AvSec Awareness

IATA - AVIATION SECURITY AWARENESS

October 2011

MODULE 1 – THREATS TO AVIATION

1.1. Why is Civil Aviation an Attractive Target?1.1.1. Profile of Civil Aviation

Domestic, national and international civil aviation is the basis of a multi-national business involved in the transport of people and goods around the world. Wide-bodied aircraft that can transport people at tremendous speed and range and for reasonable cost have made travel very accessible. Cargo capacity, enabling the express just-in-time delivery of exports/imports, has made air transport attractive to international trade.

Civil aviation has been marked by:

- Rapid technological and engineering development- Rapid growth- Increasing commercialization of all assets and services- An interdependence between human beings and technology- The reactive development of international security measures- A sharing of the skies and facilities by civil, military and general aviation- The increasing affordability of air travel

1.1.2. An Attractive Target

Civil Aviation is a growth sector. It is very dynamic and because it is the most popular mode of transportation for international level, it has attracted attention. From holiday travelers and businessmen to dignitaries and other ordinary people who need to travel. However, Civil Aviation has also attracted the attention of terrorists and criminals who use the industry to perpetrate crimes to serve their group or individual needs. For this category of people, the industry has become attractive because:

- It is high profile, has commercial value and is considered prestigious- Has high passenger traffic levels- An incident may force a government reaction, i.e. will increase security- It offers limited risk to the terrorist (who is possibly remote from any accident).

1.1.3. Other Developments Adding to Popularity

The industry is continuously expanding and re-inventing itself. Developments that have added to its appeal to terrorists include:

- The expansion of more travel destinations due to global trade growing economies- More passengers are travelling (1.6 billion) as air travel becomes more comfortable- More airlines are created, especially low cost airlines, due to increasing demands for air travel

and also competitive needs- More airports are being built to cater to the increased air traffic and the concept of “hubbing”- Bigger aircraft (A380) are coming on line to meet both fuel efficiency and environmental needs

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- More air cargo is being delivered- The use of aircraft has been shown to be effective as a vehicle of attacks as demonstrated by the

9/11 incident

These factors have all added to the vulnerability of the industry. Threats are directed at the industry by a variety of perpetrators, some of whom fall under the most “unlikely” threats.

1.2 Types of Threats, their Sources and Methodologies

1.2.1. Types of Threats

Threats to civil aviation fall into two broad categories, direct and indirect.

Direct threats are those that specifically target civil aviation. They include the following:

- Bomb/Improvised Explosive Device (IED) – Threat of a bomb/IED on an aircraft, terminal or other airport facilities

- Hijack – Threats to seize control of an aircraft, in the air or on the ground- Seizure of Hostages – Threats to seize hostages in a terminal or other airport building. Such a

threat, if carried out, could lead to major disruptions to the airport facility- Armed Attacks – Threats by an individual or a group to carry out an armed attack at an airport of

other facility- Sabotage – Threats of malicious or wanton destruction of aviation facilities and equipment.

Could include the use of bombs/IEDs.- Extortion – Intimidation of aviation industry organizations for financial gain by threatening to

attack their aviation assets- Violent Protest – The threat of protest by political or special interest groups form whom there is

likely to be an intent to commit acts of violence and/or to disrupt the operations of an aviation facility

- Breaches of Security – Threats to breach or compromise security measures with the intention of gaining access to security restricted areas of airports place weapons on aircraft or sabotage aircraft instrumentation

- War-like Actions – Threats to an aircraft arising from its operation into or over countries in civil disruption. Threats could be in the form of ground-to-air or air-to-air fire directed against the aircraft in flight or armed assault on the ground.

- Missile Attacks – Threats of attacks against low flying aircraft, i.e. approaching or departing an airport, by persons using shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles

- Suicide Attacks – Attacks executed by suicide bombers against aviation facilities or assets

Indirect threats can arise from actions that, while not intended to threaten aviation in general, are nevertheless unlawful. They include:

- Drug, flora or fauna trafficking

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- Smuggling (e.g.: currency or bullion)- In-flight violence (e.g.: assault by an individual or a group on another passenger or flight crew)- Workplace violence

When trafficking and smuggling is detected at the airport, action by law enforcement officers to apprehend the offenders could lead to a situation where aviation operations are threatened by the offenders in their attempt to avoid arrest. An example would be offenders seizing a hostage and barricading themselves in an office in a terminal building.

In the case of in-flight or work place violence, unless quick and effective action is taken to deal with the situation, the violence could escalate to a point where the safe operation of an aircraft could be at risk or damage could occur to airport facilities and equipment.

As a result of numerous ways that indirect have been perpetrated against civil aviation, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which is a United Nations body that regulates aviation safety and security, categorized these threats under the term “Act of Unlawful Interference”. All 190 Contracting States have adopted this term in their legislation and applied it to domestic as well as international civil aviation.

1.2.2. Sources of Threats

The threat to civil aviation can come from a variety of sources. These include:

- Terrorists- Criminals- The mentally disturbed- Employees (disaffected or those with criminal motives)- Refugees- Other governments

In fact, this list is ever changing. More recently, intelligence agencies have identified individuals who are involved in what is termed “Do-it-yourself-terrorists”. These are individuals who have been influenced by religious extremism and decide to become terrorists without affiliation to a specific group.

There are also groups who align themselves to certain terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and act unilaterally in the name of that organization to conduct terrorist activities. Such groups may have members who have no previous criminal record or history of being involved in such activities.

The motives for terrorist groups are many. Some of the more common ones are:

- To gain publicity for their cause- To gain release of political prisoners or other terrorists- To change government or international policy- To undermine and discredit authorities who oppose their cause

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- To target individuals for assassination- To frighten the public and disrupt normal life- To obtain money by threat or blackmail

1.2.3. Methodologies

Some of the methods used by terrorists against civil aviation are as follows:

- Hijacking – Techniques that involve the smuggling of arms or weapons on board an aircraft, seizing the aircraft forcibly and taking hostages

- Sabotage - This involves the use of explosives or incendiaries (or a combination of both) on board an aircraft or in strategic locations in airport facilities

- MANPADS – Otherwise known as Man Portable Air Defense Systems, are used against aircraft in flight or on the ground. MANPADS have been recognized as one of the new emerging threats to civil aviation.

- Suicide Bomber – This involves the detonation of explosives that are carried in a vehicle or on a person

- Military-Style Attacks – These can be conducted by a group of terrorists armed with automatic weapons and explosives against airport facilities

- Aircraft – The infamous 9/11 incident in the United States introduces a new method whereby an aircraft is hijacked and purposefully crashed into strategic targets in order to destroy them

- CBRN – This refers to the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapon systems. It is understood that terrorists are attempting to acquire such devices. If they succeed, this will change the threat environment dramatically.

- Cyber-Terrorism – This is a highly technical form of warfare that involves the intentional clipping of an organization’s communications and computer networks.

1.3 Past Aviation Security Incidents

1.3.1 Types of Incidents in the Past

We will now see how terrorists executed some of the attacks against civil aviation. Their success can be attributed to many factors. One of these is that aviation security tends to be very reactive rather than proactive in reducing the potential impact of threats.

The main reason for this is that terrorists have “the element of surprise”. This means that they choose the target, date and time as well as the method to use against civil aviation. Thus, security generally reacts to an incident that has already happened and then puts in place measures to reduce recurrence. It is against this backdrop that we are going to discuss some of the major incidents that have been perpetrated against civil aviation.

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Hijack of El Al Flight, Rome – Tel Aviv

This was the first hijacking carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The aircraft was diverted to Algiers by three PFLP members. The terrorists demanded the release of 1,200 prisoners. The last hostages were released on September 1, 1968. This resulted in the IFALPA (the International Pilot Association) threatening to boycott Algeria. This hijacking lasted almost three months.

Terrorist Attack at Tel Avis’s Airport

On May 30, 1972, three members of the Japanese Red Army undertook a terrorist attack on behalf of the PFLP at Tel Aviv’s Lod Airport (now Ben Gurion International Airport0. Because airport security was focused on the possibility of an attack by Palestinians, the use of Japanese terrorists took the guards by surprise. Also, the “terrorists” commitment to a suicide mission simplified the planning. Kozo Okamoto, Tsuyoshi Okudaira and Yasuyuki Yasuda had been trained in Baalbeck, Lebanon.

Bomb Explosion on Board Air India Flight 182

Air-India Flight 182 was a Boeing 747 that exploded on June 23, 1985 while at an altitude of 31,000 feet (9,500 m) above the Atlantic Ocean, south of Ireland. All 329 passengers on board were killed, of whom 136 were children and 280 were Canadian citizens. Up until September 11, 2001, the Air India bombing was the single deadliest terrorist attack involving aircraft. It is also the larger mass murder in Canadian history. It occurred within an hour of the Narita Airport bombing.

Bomb Explosion on Board Air Lanka’s L-1011

On May 3, 1986, a bomb exploded on an Air Lanka L-1011 Tristar aircraft on the ground at Colombo International Airport. The incident occurred as passengers were boarding the aircraft prior to its departure for a scheduled flight to the Maldives. The explosive device was placed inside a consignment of perishable cargo that had been stowed in the C2 cargo compartment near the rear of the aircraft.

The flight was delayed because of damage caused during the loading of the aircraft. The bomb would appear to have been timed to explode while the aircraft was in the air. A total of 16 people were killed and 40 injured 16 of them seriously. Responsibility for the bomb attack was attributed to extremist Tamil separatists from Sri Lanka.

Explosive Device on Board Pan Am Flight 103

On December 21 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was en route from London Heathrow airport to New York. What was not known was that there was an explosive device disguised in a transistor radio in the bag of one of the passengers that was loaded in the cargo hold of the aircraft. The passenger was not on board the flight. This flight originated from Frankfurt and the bag with the explosive device originated from Malta. The explosive device detonated when the flight was over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 passengers and 11 Lockerbie residents. The bomb was planted by Libyan agents.

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New York – September 11, 2001

On September 11, 2001, a total of 19 hijackers boarded four US carriers from different airports, hijacked the aircrafts and crashed into the “TwinTowers’, eventually causing both towers to collapse. The third aircraft was crashed into Pentagon. The fourth aircraft was heading towards the “White House”, but passengers forced it to crash into fields. More than 3,000 people were killed in this incident which changed the scope of security completely.

Crash of Arkia Airlines

On November 28, 2002, two MANPADS ground-to-air missiles were fired at Arkia Airlines which caused it to crash. This was just one incident. There were 42 other such incidents that had happened before.

