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1
ARE CORPORATE PROPERTIES UNDERVALUED? EVIDENCE
FROM INTERNATIONAL RETAIL COMPANIES1 Working paper by Kim Hiang Liow, National University of Singapore; to be presented at the 25th Annual ARES Meeting, April 1‐4 2009, Monterey Marriott, Monterey, California Abstract This paper examines whether properties owned by retailers are undervalued by the stock market. We propose a theoretical CRE valuation framework to place properties in the context of core business and use the model to assess whether the values of CRE assets are fully reflected in earnings (firm) valuation. Our results from a simultaneous equations model document the empirical validity of the “latent assets” hypothesis in CRE literature and highlight the importance of the joint earnings and property valuation in corporate environment.
1. Introduction
The use of land, also known as real estate, as part of business operations and associated
activities, is referred to as corporate real estate (CRE). Capital markets today are putting tremendous
pressure on corporate management to maximize shareholders’ value. As CRE is a major component
in some business firms’ financial statements, one question of interest is: given that management is
committed to increasing shareholders’ wealth, what role, if any, can CRE play in achieving that aim?
The extant literature has revealed that, the belief that CRE is undervalued – at least until a
company is “put into play”, appeared almost universally held by the corporate management and
investment bankers. For example, properties that were purchased years ago are carried on the
balance sheet for a fraction of their market value ‐ real estate has been categorized as “latent assets”
where value of the assets owned by a corporation might not be accurately reflected in its share
prices (Brennan, 1990). For publicly listed business firms, their shares are valued in the stock market,
whereas the CRE assets are valued by reference to the underlying real estate market. Hence whether
the CRE is valued by the stock market on a different basis from its market value is definitely of great
concern to corporate management. One obvious implication is that if share prices do not reflect the
1 The author wishes to thank the Singapore Ministry of Education’s ARF Tier 1 funding support for his research project entitled “corporate real estate performance effects and strategy dynamics of international retail companies” (research grant number: R‐297‐000‐083‐112) upon which this paper was based on.
2
CRE at current values, there are arbitrage opportunities either for companies or in the stock and real
estate markets.
The Arthur Anderson and Rosen (2000) surveys suggest that CRE may be a sub‐optimally
managed asset. This notion has been supported by Brennan (1990) who has used the term “latent
assets” to describe situations where the stock price of a firm does not reflect the true value of all the
assets it owns. Real estate holding as a class of corporate assets is a good example. Brueggeman,
Fisher and Porter (1990) have reviewed real estate’s role in the corporate restructuring of the 1980’s,
and they have shown that rational investors may value companies with large real estate holdings at
prices well below break‐up value, even when stock markets are efficient. They state that “……..the
value of CRE is “hidden” from investors and therefore not fully reflected in share prices.”
The market‐to‐book value ratio (M/B) measures the relative market valuation of a firm’s
assets. To the extent that its property assets are undervalued by the stock market, the disparity (gap)
between the market value and the book value of the firm’s assets is indicated by its higher B/M ratio
or even M/B ratio of less than one. This measure has been popularly discussed in the USA CRE
literature as well as in corporate finance.
This paper will examine whether the values of properties owned by retailers are fully
reflected in share prices (i.e. firm valuation). No formal examination of this issue has been reported
although corporate management generally agrees that there is some extent of market
undervaluation in corporate properties. We contribute to this scanty literature by focusing on listed
retail firms because real estate forms a significant proportion of the total assets in the balance sheet
of many leading retailers. Further, real estate has always been recognized as a key value driver in the
retail industry. Separately, Guy (1999) has pointed out that many retailers’ real estate cannot be
simply regarded as sunk or negative costs to the retailers. This is because properties have significant
values on balance sheets and can usually be disposed of on the open market at substantial financial
gains over the original cost of purchase. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is probably very
3
difficult (if not impossible) to separate the performance of the retail firms’ core business from the
contribution of the real estate owned by the firm. That is, whether the firm is more (or less) valuable
because it merely owns real estate; or is the real estate more (or less) valuable because of the real
estate’s synergy (or lack thereof) with the firm? This study will not make a distinction between these
two groups of firms.
Our contributions are two folds. First we propose a theoretical CRE valuation framework to
place property in the context of core business on the belief that property value in consumer‐led
sectors such as retailing is largely driven by earnings and alternative use. By positioning the retail
firms in one of the four valuation segments depicted by the framework, investors will be able to
assess whether corporate properties are undervalued in firm valuation. We use this framework to
position a sample of retail firms in the four valuation segments and to provide a basis for the
empirical examination. Second, we appeal to a simultaneous equations model to consider the
relationship between CRE ownership and firm valuation (i.e. book‐to‐market valuation ratios ‐ B/M)
The simultaneous equations approach is appropriate because CRE investment decisions, firms’ key
financial characteristics (such as firm size, gearing and profitability), earnings and asset valuation and
country/segment differences are intertwined and are considered in the context of “whole” firm
(Miles et al. 1989). Because of their inter‐relationships, examination of the components in isolation
misses feedback effects and may result in erroneous inferences. Using a sample of listed retail firms
from the world three developed economies, our results document the empirical validity of the
“latent assets” hypothesis in CRE literature and highlight the importance of the joint earnings and
property valuation in corporate environment
This research is timely when capital markets are in constrained cycles, and with many firms’
shares selling at or below book value per share – and in some cases, below the market values of their
CRE, being vulnerable for takeovers and leveraging on their CRE to raise the required capital for such
takeovers. Even some large retailers with a long heritage of freehold property ownership are not
4
immune to this trend. The pressure to divest /outsource their CRE is fuelled by falling stock market
valuations, fear of predators and concerns about the long‐term value of property in a world where
electronic commerce is becoming increasingly important.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review. The third
section describes a theoretical framework for corporate property valuation. Section 4 describes the
retail sample and their real estate ownership characteristics. In the fifth section, the main empirical
procedures are explained. Thereafter, we discuss the empirical results and implications in Section 6.
The paper ends with a summary of the key findings in Section 7.
