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Ashes of Hama: The MuslimBrotherhood in SyriaItzchak Weismanna

a Haifa UniversityPublished online: 21 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Itzchak Weismann (2014) Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria,Middle Eastern Studies, 50:1, 171-174, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2013.860317

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.860317

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than on resistance by the current opposition parties. Much may also depend on pos-

sible changes to the electoral system, which have now come onto the agenda as part

of the government’s claimed ‘democratization package’, This is the subject of the last

two chapters, rounding off an exteremely informative and thoughtful study.

WILLIAM HALE

School of Oriental and African Studies, London (emeritus)

� 2014 William Hale

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.854006

Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria

Rapha€el Lef�evreLondon: Hurst & Co., 2013. Pp. 273, index. £30.00 (hardback) ISBN 978-1-8490-

4285-7

Lef�evre’s book is the first comprehensive treatment of the history of the Muslim

Brotherhood movement in Syria. Far beyond what the title suggests, it begins with

the reformist Salafi trend of the late Ottoman and the populist Islamic societies of

the Mandatory periods, before delving into the various phases of the Muslim Broth-ers’ evolution from independence to this day. Subsequent chapters of the book thus

explore the participation of the movement in the initial Syrian democratic experi-

ence, its consolidation into the main opposition to the Ba’th regime, the road to the

debacle of Hama and the whereabouts of the Muslim Brothers and radical Islamists

in the aftermath: in exile, within al-Qaeda, and in the current uprising and civil war.

As Lef�evre correctly points out, unlike today’s violent Islamists, the late nine-

teenth-century Salafiyya was basically an intellectual-political endeavour to confront

western domination by peaceful means. The Syrian Salafis in particular espoused apluralistic and tolerant interpretation of the legacy of the forefathers of Islam (al-

salaf al-salih) in reflection of the sectarian makeup of the country. They were influ-

enced by the modernist teachings of Afghani and Abduh, and helped revive the leg-

acy of the medieval Salafi theologian Ibn Taymiyya, who lived and died in

Damascus. Lef�evre, however, confuses (pp.8–9) Tahir al-Jaza’iri, who adopted Ibn

Taymiyya’s use of ijtihad and rejection of popular Sufi practices, with his older com-

patriot Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri, a reformer who remained loyal to the Sufi teachings

of Ibn Arabi. Moreover, he overlooks the influence of the Alusis of Baghdad on theDamascene Salafiyya as well as the rise of this trend in other Syrian cities, which pro-

duced figures such as Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi in Aleppo and Rashid Rida in

Tripoli.

Populist Islamic societies followed the introduction of mass politics by the French

Mandate. The populists pursued the Salafis’ concern with the spread of Muslim edu-

cation for boys and girls, but in appealing to the masses many of them emphasized

the need to protect traditional Islamic values. The combination of Salafi ideology

and populist activism in some societies – Dar al-Arqam in Aleppo and ShababMuhammad in other cities – precipitated the consolidation of the Muslim Brothers

in Syria under the leadership of Dr Mustafa al-Sibaʿi, who joined the Egyptian move-

ment while completing his studies at al-Azhar in Cairo.

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Lef�evre’s treatment of the first phase in the evolution of the Syrian Muslim Broth-

erhood, from its foundation with independence in 1946 to the Baʿth takeover in

1963, is aptly tackled under the title Islam and democracy. Prominent Brothers and

candidates affiliated with the movement were regularly elected to parliament, and

two of them – Muhammad Mubarak and Maʿruf al-Dawalibi – served as ministers.Their pragmatic approach was demonstrated during the heated debate over the con-

stitution in 1950, in which they accepted a compromise that made Islam the religion

of the head of state and the main source of legislation. Concomitantly, Sibaʿi devel-oped his brand of ‘Islamic socialism’ in an attempt to strike a middle course between

western capitalism and Soviet communism. Curiously, whereas many Brothers

rejected the doctrine, their arch-rival, Egyptian President Nasser, made it the official

policy of his regime. The Syrian Ikhwan had backed the union with Egypt in 1958,

while their new Director General, Isam al-ʿAttar, was the only leader who refused tosign the declaration of cessation, thereby clearing the way for the Baʿth.

Lef�evre remains consistent when he deals with the next phase of the Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood, from the Baʿth coup of 1963 to the Hama uprising of 1982, under two

separate headings, one devoted to the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, which tried

to keep to its moderate path, the other to its radical offshoot, the Fighting Vanguard,

which pushed toward a disastrous confrontation with the regime. Islamic opposition

to the Baʿth was widespread and rested on two foundations: its social policies, which

promoted the peasants and lower classes at the expense of the urban traditional andmiddle class elites, and its sectarian composition, with the Alawis at the helm. Yet

when describing the course of events Lef�evre does not always distinguish between

the moderates and the radicals. In the first confrontation with the Baʿth that took

place in Hama as early as 1964 Muhammad al-Hamid, the spiritual head of the

Brothers in the city, made his utmost to avoid violent confrontation. Sa’id Hawwa,

the foremost ideologue of the movement, resorted to sectarian jihadi language in the

late 1970s, but was also author of the Charter of the Islamic Front in Syria and other

documents that showed commitment to democratic rule. I therefore doubt Lef�evre’sstatement that Hawwa appears to have pushed the Brotherhood into a doomed con-

frontation with the regime in the Hama uprising of 1982 (p.125).

