Assessment of the Sri Lanka Sub- National Governance ...smartcity.sngpweb.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/... · The Sri Lanka Sub-National Governance Program (SNGP), launched by the

AssessmentoftheSriLankaSub-

NationalGovernanceProgram(SNGP)DraftReport

January2017

NO . 5A PO L I CE P AR K P L A CE , C O L OMBO 00500 , S R I L A N KA TE L : + 9 4 11 205554 4 ; F AX : + 94 71 9379 567

EM A I L : R E C E PT I ON@V ER I TE R E SE A R CH . ORG

TableofContents1.Introduction.....................................................................................................................................................................1

2.Backgroundandoperatingcontext........................................................................................................................2

3.Researchdesignandmethodology........................................................................................................................6

4.AssessmentoftheSNGP..............................................................................................................................................8

4.1AssessmentoftheSNGPstrategy....................................................................................................................9

4.2AssessmentofSNGPimplementation........................................................................................................14

5.Recommendations......................................................................................................................................................20

Annex1:Keyinformantinterviewsandsitevisits...........................................................................................22

Annex2:TOCadjustmenttemplate.........................................................................................................................23

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1.Introduction

The Sri Lanka Sub-National Governance Program (SNGP), launched by the AsiaFoundation (TAF) in November 2015, seeks to advance equitable growth andparticipatory, inclusive sub-national governance in Sri Lanka. To this end, the SNGPaims to institutionalize testedmodels for resilience, redress and representation in thelocal government authorities of nine secondary cities and 18 replication sites.Designated as ‘dynamic economic centres’, these sites were identified through acompetitive selection process deployed across all 335 local authorities (LAs) in thecountry. The SNGP seeks to adopt a ‘learning and iterative approach’ that involvescontinuous experimentation with identified sub-national actors on models forresilience, representation and redress. The SNGP’s expected outcome is theinstitutionalizationofthesetestedmodelsinthegovernanceofpartnerLAs.The SNGP involves a yearly review and calibration cycle. In October 2016, TAFcommissioned Verité Research (VR) to carry out an independent assessment of theSNGP,uponcompletionofoneyearoftheprogram’sduration.ThisreportpresentsVR’sinitial findings in relation to activities carried out in the programme’s first year. Theinformation utilised is primarily drawn from project documents provided by TAF,documents provided by partner LAs, key informant interviews (KIIs) and groupinterviews with TAF staff, partner LA and provincial council officials, and otherstakeholdersconductedonsiteandinColombo.

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2.Backgroundandoperatingcontext

The SNGP was conceptualised and launched during a period of substantial politicaltransformation in Sri Lanka. The presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015instituted Sri Lanka’s first post-war political transition, bringing into power anunprecedented coalition government on a campaign of good governance and anti-corruption.Thecoalitionincludedboththecountry’stwolargest,andhistoricallyrival,political parties: the SLFP, led by PresidentMaithripala Sirisena, and theUNP, led byPrimeMinisterRanilWickremesinghe.Thecoalition thusrepresentsacombinationofbroadly divergent ideological leanings, and in turn, divergent policy preferences.Meanwhile,adissidentgroupwithintheSLFPhasremained loyal to formerpresident(andcurrentMemberofParliament)MahindaRajapaksa. In thiscontext, theSirisena-Wickremesinghe government’s two years in power have been marked by increasingintra-coalitioncompetitionandcontinuedpolicyinstability.Thegovernmenthascommittedtoanexpansiveprogrammeofeconomicandpoliticalreformincludinginrelationtotheconstitution,governanceandtransitionaljustice.AspartofSirisena’spost-election100-DayProgrammeofreforms,the19thAmendmenttotheConstitutionwaspassedbyParliamentinApril2015.The19thAmendmentrestoredchecks on executive presidential power and introduced a degree of power sharingbetween the President and Prime Minister. As such, it helped stem the activecentralisation of political power - particularly under the office of the president - thatmarked the Rajapaksa presidency. The government has also embarked on a freshconstitutionalreforminitiative,thelatestinSriLanka’slonghistoryofsucheffortsandthefirstsincetheendofthesecessionistwarin2009.LocalgovernanceThe ongoing constitutional reform efforts have presented an opportunity forrenegotiation of power-sharing arrangements with minority parties that haveadvocatedgreaterdevolutionfromthecentre.TheSriLankanstatecurrentlycomprisesthree levels of government: central, provincial and local. The 13th Amendment to theConstitutionpassedin1987introducedtheprovincialcouncilsthatformthesecondtierofdevolvedgovernment.Subjectsandfunctionsassignedtoprovincialcouncilsincludeinternal law and order, education, agriculture and land. The establishment of localauthorities (LAs):municipal councils, urban councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas, predatethatoftheprovincialcouncils.LAsareresponsiblefordeliveryofseveralservices,suchas utilities, wastemanagement andmaintenance of roads. The Constitution providesthat supervision and administration of LAs are devolved to the provincial councils.1Provincial councils are also empowered to confer additional powers to LAs, and arerestricted fromtakingawaypowersalreadyvested inLAs throughpre-existing laws.2SriLanka’sdevolvedgovernmentstructurescurrentlycomprisenineprovincialcouncilsand335LAs:23municipalcouncils,41urbancouncilsand271PradeshiyaSabhas.Despite the lapse of almost three decades since its passage, the central governmentcontinuestoexercisekeypowersandfunctionsdevolvedtotheprovinces,suchasover 1List1(ProvincialCouncilList),NinthScheduletotheConstitutionoftheDemocraticSocialistRepublicofSriLanka.2Ibid.

