Albert Bandura - Self-Efficacy - Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change 1977

Psychological Review1977, Vol. 84, No. 2, 191-215

Self-efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change

Albert BanduraStanford University

The present article presents an integrative theoretical framework to explainand to predict psychological changes achieved by different modes of treatment.This theory states that psychological procedures, whatever their form, alter thelevel and strength of self-efficacy. It is hypothesized that expectations of per-sonal efficacy determine whether coping behavior will be initiated, how mucheffort will be expended, and how long it will be sustained in the face of ob-stacles and aversive experiences. Persistence in activities that are subjectivelythreatening but in fact relatively safe produces, through experiences of mastery,further enhancement of self-efficacy and corresponding reductions in defensivebehavior. In the proposed model, expectations of personal efficacy are derivedfrom four principal sources of information: performance accomplishments,vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states. The more de-pendable the experiential sources, the greater are the changes in perceived self-efficacy. A number of factors are identified as influencing the cognitive processingof efficacy information arising from enactive, vicarious, exhortative, and emotivesources. The differential power of diverse therapeutic procedures is analyzed interms of the postulated cognitive mechanism of operation. Findings are reportedfrom microanalyses of enactive, vicarious, and emotive modes of treatment thatsupport the hypothesized relationship between perceived self-efficacy and be-havioral changes. Possible directions for further research are discussed.

Current developments in the field of be-havioral change reflect two major divergenttrends. The difference is especially evident inthe treatment of dysfunctional inhibitionsand defensive behavior. On the one hand, themechanisms by which human behavior isacquired and regulated are increasingly for-mulated in terms of cognitive processes. Onthe other hand, it is performance-based pro-cedures that are proving to be most powerfulfor effecting psychological changes. As a con-sequence, successful performance is replacingsymbolically based experiences as the prin-ciple vehicle of change.

The present article presents the view thatchanges achieved by different methods derivefrom a common cognitive mechanism. The

The research by the author reported in this articlewas supported by Research Grant M-5162 from theNational Institutes of Health, United States PublicHealth Service.

Requests for reprints should be sent to AlbertBandura, Department of Psychology, Stanford Uni-versity, Stanford, California 94305.

apparent divergence of theory and practicecan be reconciled by postulating that cogni-tive processes mediate change but that cog-nitive events are induced and altered mostreadily by experience of mastery arising fromeffective performance. The distinction be-tween process and means is underscored, be-cause it is often assumed that a cognitivemode of operation requires a symbolic meansof induction. Psychological changes can beproduced through other means than per-formance accomplishments. Therefore, theexplanatory mechanism developed in thisarticle is designed to account for changes inbehavior resulting from diverse modes oftreatment.

Cognitive Locus of Operation

Psychological treatments based on learningprinciples were originally conceptualized tooperate through peripheral mechanisms. Newbehavior was presumably shaped automat-ically by its effects. Contingency learningthrough paired stimulation was construed in

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192 ALBERT BANDURA

connectionist terms as a process in which re-sponses were linked directly to stimuli. Al-tering the rate of preexisting behavior by re-inforcement was portrayed as a processwherein responses were regulated by theirimmediate consequences without requiringany conscious involvement of the responders.

Growing evidence from several lines of re-search altered theoretical perspectives on howbehavior is acquired and regulated. Theo-retical formulations emphasizing peripheralmechanisms began to give way to cognitivelyoriented theories that explained behavior interms of central processing of direct, vicari-ous, and symbolic sources of information.Detailed analysis of the empirical and con-ceptual issues (see Bandura, 1977) fallsbeyond the scope of the present article. Tosummarize briefly, however, it has now beenamply documented that cognitive processesplay a prominent role in the acquisition andretention of new behavior patterns. Transitoryexperiences leave lasting effects by beingcoded and retained in symbols for memoryrepresentation. Because acquisition of re-sponse information is a major aspect of learn-ing, much human behavior is developedthrough modeling. From observing others, oneforms a conception of how new behavior pat-terns are performed, and on later occasionsthe symbolic construction serves as a guidefor action (Bandura, 1971). The initial ap-proximations of response patterns learnedobservationally are further refined throughself-corrective adjustments based on informa-tive feedback from performance.

Learning from response consequences isalso conceived of largely as a cognitiveprocess. Consequences serve as an unarticu-lated way of informing performers what theymust do to gain beneficial outcomes and toavoid punishing ones. By observing the dif-ferential effects of their own actions, in-dividuals discern which responses are ap-propriate in which settings and behave ac-cordingly (Dulany, 1968). Viewed from thecognitive framework, learning from differ-ential outcomes becomes a special case ofobservational learning. In this mode of con-veying response information, the conceptionof the appropriate behavior is gradually con-

structed from observing the effects of one'sactions rather than from the examples pro-vided by others.

Changes in behavior produced by stimulithat either signify events to come or indicateprobable response consequences also havebeen shown to rely heavily on cognitive rep-resentations of contingencies. People are notmuch affected by paired stimulation unlessthey recognize that the events are correlated(Dawson & Furedy, 1976; Grings, 1973).Stimuli influence the likelihood of a be-havior's being performed by virtue of theirpredictive function, not because the stimuliare automatically connected to responses bytheir having occurred together. Reinterpreta-tion of antecedent determinants as predictivecues, rather than as controlling stimuli, hasshifted the locus of the regulation of be-havior from the stimulus to the individual.

The issue of the locus at which behavioraldeterminants operate applies to reinforce-ment influences as well as to antecedent en-vironmental stimuli. Contrary to the commonview that behavior is controlled by its im-mediate consequences, behavior is related toits outcomes at the level of aggregate con-sequences rather than momentary effects(Baum, 1973). People process and synthesizefeedback information from sequences ofevents over long intervals about the situa-tional circumstances and the patterns andrates of actions that are necessary to producegiven outcomes. Since consequences affect be-havior through the influence of thought, be-liefs about schedules of reinforcement canexert greater influence on behavior than thereinforcement itself (Baron, Kaufman, &Stauber, 1969; Kaufman, Baron, & Kopp,1966). Incidence of behavior that has beenpositively reinforced does not increase if in-dividuals believe, based on other information,that the same actions will not be rewardedon future occasions (Estes, 1972); and thesame consequences can increase, reduce, orhave no effect on incidence of behavior de-pending on whether individuals are led tobelieve that the consequences signify correctresponses, incorrect responses, or occur non-contingently (Dulany, 1968).

The discussion thus far has examined the

SELF-EFFICACY THEORY 193

role of cognition in the acquisition andregulation of behavior. Motivation, which isprimarily concerned with activation and per-sistence of behavior, is also partly rooted incognitive activities. The capacity to repre-sent future consequences in thought providesone cognitively based source of motivation.Through cognitive representation of future out-comes individuals can generate current mo-tivators of behavior. Seen from this per-spective, reinforcement operations affect be-havior largely by creating expectations thatbehaving in a certain way will produce antici-pated benefits or avert future difficulties(Bolles, 1972b). In the enhancement ofpreviously learned behavior, reinforcement isconceived of mainly as a motivational de-vice rather than as an automatic responsestrengthener.

A second cognitively based source of mo-tivation operates through the intervening in-fluences of goal setting and self-evaluativereactions (Bandura, 1976b, 1977). Self-motivation involves standards against whichto evaluate performance. By making self-rewarding reactions conditional on attaining acertain level of behavior, individuals createself-inducements to persist in their effortsuntil their performances match self-prescribedstandards. Perceived negative discrepanciesbetween performance and standards createdissatisfactions that motivate correctivechanges in behavior. Both the anticipatedsatisfactions of desired accomplishments andthe negative appraisals of insufficient per-formance thus provide incentives for action.Having accomplished a given level of per-formance, individuals often are no longersatisfied with it and make further self-rewardcontingent on higher attainments.

The reconceptualization of human learn-ing and motivation in terms of cognitiveprocesses has major implications for themechanisms through which therapeutic pro-cedures alter behavioral functioning. Al-though the advances in cognitive psychologyare a subject of increasing interest in specu-lations about behavioral change processes,few new theories of psychotherapy have beenproposed that might prove useful in stimu-lating research on explanatory mechanisms

PERSON -#• BEHAVIOR

II

r EFFICACY ~1I EXPECTATIONS I

I OUTCOME II EXPECTATIONS'

-»• OUTCOME

Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of the differ-ence between efficacy expectations and outcome ex-pectations.

and in integrating the results accompanyingdiverse modes of treatment. The presentarticle outlines a theoretical framework, inwhich the concept of self-efficacy is assigneda central role, for analyzing changes achievedin fearful and avoidant behavior. The ex-planatory value of this conceptual systemis then evaluated by its ability to predictbehavioral changes produced through dif-ferent methods of treatment.

Efficacy Expectations as a Mechanism ofOperation

The present theory is based on the prin-cipal asssumption that psychological pro-cedures, whatever their form, serve as meansof creating and strengthening expectationsof personal efficacy. Within this analysis,efficacy expectations are distinguished fromresponse-outcome expectancies. The differ-ence is presented schematically in Figure 1.

