Alternative Submarines

8/9/2019 Alternative Submarines

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ALTERNATIVESUBMARINESMINITRUDERSANDGREENNUKESbv Richard Compton-Hall

At a time when Canada s consideringhow to renew and perhapsexpand heisubmarine force it might be helpful torecallsome oddities about submarineprocurementand design.The Need for SubmarinesThere are more than 1,000 ubmarinesamongst 41 navies today; and severalmore naviesare showins underwater n-clinations.Yet emarkably ew countries,outside the maior powers, have ever stat-ed categorically why they want subma-rines in the first place or why they haveselecteda paiticular type.Thosequestionsare,self-evidently,im-portant but the aim is by no means alwal'sclear; and the lack of darity should not bedue to seqecy alone becausea 'fleet in be-ing' (which is what many submanneservicescompdse) must parade ts wares.It rnight alsobe askedwhether those na-vies which are updating thef underwaterwarfare capabilitt or about to make astart, really appreciate the inescapablefacts of underwater life.Submarines are notoriou sly high-priced; and the hidden costs of shore-support, communications, manpower,training and salety vastly outweigh thecapital cost of the submarines themselves- although the huge through-life ex-pense is not, as a rule, explained by per-suasivesalesmen. Canadat rejection of anuclear fleet, alter a good deal of nuga-tory effort erqloring possibilitiet suggeststhat the ultimate outlay was not recog-nised early. ndeed, for one reasonandanothel, it was probably concealed.Thenthere is the matter of effectiveness: ttakes, from experience, about ten ortwelv years foi a new submarine arm to

become eally efficient; and it has oftentaken almostas long for a new weaponsystem to work properly.On the other hand, even submarines ofquestionable effectiveness n a given sit-uation can be a considerable uisance oa powerfulsurface leet: thev hinder thelattels offensive operations and, paradox-icall, they weaken air and surfacedefencesby the need to devote resourcesto anti-submarine warfare (ASW), Thedilficulties confronting the British ThskForce Commander in the South Atlanticin 1982were evidence of that.Moreover, he mere suspectedpresenceof submarines is a oowerful detenent.That, toq was plah-in 1982when, after

the sinking of the unJortunate cruiserGeneral Belgtanq the Argentinian fleetdeclined to put to sea n face of the RoyalNaw's nuclear-powered attack subma-dne; (SSNS).Deterence is a word thathas come to be associated niquely, inmost minds, with nudear ballistic-missilemonsters (SSBNS)and the value of brdinar:y' submarines in the deterrent rcle isnot cited as it should be. Nor is the factthat a submarine can undertake tasks, n-cluding intelligence-gatherin& in plotect-ed areaswhere surface and air units can-not operate without blatant provocationin peaceor undue danger in war. And, ofcourse, a suDmanne ln sucn areas canconvert from peace to war instantly if

Colmdder Richard Cohpton-H.tl, RN rst'd, ir Dtrc.toroi The Royal Navy Subnaine Museun in Codord,Endand He b the authot of numeb$ afti.les and booksTl-e Marha||a'3cslg'awairingflals n 1988.

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requhed.In short, submarines are valuable assetsfor most navies, ut thequestion emainswhether all nayies undirstand and ex-ploit the value fully or acquire the t,?e ortvpes best suited to their individualneeds. It is trorses for cowses in the sub-'seaworld: what suits one naly may wellnot suit or be affordable bv another, andit is demonstrably expensive to keep upwith the Jones's or the sake of prestigealone. We could wonder, for example,how Brazil can be contemplating SSNS nthe present state of her economy. By con-trast, doubb might equaly be voicedabout Australia's forthcoming improved,but still somewhat pedestrian, dieselboats 55Ks) which can hardly be).pect-ed to deploy rapidly enough to meet animminent threat over such a vast exDanseof ocean. Australia could easily justifySSNs, but politics forbid at present.Supposing that submarines are duly

conshaints n the weaponrywhich is, af-ter all, the pu{pose in war of a subma-dne's existence. t would have made bet-ter sense o decide at the outset what thetasks and targetswere likely to be at somequite distant futue time; what weaponsystemswere best to deal with them; andonly then determine the most suitableplatform to carry the systems. This iswhere a break ftom tradition would beadvantageous. Of course, from a subma-dne protagonist's point of view the snagin that line of thinkine is that the bestDlatform mav not be a;ubmarine at all.but when somuch money s at stake t iswell to be non-partisan.

