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ICAO specialized agency of the UN ensures safe, orderly growth of civil aviation throughout the world develops standards of AVSEC throughout world for airport, airway, air nav. Facility development, safety of flight

Avsec policy

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Page 1: Avsec policy

ICAO

specialized agency of the UN

ensures safe, orderly growth of civil aviation throughout the world

develops standards of AVSEC throughout world for airport, airway, air nav. Facility development, safety of flight

Page 2: Avsec policy

ICAO

• Meets once every 3 years

– Contracting states get 1 vote

– Decisions made by majority vote

– 188 participating member states

Page 3: Avsec policy

Annex 17

• 1944 ICAO Convention

– Aircraft in distress

• Humanitarian principle to assist another contract state if in danger

• Originally for sea vessels, adopted to aircraft during Chicago Convention

• What event caused the implementation of this policy?

Page 4: Avsec policy

Annex 17

Answer:

In 1985 TWA Flt.# 847

Controllers in Beirut and Algiers repeatedly denied permission of hijacked flight to land.

Page 5: Avsec policy

Conventions impacting AVSEC policy:

• Tokyo Convention: 1963

– Unlawful acts onboard that affect safety of flight

• Allow PIC to take reasonable measures to protect pax onboard

• Ability to have Pax restrained or removed

• How countries should handle hijack aircraft

• Contracting states obligated to take measures to restore/maintain control to PIC

• County in which aircraft is registered has juristiction over hijacked aircraft = unclear

Page 6: Avsec policy

Hague Convention: 1970

• Hijacking is a distinct offense with a severe punishment

• “unlawful seizure’ is defined (87)• Member states obligated to return a seized

aircraft to country of registered aircraft• Jurisdiction further defined = 1st to registered

state… if unable to respond or recover then goes to contract state

• Penalties to be imposed not listed for hijacking– Extradition policies not specified

Page 7: Avsec policy

Montreal Convention: 1971

• All contract states now screen pax, baggage, and employ national security agency at all airports

• Covers any attck on aircraft regardless of inflight or not– “inflight” defined as doors closed to doors open for

disembarkation

– Added perpetrators of attack not on board:• Saboteurs

• Bombers

• Facilitators

Page 8: Avsec policy

Montreal Convention: 1971

• 5 Offenses:

– Commit act of violence against person on board that endangers safety of flight

– Destroying/damaging aircraft

– Placing/cause of placement of device/substance likely to destroy/damage aircraft

– Destroy/interfere with air navigation facilities

– Communicate false info that interferes with safety (88)

Page 9: Avsec policy

Resolution A33-1: Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of Destruction and Other Terrorist Acts

Involving Civil Aviation:2001

• ICAO and UN– Establish audit program relating to airport security

arrangements and civil aviation security program

– Convene an international high-level, miniterial converence on aviation security

– Strengthen ICAO’s role in adoption of standards and recommended practices in AVSEC and auditing of their implementation.

Page 10: Avsec policy

Resolution A33-1

• Aviation Security Plan of Action (ASPA)

– Regular, mandatory, systematic, harmonized audits

• Enable the evaluation of AVSEC in all member states

• Addressed need to identify and assess global resonses to new threats

• Take action to protect airports, aircraft, ATC centers

Page 11: Avsec policy

ICAO Universal Security Audit Program (USAP)

• ICAO provides it’s own guidance = “How to” audit

– ICAO would assist with execution of audit program:

• Contracting state, airport, aircraft operator in developing programs to addres deficiencies in AVSEC capabilities.

• Part of larger effort to establish global aviation security system

Page 12: Avsec policy

Universal Security Audit Program (USAP)

• Each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace of it’s territory

• Elements and process of audit are transparent and made available to all contract states

• All-inclusive and centered on Annex 17 standards• Audits expected to expand to include other annexes

and recommended practices to ensure implementation of all appropriate security-related SARPs in contacting states’ civil aviation systems.