An outcome expectancy is defined as aperson's estimate that a given behavior willlead to certain outcomes. An efficacy ex-pectation is the conviction that one cansuccessfully execute the behavior required toproduce the outcomes. Outcome and efficacyexpectations are differentiated, because in-dividuals can believe that a particular courseof action will produce certain outcomes, butif they entertain serious doubts about whetherthey can perform the necessary activitiessuch information does not influence theirbehavior.

In this conceptual system, expectations ofpersonal mastery affect both initiation andpersistence of coping behavior. The strengthof people's convictions in their own effective-ness is likely to affect whether they will eventry to cope with given situations. At thisinitial level, perceived self-efficacy influences

194 ALBERT BANDURA

choice of behavioral settings. People fear andtend to avoid threatening situations theybelieve exceed their coping skills, whereasthey get involved in activities and behaveassuredly when they judge themselves cap-able of handling situations that would other-wise be intimidating.

Not only can perceived self-efficacy havedirective influence on choice of activitiesand settings, but, through expectations ofeventual success, it can affect coping effortsonce they are initiated. Efficacy expectationsdetermine how much effort people will ex-pend and how long they will persist in theface of obstacles and aversive experiences.The stronger the perceived self-efficacy, themore active the efforts. Those who persist insubjectively threatening activities that arein fact relatively safe will gain correctiveexperiences that reinforce their sense ofefficacy, thereby eventually eliminating theirdefensive behavior. Those who cease their cop-ing efforts prematurely will retain their self-debilitating expectations and fears for a longtime.

The preceding analysis of how perceivedself-efficacy influences performance is notmeant to imply that expectation is the soledeterminant of behavior. Expectation alonewill not produce desired performance if thecomponent capabilities are lacking. Moreover,there are many things that people can dowith certainty of success that they do notperform because they have no incentivesto do so. Given appropriate skills and ade-quate incentives, however, efficacy expecta-tions are a major determinant of people'schoice of activities, how much effort they willexpend, and of how long they will sustaineffort in dealing with stressful situations.

Dimensions of Efficacy Expectations

Empirical tests of the relationship betweenexpectancy and performance of threateningactivities have been hampered by inadequacyof the expectancy analysis. In most studiesthe measures of expectations are mainly con-cerned with people's hopes for favorable out-comes rather than with their sense of per-

sonal mastery. Moreover, expectations areusually assessed globally only at a singlepoint in a change process as though theyrepresent a static, unidimensional factor.Participants in experiments of this type aresimply asked to judge how much they expectto benefit from a given procedure. Whenasked to make such estimates, participantsassume, more often than not, that the benefitswill be produced by the external ministra-tions rather than gained through the de-velopment of self-efficacy. Such global mea-sures reflect a mixture of, among other things,hope, wishful thinking, belief in the potencyof the procedures, and faith in the therapist.It therefore comes as no surprise that out-come expectations of this type have littlerelation to magnitude of behavioral change(Davison & Wilson, 1973, Lick & Bootzin,1975).

Efficacy expectations vary on several di-mensions that have important performanceimplications. They differ in magnitude. Thuswhen tasks are ordered in level of difficulty,the efficacy expectations of different individ-uals may be limited to the simpler tasks, ex-tend to moderately difficult ones, or includeeven the most taxing performances. Efficacyexpectations also differ in generality. Someexperiences create circumscribed mastery ex-pectations. Others instill a more generalizedsense of efficacy that extends well beyond thespecific treatment situation. In addition,expectancies vary in strength. Weak expecta-tions are easily extinguishable by discon-firming experiences, whereas individuals whopossess strong expectations of mastery willpersevere in their coping efforts despite dis-confirming experiences.

An adequate expectancy analysis, there-fore, requires detailed assessment of themagnitude, generality, and strength of ef-ficacy expectations commensurate with theprecision with which behavioral processes aremeasured. Both efficacy expectations and per-formance should be assessed at significantjunctures in the change process to clarifytheir reciprocal effects on each other. Masteryexpectations influence performance and are,in turn, altered by the cumulative effects ofone's efforts.


Sources of Efficacy Expectations

In this social learning analysis, expecta-tions of personal efficacy are based on fourmajor sources of information: performanceaccomplishments, vicarious experience, verbalpersuasion, and physiological states. Figure 2presents the diverse influence procedurescommonly used to reduce defensive behaviorand presents the principal source throughwhich each treatment operates to createexpectations of mastery. Any given method,depending on how it is applied, may ofcourse draw to a lesser extent on one or moreother sources of efficacy information. For ex-ample, as we shall see shortly, performance-based treatments not only promote be-havioral accomplishments but also extinguishfear arousal, thus authenticating self-efficacythrough enactive and arousal sources of in-formation. Other methods, however, providefewer ways of acquiring information aboutone's capability for coping with threateningsituations. By postulating a common mecha-nism of operation, this analysis provides aconceptual framework within which to studybehavioral changes achieved by differentmodes of treatment.

Performance accomplishments. This sourceof efficacy information is especially influential

because it is based on personal mastery ex-periences. Successes raise mastery expecta-tions; repeated failures lower them, par-ticularly if the mishaps occur early in thecourse of events. After strong efficacy ex-pectations are developed through repeatedsuccess, the negative impact of occasionalfailures is likely to be reduced. Indeed, oc-casional failures that are later overcome bydetermined effort can strengthen self-moti-vated persistence if one finds through ex-perience that even the most difficult ob-stacles can be mastered by sustained effort.The effects of failure on personal efficacytherefore partly depend on the timing andthe total pattern of experiences in which thefailures occur.

Once established, enhanced self-efficacy tendsto generalize to other situations in whichperformance was self-debilitated by pre-occupation with personal inadequacies (Ban-dura, Adams, & Beyer, in press; Bandura,Jeffery, & Gajdos, 1975). As a result, im-provements in behavioral functioning transfernot only to similar situations but to activitiesthat are substantially different from those onwhich the treatment was focused. Thus, forexample, increased self-efficacy gained throughrapid mastery of a specific animal phobia can

EFFICACY EXPECTATIONS

SOURCE

PERFORMANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS

MODE OF INDUCTION

..PARTICIPANT MODELING- - - PERFORMANCE DESENSITIZAT ION

--PERFORMANCE EXPOSUREx SELF- INSTRUCTED PERFORMANCE

VICARIOUS EXPERIENCE

VERBAL PERSUASION

EMOTIONAL AROUSAL

,,.,-LIVE MODELING----SYMBOLIC MODELING

..SUGGESTION^--EXHORTATION----SELF-INSTRUCTION

"-INTERPRETIVE TREATMENTS

.-ATTRIBUTION— --RELAXATION, BIOFEEDBACK"~ '-SYMBOLIC DESENSITIZATION

"^SYMBOLIC EXPOSURE

Figure 2. Major sources of efficacy information and the principal sources through which differentmodes of treatment operate.

196 ALBERT BANDURA

increase coping efforts in social situationsas well as reduce fears of other animals.However, the generalization effects occurmost predictably to the activities that aremost similar to those in which self-efficacywas restored by treatment (Bandura, Blanch-ard, & Ritter, 1969).

Methods of change that operate on thebasis of performance accomplishments conveyefficacy information in more ways than simplythrough the evidence of performance im-provements. In the course of treatments em-ploying modeling with guided performance,participants acquire a generalizable skill fordealing successfully with stressful situations,a skill that they use to overcome a variety ofdysfunctional fears and inhibitions in their ev-eryday life (Bandura et al., in press; Banduraet al., 1975). Having a serviceable copingskill at one's disposal undoubtedly contributesto one's sense of personal efficacy. Behavioralcapabilities can also be enhanced throughmodeling alone (Bandura, 1971; Flanders,1968). However, participant modeling pro-vides additional opportunities for translatingbehavioral conceptions to appropriate actionsand for making corrective refinements towardthe perfection of skills.

Most of the treatment procedures de-veloped in recent years to eliminate fearfuland defensive behavior have been imple-mented either through performance or bysymbolic procedures. Regardless of themethods involved, results of comparativestudies attest to the superiority of perform-ance-based treatments. In the desensitizationapproach devised by Wolpe (1974), clientsreceive graduated exposure to aversive eventsin conjunction with anxiety reducing ac-tivities, usually in the form of muscularrelaxation. A number of experiments havebeen reported in which relaxation is pairedwith scenes in which phobics visualizethemselves engaging in progressively morethreatening activities or with enactment ofthe same hierarchy of activities with theactual threats. Findings based on differenttypes of phobias consistently reveal thatperformance desensitization produces sub-stantially greater behavioral change than doessymbolic desensitization (LoPicollo, 1970;

Sherman, 1972; Strahley, 1966). Physiolog-ical measures yield similar results. Symbolicdesensitization reduces autonomic responsesto imagined but not to actual threats, whereasperformance desensitization eliminates auto-nomic responses to both imagined and actualthreats (Barlow, Leitenberg, Agras, & Wincze,1969). The substantial benefits of successfulperformance are typically achieved in lesstime than is required to extinguish arousal tosymbolic representations of threats.

