Are Bottom Up Sacrifices Unjust?

8/13/2019 Are Bottom Up Sacrifices Unjust?

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Author name: Sam Fremantle

Institution: University College London

Are bottom-up sacrifices unjust?

Abstract

Early inA Theory of Justice Rawls presents an intuitive argument against utilitarianism remar!ing that it

hardly seems li!ely that persons who view themselves as e"uals###would agree to a prin$iple whi$h may re"uire

lesser li%e prospe$ts %or some simply %or the sa!e o% a greater sum o% advantages en&oyed 'y others# (his

argument ) whi$h is generally interpreted as an o'&e$tion to the relatively disadvantaged 'eing sa$ri%i$ed %or the

sa!e o% greater advantages o% the more advantaged * plays an important role in Rawls own theory and his

arguments against utilitarianism# +ut its in%luen$e does not end there# It has also 'een endorsed 'y other

$ontra$tualists nota'ly (homas S$anlon and +rian +arry who have used it as a $orner stone in their argumentsagainst utilitarianism#

,espite its supposed intuitive appeal this argument as it appears in the $onte-t o% Theory is deeply pu..ling

when it is 'orne in mind that the greater sum o% advantages to whi$h Rawls re%ers would 'e en&oyed 'y the

$ooperating mem'ers o% so$iety whose interests are at sta!e# It is not o'vious that the $ooperating mem'ers o%

so$iety would not on 'alan$e pre%er a greater net distri'ution o% advantages nor that their representatives in

Rawls original position would re&e$t a prin$iple that would ma-imi.e the sum o% advantages#

(he presen$e o% this pu..ling argument in Theory$an 'est 'e e-plained as a $ompromise on a mu$h stronger

line against utilitarianism that Rawls too! in his essayDistributive Justice that he wrote prior to Theory#

(hrough a side 'y side $omparison o% passages I shall demonstrate that Rawls originally appeared to ta!e the

line that utilitarianisms aim o% ma-imising the sum o% advantages would not $ompensate the $ooperating

mem'ers o% so$iety %or the loss o% the %reedom they would en&oy in his version o% a state o% nature# I shall alsoshow that 'y the time o% Theory Rawls did not have the theoreti$al resour$es to sustain this $laim where

$onsisten$y should $ommit him to the position that utilitarianism would $ompensate all $ooperating parties %or

the loss o% %reedom they would en&oy in a state o% nature#

/ Introdu$tion

I should %irst put this paper in the $onte-t o% the pro&e$t o% whi$h its argument %orms a part#

0ost students o% philosophy %ind themselves at least at times $on%ronting potential $on%li$ts

'etween ideas that appear to vie %or allegian$e and I was no e-$eption# 1n the one hand I

was very sympatheti$ towards $lassi$al utilitarianism# 1n the other I thought that distri'utive

&usti$e re"uired people to give others what they owed them in return %or the 'ene%its those

others had provided them# (his $on$eption o% &usti$e has 'een re%erred to asjustice as fair

reciprocity. (hroughoutA Theory of Justice Rawls argues that utilitarianism in 'oth its

$lassi$al and average versions is irre$on$ila'le with the $on$eption o% so$iety as a

$ooperative venture %or mutual advantage and 'y impli$ation with &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity

) although he never a$tually used this term inA Theory of Justice, he has su'se"uently

endorsed this reading o% his theory#/ 2hen I started my en"uiry into this issue my hope was

/(his interpretation o% Rawls was %irst put 'y Alan 3i''ard in Constru$ting 4usti$e# It was later endorsed 'yhim inPolitical Liberalism. Alan 3i''ards essay was a ma&or in%luen$e on the ideas in this paper#

/


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to show that $lassi$al utilitarianism and &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity were re$on$ila'le# I have

had to $ompromise on that am'ition at least %or the time 'eing and settle %or the more

modest aim o% showing that Rawls did not su$$eed in demonstrating that utilitarianism and

&usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity were irre$on$ila'le# (his would 'e at least a step in the right

dire$tion and I thin! given the in%luen$e o% Rawls a signi%i$ant one# So although I am notyet a'le to show that Rawls was wrong in $laiming that utilitarianism $annot 'e re$on$iled

with the $on$eption o% so$iety as a $ooperative venture %or mutual advantage ) he may yet 'e

proved right in this * I 'elieve I am a'le to show that he did not su$$ess%ully ma!e good his