The main question is, then, why and how did the moderate and pragmatic Muslim

Brotherhood become dominated by violent elements. To answer this question Lef�e-vre seeks to disentangle the dynamics of the movement itself, identifying within it

two reinforcing trends: a leadership crisis and the rise of a jihadist faction. Internal

crisis derived from the challenge that the ‘Northern axis’ of Ikhwanis from Aleppo,

Hama and other cities posed to the leadership of the ‘Damascus wing’. ‘Attar and hisDamascene colleagues were heirs to the moderate Salafiyya of the late Ottoman

period; the Northerners opposed this brand of Salafism not because it had been con-

fined to the capital, as Lef�evre suggests (pp.83–4), but because most of them were

associated with the activist Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood which the Salafis tended to

deride. The result was a split on regional lines. The Northerners took over following

ʿAttar’s exile from Syria and the leadership devolved to the Hamawi Saʿd al-Din

Ibrahim.

The godfather of the radical wing in Syria was Marwan Hadid, a follower of theEgyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb and instigator of the Hama uprising of 1964. His

martyrdom in a Baʿthist prison gave inspiration to the creation in 1976 of the

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Fighting Vanguard, a secretive jihadist organization that under the charismatic

‘Adnan Uqlah engaged in increasingly daring terrorist acts against the Assad

regime. Harsh state repression against the entire Islamist camp finally drew the

Muslim Brothers of the Northern axis and even the Damascene wing into jihad in

alliance with the radicals. For Hafiz al-Asad this was a struggle for life and death.The brutal methods he used to meet the challenge, surpassed only by his son

Bashar in the current civil war, culminated in the Hama uprising. The army bom-

barded the old city indiscriminately for three weeks, bringing about its total

destruction and the death of thousands of mujahidin and civilians alike. The Mus-

lim Brotherhood was crushed and dispersed, while its image remained long associ-

ated with terror and violence.

The last part, the title of which is that of the entire book, ‘Ashes of Hama’, in

many respects is also the most original part of the work. Holding to the distinctionbetween radicals and moderates, Lef�evre examines, on one hand, the integration of

militant Syrian Islamists into global jihadism and, on the other hand, the conduct of

the Muslim Brotherhood in exile. Both are set against the regime’s efforts in the

aftermath of Hama to co-opt the religious scholars and Muslim public. Members of

the Fighting Vanguard joined the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan after the

capture of ‘Uqlah in late 1982 and the collapse of jihad in Syria. Though a small con-

tingent, their military experience was appreciated and some of them, most notably

Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri, took part in the creation of al-Qaeda and in developing a jihad-ist theory. A larger contingent of Syrian jihadists of the next generation joined the

Iraqi insurgency following the American invasion of 2003, a trend that the Syrian

regime apparently encouraged.

The Muslim Brotherhood was scattered throughout the world and, without a base

inside Syria, its leaders were given to internal bickering and mutual blaming. The

Ikhwan regained their influence within the Syrian opposition in the early 2000s, after

the ‘Aleppo faction’ took over from the ‘Hama clan’. Under the direction of ’Ali

Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, the movement adopted a conciliatory stand toward thenew regime of Bashar al-Asad and, in the National Honour Charter published in

2004, which Lef�evre analyses in detail (pp.171–2), it renounced the use of violence

and confirmed Siba’i and ’Attar’s commitment to democratic and pluralistic rule. As

hopes for political liberalization promised by Bashar’s ‘Damascus spring’ faded, the

Muslim Brotherhood allied with other Syrian opposition forces, including left-wing

intellectuals, Kurdish nationalists and even the ex-Vice President ’Abd al-Halim

Khadam, in calling for a regime change.

Religion was not the instigator of the Arab Spring protests, which in Syria beganin March 2011. But, as Lef�evre correctly points out, the brutal crackdown of the

regime on the civilian population and its unfounded accusations of the Muslim

Brotherhood for standing behind them evoked the memory of the atrocities of 1982

and fuelled a fresh wave of Islamic rage. Radicalized protestors declared jihad

against the ‘infidel’ regime and its sectarian supporters, while global Salafi-jihadist

elements infiltrated Syria to take part in the civil war. It was the Muslim Brother-

hood, however, now unified under the present Director General, Muhammad Riyad

al-Shuqfa, that distinguished itself as the major component in the struggle to toppleAsad. Adopting a more cautious policy so as not to repeat the mistakes of the past,

in October 2011 it joined the opposition umbrella of the Syrian National Council in

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Istanbul and recovered its base inside Syria. This allowed it to support the brigades

of the Free Syrian Army and provide assistance to the refuges.

Ashes of Hama suffers from some inaccuracies in detail and interpretation, as well

as from lacunae deriving from the fact that in Syria information is often hard to

come by. Still, the book makes an important contribution to our understanding ofthe evolution of the Islamic movement in Syria and of the religio-political history of

the country at large. Together with Thomas Pierret’s study of the Syrian ulama,

Lef�evre’s book enriches our perspective on the all-important struggle between Islam-

ism and the Ba’thist regime in Syria. On the other hand, it serves as a corrective to

the prevailing focus in the scholarly literature on the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. It

remains to be seen whether the Syrian Brotherhood will be able to surpass its mother

movement and not only win the civil war, but also keep to its promises to create a

democratic and pluralist government.

ITZCHAKWEISMANN

Haifa University

� 2014 Itzchak Weismann

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.860317

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