More recently, avoidance behavior hasbeen treated by procedures involving massiveexposure to aversive events. In this approach,intense anxiety is elicited by prolonged ex-posure to the most threatening situationsand sustained at high levels, without relief,until emotional reactions are extinguished.Several investigators have compared therelative success of prolonged exposure toaversive situations in imagery and actual en-counters with them in ameliorating chronicagoraphobias. Real encounters with threatsproduce results decidely superior to imaginedexposure, which has weak, variable effects(Emmelkamp & Wessels, 1975; Stern &Marks, 1973; Watson, Mullett, & Pillay,1973). Prolonged encounters that ensure be-havioral improvements are more effectivethan distributed brief encounters that arelikely to end before successful performanceof the activity is achieved (Rabavilas,Boulougouris, & Stefanis, 1976).

The participant modeling approach to theelimination of defensive behavior utilizessuccessful performance as the primary vehicleof psychological change. People displayingintractable fears and inhibitions are notabout to do what they dread. In implement-ing participant modeling, therapists thereforestructure the environment so that clients canperform successfully despite their incapaci-ties. This is achieved by enlisting a variety ofresponse induction aids, including preliminarymodeling of threatening activities, graduatedtasks, enactment over graduated temporalintervals, joint performance with the thera-pist, protective aids to.reduce the likelihoodof feared consequences, and variation in theseverity of the threat itself (Bandura, Jeffery,& Wright, 1974). As treatment progresses,


the supplementary aids are withdrawn sothat clients cope effectively unassisted. Self-directed mastery experiences are then ar-ranged to reinforce a sense of personal ef-ficacy. Through this form of treatment in-capacitated people rapidly lose their fears,they are able to engage in activities theyformerly inhibited, and they display general-ized reductions of fears toward threatsbeyond the specifically treated conditions(Bandura, 1976a).

Participant modeling has been comparedwith various symbolically based treatments.These studies corroborate the superiority ofsuccessful performance facilitated by model-ing as compared to vicarious experience alone(Bandura et al., 1969; Blanchard, 1970b;Lewis, 1974; Ritter, 1969; Roper, Rachman,& Marks, 1975), to symbolic desensitization(Bandura et al., 1969; Litvak, 1969), andto imaginal modeling in which clients visual-ize themselves or others coping successfullywith threats (Thase & Moss, 1976). Whenparticipant modeling is subsequently ad-ministered to those who benefit only par-tially from the symbolic procedures, avoid-ance behavior is thoroughly eliminated withina brief period.

The findings summarized above are con-sistent with self-efficacy theory, but they donot shed much light on the mechanism bywhich specific mastery experiences producegeneralized and enduring changes in behavior.Verification of the operative mechanism re-quires experimental evidence that experiencedmastery does in fact alter the level andstrength of self-efficacy and that self-efficacyis, in turn, linked to behavior. We shall re-turn later to research that addresses itselfspecifically to the linkages between treat-ment procedures, perceived self-efficacy, andbehavior.

Vicarious experience. People do not rely onexperienced mastery as the sole source of in-formation concerning their level of self-efficacy. Many expectations are derived fromvicarious experience. Seeing others performthreatening activities without adverse con-sequences can generate expectations in ob-servers that they too will improve if theyintensify and persist in their efforts. They

persuade themselves that if others can do it,they should be able to achieve at least someimprovement in performance (Bandura &Barab, 1973). Vicarious experience, relyingas it does on inferences from social com-parison, is a less dependable source of in-formation about one's capabilities than isdirect evidence of personal accomplishments.Consequently, the efficacy expectations in-duced by modeling alone are likely to beweaker and more vulnerable to change.

A number of modeling variables that areapt to affect expectations of personal efficacyhave been shown to enhance the disinhibitinginfluence of modeling procedures. Phobicsbenefit more from seeing models overcometheir difficulties by determined effort thanfrom observing facile performances by adeptmodels (Kazdin, 1973; Meichenbaum, 1971).Showing the gains achieved by effortfulcoping behavior not only minimizes for ob-servers the negative impact of temporarydistress but demonstrates that even the mostanxious can eventually succeed through per-severance. Similarity to the model in othercharacteristics, which increases the personalrelevance of vicariously derived information,can likewise enhance the effectiveness ofsymbolic modeling (Kazdin, 1974b).

Modeled behavior with clear outcomesconveys more efficacy information than if theeffects of the modeled actions remain am-biguous. In investigations of vicarious pro-cesses, observing one perform activities thatmeet with success does, indeed, producegreater behavioral improvements than wit-nessing the same performances modeled with-out any evident consequences (Kazdin, 1974c,1975). Diversified modeling, in which theactivities observers regard as hazardous arerepeatedly shown to be safe by a variety ofmodels, is superior to exposure to the sameperformances by a single model (Bandura &Menlove, 1968; Kazdin, 1974a, 1975, 1976).If people of widely differing characteristicscan succeed, then observers have a reason-able basis for increasing their own sense ofself-efficacy.

The pattern of results reported above of-fers at least suggestive support for the viewthat exemplifications of success through sus-

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tained effort with substantiating comparativeinformation can enhance observers' percep-tions of their own performance capabilities.Research will be presented below that bearsmore directly on the proposition that model-ing procedures alter avoidance behaviorthrough the intervening influence of efficacyexpectations.

Verbal persuasion. In attempts to influencehuman behavior, verbal persuasion is widelyused because of its ease and ready avail-ability. People are led, through suggestion,into believing they can cope successfully withwhat has overwhelmed them in the past.Efficacy expectations induced in this mannerare also likely to be weaker than those arisingfrom one's own accomplishments becausethey do not provide an authentic experientialbase for them. In the face of distressingthreats and a long history of failure in copingwith them, whatever mastery expectationsare induced by suggestion can be readilyextinguished by disconfirming experiences.

Results of several lines of research attestto the limitation of procedures that attemptto instill outcome expectations in peoplesimply by telling them what to expect. Inlaboratory studies, "placebo" conditions de-signed suggestively to raise expectations ofimprovement produce little change in re-fractory behavior (Lick & Bootzin, 1975;Moore, 1965; Paul, 1966). Whether this isdue to the low credibility of the suggestionsor to the weakness of the induced expecta-tions cannot be determined from these stud-ies, because the expectations were notmeasured.

Numerous experiments have been con-ducted in which phobics receive desensitiza-tion treatment without any expectancy in-formation or with suggestions that it is eitherhighly efficacious or ineffective. The differ-ential outcome expectations are verbally in-duced prior to, during, or immediately aftertreatment in the various studies. The findingsgenerally show that desensitization reducesphobic behavior, but the outcome expectancymanipulations have either no effect or weak,inconsistent ones (Hewlett & Nawas, 1971;McGlynn & Mapp, 1970; McGlynn, Mealiea,& Nawas, 1969; McGlynn, Reynolds, &

Linder, 1971). As in the "placebo" studies, itis difficult to make conclusive interpretationsbecause the outcome expectations inducedsuggestively are not measured prior to theassessment of behavior changes, if at all.Simply informing participants that they willor will not benefit from treatment does notmean that they necessarily believe what theyare told, especially when it contradicts theirother personal experiences. Moreover, in thestudies just cited the verbal influence isaimed mainly at raising outcome expectationsrather than at enhancing self-efficacy. It ischanges on the latter dimension that aremost relevant to the theory under dis-cussion.

Although social persuasion alone may havedefinite limitations as a means of creating anenduring sense of personal efficacy, it cancontribute to the successes achieved throughcorrective performance. That is, people whoare socially persuaded that they possess thecapabilities to master difficult situations andare provided with provisional aids for ef-fective action are likely to mobilize greatereffort than those who receive only the per-formance aids. However, to raise by per-suasion expectations of personal competencewithout arranging conditions to facilitate ef-fective performance will most likely lead tofailures that discredit the persuaders andfurther undermine the recipients' perceivedself-efficacy. It is therefore the interactive, aswell as the independent, effects of socialpersuasion on self-efficacy that merit experi-mental consideration.

Emotional arousal. Stressful and taxingsituations generally elicit emotional arousalthat, depending on the circumstances, mighthave informative value concerning personalcompetency. Therefore, emotional arousal isanother constituent source of informationthat can affect perceived self-efficacy in cop-ing with threatening situations. People relypartly on their state of physiological arousalin judging their anxiety and vulnerability tostress. Because high arousal usually debili-tates performance, individuals are more likelyto expect success when they are not besetby aversive arousal than if they are tenseand viscerally agitated. Fear reactions gen-


erate further fear of impending stressfulsituations through anticipatory self-arousal.By conjuring up fear-provoking thoughtsabout their ineptitude, individuals can rousethemselves to elevated levels of anxiety thatfar exceed the fear experienced during theactual threatening situation.