• Each state responsible for aviation security– Including decision-making powers with respect to

implementing corrective actions related to audit findings

Page 13: Avsec policy

Audit Program

• Access control– Physical security measures

– Background checks

– Personnel identification system design

– Vehicle permits

• Protection fo aircraft – Preflight precautions

– Aircraft searches

– Control of access to aircraft

Page 14: Avsec policy

Audit Program

• Managing responses to unlawful acts

• Airport design

– Security including minimizing effects of explosion on people and facilities

• Quality control

– Security inspections and audits

– Security tests

– Training of security staff

Page 15: Avsec policy

Audit Program

• Security equipment and explosives

– WTMDs (walk through metal detector)

– X-ray machines

Page 16: Avsec policy

Audit Program

• Search and evacuation guidelines

• Surface-to-air missiles

• Incident command and emergency operations

• Model airport and aircraft operator security programs

• Dangerous goods

Page 17: Avsec policy

Audit Program Recommendations

• Information regarding use of forged travel docs should be shared

• Information on actions and movements of known terrorists should be shard with other member states

• Commercial explosives material should be tagged with chemical known as Taggant– Makes it easier to detect with explosive trace

detection machines

Page 18: Avsec policy

Audit Program Recommendations

• Informaton relating to arms and explosives smuggling should be shared

• Countries must prosecute suspected bombers or extradite them.

Page 19: Avsec policy

Additional Annexes

• Annex 2: allows ATC to direct aircraft under unlawful interference to deviate and grant priority landing

• Annex 6: establishes guidance for security of aircraft = protection fo flight deck, aircraft search procedures, security training programs for crewmembers, reporting security incidents

Page 20: Avsec policy

Additional Annexes

• Annex 9: security controls must be put into place to protect aircraft, pax, cargo, but must not inhibit movement of aircraft, pax cargo

• Annex 10: Aeronautical Telecommunication –provices method to notify ATC of aircraft subject to unlawful interference = transponder code 7500

Page 21: Avsec policy

Additional Annexes

• Annex 11: ATC provide max amount of assistance to aircraft under unlawful interference

– “provide max assistance including priority handling, notify and provide info to appropriate agencies, rescue coordination centers, and other aircraft…not refer to situation in communications with aircraft unless it is certaintha tsuch references will not aggravate the situation.”

Page 22: Avsec policy

Additional Annexes

• Annex 13: Aircraft accident and incident investigation reporting requirements for unlawful interference incidents

• Annex 14: airport security measures– Isolated parking position– Placement of perimeter fencing– Positioning of airport emergency plan that addresses

hijackings, bombings, and other security incidents

• Annex 18: Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air = air cargo security; hazmat shipment

Page 23: Avsec policy

ATC role in unlawful interference

• Responsible for ensuring greater separation from other aircraft

• Greater leeway in handling the flight

– Deciding best way to provide assitance

– Enlist aid fo other air traffic services

– Providing flight crew with info on suitable airports for landing, minimum altitudes, wx

Page 24: Avsec policy

ATC role in unlawful interference

• In hijacking:

– Controllers attempt to determine number of individuals onboard/remaining; presence of hazmat

– Try to expedite all phases of flight

– Transmit info pertinent to sae conduct of flight to other agencies

– Monitor and plot progress of flight

Page 25: Avsec policy

Role of ATC in unlawful interference

– Coordinate transfer of flight to other ATC facilities without requiring transmissions or responses from aircraft

– Advise adjacent ATS unites of progress of flight

– Notify aircraft operator, rescue coordination centers, and designated security authorities

– Suspected bomb threat = prompt response to pilot requests• Air nav procedures and services along route and at

airports of intended landing

Page 26: Avsec policy

Role of ATC in unlawful interference

• If crew doesn’t know that bomb hreat has been received, ATC must advise crew immediately, determine intention of crew, provide clearnaces for new destinations without delay

• Grounded aircraft mst be advised to remain as far away as possible from other aircraft and facilities

• Controller’s responsibility to direct PIC off runway to parking area

• Do NOT provide advice or guidance concerning explosive device

Page 27: Avsec policy

U.S. Aviation Policies

• Federal Aviation Act: 1958

– Foundation for policies, procedures, regs currently practiced

– AVSEC became an issue in 1960

– JFK assigned air marshals to flight in 1961

– Airports joined AVSEC program 1971

• Part 107 (Airport Security) – placed responsibility of protecting air operations area on an airport from unauthorized access.