Terrorist on Board Delta Airlines Flight

A Nigerian citizen, Farouk Abdulmutaallab, travelling on Delta Airlines from Amsterdam to Detroit with no checked baggage, had explosives concealed in his underwear. The bomb was to be triggered by chemical reaction on board the American airliner. He was overpowered by passengers and crew while attempting to initiate the explosion, 20 minutes prior to landing. He received his training in Yemen.

1.3.2 Security Measures Implemented as a Result of Past Incidents

As a result of the numerous attacks against civil aviation, a number of security measures were implemented to reduce the possibility of recurrences. ICAO, an entity of the United Nations, is responsible for these security measures. ICAO produces two security documents; namely Annex 17, which is called “Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference” and the ICAO Security Manual, which also called “Document 8973”.

Annex 17 contains the Standards and Recommended Practices for aviation security. It dictates the security requirements that have to be implemented in the airports of the Contracting States. Document 8973 specifies how they can be implemented.

Therefore, following various “Acts of Unlawful Interference”, ICAO made changes to Annex 17 in the form of amendments. Some of the key changes were as follows:

4.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that aircraft security checks of originating aircraft engaged in commercial air transport movements are performed or an aircraft security search is carried out. The determination of whether it is an aircraft security check or a search that is appropriate shall be based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.

4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage is screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations departing from a security restricted area.

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4.5.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators do not transport the baggage of passengers who are not on board the aircraft unless that baggage is identified as unaccompanied and subjected to additional screening.

Each Contracting State shall ensure that cargo and mail to be carried on a passenger commercial aircraft are protected from unauthorized interference from the point security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.

The above are only some of the many measures that were required to be implemented to raise the security status of airports and airlines to protect against Acts of Unlawful Interference.

MODULE 2 – ROLE OF ICAO, IATA AND ACI IN AVSEC

2.1 AVSEC Global Structure

2.1.1 ICAO – The Regulatory Agency

ICAO has its origins in the Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention), which was signed in that city on December 7, 1944, by 52 countries. Pending ratification of the Convention by at least 26 member states, the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO) was established. It functioned from June 6, 1945 until April 4, 1947. On March 5, 1947 the 26 th

ratification was received and ICAO came into being on April 4, 1947. In October of the same year, IACO became a specialized agency of the United Nations linked to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Organizational Structure

To regulate aviation security globally amongst its 190 member states, the ICAO Assembly consists of the Secretary General and his team (Secretariat) as well as the Council President and members. Let’s begin by looking at how the Secretary General and his team are organized.

The Secretary General heads the ICAO and the Secretariat which is organized into five departments or bureaus:

- Administration- Air Navigation- Air Transport- Legal- Technical Cooperation

Within the Air Transport Bureau (ATB) is Security & Facilitation and the Aviation Security Audit Unit. The Aviation Security Section, including the AVSEC Mechanism, functions under Security & Facilitation.

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We will now look at the Council President and its 36 members. The Council is the operational team of ICAO. It is actively involved in managing a variety of global operational issues related to aviation security.

To support the Council President and members, there are seven specialized committees. These are:

- Air Navigation- Air Transport- Unlawful Interference- Finance- Joint Support- Legal- Technical Cooperation

The functions of some of these committees mirror those of the Bureaus but operate at different levels. The Bureaus handle matters at the State level while the Committees work at Airport. Both groups maintain close links with each other.

Under the Committee on Unlawful Interference are two specialized units: the International Explosives Technical Commission and an ad-hoc group of specialists on the Detection of Explosives.

2.1.2 IATA – Association of Airlines

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IATA is an association of air carriers. It is an international trade body that was first established in 1945 in Havana, Cuba, by a founding group of airlines. Today, IATA represents some 320 airlines comprising 93% of the scheduled international air traffic. The organization’s function is to represent, lead and serve the airline industry.

IATA is headed by the Director General (DG) and Chief Executive Officer. The DG is supported by a team that is organized into the following functional areas:

- Human Capital- Environment- Communications- Chief Economist- Legal Services

and five major divisions as follows:

- Corporate Services- Industry Distribution and Financial Services- Marketing and Commercial Services- Member & Government Relations & Corporate Secretary- Safety, Operations and Infrastructure

Over the years, IATA has widened its focus, which today can be categorized as follows:

- Safety & security: to promote safe, reliable and secure air services- Industry recognition: to achieve recognition of the importance of air transport for worldwide

social and economic development- Financial viability: to assist the industry to achieve adequate levels of profitability of optimizing

revenues (yield management) while minimizing costs (fuel charges and taxation)- Products & services: to provide high-quality, value-for-money, industry-required products and

services that assist the airlines in meeting the needs of the consumer- Standards & procedures: to develop cost-effective, environmentally-friendly standards to

facilitate the operations of international air transport- Industry support: to identify and articulate common industry positions and support the

resolution of key industry issues (e.g.: congestion, infrastructure)

IATA plays a key role in safety and security for its airline members and has introduced a number of new initiatives to help cut operational costs for airlines.

2.1.3 ACI – A Community of Airports

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In 1991, airport operators around the world created Airport Council International, the first worldwide association to represent their common interests and foster cooperation with partners throughout the air transport industry. Through ACI, the airport community now speaks with a single voice on key issues and concerns and, despite regional diversity, can move forward as a united industry.

ACI has 575 members operating over 1,633 airports in 179 countries and territories. In 2008, AIC members handled 4.8 billion passengers, 86 million metric tons of freight and 77 million aircraft movements.

AIC pursues the interests of airports in discussion with international organizations. The most important relationship it has is with ICAO, where international standards for air transport are debated and developed. AIC defends airports’ positions and develops standards and recommended practices in the areas of safety, security and environmental initiatives.

ACI is headed by a Director General who is supported by a General Assembly comprising 29 members. The DG has a team of Directors and Managers focusing on:

- Aero political and economic affairs- ICAO liaison and Environment- Communications- Facility and security- Safety and technical training

2.2 Explain Roles of ICAO, IATA and ACI in AVSEC

2.2.1 Roles of ICAO

ICAO is a United Nations Agency that has 190 members or “Contracting States”. As part of its many functions, ICAO’s Aviation Security Section is involved in all aspects of aviation security. This section’s mission is:

- To develop aviation security principles- To communicate and promote these principles worldwide- To assist ICAO Contracting States in implementing the principles.

ICAO achieves its mission through a variety of initiatives, principally:

- Maintenance of Annex 17- Maintenance of the aviation security portions of other Annexes and Manuals- Organization of AVSEC seminars- Follow-up reporting on aviation security incidents- Analysis of reports- Maintenance of the Security Manual (Document 8973)- Development of the ICAO Training Programs

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- Development of new Aviation Security Training Programs (ASTPs)- Coordination of the worldwide network of Aviation Security Training Centers (ASTCs).

The current locations of the ASTCs are:

- Argentina (Buenos Aires)- Canada (Montreal)- China (Hong Kong)- China (Kinming)- Ecuador (Quito)- Jordan (Amman)- Kenya (Nairobi)- Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur)- Morocco (Casablanca)- New Zealand (Auckland)- Russian Federation (Moscow)- Senegal (Dakar)- South Africa (Johannesburg)- Trinidad (Port of Spain)- UAE (Dubai)- Ukraine (Kiev)

ICAO conducts a variety of aviation security courses at these centers to train those in the industry.

ICAO has two important documents that form the basis upon which aviation security is conducted in its Contracting States. These documents are:

- Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, which provides the basis for all aviation security regulation and legislation

- Document 8973, which is the ICAO Security Manual.

In order to maintain consistency of standards in airports, ICAO conducts audits of these airports under its “Universal Security Audit Programme” (USAP). The USAP was introduced after the events of 9/11, which resulted in a ministerial-level conference in Montreal, in February 2002. The key decisions made at this meeting were in the following areas:

- Preventing, combating and eradicating acts of terrorism- Strengthening ICAO’s role in developing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)- Ensuring financing for urgent actions

It was at this meeting that some very important decisions were made for the future of aviation industry. The AVSEC Plan of Action, as it was termed, included the following:

- Establishment of the ICAO Audit Programme (USAP)

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- Reinforcement of AVSEC Mechanism for urgent assistance and follow-up- Assistance to States through the Technical Cooperation Programme in addressing gaps in

aviation security.

2.2.2 Roles of IATA

In representing its constituent members as an association of airlines, IATA provides industry input to governments and other international organizations by:

- Assisting in the development of International Standards and Recommended Practices- Participating in the ICAO Aviation Security Panel- Providing input to ICAO regional activities- Encouraging governments to ratify, implement and adhere to international security conventions

IATA also focuses on continual improvement, cost reduction and promoting measures to reduce criminal activities such as:

- The carriage of illicit narcotics and other prohibited substances- Stolen and unapproved aircraft parts- The theft of baggage, cargo and mail- The theft of corporate assets

IATA also:

- Provides guidance to its members to combat the threat of unlawful interference with civil aviation

- Conducts the IOSA audit program

Another important aspect of IATA’s contribution to aviation security is the development of the IATA Security Manual. This document is a tremendous help to the airlines because it is designed to assist in the implementation of Standards and Recommended Practices prescribed in Annex 17.

Annex 17 is available to all agencies including the airlines. However, Document 8973 is only available to government agencies. This means that airlines do not necessarily have immediate access to the guidelines on implementation of Annex 17. IATA “bridged” this gap with the production of its IATA Security Manual.

IATA also runs a variety of specialized aviation courses for practitioners in the industry. One series of courses relates to aviation security. Unlike ICAO which focuses on aviation security for airports, IATA focuses on the aviation security for airlines. Both of these use Annex 17 as the baseline for their instruction.

For this purpose, IATA has more than 262 authorized training centers around the world.

2.2.3 Roles of ACI

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- As a community of airports, the role of ACI is to: Draft positions for ICAO AVSEC Panel

- Issue joint positions with IATA

- Lobby governments for sustainable security rules

- Prepare guidance for members

- Plan scenarios for 100% checked baggage screening

- Include security in airport design

- Share experiences with new screening technologies.

ACI defends the positions of its members and develops standards and recommended practices in the areas of safety, security and environmental initiatives. ACI also provides the platform for pursuing a constructive and cooperative relationship with airline associations, governments and regulators.

Training is also a key feature for ACI. It offers a number of aviation security courses and has training centers in various countries.