As will be recalled from the earlier dis-cussion, desensitization and massive exposuretreatments aimed at extinguishing anxietyarousal produce some reductions in avoidancebehavior. Anxiety arousal to threats is like-wise diminished by modeling, and is evenmore thoroughly eliminated by experiencedmastery achieved through participant model-ing (Bandura & Barab, 1973; Bandura etal., 1969; Blanchard, 1970a). Modeling ap-proaches have other advantages for enhancingself-efficacy and thereby removing dysfunc-tional fears. In addition to diminishing prone-ness to aversive arousal, such approaches alsoteach effective coping skills by demonstratingproficient ways of handling threatening situa-tions. The latter contribution is especially im-portant when fear arousal partly results frombehavioral deficits. It is often the case thatfears and deficits are interdependent. Avoid-ance of stressful activities impedes develop-ment of coping skills, and the resulting lackof competency provides a realistic basis forfear. Acquiring behavioral means for con-trolling potential threats attenuates or elim-inates fear arousal (Averill, 1973; Notter-man, Schoenfeld, & Bersh, 1952; Szpiler &Epstein, 1976). Behavioral control not onlyallows one to manage the aversive aspects ofan environment. It also affects how the en-vironment is likely to be perceived. Poten-tially stressful situations that can be con-trolled are construed as less threatening,and such cognitive appraisals further re-duce anticipatory emotional arousal (Averill,1973).

Diminishing emotional arousal can reduceavoidance behavior, but different theoriesposit different explanatory mechanisms forthe observed effects. In the theory fromwhich the emotive treatments are derived,emotional arousal is conceived of as a drivethat activates avoidance behavior. This viewstresses the energizing function of arousal

and the reinforcing function of arousal re-duction. Social learning theory, on the otherhand, emphasizes the informative functionof physiological arousal. Simply acknowledg-ing that arousal is both informative and mo-tivating by no means resolves the issue indispute, because these are not necessarily twoseparate effects that somehow jointly producebehavior. Rather, the cognitive appraisal ofarousal to a large extent determines the leveland direction of motivational inducementsto action. Certain cognitive appraisals ofone's physiological state might be energizing,whereas other appraisals of the same statemight not (Weiner, 1972). Moreover, manyforms of physiological arousal are generatedcognitively by arousing trains of thought.When motivation is conceptualized in terms ofcognitive processes (Bandura, 1977; Weiner,1972), the informational and motivational ef-fects of arousal are treated as interdependentrather than as separate events. We shall re-turn to this issue later when we consider thedifferential predictions made from social learn-ing theory and from the dual-process theory ofavoidance behavior concerning the behavioraleffects of extinguishing anxiety arousal.

Researchers working within the attribu-tional framework have attempted to modifyavoidance behavior by directly manipulatingthe cognitive labeling of emotional arousal(Valins & Nisbett, 1971). The presumptionis that if phobics are led to believe that thethings they have previously feared no longeraffect them internally, the cognitive reevalua-tion alone will reduce avoidance behavior. Intreatment analogues of this approach, pho-bics receive false physiological feedback sug-gesting that they are no longer emotionallyupset by threatening events. Results of thisprocedure are essentially negative. Earlyclaims that erroneous arousal feedback re-duces avoidance behavior (Valins & Ray,1967) are disputed by methodologicallysuperior studies showing that false feedbackof physiological tranquility in the presenceof threats has either no appreciable effecton subsequent fearful behavior (Gaupp,Stern, & Galbraith, 1972; Hewlett & Nawas,1971; Kent, Wilson, & Nelson, 1972; Rosen,Rosen, & Reid, 1972; Sushinsky & Bootzin,

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1970), or produces minor changes undersuch limited conditions as to be of littlepractical consequence (Borkovec, 1973).

Misattribution of emotional arousal isanother variant of the attributional ap-proach to modification of fearful behavior.The strategy here is to lead fearful peopleinto believing that their emotional arousalis caused by a nonemotional source. To theextent that they no longer label theiragitated state as anxiety, they will behavemore boldly. It may be possible to reducemild fears by this means (Ross, Rodin, &Zimbardo, 1969), but the highly anxious arenot easily led into misattributing their anxietyto irrelevant sources (Nisbett & Schachter,1966). When evaluated systematically, mis-attribution treatments do not produce sig-nificant changes in chronic anxiety condi-tions (Singerman, Borkovec, & Baron, 1976),and some of the benefits reported with otherdysfunctions cannot be replicated (Bootzin,Herman, & Nicassio, 1976; Kellogg & Baron,197S). There is also some suggestive evidencethat in laboratory studies the attenuation offear may be due more to the veridicality ofarousal information than to misattribution offear arousal to an innocuous source (Calvert-Boyanowsky & Leventhal, 1975).

Any reduction in fear resulting from de-ceptive feedback is apt to be short-livedbecause illusory assurances are not an espe-cially reliable way of creating durable self-expectations. However, more veritable ex-periences that reduce the level of emotionalarousal can set in motion a reciprocal processof change. In the social learning view, po-tential threats activate fear largely throughcognitive self-arousal (Bandura, 1969, 1977).Perceived self-competence can therefore af-fect susceptibility to self-arousal. Individualswho come to believe that they are less vulner-able than they previously assumed are lessprone to generate frightening thoughts inthreatening situations. Those whose fearsare relatively weak may reduce their self-doubts and debilitating self-arousal to thepoint where they perform successfully. Per-formance successes, in turn, strengthen self-efficacy. Such changes can, of course, bereliably achieved without resort to ruses.

Moreover, mislabeling arousal or attributingit to erroneous sources is unlikely to be ofmuch help to the highly anxious. Severeacrophobics, for example, may be temporarilymisled into believing that they no longerfear high elevations, but they will reexperi-ence unnerving internal feedback when con-fronted with dreaded heights. It should alsobe noted that in attributional explanationsof the success of behavioral treatments theheavy emphasis on physiological arousalderives more from speculations about thenature of emotion (Schachter, 1964) thanfrom evidence that arousal is a major deter-minant of defensive behavior.

Cognitive Processing oj Efficacy Information

The discussion thus far has centered pri-marily on the many sources of information—enactive, vicarious, exhortative, and emotive—that people use to judge their level ofself-efficacy. At this point a distinction mustbe drawn between information contained inenvironmental events and information asprocessed and transformed by the individual.The impact of information on efficacy ex-pectations will depend on how it is cognitivelyappraised. A number of contextual factors,including the social, situational, and temporalcircumstances under which events occur, enterinto such appraisals. For this reason, evensuccess experiences do not necessarily createstrong generalized expectations of personalefficacy. Expectations that have served self-protective functions for years are not quicklydiscarded. When experience contradicts firmlyestablished expectations of self-efficacy, theymay undergo little change if the conditionsof performance are such as to lead one todiscount the import of the experience.

The corrective value of information derivedfrom successful performance can be at-tenuated in several ways. The first involvesdiscrimination processes. The consequencesindividuals anticipate were they to performfeared activities differ in circumstances whichvary in safeguards. As a result, they maybehave boldly in situations signifying safety,but retain unchanged their self-doubts underless secure conditions. Such mitigative dis-criminations can extend to the treatments


themselves, as well as to the situational cir-cumstances in which behavioral attainmentsoccur. This is especially true of treatmentsrelying solely on symbolic and vicarious ex-perience. Achieving reductions in fear tothreats presented symbolically is unlikely toenhance perceived self-efficacy to any greatextent in people who believe that success inimagery does not portend accomplishmentsin reality. Information conveyed by facilelymodeled performances might likewise beminimized by anxious observers on thegrounds that the models possess specialexpertise enabling them to prevent injuriousconsequences that might otherwise befall theunskilled. Because such discriminations, eventhough objectively mistaken, impede changein self-efficacy, observers will be reluctant toattempt feared activities and will be easilydissuaded by negative experience.

Cognitive appraisals of the causes of one'sbehavior, which have been examined exten-sively in investigations of self-attributionalprocesses (Bern, 1972), can similarly delimitgains in self-efficacy from behavioral attain-ments. It was previously shown that at-tributions of affect and actions to illusorycompetence have little, if any, effect onrefractory behavior. This does not, of course,mean that causal appraisals are of limitedimportance in the process of behavior change.Quite the contrary, performance attainmentis a prominent source of efficacy information,but it is by no means unambiguous. As al-ready mentioned briefly, people can gain com-petence through authentic means but, be-cause of faulty appraisals of the circum-stances under which they improve, will credittheir achievements to external factors ratherthan to their own capabilities. Here theproblem is one of inaccurate ascription ofpersonal competency to situational factors.Successes are more likely to enhance self-efficacy if performances are perceived asresulting from skill than from fortuitous orspecial external aids. Conversely, failureswould be expected to produce greater reduc-tions in self-efficacy when attributed toability rather than to unusual situationalcircumstances. The more extensive the situa-tional aids for performance, the greater are

the chances that behavior will be ascribedto external factors (Bern, 1972; Weiner,1972).