aim - maybe with other taskson the side- becauseotherwise not so much em-phasis would be laid on the Arctic whereonlv submarines can operate. It followsthai Canada needs an-effectiveunder-water suweillance system in peace, andan ASW attack caDabilitu in war.m tnat u8nt, notrng nat suDmannes lrepotentiallygood anti-submarine njts (al-beit without meaningful wartime ex-Derience of hunter and hunted both sub-herged); observing that submarines areuniquely capable of manoeuwing freelybeneath the ice-bound Arctic (given thatthey are air-independent)i and seeingthat Canada has to euard two other

Typcal L4aritaliamini-SSKesign

selectedwith logic and by objective plan-ning, there is still a pitfall that could beavoided bv a navv which is not tied inex-tricablv to tradition in the Drocurementprocess. t has been a strarigebut con-mon practice in the past to give prece-dence to vehicles over aimament. Near-ly always (with the exception of strategics].stems ike Polaris) the ffust considera-tion has been speed linked with endur-ance, and propulsion has been devisedfor that. Nrd, the hull has been designedto accommodatemachineryand fuel in ashape more or less suited to the speedand diving depth, with space for thecrew. And finally, almost as an aJter-thought sometimes, weapons havebeencho-seno fit the farf accompfi at the sharpenq.Naval architects and planning staffswould probably say that the customaryapproach has been unavoidable. But,n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e b a c k - t o - f r on tphilosophy has imposed swere physical

Page 8 Canadian elence uarterly

Canadds Submarine RequirementsIt is not for an outsidet albeit a staunchsupporter and admirer of the CanadianArmed Forces, to enquire why Canadawants to uDdate her submarine service.It is enough to know that it needs updat-ing to continue in businest and it mustbe assumed that its objective is crystaldear although that is not immediately ap-Darent from a distance. The wordsovereigntycrops up time and again n ar-ticles and speeches by distinguishedpatriott but strategy seldom features inpublic protestations.However, it looks as though Canada'stwo basic concerns are accepted.Theywere quoted bv Rear-Mmiral Drvis in hiscompiehensive article "Le Mieux estl'Enaemi du Bien" in ihe Autum 1988 s-sue of Canadian Defence Quarterly.. plotection of Canada'ssovereignty andseculity, currently with a special empha-sis on the Arctic: and,. contributing (of necessity) to thedefence of our Nor th Amer icanneighbours.It appears, therefore, that ASW is the

oceans where submarines should beequally effective, a pretty good case canb e m a d e f o r m o d e r n i s a t i o n a n dexPemsron.Suweillance rright be related not onlyto Dotential enemv submarines but tofrieirdly SSNs as w6U, partly to rcmark onany infiirgement of national waters andpartly to persuade a powerful neighbourto share in the intelligence hopefullygaired during under-iceoperations,It mav be cheaper to morutor a seaareacontinuously with static devices- someform of SOSUS- than it is with subma-rines: that is an option which deserves obe looked at very carefully, not least be-cause it is dilficult for submarines on

Starting o assemble toroidalhull.


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pahol under the ice to communicatequickly with a shore headquaitrs. For-tunately, hough, messages an be sentfrom shore to a submergedsubmarine,whether under the ice or not, with a highenough probability of speedyreceptionnowadays:so submarines can be, to someextent, vectored ftom shore on the basrsof SOSUS-twe information.Like as noi, acombination of fixed andmobile (i.e. submarine) surveillarce-cum-guard posts will be most appropriate tothe requirements.Submarine Weapon RequirementsNow to attack. It is uneconomical tocarry a mix of weapons, and missilescannot be fired through ice. So, for Canada,it would seem that smart dual-purposetorDedoes, which can be fired at subma-rin6s or against surface aets in the openocean, are preferable to partial-flightweapons like the US Navy's Sea lance.Given that tomedoes cou.ldbe marked-ly more effective and explode with a big-ger bang iI their size and shape were notinhibited by tladitional vehicle-designand launching tubes, it is not stretchingthe imagination too far to suggest that asingle kind of new and wholly under-water weapon could deal with all proba-ble, if not all possible, future targets.?How manv such torpedoesshould becarried in iny one iubmarine? Two,perhaps four, might well be enough. Sur-face tartets will not be numerous (andthere are, anyway, other non-submannew a y s o f a t t a c k i n g t h e m ) , w h i l esubmarine-versus submarine engage-