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land and policing, in contravention of the Constitution. Furthermore, the 13thAmendmentprovidesforsignificantcentralgovernmentcontroloverthefunctioningofprovincial councils; for instance, through the office of the provincial Governorappointed by the president, that yields substantial discretionary power to review orveto provincial legislation. Successive governments have also maintained adecentralised administrative system answerable directly to the centre, alongside theexisting devolved system. The state’s decentralised structure comprises district anddivisionalsecretariatsthatareautonomousfromdevolvedlocalgovernmentstructures.Thisdecentralisedadministrativesystemhasenabledthecentralgovernmentactorstoeither circumvent local government, or intervene unduly in local spheres ofgovernment.Moreover,thereexistsacultureofcentralisationwithinlocalgovernmentandadministrationthatundermineseffectivepowerdevolutioninpractice.3However, therehavebeensignsofpotential riftsbetweenprovincial councilsand thecentralgovernment.InJanuary2017,theprovincialcouncilsrejectedtheDevelopment(SpecialProvisions)BillproposedbythePrimeMinister,ostensiblybecauseitsoughttoover-centralise power over policy-making - thus undermining second-tier devolution.With the exception ofminority-controlled ones, provincial councils havenot typicallysoughttocheckcentralgovernmentoverreachintotheprovincialsphere.Assuch,theopen resistance of provincial councils to a key national development initiativepresentedamajorpoliticalsetbackforthegoverningcoalition.Yet,therejectionoftheBill has mirrored - rather than challenged - national-level political dynamics. Thecouncils’ existing compositions are the outcomes of elections held in 2012, 2013 and2014; thus, several remaincontrolledby theUPFA,which includesbothcurrentSLFPdissidents as well as pro-Rajapaksa members. The trajectory of the Development(SpecialProvisions)Billhasthusreflectedcontinuedintra-coalitioncompetitionatthenational level, and is unlikely to signal a break from the norm of weak provincialresistancetocentraloverreach.In this context, there is limited value attached to devolution as an instrument ofstrengtheninglocal-leveldemocracyandaccountability.LocalgovernmentbodiesinSriLanka have come to operate largely on the basis of patronage relationships betweenelectedmembersandlocalconstituencies.LAsthusprovideanimportantsitethroughwhich political parties consolidate their popular support bases. The most recent LAelectionswere held in 2011, and fresh elections due in 2016 have been subject to aprolonged delay. With their respective terms having lapsed, LAs across the countrycurrentlyoperatesanstheirelectedrepresentatives.Thegovernmenthasattributedthedelaytothependingcompletionofthedelimitationprocess.The question of LA elections has been a key point of political contention under theSirisena-Wickremesinghegovernment.Partiesinpowernationallytypicallypossessanincumbency advantage in LA elections, and election outcomes often signal publicsentiment on the government’s performance. However, given the continued intra-coalition competition at the national level, fresh elections to LAs island-wide wouldpose certain risks to key coalition parties - particularly the divided SLFP. Yet, theprolongeddelayofelectionshasthusfarnotaidedtheconsolidationoftheSLFP,whose

3CentreforPolicyAlternatives,‘DevolutionintheNorthernProvince:September2013-February2015’(March2015).

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intra-party tensions have only intensified rather than diminished over time.Furthermore, thedissolutionofLAshaserodedparties’politicalpatronagestructures,thus undermining their ability to organise local-level electoral support. As such, thepolitical logic of further delaying LA elections has diminished over time, as publicdissatisfactionoverthesamehasgrown.EconomicdevelopmentSriLankahasexperiencedrapidurbanization,characterizedbyanexpansionofurbanareasaroundthecityofColomboandalongmajortransportroutes.4Officialestimatesare considered to overlook ‘hidden urbanisation’: independent estimates have placedtheshareofthepopulationlivinginurbanareasbetween43%and47%,comparedtoofficialestimatesoflessthan20%.5SriLanka’simmediatepost-waryearswitnessedaheavily infrastructure-centricurbandevelopmentdrive.6The current governmenthasplaceditsWesternRegionMegapolisDevelopmentprojectatthecentreofitseconomicdevelopmentagenda,alongsidedevelopmentofsecondarycitiesaroundtheisland.TheMegapolisprojectenvisagesre-developmentofColomboanditsneighbouringdistrictsinto a commercial hub. The government anticipates that the proposed WesternMegapolis will attract investment, create employment and boost economic growth.However,criticsofthegovernment’sambitiousplanhavequestionedthepotential forlargescale,stand-aloneprojectstosubstantiallyenhanceinvestment,intheabsenceofmore integrated planning and othermeasures to boost investment confidence in thelongterm.7Furthermore, Sri Lanka has also experienced the phenomenon of ‘jobless growth’.Outside theNorth andEast, thenumber of jobs in the country grewby less than1%from 2006 to 2012, despite real GDP growth of over 40% during the same period.8Economicgrowth ratesof approximately7.5% in the immediatepost-waryearsweredriven mainly by expansion of a few sectors, mainly construction, import trade andtransport.Meanwhile,thedecreaseinunemploymentlevelsfrom5.8%in2009to4.3%in 2013 has been attributed mainly to public sector recruitment and migrantemployment. In addition, there remains a large gap betweenmale and female labourforceparticipation,at35.1%forwomencomparedto74.9%ofmen.9 4TheWorldBank,‘LeveragingurbanizationinSriLanka’,24September2015,athttp://www.worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/brief/leveraging-urbanization-sri-lanka[accessedon:15January2017].5BileshaWeeraratne,‘CanweproducebetterestimatesofurbanisationinSriLanka?’DailyFT,6April2016,athttp://www.ft.lk/article/535134/Can-we-produce-better-estimates-of-urbanisation-in-Sri-Lanka[accessedon:15January2017].6Regionalandvillage-levelinfrastructuredevelopmentinitiativesincluded‘UthuruWasanthaya’(‘NorthernSpring’),‘NagenahiraNavodaya’(‘EasternRevival’),‘MagaNeguma’(roaddevelopment),‘GamaNeguma’(villagedevelopment)and‘Gemidiriya’(villagestrengthening).7MunzaMushtaq,‘SriLanka's$40bn'megapolis'planisbold-butachievable?’,NikkeiAsianReview,10March2016,athttp://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Sri-Lanka-s-40bn-megapolis-plan-is-bold-but-achievable?page=2[accessedon:15January2017].8VeritéResearch,‘SriLankaBudget2013:IncreasingAssistance,andVulnerability’(December2012).9SriLankaLabourForceSurvey,1stQuarter2016.

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Critics of the Megapolis plan have also cautioned against heavy investment indevelopment of the western region at the expense of other growing urban centres.While Sri Lanka has made progress in connectivity to urban centres, significantchallengesto furtherdevelopmentof theseareasremain, including inrelationto localgovernment.Urbanplanning, local infrastructuredevelopmentandservicedeliverybyLAsareoftenunderminedbytheirweakinstitutionalandfinancialcapacity.Assuch,intheabsenceoffurtherinvestmentsinstrengtheninglocalgovernance,LAscouldremainpoorlyequippedtomeetthegrowingdemandsofrapidurbanization.

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Bydevelopingeffectivemodelsforresilience,representation,andredressthrough iterative learningandexperimentationwithsubnationalactors,it will be possible to improve the evidence base and institutionalizeeffectivepractices in thesegoodgovernanceareas, thereby contributingto future investments in equitable growth and participatory, inclusivesubnationalgovernanceinSriLanka.

