number of lawyers (2010, 2012, 2014)

Monopoly of legal representation

Organisation of the court system (number by level of court; general versus specialised courts; Data categories of relevance to corruption where data for Greece is missing:

Number of cases handled by public prosecutors per 100 inhabitants

Clearance Rate of 1st instance criminal cases between 2010 and 2014

Disposition Time of 1st instance criminal cases between 2010 and 2014 (page 230)

European Sourcebook of

Data categories in which Greece has entries:

Trends in police staffing data (2007-2011).







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Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics – 2014 Contains data up to 2011.

Criminal offences per 100K population (2007-2011; Greek data marked as not available in 2011) plus breakdown of these data by type of criminal offence (e.g. homicide and fraud, but no data on money laundering). Corruption offences per 100K population (2007-2011) ; Offenders per 100K population (2007-2011) plus breakdown of these data by type of criminal offence.

Offenders per 100K population (2007-2011; these data show Greece as being systematically below the median for the 40 statistical areas covered). Percentage of females, minors and aliens among offenders (2010) and breakdown of same data by type of offense, including for corruption.

Different categories of dispositions of cases by prosecutors (2010; Greece only presents data on cases brought before a court and cases dropped for legal or factual reasons page 122.)

Total persons convicted per 100K population (2007-2010; 2011 data not provided) plus breakdown of these data by type of criminal offence. Persons convicted of corruption per 100K population (entry is zero for 2007, no data provided 2008-2011). Percentage of females, minors and aliens convicted, total and by type of offense (2010). The conviction data suggest that, based on convictions for all offenses per 100K population

Total persons receiving sanctions/measures (2010)

Persons convicted by length of unsuspended custodial sanctions and measures imposed (2010); Persons held in pre-trial detention (at least temporarily) among persons convicted in 2010 – Criminal offences: Total

Various tables on the prison population (2007-2011); Convicted prison population by type of offence (2010)

Convictions for corruption: ‘The only countries with a significant level of convictions were Lithuania (9.4), Poland (6.9) and Estonia (4.9). …. Corruption convictions were over 80% males, except in Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine.’ (page 153) On page 172, the report has Greece showing zero convictions for corruption per 100,000 population in 2007 and then the data being marked as not available for 2008-2011.

Data categories for which Greek data are missing: Criminal cases handled by prosecuting authorities; Percentage brought before the courts of the total output of criminal cases handled by prosecuting authorities. Criminal cases handled by prosecuting authorities per 100K population. Total persons receiving sanctions/ measures for corruption in 2010. National victimization surveys (page 341).

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Annex Table 2. GSAC reports containing data on corruption-related misconduct and anti-corruption law enforcement

GSAC Report name

Description of contents

Corruption Data Collection, 2016 (available only in Greek; the information provided here is based on an unofficial translation)

Data categories provided on line (references to offences generally include: 1 passive bribery of public officials; 2. active bribery of public officials; 3. non-prevention of public officials from active bribery; 4) foreign bribery’5) bribery committed by a judge; 6) trading in influence; 7) bribery in the private sector; 7) embezzlement in the framework of public service):

Prosecution by offence (2014-2015): A diminution of the total number of prosecutions by 30% has been registered between 2014 and 2015. Distribution of offences by prosecution and by region of Greece (2014-2015)

Number of offenders by offence (2014-2015) for the offences described above. A diminution of the total number of accused offenders by 70% has been registered from 2014 to 2015.

Confiscation of cigarettes (2015-2016), relevant numbers per public agency (Coast guard, Customs office, Police, Financial Police, SDOE etc.) and respective taxes.

Inspections and Controls carried out by the Inspectors’ Body for Health and Welfare (2016) divided by inspection category (administrative, sanitary, financial, regular, management, medical, preliminary examination, public health, due diligence, medicines, investigation order).

Administrative financial controls: cases forwarded to the prosecutor (2009-2016) in public health units (hospitals, pharmacies, therapists etc.) and in the field of social welfare

Table of suspicious transactions by liable persons (2014-second trimester of 2016) including brokerages, private companies, insurance companies, credit institutions, public services. Number of suspicious transaction reports resulting in investigations against natural or legal persons (2014-second trimester of 2016) for the offences of tax evasion, establishment of a criminal organisation, human trafficking, electronic fraud, terrorist acts and terrorism funding. Incoming and outgoing requests of the FIU.

Irregularities during the control of revenue (2014) concerning specific categories of natural persons.

Number of complaints concerning corruption of public officials (2014-second trimester of 2016) under investigation, preliminary examination, transmission to the prosecutor’s office, archived complaints. Number of complaints for corruption against the police and categorization by offence: bribery, extortion, abuse of power, theft, smuggling, breach of confidentiality during the service etc.