MODULE 3 – REGULATING AVSEC

ANNEX 17, DOCUMENT 8973 & THE IATA SECURITY MANUAL

3.1 The International Conventions

3.1.1 The Chicago Convention

A conference of aviation states was held in Chicago in 1944 resulting in the Convention on International Aviation – commonly known as the “Chicago Convention”. The Convention signed in 1944 took effect in 1947.

This Convention contained a portfolio of standards, documents, protocols and procedures that related to every aspect of commercial aviation. The Convention was an attempt to guide sovereign states in developing their own (internal) regulations while adhering to international uniformity. The Convention was comprehensive. It included agreements on air navigation procedures, air corridors, air traffic control, air search and rescue, aeronautical information services, airport configurations and design, environmental protection, the transport of dangerous goods, communications, surveillance, dissemination of meteorological information, the airworthiness of aircraft and eventually… security.

The Chicago Convention published a series of main documents containing agreements to each of the specific aviation areas. Attached to these documents were a number of annexes. A total of 18 annexes were set out. Annex 17 was the security annex.

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The Convention on International Civil Aviation set forth the purpose of ICAO:

WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security;

WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that co-operation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends,

THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically.

3.1.2 The AVSEC Conventions

To ensure the safety and security of civil aviation from Acts of Unlawful Interference, a set of AVSEC Principles were established. These became the foundation upon which aviation security was regulated in the world. These principles were:

- Safe and secure operational environment- Legislation and procedures- Security measures consistent with ICAO standards- Prosecute or extradite persons who carry out acts of unlawful interference.

Based on these principles, we can now look at the International Conventions. These are statements of principle by which states affirm their intention to enforce the terms and provisions of the conventions. Therefore, specific national legislation is required to bring the terms of international conventions into national law. This process is called “Ratification”.

There have been a total of five conventions that have looked at aviation security. They are:

- Tokyo Convention of 1963- The Hague Convention of 1970- Montreal Convention of 1971- Supplementary Protocol (Montreal) of 1988- Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention of 1991

These conventions were set out to handle a variety of Acts of Unlawful Interference that civil aviation experienced over the years.

Tokyo Convention of 1963

The Tokyo Convention is the convention on “Offences and certain other acts committed on board aircraft”. It is sometimes called the “Crimes in the Air” Convention. It contains 26 articles regarding acts

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committed on board aircraft that affected the safety of aircraft, persons and property. The key elements of these are summarized as follows:

- It gave limited jurisdiction based on the State of Registry- It provided for the power to restrain or disembark passengers- It mentioned the obligation of a State to accept disembarked passengers- It indicated that extradition of offenders was unlikely.

The Hague Convention of 1970

The Hague Convention is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. It is sometimes called the “Hijack Convention”. It contains 14 articles. The key elements of this convention are as follows:

- Defined the offence of hijacking and imposed severe punishments- Allowed for extradition or prosecution- Jurisdiction was extended beyond the state of registry of the aircraft.

The Montreal Convention of 1971

The Montreal Convention is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. It contains 16 articles. The key elements it covered were:

- Violence against persons on aircraft- Sabotage or attempted sabotage of aircraft- Sabotage of air navigation facilities- Dissemination of false information.

The Montreal Protocol of 1988

Following the Montreal Convention of 1971, a supplementary Protocol was developed to enhance it.

This Protocol was called “Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports serving International Aviation”. It contains sic articles covering the following:

- Acts committed at international airports- Violence against persons at airports- Sabotage of airport facilities or aircraft not in service- Disrupting airport operations.

Making of Plastic Explosives 1991

This Convention is called “Making of Explosives for the purpose of Detection”. With the increased number of incidents related to the use of explosive devices against civil aviation, this convention was a natural development. It contains 15 articles. These articles specified the following:

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- Allow existing detection technology- Inject marking agent into explosives at manufacture- Create a technical commission- Producer states to prevent manufacture of unmarked explosives- All states to prevent movement of unmarked explosives through their territory.

States were required to incorporate the provisions of these conventions into their national laws and respective National Civil Aviation Security Programs.

To demonstrate that aviation security is ever changing, this list of conventions must be brought up to date by the 2010 Beijing Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation and the 2010 Beijing Protocol which updates the 1971 Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. The Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol will significantly strengthen the existing international counterterrorism legal framework and facilitate the prosecution and extradition of those who seek to commit acts against civil aviation.

These new treaties will require parties to criminalize a number of new and emerging threats to the security of civil aviation, including using aircraft as a weapon. The Conventions also update provisions to promote cooperation between states in combating terrorism directed against civil aviation while emphasizing the human rights and fair treatment of terrorist suspects. Importantly, the 2010 Beijing Convention will also require states to criminalize the transport of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and related material.

3.2 Purpose and Content of Annex 17, Document 8973 and the IATA Security Manual

3.2.1 ICAO Annex 17

Almost all of the world’s sovereign states are now signatories to a number of international civil aviation “Conventions”. Currently, there are 190 “Contracting States” who have agreed to the implementation of common or uniform air transport standards.

ICAO Annex 17, the 1st edition of which was published in August 1975, sets out the Standards and Recommended Practices that signatory states are to apply or observe to safeguard international aviation from acts of unlawful interference. Annex 17 is the security annex. Titled “Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference”, Annex 17 was eventually agreed to by all signatories to ICAO. It comprises the now familiar international standards, protocols and procedures for all aspects of aircraft, airline and security airport. Its focus at the time was to combat increasing threats to air travel from hijackers and, later, terrorism.

The Annex covers matters such as the organization of security arrangements, preventive measures and the management of the response to acts of unlawful interference. It also contains extracts from other ICAO Annexes that impact aviation security.

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The 190 Member States of ICAO are obliged to implement the standards contained in Annex 17, unless they file a variation. There is no similar requirement with regard to the recommended practices.

We have just mentioned two terms used to describe the contents of Annex 17. These are “Standards” and “Recommended Practices”. Here is what they mean.

Standard

“Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary.”

A standard is therefore a security measure that is considered as “compulsory” for implementation.

Currently, with Annex 17, edition 8, there are 74 standards to adhere to.

Recommended Practice

“any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as desirable in the interests of safety, regularity or efficiency of international air navigation.”

A Recommended Practice is to implement a security measure where possible.

Annex 17 has undergone a number of amendments over the years since its inception in 1975. As of 2010, it has undergone a total of 11 amendments. The latest edition of Annex 17 is edition 8 which has been applicable since July 1, 2006. Most of these amendments were needed due to an Act of Unlawful Interference against the industry. Two of the amendments, Amendments 10 and 11, came as a result of the 9/11 attack in the United States. The amendments usually convert recommended practices into standards or add new recommended practices to Annex 17. ICAO also realizes that there may be instances whereby a Contracting State may not be able to implement some of the standards due to specific circumstances. The Chicago Convention made provisions for this situation with Article 38 – Notification of Difference which requires the state to file a variation with ICAO.

The Contents

Annex 17 is divided into 5 chapters. They are:

- Definitions- General principles- Organization

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- Preventive security measures- Management of response to AUI

3.2.2 Document 8973

To assist states in meeting the Standards and Recommended Practices set out in Annex 17, ICAO has also developed a Security Manual, commonly known as Document 8973. The full title is “Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference”.

The purpose of the Security Manual is to provide details on how to comply with the Standards and Recommended Practices (i.e.: the content is for guidance purposes only).

Therefore, we can say that the ICAO Annex 17 is the “What must be done” and Document 8973 is the “How it can be done”.

Contents

The 7th edition of the ICAO Security Manual comes in 5 volumes. They are:

- Volume I – National Organization and Administration- Volume II – Recruitment, Selection and Training- Volume III – Airport Security, Organization, Program and Design Requirements- Volume IV – Preventive Security Measures- Volume V – Crisis Management and Response to Acts of Unlawful Interference

3.2.3 IATA Security Manual

IATA has also produced its own security manual. The IATA Security Manual (6 th edition V2) contains extensive guidance and reference material to assist airline, airport and government personnel at all levels in matters relating to aviation security. Reference is made in this manual to information contained in the ICAO Security Manual, Annex 17 and the IATA Standards and Recommended Practices (ISARP’s).

One of the challenges faced by the airlines is that they have access to ICAO Annex 17 but not Document 8973 which is restricted. Therefore, they have the “What” but not the “How”. The IATA Security Manual bridges the gap.

The manual provides guidance for all air carriers, as well as other stakeholders, to help integrate the SeMS (Security Management System) principles into daily operations. Extensive guidance material has been included and assists airlines and other stakeholders in developing or upgrading their security programs.

Contents

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The 6th Edition V2 of the IATA Security Manual has 10 chapters and a section on the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA). The chapters are:

- Chapter 1 – general information- Chapter 2 – organization & management- Chapter 3 – human resources management- Chapter 4 – quality assurance & quality control- Chapter 5 – security operations- Chapter 6 – contingencies- Chapter 7 – cargo security- Chapter 8 – personnel security- Chapter 9 – terrorism & threats against aviation- Chapter 10 – additional security accountabilities- IOSA Section 8 – Security Management (Sec)

MODULE 4 – MANAGING ACCESS CONTROL – PEOPLE & VEHICLES

4.0 Managing Access Control – People & Vehicles

4.1. Demarcation of an Airport

4.1.1 Define and Delineate Areas to be Controlled

Airports have defined areas within the airport to be controlled. This is a requirement of ICAO Annex 17 based upon Standard 4.2.2:

“Each Contracting State shall ensure that security restricted areas are established at each airport serving civil aviation designated by the State based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.”

Some of the areas that can be defined are as follows:

Airside

All airports have an area called the airside. ICAO defines this area as “the movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain or buildings, or portions thereof, access to which is controlled.”

Security Restricted Areas (SRA)

Similarly, airports will also have areas that will be designated as Security Restricted Areas. Such areas are designated following a risk assessment carried out by relevant authorities. SRAs are those airside and landside areas of an airport into which access is controlled, such as all passenger departure areas between the screening checkpoint and aircraft.

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Tenant Restricted Areas (TRA)

These are facilities and areas within the airport that are administered by other entities. These include catering companies, cargo handlers and engineering companies. Typically, these companies straddle the barrier between airport airside and landside. Therefore the companies themselves are required to exercise control over access into the SRA.

Sterile Area

A sterile area is an area within the airport where all final security checks have been conducted and every precaution has therefore been taken to ensure that no unauthorized persons and no prohibited items are present.

