An Experiment in Increasing Productivity of Police Service Employees

An Experiment in Increasing Productivity of Police Service EmployeesAuthor(s): Paul D. StaudoharSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 35, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1975), pp. 518-522Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/974189 .

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518

An Experiment in Increasing

Productivity of Police

Service Employees

Paul D. Staudohar, California State University, Hayward

The role of government has expanded to the level of employing nearly a fifth of the civilian labor force. Yet demands on government continue to increase, and key indicators such as crime, air

pollution, and traffic congestion suggest that some services are not keeping pace with problems. Public employee wages are increasing rapidly and are likely to continue to do so in the future

despite the much acclaimed taxpayer rebellion. In view of this gloomy prognosis, public policy is

shifting toward emphasis on decreases, or at least reductions in the rate of increase, in costs of

providing public service, while at the same time

seeking to avoid a concomitant lowering in quality of service. This policy redirection is based on the

premise that, with other things equal, a jurisdic- tion that raises rates of output per employee requires fewer employees to perform a given level of service, or can perform a higher service level with the same number of employees.

Increases in the crime rate, even in the face of a

steady rise in numbers of police personnel, are of

particular concern to the citizenry, and programs to increase police output are being given special attention. Costs of police service are high and

climbing. Annual cost of placing an additional officer in a police car with a partner 24 hours a

day has been estimated to exceed $175,000.1 Of

encouragement, however, is that potential for

improvement in performance of police service is

significant, as illustrated by a study showing that total police expenditures varied by over a factor of four for cities of similar crime rate and size.2

Approaches to productivity improvement that are being tried in police service include: (1) changes in

technology, e.g., making more extensive use of computers to provide data on criminal records, missing persons, automobile thefts, and the like; (2) changes in organization, e.g., combining of police services in nearby communities to generate economies of scale, and rescheduling of work within an agency; and (3) increasing employee motivation, e.g., creating psychological incentives, through financial reward or job enrichment, which can increase individual or group output. With personnel accounting for about four-fifths of police costs in most jurisdictions, accent on optimizing human resource use is vital to attempts at increasing overall productivity of police departments.

This article examines an experiment in the third category above, involving an attempt to increase employee motivation through a group incentive plan. The plan is contained in a 1973 agreement between the City of Orange, California, and the

City of Orange Police Association which provides for salary increases if there is a reduction in four crimes-rape, robbery, burglary, and auto theft- over periods of time set forth in the agreement. It is the first such agreement involving police in the nation, and its announcement received national publicity.3 Discussed below are features of the incentive plan and an analysis of experience under it. Prior to this, however, it is appropriate to examine some of the unique problems presented by productivity measurement in the public sector in general and police service in particular. This is done to indicate certain measurement criteria in

light of which the Orange incentive plan can be assessed.

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1975



POLICE PRODUCTIVITY

The Measurement Problem

The National Commission on Productivity has identified two reasons for productivity of police being particularly hard to measure: (1) the basic data on crime statistics and police output are weak; and (2) the effect of police activity on deterrence of crime is difficult to determine.4 To these it might be added that difficulty of measurement of police output is complicated by the need, in some instances, to relate it to overall output of a larger system of providing service.5 This problem is illustrated by the measurement of police output whose overall effectiveness is a function of other components of the system of justice, such as the ultimate prosecution of apprehended criminals by the courts. Despite an increase in the number of arrests, the courts may be unable to process the extra load of cases, thereby negating the potential contribution to efficiency of the system of justice made by the police. Thus, to the extent that inputs and outputs of agencies within a system are related, it is useful to coordinate productivity efforts among them and to measure the output of each agency in terms of the overall effects on service.

Underlying the complexity of output measurement is the qualitative side of public service. It can be misleading to attribute improvements in opera- tion of, for instance, public schools and sanitation service simply to larger numbers of pupils per class and tons of garbage collected. Despite a productivity improvement in quantitative terms, quality of education may be impaired if decreased per- sonal attention by the instructor impedes student progress. Tons of garbage collected might increase at the same time more waste is strewn about and more noise made by the collection process. Com- plexity of estimation of output grows with the number of qualitative factors involved. Optimally, each qualitative factor should be isolated, have a weight assigned to it, and be indexed so that the factors will be additive to reflect a total result. Qualitative factors that might be considered in interpreting police productivity, as expressed in terms of say arrests or number of crimes reported, are reduction in response time, outcome of apprehended offenders' court cases, indication of citizen reactions to the propriety of various services provided, and overall feelings of citizen security.

