M. AKIF KHALID ROLL NO: 12135 Awais Anwar ROLL NO: 12131

What is unlawful Interference (1) Any of the following done, or attempted to be done, without lawful authority is an with unlawful interference aviation: (a) taking control of an aircraft by force, or threat of force, or any other form of intimidation or by any trick or false pretence; (b) destroying an aircraft that is in service; (c) causing damage to an aircraft that is in service that puts the safety of the aircraft, or any person on board or outside the aircraft, at risk; (d) doing anything on board an aircraft that is in service that puts the safety of the aircraft, or any person on board or outside the aircraft, at risk; (e) placing, or causing to be placed, on board an aircraft that is in service anything that puts the safety of the aircraft, or any person on board or outside the aircraft, at risk; (f) putting the safety of aircraft at risk by interfering with, damaging or destroying air navigation facilities; (g) putting the safety of an aircraft at risk by communicating false or misleading information; (h) committing an act at an airport, or causing any interference or damage, that puts the safe operation of the airport, or the safety of any person at the airport, at risk. (2) However, unlawful interference with aviation does not include lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that does not result in, or contribute to, an action of a kind mentioned in paragraphs(1)(a) to (h)

Aircraft hijacking (also known as skyjacking and sky controlling) is the unlawful seizure of an aircraft by an individual or a group. In most cases, the pilot is forced to fly according to the orders of the hijackers. Occasionally, however, the hijackers have flown the aircraft themselves, such as the September 11 attacks of 2001. In at least one case, a plane was hijacked by the official pilot

There are various offences that can be perpetrated by privateindividuals or groups of individuals against civil aviation, the earliestcommon species of which was hijacking of aircraft. Hijacking, in the late1960s started an irreversible trend which was dramatised by suchincidents as the skyjacking by Shiite terrorists of TWA flight 847 in June1985. The skyjacking of Egypt Air flight 648 in November the same yearand the skyjacking of a Kuwait Airways Airbus in 1984 are other earlyexamples of this offence. Aviation sabotage, where explosions on theground or in mid air destroy whole aircraft, their passengers and crew, isalso a threat coming through the past decades. The destruction of AirIndia flight 182 over the Irish Sea in June 1985, PAN AM flight 103 overLockerbie, Scotland in 1988, and the UTA explosion over Niger in 1989are examples. Missile attacks, where aircraft are destroyed by surfaceto air missiles (SAM) have also occurred as early as in the 1970's. Thedestruction of the two Viscount aircraft of Air Rhodesia in late 1978/early 1979 are examples of this offence. A re-emerging threat, namelyarmed attacks at airports, shows early occurrence in instances whereterrorists opened fire in congested areas of airport terminals. Examplesof this type of terrorism are: The June 1972 attack by the Seikigunha(Japanese Red Army) at Ben Gurion Airport, Tel Aviv; the August 1973attack by Arab gunmen on Athens Airport; and the 1985 attacks onRome and Vienna Airports. Finally, the illegal carriage by air of narcoticsand other psychotropic substances and crimes related thereto such as theseizure of, or damage to, aircraft, persons and property is also a threatthat cannot be ignored in the present context, although, like otherexamples cited, it has been a perennial issue.The issue of State responsibility for private acts of unlawfulinterference against civil aviation was not a contentious issue until theparadigm shift of 11 September 2001, when terrorists engaged inhijacking aircraft with a view to using them as weapons of massdestruction, causing damage to civilians on the ground.

Now I m giving the detail of one of the most famous hijacking case of Indian airline.

