Ateneo 2013 Labor Jurisprudence

8/15/2019 Ateneo 2013 Labor Jurisprudence

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ateneo-2013-labor-jurisprudence 1/100

Probationary employees can join a

union and can vote in a CE•

Any employee, whether employed for a definiteperiod or not, shall beginning on the first day ofhis/her service, be eligible for membership in anylabor organization. In a certification election for

the bargaining unit of rank and file employees,all rank and file employees, whetherprobationary or permanent are entitled to vote.

As long as probationary employees belong tothe defined bargaining unit, they are eligible tosupport the petition for certification election.

•

NUWHRAIN-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary, July 31,2009

In fact they can form a union if the

employer is brave enough.



Confidential Employees

•

Confidential employees are those who (1) assistor act in a confidential capacity, (2) to personswho formulate, determine, and effectuatemanagement policies in the field of laborrelations. The two (2) criteria are cumulative,

and both must be met

• The exclusion from bargaining units ofemployees who, in the normal course of theirduties, become aware of management policies

relating to labor relations is a principal objectivesought to be accomplished by the “confidentialemployee rule.”

• Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery v. Asia

Brewery, August 3, 2010

Akin to managerial employees

Necessary access.



• As regards the qualification of bank cashiers as confidential employees,National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) – Republic Planters BankSupervisors Chapter v. Torres declared that they are confidentialemployees having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters,e.g ., the branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vaultcombination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other

negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central Bank Manualregarding joint custody, and therefore, disqualified from joining or assistinga union; or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization.

• Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja meanwhile stated that “confidentialemployees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the source ofundue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party

to a collective bargaining agreement.” • In Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, the Court designated personnel staff , in which humanresources staff may be qualified, as confidential employees because by thevery nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacityto, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercisemanagerial functions in the field of labor relations.

•

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (SCBEU-NUBE) v. StandardChartered Bank, April 22, 2008





•

Payroll Master and employees who haveaccess to salary and compensation data

are NOT Confidential employees. Their

position do not involve dealing withconfidential labor relations information.

• San Miguel Foods v. SMC Supervisors and Exempt

Union, August 1, 2011



20% requirement must be at the

time of registration

•

Art. 234(c) requires the list of names of all theunion members of an INDEPENDENT UNIONcomprising at least 20% of the bargaining unit.

This should not be equated with the list ofworkers who participated in the organizationalmeetings (par [b]).

• Subsequent affidavits of retraction (withdrawal of

membership) will not retroact to the time of theapplication for registration or even way back tothe organizational meeting.

•

Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club v. CA, March 18, 2010

No reqt in the case of

chartered local



A trade union center

CANNOT create a chapter

• A trade union center is any group of registerednational unions or federations organized for themutual aid and protection of its members; forassisting such members in collective bargaining;or for participating in policy formulation.

• A trade union center has no authority to charterdirectly. Under the law and the rules, the

power granted to labor organizations to directlycreate a chapter or local through chartering isgiven to a federation or national union only, notto a trade union center.

•

San Miguel Corporation Employees Union v. San MiguelPackaging Products Employees Union, September 12, 2007



Charter Certificate not required to

be certified under oath•

The charter certificate need not be certifiedunder oath by the local union’s secretary ortreasurer and attested to by its president.

•

Considering that the charter certificate isprepared and issued by the national union andnot the local/chapter, it does not make senseto have the local/chapter

s officers certify orattest to the due execution of such document.

•

Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER)v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011



Mixture of R&F and Supervisory

employees does not negate the

union’s legitimacy• The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory

employees in a union does not nullify its legal

personality as a legitimate labor organization.

•

Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER)

v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011

•

As amended by R.A. 9481, the Labor Codenow allows a R&F union and a Supervisory

union of the same company to be part of the

same federation.



Voluntary Recognition•

An employer cannot ignore the existence of a legitimate labororganization at the time of its voluntary recognition of another union.The employer and the voluntarily recognized union cannot, bythemselves, decide whether the other union represented anappropriate bargaining unit.