Page 28: Avsec policy

• Security regulations are created through:

– Specific acts

– Presidential executive orders

– Amendments attached to funding leglislation

Page 29: Avsec policy

Significant U.S. Congressional acts passed in response to air terrorism

• Anti-Hijacking Act 1971

– USA up to ICAO standards on prevention of unlawful seizure

– Punishment of hijackers

– Maximum penalty for surrender

– Mandated pax screening

Page 30: Avsec policy

• Anti-Hijacking Act 1974

– Authorized President to suspend air service to foreign nations that encouraged hijacking

– Authorized Sec. of Transportation to restrict ops of foreign air carriers within USA

– Required screening of all pax & all property using “weapons detection” technology

– Enabled airlines to refuse transport to anyone not consentin to search

Significant U.S. Congressional acts passed in response to air terrorism

Page 31: Avsec policy

– Mandated law enforcement presence at nation’s commercial service airports

– Placed responsibility for pax screening to air carriers… what’s the problem?

Significant U.S. Congressional acts passed in response to air terrorism

Page 32: Avsec policy

• Act to Combat Terrorism – 1978

– Added req. for airports to notify travelers to foreign airports that were deemed dangerous to for use for Americans

– Authorized President to suspect air service to those countries.

Page 33: Avsec policy

• AVSEC Improvement Act of 1990

– Major legislation to change avsec system

– Response to downing of PSA 1771 and bombing of Pan Am 103

– Revised title 14 CFR Part 107 (Airport Security)

• to include more comprehensive regs on personnel identification systems and airport access conrol systems.

• Airport and airline personnel to under go pax screening.

Page 34: Avsec policy

• Pan Am 103:– Access Control

• Airports and personnel identification systems now required to keep record of who has authorized accesss to doors, aes, or access points

• Must immediately prevent individuals without approved access

• Standard raised for personnel identifiation systems – more difficult to duplicate

– Portable radio found as part of bomb• Pax required to turn on laptop computers and PEDs at checkpoints

• Why not X-ray the PEDs?

• Restricting laptops and cell phones impacts business travelers = significant portion fo airline’s revenue.

Page 35: Avsec policy

• Employee screening

– Pilot control of aircraft

– Crash axe in cockpit

– Bypass screenings starting to be implemented for some

Page 36: Avsec policy

Aviation Security and antiterrorism Act - 1996

• TWA 800: JFK-CDG exploded shortly after takeoff

– Exact cause of crash uncertain

– Security experts claimed it a result of terrorism as bomb residue was discovered in wreckage

– White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security = “Gore Commission”

• Federal government should consider aviation security to be national security issue and provide funding

Page 37: Avsec policy

“Gore Commission”

– Terrorist attacks on civil aviation are directed at USA

– Proactive policy toward aviation security

– AVSEC is government responsibility

– Welcome relief to airline industry

– Over 50 recommendations:

• Security consortium: airport security, law enforcement personnel, FAA, FBI, other airport stakeholders

• Goals: stay abreast of evolving threats to aviation, develop strategies and recommendations to counteract threats

Page 38: Avsec policy

“Gore Commission”

• Airports conduct vulnerability assessments

– FAA and FBI to conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments every 3 years at high risk airports

• DOT, FAA, FBI established formulas to determine a high risk airport

– Security-sensitive information

• Fingerprint-based criminal history record checks for all screeners and airport, airline employees with access to security areas….. Flaws?

Page 39: Avsec policy

“Gore Commission”

• Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS)

– Pax separated into low-risk and high–risk categories

• Exposive detection systems and trace detections systems

• Bomb-sniffing dogs

• Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC)

– Industry professionals advise federal gov’t on security issues

Page 40: Avsec policy

• Commercial aircraft search before each flight and increase inspections of air cargo

– Known shippers program

• Research efforts:

– FBI, CIA, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)

• Research known terrorist, hijackers, bombers

• Develop profile indicators tied to automated pax information system

Page 41: Avsec policy

“Gore Commission”

• Not based on race, relgion, national origin• Airlines not retain pax name data info• Pax made aware of process and allowed to

decline and not fly• DoJ review profiling procedures

– Advisory board formed

– Profiling becomes less effective with developmemt of more eficient screening technology

– Profiling recommend to cease after EDS unites are fully deployed… controversy?

Page 42: Avsec policy

“Gore Commission”

• Security systems testing– Red teams

• Red team results not admissible for enforcement proceedings against airport and airline operators

• Aviation Family Disaster Act – 1996– Gives NTSB responsibility for aiding families of

aircraft accident victims and coordinating federal response to major domestic aviation accidents