Case*1

Indian Airlines Flight 814Some details of flight 814

Indian Airlines Flight 814

Taliban militia in front of the hijacked plane

Hijacking summary

DateDecember 24, 1999-January 1, 2000

TypeHijacking

SiteHijacked between Kathmandu, Nepal, and Delhi, India, in Indian airspace, landed at Amritsar, India; Lahore, Pakistan; Dubai; and Kandahar, Afghanistan

Passengers178

Crew15

Injuries17

Fatalities1 (Rupin Katyal)

Survivors192

AircrafttypeAirbus A300

OperatorIndian Airlines

RegistrationVT-EDW

Flight originTribhuvan International Airport, Kathmandu, Nepal

DestinationIndira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi, India

HijackingIndian Airlines Flight 814 (call sign IC-814) was an Indian Airlines Airbus A300 en route from Tribhuvan International Airport (Kathmandu, Nepal) to Indira Gandhi International Airport (Delhi, India) when it was hijacked by five Pakistani nationals[1] on 24 December 1999. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, was held responsible for the hijacking.The aircraft was hijacked by armed gunmen shortly after it entered Indian airspace at about 17:30 hours IST. After touching down in Amritsar, Lahore and Dubai, the hijackers forced the aircraft to land in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The hijackers released 27 of 176 passengers in Dubai but fatally stabbed one and wounded several others.India's lack of recognition of the Taliban-regime in Afghanistan complicated negotiations between Indian authorities and the hijackers. Taliban moved its well-armed fighters near the hijacked aircraft in an attempt to prevent Indian special forces from storming the aircraft. The hijacking lasted for seven days and ended after India released three Islamic militants Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (who was later arrested for the murder of Daniel Pearl) and Maulana Masood Azhar (who later founded Jaish-e-Mohammed).Indian and U.S. intelligence agencies reported of credible links between the hijackers, the al-Qaida and the Taliban. The five hijackers and the three released militants were provided a safe passage by the Taliban. The dubious role played by the Taliban was widely condemned and led to further deterioration of relations between India and the TalibanThe identities of the hijackers according to the Indian Government were:1. Ibrahim Azhar, Bahawalpur, Pakistan2. Shahid Akhtar Sayed, Karachi, Pakistan3. Sunny Ahmed Qazi, Karachi, Pakistan4. Mistri Zahoor Ibrahim, Karachi, Pakistan5. Shakir, Sukkur, PakistanAnil Sharma, the chiefflight attendant on IC-814, later recalled that a masked, bespectacled man threatened to blow up the plane with a bomb and ordered Captain Devi Sharan to fly west. The hijackers wanted Captain Sharan to divert the aircraft overLucknow and head towardsLahore, butPakistani authorities quickly refused permission as they were wary of being linked with the terrorists. Also, the fuel was not sufficient. Captain Sharan told the hijackers that they had to land inAmritsar, India.

Landing in Amritsar, IndiaAt Amritsar, Captain Sharan requested refueling the aircraft. However, the Crisis Management Group in Delhi directed Amritsar Airport authorities to ensure that the plane was immobilized, which armed personnel of the Punjab police were already in position to try to do. They did not receive approval from New Delhi. Eventually, a fuel tanker was dispatched and instructed to block the approach of the aircraft. As the tanker sped towards the aircraft, air traffic control radioed the pilot to slow down, and the tanker immediately came to a stop. This sudden stop aroused the hijackers suspicion and they forced the aircraft to take off immediately, without clearance from air traffic control. The aircraft missed the tanker by only a few feet.Landing in Lahore, PakistanDue to extremely low fuel level, the aircraft requested emergency landing inLahore,Pakistan.Pakistan denied the request fearing that their country might be linked with the terrorists. Pakistan also shut down their Air traffic services, thus effectively blackening the whole of Pakistan airspace for the Indian Airlines flight, and switched off all lights at Lahore Airport.With no help from ATC, Captain Sharan banked on his visual instincts and began descending on what he thought was a runway, only to find out that it was a well lit road, and ascended the aircraft in time. On understanding that the only other option for the aircraft was to crash land, Lahore Airport switched on its lights and allowed the aircraft to land. Lahore airport officials refueled the aircraft and allowed it to leave Lahore at 22:32 hours IST. Moreover, Pakistani officials rejected IC-814 pilots request to offload some women and children passengers.Landing in Dubai, UAEThe aircraft took off forDubai where 27 passengers aboard the ill-fated flight were released. The hijackers also released critically injured 25 year old Indian male, Ripan Katyal, who was stabbed by the hijackers multiple times. Ripan later succumbed to his injuries, becoming the first and only casualty of the hijacking.Soon after the release of these passengers, the hijacked plane left forKandahar International Airport.Landing in Kandahar, AfghanistanAfter the aircraft landed inKandahar, Taliban authorities, in an attempt to gain international recognition, agreed to cooperate with Indian authorities and took the role of mediators between the hijackers and the Indian government. Since India did not recognize the Taliban-regime, it dispatched an official from its High Commission inIslamabad toKandahar. Indias lack of previous contact with the Taliban-regime complicated the negotiating process.However, the intention of Taliban came under doubt when its armed fighters surrounded the hijacked aircraft. The Taliban maintained that the forces were deployed in an attempt to dissuade the hijackers from killing or injuring the hostages but some analysts believe it was done to prevent Indian military operation against the hijackers.