Prosecution of public officials by offence (2014-second trimester of 2016)


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Number of offences committed by public officials (2006-mid 2016).

Offences investigated according to the prosecutors’ offices (2014-2016): number of prosecutions by region of Greece, number of prosecutions by public official, elected representatives, security forces, public official in general, academia. Number of convictions, prosecutions, referral orders (2014-2016).

Number of administrative controls and inspections in the public sector (2012-2014). Data was collected from Prosecutors’ Offices and administrative control bodies. The participating bodies were: Customs Audit and Infringement Directorate (Δ’ Τμήμα Διεύθυνσης Στρατηγικής Τελωνειακών Ελέγχων και Παραβάσεων), Inspectors’ Body for Health and Welfare (Σώμα Επιθεωρητών Υπηρεσιών Υγείας και Πρόνοιας, ΣΕΥΥΠ), the Greek FIU, Department of Financial Police, Department of Internal Affairs of the Police, Body of Inspectors of the Public Administration, General Inspector of the Public Administration.

Annual Report 2016 (available only in Greek; the information provided here is based on an unofficial translation)

A ‘’Public Opinion and Corruption Perceptions in Greece” survey was carried out by GSAC in co-operation with the OECD. GSAC refers to a ‘’gap’’ between the perception of people concerning corruption and their actual experiences of corrupt practices. The survey instrument poses questions on: i. Public opinion and perception of corruption (ethical acceptance, perception of corrupt acts and recognition of their harmfulness); ii. Experience of actual incidents of corruption during transactions with public services; iii. Attitude towards the consequences of corruption and ways of dealing with it; and iv. Recognition of GSAC.

http://www.gsac.gov.gr/attachments/article/186/%CE%95%CF%84%CE%AE%CF%83%CE%B9%CE%B1%20%CE%88%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7%202016%20%CE%93%CE%95%CE%93%CE%9A%CE%91%CE%94.pdf

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Annex Table 3. Selected national reports or online statistics compilations covering criminal justice systems

Name of institutions publishing indicators

Country Type of reporting entity

General observations, including list of indicators and statistics published

Ministry of Justice Les chiffres clés de la justice 2016 See also the Ministry of the Interior’s Interstats webpage for policing statistics

France Statistical section of justice ministry

Report on criminal justice covers criminal, civil and administrative law. For justice system as a whole, statistics include total budget and information about staffing levels broken down by category. For criminal law, statistics include: decisions under criminal law; main sentences (e.g. fines and prison terms) Volume and outcome of court activity (e.g. number of cases prosecuted under criminal law, number of prison sentences); Nature of criminal offense; lengths of criminal proceedings. Corruption is not reported on as a separate crime category in this report. The Ministry of the Interior Interstats website contains a series of monthly crime reports and special-focus statistical studies (for example on reporting of crimes by victims). [webpage consulted mid-October 2017]

Statistics Canada (the statistics ministry) -Police-Reported Crime Statistics -Police Resources 2016 -Integrated Criminal Court Survey 2015/2016

Canada National Statistics ministry

This online report consists of 18 data tables giving criminal justice data for 2011-2016. The data include number of criminal cases, elapsed time for dealing with cases, guilty cases by type of sentence, number and type of sanctions. The statistics are collected by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (a unit of Statistics Canada) in co-operation with territorial and provincial government departments responsible for criminal courts. The STATCAN website also contains statistics on the police force (total expenditure on policing, staffing numbers, gender, ethnic and age composition of police officers) and on police-reported crimes (including a Crime Severity Index which is a measure of police-reported crime that reflects the relative seriousness of individual offences and tracks changes over time in crime severity. Corruption is not reported on as a separate crime category in this report.

Ministry of Justice Collection of Criminal Justice Statistics Quarterly Report to 9/2016

United Kingdom

Statistics section of justice ministry

A wide range of statistics is published on the entire criminal justice system, from policing to corrections. Statistics published include: Arrests for recorded crime (notifiable offences) and the operation of certain police powers; tribunal statistics; Race and the criminal justice system; women and the criminal justice system; youth justice statistics; criminal justice system performance information. Corruption is not reported on as a separate crime category in this report.

http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_CC%202016.pdf

http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_CC%202016.pdf

https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Interstats/Actualites

https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Interstats/Actualites

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/170724/dq170724b-eng.htm

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/170724/dq170724b-eng.htm

https://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/14777-eng.htm

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/170925/dq170925f-cansim-eng.htm



https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/592058/criminal-justice-statistics-quarterly-update-september-2016.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/592058/criminal-justice-statistics-quarterly-update-september-2016.pdf