•

The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status ofa union in unorganized establishments. SLECC WAS NOT ANUNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENT WHEN IT VOLUNTARILYRECOGNIZED SMSLEC AS ITS EXCLUSIVE BARGAININGREPRESENTATIVE ON 20 JULY 2001. CLUP-SLECC AND ITS

AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION FILED A PETITION FORCERTIFICATION ELECTION ON 27 FEBRUARY 2001 AND THIS

PETITION REMAINED PENDING AS OF 20 JULY 2001. THUS,SLECC ’S VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF SMSLEC ON 20 JULY2001, THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTINGREGISTRATION OF A CBA EXECUTED BY SLECC AND SMSLEC

ARE VOID AND CANNOT BAR CLUP-SLECCWA’S PRESENTPETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

•

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Hon. Secretary OfLabor, August 14, 2009

Only one union, not when establishment is

unorganized. Inaccurate yung ruling in

this case.



Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping

NOT required

in Petition for Certification Election

•

There is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping in the Labor Code or in therules.

•

A certification proceeding, even though initiated bya “petition,” is not a litigation but an investigationof a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.

Such proceedings are not predicated upon anallegation of misconduct requiring relief, but,rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature.

•

SAMMA-LIKHA v. SAMMA Corporation, March 13, 2009



Petition for Certification Election•

The Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed the firstpetition as it was filed outside the 60-day freedom period.Subsequently, another petition for CE was filed, this time withinthe freedom period. Is this later Petition barred?

• At that time therefore, the union has no cause of action since

they are not yet legally allowed to challenge openly and formallythe status of SMCGC-SUPER as the exclusive bargainingrepresentative of the bargaining unit. Such dismissal, however,has no bearing in the instant case since the third petition forcertification election was filed well within the 60-day freedomperiod. Otherwise stated, there is no identity of causes of action

to speak of since in the first petition, the union has no cause ofaction while in the third, a cause of action already exists for theunion as they are now legally allowed to challenge the status ofSMCGC-SUPER as exclusive bargaining representative.

•

Chris Garments Corporation v. Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas andChris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO, January 12, 2009

Will not be barred by error.



Union’s legal personality not

subject to collateral attack• The legal personality of petitioner union cannot

be collaterally attacked in the certificationelection proceedings. A separate action for

cancellation of the union’s registration/legalpersonality must be filed.

•

Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER)v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011

•

As amended by R.A. 9481, the Labor Code nowprovides that, in certification election cases, theemployer shall not be considered a party with aconcomitant right to oppose a petition for

certification election.



Union’s legal personality not

subject to collateral attack• The legal personality of petitioner union cannot

be collaterally attacked in the certificationelection proceedings. A separate action for

cancellation of the union’s registration/legalpersonality must be filed.

•

Legend International Resorts v. Kilusang Manggagawa ngLegend, February 23, 2011



Employer as Bystander

•

Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, anemployer is a mere bystander to any petition for certificationelection; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merelyinvestigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine whichorganization will represent the employees in their collective

bargaining with the employer. The choice of theirrepresentative is the exclusive concern of the employees; theemployer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannotinterfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing amotion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere

allegation that some employees participating in a petition forcertification election are actually managerial employees willlend an employer legal personality to block the certificationelection. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to benotified or informed thereof.

•

Republic of the Philippines, represented by DOLE, v.Kawashima Textile, July 23, 2008



Whoever alleges fraud/

misrepresentation

has burden of proof•

The charge that a labor organization committedfraud and misrepresentation in securing its

registration is a serious charge that should beclearly established by evidence and thesurrounding circumstances.

•

The petitioner (the party that filed the Petition forCancellation) has the burden of proof.

•

Yokohama Tire Phils. v. Yokohama Employees Union, March10, 2010; Heritage Hotel Manila v. PIGLAS-Heritage, October 30,2009



Signing of Petition for CE not

disloyalty

•

The mere signing of the authorization in support

of a Petition for Certification Election before the

“freedom period,” is not sufficient ground to

terminate the employment of union members

under the Union Security Clause respondents

inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed

during the freedom period.• PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Tañeca, August 9, 2010

Because representation

aspect is being questioned.



Employer ’s insistence to exclude a

particular provision in the

negotiations NOT refusal to bargain• The duty to bargain does not include the

obligation to reach an agreement. While the lawmakes it an obligation for the employer and theemployees to bargain collectively with eachother, such compulsion does not include thecommitment to precipitately accept or agree tothe proposals of the other. All it contemplates is

that both parties should approach thenegotiation with an open mind and makereasonable effort to reach an agreement.