2. Related Literature
The concept of shareholder value provides a direct capital market indicator to demonstrate
to management how real estate could affect the health of the company (Louargand 1999). There are
two ways in which real estate might affect firm valuation. Firstly, occupancy costs play a very
important role in determining the cost base and hence the net operating profit of the firm. The
proportion of fixed occupancy cost to total business cost affects the profitability and return of the
firm through the simple equation: Profit = revenue – cost. The second way is through its cost of
capital. The presence of real estate on balance sheet could mean a high cost of capital that includes a
substantial risk premium to account for higher operating leverage arising from the ownership of real
estate. Another source of risk comes from the increased financial leverage as a result of financing
CRE using debt. Financial theory postulates that cost of capital is the weighted average of cost of
equity and cost of debt of the firm. It is able to influence the systematic risk and hence the pricing of
the firm in the stock market. Higher CRE ownership normally suggests that the firm is likely to have a
higher debt (i.e. high‐geared). As debt financing has the effect of leveraging (positively or negatively)
any changes in the company’s returns, a higher CRE / higher‐geared firm may be riskier than a lower
CRE / lower‐geared firm, and consequently, results in unfavorable stock market valuation.
5
Corporate management has long argued that there is significant “hidden value” in real
estate that is not reflected in a company’s share price. One main reason is that properties that were
purchased years ago are carried on balance sheets for a fraction of their market value. In Brennan
(1990)’s terminology, real estate would be categorized as “latent assets” where value of assets
owned by a corporation might not be accurately reflected in its share prices. Brueggeman et al (1990)
have pointed out that the market value of property assets are typically governed by factors very
different from those that drive the value of a firm’s operating business. For example, a unique quality
of real estate, as a corporate asset, is that it can function as either a production factor or a profit
centre and provides flexibility not common to other corporate assets. Other reasons for the
perceived undervaluation of corporate properties include differences in the valuation methods
between stock and properties, high information cost due to thin trading, uncertainty as to the true
property asset values due to historical cost convention or inefficiency in the management of CRE.
However, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) argues that if the stock market is efficient, then
current stock prices should reflect all available public information about a company’s future
profitability. Accordingly, current values should be unbiased estimates of the present value of future
cash flows which derive the values of CRE assets. Finally, there is also evidence in the literature
(Rodriguez and Sirmans, 1996) that decisions concerning CRE such as acquisitions, leasing,
dispositions, sell‐offs, sales‐and‐leasebacks and spin‐offs could have significant effects on firm value.
As shareholders are concerned with the net present value of the firm’s current and future
investment opportunities in order to create value, it follows that non‐real estate firms need to seek
and implement feasible CRE asset strategies that would enable investors to explicitly recognize
“hidden” real estate values and enhance market valuation of the firms.
3. A theoretical framework of CRE asset valuation
6
For many non‐real estate firms such as retailers, corporate management generally agrees
that the significance of their real estate to the stock market might not be so much of the property
value effect per se, but rather more of the investors’ expectations on the performance of the
company closely tied to the profitability of the trading business. From the valuation perspective, it is
however very difficult, if not impossible, to separate the market valuation of properties
(property
property
MVBV
) from the market valuation of the firm (represented by earnings valuation)
(earnings
earnings
MVBV
). This valuation task is made even more complicated because the market
values of properties are often unobservable. To overcome this problem, we propose a CRE valuation
framework in the context of core business, as shown in Exhibit 1. The framework is designed as a
plane formed by two decision parameters. The X‐axis represents the earnings valuation of a retail
firm and the Y‐axis indicates the CRE valuation line. To the extent that the Net Present Values of the
marginal dollar invested in its business and its CRE assets are equal to one, then the two axes might
separate the plane into four valuation segments (A, B, C and D) where the relative valuation
“premium” and “discount” of firm’s CRE assets against its earnings could be assessed and
investigated.
(Exhibit 1 here)
The significance of the four valuation segments is briefly highlighted below:
Segment A – a retail firm in this segment is in an unfavorable position as both its earnings and CRE
holdings are not fully reflected in its share prices. In this situation, the value of an asset to a business
is its net realizable value (or break‐up value). As the market prices of properties are low, a
comprehensive restructured business strategy is likely required with the hope to turn the company
around with property policy being a component of the restructuring process if property is a sizable
asset in its balance sheet
7
Segment B ‐ A retail firm in this segment faces slower growth prospects and falling margins which
depress market valuation of earnings (i.e. at discount) and on the property side too much property
for a tired retail formula. Faced with this situation, a plausible strategy for an ailing multiple retailer
typical of this segment is to reduce its property holdings through a program of rationalization in
order to reduce heavy borrowing and raise cash to inject into the business. For example, a property
disposal program will involve selling off property sites and those outlets where the firm no longer
sees an adequate return on capital. In addition, those “high‐price” properties might be written down
in order to produce surpluses on disposal, thereby boosting the firm’s operating profits to a point
where its wishes to signal a major shift in strategy or earnings trends.
Exhibit 1 Four Strategic CRE and Earnings Valuation Segments
Property valuation
( propertyproperty MVBV )
Segment C Segment A (property valuation>1, earnings valuation>1)
(property valuation>1, earnings valuation<=1)
Earnings (firm) valuation
( earningseaenings MVBV )
Segment D Segment B (property valuation<=1, earnings valuation>1)
(property valuation<=1, earning valuation<=1)
8
Segment C ‐ a retail firm in this segment has its CRE holdings undervalued by the stock market.
Compared with its good earning performance, one plausible strategy is to create a separate real
estate subsidiary to exploit the undervalued CRE assets. In so doing, the firm lets the stock market
puts its own value on the properties as a separate business.
Segment D – A firm in this segment is in a favorable position as both its earnings and property assets
are valued at a premium. This suggests that the firm has a successful trading formula and can access
extra property holdings as a strong platform for growth. However, one possible problem with this
firm is that some of its “high‐price” stores were not able to achieve the high return on capital
expected. Hence the firm has to re‐align use of its properties in the hope of “squeezing” higher
profitability from its space portfolio and improving its relative property ratios.
Finally, since the market values of properties for individual firms are often not directly
observable, we use the market value of firm (i.e. earnings) to proxy for the market value of CRE. This
is based on the assumption that for retailers, their earningsMV should usually be greater than the
propertyMV if property ownership is viewed as subsidiary to core business. We apply this theoretical
framework as a basis to assess the empirical relationship between firm valuation (proxied by
)MVBV and CRE ownership for our sample of retail firms.
4. Sample and Data
A sample of 326 listed retailers from Japan, the USA and the UK was derived from the Osiris
database2 based on SIC primary code classification 52 to 59 3 as of December 2007. The stocks of
2 Osiris is a comprehensive database of listed companies, banks and insurance companies around the world. In addition to the income statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement and ratios it contains a wide range of complementary information such as news, ownerships, subsidiaries, M & A activities and ratings. Osiris contains information on 38,000 companies from over 130 countries including 30,000 listed companies and 8,000 unlisted or de‐listed companies.