Release of militantsThe hijackers initially demanded the release of 35 Islamic militants in Indian jails and US$200 million in cash but Indian negotiators succeeded in persuading the hijackers in reducing their demand to the release of three prisoners. These were: Maulana Masood Azhar founded Jaish-e-Muhammed in 2000 which gained notoriety for its alleged role in 2001 Indian Parliament attack. Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh arrested in 2002 by Pakistani authorities for the abduction and murder of Daniel Pearl. Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar has played an active role since release in training Islamic militants in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, who had been imprisoned in connection with 1994 Kidnappings of Western tourists in India, went on to murder Daniel Pearl and also allegedly played a significant role in planning the September 11 attacks in the United States. After the three militants landed in Kandahar, the hostages aboard the flight were freed. On 31 December 1999, the freed hostages of the Indian Airlines Flight 814 were flown back to India on a special plane.INVESTIGATION The case was investigated by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) which charged 10 people out of which seven including the five hijackers were still absconding and are in Pakistan. On 5 Feb 2008, a special anti hijacking Patiala House Court sentenced all three convicts namely Abdul Latif, Yusuf Nepali and Dilip Kumar Bhujel to life imprisonment. They were charged for helping the hijackers in procuring fake passports and to take weapons on board. However, CBI moved Punjab and Haryana High Court demanding death penalty (instead of life imprisonment) to Abdul Latif. The case is set to come up for regular hearing in high court in September 2012. On 13 September 2012,the Jammu and Kashmir Police arrested terror suspect Mehrajuddin Dand, who allegedly provided logistical support for the hijacking of IC-814 in 1999. He allegedly provided travel papers to IC-814 hijackers

Similarly here I discuss another case of UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE

Case* 2

'Unlawful Interference' Cited in 1997 Accident: Report on SilkAir Crash Alludes to Pilot Suicide

Some details of flight 185

SilkAir Flight 185

Illustration of 9V-TRF

Occurrence summary

Date19 December 1997

TypeMurdersuicide (disputed) Pilot Error

SiteMusi River Palembang, Indonesia22730S 1045612E / 2.45833S 104.93667E / -2.45833; 104.93667Coordinates: Click the blue globe to open an interactive map. 22730S 1045612E / 2.45833S 104.93667E / -2.45833; 104.93667

Passengers97

Crew7

Injuries0

Fatalities104 (all)