•

Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Phils., March 3,

2008



5-year term

•

While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any suchamendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it achange in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining status. Byexpress provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, theexclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and therepresentation status is a legal matter not for the workplaceparties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement fora CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an originalprovision or by amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusivebargaining status is effective only for five years and can bechallenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the

CBA’s first five years.

•

FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General WorkersOrganization (FVCLU-PTGWO) v. Sama-Samang NagkakaisangManggagawa Sa FVC-Solidarity Of Independent And General LaborOrganizations (SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO), November 27, 2009



Bargaining Unit

•

The test of grouping is community ormutuality of interest.

• There should be only one bargaining unit foremployees involved in “dressed chicken” processing and workers engaged in “livechicken” operations.

• Although they seem separate and distinctfrom each other, the tasks of each divisionare actually interrelated and there existsmutuality of interests which warrants theformation of a single bargaining unit.

• San Miguel Foods v. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors

and Exempt Union, August 1, 2011



ULP

•

In Silva v. National Labor Relations Commission, weexplained the correlations of Article 248 (1) and Article 261 ofthe Labor Code to mean that for a ULP case to be cognizableby the Labor Arbiter, and for the NLRC to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereon, the allegations in the complaint mustshow prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1)

gross violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to theeconomic provisions of the CBA.

• This pronouncement in Silva, however, should not beconstrued to apply to violations of the CBA which can beconsidered as gross violations per se, such as utter disregardof the very existence of the CBA itself, similar to whathappened in this case. When an employer proceeds tonegotiate with a splinter union despite the existence of itsvalid CBA with the duly certified and exclusive bargainingagent, the former indubitably abandons its recognition of thelatter and terminates the entire CBA.

•

(Employees Union of Bayer v. Bayer Phils., December 6,2010)



Bonus in the CBA

•

Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceableobligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it must havebeen promised by the employer and expressly agreedupon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this case is

integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of ademandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of itsincorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due torespondent Association has become more than just anact of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a

contractual obligation it has undertaken.• Lepanto Ceramics v. Lepanto Ceramics Employees

Association, March 2, 2010; Eastern Telecoms v.Eastern Telecoms Employees Union, February 8,2012



Grievance

•

Petitioners clearly and consistently questioned the legalityof RGMI’s adoption of the new salary scheme (i.e., piece-rate basis), asserting that such action, among others,violated the existing CBA. Indeed, the controversy was nota simple case of illegal dismissal but a labor dispute

involving the manner of ascertaining employees’ salaries,a matter which was governed by the existing CBA.

•

Article 217(c) of the Labor Code requires labor arbiters torefer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to thegrievance machinery provided therein and to voluntaryarbitration.

•

Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that suchdisputes must be referred first to the grievance machineryand, if unresolved within seven days, they shallautomatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.

•

Santuyo v. Remerco Garments, March 22, 2010



Grievance

•

Individual employees cannot raise a grievance.

• Only disputes involving the union and the

company shall be referred to the grievance

machinery or voluntary arbitrators.•

A FEDERATION cannot raise a grievance on

behalf of members of its local/chapter.•

Insular Hotel Employees Union v. Waterfront Insular Hotel,

September 22, 2010



Arbitral Award• While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an

agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because itrequires the intervention and imposing power of the Statethru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction,the arbitral award can be considered an approximation ofa collective bargaining agreement which wouldotherwise have been entered into by the parties, hence, it

has the force and effect of a valid contract obligation.• That the arbitral award was higher than that which was

purportedly agreed upon in the MOA is of no moment. Forthe Secretary, in resolving the CBA deadlock, is not limitedto considering the MOA as basis in computing the wageincreases. He could, as he did, consider the financialdocuments submitted by respondent as well as the parties’ bargaining history and respondent’s financial outlook andimprovements as stated in its website.

•

Cirtek Employees Labor Union v. Cirtek Electronics,

November 15, 2010

The arbitral award is a

collective bargaining agreement.

No difference!



Arbitral Award• The hold-over principle, i.e., the duty of the parties to

keep the status quo and to continue in full force andeffect the terms and conditions of the existing CBA until

a new agreement is reached by the parties applies to an

imposed CBA (i.e., an arbitral award).

•

The law does not provide for any exception norqualification on which economic provisions of the existing

agreement are to retain its force and effect. Likewise,

the law does not distinguish between a CBA duly agreedupon by the parties and an imposed CBA.