$ase# (his paper %orms a small part o% my argument#

(he %o$us o% this paper is on Rawls o'&e$tion to the 'ottom*up sa$ri%i$es that utilitarianism

may re"uire o% the less advantaged %or the more advantaged# (his has 'e$ome something o%

a rallying $ry %or $ontemporary $ontra$tualists as other $ontra$tualists su$h as (homas

S$anlon and +rian +arry are prepared to 'ury their "uite su'stantial di%%eren$es with Rawls in

the $ommon ground o% this o'&e$tion to utilitarianism# +arry and S$anlons theories start out

with a di%%erent underlying motive %or 'eing &ust to Rawls# In pla$e o% Rawls assumption o%

re$ipro$ity they put the motive o% a$ting reasona'ly or impartially towards ea$h other# +arry

has named this $on$eption o% &usti$ejustice as impartiality. Correspondingly they have

di%%erent arguments as to why 'ottom up sa$ri%i$es are un&ust# I am not a'le to give these

proper $onsideration here 'ut shall &ust $onsider the "uestion o% whether they are un&ust

a$$ording to the $on$eption o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ityand I shall $on$lude that Rawls has

not demonstrated that they are#

0y strategy will 'e to show that the o'&e$tion to 'ottom*up sa$ri%i$es loo!s wea! in$omparison to a mu$h stronger line o% argument that Rawls $onsidered in an earlier essay

,istri'utive 4usti$e pu'lished in /567 that he apparently gave up on 'y the time he got to

Theory in /57/ and I shall show this with a side 'y side $omparison o% the two passages# (his

strategy re"uires a word o% e-planation# 2hen I started loo!ing $losely atA Theory of

Justice, one o% the di%%i$ulties I en$ountered was that it was very hard to ma!e sense o% many

o% the arguments Rawls made against utilitarianism parti$ularly some o% those espe$ially

relevant to his $on$eption o% so$iety as a $ooperative venture %or mutual advantage# (his was

%or two reasons8 %irstly many o% them are e-pressed in very am'iguous terms and se$ondly

he didnt appear to have the ne$essary theoreti$al resour$es to 'a$! them up# Light was shed

on this issue when I read some o% his earlier essays and dis$overed that many o% the

arguments presented inA Theory of Justice had originally 'een presented as similar 'ut

importantly di%%erent arguments in these earlier essays# I had also 'een in%luen$ed 'y Ro'ert

9aul 2ol%%s 'oo! Understanding Rawlswhi$h seems to me to ta!e the right approa$h to

Rawls theory o% distri'utive &usti$e# 2ol%% maintained that Rawls theory should not 'e

approa$hed as a sel% $ontained theory presented in his 'oo!A Theory of Justice 'ut as a

$ontinually evolving theory o% at least twenty years development that $hanged as Rawls made

ad&ustments in new versions to %i- pro'lems hed %ound with earlier ones# 2ol%% identi%ied

three $lear and distin$t versions o% Rawls theory on the 'asis o% his writings up to and

4o 2ol%% %irst suggested I would pro%it %rom studying this a%ter I had noted dis$repan$ies 'etween argumentsput inA Theory of Justiceand Rawls essayDistributive Justice.


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in$luding the %irst /57/ edition o% Theory'ut suggests there may well have 'een more# ;e

also remar!ed o% Theorythat there are numerous serious in$onsisten$ies and un$larities that

ma!e it appear that Rawls $ould not ma!e up his mind on "uite %undamental "uestions#A third alternative $on$eption o%

&usti$e already mentioned isjustice as impartiality. It is worth my distinguishing my

setting %orth my position on this as others have interpreted Rawls as a theorist o% &usti$e as

mutual advantage or &usti$e as impartiality#?

A $ontemporary $ontra$tualist who is happy to em'ra$e &usti$e as mutual advantage is ,avid 3authier

parti$ularly inorals by Agreement.?

@ota'ly +rian +arry who identi%ies 'oth these $on$eptions o% &usti$e in Rawls in his 'oo! Theories of Justiceand its se"uelJustice as !m"artiality. 0y distin$tion 'etween the three theories largely %ollows his wor! andthe a%orementioned arti$le 'y Alan 3i''ard whi$h was a review o% +arrys Theories of Justice.