Survivors0

AircrafttypeBoeing 737-36N

OperatorSilkAir

Registration9V-TRF

Flight originSoekarno-Hatta International Airport

DestinationSingapore Changi Airport

Flight HistoryThe Boeing 737-300 operating as Flight MI 185 was the newest in SilkAir's fleet, delivered to the airline on 14 February 1997, ten months before the crashCarrying 97 passengers and a crew of seven, the Boeing departed Jakarta's Soekarno-Hatta International Airport's runway 25R at 15:37 local time (08:37 UTC) for a planned 80 minute flight to Singapore Changi Airport, with the captain at the controls. Generally fair weather was expected for the route, except for some thunderstorms near Singkep Island, 120km south of Singapore.The jetliner was cleared to climb to flight level 350 (35,000 feet/10,668 m above mean sea level), and to head directly to Palembang At 15:47 the aircraft climbed through FL245 (24,500 feet/7,468 m). The crew then requested a clearance to proceed directly to PARDI. At 15:53 the crew reported reaching its cruise altitude of FL350 and was cleared to proceed directly to PARDI, and to report abeam Palembang. At 16:05 the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) ceased recording. According to the TV series Mayday, Captain Tsu took the opportunity of dropping his headphones to trip the circuit breaker. At 16:10 the controller informed the flight that it was abeam Palembang. The controller instructed the aircraft to maintain FL350 (35,000 feet/10,668 m) and to contact Singapore Control upon reaching PARDI. First Officer Duncan acknowledged this call. At 16:11:27 the flight data recorder (FDR) ceased recording.CrashFlight 185 remained level at FL350 (35,000 feet/10,668 m) until it started a rapid and nearly vertical dive, as shown on Jakarta radar, around 16:12:18. The aircraft broke up in flight, and its debris crashed into the Musi River, near Palembang, Sumatra. From the moment it dived to impact took less than 1 minute. The plane was travelling faster than the speed of sound for a few seconds before it broke up.All 104 people on board, including the 41-year-old Singaporean captain, Tsu Way Ming () and the 23-year-old co-pilot, New Zealander Duncan Ward, died in the crash.The aircraft broke into pieces before impact, with the debris spread over several kilometres, though most of the wreckage was concentrated in a single 60-metre (200ft) by 80-metre (260ft) area at the river bottom. There was not a complete body, body part or limb found, as the entire aircraft and passengers disintegrated upon impact. Only six positive identifications were later obtained from the few recovered human remains. Among those killed in the crash was Singaporean model and author Bonny Hicks.Investigation and Final ReportThe accident was investigated by the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), which was assisted by expert groups from the U.S., Singapore and Australia, and the American National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).Approximately 73% of the wreckage (by weight) was recovered, partially reconstructed and examined. Both "black boxes" the Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and Flight data recorder (FDR) were successfully retrieved from the wreckage, and their data was extracted and analyzed.According to Mayday, At 16:00 Captain Tsu left the cockpit; 5 seconds later, the CVR stopped recording. It was believed that Captain Tsu tripped the CVR circuit breaker before leaving the cockpit. NTSC and NTSB investigators postulated that, if Captain Tsu was responsible for the crash, he returned and then concocted a pretense for First Officer Ward to leave the cockpit. Several minutes later, as recorded by Indonesian radar, the plane entered a rapid descent, broke up and crashed into the Musi River, disintegrating on impact.On 14 December 2000, after three years of intensive investigation, the Indonesian NTSC issued its final report, in which it concluded that the evidence was inconclusive and that the cause of the accident could not be determined:The NTSC has to conclude that the technical investigation has yielded no evidence as to the cause of the accident.The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also participated in the investigation, concluded that the evidence was consistent with a deliberate manipulation of the flight controls, most likely by the captain.In a letter to the NTSC dated 11 December 2000 the NTSB wrote:The examination of all of the factual evidence is consistent with the conclusions that: 1) no airplane-related mechanical malfunctions or failures caused or contributed to the accident, and 2) the accident can be explained by intentional pilot action. Specifically, a) the accident airplanes flight profile is consistent with sustained manual nose-down flight control inputs; b) the evidence suggests that the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was intentionally disconnected; c) recovery of the airplane was possible but not attempted; and d) it is more likely that the nose-down flight control inputs were made by the captain than by the first officer.Geoffrey Thomas of The Sydney Morning Herald said that "A secret report confirmed that the Indonesian authorities would not issue a public verdict because they feared it would make their own people too frightened to fly."] Santoso Sayogo, an NTSC investigator