It is important to keep security restricted areas small enough to be properly secured and to ensure that resources are not spread too thin. Although it might seem sensible to make the whole airside of an airport a security restricted area, this would cover too vast a space to secure effectively. In addition, much of the airside contains no facilities that have a role to play in commercial air transport operations.

Access points into security restricted areas should be reduced to a minimum and have effective access control measures. Access by staff to security restricted areas should be limited only to those with a clear need to enter by virtue of their duties. Similar controls should be applied to vehicles by restricting access to only those vehicles with a clear operational function. Security restricted areas not subject to continual access control measures should be a searched prior to being brought back in use.

Appropriate legislation or regulations must exist to provide penalties for any person willfully trespassing or attempting to trespass on the airside or a designated security restricted area. Such legislation or regulations should also include penalties for willful or attempted trespass on off-airport communications and navigation aids sites.

Unauthorized persons found within a designated security restricted area should be detained and, if warranted and permitted, searched and interviewed to ascertain if they had suspicious or criminal intentions. Reports of such incidents should be filed with the airport security officer and relevant policing authorities.

4.2 Access Control Measures

4.2.1 Physical and Technology-based Security Measures

Erection of Barriers

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The most common form of barrier in an airport is the Perimeter Fence. The type of fence used on the perimeter of a site should reflect the type of threat expected. The level of protection offered by a fence will depend on its height, construction, the material used and any additional security features used to increase its performance or effectiveness such as anti-climbing devices, perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDS), lighting or closed circuit television (CCTV). Fences and any points of entry should be illuminated by suitable security lighting.

Access Control Points

All airports have access points that must be controlled. These include all doors, stairs and passenger loading bridges giving access onto the apron area. Emergency exits that are not continually supervised should be equipped with audible and visual alarms that can be monitored from a central location, such as from an airport security control centre. The use of frangible devices or covers over emergency exit activation bars deters misuse.

Vehicle Access Control Points

All vehicle access control points must have an unobstructed view of the surrounding area. They must also have a guard post. To facilitate control of vehicles for the purpose of inspections, they must be equipped with drop arm barriers plus lockable gates. The perimeter fencing for vehicle control points must meet the same standard as the airport fence. The guard post must also be provided with the following:

- Lighting- Communications- Manpower

Pedestrian Access Control Points

It will be necessary to designate access control points for pedestrians. For these areas, the following considerations apply:

- Restrict the number of Pedestrian Access Control Points (PACPs) so as to better control access to the SRA. Do not have too many PACPs simply for convenience

- Consider the best use of available space and design to help ensure that the flow of pedestrians through these control points is as smooth as possible

- All access gates or barriers must be closed and secured when not in use- PACPs have to be manned by security personnel- Additional security measures (e.g.; CCTV) should be provided for sensitive points

Zoning of Restricted Areas

To further control the access of people and vehicles within restricted areas, all airports should practice a “zoning” system. This means that staff and vehicles are only given clearance to enter certain parts of

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restricted areas based on their need to enter and the activities that they must undertake. For example, personnel performing check-in counter duties may only be allowed access to the cargo terminal. Other examples include the aircraft technician who would not need to access the terminal and the washroom cleaner who has no need to access the ramp.

In designing the zoning, it is important to ensure that zones are kept to a “manageable” number to avoid practical and administrative difficulties.

When someone needs to enter a restricted area to which they do not have access, such as visitors and contractors, they need to apply for a permit to do so. They must also be escorted by a properly authorized staff-member while they are in that area.

4.3 Airport ID System

4.3.1 Types of IDs

The IATA Security Manual says:

SEC 3.1.1The operator shall ensure an identification verification system is in place that prevents personnel and vehicles from authorized access into airport airside areas and security restricted areas that are under the control of the Operator. Such identification system shall include:

i) Designated checkpoints where identification is verified before access is permitted;ii) A requirement for authorized personnel to prominently display an identification badge.

There are three different documents that can permit access to a restricted area in an airport. These are:

- A boarding card issued by an airline to regulate passenger access- A crew member certificate or company identification card to regulate operating crew access- An airport identification permit (ID) allowing staff access

The IDs come in different forms. They can be a totally manual system, a fully-automated access control system or combination or the two (semi-automated system). The manual ID will not have the smart chip or the security Micro Text.

The key factors that are important about IDs are how they are issued and controlled. There must be a process to retrieve the IDs, when the staff leaves the organization for any reason.

Vehicle Permits

Like staff, vehicles need a permit to enter restricted areas in the airport. In order to apply for the permit, the following information is to be provided to the permit issuing office:

- Registration index or serial number of the vehicle

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- Name of the organization owning/operating the vehicle- Period of validity (to a maximum twelve months)- Security restricted areas for which access is allowed- Access control points the vehicle can enter

Temporary Permits

As mentioned earlier, there may be people needing temporary access to restricted areas in the airport. They include visitors who require access for a short duration, employees awaiting their permanent permit who need access for a longer term and contractors. All of these people will need to apply for temporary permits and must be escorted by full-time permit holders.

4.3.2 Issuing Procedure

Background Checks

Prior to the issuance of an Airport ID, a background check must be done. This is a requirement of Annex 17, Standard 3.4.1. The background check must follow national legal means. Where possible, the background check must go beyond a simple criminal record check. There must also be an appeal process in place for the candidate.

Training Prior to Issuance of an Airport ID

Airport Authorities should conduct a short training session before issuing new IDs. The topics that should be covered in this training include the following:

- The legislation that governs the issuance of Airport ID and offences under the Protected Ares and Protected Places Act of the country

- Permission to enter restricted areas is only for the performance of official duties and for official business only

- Offences for unauthorized possession, use, retention, alteration, destruction or transfer of the ID to another person

- Need to display the ID at all times- The need for all personnel (not just security staff) to be vigilant and aware of suspicious

incidents and suspicious persons- Provide examples of suspicious incidents

Display

It must be emphasized that all personnel working in restricted areas at airports must display a valid ID at all times. IDs must be affixed to an outer garment, above waist height. However, if it interferes with the employee’s work (e.g.: carrying cargo), the garment should be redesigned or replaced with one

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containing a transparent pouch to place the ID in. The ID must be clearly visible to all staff to enable them to easily challenge any person who may not have the proper ID as well as to differentiate full time permits from temporary permits.

MODULE 5 – SECURITY MEASURES FOR PASSENGERS AND THEIR BAGGAGE

5.0. Security Measures for Passengers and their Baggage

5.1 Pre-board Screening of Passengers and their Cabin Baggage

SEC 3.1.3 The Operator shall ensure measures are in place to prevent the introduction of unauthorized weapons, explosives of other dangerous devices or items on board an aircraft by persons other than passengers.

5.1.1 Pre-board Screening

The ICAO definition for pre-boarding screening is as follows:

“The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.”


SEC 3.4.1 If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure originating passengers and their cabin baggage are subjected to screening prior to boarding a passenger aircraft for:

i) An international flight;ii) As required by the applicable aviation security authority, a domestic flight. (GM)

SEC 3.4.4 If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure passengers and their cabin baggage are subjected to additional security controls in accordance with requirements of the applicable aviation security authority when flights are under an increased security threat. (GM)

Pre-boarding screening of passengers is usually carried out prior to their boarding of an aircraft. Typically, a pre-board screening check point will include:

- Manual or hand search of passengers and cabin baggage- Walk through Metal Detector (WTMD) and/or Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD) of passengers- X-Ray of cabin baggage- Explosive Detection System (EDS)/Explosive Detection Dogs (EDDs)

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- A combination of the above

Following the pre-board screening, passengers and their cabin baggage are considered to be “clean” and of no risk to the aircraft.

Screening Options

The design of a passenger terminal building will determine how and at which point the final screening of passengers and their baggage will be carried out. There are three designs for passenger terminal buildings:

- Boarding gate plan- Holding area plan- Concourse plan

These are dependent on space available, passenger volumes and national policy on aviation security.

In this plan, the terminal is separated into three areas: the terminal, concourse and pier. The screening points are located at each boarding gate in the pier. Each boarding gate is an entry point to the aircraft. The characteristics of this plan are:

- Screening does not begin until aircraft arrives- Passengers are screened and immediately board- Boarding gate door is open and the aircraft is visible- Police have minimal time to react to an incident- Creates time pressure on screeners- Screening point needs to be secured when not in use.

Adopting this plan will have both advantages and disadvantages as follows:

- It requires a great deal of equipment and human resources if there are many simultaneous flights

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- It minimizes the chance of mixing between screened and unscreened passengers- It reduces the opportunities for the transfer of weapons to passengers after screening- It eliminates the need for a sterile area. It segregates low-threat carriers.

Holding Area Plan

The main difference in this Plan from the Boarding Gate Plan is that, after the pre-board screening, passengers are moved into a holding room to await the boarding call. This room is considered sterile. Other characteristics of this plan are as follows:

- Screening can start BEFORE an aircraft arrives and PRIOR to boarding- Reduces time pressure on screeners- Boarding gate door closed, therefore access to the aircraft is denied- Aircraft may not be visible which also means that it is protected- Police have more time to react to incidents in that area.

Using this plan will mean the following:

- May require fewer resources than the Boarding Gate Plan (only if there is more than one gate per holding area)

- Airlines prefer this plan as all passengers are accounted for before boarding- Holding area must be secure before and during screening- Holding area must be searched prior to star of screening (including buses or mobile lounges if

boarding is not via aero-bridge).

Concourse Plan

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The Concourse Plan is probably the most popular plan used in airports today. It provides for a centralized pre-board screening regime after which passengers move into a larger sterile area. The characteristics of this plan are as follows:

- Screening occurs continuously- Single central screening point- Same standard of screening for all carriers- No time pressure on screeners- Hard to target individual aircraft/carriers- Screening point distant from gate.

Using this plan will mean:

- Police have more time to react to an incident- Minimum equipment and human resources are required- Easy supervision of screening staff- Maximum effort in maintaining the area sterile – searching and sealing- Screening personnel may experience monotony in their surroundings as compared with the

active environment of Boarding Gate Plan screening, which could affect their attention levels.

Whichever plan is chosen for the passenger terminal, the screening points will require the following:

- X-ray machines- WTMD- HHMD for secondary checks- Search tables- Privacy booth or area- Electrical outlets- Separate entry and exit.

In addition, the screening of passenger cabin luggage may be assisted by the use of trace detection equipment.