9
these firms must be continuously traded over the study period from January 2002 through
December 2007. Our sampling procedure has survivorship bias as well as liquidity restrictions; but
has the advantage of maintaining the identity of the firms throughout the period.
Following literature, a corporate real estate ratio (CRER) is derived to measure the trend in
relative CRE ownership over a period of six years from 2002‐2007. This CRER divides Osiris’s net
property, plant and equipment (NPPE)4 by the book value of a firm’s total tangible assets (TA); i.e.
CRER = NPPE / TA. We conjecture that the book value of PPE to proxy for the value of real estate
assets owned by the firm.5 The CRER ratio will enable a comparison of relative CRE ownership (i.e.
real estate intensity) between the eight retail segments, years and also countries in the sample.
Ideally, the percentage of real estate ownership would be a better measure. However, similar to
Ambrose (1990), Deng and Gyourko (1999), Seiler et al. (2001) and Brounen et al. (2005) which
derived CRER from Compustat, we have to use the NPPE variable which offers the best available
proxy from Osiris for an international comparison in the CRE ownership. A further point to bear in
mind is that although this measure of real estate concentration, NPPE/TA, does not measure the
share of real estate in the firm’s physical capital, but rather the “tangibility” of firm, it is quite
unlikely that a larger part of the high CRER ratio for retailers can be attributed to plant and
equipment, as most retailers have little need to own significant plant and equipment. If the retail
firms own more land and buildings, this should be reflected in higher levels of NPPE. In addition, we
use the natural log of NPPE (LnNPPE) (book value) of each firm over the same period as an
3 The eight primary SIC retail segments are: SIC52 (Building materials. Hardware, garden supply and mobile home dealers), SIC53 (General merchandise stores), SIC54 (Food stores), SIC55 (Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations), SIC56 (Apparel and accessory stores), SIC57 (Home furniture, furnishings and equipment stores), SIC58 (Eating and drinking places) and SIC59 (Miscellaneous retail) 4 NPPE is equivalent to tangible fixed assets of the firm, having deducted from the historical cost and revaluation of properties, the accumulated depreciation, amortization and depletion.
5 This CRER specification ignores the impact of leasing (i.e. only include owned properties). Many large retailers have long term lease contracts that effectively give them control of (and thus exposure to) real estate; however, this will not appear on the firms’ balance sheets. As our study focuses on the relative market valuation of owned real estate, we do not capture the impact of long‐term leases.
10
alternative CRE indicator. This is because the significance of real estate to a firm can be measured by
its relative real estate level (CRER) or absolute dollar level (LnCRE). Further, the CRE literature
remains silent as to which indicator (i.e. relative or absolute) is a better measure of a firm’s real
estate investment activities.
Exhibit 2 reports the sample distribution of average CRE holdings and CRER levels across
countries over the six‐year period. Average real estate holdings were between US$95.8m (Japan) and
US$183.4m (the USA), and property made up about 38 percent of the 326 retail firms’ total tangible
assets. The ANOVA evaluations indicate that country differences are displayed in the absolute; but
not the relative CRE levels. However, these results could probably be time or sample specific. In
addition, Exhibit 3 compares the CRER levels of the retail firms for the three countries for each of the
six‐year period, 2002‐2007. On average, only the UK retail firms reported a decrease in their CRER
from 45.2% (2002) to 42.2% (2007)
(Exhibits 2 and 3 here)
Exhibit 4 shows that the average CRE holdings and the CRER levels varied considerably
between different retail segments, even within the retail industry itself. Specifically, the role of CRE
varied from around 21.7% for mixed stores to around 57.1% for eating and drinking places (and yet
with the smallest CRE holdings of about US$81.67m). The significant ANOVA F‐statistics confirmed
that there were marked differences in the absolute and (especially) relative levels of CRE ownership
and investment among the eight retail segments. This implies that CRE ownership is a function of
retail segment.
(Exhibit 4 here)
Finally, Exhibit 5 provides a breakdown of the sample retail firms’ CRE portfolios by the usual
20% CRER criterion. Overall, only 12 retail firms (about 3.7%) were extremely “real estate intensive”
(CRER Group 1) with at least more than 80% of their resources invested in properties. In contrast, a
total of 205 retail firms (about 62.8%) were moderately property intensive with their CRER levels
11
range between 20% and 60% (CRER Groups 3 and 4). The breakdowns are 84 (77.1%), 105 (57.3%)
and 16 (47.1%) for Japan, the USA and the UK respectively.
(Exhibit 5 here)
5. Methodology
Empirically, as real estate and firm size (market value) are correlated, the effect of property on
book‐market ratio might be due to the proxy effect of size. To reduce this possibility, we employ the
randomization process of Basu (1983).6 Firstly, in each year, three "size" portfolios (MV1, MV2, MV3)
were formed, and each of them was further sorted in descending order of CRER (relative) and LnRE
(absolute) respectively and divided into four portfolios of approximately equal size (P1, P2, P3 and P4). In
other words, we would have MV1P1, MV1P2, MV1P3, MV1P4, MV2P1, MV2P2, MV2P3, MV2P4, MV3P1,
MV3P2, MV3P3 and MV3P4, Finally the same "P" portfolios in the three "MV" portfolios (i.e. P1 in MV1, P1
in MV2, P1 in MV3 and so on) were combined to form P*1, P*2, P*3 and P*4. Thus, to study the real estate
effect on B/M while controlling for the size effect, a new set of four P* portfolios was formed with
different CRER and LnRE levels but randomized in terms of size as measured by market value. The
analysis of variance (ANOVA) technique is used to test for the equality of mean B/M across the four
sets of randomized property portfolios. This portfolio grouping method did not consider the country
and segment differences.
Since financial variables are related in ways that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
determine causality, and that they are often simultaneously determined by each other, we consider
a simultaneous equations model, using iterative three‐stage least squares (IT3SLS), to investigate
whether there is a significant relationship between the B/M valuation of the retail firms and their
CRER (and LNCRE) ownership levels. In our context, a simultaneous equations model is appropriate
because real estate ownership decisions and corporate financial management are intertwined. A
6 Basu (1983) conducted a study on the relationship between earnings' yield, market value and return for New York Stock Exchange common stocks. The terms 'randomized' and 'unrandomized' are his sorting definition.