Finally, local conditions should be considered in interpreting productivity data. Measurements

can vary among jurisdictions on the basis of socioeconomic characteristics such as population density, median -income, public attitudes toward certain crimes, and rate of unemployment. A degree of noncomparability may therefore exist in productivity data from jurisdictions that vary socioeconomically unless the data are adjusted to take account of this difference.

Origins of the Orange Plan

The City of Orange is a rapidly growing middleclass community located in the center of Orange County, a mile from Disneyland and 40 miles from Los Angeles. Population is estimated at 84,600 as of January 1, 1974, up from 77,000 in 1970. Of the city's labor force, three-fourths work in Orange County and one-fourth in Los Angeles County. Median family income of Orange residents as of January 1, 1974, was $16,682. Principal racial composition, according to the 1970 census, is about 87 per cent white and 11 per cent Spanish-American.

Following passage of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act of 1968, which provided for meeting and conferral by local government agencies with recog- nized employee organizations on matters of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment, the City of Orange negotiated successive one-year agreements with the City of Orange Police Association in the spring of 1970, 1971, and 1972. During 1973 negotiations, in response to a proposed wage increase by the association, the city suggested the possibility of a police performance incentive plan.6 The idea for the incentive plan was conceived by the city manager who had been trying to find a way to justify higher salaries for police without alienating taxpayers. He felt the police force was relatively well educated and capable. The average number of semester units of college and university work per policeman was about 75 units, and the crime rate in Orange was lower than in nearby cities.

The city manager discussed the types of crimes to be used in the plan with the police chief. In trying to determine which crimes might be used, the chief examined the seven "Part 1" crimes designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which include homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. The crimes of rape, robbery, burglary, and auto theft were chosen because they were felt to be "repressible" in that the police have more control


519



PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

over them. Homicide was thought to be essentially "nonrepressible" because it is a crime of passion usually occurring among family members. Larceny frequently involves theft within a business firm, while assault is a crime of passion often occurring spontaneously in or just outside bars; each of these crimes is less susceptible to police control.

The Agreement

The incentive plan became part of a two-year agreement between the city and police association reached on May 30, 1973. In the opinion of the city manager, "The high level of education and intelligence of the police personnel created the kind of environment that made negotiation of the incentive plan possible." Apart from the productivity incentive, salary increases were provided of 7.5 per cent in July 1973 and six per cent in July 1974. The pertinent sections of the agreement read:

... (I)f the crime rate for rape, robbery, all burglaries (including burglary from auto), and auto theft are reduced by 3% for the period from July 1, 1973 to February 1, 1974, as compared to the same crimes for the

period July 1, 1972 through June 30, 1973, an additional

salary increase of 1% shall be granted effective March 1, 1974. Or, if the same crimes are reduced by 6% as

compared to the base period, an additional salary increase of 2% shall be granted effective March 1, 1974. If the

population increases in increments which exceed 1500

persons, these same comparisons shall be made and the

percent reduction of crimes shall be computed on the number of these crimes per 1000 population. State

Department of Finance population estimates shall be used for the computation of these population figures.

And, if the crime rate has been reduced 8% for a

period of 20 consecutive months beginning July 1, 1973 as compared to the base period of July 1, 1972 through June 30, 1973, salaries shall be increased 1% on March 1, 1975. If the crime rate has been reduced 10%, salaries shall be increased 2%. If the crime rate has been reduced 12%, salaries shall be increased 3% on March 1, 1975. If the population increases in increments which exceed 1500 persons these same comparisons shall be made and the

percent reduction of crimes shall be computed on the basis of the number of crimes per 1000 population.

Monitoring-Radio call slips, regardless of the source, which indicate that a police report is necessary, shall be

given to the Watch Commander on duty, who shall place a

copy of the call slip in a folder kept in the Watch Commander's office.

At the end of each watch, these call slips shall be

compared to the reports submitted by the officers by the

on-duty Watch Commander, who shall reconcile any differences.

Once every two weeks, a member of the City Man-

ager's staff shall review the disposition of the call slips with the Administrative Captain as to accuracy and

disposition. Each month, the number of cases which prove to be unfounded through investigation shall be subtracted from the total. This will be done according to the Manual on Uniform Crime Reporting, and shall coincide with the same statistical data submitted to the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics.