NOTE: There is a fourth screening option which is currently in use at certain international airports. This is a configuration where all passengers and bags are screened upon entry to the terminal. Only bona fide

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passengers are permitted to enter the terminal (family members may not enter). The whole airport terminal therefore becomes a sterile area. While this configuration involves the maximum deployment of manpower and resources, it presents an alternative approach for defending against attacks.

5.2 Handling of Special Passengers

Pre-board screening also involves the screening of other special categories of passengers such as:

- People with disabilities, passengers in wheelchairs, injured persons- VIPs- Diplomats- Those authorized to carry weapons.

5.2.1 Handling of people with disabilities, passengers in wheelchair and injured persons

At pre-board screening points, screeners will come across a variety of passenger types. One category will be those passengers with disabilities or in wheelchairs or those who may have physical injuries. Screeners must treat these types of passengers with respect while conducting the necessary security screening. It will also be necessary to conduct a physical check of the aids these people may be using, such as crutches, wheelchairs etc. A wheelchair has been used in the past to smuggle a knife into the aircraft cabin.

5.2.2 Handling of diplomats

Diplomats are a special and sensitive category of passengers to be screened. Their handling is covered under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. It must be noted that although marked and sealed diplomatic bags may be screened, they cannot be opened and inspected. However, the diplomat and his or her personal baggage are subject to screening as stated in the National Civil Aviation Security Program. Diplomats understand that the purchase of an airline ticket includes an agreement to abide by the conditions for carriage and implies that consent is given to the performance of routine security measures.

5.2.3 Authorized Carriage of Weapons

Another special category of passengers is armed security officers. When they are on board, their identity is to be kept secret. Several measures are required to handle armed security officers.

If they are providing in-flight security:

- Notification to the pilot- Special handling procedures- Separate screening point, if needed- Special authorization.

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When armed security officers are not providing in-flight security, their weapons must be unloaded and made inaccessible during flight. Special handling procedures are to be applied.

5.3 Sterile Area

5.3.1 Screening of Staff entering and protection of Sterile Areas

Sterile areas are to be clearly separated from non-sterile areas by physical barriers. Entry into sterile areas is permitted only after someone has passed through screening. This applies to all staff including security personnel who will be required to work in these areas. When not in use, the doors to sterile areas are to be closed. Security officers entering sterile areas to prepare for passenger screening are to conduct a security sweep of the area to ensure no foreign or suspicious items have been left behind. This is also done after passengers have boarded and the area is to be closed. Keys to sterile areas are to be controlled.

Mixing of screened and unscreened persons is not allowed in sterile areas. This also means that departing and arriving passengers are to be kept separate, including transit passengers. Passengers in sterile areas are to be monitored, especially during boarding.

5.4 Control of Hold Baggage

ICAO Annex 17 Standard 4.5.1 specifies that:

“All Contracting States shall establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage is screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations departing from a security restricted area.”


SEC 3.6.1 If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure originating hold baggage is subjected to screening prior to being loaded into an aircraft for an international passenger flight. (GM)

5.4.1 Passenger/Baggage Reconciliation


SEC 3.6.4 If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure procedures are in place to prevent the transport of baggage of passengers that are not on board the aircraft for an international flight unless such baggage is identified as unaccompanied and subjected to appropriate security control based on risk assessment. (GM)

As part of security hold baggage, it is necessary to reconcile passengers and baggage. This is a process to ensure that when a passenger has checked-in baggage that baggage will not be carried on to the aircraft unless the passenger has boarded. In the event the passenger has not boarded the flight, the baggage

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will either be off-loaded or will not be loaded in the first instance. Baggage reconciliation is to be carried-out for:

- Originating passengers’ bags- On-line transfer bags- Interline transfer bags- Disembarking passengers’ transit bags.

In conducting baggage reconciliation, the following applies:

- Minimum ID number on bag tag, boarding card and departure control system (DCS)- At check-in: the number of bags per passenger is identified- At check-in: security questions related to the bags are asked- Bags going into Unit Load Devices (ULDs) are recorded and positioned on aircraft for easy off-

load- Checks at the boarding gate as to whether the passenger has boarded are communicated to the

baggage loading supervisor- Where possible, this process should be automated using advanced systems.

5.4.2 Screening of Hold Baggage

Locations for screening hold baggage vary depending on the risk assessment of an airport. However, as a guide, hold baggage can be screened:

- At the point of entry into a terminal building- Inside the terminal, prior to check-in- At check-in- After check-in.

Point of entry into passenger terminal

Advantages

The advantage of screening at the point of entry to the terminal is that the hold baggage can be screened and cleared in the presence of the passenger and the passenger is immediately available should any piece of their baggage require physical inspection.

Disadvantages

First, a large public area is required. Second, there may be congestion of passengers queuing to get into the terminal. Third, baggage seals are required after screening to prevent contamination and check-in agents need to verify the seals. Fourth, members of the public will crowd into the terminal which may pose a security risk.

Inside terminal, prior to check-in

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Advantages

As with the first option, the hold baggage can be screened and cleared in the presence of the passenger and the passenger is immediately available should any piece of their luggage require physical inspection.

Disadvantages

- A large check-in concourse is needed where only ticketed passengers are allowed entry- Baggage seals after screening and check-in agents to verify the seals are required.

This option may also result in passenger, security and airline personnel congestion, security staff and airline personnel.

At Check-in

Advantages

In this case, the screening is also done in the presence of passengers and passengers are available for physical inspection of their baggage. However, seals are unnecessary.

Disadvantages

A large check-in area is required to house the screening equipment and check-in time may be long. This option requires security equipment for each check-in desk and a lot of staff to operate them.

After Check-in

When screening is conducted after check-in the hold baggage proceeds immediately onto the conveyor belt. It is then screened downstream in the baggage handling system (BHS) before it goes to the baggage make-up area.

Advantages

This option provides for better passenger experience (facilitation). It also means that more time is available to do screening using centralized screening equipment with fewer resources. It provides greater access to useable space and there is no need for seals. This option provides for handling large volumes.

Disadvantages

The main disadvantage is the challenge of reuniting passenger and bag if something suspicious is found. Also, the Hold Screening System has to be integrated into the BHS which can be costly and complex.

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5.4.3 Automated Hold Baggage Screening Systems

Many airports use automated baggage screening systems as they help speed up the screening of hold baggage without compromising of the screening. These systems will normally consist of five levels of screening for suspect bags. It will be integrated into the BHS using conveyors, risers and diverters. More sophisticated systems also read bag tags using radio frequency ID (RFID). 5 levels:

Level 1

This level uses an automated EDS/EDDS, X-Ray which rejects bags that have dark/dense parts inside, an atomic number or based on shape. Bags that are not rejected proceed without further checks.

Level 2

The bag image taken at level 1 is viewed by a trained X-Ray operator who is allowed a short period of time (perhaps 12 seconds) to examine the image and to determine whether or not there may be any item in the bag requiring further screening. If the operator decides that further screening is necessary, the bag is diverted to the next level. If the operator cannot make a decision, the bag is also diverted for further screening.

If the operator clears the bag, it is sent for make-up without further checks.

Level 3

The bag will be examined by EDS (Smart X-Ray, CT Scan, Vapor Analysis, Trace Detection).

Level 4

The bag is reunited with the passenger and a physical search is conducted.

Level 5

The bag is removed to a remote location where EOD renders it safe.

MODULE 6 – SECURITY MEASURES FOR CARGO, MAIL AND CATERING

6.0 Security Measures for Cargo, Mail and Catering

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6.1 Security Measures for Air Cargo

6.1.1 Air Cargo Security

The term “Air Cargo” includes normal freight, consolidations, trans-shipments, unaccompanied courier items, postal mail, diplomatic mail, company stores and unaccompanied baggage.

Industry Definition

“Any item transported by air, whatever its nature, whose right to board an aircraft is an air waybill and not a passenger ticket.”

Air Cargo Characteristics

The security for air cargo is a complex matter because of:

- The range of size and weight of the packages- The diverse nature of the contents- It’s often urgent nature- The value of the consignment- The use of an air waybill of equivalent document.

Cargo Supply Chain

Cargo passes through many hands as part of the supply chain. For example:

- Consignor (originator of cargo)- Freight Forwarder or Cargo Agent- Consolidators- Cargo Handling Agent- Specialist Sub-Contractors- Aircraft Operator

and then back down the supply chain to finally, the Consignee.

The complexity of the business makes it a challenge to secure cargo. Nevertheless, to counter the threat to air cargo, specific security measures have been developed. The core principles for cargo security are:

- Aircraft carrying air cargo must operate from within a secure environment- Air cargo must be subject to some degree of security control before being placed on board a

passenger-carrying aircraft. Maximum effort must be used for screening air cargo consignments whose security cannot be readily determined along the supply chain.

- A consignment or air cargo one security screened must be protected from interference.

Annex 17 has defined these requirements under the following standards:

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Annex 17, Standard 4.6.1

“Each Contracting State shall ensure that security controls are applied to cargo and mail, prior to their being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in passenger commercial air transport operations.”

Standard 4.6.2

“…cargo and mail to be carried on a passenger commercial aircraft are to be protected from unauthorized interference from the point at which security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.”


SEC 3.7.1 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo and/or mail on passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure cargo and/or mail shipments for transport on passenger flights are subjected to security controls as established by the applicable state(s). (GM)

SEC 3.7.3 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo and/or mail on passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure cargo and/or mail for transport on passenger flights is protected from unauthorized interference from the point security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft. (GM)

Active and Preventative Measures

The security screening of air cargo may consist of either active or preventive procedures. Active measures detect devices that may have been placed in the cargo. Preventative security attempts to secure the integrity of cargo from its initial packing through to its loading onboard an aircraft.

Active procedures include the use of conventional X-Ray machines, explosive detection systems, explosive trace detection equipment, hand search, simulation chambers and explosive detection dogs.

Preventive measures are based on the rationale that if the consignment is packed securely from the start and kept secure thereafter, the requirement for screening is reduced. This method is the most cost-effective and, if well executed and controlled, will provide effective security.

6.1.2 Regulated Agent Concept

Annex 17 provides for the establishment of the concept of the Regulated Agent. This is defined as:

“An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts business with an operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect of cargo, courier and express parcels and mail.”

Standard 4.6.3

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Each Contracting State shall establish a process for the approval of Regulated Agents, if such agents are involved in implementing security controls.