ments will predictablv be rare: it is hardenough to -bring about interactions rnpeacetime exercises where, admittedly,relatively few players are involved - butthe numbers gamewil be discussed ater.Good classificationequipment shouldhelp to obviate the possibility of firingweapons at false 'non-suU targets; andbeneath the ice a solid contact can benothing but a submarine anyway.Arguably, then, Canada's futurehunter-killer submarines need not belarge for the sake of weaponry alone.A Flock of Liftle Submarines?Putting all this together, it appears hatCanada might consider a single under-water weaDon svstem which is not con-strainedby torpedo-tube imitations(i.e.hull design), a generous number o1ar-independent small submarines for sur-veillance and attack n three oceans,alongwith a static surveillancesystem n select-eq ,ueas.If these assumptionsand conclusionsare not agreed they may at least lead todebate; and some vigorous debatingnever does any harm. There is a respec-table school of thought, initiated by Ben-jamin Franklin two centuries agq whichbelieves hat argument and disagreementis a good deal more productive than go-ing along with a dutiful line for the sakeof peaceand quiet.But we have o start somewhere:so etus say- for the sake of argument - thatthese proposals are not urreasonable forCanada's ubmergeddefences.

There is, in fact, much to be said for

making submadnes smaller and havingplentv of thm. With submarinesbecom-ing v6ry quiet on all sides, passivesonar- low-frequency listening equipment -can no longer expect to enioy the longranges ormerlygainedon older andnois-ier enemy boats.The implications are sig-nificant. Active sonarwill increasingly benecessitated for search and location, atwhich point the enemy will probablyrespond in kind. Thereby not only willstealth - which submadners have beenat much pains to acquire - be sacrificed,but big will no longer be beautiful (if iteverwas) becausedetectabilitv is relatedto size.Nevertheless, as a rule, active de-tection and counter-detection ranges willbe comparativelyshort; and, therefore,whether active or passive sonar is em-ployed, more hunter-killers will be re-ouired to cover the area of concern.Until recently a submarine has had tobe big in order to go fast and far But iI theprinciple of substituting a flock of littlesubmarines or a few large ones s accept-ed, together with a reduction of individu-al weapon oads, he picture chantes inlight of new technology.Admiral Davis, with the disDassionatelogic which might be expected from aformer Commandant of the NationalDefence College, spelled out the alterna-tives to nudear power with particular em-phasis on air-independent propulsion(AIP).He listed (for AIP) fuel ce[s, the 9thlintengine and the very interesting Autono-mous Marine Power Source (AMPS) in-volving a small safe reactor in a systemdesignedby the ECSCroup in Ottawa. Are-rcad of his article wil remind readersof these hree concepts,all of which im-ply hybrid propulsion depending uponimprored but probably conventional elec-tric batteries or burst tacticalsDeedHistory strongly su8geststhit, unlessone system has very marked advantagesover another, t is wise to put the simplestat the toD of the list. On balance, t wouldappeai that AMPS, with its low-temperature, ow-pressureand inherendysafe nuclear reactor, has been so simpli-fied that it could legitimatelyqua.lify-forpriority considerationamongst he AIPs),'stemsso far mentioned. AMPS is, ofcourse,a Canadianproiect and that is onegood reason for Canada pursuing whatthe ECS Group call an SSn.And the con-cept is apphcable to both military andcommercial work - although environ-mentalists may not be too happy aboutthe nudear corurotation despite the small'n'. AMPS can be plugged in to an exist-ine but extended diesel-electric subma-rine (9SK), and can provide power up toockpitof'3GST9'just beforecompletiont he kansparentnosecone is not yet fifted.