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I shall assume that anyone reading this is %amiliar with the main idea o% Rawls $ontra$tualist

theory o% &usti$e and shall &ust give a 'are 'ones outline o% it here# In %a$t I shall sti$! to the

'are 'ones outline that Rawls himsel% gave &ust early on in Theory, immediately pre$eding

the passage %rom Theory that I am $on$erned with#6

Rawls maintained that the $orre$t prin$iples to govern so$iety $on$eived o% as a $ooperative

venture %or mutual advantage would 'e those prin$iples that %ree and rational persons

$on$erned to %urther their own interests would a$$ept in an initial position o% e"uality as

de%ining the %undamental terms o% their asso$iation#7 In $ontrast to traditional so$ial $ontra$t

theorists su$h as ;o''es Lo$!e or Rousseau Rawls does not $on$eive o% this initial position

as a histori$al state o% a%%airs or primitive state o% so$iety re%erred to in their theories as the

state o% nature#Instead Rawls own initial position o% e"uality is purely hypotheti$al

$onstru$ted solely %or the purpose o% dis$overing the $orre$t prin$iples o% &usti$e# ;e $alled

it %amously the original position and its pla$e in his theory $orresponds to the pla$e o% a

state o% nature in the traditional theory o% the so$ial $ontra$t# Rawls gave the name &usti$e

as %airness to the view that whatever prin$iples would 'e $hosen in this situation would 'e

the prin$iples that $ould uni"uely $laim to 'e &ust#

(here are two important assumptions Rawls made regarding the original position that need to

'e noted here# (he %irst is that although the parties ma!ing the $hoi$e in the original

position are presumed to 'e representatives o% real people in so$iety they do not !now what

position in so$iety they o$$upy what their natural assets and a'ilities are or what the

interests that the real people they represent would 'e $on$erned to %urther are Bthey &ust !now

they have them# All these attri'utes o% the real people they represent are o's$ured 'y a veilo% ignoran$e# (he se$ond is that the parties in the original position are assumed to 'e

rational and mutually disinterested#5So they are to ma!e their $hoi$es purely with regard as

to what would 'e good %or them without any regard to what would 'e good %or the others

they have to $o*operate with#

;aving set out this 'are 'ones a$$ount o% his $ontra$tualist $onstru$tion Rawls

spe$ulates that the parties would re&e$t the prin$iple o% utility in %avour o% his two prin$iples

o% &usti$e the %irst re"uiring li'erties to 'e distri'uted e"ually the se$ond holding that

ine"ualities are &usti%ied only i% they result in $ompensating 'ene%its %or everyone in

parti$ular the least advantaged mem'ers o% so$iety# (hese arguments will 'e gone into in %ar

greater depth later on in Theory 'ut Rawls puts a 'rie% $ase %or the re&e$tion o% the prin$iple

o% utility that he $learly intends to 'e intuitively appealing to the reader in advan$e o% his

more detailed argument# (his is repeated 'elow#

< (he argument in Theory.

6(his outline and the passage under $onsideration are in se$tion


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D#on$e the prin$iples o% &usti$e are thought o% as arising %rom an original agreement in a

situation o% e"uality it is an open "uestion whether the prin$iple o% utility would 'e

a$!nowledged# 1%%hand it hardly seems li!ely that persons who view themselves as e"uals

entitled to press their $laims upon one another would agree to a prin$iple which may re#uire

lesser life "ros"ects for some sim"ly for the sa$e of a greater sum of advantages en%oyed byothers. Sin$e ea$h desires to prote$t his interests his $apa$ity to advan$e his $on$eption o%

the good no one has a reason to a$"uies$e in an enduring loss %or himsel% in order to 'ring

a'out a greater net 'alan$e o% satis%a$tion# In the a'sen$e o% strong and lasting 'enevolent

impulses a rational man would not a$$ept a 'asi$ stru$ture merely 'e$ause it ma-imi.ed the

alge'rai$ sum o% advantages irrespe$tive o% its permanent e%%e$ts on his own 'asi$ rights and

interests#/Bmy itali$s

2hen a writer introdu$es an argument with a rhetori$al %lourish to the e%%e$t that it should 'e

o'vious that is o%ten a signal that it will turn out to 'e anything 'ut# So it proves here# (he

%irst pro'lem to 'e %a$ed is how to interpret the !ey $laim * that the prin$iple o% utility

re"uires lesser li%e prospe$ts %or some simply %or the sa!e o% a greater sum o% advantages

en&oyed 'y others# (o help with this pro'lem o% interpretation here I shall introdu$e a model

that will later prove use%ul %or other parts o% my argument#

Suppose that in /57/ the two islands in the English Channel 4ersey and 3uernsey had

identi$al e$onomies and %a$ed identi$al alternatives o% $hoosing 'etween the prin$iple o%

utility Rawls di%%eren$e prin$iple or anar$hy# (hey ea$h had only three so$ial $lasses8