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Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime in the United States 2016 Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) See the BJS website

United States

Statistical section of FBI Statistical section of DOJ

Online reporting covers (at national and sub-national levels) offences known to law enforcement, persons arrested police employee data it also features special reports on hate crimes, violence against police, Corruption not reported on as a separate crime category in this report. Online reporting provides statistics (at national and sub-national levels) on all aspects of the criminal justice system from reporting of crimes to prosecution and sanctions. Also contains data on expenditure and employment for law enforcement officials at the sub-national level (latest available statistic is from 2012) which is based on Census Bureau survey data. Use of census data presumably reflects the large number of subnational units employing law enforcement officials. Corruption is not reported on as a separate crime category in this report.

https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016

https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016

https://www.bjs.gov/

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Annex Table 4. National reports or online compilations of statistics covering anti-corruption law enforcement

Name of anti -corruption agency

Country Reporting entity General observations, including list of indicators provided in the Annual report

Serious Fraud Office See Annual Report 2016

New Zealand

Anti-fraud agency, including anti-corruption

Statement on core principles and strategic objectives.

Summary of achievements (investigations, prosecutions etc). Includes top level indicators on how SFO is meeting strategic objectives.

New Zealand’s ranking in the TI CPI.

Significant qualitative material to accompany statistical material and indicators (e.g. narrative descriptions of international co-operation and on their ‘systems, processes and technology’).

No information on cases involving liability of legal persons and no narrative accounts of corruption cases.

OKOKRIM See Annual Report 2016

Norway Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime

Budget and full time equivalent employees.

Functions/ expertise of staff.

Statistics and indicators. Cases under investigation; new cases; case processing time; clearance rate; decisions to proceed with prosecution; court cases (District Court, Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court); final decisions; convictions in final decisions; enforceable confiscations/financial sanctions; cases in which ØKOKRIM provided support; and suspicious transactions reports

Detailed narrative descriptions of large cases handled by OKOKRIM.

The narrative descriptions shed light on cases involving liability of legal persons.

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) See CPIB Annual Report 2016.

Singapore Anti-fraud agency, including anti-corruption

Statement of mission, vision and core values.

Statistics and indicators. Complaints received by CPIB and cases registered for investigation (2012-2016); Modes of complaints received and modes of complaints that resulted in investigations (2016); Breakdown of cases registered for investigation by the private sector versus the public sector (2014-2016); Public and private sector employees prosecuted in court (2014-2016); Number of cases handled in a year from registration of new cases to completion of cases (2014-2016); Conviction rate and clearance rate (2014-2016).

Results of public perception survey on prevalence of corruption (2016).

https://www.sfo.govt.nz/file/281

https://www.sfo.govt.nz/file/281

https://www.okokrim.no/getfile.php/3881783.2528.7nannji7ut7tj7/2016_AnnualReport_okokrim.pdf

https://www.okokrim.no/getfile.php/3881783.2528.7nannji7ut7tj7/2016_AnnualReport_okokrim.pdf

https://www.cpib.gov.sg/sites/cpibv2/files/CPIB_Annual%20Report_2016.pdf

https://www.cpib.gov.sg/sites/cpibv2/files/CPIB_Annual%20Report_2016.pdf

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Report on international engagement and on prevention and domestic outreach.

No narrative descriptions of important cases

No data on liability of legal persons.

Serious Fraud Office See Annual Report 2016-2017 And list of SFO cases.

United Kingdom

The Annual Report begins with statements of strategic objectives and values.

Data and narrative description of case processing.

Narrative descriptions of stakeholder engagement and inter-government co-operation.

Narrative description of digital and technological capabilities

The list of SFO cases allows a complete picture to be formed on how legal person liability is used in the context of corruption cases and for other economic crimes

Fraud Section – Department of Justice See Fraud Section – Year in Review 2016

United States

Fights economic crime, including foreign corrupt practices

Summary statistics on individuals charged and individuals convicted

Number of corporate resolutions

Total value of fines, penalties and forfeiture and total resolution amounts paid to US and foreign governments.

Detailed narrative accounts of particular cases, including several foreign corrupt practices cases; documents for these cases are available elsewhere on the Fraud Section’s website.

Documentation provided on website allows a complete picture to be formed on how legal person liability is used in the context of corruption cases and for other economic crimes.

https://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-cases/

https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/929741/download

https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/929741/download

Documents

Baseline Report on Greece’s - Εθνική Αρχή ΔιαφάνειαςThe purpose of this Baseline Report is to provide an overview of the process for revising Greece’s National