3.Researchdesignandmethodology

VR’sassessmentoftheSNGPhasfocusedontwobroad, inter-relatedareasof inquiry.First,VRtestedtheSNGP’soverallprogramstrategyanddesign.Second,VRevaluatedthe execution of the SNGP’s strategy in program activities and outcomes during theprogram’s first year. Based on these assessments, VR will develop forward-lookingrecommendationstoinformtheSNGP’soverallstrategyandexecution.AssessmentoftheSNGP’sstrategyanddesignTheSNGP’stheoryofchangeisasfollows:10

Testing the SNGP’s overall strategy necessitates (i) an assessment of its theory ofchange, including its flexible, iterative approach to program execution; and (ii) anassessment of the SNGP’s key delivery strategies. As such, VR sought to answer thefollowingkeyinter-relatedquestionsunderthiscomponent:

1. TowhatextentaretheSNGP’stheoryofchangeanddeliverystrategiesrelevanttoSriLanka’ssub-nationalcontext?

2. To what extent do the SNGP’s delivery strategies advance resilience,representationandredress?

AssessmentoftheSNGP’sexecution

Underthiscomponent,VRassessedtheperformanceoftheSNGPoverthepastyearintermsoftwointer-relatedareas:(i)flexibilityoftheSNGP,and(ii)thedeliveryofSNGPactivities and outcomes. The following questions were considered under each sub-component:Flexibility

1. How effective is the SNGP’s monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) andknowledgemanagement?

2. DoestheSNGPprovide foreffective feedbackand interactionbetween learningandprogramadjustments?

3. HowhastheSNGP’sexecutionadaptedtonewlearningandinformation?4. Towhatextentwasinnovationinstrumentaltothedesignofprogramactivities?

Delivery

1. To what extent have the SNGP’s activities advanced resilience, representationandredressinpartnerLAs?

10 TheAsia Foundation (2015). Sri Lanka Subnational Governance Program (SLSNGP)RevisedTechnicalProposal:SubmittedtotheAustralianGovernmentDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade(DFAT).

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2. To what extent have the SNGP’s tools, models and approaches beeninstitutionalizedinpartnerLAs?

3. HoweffectiveistheSNGP’sgovernanceandoversight?4. HoweffectivelyhavetheSNGP’sactivitiesandoutcomesbeencommunicatedto

stakeholders?5. Howeffectivelyhastechnologybeenusedintheroll-outoftheSNGPs’activities?6. TowhatextenthaveGenderEqualityandSocialInclusion(GESI)principlesbeen

incorporatedintotheSNGP’sdelivery?

Forward-lookingrecommendationsVRaimstodrawonthefindingsofitsassessmentunderthetwocomponentsabovetoprovide TAF with forward-looking recommendations on the SNGP’s strategy andexecution. Indesigning these recommendations,VRwill seek to answer the followingquestions:

1. What adjustments, if any, need to bemade to the SNGP’s overall strategy andtheory of change considering contextual developments and other newinformation?

2. How can the effectiveness of SNGP’s execution in Sri Lanka’s sub-nationalcontextbeenhanced?

SourcesofinformationVR’sassessmentreliedonthreemainsourcesofinformation:

1. RelevantframeworkdocumentsincludingtheSNGPInceptionReport,Bi-AnnualReport(2016),GESIframework,andYear1ActivityImplementationPlan.

2. Keyinformantinterviews(KIIs)witharangeoftheSNGP’spersonnelincludingitsprogramdirector,technicaladvisors,GESIfocalpointandothers.

3. SitevisitstotheSNGP’sprimarysites,duringwhichVRcarriedoutKIIsandfocusgroup discussions (FGDs) with LA representatives, officials representing theOfficeoftheCommissionerforLocalGovernment(CLG),andSNGPpersonnel.VRhasthusfarundertakenvisitstothefollowingsites:

• OfficeoftheCommissionerforLocalGovernment(CentralProvince)• OfficeoftheCommissionerforLocalGovernment(SouthernProvince)• MataraMunicipalCouncil(SouthernProvince)• KataragamaPradeshiyaSabha(UvaProvince)• PeliyagodaUrbanCouncil(WesternProvince)• ChilawUrbanCouncil(NorthWesternProvince)• BalangodaUrbanCouncil(SabaragamuwaProvince)

Annex1ofthisreportcontainsadetailedlistofKIIsandsitevisitsundertaken.Atthetime of drafting this assessment, VR had not undertaken site visits to the remainingGoodGovernance Resource Centres (GGRCs) SNGP replication sites. Furthermore, VRhasyettointerviewrepresentativesoftheMinistryofLocalGovernmentandProvincialCouncils,andtheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade(DFAT)Australia.

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4.AssessmentoftheSNGP

The SNGP is a 42-month program that seeks to advance equitable growth andparticipatory, inclusive sub-national governance in Sri Lanka. To this end, the SNGPaimsto institutionalize testedmodels forresilience,redressandrepresentation in thelocal government authorities of nine secondary cities and 18 replication sites.Designated as ‘dynamic economic centres’, these sites were identified through acompetitive selection process deployed across all 335 local authorities (LAs) in thecountry.

This program’s overall outcome is to be realized through the achievement of thefollowingintermediateoutcomes:

1. Strengthenedeconomicresilienceofsecondarycitiesthroughenhancedrevenuestreamsandimprovedpublicfinancialmanagementandregulatorysystems;

2. Effective,equitable,andinclusiverepresentationofcitizens in localgovernanceprocessesandmechanismsthatyieldcitizen-responsiveservicesandoutcomes;and

3. Improved redress and responsiveness of local government to grievances forcitizensandbusinesses.

Theprogramaimstodeploy the followingkeydeliverystrategies inorder toadvanceresilience,representationandredress:

i. Maintainingflexibilitytoafluidpoliticalenvironment;ii. AligninginterventionswiththeLAParticipatoryDevelopmentPlanningprocess

andLAannualbudgetcycle;iii. Focusingonsub-nationalpublicandregulatoryserviceimprovements;iv. Promotingco-creationandownershipthroughstakeholderinvolvement;v. Conductingexperimentationininclusivegrowthofsecondarycities;andvi. Promotingvalueformoney.

The SNGP integrates a cross-cutting GESI component into program interventions, toadvance equitable participation, representation, and access to information andresources to women and other marginalized groups. The program also features acentralroleforMELandknowledgemanagement.SNGPinterventionsinYear1focusedon strengthening LAs’ financial management practices, improving citizen-friendlyservicedeliveryandenhancingLAs’capacityforlong-termfinancialplanning.Section 4.1 is considered primarily in relation to the first central question examinedthroughthisassessment.‘TowhatextentaretheSNGP’stheoryofchangeanddeliverystrategiesrelevanttoSriLanka’ssub-nationalcontext?’Section4.2isconsideredprimarilyinrelationtothesecondcentralquestion ‘Towhatextent do the SNGP’s delivery strategies advance resilience, representation andredress?’