• General Milling Corporation-ILU v. General Milling

Corp., June 15, 2011



ULP

•

For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must beshown that the employer was motivated by ill-will, bad faithor fraud, or was oppressive to labor. The employer musthave acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs,or public policy causing social humiliation, wounded

feelings or grave anxiety. While the law makes it anobligation for the employer and the employees to bargaincollectively with each other, such compulsion does notinclude the commitment to precipitately accept or agree tothe proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that bothparties should approach the negotiation with an open mind

and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground ofagreement.

•

Manila Mining Corporation Employees Association v.manila Mining Corp., September 29, 2010

Works in favor of mgmt.



ULP

•

Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and hewho alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Byimputing bad faith to the actuations of CAB, CABEU-NFLhas the burden of proof to present substantial evidenceto support the allegation of unfair labor practice.

Apparently, CABEU-NFL refers only to thecircumstances mentioned in the letter-response, namely,the execution of the supposed CBA between CAB andCABELA and the request to suspend the negotiations, toconclude that bad faith attended CAB’s actions. The

Court is of the view that CABEU-NFL, in simply relyingon the said letter-response, failed to substantiate itsclaim of unfair labor practice to rebut the presumption ofgood faith.

•

Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Union v.Central Azucarera de Bais, November 17 , 2010

Good faith is always presumed.



Union Security Clause

•

Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment dueto the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA.

• A stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employeesare of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal underthe Labor Code, since “a CBA is the law between the companyand the union and compliance therewith is mandated by theexpress policy to give protection to labor.”

• In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing theunion security clause, the employer needs only to determine andprove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) theunion is requesting for the enforcement of the union securityprovision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence tosupport the decision of the union to expel the employee from theunion. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating anemployee based on the union security provision of the CBA.

• General Milling Corporation v. Casio, March 10, 2010•



Union Security Clause•

“

Union security”

is a generic term, which is applied to and

comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “

maintenance ofmembership,

”

or any other form of agreement which imposes uponemployees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as acondition affecting employment.

– There is union shop when all new regular employees are requiredto join the union within a certain period as a condition for theircontinued employment.

–

There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, whoare union members as of the effective date of the agreement, orwho thereafter become members, must maintain unionmembership as a condition for continued employment until theyare promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or theagreement is terminated.

– A closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise

in which, by agreement between the employer and his employeesor their representatives, no person may be employed in any orcertain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is,becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains amember in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or ofwhich the employees in interest are a part.

•

General Milling Corporation v. Casio, March 10, 2010•




•

The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer.However, this is not without limitations. The employer is bound toexercise caution in terminating the services of his employeesespecially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union

pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. x x x.

•

While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees

expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security clauseof the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation bythe union, this dismissal should not be done hastily and summarilythereby eroding the employees’ right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure. The enforcement of unionsecurity clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement

is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with dueprocess. Even on the assumption that the federation had validgrounds to expel the union officers, due process requires thatthese union officers be accorded a separate hearing byrespondent company.

•

General Milling Corporation v. Casio, March 10, 2010




•

The Union Shop Clause in the CBA simply states that “newemployees” who during the effectivity of the CBA “may beregularly employed” by the Bank must join the union withinthirty (30) days from their regularization. There is nothing inthe said clause that limits its application to only newemployees who possess non-regular status, meaningprobationary status, at the start of their employment.Petitioner likewise failed to point to any provision in the CBAexpressly excluding from the Union Shop Clause newemployees who are “absorbed” as regular employees fromthe beginning of their employment. What is indubitable fromthe Union Shop Clause is that upon the effectivity of the CBA,petitioner ’s new regular employees (regardless of themanner by which they became employees of BPI) arerequired to join the Union as a condition of their continuedemployment.

•

BPI v. BPI employees Union-Davao, August 10, 2010




•

Theoretically, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence to prevent an employer and aunion from stipulating that existing employees(who already attained regular and permanent

status but who are not members of any union)are to be included in the coverage of a unionsecurity clause. Even Article 248(e) of the LaborCode only expressly exempts old employeeswho already have a union from inclusion in a

union security clause.