Even under conditions of perceived self-determination of outcomes, the impact ofperformance attainments on self-efficacy willvary depending on whether one's accomplish-ments are ascribed mainly to ability or toeffort. Success with minimal effort fostersability ascriptions that reinforce a strongsense of self-efficacy. By contrast, analogoussuccesses achieved through high expenditureof effort connote a lesser ability and are thuslikely to have a weaker effect on perceivedself-efficacy. Cognitive appraisals of the dif-ficulty level of the tasks will further affect theimpact of performance accomplishments onperceived self-efficacy. To succeed at easytasks provides no new information for alter-ing one's sense of self-efficacy, whereas mas-tery of challenging tasks conveys salient evi-dence of enhanced competence. The rate andpattern of attainments furnish additional in-formation for judging personal efficacy. Thus,people who experience setbacks but detectrelative progress will raise their perceivedefficacy more than those who succeed but seetheir performances leveling off compared totheir prior rate of improvement.

Extrapolations from theories about attribu-tion and self-perception to the field of be-havioral change often imply that people mustlabor unaided or under inconspicuously ar-ranged influences if they are to convincethemselves of their personal competence(Kopel & Arkowitz, 1975). Such prescrip-tions are open to question on both con-ceptual and empirical grounds. Cognitivemisappraisals that attenuate the impact ofdisconfirming experiences can be minimizedwithout sacrificing the substantial benefitsof powerful induction procedures. This isachieved by providing opportunities for self-directed accomplishments after the desiredbehavior has been established. Any lingeringdoubts people might have, either about theircapabilities or about probable response con-sequences under unprotected conditions, aredispelled easily in this manner (Banduraet al., 197S). The more varied the circum-stances in which threats are mastered in-

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dependently, the more likely are success ex-periences to authenticate personal efficacyand to impede formation of discriminationsthat insulate self-perceptions from disconfirm-ing evidence.

Results of recent studies support thethesis that generalized, lasting changes inself-efficacy and behavior can best beachieved by participant methods using power-ful induction procedures initially to developcapabilities, then removing external aids toverify personal efficacy, then finally usingself-directed mastery to strengthen and gen-eralize expectations of personal efficacy(Bandura et al., 1975). Independent per-formance can enhance efficacy expectationsin several ways: (a) It creates additionalexposure to former threats, which providesparticipants with further evidence that theyare no longer aversively aroused by whatthey previously feared. Reduced emotionalarousal confirms increased coping capabilities,(b) Self-directed mastery provides opportuni-ties to perfect coping skills, which lessenpersonal vulnerability to stress, (c) Indepen-dent performance, if well executed, producessuccess experiences, which further reinforceexpectations of self-competency.

Extensive self-directed performance offormerly threatening activities under pro-gressively challenging conditions at a timewhen treatments are usually terminated couldalso serve to reduce susceptibility to relearn-ing of defensive patterns of behavior. A fewnegative encounters among many successfulexperiences that have instilled a strong senseof self-efficacy will, at most, establish dis-criminative avoidance of realistic threats, aneffect that has adaptive value. In contrast, ifpeople have limited contact with previouslyfeared objects after treatment, whateverexpectations of self-efficacy were instatedwould be weaker and more vulnerable tochange. Consequently, a few unfavorableexperiences are likely to reestablish defensivebehavior that generalizes inappropriately.

We have already examined how cognitiveprocessing of information conveyed by model-ing might influence the extent to whichvicarious experience effects changes in self-efficacy. Among the especially informative

elements are the models' characteristics (e.g.,adeptness, perseverance, age, expertness), thesimilarity between models and observers, thedifficulty of the performance tasks, the situa-tional arrangements under which the modeledachievements occur, and the diversity ofmodeled attainments.

Just as the value of efficacy informationgenerated enactively and vicariously dependson cognitive appraisal, so does the informa-tion arising from exhortative and emotivesources. The impact of verbal persuasion onself-efficacy may vary substantially depend-ing on the perceived credibility of the per-suaders, their prestige, trustworthiness, ex-pertise, and assuredness. The more believablethe source of the information, the morelikely are efficacy expectations to change.The influence of credibility on attitudinalchange has, of course, received intensivestudy. But its effects on perceived self-efficacyremain to be investigated.

People judge their physiological arousallargely on the basis of their appraisal of theinstigating conditions. Thus, visceral arousaloccurring in situations perceived to bethreatening is interpreted as fear, arousal inthwarting situations is experienced as anger,and that resulting from irretrievable loss ofvalued objects as sorrow (Hunt, Cole, &Reis, 1958). Even the same source of phys-iological arousal may be interpreted differentlyin ambiguous situations depending on theemotional reactions of others in the samesetting (Mandler, 1975; Schachter & Singer,1962).

When tasks are performed in ambiguous orcomplex situations in which there is a varietyof evocative stimuli, the informational valueof the resultant arousal will depend on themeaning imposed upon it. People who per-ceive their arousal as stemming from personalinadequacies are more likely to lower theirefficacy expectations than those who attributetheir arousal to certain situational factors.Given a proneness to ascribe arousal to per-sonal deficiencies, the heightened attention tointernal events can result in reciprocallyescalating arousal. Indeed, as Sarason (1976)has amply documented, individuals who areespecially susceptible to anxiety arousal


readily become self-preoccupied with theirperceived inadequacies in the face of dif-ficulties rather than with the task at hand.

Differing Perspectives on Self-efficacy

The phenomena encompassed by the con-struct of self-efficacy have been the subjectof interest in other theories of human be-havior. The theoretical perspectives differ,however, in how they view the nature andorigins of personal efficacy and the interven-ing processes by which perceived self-efficacyaffects behavior. In seeking a motivationalexplanation of exploratory and manipulativebehavior, White (1959) postulated an "effec-tance motive," which is conceptualized as anintrinsic drive for transactions with the en-vironment. Unlike instigators arising fromtissue deficits, effectance motivation is be-lieved to be aroused by novel stimulationand is sustained when the resultant inquisi-tive and exploratory actions produce furtherelements of novelty in the stimulus field.The effectance motive presumably developsthrough cumulative acquisition of knowledgeand skills in dealing with the environment.However, the process by which an effectancemotive emerges from effective transactionswith the environment is not spelled out inWhite's theory. Nor is the existence of themotive easy to verify, because effectancemotivation is inferred from the exploratorybehavior it supposedly causes. Without anindependent measure of motive strength onecannot tell whether people explore and manip-ulate things because of a competence motiveto do so, or for any number of other reasons.Athough the theory of effectance motivationhas not been formulated in sufficient detailto permit extensive theoretical comparisons,there are several issues on which the sociallearning and effectance theories clearly differ.

In the social learning analysis, choice be-havior and effort expenditure are governedin part by percepts of self-efficacy ratherthan by a drive condition. Because efficacyexpectations are defined and measured in-dependently of performance, they providean explicit basis for predicting the occurrence,generality, and persistence of coping be-

havior, whereas an omnibus motive doesnot. People will approach, explore, and tryto deal with situations within their self-perceived capabilities, but they will avoidtransactions with stressful aspects of theirenvironment they perceive as exceeding theirability.

The alternative views also differ on theorigins of efficacy. Within the framework ofeffectance theory, the effectance drive de-velops gradually through prolonged trans-actions with one's surroundings. This theorythus focuses almost exclusively on the effectsproduced by one's own actions. In the sociallearning theory, self-efficacy is conceptualizedas arising from diverse sources of informa-tion conveyed by direct and mediated ex-perience. These differences in theoretical ap-proach have significant implications for howone goes about studying the role of perceivedself-efficacy in motivational and behavioralprocesses. Expectations of personal efficacydo not operate as dispositional determinantsindependently of contextual factors. Somesituations require greater skill and morearduous performances and carry higher riskof negative consequences than do others.Expectations will vary accordingly. Thus, forexample, the level and strength of perceivedself-efficacy in public speaking will differdepending on the subject matter, the formatof the presentation, and the types of audi-ences that will be addressed. The sociallearning approach is therefore based on amicroanalysis of perceived coping capabilitiesrather than on global personality traits ormotives of effectance. From this perspective,it is no more informative to speak of self-efficacy in general terms than to speak ofnonspecific approach behavior. To elucidatehow perceived self-efficacy affects behaviorrequires a microanalysis of both factors.

Discrepancies between efficacy expecta-tions and performance are most likely toarise under conditions in which situationaland task factors are ambiguous. When per-formance requirements are ill-defined, peoplewho underestimate the situational demandswill display positive discrepancies betweenself-efficacy and performance attainments;those who overestimate the demands will

204 ALBERT BANDURA

exhibit negative discrepancies. Therefore, intesting predictions from the conceptualscheme presented here it is important thatsubjects understand what kind of behaviorwill be required and the circumstances inwhich they will be asked to perform them.Moreover, performances and the correspond-ing efficacy expectations should be analyzedinto separate activities, and preferablyordered by level of difficulty. In this typeof microanalysis both the efficacy expecta-tions and the corresponding behaviors aremeasured in terms of explicit types of per-formances rather than on the basis of globalindices.