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4.1AssessmentoftheSNGPstrategyAdefining featureof theSNGP is that ithasbeendesignedwith theaimof remainingflexible throughout itsduration.Theprogramseeks to adopt a ‘learningand iterativeapproach’ that involves continuous experimentation with sub-national actors ondeveloping models for resilience, representation and redress. This approach entailscontinuous adaption following contextual developments and new learning gainedduring program execution. It emphasizes flexibility, relationship building and tightfeedback between learning and action. Such an approach is especially suited topoliticallyfluidcontexts,whereprogramsneedtoconsiderpolitical-economydynamicsandincentivesthatinfluencethereformtrajectory.11TheSNGPwashencedesignedwithaviewtomaximiseTAF’sability toadvance localgovernance reforms in Sri Lanka’s complex operating environment. Two keyobservations canbenoted in this regard. First, theSNGPhasbenefited from thehighdegree of trust among partner LAs that TAF enjoys. TAF’s prior work in localgovernancehashelpeditbuildrelationshipsandsecurebuy-infortheSNGPamongkeyactors in government, thus providing a sound foundation on which reforms can beadvanced. Furthermore, TAF’s prior interventions in local government have providedavenues for learning and experimentation that the SNGP could build on. Second, LAshaveplacedahighvalueonthe‘form’ofSNGPinterventions,i.e.itsfocusonimprovingsystemsandprocesses,alongwithtechnicalsupporttostrengthenservicedelivery.Forinstance,partnerLAswelcomedtheSNGP’sintroductionoffinancialmanagementtoolsand technical assistance in relation to by-laws.12 Taken together, these factors havehelpedtopositionTAFamongLAsasanon-threatening,credible,andvaluablepartnerin the localgovernmentsphere.This identification isparticularlyuseful in theSNGP’soperating context, where government responsiveness and interest are oftenprerequisitesforeffectivelyadvancingsystemicreforms.Moreover,governancereforms-particularlyinrelationtofinancialmanagement-havebeenakeypriorityareaoftheSirisena-Wickremesinghegovernment.Inthiscontext,theSNGPhasalsobenefitedfromagenerallynon-threateningpoliticalspacetoadvancereforms.This assessment found the SNGP’s overall theory of change and delivery strategiesrelevant and responsive to the demands of Sri Lanka’s sub-national context.Institutionaldeficiencies arepervasive inSriLanka’s governance.Theeffectsof thesedeficienciesarefeltnotonlyamongthepublic,butalsoamonggovernmentactorsandbodiesunabletoeffectivelycarryouttheirfunctionsduetoalackofresources,capacity,and motivation. In this context, the SNGP’s institution-strengthening interventionscould potentially combine LAs’ own interests in improving their ability to deliverservices with the broader public interest in advancing participatory, inclusive andaccountablesub-nationalgovernance.However,theSNGP’sbalancingoftheseinterestshasinvolvedcertaintrade-offsbetweenmaintainingLAs’owncommitmenttolearningandexperimentationinSNGPinterventionsontheonehand,andadvancingthebroader

11LadnerD.,(2015).StrategyTesting:AnInnovativeApproachtoMonitoringHighlyFlexibleAidPrograms.TheAsiaFoundation.Retrievedfrom:https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/AnInnovativeApproachtoMonitoringHighlyFlexibleAidPrograms.pdf.12SitevisitstoKataragamaPS,officeoftheSouthernProvinceCLG.

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public interest reforms that are likely to draw LA resistance. This trade-off has beenfurtheranalysedbelow.The roll-out of SNGP activities began in early 2016. VR’s assessment has identifiedthree key features of the SNGP that reflect strategic consideration by TAF inresponsetotheprevailingcontext.Theseare:(1)theselectionofprimarysites;(2)thesequencingofSNGPcomponents;and(3)theSNGP’sidentifiedmodelforsustainability.Thefollowingsub-sectionsassesstheextenttowhicheachrespondstothedemandsoftheSNGP’soperatingcontextandadvances theprogram’soverall reformgoalswithinthesame.SelectionofSNGPsitesTheSNGPdeployedarelativelyinnovativeapproachtotheselectionofimplementationpartners. The nine primary sites and 18 replication sites were identified through acompetitive selection process that scored LAs in terms of their population density,urban character, entrepreneurial base, economic linkages, and revenue generationcapacity. These criteria sought to ensure that characteristics of the identified partnerLAsjustifiedprograminvestments.Theproposal‘writeshops’gaveLAstheopportunitytodemonstratetheirinterestintheprogram,withaviewtoensuringthattheSNGPwasrootedinlocaldemandandownership.TheprocesscouldthusbeexpectedtominimisetheriskofpooruptakebypartnerLAs,whichwouldundermineachievementofSNGPoutcomes.KIIs with key LA personnel indicated that the selection process also served arelationship-building function that benefited the SNGP during the implementationphase.ThecompetitivenatureoftheprocesscreatedincentivesforLAstodemonstratecommitment to reforms and keenness to improve service-delivery. Partner LAs oftenrecalledtheirselectionfortheSNGPasakeyaccomplishment,andavoteofconfidencein their commitment to better serve their constituencies.13 The selection processaccordingly generated high interest in the program and momentum for itsimplementationwithinpartnerLAs.However, SNGP partner LAs have demonstrated varying levels of commitment andinterestintheprogram,despitethebuilt-inbuffersagainstpooruptakeofferedbythisselection process. Weak ownership in certain sites can be attributed in part to theSNGP’s dependence on individual ‘champions’ within partner LAs - who have hadsubstantialinvolvementinSNGPactivities,includingintheselection‘write-shops’–forsustaining interest in the program.As detailed in section3.2 below, partner LAs thatexperienced turnoverof staffor lackedstaffparticipation inSNGPactivitiesbeyondafew individuals often saw diminished interest in the program, and in turn slowerprogressinimplementation.Anadditional consideration is the likelihoodofLAelections in thenear future,whichcouldintroduceanumberofnewactorsandincentivestotheSNGP’soperatingcontext.Currently,thecontinuedabsenceofelectedLAmemberspresentsakeychallengetotheachievementoftheSNGP’sgoalsoflocalgovernancereform,particularlyinrelationtocitizenrepresentation.Meanwhile, thereconstitutionofelectedcouncilscouldpresent

13SitevisitstoChilawUC,BalangodaUC,KataragamaPS.