who worked on the SilkAir 185 case, said in an episode of the Canadian television series Mayday (Air Crash Investigation, Air Emergency) that the NTSB opinion was in fact shared by some Indonesian investigators who were overruled by their boss. SINGAPORE Indonesian investigators have concluded that "unlawful interference" may have caused the mysterious crash of a Singapore jet in December 1997 that killed all 104 people on board, the Singapore government said Wednesday. The finding, contained in a new report by the official Indonesian body investigating the crash, is the closest authorities have yet come to confirming persistent rumors that pilot suicide might have been the cause. It will likely have a significant bearing on the class-action suit that relatives of dead passengers are reportedly preparing against the airline, SilkAir, the regional unit of Singapore Airlines Ltd. All 97 passengers and seven crew aboard the SilkAir Boeing 737-300 jet died when the plane, which had been recently serviced and was only 10 months old, plunged from sky in good weather into a mangrove swamp near the Indonesian town of Palembang while on a routine flight from Jakarta to Singapore. The Singapore government said it had been advised by Giri Hadihardjono, the communications minister of Indonesia, that the team investigating the ill-fated flight had "found indications raising suspicions that unlawful interference may have been a factor in the accident." The police in both Indonesia and Singapore had been informed, the government said. The Indonesian update on the investigation released Wednesday said there were indications that in the last seconds of the cockpit voice recorder, the pilot, Tsu Way Ming, "was in the process of, or intending to, leave the cockpit." The report also said there were indications that at the time of the accident Mr. Tsu was "facing financial problems, and had experienced several company disciplinary actions." It said that wreckage investigation and the flight data recorder indicated that when the jet struck the ground, "the horizontal stabilizer had a nose-down trim which was different from the last known trim setting for cruise flight." This, the Indonesian investigators concluded, "could indicate a manual input from the cockpit," although they added that they were not yet able to establish who was responsible for this action. Mak Swee Wah, the general manager of SilkAir, said in a statement that the reference to financial difficulties, and to an unknown person setting the horizontal stabilizer to point the nose of the aircraft toward the ground, were new to the company. "We were not aware of this until now," Mr. Mak said. "SilkAir is saddened and disturbed to learn that human intervention may have caused the crash of MI 185." But the airline confirmed Wednesday that Mr. Tsu had been reprimanded for breaches of flying procedure three times in the 10 months before the fatal crash. As a result of one of the breaches for deactivating the cockpit voice recorder before takeoff so that his conversation would not be recorded he was demoted from the position of line instructor pilot to his previous rank of captain. In another incident, Mr. Tsu made an unsuccessful landing approach but did not file a report. After SilkAir subsequently learned of this, it said it had instituted an inquiry but did not say what the outcome was or whether disciplinary action had been taken. In the third incident, Mr. Tsu encountered power deficiency in one of the engines of the plane he was flying and correctly returned for a landing but again did not file a report, for which he was "counseled verbally and in writing," SilkAir said. "These three incidents should be judged in the context of Captain Tsu's otherwise satisfactory flying record, " Mr. Mak said. "The incidents did not give reason to take more severe action, such as grounding Captain Tsu. Deactivation of the cockpit voice recorder is not a safety hazard and therefore the aircraft was not in any danger." The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of Singapore said Wednesday that it was not aware of these disciplinary incidents as they did not infringe safety regulations or warrant action by the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore against the pilot. SilkAir said Wednesday that it had reviewed its recruitment and handling of Mr. Tsu, who had joined the company as a first officer in 1992 after 17 years of service with the Singapore Air Force where he had a "good record" as a highest-level instructor and a member of the elite Black Knights aerobatics team. "Captain Tsu was a skilled and experienced pilot," Mr. Mak said. "He passed his regular medical checks and competency tests. By the best standards in the industry, he was fit to fly." The copilot on the flight, Duncan Ward, had also passed his regular medical examination. Mr. Mak drew attention to the fact that the Indonesian update report had noted that "both pilots were properly trained, licensed and qualified to conduct the flight," and that there was "no evidence found to indicate that the performance of either pilot was adversely affected by any medical or physiological condition." Mr. Mak said that SilkAir would work to settle the claims of next-of-kin fairly and promptly, adding that the airline was adequately insured to cover compensation claims.