Alphas 3ammas and Epsilons# In the event 4ersey went %or the prin$iple o% utility and

3uernsey opted %or the Rawls di%%eren$e prin$iple# (he di%%eren$e prin$iple is how Rawlslater on $ashes out his se$ond prin$iple o% &usti$es re"uirement that ine"ualities must result

in $ompensating advantages %or everyone espe$ially the least advantaged# It stipulates that

the worst*o%% group in so$iety must 'e as well o%% as possi'le# Suppose that the $hoi$e ea$h

island initially %a$ed was this:

Fig ia Choi$e %a$ed 'y the Channel Islands early /57/

Epsilons

Bpop#/?

3ammas Bpop#


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Epsilons

Bpop#/?

3ammas Bpop#


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with the $hoi$e o% emigrating to 3uernsey or 4ersey might well in the a'sen$e o% !nowledge

o% what so$ial position they would o$$upy set out %or 4ersey whi$h permits 'ottom up

sa$ri%i$es on the grounds that they would li!ely 'e the 'ene%i$iary o% su$h sa$ri%i$es and even

i% they werent and turned out to 'e amongst the Epsilons who made su$h sa$ri%i$es their

prospe$ts wouldnt 'e too 'ad#

/

So Rawls argument on this interpretation loo!s very wea!#Alternatively suppose we waive the assumption that the parties should $hoose as i%

they $ould turn out to 'e anyone and suppose instead that those who would undergo 'ottom

up sa$ri%i$es !new themselves to 'e su$h# Even then it is not $lear that they would re%use to

agree to a prin$iple that would re"uire su$h sa$ri%i$es# It depends on what else they $ould

hope to get# I% the alternative to agreement would 'e to end up with anar$hy then it would 'e

highly li!ely that they would agree to a prin$iple that might re"uire 'ottom*up sa$ri%i$es#

Rawls argument still loo!s wea!#

Further pro'lems arise regarding the "uestion o% who the $laims in this passage are

supposed to apply to# (he $laim that persons wouldnt agree to the prin$iple o% utility $learly

applies to the parties in the original position# (he $laim that the prin$iple o% utility may

re"uire 'ottom*up sa$ri%i$es applies at least on this interpretation to people in an a$tual

so$iety# +ut what a'out the su'se"uent $laims o% the third and %ourth senten$es that no*one

has a reason to a$"uies$e in an enduring loss %or himsel% in order to 'ring a'out a greater net

'alan$e o% satis%a$tion and in what appears to 'e the same $laim repeated in other words that

a rational man would not a$$ept a 'asi$ stru$ture merely 'e$ause it ma-imised the alge'rai$

sum o% sum o% advantages irrespe$tive o% its e%%e$ts on his own rights and interests= Firstly

we $ould try interpreting it as applying to the parties in the original position# +ut they are

simply theoreti$al $onstru$ts and it seems strange to as$ri'e rights and interests to them#

Se$ondly we $ould try interpreting it as re%erring to the rights and interests people wouldhave in a situation where no so$iety had 'een esta'lished 'e$ause no agreement had 'een

rea$hed# +ut then ) as the anar$hy option %or 4ersey demonstrates ) the interests and $apa$ity

to advan$e the $on$eption o% the good o% everyone in$luding the worst o%% might well 'e

'etter served in a utilitarian so$iety that re"uired the worst o%% to ma!e 'ottom up sa$ri%i$es#

A third Band perhaps the most natural way to interpret these $laims would 'e to ta!e them to

apply to persons in an a$tual so$iety rather than the parties in the original position and to

e-tend the assumption o% rational sel%*interested 'ehaviour to a$tual people# +ut this

interpretation %ails to %avour either alternative# Rational persons who would %are 'etter under

utilitarianism and were solely $on$erned to advan$e their interests would have no more

reason to a$"uies$e in the enduring losses that the di%%eren$e prin$iple would 'ring them than

those who would %are 'etter under the di%%eren$e prin$iple would have to 'ring a'out a

greater net 'alan$e o% satis%a$tion# (he Alphas and 3ammas in 4ersey would want to !eep

their e$onomy as it was while the Epsilons would want to overturn it and vi$e versa in