12
significant positive relationship between the B/M ratios and real estate variables suggests that the
property holdings of retailers might be undervalued by the stock market as higher CRE ownership
leads to higher B/M (or lower M/B) valuation. To implement this approach, we first derive the
predicted real estate variables (CRER / LNCRE ) from a regression model using lagged one‐year
real estate, a set of two country dummy variables and another set of seven segment dummy
variables as instrumental variables. The two equations of the system are specified as:
7
1
2
1,110 )(
sjss
rrijtj DSEGfDNATflagCREReeCRER
7
1
2
143210 )()()/(
sjss
rrijjjjj DSEGcDNATcROAaTDEBTRaLnMVaCRERaaMB
Where CRER is the predicted value of percentage of real estate holdings at year t,
lagCRER is the one‐period lagged value of CRER7 and B/M is the book/market value ratio. LnMV
represents the natural logarithm of market capitalization (proxy for size), ROA is the return on asset
(proxy for profitability) and TDEBTR is the percentage of debt to total assets (proxy for financial
leverage). DNATr (r = 1,2) are (0,1) dummy variables representing Japan and the USA (relative to the
UK); the national dummy is included to account for country fixed‐effect and would provide a good
control for differences in accounting methods and lease structure across countries. DSEG s
(s=1,2,3,4,5,6,7) are (0,1) dummy variables representing SIC codes 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 and 58
(relative to SIC code 59); this segment dummy variable allows for a determination of possible
differences in the CRE ownership by retail segments. Finally j is the regression error term. We
repeat another system estimation using LnCRE (absolute CRE ownership) to search for possible
evidence of undervaluation in absolute property holdings.
7 Some CRE investment decisions may also take on a longer planning horizon. Although, we could only afford to consider one‐year lag because of the shorter sample period (only 6‐years) with the study.
13
6. Results
Results of the randomization tests are provided in Exhibits 6(a) (CRER) and 6(b) (LnCRE).
Over the 6‐year period, there is some evidence of a significant positive relationship between the B/M
valuation ratio and average LnCRE across the four property portfolios; i.e. the larger the average
LnCRE values, the higher the B/M values. A wider implication from this evidence is that the market
valuation of a non‐real estate firm’s property assets may become unfavorable when its real estate
ownership (in absolute term) reaches a limit that is considered too high by the market. This situation
happens either because the stock market is of the opinion that the firm’s earnings growth is not
strong enough to sustain a larger property base or the market does not believe the firm can manage
its enlarged property holdings in their highest and best use. Nevertheless, we were unable to derive
the same finding for the relationship between B/M and CRER levels.
(Exhibits 6a and 6b here)
Following the theoretical CRE valuation framework depicted in Exhibit 1, the 326 retail firms
were positioned in the four valuation segments based on their six year averages of
( earningsproperty MVBV ) and ( earningsearnings MVBV ). A point of clarification is needed here. Since
the market values of properties for individual firms are not available, we use the market value of firm
(i.e. earnings valuation) to proxy for the market value of CRE. This is based on the assumption that
for retailers, their earningsMV should usually be greater than the propertyMV if property ownership is
viewed as subsidiary to core business. The results reported in Exhibit 7 indicate that the numbers of
retail firms in each valuation segment are: 36 (Segment A), 57 (Segment B), 37 (Segment C) and 196
(Segment D). For our sample of retail firms, it thus appears that the property assets of at least 73
firms (22.4% ‐ from Segments A and C) were clearly undervalued by the stock market. On average,
these firms’ shares were selling at approximately between 49.1 percent and 61.8 percent of their
book values of properties. The market values of these firms were too heavily dependent on their
property values!
14
(Exhibit 7 here)
Exhibit 8 reports the simultaneous equations estimates of the relationship between B/M
ratios and CRER levels for the overall sample and three national sub‐samples. As the numbers of
Equation (1) indicate, all lagged one‐year CRER values are highly significant in predicting the current
year CRER levels implying that CRE investment decisions were stretched for at least a year. Except for
the USA sub‐samples, the remaining three CRER coefficients are significantly positively related to the
B/M ratios in equation 2, implying that the higher the CRER levels, the higher the B/M valuation. The
coefficient for the USA’s CRER level is insignificantly positive. As for the three financial variables, firm
size (LnMV) is significantly negative in all four cases; higher debt ratios (TDEBTR) are associated with
significantly lower B/M values (higher M/B values) in the full sample and two national sub‐samples
and profitability (ROA) has a significantly negative impact on B/M except for one national sub‐
samples. The coefficients on the two national dummies and seven segment dummy variables
indicate that there are some significant variations in the B/M valuation across Japan, the USA and
the UK as well as across the eight retail segments. The adjusted R2 for the four cross‐sectional B/M
regressions range between 0.329 and 0.406 suggesting that a moderate portion of the variations in
the four cross‐sectional endogenous variables is accounted for with the chosen set of explanatory
variables that include the CRE ownership variable (i.e. CRER level).
(Exhibit 8 here)
The 3SLS estimates, by retail segments, are reported in Exhibit 9. Focusing on the estimated
CRER coefficients, they are significantly positive for three retail segments (SIC 53, 54 and 56),
insignificantly positive for 4 segments (SIC 52, 53, 58 and 59) and significantly negative for one retail
segment (SIC 57). In accordance with the earlier results that different retail segments have different
CRER levels, our results here imply that the impact of CRE ownership on B/M ratios is also a function
of retail segment membership. Thus it is possible while retail firms in the majority of the retail
segments are likely to experience some degree of market undervaluation of properties, firms in one
15
or two other retail segments could have their properties fairly valued or even valued at a premium
by the stock market.
(Exhibit 9 here)
Using an absolute CRE proxy (LnCRE), Exhibit 10 indicates CRE ownership influences
significantly retail firms’ B/M valuation positively for the full sample and three national sub‐samples.
Similar estimates reported in Exhibit 11 indicate that the coefficients for LNCRE are significantly
positive for six retail segments (SICs 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59). Hence, the positive impact of
corporate properties on B/M valuation is affirmed.