Case*3

Accident: TAME E190 at Quito on Sep 16th 2011, overran runwayEcuador's Accident Investigation Commission JIA have released their final report in Spanish concluding the probable cause of the accident was:

the crew's decision to continue the approach and landing without actioning the relevant checklists (EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL Procedures), that were required for malfunctions of the slat/flap systems by the Quick Reference Handbook, resulting in too long a landing.

The aircraft and crew had been scheduled to fly the sectors Loja-Quito-Cuenca-Quito that evening. There had been discussion between the captain and dispatch, the captain argued that the sector Quito-Cuenca-Quito should be flown by another crew which was turned down.

The departure from Loja had been delayed by 46 minutes, past the official opening hours of that aerodrome. With the permission of the head of the aerodrome the aircraft departed, the crew took the decision to depart due to the subsequent sectors to be flown. The aircraft departed Loja with 4000kg of fuel on board, 1626 kg of fuel was planned for the sector Loja-Quito, 1013 kg for the diversion to the planned alternate aerodrome Manta and 1265 kg of reserve fuel.

The captain (55, ATPL, 6,160 hours total, 1,879 hours on type) was pilot flying for the sector, the first officer (51, CPL, 4,891 hours total, 2,807 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.

Following an uneventful departure and cruise the aircraft was vectored onto the ILS approach for Quito's runway 35. The crew was instructed to reduce speed to 230 KIAS while being vectored towards the final approach and further instructed the aircraft to reduce to minimum approach speed due to separation to the preceding aircraft, the crew selected the flaps to the landing configuration but received indication that the slats remained retracted and the flaps only moved to position 2. The crew attempted to reset the flap system 5 times, however without success, and decided to continue the approach, but did not work the related abnormal checklist procedures, for example the crew did not compute their reference speed and landing distance required in view of the slat failure. The captain indicated to the first officer he wanted to lower the gear as late as possible voicing concern about the fuel situation, at that point the aircraft had consumed 1730kg of fuel (planned 1626kg). About 3.5 minutes after encountering the first trouble the crew reported established on the localizer and was handed off to tower, the crew switched to tower frequency and reported on tower frequency over the outer marker. Tower instructed to continue the approach, winds were calm, the runway was wet and instructed to report runway in sight. The crew inquired about their separation to the preceding A320, tower replied that his radar was out of service, 30 seconds later the tower reported the A320 had landed and another 30 seconds later the A320 had vacated the runway. The crew reported they had the runway in sight and were cleared to land on runway 35, winds were calm, braking action average, after that transmission was acknowledged the tower instructed the crew to turn on their landing lights. The flight data recorder identified the main wheels touched down 880 meters/2900 feet past the runway threshold, overran the end of the runway, travelled past the runway end safety area of 166 meters/540 feet, took down 6 of the 14 the localizer antennas and broke through the aerodrome perimeter wall knocking down 19 meters of the wall before coming to a stop about 300 meters/1000 feet past the runway end.

The tower controller had watched the landing and pressed the crash button immediately when the aircraft went past the runway end. Emergency services responded and reached the aircraft 50 seconds after the aircraft came to a stop. The aircraft spilled fuel from the wing tanks, emergency services therefore foamed the aircraft. The occupants of the aircraft were evacuated via the 2L and 2R slides. The forward left slide did not inflate and the safety pin could not be removed, the forward right slide was blocked by a housing wall although it had normally inflated. Slide 3R could not be used due to obstacles.