3uernsey#

/(he "uestion o% whether the parties in the original position would $hoose the prin$iple o% average utility or thedi%%eren$e prin$iple has 'een e-tensively de'ated and my argument here is intended to put a summari.ed $ase

%or the $hoi$e o% the prin$iple o% average utility# Someone might want to o'&e$t here that my argument and my

4ersey 3uernsey e-ample is un%airly 'iased towards utilitarianism# (hat is $ertainly true 'ut it is %air enough%or my purpose here whi$h is not to argue that the parties in the original position would %avour the prin$iple o%average utility over Rawls two prin$iples o% &usti$e 'ut simply that it is not o'vious that they wouldnt#

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(here may well 'e other possi'le interpretations availa'le %or the $laims made in this

passage 'ut I very mu$h dou't that they $ould ma!e good sense o% it# And the reason %or this

as I show 'elow is that the argument started out li%e as a rather di%%erent argument where

some o% the wording made 'etter sense 'ut whi$h had impli$ations that $lashed with other

parts o% Rawls theory as he was then developing it whi$h led to his revising its $entral$laim without su%%i$iently revising the a$$ompanying wording# (his resulted in the

di%%i$ulties &ust gone over#

> (he argument in ,istri'utive 4usti$e#

(he $orresponding argument in ,istri'utive 4usti$e pu'lished in /567 went li!e this:

1n$e &usti$e is thought o% as arising %rom an original agreement o% this !ind it is evident that

the prin$iple o% utility is pro'lemati$al# For why should rational individuals who have a

system o% ends they wish to advan$e agree to a violation of their liberty for the sa$e of a

greater balance of satisfactions en%oyed by others& It seems more plausi'le to suppose that

when situated in an original position o% e"ual right they would insist upon institutions whi$h

returned $ompensating advantages %or any sa$ri%i$es re"uired# A rational man would not

a$$ept an institution merely 'e$ause it ma-imised the sum o% advantages irrespe$tive o% its

e%%e$t on his own interests#/


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passage ma!e mu$h more sense than the ones in Theory, to whi$h they $orrespond# Rational

sel% interested persons in an original "osition of freedom and e#ualitywould not a$$ept an

institution that ma-imised the sum o% advantages in so$iety when their interests would 'e

'etter served 'y the %reedom and e"uality o% the original position#

A se$ond very important impli$ation o% this argument on my reading o% it is thatRawls appears to $on$ede that a$$epting the institutions o% so$iety involves a loss o% natural

li'erty a $on$ession that he is relu$tant to ma!e throughout Theory. (his 'rings him $loser

to su$h $ontra$tualist prede$essors as ;o''es and Lo$!e %or whom $ontra$ting into so$iety

involved the surrender o% at least some o% ones natural %reedoms in return %or the advantages

o% so$iety# And the original position o% e"ual right re%erred to in the passage %eatures in this

argument in a way that is more li!e the traditional state o% nature than the original position in

Theory.

A third impli$ation is that Rawls prin$iples o% &usti$e would $ompensate people %or

the loss o% li'erty they en&oyed in the original position ) the argument assumes that

alternatives are availa'le that provide institutions that $ompensate people %or the loss o%

li'erty they would en&oy in a state o% nature and Rawls prin$iples presuma'ly $onstitute one

o% those alternatives#

Even at the time o% his writing this passage there were elements o% Rawls theory that

$on%li$ted with it so it $ant really 'e said to represent his theory at the time# And these

$on%li$ts led him to revise it# +ut it $ontains a mu$h stronger potential line o% argument

against utilitarianism %rom the perspe$tive o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity than the

$orresponding argument in Theorythat sheds light on some o% the things he says in Theory.

So I shall pro$eed to e-amine the argument Rawls might have made had he 'een a'le tosustain the underlying assumptions that the prin$iple o% utility would not ne$essarily improve

everyones position in $omparison to the 'en$hmar! o% a hypotheti$al state o% nature where

everyone is %ree and e"ual while Rawls prin$iples o% &usti$e would#

+ut 'e%ore pro$eeding we should $he$! whether theres a sense in whi$h Rawls

prin$iples o% &usti$e really would provide institutions that returned $ompensating advantages

%or any sa$ri%i$es re"uired= I $ant give this issue the attention it deserves 'ut theres a 'rie%

proposal o% how they might#

Suppose we start %rom the most li'eral de%inition o% natural li'erty * the li'erty

en&oyed in the state o% nature ) that o% (homas ;o''es whi$h e%%e$tively amounts to the