The social learning determinants of self-efficacy can be varied systematically andtheir effects measured. Hence, propositionsconcerning the origins of self-efficacy areverifiable with some precision. A slowly de-veloping motive, however, does not easilylend itself to being tested experimentally.Another dimension on which the alternativetheories might be judged is their power toproduce the phenomena they purport toexplain. As we shall see later, there are morediverse, expeditious, and powerful ways ofcreating self-efficacy than by relying solelyon novel stimulation arising from exploratoryactions.

With the ascendency of cognitive views ofbehavior, the concept of expectancy is as-suming an increasingly prominent place incontemporary psychological thought (Bolles,1972b; Heneman, & Schwab, 1972; Irwin,1971). However, virtually all of the theoriz-ing and experimentation has focused onaction-outcome expectations. The ideas ad-vanced in some of the theories neverthelessbear some likeness to the notion of self-efficacy. According to the theory of person-ality proposed by Rotter (1966), behaviorvaries as a function of generalized expect-ancies that outcomes are determined by one'sactions or by external forces beyond one'scontrol. Such expectations about the instru-mentality of behavior are considered to belargely a product of one's history of reinforce-ment. Much of the research within this tradi-tion is concerned with the behavioral cor-relates of individual differences in the tend-

ency to perceive events as being either per-sonally or externally determined.

The notion of locus of control is oftentreated in the literature as analogous to self-efficacy. However, Rotter's (1966) conceptualscheme is primarily concerned with causalbeliefs about action-outcome contingenciesrather than with personal efficacy. Perceivedself-efficacy and beliefs about the locus ofcausality must be distinguished, because con-victions that outcomes are determined byone's own actions can have any number ofeffects on self-efficacy and behavior. Peoplewho regard outcomes as personally determinedbut who lack the requisite skills would ex-perience low self-efficacy and view activitieswith a sense of futility. Thus, for example,a child who fails to grasp arithmetic conceptsand expects course grades to be dependententirely on skill in the subject matter hasevery reason to be demoralized. While causalbeliefs and self-efficacy refer to differentphenomena, as we have already noted, causalascriptions of behavior to skill or to chancecan mediate the effects of performance at-tainments on self-efficacy.

The theoretical framework presented in thepresent article is generalizable beyond thepsychotherapy domain to other psychologicalphenomena involving behavioral choices andregulation of effort in activities that can haveadverse effects. For example, the theory oflearned helplessness advanced by Maier andSeligman (1976) assumes that as a result ofbeing subjected to uncontrollable aversiveevents, organisms acquire expectancies thatactions do not affect outcomes. Becausethey come to expect future responding to befutile, they no longer initiate behavior insituations where outcomes are in fact con-trollable by responses. Although this theoryposits an expectancy mechanism of operation,it focuses exclusively on response-outcomeexpectancies.

Theorizing and experimentation on learnedhelplessness might well consider the con-ceptual distinction between efficacy and out-come expectations. People can give up tryingbecause they lack a sense of efficacy inachieving the required behavior, or they maybe assured of their capabilities but give up


trying because they expect their behavior tohave no effect on an unresponsive environ-ment or to be consistently punished. Thesetwo separable expectancy sources of futilityhave quite different antecedents and remedialimplications. To alter efficacy-based futilityrequires development of competencies andexpectations of personal effectiveness. Bycontrast, to change outcome-based futilitynecessitates changes in prevailing environ-mental contingencies that restore the in-strumental value of the competencies thatpeople already possess.

Microanalysis of Self-efficacy and BehavioralChange

To test derivations from the social learn-ing analysis of the process of change, anexperiment was conducted wherein severephobics received treatments designed tocreate differential levels of efficacy expecta-tions, and then the relationship between self-efficacy and behavioral change was analyzedin detail (Bandura et al., in press). The ex-periment proceeded as follows. Adult snakephobics, whose phobias affected their lives ad-versely, were administered for equivalentperiods either participant modeling, model-ing alone, or no treatment. In participantmodeling, which operates through directmastery experiences, subjects were assisted,by whatever induction aids were needed, toengage in progressively more threatening in-teractions with a boa constrictor. After com-pleting all the therapeutic tasks, which in-cluded holding the snake, placing open handsin front of its head as it moved about theroom, holding the snake in front of theirfaces, and allowing it to crawl freely in theirlaps, the subjects engaged in a brief periodof self-directed mastery. In the present ex-periment, the modeling aid was used onlybriefly if needed to help initiate performancein order to minimize overlap of this elementin the two modes of treatment.

Subjects receiving the modeling treatmentmerely observed the therapist perform thesame activities for an equivalent period.These subjects did not engage in any behaviorthemselves, and consequently they had no

performance sources of information for theirefficacy expectations. Enactive and vicariousprocedures were selected for study to assessthe predictive value of self-efficacy createdby quite different modes of treatment.

The level, strength, and generality of thesubjects' efficacy expectations were measuredat critical junctures in the change process.Subjects privately designated, on a list of 18performance tasks ranked in order of in-creasing threat, those tasks they consideredthemselves capable of executing. They thenrated the strength of their expectations foreach of these tasks on a 100-point probabilityscale ranging, in 10-unit intervals, from greatuncertainty, through intermediate values ofcertainty, to complete certainty. They ratedtheir efficacy expectations for coping withsnakes of the same variety used in treatmentas well as dissimilar snakes to measure thegenerality of their efficacy expectations.These measures were obtained prior to treat-ment, following treatment but before thebehavioral posttest, and after completing theposttest. Approach behavior was assessed inthe posttest by a series of performance tasksrequiring increasingly more threatening inter-actions with a different type of boa constrictorfrom the one used in treatment and with acorn snake of markedly different appearancebut equivalent threat value. Different phobicobjects were used to provide a test of thegeneralized effects of changes in efficacyexpectations along a dimension of similarityto the threat used in treatment.

Subjects assigned to the control conditionparticipated in the assessment procedureswithout receiving any intervening treatment.Following completion of the posttest, thecontrols and those in the modeling conditionwho failed to achieve terminal performancesreceived the participant modeling treatment.

Consistent with the social learning analysisof the sources of self-efficacy, experiencesbased on performance accomplishments pro-duced higher, more generalized, and strongerefficacy expectations than did vicarious ex-perience, which in turn exceeded those inthe control condition. Figure 3 summarizesthe level of efficacy expectations and per-formance as a function of treatment condi-

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PRE-TEST POST-TEST PRE-TEST POST-TESTSIMILAR THREAT DISSIMILAR THREAT

Figure 3. Level of efficacy expectations and approach behavior displayed by subjects toward threatsafter receiving vicarious or enactive treatments, or no treatment (Bandura et al., in press).

tions at different phases of the experiment.As shown in the figure, performance changecorresponds closely to the magnitude of ex-pectancy change. The greater the incrementsin self-perceived efficacy, the greater thechanges in behavior. Similar relationships be-tween level of self-efficacy and performanceare obtained when the data are consideredseparately for the two snakes. In accordancewith prediction, participant modeling pro-duced the more generalized increases in effi-cacy expectations and the more generalizedbehavioral changes.

Although the enactive and vicarious treat-ments differed in their power to enhanceself-efficacy, the efficacy expectations wereequally predictive of subsequent performanceirrespective of how they were instated. Thehigher the level of perceived self-efficacy atthe completion of treatment the higher wasthe level of approach behavior for efficacyexpectations instated enactively (r = .83) andvicariously (r = .84). It might be noted herethat all subjects had at their disposal thecomponent responses for producing the inter-active patterns of behavior, and they all hadsome incentive to overcome their phobic be-havior. Under conditions in which peoplediffer substantially in component capabilitiesand motivation, skill and incentive factors

will also contribute to variance in perform-ance.

Correlation coefficients based on aggregatemeasures do not fully reveal the degree ofcorrespondence between self-efficacy and per-formance on the specific behavioral tasksfrom which the aggregate scores are obtained.A subject can display an equivalent numberof efficacy expectations and successful per-formances, but they might not correspondentirely to the same tasks. The most preciseindex of the relationship is provided by amicroanalysis of the congruence between self-efficacy and performance at the level of in-dividual tasks. This measure was obtained byrecording whether or not subjects consideredthemselves capable of performing each ofthe various tasks at the end of treatmentand by computing the percentage of accuratecorrespondence between efficacy judgmentand actual performance. Self-efficacy was auniformly accurate predictor of performanceon tasks varying in difficulty with differentthreats regardless of whether the changes inself-efficacy were produced through perform-ance accomplishments (89% congruence) orby vicarious experience alone (86% con-gruence). The degree of congruence betweenperceived self-efficacy and subsequent behav-ior is equally high for enactive (82%) and


vicarious (79%) treatments when the micro-analysis is conducted only on the subset oftasks that subjects had never performed in thepretest assessment.