Standard 4.6.4

Air Carriers shall not accept cargo for passenger flights unless from a Regulated Agent or unless that cargo has been subjected to other security controls.


SEC 3.7.4 If the Operator transports revenue cargo and/or mail on passenger flights, and if the Operator accepts cargo and/or mail in locations where regulated agent or known shipper/consignor program exists, the Operator shall have a process to ensure, in such locations, cargo and/or mail is not accepted for transport on a passenger flight unless either:

i) The application of security controls is confirmed and accounted for by the Operator or a regulated agent, or

ii) Such consignments have been subjected to appropriate security controls through a known shipper/consignor program. (GM)

SEC 3.7.5 If the Operator transports revenue cargo and/or mail on passenger flights, and if the Operator accepts cargo and/or mail in locations where regulated agent or known shipper/consignor program exist, the Operator shall have a process to ensure, in such locations, cargo and/or mail for transport on a passenger flight is not accepted from a regulated agent unless such regulated agent is approved by the relevant state.

Regulated Agent (RA)

Aircraft operators, freight forwarders, postal authorities and courier companies are made specifically accountable for the security of all consignments of air cargo, mail and other goods by:

- Identifying consignments, the security of which can be easily determined- Screening consignments, the security of which cannot be easily determined- Maintaining the security of consignments once it has been established, until it is delivered to

another regulated agent or an aircraft operator, and- Providing the next regulated agent or the aircraft operator with written documents stipulating

the security status of each consignment.

The name “regulated agent” implies that some form of regulatory regime will be in place governing freight forwarders and:

- The security controls put in place by these agents would be “accepted or required by the appropriate authority…”

- National authorities need to establish criteria for regulated agents to follow

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- National authorities need to ensure that these criteria are being continually applied through audits.

Thus, regulated agents are responsible for:

- Carrying out screening or searching of cargo, or- Being satisfied that the cargo has been screened or searched to an acceptable level prior to the

tendering if the cargo to the carrier for acceptance- Protect the consignment from interference while it is their custody.

Known Consignor or Shipper (KC)

A known consignor or shipper is an originator of shipments for transportation by air who has established business with a Regulated Agent or an Operator on the basis of having satisfied specific requirements for the safe transportation of cargo.

A KC is:

- A tool for RAs and airlines to determine the security of consignment- A regular shipper who packed the cargo in a secure environment and maintained it in a secure

state until delivery to the RA- Able to dispense with the need for screening all cargo delivered to RAs or airlines- Expected to ensure his or her staff are aware of security requirements- Subject to be audited by RAs and/or airlines.

Aircraft Operator


SEC 3.7.9 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo on passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure known cargo shipments presented for transport on a passenger flight are:

i) Delivered by an employee or nominated person of the known shipper/consignor, regulated agent or the Operator;

ii) Free from any signs of tampering;iii) Presenting with all required documents that correspond to the cargo being delivered;iv) Protected from unauthorized access;v) Subject to additional security controls are required by risk assessment. (GM)

With this regime, the aircraft operator is required to ensure that cargo is:

- Delivered by an established employee of a regulated agent or known consignor- Covered by valid documentation that has been checked for inconsistencies- Covered by a valid Consignment Security Declaration- Checked to ensure that there is no evidence of tampering

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- Kept secure since it was accepted into the aircraft operator’s charge- Subjected to screening or other security control.

The aircraft operator is also to ensure:

- The identity of the regulated agent, known consignor or other entity- The destination of the consignment- That the consignment has been screened or searched- That the consignment has been secured and free from interference while in the custody of the

regulated agent, known consignor or other entity- The declaration is signed by a person in authority.

The aircraft operator must stipulate that a false declaration will lead to prosecution.

Under this regime, consignments received from non-regulated agents must therefore be treated as unknown cargo and be screened or searched prior to being transported by air.

If known cargo passes out of the custody of an aircraft operator, regulated agent or their sub-contracted agent, it reverts to being unknown cargo and must be treated accordingly and therefore must be subject to the normal screening procedures.

Other measures

Other security measures that will ensure the integrity of the security of air cargo are:

- Random checks- Documented records- Storage- Transportation (ground)- Access control- Pre-employment background checks- Training

The Regulated Agent concept can be illustrated as follows:

6.2 Mail Security Measures

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6.2.1 Mail Security Procedures


SEC 3.7.1 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo and/or mail on passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure cargo and/or mail shipments for transport on passenger flights are subjected to security controls as established by the applicable state(s). (GM)

SEC 3.7.3 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo and/or mail on passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure cargo and/or mail for transport on passenger flights is protected from unauthorized interference from the point security control are applied until departure of the aircraft. (GM)

Mail is another category of goods that gets transported via airlines. Although mail threats are somewhat less serious than those posed by cargo, they can still be used to commit acts of unlawful interference against the aviation industry.

ICAO requires that states screen all mail destined to be carried on passenger aircraft. Due to the legalities regarding the transportation of mail and possible operational or technological constraints, the appropriate airport authority is required to work with the designated postal authority to secure the mail.

Mail Security Procedure

The threat posed by mail to the aviation industry is based on improvised explosive devices in the form of letter and parcel bombs. Thus, the same measures that apply to cargo are valid for mail. Security equipment will be used to screen mail before it is loaded on-board a passenger aircraft.

6.3 Catering Security Measures

6.3.1 Principles of Security

Catering supplies and aircraft operators’ stores and supplies can provide a means for perpetrators of acts of unlawful interference to introduce weapons, explosive devices or other dangerous substances.

Annex 17, Standard 4.5.4

“Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that catering supplies and operator’s stores and supplies intended for carriage on passenger flights are subjected to appropriate security controls.”


SEC 3.8.1 If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure in-flight catering and/or other supplies intended for transport on a passenger flight are subjected to

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appropriate security controls as established by the applicable state(s) and is thereafter protected until loaded onto the aircraft. (GM)

Thus, the security measures applied to catering supplies or stores are meant to prevent any articles that could be used to carry out an act of unlawful interference from being brought onto an aircraft. The principles used to secure catering and catering supplies can be summarized as follows:

- Security measures must be applied in buildings where catering supplies and stores are prepared, stored and dispatched to ensure that no device or weapon is introduced into consignments;

- Security measures must be applied during the transportation and delivery of catering supplies and stores to the aircraft to ensure that the consignment remains secure;

- Security measures must be applied by the airline operator on receipt of catering consignments to ensure they have been correctly assigned and not been tampered with.

6.3.2 Security Program

Catering operations are usually owned by either aircraft operators or function as independent contracted companies. Whatever the case, the catering company must have its security program approved by the state’s relevant airport authority. This should be in line with requirements of the National Aviation Security Plan (NASP).

Security Management

A suitably qualified and trained person should be formally appointed by the company as the Security Manager and given overall responsibility to ensure that all security requirements are enforced. If the catering company has a few centers in different locations, then each of these locations must have an appointed Security Manager.

Pre-employment background checks

All staff employed in the preparation and delivery of catering supplies and stores should undergo a pre-employment background check to establish their identity and previous experience. This includes any criminal history.

Security Training

Staff working in the catering facility must be provided with sufficient security awareness training to enable them to understand and carry out their security responsibilities. This training is to be conducted before they are allowed to access any “known” supplies or stores for dispatch to an aircraft.

6.3.3 Security Measures

Catering supplies and stores assigned to an aircraft operator may be regarded as “known stores”. The receiving aircraft operator must be provided with all the necessary security measures to ensure the integrity of the consignment at all times, including until it is loaded onto the aircraft.

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Any supplies and stores originating from any other source must be regarded as “unknown stores” and should not be loaded onto an aircraft until it is properly screened for any weapon, device or harmful substance. Once subjected to security measures, they can be considered as “known stores”.

The key considerations in catering security also include the following:

- Location of facility- Security program- Physical protection- Access control and pass system- Searching of staff (arriving and departing)- Supplies of raw materials- Surveillance of food preparation areas- Storage- Use of catering seals- Transportation systems/routes- Doors/locks/key control- Threat assessments- Contingency plans- Potential for smuggling.

MODULE 7 – RESPONSE TO BOMB THREATS

7.0 Response to Bomb Threats

7.1 Nature of Bomb Threats


SEC 4.1.1 The Operator shall have a process to identify security threats directed against the Operator, to include:

i) Assessment to associated risk;ii) Development of appropriate response measures. (GM)

SEC 4.1.2 The Operator shall have a process to ensure the implementation of appropriate security measures in response to:

i) Security threats directed against the Operator:ii) Threat levels issued by applicable aviation security authorities. (GM)

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7.1.1 Characteristics of a Bomb Threat

Experience has shown that bomb threats may be directed against:

- Aircraft on the ground or in the air- Airport installations, facilities and buildings- Navigation aids on airport property or in the immediate vicinity or airports- Air cargo- Cargo installations, facilities and buildings.

Who make bomb threats?

The categories of people known to make bomb threats are as follows:

- Real bombers, trying to give a legitimate warning- Potential extortionists who want a device to be discovered- Nuisance callers who want to disrupt operations- Late passengers trying to delay the flight- Mentally disturbed persons.

How are bomb threats made?

The most common include:

- In writing (by letter or electronically)- In person- Verbally (usually by telephone).

Statistics

Statistical analysis of past bomb threats reveals:

- 98% of bomb threats are false- Less than 2% of bomb explosions have been preceded by a threat/warning.

The culture of a country affects the type of bombers it produces:

- Capability of manufacturing a bomb- Availability of materials- Efficiency of law enforcement response- Propensity to issue bomb threats.

Some examples:

- UK – the vast majority of all bombs that exploded were preceded by a warning (Irish terrorists used a code word)

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- South Africa – Only one warning in 20 years- Asia – bombings in Bali, Manila, Jakarta and Turkey: no warnings.- Iraq – no warnings.

Procedures in case of bomb threat

In the event that written threats are received via mail, courier or handed in person, staff must be trained to preserve the evidence, minimize handling of the note and pass the information on to security for analysis.

If the threat is received via telephone, staff must be trained to do the following:

- Stay calm- Attract the attention of a co-worker as quietly as possible- Record details of the conversation (use check list)- Use a tape recorder or write down the exact words used by the person making the threat- Keep the caller on the line as long as possible- Ask questions- Keep the line open, DO NOT HANG UP- Stay at your post- Notify security.

In order to gather more information, keep the caller on the line and facilitate tracing of the call, staff should ask the caller the following questions:

- WHEN – will the bomb explode?- WHERE – is it?- WHAT – does it look like?- HOW – does the bomb work? What will set it off?- WHY – are you doing this?- WHO – are you?