(Exhibits 10 and 11 here)
Finally, Exhibit 12 reports the real estate impact of B/M valuation for the four firm portfolios
classified using Exhibit 1. As the numbers indicate, the coefficients for LNCRE are significantly
positive in all four portfolios. Thus our results imply not only that property values were “discounted”
by the stock market in all three countries and in some retail segments, the market undervaluation of
properties could happen even to some retailers whose earnings and properties are valued at a
premium. As highlighted above, a possible scenario is that these firms’ property portfolios could be
highly valuable relative to the current level of earnings achieved by the firm (Segment D ‐ i.e. real
estate was too expensive for the business!). If they fail to realign use of their properties to “squeeze”
higher profitability from the space portfolio, then its full property values are unlikely to be
recognized by stock market investors and reflected in firm valuation. Finally, the results using the
CRER levels support the market undervaluation argument for retail firms in Segments A and C.
(Exhibit 12 here)
In summary, the simultaneous equations results are reasonably conclusive to support the
“latent assets” hypothesis for retailers’ CRE. Higher CRE ownership (whether measured in absolute
or relative levels) causes larger B/M valuation implying that stock market investors are unlikely to
recognize the true value of the corporate properties the business own. While the reasons for this
16
market undervaluation might be different for different firms, it is important for those affected firms
to identify their relative valuation premiums or discounts (i.e. property valuation and earnings
valuation) at the firm level. In this regard, our Exhibit 1 provides a useful analytical tool. Another
lesson to learn from our analysis is that even real estate is a value driver of the retail industry, stock
market investors would still penalize those retailers who own significant properties that are probably
in excess of their business requirements. The optimal proportion of CRE ownership remains an
important strategic decision that these retail firms have to regularly review with the hope to achieve
higher stock market recognition in property valuation in the wider context of firm valuation.
7. Conclusion
This paper is a contribution to the literature in CRE ownership in an international
environment. Motivated by Brenann (1990)’s argument that labeled corporate properties as “latent
assets” and lack of academic evidence regarding the relative valuation of corporate properties, we
investigate whether the property holdings of a sample of listed retail firms have been and are
adequately valued by the stock markets. With an understanding that retailers’ property values and
business performance are often inseparable, we develop a theoretical framework that depicts for
four corporate property valuation segments and identify the characteristics of property valuation
and earnings (firm) valuation in each valuation segment.
Our empirical investigation appealed to a simultaneous equations model that placed CRE in
the context of “whole” firm and further considered the country and retail segment differences.
Overall, a reasonable conclusion emerged from our analysis is the “latent assets” hypothesis put
forward by Brennan (1990) is supported at least for our sample of retail firms across country, across
retail segment and within the four valuation segments. For those retailers that have a significant CRE
portfolio, our evidence indicates since stock market investors are unlikely (not able and not willing)
to recognize the true value of corporate properties in firm valuation and in some cases create
17
“disequilibrium” in firm and property valuations, it is important for them to realign their CRE
ownership with the hope of maximizing the property contribution to business performance as well as
improving the property valuation ratio.
Finally, it should be noted that our results could simply be time or sample specific. All else
equal, investors might expect better (inferior) property valuation ratio for firms with relatively large
real estate holdings during periods of booming (collapsing) real estate markets. Either result should
not be blindly assumed to apply out of sample. With longer periods of data available, our analysis
can well be extended to other non‐real estate sectors to uncover more empirical evidence to
validate the “latent assets” hypothesis in CRE investment.
References
Ambrose, B.W. (1990), “Corporate real estate’s impact on the takeover market” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 13(4): 307‐324 Anderson and Rosen (2000), “eReal Estate: A Certainty” Arthur Anderson, Chicago, IL Brennan, M. J. (1990) Latent assets, Journal of Finance 45(3), pp. 709‐729 Brounen, D., Colliander, G., and Eichholtz, P. M. A. (2005), “Corporate real estate and stock performance in the international retail sector” Journal of Corporate Real Estate, 7(4), 287‐299 Brueggman, W.B., Fisher, J.D. and Porter, D.M. (1990) Rethinking corporate real estate, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 3(1), pp. 39‐50 Deng, Y. and Gyourko, J. (1999), “Real estate ownership by non‐real estate firms: an estimate of the impact of firm return”, Working Paper, Zell/Lurie Real Estate Centre, Wharton Business School, University of Pennsylvania Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. (1992), “The cross‐section of expected stock returns”, Journal of Finance 47: 427‐465 Guy, C. (1999), “Exit strategies and sunk costs: the implications for multiple retailers”, International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management 27(6): 237‐245 He, L.T. (2002), “Excess returns of industrial stocks and the real estate factor”, Southern Economic Journal 68(3): 632‐645 Liow, K. H. (1999) Corporate investment and ownership of real estate in Singapore – some empirical evidence, Journal of Corporate Real Estate 1:4, 329‐42
18
Liow, K.H. and Nappi‐Choulet, I. (2008), “A combined perspective of corporate real estate” Journal of Corporate Real Estate 10(1):54‐67 Louargand, M. (1999), Real estate’s influence on enterprise value, Journal of Corporate Real Estate (3): 254‐261 Miles, M., Pringle, J. and Webb, B. (1989) Modeling the corporate real estate decision, Journal of Corporate Real Estate 4(3), 47‐66 Rodriguez, M and Sirmans, CF (1996) Managing corporate real estate: evidence from the capital markets, Journal of Real Estate Literature 4, 13‐33 Seiler, M., A. Chatrath and J. Webb (2001) Real asset ownership and the risk and return to stockholders, Journal of Real Estate Research 22(1/2), 199‐212 Zeckhauser, S. and R. Silverman (1983), "Rediscover your company's real estate" Harvard Business Review, January/February, pp. 111‐117