The Monthly Crime and Clearance Report indicates each month the number of offenses reported unfounded, and the number of actual offenses. Each month, these reports and the statistical data relating to the four repressible crimes shall be reviewed by the Chief of Police for accuracy.

Initially affected by the agreement were 113 sworn and 23 nonsworn police personnel through the rank of lieutenant.7 (Although the bargaining unit covered by the agreement does not include sergeants or lieutenants, these groups were in- cluded in the incentive plan by the city).

Experience Under the Agreement

On March 1, 1974, police in Orange earned a two per cent salary increase, which was the maximum possible in the first phase of the plan. Receiving the increase were 139 sworn and nonsworn personnel. Computation of the increase was based on a comparison of the number of reported crimes per thousand population from the period July 1, 1972, to February 1, 1973, with data on

reported crimes from July 1, 1973, to February 1, 1974. (The original agreement provides that the

comparison period be July 1, 1972, to June 30, 1973, but the parties changed the comparison period to from July 1, 1972, to February 1, 1973.) In the first period there were 13.0364

reported crimes per thousand people, while in the second period the rate droped to 10.739 per thousand. Based on these figures the decrease in

reported crime was 17.62 per cent, well over the 6

per cent decrease required for the maximum salary hike. Interestingly, the reported incidence of

robbery and auto theft actually went up, while

rape and burglaries were down. Particularly influ- ential was the decrease in burglaries, which account for about 80 per cent of the activity in the four categories, and which more than offset increases in reports of other crimes measured.

The average salary increase for employees covered by the agreement was approximately $21 per month. An informal understanding between the

city and police association provides for a 15 per cent differential between certain job classifications. For example, a sergeant is paid 15 per cent more than a master patrolman, and a lieutenant is


520



POLICE PRODUCTIVITY

paid 15 per cent more than a sergeant. Since master patrolmen receive the two per cent salary increase due to their inclusion in the bargaining unit, sergeants' and lieutenants' wages were adjusted upward to maintain the differential. Salaries of captain and above, which are classifications involved in monitoring the incentive plan, were not affected.

Following the initial pay increase under the plan, the incidence of reported crimes continued down, but not by as much as during the first phase. On March 1, 1975, the plan ended with covered employees earning a three per cent pay increase, the maximum possible, for reducing the crime rate by 12.56 per cent over the plan's 20-month duration. This was barely over the 12 per cent decrease necessary to receive the maximum. As in the first phase, robbery and auto theft rose while rape and burglary dropped.

Appraisal of Results

To what can the apparent success in reducing numbers of reported target crimes in Orange be attributed? The plan's monetary incentive has had some affect in motivating police to be more effective. There appears to be a "Hawthorne effect" in existence, and employee morale is high. Credit also seems due to the department's Crime Prevention Bureau set up in 1973 in conjunction with the incentive plan. If a crime pattern begins to form, the bureau will inform those potentially involved of how to deal with the hazard. For example, if there is a burglary pattern at construc- tion sites, the bureau will send a letter to building contractors making suggestions for minimizing losses. Victims of home burglaries are informed of how to prevent them in the future. Also, literature is sent to people in the community asking them to close their garage doors and keep cars locked. Officer teams of three are sent out to give talks to local groups on residential burglary, consumer fraud, self-defense for women, and gun safety. The idea is to get people thinking about preventing crime and to establish a closer and more person- alized relationship between police and the community through better communication. Not only does rapport between the police and citizenry appear to have improved, but police are talking to each other more. Because nearly everyone in the department benefits from a decrease in reported crime, they tend to cooperate more to get results. Between shifts, personnel who specialize in investi-

gation of various types of crimes can be found in group discussions.

In addition to the bureau, a Special Enforce- ment Team was also established in conjunction with the incentive agreement. It consists of a sergeant and four patrol officers, and is designed to promote coordination in crime reduction efforts. The teams have been particularly successful in undercover work.

A critical examination of the incentive plan and experience under it shows that there has been an increase in the number of sworn police personnel during the agreement. From the start of the plan to November 1974, sworn personnel went from 113 to 118, and remained at the higher level when the plan ended. The reduction in reported crimes may therefore be in part due to the increase in staff.