• BPI v. BPI employees Union-Davao, August10, 2010, October 19, 2011




•

The rationale for upholding the validity of union shopclauses in a CBA, even if they impinge upon theindividual employee’s right or freedom of association, isnot to protect the union for the union’s sake. Laws and

jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain

protections to the certified bargaining agent in aunionized company because a strong and effective unionpresumably benefits all employees in the bargainingunit since such a union would be in a better position todemand improved benefits and conditions of work fromthe employer. This is the rationale behind the Statepolicy to promote unionism declared in the Constitution,which was elucidated in the above-cited case of LibertyFlour Mills Employees v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc.

•

BPI v. BPI employees Union-Davao, August 10, 2010



STRIKE

•

Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, defines strike as anytemporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employeesas a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includesany controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions ofemployment or the association or representation of persons innegotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and

conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not thedisputants stand in the proximate relation of employers andemployees.

•

The term “strike” shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages,but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage,destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar

activities. Thus, the fact that the conventional term“strike

” was notused by the striking employees to describe their common course of

action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, andnot its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

•

Solidbank Corp. v. Gamier, November 15, 2010



STRIKE

•

“Mass leave” refers to a simultaneous availment ofauthorized leave benefits by a large number ofemployees in a company.

•

If only 5 employees were absent on the same day, andthey went on leave for various reasons, they cannot be

considered to have gone on “mass leave”. They did notgo on strike.

•

“Concerted” is defined as “mutually contrived orplanned” or “performed in unison”

•

Naranjo v. Biomedica Heath Care, September 19, 2012





PICKETING

•

As we have stated, while the picket was moving, themovement was in circles, very close to the gates, with thestrikers in a hand-to-shoulder formation without a break intheir ranks, thus preventing non-striking workers andvehicles from coming in and getting out. Supported by

actual blocking benches and obstructions, what the uniondemonstrated was a very persuasive and quietlyintimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze theoperations of the company, not solely by the work stoppageof the participating workers, but by excluding the companyofficials and non-striking employees from access to and

exit from the company premises. No doubt, the strikecaused the company operations considerable damage, asthe NLRC itself recognized when it ruled out thereinstatement of the dismissed strikers.

• PHIMCO Industries v. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association, August11, 2010



STRIKE

•

Employees’ refusal to work on three

consecutive holidays, prompted by their

disagreement with the management-imposed

new work schedule, was considered a strike thatwas grounded on a non-strikeable issue, and a

violation of the No-Strike Clause in the CBA.

•

A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A.Soriano Aviation, August 14, 2009



Placards/Banners

may make strike illegal

• The display of placards and banners imputing criminalnegligence on the part of the employer and its officers,apparently with the end in view of intimidating theemployer ’s clientele, are, given the nature of its

business, that serious as to make the strike illegal. Theputting up of those banners and placards, coupled withthe name-calling and harassment, indicates that it wasresorted to to coerce the resolution of the dispute. Thatthe alleged acts were committed in nine non-consecutivedays during the almost eight months that the strike was

on-going does not render the violence less pervasive orwidespread to be excusable. Art. 264 does not requirethat violence must be continuous or that it should be forthe entire duration of the strike.

• A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation,

August 14, 2009



In Pari Delicto rule

• When management and union are in pari

delicto, the contending parties must be

brought back to their respective positionsbefore the controversy, i.e., before the

strike.

•

Automotive Engine Rebuilders v. ProgresibongUnyon ng mga Manggagawa sa AER, July 13, 2011



LIABILITY OF OFFICERS

•

The effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264 of theLabor Code, make a distinction between participatingworkers and union officers. The services of an ordinarystriking worker cannot be terminated for mere

participation in an illegal strike; proof must be adducedshowing that he or she committed illegal acts during thestrike. The services of a participating union officer, on theother hand, may be terminated, not only when heactually commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if

he knowingly participates in an illegal strike.

•

PHIMCO Industries v. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association, August 11, 2010



Employer may dismiss employees

for illegal acts during a strike even

if there is no petition to declare a

strike illegal•

The use of unlawful means in the course of a

strike renders such strike illegal. The filing of a

petition to declare the strike illegal is thus

unnecessary. Article 263 provides that an

employer may terminate employees found tohave committed illegal acts in the course of a

strike. •

Jackbilt Industries v. Jackbilt Employees Union, March 20, 2009



Illegal Strike

•

A strike conducted by a union which

acquired its legal personality AFTER the

filing of its Notice of Strike and the conduct

of the Strike Vote is ILLEGAL.

• Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood v.

KMLMS, October 19, 2011



Assumption of Jurisdiction

•

Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to

address an extraordinary situation – a strike or lockout in an industry

indispensable to the national interest. This grant is not limited to the

grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have

preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the

strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place.

•

As the term “assume jurisdiction” connotes, the intent of the law isto give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within

the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or

lockout; it includes and extends to all questions and controversies

arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over which thelabor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

•

Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Triumph v. Secretary,

July 5, 2010

All related issues arising from or related to

the dispute to the exclusn of the l.a.

Wage 466 by january. Dati 456





Termination Due to Strikes

•

We explained in Suico v. National LaborRelations Commission, that Article 277(b), inrelation to Article 264(a) and (e) of the LaborCode recognizes the right to due process of all

workers, without distinction as to the cause oftheir termination, even if the cause was theirsupposed involvement in strike-related violenceprohibited under Article 264(a) and (e) of theLabor Code.

• PHIMCO Industries v. PHIMCO IndustriesLabor Association, August 11, 2010

S i f O i /



Suspension of Operations/

Termination

• An employment should be deemed terminated, should thesuspension of operation go beyond six (6) months, even if thecontinued suspension is due to a cause beyond the control ofthe employer.

• The decision to suspend operation ultimately lies with theemployer, who in its desire to avert possible financial losses,declares suspension of operations.

• Article 283 is emphatic that an employee, who was dismisseddue to cessation of business operation, is entitled to theseparation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least

one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whicheveris higher. And it is jurisprudential that separation pay shouldalso be paid to employees even if the closure or cessation ofoperations is not due to losses.

•

Manila Mining Corporation Employees Association v. manila

Mining Corp., September 29, 2010





No Need for Hearing or Conference

in Termination Process•

Art. 227 (b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases oftermination for a just cause, an employee must be given“ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.”

This right to be heard is satisfied not only by a formal faceto face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity tocontrovert the charges against him and to submit evidencein support thereof. It does not mean verbal argumentationalone inasmuch as a person may be heard just aseffectively through written explanations, submissions or

pleadings.“ Ample opportunity to be heard

” means anymeaningful opportunity – verbal or written – given to the

employee to answer the charges against him and submitevidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing,conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.

•

Perez v. PT&T, April 7, 2009







If no actual or payroll reinstatement was effected during the

period of appeal despite the Labor Arbiter ’s reinstatement order,

can the employee still collect the wages due him for the period of

the supposed reinstatement even after the Labor Arbiter ’sdecision has already been reversed by the NLRC?

• Yes. The reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter ’sorder is self-executory. The salary automaticallyaccrued from notice of the Labor Arbiter ’s order ofreinstatement until its ultimate reversal by the NLRC or ahigher court. Hence, even after the Labor Arbiter ’sorder has been reversed, the employee can still collectthe wages due for the period of the reinstatementpending appeal. The employee may be barred from

collecting the accrued wages, however, if it is shown thatthe delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appealwas without fault on the part of the employer.

• Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, January 20, 2009

Kahit talo ka sa sc, pero di mo nakuha not your fault. You presented yourself.

















Constructive Dismissal

•

There is constructive dismissal when the employer pre-judged theemployee’s guilt without proper investigation, and instantly reportedher to the police as the suspected thief, after the employee herself(a cashier) reported the loss of money. (The employee languishedin jail for two weeks.)

•

The due process requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory

and may not be supplanted by police investigation or courtproceedings. The criminal aspect of the case is consideredindependent of the administrative aspect. Employers should not relysolely on the findings of the Prosecutor ’s Office. They aremandated to conduct their own separate investigation, and to accordthe employee every opportunity to defend himself/herself.

•

Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corp. v. Ranchez,January 19, 2011.

Limited yung backwages to the probationary period.





Reinstatement

•

A transfer of work assignment without any

justification therefor, even if the employee

would be presumably doing the same job

with the same pay cannot be deemed asfaithful compliance with a reinstatement

order.

• Pfizer v. Velasco, March 9, 2011











Control

•

Guidelines indicative of labor law “control,”,should not merely relate to the mutuallydesirable result intended by the contractualrelationship; they must have the nature of

dictating the means or methods to be employedin attaining the result, or of fixing themethodology and of binding or restricting theparty hired to the use of these means.