19
Exhibit 2 Real estate ownership of retail companies: 2002‐2007
Country No. of companies Average NPPE (US$m)
Average CRER
Japan 109 95.72 0.352
USA 183 183.36 0.387
UK 34 128.64 0.429
Total 326 142.18 0.380
ANOVA F 4.125** 2.109
Notes: Mean NPPE (US$m) = net property plant and equipment Mean CRER = (net property plant and equipment (NPPE)/ (total asset value) ANOVA F – derived from SPSS One‐Way Analysis of Variance Test ** ‐ indicates significance at the 5% level
Exhibit 3
Real estate ownership (CRER) of companies by years: 2002 – 2007
Year Overall Japan USA UK 2002 0.388 0.351 0.398 0.452
2003 0.386 0.350 0.398 0.436
2004 0.382 0.359 0.387 0.424
2005 0.378 0.356 0.384 0.421
2006 0.375 0.355 0.378 0.418
2007 0.371 0.342 0.379 0.422
Mean 0.380 0.352 0.388 0.429
ANOVA F 0.314 0.157 0.272 0.090
Notes: CRER = corporate real estate ratio ANOVA F – derived from SPSS One‐Way Analysis of Variance Test
20
Exhibit 4 Real (estate) ownership of retail companies by segment: 2002‐2007
SIC Segments No. of companies
Mean NPPE
(US$m)
Mean CRER
SIC 5200 – 5271 Materials and home dealers 10 244.15 0.405
SIC 5311 – 5399 Departmental stores 37 291.47 0.437
SIC 5400 – 5499 Food stores 27 328.79 0.483
SIC 5500 – 5599 Vehicles stores 24 143.21 0.304
SIC 5610 – 5699 Clothing stores 52 172.28 0.310
SIC 5700 – 5736 Furniture stores 28 136.62 0.289
SIC 5810 – 5813 Eating and drinking places 76 81.67 0.571
SIC 5910 – 5949 Mixed stores 72 105.48 0.217
Overall ‐ 326 142.18 0.380
ANOVA F 236 2.999*** 32.610***
Notes: Mean NPPE (US$m) = net property plant and equipment (million) Mean CRER = (net property plant and equipment (NPPE)/ total asset value) The chi‐square values are derived from Non‐parametric Kruskal‐Wallis tests ANOVA F – derived from SPSS One‐Way Analysis of Variance Test *** ‐ indicates significance at the 1% level
Exhibit 5 Distribution of real (estate) ownership profile: 2002‐2007
Country CRER group
CRER range No of companies
Mean CRER Mean NPPE(US$m)
Japan 1 80%<CRER<=100% ‐ ‐
2 60%<CRER<=80% 7 0.658 173.52
3 40%<CRER<=60% 35 0.476 96.01
4 20%<CRER<=40% 49 0.304 117.19
5 0% <=CRER<=20% 18 0.123 43.51
USA 1 80%<CRER<=100% 8 0.864 156.61
2 60%<CRER<=80% 29 0.698 147.04
3 40%<CRER<=60% 43 0.481 216.38
4 20%<CRER<=40% 62 0.289 267.81
5 0% <=CRER<=20% 41 0.126 104.77
UK 1 80%<CRER<=100% 4 0.845 212.89
2 60%<CRER<=80% 6 0.671 298.60
3 40%<CRER<=60% 6 0.498 86.01
4 20%<CRER<=40% 10 0.303 158.34
5 0% <=CRER<=20% 8 0.144 55.58
Overall 1 80%<CRER<=100% 12 0.858 173.27
2 60%<CRER<=80% 42 0.688 167.25
3 40%<CRER<=60% 84 0.480 144.40
4 20%<CRER<=40% 121 0.296 183.49
5 0% <=CRER<=20% 67 0.127 76.71
21
Exhibit 6(a)
Book‐to‐market values ratio (BV/MV) of four Property Portfolios (CRER) Randomized over Size A
Property Portfolio Mean CRER (%) Mean BV / MV *1 0.669 0.7718
P*2 0.431 0.8551 P*3 0.289 0.8758 P*4 0.141 0.8189
F-stat 1 4485.46*** 1.62 Chi-sq 2 1804.55*** 9.56**
Exhibit 6(b) Book‐to‐market values ratio (BV/MV) of
four property Portfolios (LnCRE) randomized over Size A
Property Portfolio Mean LNCRE Mean BV / MV P*1 20.360 0.9059 P*2 19.275 0.8398 P*3 18.433 0.8287 P*4 17.031 0.7466
F-stat 1 387.05*** 3.298** Chi-sq 2 678.89*** 18.422***
AThe main objective is investigate the real estate effect of BV/MV while controlling for the firm size effect. A new set of four P* portfolios was formed with different CRER (Exhibit 5a) and LnCRE (Exhibit 5b) but randomized in term of firm size as measured by market capitalization. 1 Obtained from ANOVA test (parametric); 2 Obtained from Kruskal‐Wallis test (non‐parametric) ***, ** Indicates two‐tailed significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively Exhibit 7 Average results of four retail portfolios
PORTFOLIO GROUP
1 (Segment A) 2 (Segment C) 3 (Segment B) 4 (Segment D)
RE/MV>1 and BV/MV>1
RE/MV>1 and BV/MV<=1
RE/MV<=1 and BV/MV>1
RE/MV<=1 and BV/MV<=1
Number of firms 36 37 57 196
Average CRER 0.383 0.432 0.352 0.375
Average RE (‘USD million)
131.74 511.69 34.69 170.66
Average BV/MV 1.324 0.805 1.109 0.465
Average RE/MV 2.041 1.618 0.508 0.358
Average RE/BV 1.542 2.010 0.458 0.770
Notes: Based on the four valuation segments shown in Exhibit 1, the 326 firms are grouped into four portfolios based on their 6‐year average RE/MV and BV/MV values. RE is the book value of CRE, BV and MV are the book value and market value of the firm. This portfolio grouping method does not consider the country and segment differences
22
Exhibit 8 Results of Simultaneous Equation Estimation: 2002‐2007 (real estate variable: CRER) Explanatory variables/ Adjusted R2 Full sample Japan USA UK
7
1
2
1,110 )(
sjss
rrijtj DSEGfDNATflagCREReeCRER
Intercept 0.0061 0.0009 0.0101*** 0.0038
LagCRER 0.9532*** 0.9714*** 0.9390*** 0.9600***
DNAT (dummy) – Japan ‐0.0006 ‐ ‐ ‐
DNAT (dummy) –USA 0.0011 ‐ ‐ ‐
DSGE (dummy) – SIC52 0.0097 0.0317*** 0.0093 0.0065
DSGE (dummy) – SIC53 0.0169*** 0.0137*** 0.0159*** 0.0327
DSGE (dummy) – SIC54 0.0134*** 0.0101 0.0189*** 0.0127
DSGE (dummy) – SIC55 0.0061 0.0068 0.0055 ‐0.0047
DSGE (dummy) – SIC56 0.0009 0.0005 0.0029 ‐0.0008
DSGE (dummy) – SIC57 0.0077 0.0037 0.0085 0.0160
DSGE (dummy) – SIC58 0.0146 0.0110*** 0.0226*** 0.0057
Adjusted R2 0.953 0.950 0.954 0.945
7
1
2
143210 )()()/(
sjss
rrijjjjj DSEGcDNATcROAaTDEBTRaLnMVaCRERaaMB
Intercept 4.805*** 7.7260*** 4.4501*** 3.4564***
CRER 0.3671*** 0.4952*** 0.1411 0.8347***
Size (LnMV) ‐0.2032*** ‐0.3152*** ‐0.1827*** ‐0.1417***
Leverage (TDEBTR) ‐0.4244*** ‐1.5344*** ‐0.0727 ‐0.5952***
Profitability (ROA) ‐0.6006*** ‐3.6843*** ‐0.4265*** ‐0.3158
DNAT (dummy) – Japan 0.2746*** ‐ ‐ ‐
DNAT (dummy) –USA 0.0988*** ‐ ‐ ‐
DSGE (dummy) – SIC52 0.0312 0.2055 0.0068 ‐0.1490
DSGE (dummy) – SIC53 0.2658*** 0.4466*** 0.2889*** 0.2565
DSGE (dummy) – SIC54 ‐0.0054 0.1261 ‐0.1768 0.1326
DSGE (dummy) – SIC55 0.1506*** 0.2820*** ‐0.0427 0.3897***
DSGE (dummy) – SIC56 ‐0.0672 0.3360*** ‐0.1847*** 0.4825***
DSGE (dummy) – SIC57 0.3107*** 0.8038*** 0.0711 ‐0.0503
DSGE (dummy) – SIC58 ‐0.3558*** ‐0.4110*** ‐0.2747*** ‐0.4134***
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.378 0.343 0.406
Notes: This table reports the estimation results for the full sample and three countries (Japan, USA and UK) subsamples. CRER is the predicted value of the percentage of real estate
obtained from the first equation of the system estimation and B/M is the ratio of book value to market value. Firm size is represented by the natural log of market capitalization (lnMV) of
each firm; leverage is represented as the percentage of debt to total tangible assets (TDEBTR). The country dummies (DNAT) and segment dummies (DSEG) controls for cross‐country retail
variations (UK and SIC59 are the respective references). The two equations are estimated via a simultaneous equation framework using iterative 3SLS technique available from E‐view 6.