In the preceding analysis efficacy expecta-tions were considered without regard tostrength. A weak sense of self-efficacy thusreceived the same weight as one reflectingcomplete certitude. However, the intensityand persistence of effort, and hence level ofperformance, should be higher with strongthan with weak self-efficacy. The likelihoodthat a task will be performed as a functionof the strength of the corresponding efficacyexpectation therefore provides a further re-finement in the analysis of the relationshipbetween self-efficacy and performance. Theprobability of successful performance of anygiven task as a function of strength of efficacyexpectations is plotted in Figure 4. Becausethe control subjects performed few responsesand had correspondingly restricted efficacyexpectations, their data were plotted afterthey had received the participant modelingtreatment. In all conditions, the stronger theefficacy expectations, the higher was thelikelihood that a particular task would besuccessfully completed. The positive relation-ship between strength of self-efficacy andprobability of successful performance is vir-tually identical for the similar and the dis-similar threats.

In brief, the theory systematizes a varietyof findings. As the preceding results show, it

predicts accurately the magnitude and gen-erality of behavioral change for efficacy ex-pectations induced enactively and vicariously.Moreover, it orders variations in level ofbehavioral change occurring within the sametreatment condition. Subjects who receivedparticipant modeling, either as the primaryor as the supplementary treatment, success-fully performed all of the behaviors in treat-ment that were later assessed in the posttesttoward different threats. Although all hadpreviously achieved maximal performances,not all expressed maximal efficacy expecta-tions. One can therefore compare the errorrates of predictions made from maximal pastperformance and from maximal efficacy ex-pectations. It would be predicted from theproposed theory that among these successfulperformers, those who acquire maximal effi-cacy expectations should attain terminal per-formances, whereas those holding lower ex-pectations should not. If one predicts thatthose who performed maximally in treatmentwill likewise achieve terminal performanceswhen assessed with similar tasks, the errorrate is relatively low for the similar threat(28%) but high for the dissimilar threat(52%). If, on the other hand, one predictsthat those who express maximal expectationswill perform maximally, the error rate iscomparably low for both the similar (21%)and the dissimilar (24%) threats. The pre-dictive superiority of efficacy expectationsover past performance is significant for total

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Figure 4. Probability of successful performance of any given task as a function of strength ofself-efficacy. The figure on the left shows the relationship for vicarious and enactive treatments;the figure on the right shows the relationship between strength of self-efficacy and successful ap-proach responses toward similar and dissimilar threats combined across treatments (Bandura et al.,in press).

208 ALBERT BANDURA

approach behavior and for approach behaviortoward the dissimilar threat. These differ-ential findings indicate that experiencedmastery altered subjects' sense of personalefficacy rather than merely providing be-havioral cues for judgments of self-efficacy.

The theory also accounts for variations inbehavioral change produced by modelingalone. To equate for duration of treatment,subjects in the modeling condition wereyoked to matched counterparts in participantmodeling, who received treatment until theyperformed all the therapeutic tasks. Thesubjects in the participant modeling condi-tion varied in the time they required to com-plete treatment, so some of the subjects inthe modeling conditions had only brief ex-posure to successful performances, whereasothers had the benefit of observing fearedactivities modeled repeatedly without anyuntoward consequences. The findings areconsistent with hypothesized increases in self-efficacy as a function of repeated observa-tion of successful modeling. Brief exposureproduced limited increases in the level (9%)and strength (5%) of efficacy expectationsand correspondingly little behavior change(10%). In contrast, repeated observation ofsuccessful performances increased by a sub-stantial amount the level (44%) and strength(38%) of self-efficacy which, in turn, wasaccompanied by similarly large incrementsin performance (35%).

Comparison of Self-efficacy and Dual-ProcessTheory

As a further test of the generality of thetheory under discussion, a microanalysis wasconducted of efficacy expectations instatedby desensitization procedures, which areaimed at reducing emotional arousal. Sociallearning theory and the dual-process theoryof anxiety, on which the desensitization ap-proach is based, posit different explanatorymechanisms for the changes accompanyingthis mode of treatment. The alternative viewstherefore give rise to differential predictionsthat can be readily tested.

The standard desensitization approach is

based on the assumption that anxiety ac-tivates defensive behavior (Wolpe, 1974).According to this view, association of neutralevents with aversive stimulation creates ananxiety drive that motivates defensive be-havior; the defensive behavior, in turn, isreinforced by reducing the anxiety arousedby conditioned aversive stimuli. Hence, toeliminate defensive responding, it is con-sidered necessary to eradicate its underlyinganxiety. Treatment strategies are thereforekeyed to reduction of emotional arousal.Aversive stimuli are presented at graduatedlevels in conjunction with relaxation untilanxiety reactions to the threats are elimi-nated.

Although desensitization produces be-havioral changes, there is little evidence tosupport the original rationale that defensivebehavior is diminished because anxiety iseliminated either by reciprocal physiologicalinhibition or by associative recoupling ofthreatening stimuli to relaxation. Desensitiza-tion does not require graduated exposure, andanxiety-reducing activities are at most facili-tory, not necessary, conditions for eliminatingdefensive behavior (Bandura, 1969; Wilson& Davison, 1971).

The principal assumption that defensivebehavior is controlled by anxiety arousal isalso disputed by several lines of evidence.Autonomic arousal, which constitutes theprincipal index of anxiety,-is not necessaryfor defensive learning. Because autonomic re-actions take much longer to activate than doavoidance responses, the latter cannot becaused by the former. Studies in which auto-nomic and avoidance responses are measuredconcurrently indicate that these two modesof activity may be partially correlated in theacquisition phase but are not causally re-lated (Black, 1965). Avoidance behavior, forexample, can persist long after autonomicreactions to threats have been extinguished.Surgical removal of autonomic feedback ca-pability in animals has little effect on theacquisition of avoidance responses (Rescorla& Solomon, 1967). Maintenance of avoidancebehavior is even less dependent on autonomicfeedback. Once defensive behavior has beenlearned, depriving animals of autonomic feed-


back does not hasten the rate at which suchactivities are extinguished.

Research casts doubt on the postulatedreinforcement sources, as well as the activat-ing sources, of defensive behavior. In thedual-process theory, the anxiety reductionoccasioned by escape from the feared stim-ulus presumably reinforces the defensive be-havior. The evidence, however, reveals thatwhether or not defensive behavior removesthe feared stimulus has variable effects onthe maintenance of the behavior (Bolles,1972a). Moreover, defensive behavior can beacquired and maintained by its success indiminishing the frequency of aversive stim-ulation, even though there are no fearedstimuli to arouse anxiety and to provide thesource of decremental reinforcement (Herrn-stein, 1969). The substantial negative evi-dence concerning an anxiety mediationalmechanism in avoidance behavior suggeststhat the effects of desensitization treatmentmust result from some other mechanism ofoperation.

Social learning theory regards anxiety anddefensive behavior as coeffects rather than ascausally linked (Bandura, 1977). Aversiveexperiences, either of a personal or vicarioussort, create expectations of injurious effectsthat can activate both fear and defensive be-havior. Being coeffects, there is no fixedrelationship between autonomic arousal andactions. Until effective coping behaviors areachieved, perceived threats produce highemotional arousal and various defensivemaneuvers. But after people become adept atself-protective behaviors, they perform themin potentially threatening situations withouthaving to be frightened (Notterman et al.,1952). Should their habitual coping devicesfail, they experience heightened arousal untilnew defensive learning reduces their vulner-ability.

Perceived threats activate defensive be-havior because of their predictive value ratherthan their aversive quality. That is, whenformerly neutral stimuli are associated withpainful experiences, it is not that the stimulihave become aversive but that individualshave learned to anticipate aversive con-sequences. It is people's knowledge of their

environment, not the stimuli, that arechanged by correlated experience. Stimulihaving predictive significance signal thelikelihood of painful consequences unlessprotective measures are taken. Defensive be-havior, in turn, is maintained by its successin forestalling or reducing the occurrence ofaversive events. Once established, self-pro-tective behavior is difficult to eliminate eventhough the hazards no longer exist. This isbecause consistent avoidance prevents a per-son from learning that the real-life conditionshave changed. Hence, the nonoccurrence ofanticipated hazards reinforces the expectationthat the defensive maneuvers forestalledthem.

From the perspective of dual-processtheory, thorough extinction of anxiety shouldeliminate avoidance behavior. In the desensi-tization treatment, however, anxiety reactionsare typically extinguished to visualized rep-resentations of feared situations. One wouldexpect some transfer loss of extinction effectsfrom symbolic to real-life threats, as is in-deed the case (Agras, 1967; Barlow et al.,1969). It is not uncommon for people tofear and avoid real-life situations to whichthey have been desensitized in imagery.Therefore, according to this view, thoroughextinction of anxiety to visualized threatsshould produce substantial, though less thancomplete, reductions in defensive behavior.However, dual-process theory provides nobasis for predicting either the level of be-havior change or the variability in behaviordisplayed by subjects who have all beenequally desensitized.