6 crew and 5 passengers received minor injuries.

The aircraft received substantial damage including fracture of the left and right main gear struts, displacement of the nose section due to impact with the wall, the main wheel tyres received cuts as result of impact with the wall.

In addition to the damage to 6 of 14 localizer antennas and destruction of 19 meters of aerodrome perimeter wall the wall of a house's living room below the final position of the aircraft was damaged over a length of 9 meters.

The JIA stated that with landing flaps applied the landing distance required would have been 880 meters at a Vref of 119 KIAS for the present weight of the aircraft and environmental conditions. However, with the flaps extended only to position 2 and slats remaining retracted, the Vref would have been 149 KIAS and the landing distance required would have been 1940 meters (runway length 3125 meters, elevation 9230 feet). The aircraft however crossed a point 80 meters before the runway threshold below 50 feet AGL at a speed of 163.8 KIAS, the main wheels touched down 880 meters past the runway threshold about 9 seconds later, the spoilers deflected 950 meters past the threshold, the thrust reversers deployed 1280 meters past the threshold and the brakes were operated 1660 meters past the threshold, full brakes were applied 2300 meters past the threshold with antiskid modulating the brakes pressure correctly. Due to the 15 knots higher approach speed than Vref, the long flare and the late application of the brakes the needed landing distance was significantly longer than 1950 meters.

The JIA analysed that despite the higher fuel burn encountered on the way to Quito there was still sufficient fuel on board to divert to Manta following a go-around from low height and arrive in Manta above final fuel reserve (editorial note: sum up the planned fuel figures, sum is 3904 kg!) and indicated that according to cockpit voice recorder the fuel meters even read 4070kg of fuel on board at the time of departure from Loja.

The JIA established that all brakes were functioning normally and were no factor contributing to the accident.

According to the computerized maintenance logs of the aircraft there had been 53 cases of slat failure indications since July 19th 2011 to the date of the accident, 6 on approach, 47 enroute. 3 of the events were on the accident date. The JIA queried the efficiency of the corrective actions taken and reported that all 16 slat actuators were taken to the manufacturer's facility for testing.

These tests showed that two actuators, 5 left and 6 right, did not rotate freely due to binding with the other 14 rotating without binding. These two actuators also failed the cold testing after being exposed to -40 degrees C over night. Moisture was detected inside 3 of the actuators, including 5L and 6R, following disassembly. A 4th actuator contained rust coloured grease. Actuator 6R was re-assembled using new grease and subsequently tested successfully, without any binding or torque issues.

Slide 1L was tested, with the door armed and opened it did not inflate. After removing the decorative cover the safety pin was found still installed, although the maintenance manual required the safety pin removed before that cover is being installed.CONCLUSION:The JIA thus analysed that the crew did not work the relevant checklists after encountering the slat failure, did not abort the approach although the stabilized approach criteria were never met, and applied brakes late and irregular thus preventing the aircraft to stop within the shortest landing distance possible. The crew was under significant discomfort and stress, especially the captain following the argument with dispatch and the delay in Loja, their performance was therefore impaired. The JIA stated: "the human factor, including a good deal of time spent during flight in conversation about these issues unrelated to the conduct of the flight, was a dominant factor into the accident sequence leading to loss of situational awareness and inappropriate decision making".

A TAME Embraer ERJ-190, registration HC-CEZ performing flight EQ-148 from Loja to Quito (Ecuador) with 97 passengers and 6 crew, landed on Quito's runway 35 in rain at around 19:00L (00:00Z Sep 17th) but could not stop on the runway. The aircraft went over soft ground, through the localizer antenna and came to a stop at the airport perimeter wall about 275 meters/900 feet past the runway end. 4 people received minor injuries, the aircraft received substantial damage.

ILS runway 35 approach chart (Graphics: AIP Ecuador):