To assist the receiver of a bomb threat, the organization must provide staff with a simple bomb threat form that is easily accessible at any time.

7.2 Bomb Threat Analysis

7.2.1 Evaluation of Bomb Threats

Bomb threats are classified into three types:

- Hoax- Non-specific- Genuine.

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Analysis or Evaluation

Analysis of a bomb threat is conducted on available information by a team of trained personnel in order to:

- Minimize disruption to business- Ensure the safety of persons and property- Determine the proper course of action.

Evaluation is a subjective process. There are no absolutes. The objective is to judge the credibility of the threat and the likelihood that it is genuine or not. This judgement is made by the Crisis Management Team (CMT) and uses analysis known as Positive Target Identification (PTI).

Indicators of Genuine Threats

There are some indicators that analysts rely on. They include:

- Evidence of prior placing of devices- A code word given by the caller- Reading from a prepared statement- Delivered to a third party, i.e.: newspaper- Precise knowledge of the mechanism of the bomb, i.e.: composition or exact location- Insisting on need to evacuate- Time to detonation of 30-90 minutes.

Indicators of Non-Specific Threats

Similarly, there are indicators of a non-specific threat. They are:

- Some knowledge of company premises- Describing mechanism or composition of bomb- Some knowledge of persons working in building- No time to detonation stated.

Indicators of a Hoax

Hoaxes usually have these characteristics:

- Person has no knowledge of the premises or persons working there- Person has an irrational reason for placing the device- Person has a juvenile voice, laughter in background- Over 90 minutes to detonation (time to find the bomb and render it safe).

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Evaluation Steps

The steps taken to evaluate a threat are as follows:

- Review the bomb threat checklist/recording- Interview the person who received the call- Consider the current threat assessment- Use positive target identification (PTI)- Make decision and classify threat- Take action.

Positive Target Identification

PTI recognizes that the vast majority of threats are hoaxes unless the caller displays specific knowledge of the target or device. Therefore, assessors will consider factors such as:

- Has a target been identified (airport, airline, flight number, location of aircraft etc.)?- Is there any background credibility (recent history of threats and/or incidents, high profile

passenger travelling, late passengers etc.)?

7.3 Actions to Resolve a Bomb Threat

7.3.1 Resolving a Bomb Threat

There are several options when a bomb threat is received:

- Treat the threat as a hoax and do nothing- Classify the threat as genuine or non-specific- Alert staff- Search for a device- Evacuate: full evacuation or partial evacuation.

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Evacuation

Once a threat has been evaluated and a decision made to evacuate, then the CMT will:

- Instruct the staff to start evacuation of passengers and others- Notify police and emergency services- Notify tenants- Evacuate to a designated assembly point- Set up Crisis Management Center (CMC)- Prepare initial press conference and press release.

Security Staff

Security personnel have an important role to play during an evacuation. This includes:

- Inspect and secure escape routes- Establish assembly points- Co-ordinate reception of staff at assembly points- Ensure each floor is fully evacuated and secure- Evacuate after everyone has been cleared.

Floor/Area Wardens

All organizations must have staff trained to be floor wardens in the event of evacuations. These wardens are required to:

- Take up a position at the access point to an escape route- Monitor the evacuation and ensure it is orderly- Check their area to ensure everyone has evacuated- Report to a designated assembly point.

Employees

Employees are to follow the instructions of the floor wardens and:

- Evacuate in a calm and orderly manner- Take personal articles with them- Use pre-designated primary escape routes- DO NOT USE ELEVATORS- Go to pre-designated assembly points and not leave until told to do so- DO NOT RE-ENTER PREMISES UNTIL THE ALL-CLEAR IS GIVEN.

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Medical/First Aid Staff

Medical staff and first aiders are to assist Floor Wardens and stand by for medical emergencies. They are required to establish Medical Posts at the assembly points and liaise with Emergency Services.

Resumption

Once the bomb threat has been resolved, it is necessary to resume normal operations. This will involve:

- Stand down alert – take no action- Resume operations after all-clear and re-enter building- Collect any evidence for possible investigation- Secure all emergency exits used during evacuation- Ensure all used emergency equipment is replaced or recharged as necessary- Conduct debrief of incident- Amend procedures following debrief as necessary.

Training of staff

In order to ensure that such incidents are managed efficiently and effectively, it is important to train the following personnel through exercises and drills:

- Floor wardens and alternated- Search team personnel- Security personnel- All employees.

MODULE 8 – SECURITY AWARENESS IN THE AIRPORT ENVIRONMENT

8.0 Security Awareness in the Airport Environment


SEC 2.1.1 The Security Program of the Operator shall specify a security training program that includes initial and recurrent training, which shall be in accordance with requirements of the civil aviation security program of the State and applicable requirements of other states where operations are conducted. The security training program shall have a balanced curriculum of theoretical and practical training to ensure:

i) Personnel, employed by or under the control of the Operator who implement security controls, have the competence to perform their duties;

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ii) Crew members and frontline ground handling personnel are able to act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of acts of unlawful interference and/or disruptive passenger behavior.

Operational personnel complete security awareness training that focuses on preventive measures and techniques in relation to passengers, baggage, cargo, mail, equipment, stores and supplies intended for transport on aircraft, as applicable, and permits such personnel to contribute to the prevention of acts of sabotage and other forms of unlawful interference. (GM)

8.1 What needs to be protected?

8.1.1 Elements in an Airport Requiring Protection

An airport is a very busy and complex facility that has many buildings, people and activities that go on continuously. These facilities include:

- Passenger terminal buildings- Aircraft parking bays- Cargo terminals- Aircraft fuel farms- Aircraft hangars and maintenance bays- Control tower- Airline offices

All of these areas, and others, need to be assessed in terms of risk and countermeasures put in place to address areas of vulnerability.

In general, the elements of an airport can be classified as:

- Assets- People and their property- Intellectual property

These elements are subject to a variety of risks and threats. They include:

- Crime- Acts of terrorism- Bomb threats- Fire caused by arson- Postal devices (e.g.: Letter Bombs)- Natural disasters

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These risks and threats can be either “man-made” or “non-people related”:

Man-made

These risks can come from:

- Employees- Visitors- Customers- Burglars- Saboteurs- Rioters

Non-people related

- Fires- Explosions- Earthquakes- Hurricanes- Floods

8.2 Behavioral Issues Leading to Crime

No organization is spared the issues related to the criminal behavior of personnel. This can result in:

- Dishonesty leading to misappropriations, theft etc.- Substance abuse leading to theft etc.- Conflicts of interest leading to bribery etc.- Emotional problems leading to bomb threats etc.- Anti-social behavior leading to conflicts- Gambling habits leading to theft- Social unrest leading to rioting- Political unrest leading to terrorism (sabotage, extortion, kidnapping etc.)- Emotional immaturity leading to malicious destruction or vandalism- International or corporate espionage leading to attacks on intellectual property and computer

crimes.

A recent survey conducted by the US Chamber of Commerce estimated that white collar crime costs the American economy approximately US$40 billion every year.

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Common Threats

The most common threats that airports experience are:

- Theft- Bomb threats

Theft

Theft is typically the most common problem that organizations face. It can range from petty theft to syndicate crime. It not only affects staff morale, it also impacts on the image and financial viability of the organization. Furthermore, if theft is not controlled, it can act as a precursor to acts of terrorism. Terrorist organizations have learned much from well established criminal syndicates and have applied the techniques used by these criminals to circumvent security measures.

Why Do People Commit Theft?

Some of the many reasons include:

- Greed- Poverty- High level of temptation- Intimidation and threat by other parties (i.e.: extortion, bribery)- Low probability of being detected or arrested- Desire to improve standard of living or social status- Challenge to steal (i.e.: dare)- Boredom- Resentment- Vandalism- Making a living (i.e. professional thieves)- Funding drug addiction

This list demonstrates that there are many motivations driving people to commit crimes. In an earlier module, we learned that pre-employment checks must be done for all staff working in an airport. However, behavioral issues may set in after an employee has been in the organization for some time.

How do people steal?

Here are some of the methods people have used to steal in the past:

- Conceal stolen object in their body, clothing or bags- Conceal stolen object in a company vehicle- Conceal stolen object in false ceiling or toilet- Wear stolen article and walk out

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- Collaborate with suppliers- Throw stolen items in the trash and collect later- Falsifying documents and figures to cover theft- Throwing items over fences to pick up later.

Recognizing Employees Prone to Theft

Investigators have classified behaviors of people who are prone to theft into the following categories:

- Scarp collector – reuses or resells scrap materials- Hoarder – constantly hoards odds and ends for later use- Middleman or Good Samaritan – always trying to sell something “for a friend”. Will swap one

stolen item for another.- Disgruntled employee – complains of being underpaid and unappreciated, so steals from

company who “owes” him- Employee in debt – buys on credit and steals to settle debts- Blackmail victim – being used to steal- Egotist – enjoys “beating the system”- Practical joker – steals to create excitement- Homeowner – looks for things to use in the house

8.3 Managing Threats

8.3.1 Holistic Approach to Crime Prevention

Total Security Concept

In order to manage and reduce the potential for crime in an organization, a holistic approach should be implemented. This approach involves:

- Hardware – physical security measures such as access control- Software – Information security measures such as procedures- Employees – personnel security.

8.3.2 Employees – The Untapped Security Resource

Employees are the 1st Line of Defense in an organization. They are the single most effective monitoring and control system available against crime. As such, they must be provided with Security Awareness Education so that they may contribute towards a safe and secure airport environment for everyone.

Both employees and supervisors must be convinced of the need for security. This may be achieved through continuing education on their role in aviation security. All new employees must be educated on the standards and procedures that have been established for handling security issues. Pre-employment screening must also be conducted.

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Communications

Two-way communications within the organization is key to the success of any program involving employees in airport security. Feedback on security procedures and policies must be encouraged and follow-up on issues must be done. This will increase participation by employees as they have a say in how airport security is conducted.

It is important regularly update all employees on the latest security-related news so that they are informed of risks and threats. This can be done through company communication channels:

- Publication of a protection manual- Articles in the company newsletter- Bulletins and posters- Lectures- Discussions with staff or other meetings to discuss security issues.