*** ‐ denotes two‐tailed significance at the 5% level
23
Exhibit 9 Results of Simultaneous Equation Estimation – By retail segments: 2002‐2007 (real estate variable: CRER)
Explanatory variables /Adj R2 SIC52 (N=13)
SIC53 (N=80)
SIC54 (N=43)
SIC55 (N=37)
SIC56 (N=75)
SIC57 (N=41)
SIC58 (N=91)
SIC59 (N=100)
7
1
2
1,110 )(
sjss
rrijtj DSEGfDNATflagCREReeCRER
Intercept ‐0.0292 0.0419*** 0.0223 ‐0.0196 0.0176 0.0338*** 0.0210 0.0033
LagCRER 1.0276*** 0.9490*** 0.9521*** 1.0095*** 0.9156*** 0.9092*** 0.9430*** 0.9264***
DNAT (dummy) – Japan 0.0434*** ‐0.0169 ‐0.0038 0.0125 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0116 0.0021 ‐0.00008
DNAT (dummy) –USA 0.0157 ‐0.0199*** ‐0.0006 0.0217*** 0.0030 ‐0.0064 0.0090 0.0020
Adjusted R2 0.974 0.896 0.944 0.951 0.898 0.867 0.913 0.933
7
1
2
143210 )()()/(
sjss
rrijjjjj DSEGcDNATcROAaTDEBTRaLnMVaCRERaaMB
Intercept 4.2760*** 5.7858*** 2.8833*** 4.6429*** 5.5924*** 8.3343*** 4.1042*** 4.6046***
CRER 0.1144 1.9241*** 0.7016*** 0.0102 1.1755*** ‐1.5879*** 0.2149 0.1817
Size (LnMV) ‐0.1496*** ‐0.2192*** ‐0.1196*** ‐0.1924*** ‐0.2561*** ‐0.3453*** ‐0.1835*** ‐0.1850***
Leverage (TDEBTR) ‐1.4064*** ‐1.9989*** 0.1651 0.2038 0.0789 ‐0.8399 ‐0.3447*** ‐0.8140***
Profitability (ROA) ‐0.2364 ‐6.2126*** ‐2.6735*** ‐2.7587*** 0.0500 ‐0.9467 ‐0.1986 ‐1.0209***
DNAT (dummy) – Japan 0.1521 0.1436 0.1495 0.3024*** 0.2148 0.8783*** 0.1894*** 0.2849***
DNAT (dummy) –USA 0.1565 0.2334 ‐0.2491*** ‐0.0130 ‐0.2624*** 0.4314*** 0.1607*** 0.2510***
Adjusted R2 0.704 0.389 0.446 0.509 0.444 0.446 0.365 0.269
Notes: This table reports the estimation results for eight SIC retail segments. CRER is the predicted value of the percentage of real estate obtained from the first equation of the
system estimation and B/M is the ratio of book value to market value. Firm size is represented by the natural log of market capitalization (lnMV) of each firm; leverage is represented as
the percentage of debt to total tangible assets (TDEBTR). The country dummies (DNAT) and segment dummies (DSEG) controls for cross‐country retail variations (UK and SIC59 are the
respective references). The two equations are estimated via a simultaneous equation framework using iterative 3SLS technique available from E‐view 6. *** ‐ denotes two‐tailed
significance at the 5% level
24
Exhibit 10 Results of Simultaneous Equation Estimation: 2002‐2007 (real estate variable: LNCRE) Explanatory variables/ Adjusted R2 Full sample Japan USA UK
7
1
2
1,110 )(*
sjss
rrijtj DSEGfDNATfLnCRElageeLnCRE
Intercept 1.0278*** 1.4758*** 0.9193*** 1.3253***
Lag(lnCRE) 0.9507*** 0.9203*** 0.9571*** 0.9271***
DNAT (dummy) – Japan ‐0.0716 ‐ ‐ ‐
DNAT (dummy) –USA ‐0.0202 ‐ ‐ ‐
DSGE (dummy) – SIC52 0.0157 0.1182 0.0240 ‐0.0639
DSGE (dummy) – SIC53 ‐0.0084 0.1252 ‐0.0960 0.1371
DSGE (dummy) – SIC54 ‐0.0089 0.0025 ‐0.0402 0.4189***
DSGE (dummy) – SIC55 0.0448 0.0847 ‐0.0122 0.2199
DSGE (dummy) – SIC56 0.1248*** 0.2700*** 0.0789 0.2451
DSGE (dummy) – SIC57 ‐0.1234*** ‐0.1803 ‐0.1518 0.1269
DSGE (dummy) – SIC58 ‐0.0424 ‐0.0295 ‐0.0738 0.1188
Adjusted R2 0.899 0.857 0.900 0.931
7
1
2
143210 )()()/(
sjss
rrijjjjj DSEGcDNATcROAaTDEBTRaLnMVaLnCREaaMB
Intercept 4.6093*** 7.2790*** 4.2824*** 3.9729
LnCRE 0.1266*** 0.1708*** 0.0643*** 0.1995***
Size (LnMV) ‐0.3066*** ‐0.4491*** ‐0.2329*** ‐0.3480***
Leverage (TDEBTR) ‐0.4506*** ‐1.4426*** ‐0.0998 ‐0.4802***
Profitability (ROA) ‐0.5425*** ‐3.0084*** ‐0.4226*** ‐0.2615
DNAT (dummy) – Japan 0.2335*** ‐ ‐ ‐
DNAT (dummy) –USA 0.0850 ‐ ‐ ‐
DSGE (dummy) – SIC52 0.0290 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0013 0.0683
DSGE (dummy) – SIC53 0.2996*** 0.3799*** 0.3360*** 0.2805***
DSGE (dummy) – SIC54 0.0140 0.0621 ‐0.1585 0.5156***
DSGE (dummy) – SIC55 0.1269*** 0.2430*** ‐0.0534 0.2278
DSGE (dummy) – SIC56 ‐0.0699 0.1795 ‐0.1681*** 0.3189***
DSGE (dummy) – SIC57 0.3011*** 0.7768*** 0.0535 0.0362