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1700 we net for SSKs of about 2000 ontor 125 kwe net for smaller boats of 1000tons or less. If a customerordered thesmaller version (AMPS 100)now it wouldbe instaled by 199t while the larger plant(AMPS 1000)would be at sea n 199. Acustom-built SSK, designed aroundAMP$ would presumably not take muchlonger to produce.Another Air-Independent ContenderHowevet there is another strong andpromising contender from Italy in the AIPfield which has not yet attracted much at-tention. This is Maritalia's revolutionaiyGST principle. CST stands or Gaseou!oxygen Stored in a foroidal hull made upoI a concentric series of circular pipesreniniscent of a Michelin man lying onhis side.To sta at the beghnin& in the eady190s, the Italian engineer Giunio Santi(now Deputy Chairman of Maitalia) pro-posed an integrated hull and propulsionsvstem hat bids fair - with certain Drovi-sbs - to overcome Canada'i AIPproblems and a good many others aswell.Santi reckond that a toroidal subma-fine hull, built of hollow pipes nsteadofsteel plates, could hold oxygen pres-surised to 350 bar as the prime energysource or a closed-circuit ieselengine.If the exhaust gaseswere also stored, af-ter launderint', there would be no reveal-ing wake for ASW units to detectand fol-low. Diesel oil storaqe would not be aproblem because thtfuel could be keptin tan ls o f any shape whereverconvement.More than one bonus was to come #-ter extensive tlials. A test toroidal hullproved five times stronger, when pres-surised to destruction, than plated steelof equivalent weight. And builaing theideal 'Albacord shape, by successivelyreducing the diameter of the hoops fromthe fattest point and then welding themtogether, was quicker and easier thanbending thick steel plate in two planes.An exceptional amount of space wasmade availableby storing prime energy mthe hull itself; airbome noise was rcduced

by 80per cent by virtue of storing exhaustgasesnstead of ejectin8 them to sea; andthe toroids themselves were exDected omuffle engine noise radiated oi.rtwards.A firm believer in midget submarines,Santi set out to build three expedmentalcraft. These were successful and he thenproduced a fully operational fi$t-of-dass'minitrudel: this was on displav at theltalian Naval Exhibition at Geioa in May1989 when it became apparent that theUnited States Navy, with Hone'.well

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AMPS eactor esselssemblednslde sub-maflneestsection.asthe American contractor, was sedous-ly contemplating the purchase of four orsix copiesof what is known, ratherunin-spiringly,as

3CST9'.Americanuseagesbelieved to be for SEAL units in the fustlnstance.

The Maritalia '3GST9'It is worth looking at the tiny 29-toncralt before going on to the prospect ofscaled-upGST designs.The designation3GSTY means that the outside diameterof eachpipe or toroid is 3 inches(pipesstill being measured in imperial units),and its leneth is in the nine mehe brack-et - 9.65 etres to be exact. Ground orlimpet mines are he primary weapons fora mini-sub that is intended, like wartirneBritish X-craft and so-called ltalian andBritish human torDedoes, to strike theenemy at source. Ground mines are lo-wered through a kind of moonpool amid-ships and, by using a vibrating device,they are buried if the seabed is softenough. Limpet mines are carried byfrogmen and attached to a taet hull bysuction pads and explosive-hammerednails: the fixing is scarcely audible.Alternativelv, '3GST9' can catrv twolightweight torpedoes o


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should, give or take, be capable of:. 30 knots - burst sDeed. 28 knots - 1,700 .miles. 9 knots - 18,000n. miles. 5 knots - ,10,000 .milesDoubling the size to 2,800 tons offe$ atheoretical:. 30 knots plus - 3000 n.rniles. 25 knots - 3,900n.miles. 23 knots - 4,600n.miles. 9 knots - ?,000 n.miles. 5 knots - 50,000n.milesBesides here beins no need for a snor-kel in a GST submaiine, the batterv canbe modest - only being needed for ultra-quiet operations or 'just in case'. Thepropulsion system is simplej trainingpresents no problems; and there is nospecial nfrastructure rcquircd other thana n o x y g e n - p r o d u c in g p l a n t a n dcompressoLThe 'Green Nukes' instancedabovehave not yet left the computer, but fair

proof of feasibility is instanced by themidget'3GSTy. n btween hesedesignsat the top and bottom of the scale areminiature GSTSSKs n the 130 o 150-tonbracket, primarily but not exclusively forinshorework. A couple of thesemay beunder construction for the Italian Naw,but they are kept urder tight wraps.These very small boats, varying inlength from 23 to 27 metres, pack apunch, and the hull can be built aroundany desired weapon system.The 150-tonversion costsabout $24mil-lion, plus $4.2million for PlessevFIYDRASonarand a further sum for weaponry. Itwill have a burst sDeedof 25 knols, a sus-tained speedof i6 knots and a deploy-ment range, fully submerged,of 2,000n.miles at 8 knots. Thut with a tacticalperformance not so verv far removedhom nuclear power, a doien or more lit-tle CST SSKscan be afforded for the priceof one SSN.3There is excellentaci

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Alternative Submarines