%reedom to do a'solutely anything one wants in pursuit o% ones goals# (he pro'lem is how

to apply that to $ooperating mem'ers in a$tual so$ietys when &usti$e re"uires them to

restrain their 'ehaviour in $on%ormity to the laws and rules o% so$iety even when to 'rea!

them would 'e in their interest# Suppose %or e-ample a tomato grower who is a mem'er o%

the Epsilon $lass in 3uernsey $ould get away with %ailing to de$lare her sales %or ta-= In not

de$laring them she would $ould 'e interpreted as e-er$ising her natural li'erty to do whatever

she wanted in pursuit o% her goals and 'y de$laring them as presuma'ly &usti$e re"uires she

would 'e sa$ri%i$ing her li'erty# +ut where are the $ompensating advantages to this

sa$ri%i$e= I% as the e-ample supposes she really $ould get away with not de$laring her salesthere appear to 'e none# 2hile this is I thin! a serious pro'lem %or a theorist o% mutual

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advantage a theorist o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity $ould answer that she re$eives indire$tly

$ompensating advantages %rom others $omplian$e with the law#/> So when de$laring her

sales she $ould $onsole hersel% %or the loss that her honesty 'rings 'y reminding hersel% that

were it not %or the similar honesty o% greenhouse and $ompost manu%a$turers her ta-es might

'e a lot higher and her li%e would 'e worse# And i% no*one in$luding hersel% restrained theirsel%*interested 'ehaviour whenever to do so was to their advantage her li%e would 'e mu$h

worse than it is when she loses out 'y o'eying the law#

?# 2ould utilitarian sa$ri%i$es 'e un&ust in /567=

In %a$t the "uestion o% whether or not this argument %rom ,istri'utive 4usti$e really

is stronger than the $orresponding argument in Theory depends on how we interpret it#

A$$ording to Rawls hypotheti$al $ontra$t model the people in the original position were to

$hoose as though they didnt !now who they would turn out to 'e# In whi$h $ase an

analogous argument applies here to the %irst one I put to "uestion Rawls $on$lusion in the

passage %rom Theory. It would argua'ly 'e rational to run the ris! o% 'eing one o% the people

who would not 'e ade"uately $ompensated %or the loss o% their li'erty in the state o% nature in

the e-pe$tation that you would pro'a'ly turn out to 'e one o% the people who was# In whi$h

$ase the parties might agree on the prin$iple o% utility and Rawls argument would 'e wea!#

+ut suppose that when Rawls wrote this passage he had overloo!ed this and wrote as

though the people who would end up worse o%% than they would 'e in the state o% nature

!new this# (hen the argument loo!s very strong# I% you !new that agreeing to the prin$iple

o% utility would leave you less a'le to advan$e your system o% ends than i% no agreement was

rea$hed and you were rational then you would $ertainly not agree to it# 1n thisinterpretation the argument loo!s very strong#

2hi$h o% these interpretations should we adopt as more in !eeping with Rawls aims

as a theorist o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity= In my opinion: the se$ond# I $an here only give a

'rie% summary o% the argument that lies 'ehind this opinion that really re"uires putting in

mu$h greater detail# (he purpose o% Rawls hypotheti$al $ontra$t model is to un$over the

prin$iples suita'le %or so$iety $on$eived o% as a $ooperative venture %or mutual advantage

and these prin$iples are intended to 'e applied to a$tually $ooperating mem'ers o% real

so$ieties# Rawls veil o% ignoran$e that o's$ures peoples !nowledge o% their identities

was ostensi'ly to serve this purpose 'y removing the 'argaining pro'lems whi$h arise in

everyday li%e %rom the possession o% !nowledge o% the $ontingen$ies o% so$ial $lass and

%ortune# +ut it has the unwel$ome $onse"uen$e o% undermining the very purpose it is

supposed to serve 'y potentially putting a$tual $ooperating mem'ers o% so$iety in positions

that would 'e worse than i% there was no so$ial $ooperation# (his undermines 'oth the main

aim o% the hypotheti$al $ontra$t and the supporting assumption o% rational sel% interest whi$h

should surely at least ensure that prin$iples that werent advantageous to all $ooperating

mem'ers in $omparison to a state o% nature should 'e re&e$ted# So Rawls hypotheti$al