DSGE (dummy) – SIC58 ‐0.2540*** ‐0.3485*** ‐0.2241*** ‐0.1480
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.407 0.351 0.474
Notes: This table reports the estimation results for the full sample and three countries (Japan, USA and UK) subsamples. LnCRE is the predicted value of the percentage of real estate
obtained from the first equation of the system estimation and B/M is the ratio of book value to market value. Firm size is represented by the natural log of market capitalization (lnMV) of
each firm; leverage is represented as the percentage of debt to total tangible assets (TDEBTR). The country dummies (DNAT) and segment dummies (DSEG) controls for cross‐country retail
variations (UK and SIC59 are the respective references). The two equations are estimated via a simultaneous equation framework using iterative 3SLS technique available from E‐view 6.
*** ‐ denotes two‐tailed significance at the 5% level
25
Exhibit 11 Results of Simultaneous Equation Estimation – By retail segments: 2001‐2006 (real estate variable: LNCRE)
Explanatory variables /Adj R2 SIC52 (N=13)
SIC53 (N=80)
SIC54 (N=43)
SIC55 (N=37)
SIC56 (N=75)
SIC57 (N=41)
SIC58 (N=91)
SIC59 (N=100)
7
1
2
1,110 )(*
sjss
rrijtj DSEGfDNATfLnCRElageeLnCRE
Intercept 0.7767 0.9206 1.5082*** 0.6642 1.8708*** 1.1519*** 0.6563*** 1.1619***
Lag(lnCRE) 0.9574*** 0.9529*** 0.9372*** 0.9744*** 0.9107*** 0.9233*** 0.9712*** 0.9361***
DNAT (dummy) – Japan 0.0512 0.0490 ‐0.3450 ‐0.0795 0.0625 ‐0.2736 ‐0.1141 0.0376
DNAT (dummy) –USA 0.1619 ‐0.0159 ‐0.2336 ‐0.0912 0.0041 ‐0.0821 ‐0.0708 0.1545
Adjusted R2 0.956 0.891 0.891 0.892 0.857 0.886 0.923 0.874
7
1
2
143210 )()()/(
sjss
rrijjjjj DSEGcDNATcROAaTDEBTRaLnMVaLnCREaaMB
Intercept 4.3704*** 6.0500*** 3.9364*** 4.4773*** 4.9936*** 6.8964*** 4.0804*** 4.6111***
LnCRE ‐0.0232 0.0595 0.1158*** 0.1717*** 0.1488*** 0.2532*** 0.0630*** 0.1288***
Size (LnMV) ‐0.1306*** ‐0.2554*** ‐0.2547*** ‐0.3555*** ‐0.3426*** ‐0.5343*** ‐0.2352*** ‐0.3011***
Leverage (TDEBTR) ‐1.3606*** ‐1.6619*** 0.2274 0.1635 ‐0.2500 ‐0.7225 ‐0.3290*** ‐0.8725***
Profitability (ROA) ‐0.3198 ‐5.3507*** ‐2.9158*** ‐1.6375 0.0293 ‐0.4257 ‐0.2255 ‐0.9550***
DNAT (dummy) – Japan 0.1774 0.0972 ‐0.2294 0.3807*** 0.0928 0.8010*** 0.1427 0.2576***
DNAT (dummy) –USA 0.1554 0.1378 ‐0.4544*** 0.1180 ‐0.2353*** 0.1954 0.1404 0.2007
Adjusted R2 0.703 0.350 0.450 0.558 0.454 0.469 0.373 0.296
Notes: This table reports the estimation results for eight SIC retail segments. LnCRE is the predicted value of the percentage of real estate obtained from the first equation of the
system estimation and B/M is the ratio of book value to market value. Firm size is represented by the natural log of market capitalization (lnMV) of each firm; leverage is represented as
the percentage of debt to total tangible assets (TDEBTR). The country dummies (DNAT) and segment dummies (DSEG) controls for cross‐country retail variations (UK and SIC59 are the
respective references). The two equations are estimated via a simultaneous equation framework using iterative 3SLS technique available from E‐view 6. *** ‐ denotes two‐tailed
significance at the 5% level
26
Exhibit 12 Results of Simultaneous Equation Estimation by Portfolio group ‐ 2002‐2007 (real estate coefficients only)(
Real estate variable: CRER (relative) Real estate variable: LnCRE (absolute)
RE/MV RE/MV
>1 <=1
>1 <=1
>1 2.2112*** 0.1525 >1 0.3063*** 0.0826** BV/MV
<=1 2.9531*** ‐0.0684
BV/MV
<=1 0.1145** 0.0563***
Notes: This table reports the estimation results (to save space, only for the coefficients of CRER and LnRE in equation 2 of the simultaneous equation system) between BV/MV and real estate values for the 4 portfolios of 326 retail firms (refer to Exhibit 1 also), controlled for country and retail segment differences. ***, and ** ‐ indicate two‐tailed significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.