In the social learning analysis presentedearlier, reducing physiological arousal im-proves performance by raising efficacy ex-pectations rather than by eliminating a drivethat instigates the defensive behavior. Thisinformation-based view of the mediatingmechanism predicts that the higher andstronger the efficacy expectations instated bydesensitization procedures, the greater arethe reductions in defensive behavior. Becausearousal is only one of several sources ofefficacy information, and not necessarily themost dependable one, extinguishing anxiety

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Figure 5. Level of efficacy expectations and approach behavior displayed by subjects towarddifferent threats after their emotional reactions to symbolic representations of feared activitieswere eliminated through systematic desensitization. (Bandura & Adams, in press.)

arousal is rarely a sufficient condition foreliminating defensive behavior.

To test the theory that desensitizationchanges behavior through its interveningeffects on efficacy expectations, severe snakephobics were administered the standarddesensitization treatment until their emo-tional reactions were completely extinguishedto imaginal representations of the mostaversive scenes (Bandura & Adams, in press).The assessment procedures were identical tothose used in the preceding experiment. Sub-jects' approach behavior was tested on theseries of performance tasks before and afterthe desensitization treatment. The level,strength, and generality of their efficacyexpectations were similarly measured beforetreatment, upon completion of treatment butprior to the posttest, and following the post-test.

The findings show that phobics whoseanxiety reactions to visualized threats havebeen thoroughly extinguished emerge fromthe desensitization treatment with widelydiffering efficacy expectations. As depictedgraphically in Figure 5, performance cor-responds closely to level of self-efficacy. Thehigher the subjects' level of perceived self-

efficacy at the end of treatment, the moreapproach behavior they subsequently per-formed in the posttest assessment (r — .74).

Results of the microanalysis of congruencebetween self-efficacy at the end of treatmentand performance on each of the tasks ad-ministered in the posttest are consistent withthe findings obtained from enactive and vi-carious treatment. Self-efficacy was an ac-curate predictor of subsequent performanceon 85% for all the tasks, and 83% for thesubset of tasks that subjects were unable toperform in the pretest assessment. Subjectssuccessfully executed tasks within the rangeof their perceived self-efficacy produced bythe desensitization treatment, whereas theyfailed at tasks they perceived to be beyondtheir capabilities.

Microanalysis oj Self-efficacy andPerformance During the Process of Change

The preceding series of experiments ex-amined the predictive value of self-efficacy atthe completion of different modes of treat-ment. A further study investigated the processof efficacy and behavioral change during thecourse of treatment itself. Participant model-


ing was selected for this purpose because theamount of treatment can be well-regulatedand it promotes rapid change.

As in the previous studies, adults whoselives were adversely affected by severe snakephobias were tested for their efficacy expecta-tions and approach behavior using the micro-analytic methodology described earlier. Thevarious treatment activities were segmentedinto natural blocks of tasks of increasingdifficulty and threat value. Items in the initialblock included looking at a snake fromprogressively closer distances; intermediateblocks required subjects to touch and to holdthe snake with gloved and bare hands forincreasing intervals; the terminal block re-quired them to tolerate the snake crawlingabout freely in their laps for an extendedperiod. Subjects received the participantmodeling treatment only for the block ofitems they failed in the hierarchy of assess-ment tasks. Treatment was continued untilthey could perform the activities in thefailed block, whereupon they were tested fortheir efficacy expectations and approach re-sponses on the succeeding tasks. Subjectswho attained terminal performances receivedno further treatment. For those who achievedonly partial improvement, the sequence oftreatment on the failed block followed byassessments of self-efficacy and approach be-havior on succeeding blocks was repeated untilthey achieved terminal performances.

Findings of the microanalysis lend furthersupport to the postulated cognitive mecha-nism of change. Subjects who mastered thesame intermediate performances during thecourse of treatment varied considerably intheir behavioral attainments when tested onsucceeding blocks of tasks. Past performancewas therefore of limited value in predictingwhat subjects would be able to do when con-fronted with more threatening tasks. However,efficacy judgments proved to be good predic-tors of degree of behavioral change resultingfrom partial mastery experiences. Self-efficacypredicted subsequent performance as mea-sured at different points in treatment in 92%of the total assessment tasks. This relationshipholds even when the measure of congruence isbased only on the subset of activities that

subjects could not perform in pretest becausethey found them too threatening, and did notperform in treatment because the activitiesextended beyond the failed block. Expecta-tions of personal effectiveness formed throughpartial mastery experiences during the courseof treatment predicted, at a 84% level ofaccuracy, performance on highly threateningtasks that subjects had never done before.

Concluding Remarks

The present theoretical formulation ordersvariations in the level of behavioral changesproduced by different modes of treatment; itaccounts for behavioral variations displayedby individuals receiving the same type oftreatment; and it predicts performance suc-cesses at the level of individual tasks duringand after treatment. It is possible to generatealternative explanations for particular sub-sets of data, but the mechanism proposed inthe present theory appears to account equallywell for the different sets of findings. It mightbe argued, for example, that self-efficacyproved to be an accurate predictor of per-formance in the enactive mode of treatmentbecause subjects were simply judging theirfuture performance from their past behavior.However, an interpretation of this type hasno explanatory value for the vicarious andemotive treatments, in which perceived self-efficacy was an equally accurate predictor ofperformance although subjects engaged in noovert behavior. Even in the enactive treat-ment, perceived self-efficacy proved to be abetter predictor of behavior toward unfamiliarthreats than did past performance. More-over, self-efficacy derived from partial en-active mastery during the course of treatmentpredicted performance on stressful tasks thatthe individuals had never done before.

As an alternative explanation, one couldinvoke a superordinate mediator that con-trols both efficacy expectations and behavior.Although such a possibility is not inconceiv-able, the mediator would have to be an ex-ceedingly complex one to account adequatelyfor the diverse sets of relationships. To citebut a few examples, it would have to affectdifferentially efficacy expectations and be-

212 ALBERT BANDURA

havior resulting from maximal enactive mas-tery; somehow, it would have to producedifferent levels of self-efficacy from equiva-lent reductions in emotional arousal; and itwould have to generate some variation inefficacy expectations from similar partialmastery experiences. The theory presentedhere posits a central processor of efficacyinformation. That is, people process, weigh,and integrate diverse sources of informationconcerning their capability, and they regulatetheir choice behavior and effort expenditureaccordingly.

Evidence that people develop somewhatdifferent efficacy expectations from similarenactive mastery and fear extinction warrantscomment. One possible explanation for thevariance is in terms of differential cognitiveprocessing of efficacy information. To the ex-tent that individuals differ in how they cog-nitively appraise their arousal decrements andbehavioral attainments, their percepts ofself-efficacy will vary to some degree. A sec-ond possibility concerns the multiple deter-mination of self-efficacy. Because people havemet with different types and amounts ofefficacy-altering experiences, providing onenew source of efficacy information would notbe expected to affect everyone uniformly.Thus, for example, extinguishing arousal tothreats will enhance self-efficacy, but moreso in individuals whose past coping attemptshave occasionally succeeded than in those whohave consistently failed.

The research completed thus far has testedthe predictive power of the conceptual schemefor efficacy expectations developed throughenactive, vicarious, and emotive-based pro-cedures. Additional tests of the generality ofthis approach need to be extended to efficacyexpectations arising from verbal persuasionand from other types of treatments aimed atreducing emotional arousal.

Cognitive processing of efficacy informa-tion, which is an important component func-tion in the proposed theory, is an especiallyrelevant area for research. A number of fac-tors were identified as influencing the cog-nitive appraisal of efficacy information con-veyed by each of the major sources of self-efficacy. Previous research from a number

of different perspectives demonstrating thatsome of these factors affect attitudinal andbehavioral changes has suggestive value. Butit is investigations that include assessment ofthe intervening self-efficacy link that can bestprovide validity for the present theory.

The operative process involved in the rela-tionship between efficacy expectations andaction also requires further investigation. Itwill be recalled that efficacy expectations arepresumed to influence level of performanceby enhancing intensity and persistence ofeffort. In the preceding experiments, thebehavioral tasks were ordered in level ofdifficulty and subjects either persisted intheir efforts until they completed all of thetasks or they quit at varying points alongthe way. The number of tasks successfullycompleted reflects degree of perseverance. Asa further step toward elucidating the inter-vening process, it would be of interest tomeasure the intensity and duration of effortsubjects exert in attempts to master arduousor insoluble tasks as a function of the leveland strength of their efficacy expectations.Further research on the processes postulatedin the present theoretical formulation shouldincrease our understanding of the relation-ship between cognitive and behavioral change.

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Albert Bandura - Self-Efficacy - Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change 1977