Relationship between Management and Employees

Management needs to:

- Work closely with subordinates- Share and exchange information- Work closely with enforcement agencies- Conduct meetings and social activities to enhance rapport and build trust.- Take necessary steps to educate employees to:

o Be vigilant at all timeso Report any unusual activitieso Report any suspicious person/so Check to ensure everything is secure before leavingo Seek assistance from a supervisor, if in doubt.

Physical Security

The airport itself must be protected through the implementation of physical security measures such as:

- Physical and electronic measures- Personnel – people to implement and administer the system- Barriers – access control devices and structures- Equipment – historical and incident records as well as transaction logs.

Access must be controlled with security measures such as:

- Install CCTV to monitor building entrances- Issue all employees with security badges

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- Escort all visitors, customers, relatives or friends- Have specific holding/waiting areas for vehicles and personnel.

Other Measures

Management needs to also look at other measures to bring across the “Security is Everyone’s Business” message and to discourage employees from getting involved in criminal activities.

Deterrence

There should be measures to deter employees from getting involving in crime. Some of these can be:

- Disciplinary action to deal with failure to follow instructions or directives- Ensuring proper reporting procedures are in place- Reducing opportunities for employees to commit crime- Encouraging the establishment of a “zero tolerance” approach- Providing adequate recognition and rewards for outstanding work.

MODULE 9 – IN-FLIGHT SECURITY MEASURES

9.0 In-Flight Security Measures

9.1 In-flight Threats

ICAO Annex 17 Standard 13.4 covers this issue as follows:

“An Operator shall establish and maintain an approved security training program that ensures crew members act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of acts of unlawful interference.”


SEC 4.1.1 The Operator shall have a process to identify security threats directed against the Operator, to include:

i) Assessment of associated risks;ii) Development of appropriate response measures. (GM)

SEC 4.1.2 The Operator shall have a process to ensure the implementation of appropriate security measures in response to:

i) Security threats directed against the Operatorii) Threat levels issued by applicable aviation security authorities. (GM)

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9.1.1 Procedure for Unruly Passengers

The threat of unruly passengers is on the rise most often because passengers are increasingly under the influence of alcohol. Cabin crew are trained to handle such situations, however, training is not the only solution. We will look at some of the other ways to help such incidents from becoming uncontrollable.

Knowing the Threat

It is important for the crew to be familiar with the basic threat levels so they can intervene before the threat escalates. For this purpose, they are trained to observe the behavior of passengers, especially those who are drinking excessively.

There is also a need to develop a close relationship between the security departments, flight operations and individual flight and cabin crew members. All agencies must work cohesively through trust and understanding.

The airline’s security department must endeavor to have access to good intelligence to provide the relevant information to the right people in a timely manner. This will help in-flight crews make more informed recommendations and help management make better decisions. When passengers are unruly there can be rapid progression to a higher level of threat.

Classification of Threats – Unruly Passengers

There is a four-tiered hierarchy of threat levels used to describe an in-flight incident involving an unruly passenger. This hierarchy is understood by both the in-flight crew and ground personnel and facilitates coordination between the parties concerned.

Classification of Threats – The Four Levels

The four levels of classification are intended to describe the nature of the threat as well as any escalation. It also outlines the actions to take at each level. The four levels are:

- Level 1 – disruptive behavior (verbally threatening)- Level 2 – physically abusive behavior- Level 3 – life-threatening behavior- Level 4 – attempted breach or actual breach of the flight crew compartment.

The actions required of cabin crew and flight crew at each of the four threat levels are as follows:

Level 1 – Disruptive behavior (verbally threatening)

Chief Purser and Cabin Crew

- Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew

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- Be attentive to other activity within the passenger population in the event that the disruptive behavior is a diversion to cover a hijacking

- Initiate lockdown of flight crew compartment (e.g.: placing a service cart in front of the cabin door to prevent forced entry)

- Suspend traffic in “clear zone” (the area immediately in front of the cabin crew compartment door)

- Alert able-bodied passengers of “Able Bodied Passengers” (ABP)- Attempt to defuse the situation verbally.

Pilot-in-Command (PIC)

- PIC to consider an announcement by the flight crew compartment- Issue Unruly Passenger Notification Card to the passenger concerned, if appropriate- Be aware of potential interception by friendly military aircraft- Document all events in company reports

Level 2 – Physically abusive behavior


- Use separation techniques by separating the unruly passenger from the rest of the passengers- Communicate with the flight crew and other cabin crew- Initiate lockdown of flight crew compartment by placing a service cart in front of the cabin door

and calling for APB’s to assist- Be attentive to other activity within the passenger population in the event the physically abusive

behavior is a diversion to cover a hijacking- Suspend traffic in “clear zone” and block with APBs.


- PIC should advise Air Traffic Control and the airline to request that the appropriate law enforcement agency meet the aircraft upon landing

- PIC should consider diversion to the nearest available airport- Solicit help from cabin crew and passengers- Be aware of potential interception by friendly military aircraft.

Level 3 – Life threatening behavior


- Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew- Suspend traffic in “clear zone” and getting passengers to take their seats and blocking the cabin

door with ABPs and service carts- Solicit all available help from cabin crew and passengers

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- Provide information regarding perpetrators to PIC- Use force to subdue assailant(s)- Use restraints and other on-board resources such as belts of passengers and physical restraints

by APBs- If necessary, implement least-risk bomb or Chemical/Biological Weapons (CBW) procedures.


- PIC will declare an emergency and activate landing plan- PIC will Squawk appropriate transponder code- Prepare for possible descent- PIC will monitor radio on 121.5 MHz and prepare for interception by military aircraft- After landing, if possible, PIC will pull fire switches and disconnect generators- If appropriate, escape from the aircraft.

Level 4 – Attempted breach or actual breach of flight crew compartment


- Maintain aircraft command and control at all costs- Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew- Solicit help from cabin crew and passengers via the public address system- Defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat- Use commands and all available resources and necessary force to subdue assailant(s) and

eliminate the threat- Use restraints and other on-board resources.


- PIC will declare an emergency and activate landing plan for the nearest suitable airport- Squawk appropriate transponder code- Monitor radio on 121.5 MHz and prepare for interception by military aircraft- As soon as operationally feasible initiate possible rapid descent- After landing, if possible, pull fire switched and disconnect generators- If appropriate, escape from the aircraft.

The ultimate goal for all crew during any incident of unlawful interference is the survival of all on board. Very strong emphasis needs to be placed on cabin crew training and the lockdown of the flight crew compartment is:

- To ensure the continued integrity of the light- To maintain continuity of control- For the protection of those on board and on the ground.

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9.1.2 Procedure for Handling a Hijacking

Several terrorist attacks over the past few years have demonstrated a much different and more sinister strategy – to kill as many people of possible. This change is critically relevant to the way civil aviation responds to terrorist acts aboard aircraft. Flight and cabin crews confronted with attempted hijackings can no longer anticipate that their aircraft will be seized and held until political or other demands are met. They must assume from the outset that the goal of the hijackers is to use the aircraft as a weapon to kill as many people on the ground as possible. In essence, any attempt to seize an aircraft today must be viewed as an imminent deadly threat to the aircraft, its crew and passengers and people on the ground. Crews must be prepared to use any means available, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the hijackers from gaining control of the aircraft.

While terrorism marks hijackings in recent history, it must be remembered that not all hijackers are terrorists. However, in order to successfully combat terrorists, it is critically important to identify and understand the perpetrators. Do not underestimate the perpetrators, but know their capabilities.

Hijacking

It is important for crew to understand and differentiate between an ongoing attempted hijacking and a hijacking. The differentiation is as follows:

- An “ongoing attempted hijacking” means that the flight crew is still in control of the control- A “hijacking” means that the hijackers are in control of the aircraft.

It is essential that flight crew clarify this distinction with air traffic control, due to the potential difference in response and risk variables to all on board the aircraft. A critical distinction is also to be made in identifying an “attempted hijacking” versus a “suspected hijacking” versus a “hijacking”.

An aircraft that has clearly diverted from its planned flight route is proceeding toward a major population centre and is not in communication with ground authorities can well be considered a hijacking with intent to use the aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction. Such aircraft may be the target of a military aircraft to intercept and shoot down the commercial aircraft.

Preventing the cockpit from being breached by hijackers is a critical aim of the cabin crew.

Clearly a hijacking in which chemical or biological agents are being threatened is Level 3 or Level 4. Training in the recognition of the characteristics of such agents is very important in determining the validity of the threat. This will reduce hysteria from developing on board the aircraft as a result of a hoax.

9.1.3 Procedure for Handling a Bomb Threat

Most bomb threats communicated to the crew during flight will have been first assessed by the airline security department and should therefore be considered a serious event. In some cases, the information

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can come directly from air traffic control without being analyzed by security experts. In such cases, the only option available to the flight crew, unless they are trained and have sufficient information to develop their own assessment, is to consider the event as serious even though it may only be a hoax.

Bomb Threats – Action by Crew

In-flight

In the event of a bomb threat in flight, responsibility for the decisions taken rests with the PIC who:

- Evaluate the threat- Respond/decide on a course of action, including whether the reaction will be overt or covert- Conduct a search in flight- Evaluate the possible effects of pressurization or pressure equalization- Establish the order of search (e.g.: public areas first)- Arrange search assignments for flight crew.

Once these are done, then the next steps will be to:

- Announce the threat to the passengers- Arrange for possible passenger participation in the search- Establish emergency procedures once the suspect explosive device is located- Determine flight routing, landing and deplaning procedures.

The search of an aircraft should be conducted systematically by staff familiar with that particular aircraft. The searchers should be provided with a checklist and assigned to specific areas of the aircraft. Attention to be given to those areas to which passengers have had access, such as main cabins, galley areas and toilets, but should also include the flight crew compartment.

If any suspicious items are found, do not touch them. Get a good description and contact the airline’s central flight dispatch who can relay information to aviation explosives security specialists. In the event that the suspicious item is identified as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and a decision is made that it is safe to move it to the Lead-Risk Bomb Location (LRBL) by the Chief Purser in consultation with the PIC, then the LRBL is prepared in accordance with the checklist contained in the flight operations manual or implement the procedure for the chemical/biological weapons, as appropriate.

Since the events of 9/11, flight crew and cabin crew are now viewed as one single aircraft crew. This is in relation to Amendment 27 to Annex 6 which requires the flight crew compartment door to be locked when the external doors of the aircraft are closed. Therefore only through good communication and interaction between the flight and cabin crew can a strong and positive influence on flight safety be achieved.

oooOOooo

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Documents

AvSec Awareness