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certainoperationalriskstoSNGPimplementationinpartnerLAs.Forinstance,partisanpoliticalcompetitionwithinelectedcouncilscouldintroducehighlevelsofvolatilityindecision-making that impedes program implementation; or the reintroduction ofpatronage structures could impedeefforts todeliver inclusive, equitableandeffectiveservices The SNGP has sought to mitigate these risks by securing the buy-in of keyactors at the central and provincial level, including provincial chief minsters andcommissioners for localgovernment.LAstaff expressedadegreeof confidence in theprogram’s ability to manage potential post-election operational challenges.14 Forinstance,aseniorofficialoftheChilawUrbanCouncilexpressed‘100%’confidencethatincomingUC representativeswould not pose a risk to the reforms introduced by theSNGP,duetoofficials’effortstosecurethesupportofallmainpoliticalparties fortheprogram.15BothpartnerLAofficialsandSNGPpersonnelnotedthatsomeinvestmentin relationship-building with incoming councillors would be necessary to ensuresmoothprogramimplementationinfuture.SequencingofSNGPcomponentsAkeystrategicshiftresultingfromprogramlearningwastheSNGP’sprioritisationofitsresiliencecomponentover therepresentationandredresscomponentsduringYear1.TheresiliencecomponentfocusedprimarilyonthestrengtheningthefinancialviabilityofLAs.Inadditiontoitsbroadervalueinstrengtheninglocalgovernance,thisshiftwasattributedtoatleasttwoconsiderations.First,LAsplacedahighvalueoninterventionsthatstrengthenedtheirfinancialposition,includinginrelationtorevenuecollectionandresource allocation. Investments in stronger financial management practices alsocorresponded to national policy priorities, thus helping to secure support for theprogram at sufficiently high levels in government. As such, prioritisation of theresilience component helped the SNGP to secure buy-in through a perceived ‘non-threatening’ area of intervention that corresponded to partner LApriorities. Second,investment in financial resilience of partner LAswasperceived to better position theSNGP to advance reforms relating to representation and redress as the programprogressed.16 Accordingly, SNGP staff understood the prioritisation of the resiliencecomponent during Year 1 in terms of both its instrumental and inherent value toachievementoftheSNGP’sbroadreformobjectives.PartnerLAswelcomedtheSNGP’s focusonstrengthening financial resilience.17 SNGPprioritisation was thus perceived as complementing LAs’ own interest in improvedfinancial management and associated improvements in service delivery. Partner LAsalso valued the SNGP’s responsiveness to their needs, as enabled by the program’sflexibledesign.Assuch,thestrategicprioritisationofresiliencehasprovedeffectiveinconsolidatingpartnerLAs’ownershipoftheSNGP,andreinforcedperceptionsofTAFasa valuable sourceof technical expertise.However, itwasnoted thatLAs’ interest andcooperation drew primarily on the ability of SNGP interventions to enhance theefficiency of workflows within the authority, for instance through the budgetmonitoring tool (BMT) that eased theLAbudgetingprocess.PartnerLAshavevalued

14KIIs–Balangoda,Chilaw,Kataragama,Peliyagoda,CentralProvinceCLG.15SitevisitstoChilawUC.16KII–Subakaran,Gopa,Dhammika.17KIIs.

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thetoolsandapproachesintroducedbytheSNGPmainlyintermsoftheirabilitytoeasethe administrative burdens associated with LAs’ work. TAF’s recognition of thislimitationhasbeenreflectedinthedesignofSNGPtools; for instance, itwasreportedthat the e-Citizen Report Card (eCRC) discarded its original accountability-relatedfeaturesbydesign,forthepurposesofitsoperationinSriLanka’ssub-nationalcontext.Asaresult,neitherLAsnortheirconstituenciesassociatetheeCRCwithservingapublicaccountability function. LAs have valued the eCRC as an important tool to identifycitizenpriorities;howeverinitscurrentform,theeCRChasalimitedabilitytoconvertinformationoncitizenprioritiestospecificservicedeliveryoutcomes.PartnerenthusiasmforSNGPtoolshasthusnotnecessarilycorrelatedwithinterestinthe SNGP’s goals of better representation, inclusiveness and public accountability.Hence, the prioritisation of resilience interventions has entailed a trade-off betweenmaintaining partner cooperation and advancing public interest reforms. In Year 1,achievementof the formerhasentaileddilutionof thepublicaccountabilitymeasuresthatSNGPinterventionscouldpotentiallyhaveadvanced.While the emphasis on resilience interventions has aided buy-in and cooperation, itcould likely set LA expectations of future SNGP activities as efficiency-driven ratherthan accountability-driven. These expectations could pose challenges for the SNGP inupcoming years as the program’s representation and redress components are rolledout, especially given that partner LAs are unlikely to naturally identify with thesecomponents to the extent they did with the resilience component. Moreover, LAinterestsandpublicinterestaremorelikelytobeatoddsinrelationtorepresentationandredressinterventionsthatinresilienceinterventions,Hence,progressoftheSNGPinupcomingyears could require substantial investments in securing andmaintaininginterestintheSNGP’sremainingcomponents,whiletakingcognizanceofthetrade-offslikelytobeinvolved.TheSNGP’ssustainabilitymodelThe SNGP’s strategy for replication, scaling and sustainability of tested models forresilience, representation and redress is centred on the establishment of GoodGovernanceResourceCentres(GGRCs)withintheofficesoftheCLGsineachprovince.The CLG is housed within the Department for Local Government in the respectiveprovincial council. Each GGRC is expected to function as the exclusive repository ofinformationandknowledgepertainingtolocalgovernance.GGRCsarealsoexpectedtocarry out training programmes for LAs within their jurisdictions, through which themodelsforresilience,representationandredresstestedintheSNGP’sprimarysitescanbereplicatedinotherLAs.Accordingly,theSNGP’scurrentdesignreliesonthesuccessof theGGRCs toachieve itsexpectedoveralloutcome: the institutionalizationof thesetestedmodelsinLAsislandwide.TAFenjoysstrongrelationshipswithCLGofficesbuiltover itspriorwork in the localgovernance sphere, through the Local Economic Governance (LEG) program forinstance.GGRCsintheNorthern,EasternandSouthernProvincesweresetuppriortotheSNGP,aspartoftheLEGprogram.Assuch,theseGGRCshavebeenfunctionalforalongerperiodoftimethantheremainingGGCRssetupundertheSNGP.RepresentativesoftheCLGofficesinterviewedduringthecourseofthisassessmentdemonstratedhigh