$ontra$t should at least 'e revised to in$lude the re"uirement that rational people who would

end up in the worst positions in so$iety under a prin$iple would still $hoose it over the state

o% nature#/>I %ollow 3i''ards Constru$ting 4usti$e again here#

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+ut at this point we might as!: what is doing the wor! in Rawls argument= It may

'e true that rational individuals in a state o% nature who !new that a $ertain prin$iple would

not $ompensate them %or the loss o% li'erty they en&oyed in a state o% nature would not agree

to that prin$iple# +ut the %a$t o% their agreement or disagreement seems irrelevant %rom the

perspe$tive o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity# From the perspe$tive o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity itshould surely appear enough %or &usti$e to re"uire that institutions returned $ompensating

advantages %or any sa$ri%i$e o% li'erty involved dire$tly with no need %or a hypotheti$al

$ontra$t to esta'lish this %a$t# And that re"uirement $ould 'e held to 'e a ne$essary $ondition

o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity 'ut not ne$essarily a su%%i$ient one#

So a$$ording to Rawls argument in ,istri'utive 4usti$e utilitarian sa$ri%i$es would

indeed 'e un&ust#

6 2ould sa$ri%i$es 'e un&ust in /57/=

+ut the ne-t "uestion is whether Rawls would have 'een a'le to sustain a similar argument in

/57/ the theoreti$al apparatus availa'le to him inA Theory of Justice.

(he a'ove argument depended %or its su$$ess on Rawls a'ility to sustain the

assumption that the prin$iple o% utility would not 'e advantageous to all the $ooperating

mem'ers o% so$iety in $omparison to the 'en$hmar! o% a hypotheti$al state o% nature# Rawls

didnt %lesh out his version o% a state o% nature in ,istri'utive 4usti$e 'ut the %a$t that his

argument supposes that in the state o% nature people were at least a'le to advan$e their

systems o% ends to some degree and that it a%%orded some prote$tion o% their interests that the

prin$iple o% utility might undermine implying a Lo$!ean rather than a ;o''esian pi$ture

underlies the argument# 4ohn Lo$!es version o% a state o% nature provided a more restri$tedde%inition o% natural li'erty than ;o''es# As previously mentioned the li'erty o% the state o%

nature a$$ording to ;o''es was $ompletely unrestri$ted: in su$h a $ondition every man

has a right to everything even to one anothers 'ody#/? In Lo$!es state o% nature 'y

$ontrast people had no right to harm ea$h other or ta!e ea$h others property %or e-ample#

Although people would 'e prone to diso'eying the laws o% nature they would respe$t them at

least up to a point and so $ould 'e viewed as re%raining %rom the egoisti$ pursuit o% their

interests out o% respe$t %or others at least to a degree# So people in a Lo$!ean state o% nature

would have at least some opportunity to advan$e their ends and re$eive at least some

prote$tion o% their interests#

Lo$!e was a realist a'out 'oth the state o% nature and the so$ial $ontra$t# ;e thought

there really had 'een a state o% nature in our histori$al past and that so$iety had $ome a'out

'y peoples mutual agreement# Rawls state o% nature however would 'e a hypotheti$al

one# It should 'e de%ined as the situation that the parties in the original position would

suppose $ome a'out in the a'sen$e o% any agreement on prin$iples o% &usti$e#

Interestingly Rawls at one point does appear to invo!e a Lo$!ean state o% nature and

maintain that utilitarianism would not 'e to everyones advantage in $omparison with that

state suggesting that he did at some stage have a Lo$!ean state o% nature in mind and never

%ully let it go#/6 +ut he doesnt attempt to &usti%y this in terms o% a non*agreement point %or

his hypotheti$al $ontra$t# ;is most e-pli$it statement on the issue $omes when he argues %or/?;o''es

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the $olle$tive rationality o% $ooperation with his two prin$iples o% &usti$e where he invo!es

a ;o''esian state o% nature:

(o 'e sure %rom the standpoint o% the original position the prin$iples o% &usti$e are

$olle$tively rational8 everyone may e-pe$t to improve his situation o% all $omply with theseprin$iples at least in $omparison with what his prospe$ts would 'e in the a'sen$e o% any

agreement# 3eneral egoism represents this no agreement point#/7

It would 'e open to Rawls to invo!e a no agreement point general egoism and still

assert that the prin$iple o% utility $ould ta!e people 'elow this point# +ut he doesnt# ;e is

impli$itly $ommitted to the position that it is not &ust his two prin$iples o% &usti$e that o%%er an

improvement over a state o% general egoism 'ut allthe $on$eptions o% &usti$e that are

availa'le %or $onsideration to the parties in the original position in$luding 'oth the prin$iple

o% average utility and $lassi$al utilitarianism# Earlier in Theory he wrote:

Dit is o'vious that 'y $hoosing one o% the other $on$eptions the persons in the original

position $an do mu$h 'etter %or themselves# 1n$e they as! whi$h prin$iples all should agree

to no %orm o% egoism is a serious $andidate %or $onsideration in any $ase# /

1n the 'asis o% Rawls theoreti$al $ommitments in /57/ then utilitarianism would

improve the situation o% all the $ooperating mem'ers o% so$iety in $omparison to he

'en$hmar! o% a hypotheti$al state o% nature# It %ollows that the institutions o% a utilitarian

so$iety would return $ompensating advantages %or any sa$ri%i$es re"uired8 the potato %armer

in the epsilon $lass in 4ersey who de$lares his sales %or ta-es $ould $onsole himsel% that hegets indire$t $ompensation %or his honesty as well as $ould the tomato grower in 4ersey# And

so a$$ording to the re"uirement o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity that institutions return

$ompensating advantages %or any sa$ri%i$e o% li'erty utilitarian sa$ri%i$es would not 'e

un&ust#

7# Are 'ottom up sa$ri%i$es un&ust=

So %ar Ive answered the "uestion o% whether utilitarian sa$ri%i$es are un&ust and not

addressed the "uestion that is the title o% this paper: are 'ottom up sa$ri%i$es un&ust= And

dont have time to address it properly here#

;owever Ill give an indi$ation o% the dire$tion Im intending the argument to ta!e#

I have argued that the o'&e$tion to 'ottom up sa$ri%i$es originated as an o'&e$tion to

un$ompensated sa$ri%i$es o% li'erty and that the re"uirement that &ust institutions return

$ompensating advantages %or any sa$ri%i$e o% li'erty involved loo!s on the %a$e o% it to 'e a

mu$h stronger re"uirement o% &usti$e as %air re$ipro$ity than a prohi'ition on 'ottom up

/6Rawls /57/ p#


13/14

sa$ri%i$es# It is not as o'vious that the potato grower on ? units o% advantage doesnt have

an o'ligation o% re$ipro$ity to pay his ta-es as it would 'e that a potato grower earning */

units o% advantage would 'e#

@evertheless it would 'e open to a theorist o% mutual advantage to a$$ept the

re"uirement that &ust institutions return $ompensating advantages %or any sa$ri%i$e o% li'ertyinvolved as one ne$essary $ondition o% %air re$ipro$ity and also endorse a prohi'ition on

'ottom up sa$ri%i$es as another# And that is what Rawls went on to do: in Theory and

Justice as 'airness( A Restatement he $ontinually re%ers to a prin$iple o% re$ipro$ity

%or'idding 'ottom up sa$ri%i$es# +ut in the $onte-ts where he does so he is tal!ing a'out

sa$ri%i$es within one generation and overloo!ing intergenerational sa$ri%i$es#

And this is at odds with another prin$iple o% re$ipro$ity that he endorses 'etween

generations# In his a$$ount o% intergenerational &usti$e he maintains that &usti$e may re#uire

the $urrent worse o%% generation to ma!e saving %or the greater advantages o% %uture

generations so re"uiring 'ottom up sa$ri%i$es in the relevant way# And they would owe this

sa$ri%i$e in return %or the sa$ri%i$es previous generations have made# So there is an important

$ontradi$tion in the way Rawls treats intragenerational and intergenerational sa$ri%i$es#

2hi$h way to resolve it= Its hard to say that a$tual previous generations have

intentionally made 'ottom up sa$ri%i$es %or our 'ene%it# +ut they $ertainly didnt

intentionally o'serve a prohi'ition on su$h sa$ri%i$es either# I hope to use this %a$t to

motivate the argument that we shouldnt do so either#

References

+arry +# B/55 Theories of Justice, ;arvester 2heatshea%#

+arry +# B/55?Justice as !m"artiality 1-%ord: Clarendon 9ress#

+rin! ,# B/55


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Rawls 4# B/555 ollected Pa"ers, ;arvard: ;U9#

S$anlon (# 0# B/5 Contra$tualism and Utilitarianism in Sen A and 2illiams +# B/5

Utilitarianism and -eyond, Cam'ridge: CU9#

/>

Documents

Are Bottom Up Sacrifices Unjust?