• Tongko v. Manufacturers Life Insurance (GR167622, June 29, 2010 & January 25, 2011)



Officer vs. Employee

•

Conformably with Section 25, a position must beexpressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order to beconsidered as a corporate office. Thus, the creation ofan office pursuant to or under a By-Law enablingprovision is not enough to make a position a corporate

office.• The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers

who may be ousted from office at will, on one hand, andordinary corporate employees who may only beterminated for just cause, on the other hand, do not

depend on the nature of the services performed, but onthe manner of creation of the office.

• Matling Industrial v. Coros, October 13, 2010





















Project Employment

•

If there is continuous rehiring for thesame tasks or nature of tasks underdifferent projects, which tasks are

vital, necessary and indispensable tothe usual business or trade of theemployer, an employee who wasinitially hired as a project employee

may eventually acquire regular status.

• Exodus International Construction v.Biscocho, February 23, 2011



Project Employment

•

The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as“casual” employees, all other employees who do not fallunder the definition of the preceding paragraph. Theproviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regularemployees those “casual” employees who have

rendered at least one year of service regardless of thefact that such service may be continuous or broken.

• The proviso is applicable only to the employees who aredeemed “casuals” but not to the “project” employees

nor the regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280.

• Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive EmployeesUnion v. PNOC, March 30, 2011



Probationary & Fixed-Term



Probationary & Fixed Term

Contracts for Teachers

•

In a situation where the probationary status overlaps with afixed-term contract not specifically used for the fixed term itoffers, Article 281 should assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give way.

• The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers tothe period agreed upon between the employer and theemployee; employment exists only for the duration of the termand ends on its own when the term expires. In a sense,employment on probationary status also refers to a periodbecause of the technical meaning “ probation” carries inPhilippine labor law – a maximum period of six months, or inthe academe, a period of three years for those engaged inteaching jobs. Their similarity ends there, however, becauseof the overriding meaning that being “on probation” connotes,i.e., a process of testing and observing the character orabilities of a person who is new to a role or job.

•

Mercado v. AMA Computer College, April 13, 2010

























Apprenticeship



Apprenticeship

•

The fact that the workers were already rendering service tothe company when they were made to undergoapprenticeship renders the apprenticeship agreementsirrelevant as far as the employees are concerned, especiallysince, prior to the apprenticeship, the employees performedtasks that were usually necessary and desirable to the

company’s usual business.

• Even assuming there was a valid apprenticeship, theexpiration of the first agreement and the retention of theemployees was a recognition by the employer of their trainingand acquisition of a regular employee status.

•

The second apprenticeship agreement for a second skillwhich was not even mentioned in the agreement is a violationof the Labor Code’s implementing rules.

•

Atlanta Industries v. Sebolino, January 26, 2011.

Operative Fact



Operative Fact

•

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration ofunconstitutionality will impose an undue burdenon those who have relied on the invalid law.

•

It does not apply to a situation where thedeclaration of unconstitutionality of Sec. 10. R.A.8042 happened while the illegal dismissal casewas pending before the Supreme Court.

•

Yap v. Thenamaris Ship

s Management, May30, 2011



Non-DeploymentLabor arbiter

mayjurisdiction.



p y

Without Just Cause

•

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (MigrantWorkers Act) which provides for money claimsby reason of a contract involving Filipino workersfor overseas deployment applies to a case ofnon deployment without valid reasons – claimsarising out of an employer-employee relationshipor by virtue of any law or contract involvingFilipino workers for overseas deploymentincluding claims for actual, moral, exemplary and

other forms of damages.• Following the law, the claim is still cognizable bythe labor arbiters of the NLRC.

• Stolt-Nielsen v. Medequillo, January 18, 2011





Construction Industry not



Construction Industry notcovered by registrationmandated by D.O. 18-A

• Section 4, Department Circular No. 1-2012

•

Thus, the DOLE, through its regional offices, shall notrequire contractors licensed by PCAB in theConstruction Industry to register under D.O. 18-A,Series of 2011. Moreover, findings of violation/s onlabor standards and occupational health and safety

standards shall be coordinated with PCAB for itsappropriate action, including the possiblecancellation/suspension of the contractor ’s license.

Documents

Ateneo 2013 Labor Jurisprudence