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levelsofenthusiasmfortheSNGPandtheprogram’senvisagedrolefortheCLGoffice.BothCLGofficesandpartnerLAsvaluedthetrainingprogrammesforofficialsdeliveredthrough theSNGPduringYear1.18 In theSouthernProvince, itwas reported that theGGRC has been providing certain categories of LA personnel, such as InvestigativeOfficers (IOs), with specialised training that was considered unlikely to be offeredelsewhere.19Notably,theSNGPsoughttoprotectagainsttheriskofpersonneltransferoutof theGGRCsbynegotiatingwith theprovincialgovernment toensure that itwasstaffedwithpersonnelwhowouldnotbeexpected to transferwithin thenext two tothreeyears.However, the extent to which the GGRCs provide a vehicle for institutionalisation ofSNGP-tested models deserves some scrutiny.20 Several key factors for considerationemergedindiscussionswithLAsregardingtheroleoftheCLG’sofficeasfacilitatorforSNGPinterventions:1. PartnerLAsarelikelytohavebenefitedstronglyfromtheirdirectaccesstotechnical

expertiseandassistance,andcloseoperationalrelationshipsbetweenLAs’andSNGPpersonnel.GiventhattheGGRCsareyettobecomefullyfunctionalinallninesites,theextenttowhichtheuptakeandapplicationofthesemodelscanbereplicatedinother sites through GGRC-delivered training and resources alone is currentlyunclear.However,thissuccesslikelydrawsonatleasttwouniquecharacteristicsofthe eCRC. First, the eCRC is primarily a data collection intervention that does notrely heavily on direct LA involvement in its administration. Second, the eCRC is atried and testedmodel that has built on previous learning and experience, unlikeotherSNGPtools.Moreover,SouthernandNorthernProvinceGGRCs,createdpriortotheSNGPthroughtheLEGproject,havehadsomesuccessindirectingtheuseofthe BMT in LAs in their respective provinces (see section 4.2 below). Theseexperiences signal that full transfer of skills gained through SNGP could requirefurthertestinganditerativelearningasapreconditiontogreatersustainability.

2. LAs currently do not perceive the CLG’s office, including the GGRCs, as a keyresource for strengthening local governance and service delivery. The successfuluptake of key SNGP tools in partner LAs during Year 1 was seen to have reliedsignificantlyonthestrengthoftheirownrelationshipswithTAF.21

3. Some LAs expressed reservations on relying closely on the CLG’s office due toviewingthelatterasplayingaconstraining,ratherthanenablingroleinrelationtoLAs.However,akeystrengthoftheCLG’sofficeasthesitefortheestablishmentofthe GGRC’s is its power to convene LAs. The CLG’s convening power potentiallyaffords some space for the CLG’s to function better as an ‘enabler’ of cross-LAlearning,ratherthanindirectdeliveryoftrainingprogrammes.

18 Site visits to CLG offices of the Central and Southern Provinces; and Balangoda UC, Kataragama PS,ChilawUC.19SitevisittoCLGofficeoftheSouthernProvince.20A limitationof thisassessment is thatonlyoneof theKIIs interviewedon fieldvisitshadexperienceworking as an official in an SNGP secondary site. Therefore, the views of secondary sites on thefunctioningofGGRCsarenotincluded.21KIIswithSNGPpersonnel.

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4.2AssessmentofSNGPimplementationThe roll-out of SNGPactivities began in early2016.Key activities carriedout includeconsultationswithnationalandsub-nationalgovernmentactors,selectionofSNGPsites,developmentofMELandGESIframeworks,establishmentofGGRCsinSNGPsites,anddelivery of technical support to partner LAs. Given theprioritisation of the resiliencecomponent for Year 1, SNGP tools and other assistance focused primarily onstrengtheningpartnerLAs’financialmanagement.Programrolloutandimplementationhas faredwelloverall inYear1. TheSNGP’s flexibledesignhas lent itself toeffectiveimplementation. Measures to enhance resilience were welcomed by partner LAs,enablingTAF to strengthen its implementationpartnerships. Theprioritisationof theprogram’s resilience component for Year 1 was also seen to have allowed TAF tocapitaliseontheopportunitytolinkprogramactivitiestothe2017budgetcycle.

Akeyoperational risk facedby theSNGPduringYear1hasbeenhigh turnoverofLApersonnel, resulting from the routine transfers of staff within the governmentbureaucracy.Hence,while theSNGP’sselectionprocesshelpedTAFmatch itsplannedinterventions to partner LAs’ demand and interest, the programhas faced challengessustaininginitiallevelsofownership.TurnoverofpersonnelinvolvedintheearlystagesoftheSNGPwastypicallyassociatedwithlowlevelsofownershipinpartnerLAs,whichwas reflected in program implementation. For instance, limited LA interest andownershipintheMataraMunicipalCouncilcanbeattributedtotransfersofthespecificpersonnel that participated in initial SNGP activities. Meanwhile, other LAsdemonstrated more broad-based ownership for the SNGP that extended to seniorofficials and other staff members of the LA bureaucracy.22 For instance, staff of theBalangodaUCdemonstrated sufficiently high ownership and interest in the SNGP fortheprogramtocontinueunimpededbyachangeincouncil’ssecretary.

LAsthatenjoysuchbroad-basedownershipcouldbeexpectedtobelessvulnerabletoprogramslowdownorstagnationresultingfromperiodicstaffingchanges.Tominimisethe risks of over-reliance on individual ‘champions’, the SNGP would benefit fromeffortstostrengthenbroaderinstitutionalownershipfortheprogramanditsactivities;for instance, through active efforts to broaden LA engagement beyond a single‘champion’torelevantdepartmentheadsforeachintervention,oreffortstostrengtheninternal knowledge-sharing and institutional memory in relation to lessons learnedthroughtheSNGP.

The SNGP’s technical support to partner LAs during Year 1 centred on the followingtoolsdeployed inallnineprimary sites: thee-CitizenReportCard (eCRC), thebudgetmonitoringtool(BMT),andtherevenuemanagementtool(RMT).TheBMTincludesarangeoftoolsgearedtowardsassistingLAsinthebudgetingprocess,suchasthebudgetestimationtool(BET)andthebudgetpreparatorytool(BPT).Apartialcomplianceauditinrelationtothe2017budgetformulationprocessbypartnerLAshasalsobeencarriedoutduringYear1.

Table 1 below outlines progress in implementation of the tools during Year 1, asreportedbyKIIsandLAofficials insitevisits.The informationcontained in this tablewillbecompletedonceremainingKIIsandsitevisitshavebeenundertaken. 22SitevisitstoChilawUCandKataragamaPS.

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Table1

Site eCRCstatus BMTuse RMTprogressPrimarysites

MataraUC

• Surveyscompleted

• HadnotreceivedeCRCfindingsatthetimeofbudgeting,henceeCRCdatanotincorporatedto2017budget

• Poorprogresswithnewrevenuesources.