Another consideration is that reported crimes do not constitute the total number of crimes committed, since crimes go unreported because of a citizen's lack of confidence in the ability of the police department to solve the crime, alienation from police, or fear of being drawn into the net of an investigation. One way to find out about unreported crimes is to make a household survey to ask persons whether crimes committed against them were not reported. It could be that a higher or lower percentage of total crimes are being reported in Orange since introduction of the incentive plan. No information on unreported crimes was available, however. Nor were data tabulated on qualitative aspects of the incentive plan, such as citizen complaints or feelings of citizen security. The plan does not link reported crimes and their resolution by police to the broader system of criminal justice. Taking account of quality and other factors would provide greater accuracy and equitability. However, greater complexity occurs when additional variables have to be factored in, and there is the advantage to simplic- ity, especially in a pioneering program, of engen- dering understanding by employees, administra- tors, and the public.

The watch commander plays a key role in monitoring the plan. Radio call slips indicating that a police report is necessary are given to him. At the end of the shift the watch commander on duty is to compare the slips with reports submitted by the officers. It is then the responsibility of the on-duty watch commander to reconcile any differences between slips and reports. A conflict of interest arises, because the watch commanders are


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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

covered by the incentive plan in that all personnel up through lieutenant get the same percentage pay adjustment whether in or out of the bargaining unit. While the watch commander's conflict of interest is probably more potential than real, it raises some doubt over the authenticity of the monitoring process.

It should be noted that the incidence of Part 1 crimes in Orange, other than the four target crimes, showed a substantial increase in numbers of reported occurrences during the first phase of the incentive plan. While homicide dropped, aggravated assault and larceny were up. Larceny is by far the largest single type of crime committed in Orange. Particularly due to the rise in larceny, the result of the comparison in the totals of reported Part 1 crimes of all types for the time period is that reported crimes have actually risen somewhat. However, because larceny is essentially a nonrepressible crime, and the rate of increase in reported larceny in nearby jurisdictions exceeded that in Orange during the period in question, the overall Part 1 figures can be discounted in terms of evaluating the results of the incentive plan.

Concluding Remarks

Experience with the police performance incentive plan in Orange indicates success in reducing the reported total of four target crimes. The results, however, are moderated by noting that although the total reported crime rate went down, individual rates for robbery and auto theft increased. Noteworthy too is that the crime figures are only for those crimes reported to the police, not for crimes which actually occurred. The potential weakness in the monitoring process points up the need for an external auditing of crime data to insure that conflicts of interest do not lead to spurious results.

Despite shortcomings, the Orange plan is an innovative experiment which will hopefully stimu- late similar schemes in other cities. Future efforts should seek to refine and improve the model. There is no single best way to attempt to increase police productivity through a group incentive plan. Police departments differ from one another, as

service emphasis, local environment, and the role a department seeks to play make what might work in one city an unwise choice in another. Dealing with an employee organization adds a further dimension, which may make it desirable to implement the creation of the plan through productivity bargaining, as in Orange. Perhaps a common denominator to such plans is that to implement them effectively will largely depend on successful community relations. There will likely have to be more emphasis on crime prevention. The results in Orange indicate that people, through the way they cooperate with the police, play a large role in determining the level of effectiveness of public safety in the community.

Notes

1. Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services, Report of the Advisory Group on Productiv- ity in Law Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Productivity, 1973), p. 1.

2. The Challenge of Productivity Diversity: Improving Local Government Productivity Measurement and Evaluation, Part 1-Overall Summary and Conclu- sions, June 1972. Prepared for the National Commis- sion on Productivity by the Urban Institute and the International City Management Association (Washing- ton, D.C.: General Services Administration, 1973), p. 23.

3. Wall Street Journal, October 2, 1973, p. 1; Business Week, No. 2312, January 4, 1974, p. 37; Newsweek, Vol. 83, No. 13, April 1, 1974, p. 69; and Time, Vol. 104, No. 12, September 16, 1974, p. 86.

4. Second Annual Report of the National Commission on Productivity, March 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 48.

5. See Robert C. Lind and John P. Lipsky, "The Measurement of Police Output: Conceptual Issues and Alternative Approaches," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Autumn 1971), p. 569.

6. Negotiation of this type is known as "productivity bargaining," a "... process which seeks to treat production as a central collective bargaining consideration and explicitly recognizes the trade off between measures to improve labor productivity and the sharing of resulting benefits," First Annual Report of the National Commission on Productivity, March 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 9.

7. Nonsworn personnel include job categories of record clerk, secretary, police clerk, dispatcher, and clerk stenographer.


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Documents

An Experiment in Increasing Productivity of Police Service Employees