• Problemswithtaxcollection

KataragamaPS


• eCRCdataIncorporatedintothe2017budget

• Usedin2017budgetcycle

• Newrevenuesourcesidentifiede.g.imposinga1%taxonhotels.

• Taxcollectionmethodsimproved

BalangodaUC


• eCRCdataincorporatedintothe2017budget

• Identifiedlackofsub-categoriesinitemiseddataentryforBMTasaweakness

• Haveidentifiednewrevenuesources,butexpresseddesireforfurtherassistanceinrevenuegeneration

PeliyagodaUC


• eCRCdataincorporatedintothe2017budget


• Haveidentifiedpotentialrevenuesourcese.g.parkingfees,buthavefoundimplementationchallenging

ChilawUC


• eCRCdataIncorporatedintothe2017budget


• Identifiedpotentialrevenuesourcese.g.newshopsnearthecentralmarket,

JaffnaMC


• Incorporatedintothe2017budget


• Identifiedthepotentialrevenuesourcesandmanagementstrategiesofexpenditureforincreasingallocationforrecurrentexpenditure

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AnuradhapuraUC



BatticaloaUC




• Identifiedcriticalrevenuesourcesfor2017

NawalapityaUC




GGRCs

CentralProvince

• Surveyscompletedforthe3mainlocations

• BMTintroducedtotheall43LAsintheprovince

• Haveconductedworkshopsforreplicationsites

SouthernProvince

• Surveyscompletedforthe3mainlocations

• BMTintroducedtothe3mainsitesintheprovince

• Haveinitiatedplanstraintheincomingcouncillorsonsustainablerevenuegeneration

NorthernProvince

• Surveycompletedforprimarysiteandonereplicationsite

• BMTwasusedtoassessthe2017budgetsof34LAs

UvaProvince• Survey

completedforprimarysite

SabaragamuwaProvince

• Surveycompletedforprimarysite

WesternProvince


NorthWesternProvince


NorthCentralProvince


EasternProvince


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Partner LAs perceived these tools to have substantially strengthened their budgetingand revenue management capabilities. The eCRC has been viewed as particularlyvaluableinenablingLAstoascertainservicedeliveryrequirementsperceivedbytheirconstituencies, and inform investment of resources accordingly. Several partner LAshave reported that findings of the eCRC surveys have been considered in budgetformulation of the 2017 budget cycle. For partner LAs, amajor value addition of theSNGP has been in relation to information management. For instance, eCRC data hashelped LAs identify citizen demands, and inform budgetary allocations and planning;andinformationgeneratedbytheBMThashelpedLAsrationaliseallocations.Partner LAs also valued the BMT as ameans to enhance the efficiency of the budgetformulation process.23 For instance, LA officials noted that budget formulationprocessesthatpreviouslyspannedoverweekscouldnowbecompletedwithindays.24Some also recalled pre-SNGP practices of budgeting by simply increasing allocationsyear-on-year by approximately 5-10%,25 with no systematic assessment of priorspending or citizen priorities. In this context, the BMTwas seen as offering amajorimprovement inLAs’ financialmanagement andplanning capacities.Compared to theeCRC, use of theBMT is a relatively newer exercisewithin partner LAs; as such, it isanticipated that the BMT will be further refined as the SNGP progresses. However,budget formulation and LA decision-making relating to resource allocation are areaswhereLAmemberswieldsubstantialdiscretionarypower.Inthiscontext,theextenttowhich the BMT advances resilience as the program progresses is likely to beconditionedbyvariationsinLAmemberpreferenceswithineachsite.IncorporationofGESIprinciplesintoSNGPactivitiesWhencomparedwithoverallprogress,theimplementationoftheSNGP’scross-cuttingGESI component has not kept pace with program developments during Year 1. GESIactivitiesinYear1includedinternalsensitisationandtrainingprogramsforTAFstaff,and the commencement of a baseline assessment of GESI integration in localgovernance. The GESI Baseline Assessment involves two phases, with phase 1surveyingsensitivitytoGESIconcernsinthenineSNGPsites,whilephasedoesthesameforthe18replicationsites.Phase1oftheGESIBaselineAssessmentwascompletedinJanuary2017.26KIIsandsitevisitsbytheSNGPassessmentteamcorroboratedthemainfindingsoftheGESIBaselineAssessment,i.e.thatLAslackunderstandingofGESIconcernsinrelationtotheirwork,andlackthecapacityaddressthisgapinunderstanding.AllpartnerLAsnoted an absence of reliable census data in relation to their LA areas on vulnerablegroups.Many KIIswith partner LA representatives indicated thatmost lack a strongunderstanding of GESI as it relates to representation and service delivery. LAsassociated vulnerability primarily with poverty, and typically did not extend theirunderstandingofmarginalisedgroupstoincludewomen,ethnicminoritiesorlinguisticminorities.With the exception of ChilawUC officials, LA officials interviewed did not

23SitevisitstoKataragamaPS,BalangodaUC.24SitevisitstoKataragamaPS,BalangodaUC,PeliyagodaUC.25SitevisitstoBalangodaUCandChilawUC.26GenderEqualityandSocial Inclusion (GESI)BaselineAssessment, SubNationalGovernanceProgram(SNGP)ofTheAsiaFoundation(January2017).

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identify women as a distinct vulnerable group whose interests are oftenunderrepresented in local governance.27 In this context, roll-out of the SNGP’s GESIstrategy could face challenges in securingpartner interest anduptake.TAF’s plannedactivities for2017 includespecificGESI-related interventionswithinactivitiesdealingwithinclusiveplanning.28Monitoring,EvaluationandLearningTheSNGPenvisagesastrongroleforMELtoinformprogramadjustments.However,theprogramhasmadelimitedprogressoverallingivingeffecttoitsplannedMELsystems.Progress on the MEL front in Year 1 included the development of MEL trackingtemplatesandworkplans,anddevelopmentofinternalknowledge-sharingprocesses.29Templates have been devised to document major program events, decisions andaccomplishments; adjustments to the program’s theory of change; and overallimplementation progress. Annex 2 below provides the template through which theSNGPteamdocumentsadjustmentstotheprogram’stheoryofchange,theirjustificationandimplications.However,thesetoolsandprocessesareyettoberoutinizedinSNGPimplementation.InmakingitsstrategicshifttoresilienceforYear1,theSNGPdidnotrelyontraditionalformsofMEL.Rather,thiskeyprogramadjustmentwasbasedonfeedbackfrompartnerLAs and SNGP staff on site, and a largely informal, consensus-based decision-makingprocessamongprogrampersonnel.30Thereareatleasttwopossibleinterpretationsofthismodel of course correctionwithin the SNGP’s flexible, learning-based design: (1)course correction was proactive and deliberate in light of new developments andlearning; or (2) course correctionwasad hoc and reactive to newdevelopments andlearning. The lack of specific, definitive criteria identified by program personnel forevaluatingtheSNGP’sdecisiontoprioritiseitsresiliencecomponentcurrentlysuggeststhat it resembled the latter rather than the former. The SNGP’s high flexibility couldserve asboth a strength and a liability: it haspermitted relatively greater leeway forcourse correction considering new learning, while also presenting few identifiablechecksoncoursedeviationfromcoreprogramgoalsinthelongterm.WhiletheSNGPsetslimitsonlong-termactivityplanningbydesign,theprogramcouldbenefitfromtheidentification of core criteria against which future decisions to modify programdirectioncanbeevaluated.Thesecriteriaforcoursecorrectioncouldserveasstrategic‘filters’ that refine decision-making processes by specifying the parameters withinwhichprogramadjustmentsarewarranted.Given their limited application thus far in the program, a more comprehensiveassessmentoftheSNGP’sMELsystemsinpracticeiscurrentlypremature.AstrongMELprocess would enable efficient and effective documentation of program adjustments,their rationale and anticipated impacts, and accordingly facilitate proactive course-correction where justified. Routine collection of MEL data would also enable TAF tounderstand drivers and processes of SNGP-induced reforms over the program’s

27SitevisitstoPeliyagodaUC,BalangodaUC,MataraUC,ChilawUC,KataragamaPS.28KIIwithSNGPpersonnel.29KIIwithSNGPpersonnel.30KIIswithSNGPpersonnel.

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duration-hencestrengtheninglearningmorebroadlyfromtheprogramonadvancingreformsinrelationtooperatingcontext.

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5.Recommendations

This section provides forward-looking recommendations for the SNGP in light oflearning fromYear1of theprogram.They aim to advance the SNGP’sbroadgoals ofgreaterresilience,representationandredressbymaximisingtheprogram’srelevance,flexibilitytoSriLanka’soperatingcontext.Relevance

1. Invest in building buy-in and consensus among partner LAs for the SNGP’srepresentation and redress components. The impending rollout of the right toinformation (RTI) laws in Sri Lanka presents an important opportunity in thisregard. The RTI Act was passed in June 2016. It is due to come into effect inFebruary2017,bywhichtimeallpublicauthoritiesfallingunderthescopeoftheRTI Act, including LAs, are expected to become RTI-compliant. There are twomainways inwhichtheRTIActseekstoenhancepublicaccessto information:(i) through periodic, proactive disclosure of information by public authorities,and(ii)onthebasisofRTIrequestssubmittedbythepublic.However,LAsarelikely to face substantial challenges in both aspects of RTI-compliance. KIIscarriedoutduringthisassessmentfoundthatLAshadnotgivenRTI-compliancesignificantconsiderationinplanningfor2017,andmostlacksystemsforstoring,organisingandmanaginginformation.31Inthiscontext,theRTIrolloutprovidesan avenue for SNGP interventions that combine: (i) LA interests in enhancingefficiency of managing RTI requests, and (ii) public interests in greatertransparencyandaccountabilityfromLAsenabledthroughtheRTI.

2. IntegrateGESIintospecificSNGPactivities.GESIintegrationintoSNGPactivitieshasbeen limited to the conductofphase1of theGESIBaselineAssessment inYear 1. Parallel to the completion of the remaining phases of the BaselineAssessment, the SNGP can integrate GESI into ongoing and future programactivities; for instance, by incorporatingGESI-sensitive budgeting via theBMT,and representation of women and marginalised groups in the informationcollectedviatheeCRC.

3. Strengthen program stability and sustainability, by consciously cultivating acriticalmass of SNGP-trained staff in partner LAs to protect against personneltransfers.

Flexibility1. StrengthentheSNGP’smechanismforprogramadjustments.Toprotectagainst

potentiallyadhocprogramadjustments,TAFcanconsiderspecifyingthresholdsor criteria for adjustments. For instance, criterion for justifiable adjustment totheprogram’soveralldirectioncanbethatitrespondstodevelopmentsaffectinga majority of sites. Another could be a radical change in political context; forexample, the introduction of a new constitution that alters the functioning oflocalgovernment.TAFcanalsoconsiderengaginginperiodicscenario-planningfor anticipated political developments, such as impending local governmentelections.

31 For instance the Peliyagoda UC reported their lack of facilities for maintaining up-to-date assetregisters.

21

2. Institute a simple, efficient MEL structure. Heavy monitoring and reportingrequirements,ifinstituted,couldintroducenewinefficienciesandadministrativeburdens that did not strongly feature in Year 1 of the SNGP. Hence, it isimportant that routine MEL practices introduced are efficient and minimallycumbersome by design, while building in ‘triggers’ for more comprehensiveinformation-gathering, such as when the SNGP faces major implementationproblemsorisconsideringashiftinstrategy.

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Annex1:Keyinformantinterviewsandsitevisits

Date KeyInformantInterviewees

15November2016 KIIs:Dr.GopaThampi,Mr.DhammikaMahendreandMs.VathsalaDayananda(TheAsiaFoundation)

5December2016 Sitevisit:CommissionerforLocalGovernmentandGGRCResourcePerson,SouthernProvince

5December2016 Sitevisit:CommissionerandAccountant,MataraUrbanCouncil

6December2016 Sitevisit:Secretaryandteam,KataragamaPradeshiyaSabha

6December2016 Sitevisit:SecretaryandAccountant,BalangodaUrbanCouncil

16December2016 KIIs:SNGPteam,TheAsiaFoundation

21December2016 KII:Mr.DilshanMohammad,MELpointperson,TheAsiaFoundation

6January2017 Sitevisit:SecretaryandAccountant,PeliyagodaUrbanCouncil

6January2017 KIIs:Mr.CyrilJayatissaandMr.Sumanadasa,TheAsiaFoundation

10January2017 Sitevisit:Secretaryandteam,ChilawUrbanCouncil

11January2017 Sitevisit:Commissioner,DeputyCommissionerandGGRCResourcePerson,CentralProvince

16January2017 KII:Mr.ArumathuraiSubhakaran,TheAsiaFoundation

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Annex2:TOCadjustmenttemplate

SummerizeChangestoToC

DegreeofChange Justification/Explanation Implication

ProblemStatement

AnalysisofKeyDynamics

Interventions/Strategies

IntermediateOutcomes

UltimateOutcomes

Documents

Assessment of the Sri Lanka Sub- National Governance ...smartcity.sngpweb.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/... · The Sri Lanka Sub-National Governance Program (SNGP), launched by the