Aglietta in England

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Aglietta in England : Bob Jessops contribution to theregulation approachseptembre 1994Bonefeld, Werner

1. Introduction

The main contribution to the Regulation Approach (RA) in the UK has come from B. Jessop [1].

His contribution bas focused on the reformulation of state theory. This reformulation aims at a

conceptualisation of an intermediate concept of state: the fordist or post-fordist states as

distinctively different modes of capitalist regulation. The reformulation of state theory bas been

criticized by various authors [2]. The reformulation was criticized for its disarticulation of

structure and struggle. ln this paper, it will be argued that Jessops adaptation of the RA entails

a destruction of the Marxian notion of social relations in favour of a combination of system

theory and conflict theory. Reformulating Marxism in this way involves a theoretical acceptance

of the conceptual and practical horizons of a social given world. This acceptance involves a

causalist and/or teleological determinism.

Jessops reformulation of state theory is aIl too ready to endorse existing reality and its

ideological projections. For Jessop so-called Thatcherism came to signify a broadranging and

distinctive programme aimed at promoting a new accumulation regime and restoring the

authority of the state. By restricting his horizon to this version of existing reality, Jessops

analysis became blinkered. The movement of class struggle was dismissed in favour of

apparently more fitting concepts like Post-Fordism. Within this restricted field of vision, the

analysis of Thatcherism entailed the acceptance of the inevitability of a presumed thatcherite

project. The acceptance of the conceptual and practical horizon of a given reality as ifs own

theory was based upon a reformulation of Marxist theory in terms of regulation theory and

Poulantzarian state theory. This reformulation entailed a fundamental revision of erstwhile

positions, embracing enthusiastically the crass ideology of neoliberalism.

This paper introduces Jessops notion of the dialectic between structure and strategy and

discusses the application of this dialectic to the analysis of Thatcherism. The presentation is

restricted to arguments relevant to the dialectic between structure and strategy. The following

is the order of presentation : A brief introduction of Jessops own understanding of his work is

followed by a short introduction of Jessops notion of accumulation strategy. The dialectic
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between structure and strategy will be discussed in the third part. There then follows a section

on Jessops approach to Thatcherism. The theoretical and political implications of Jessops

approach will be examined in the papers final part. The conclusion is written in more general

terms. This is so because it would be wrong to see his contribution as somehow unique. Jessop

works within the framework of a particular school of thought. The differences within this school

become of secondary importance when discussed in general terms.

II. Jessops Understanding of his Work

Jessop understands his own work as a combination of regulation theory with a strategic-

relational account of the state inspired by Poulantzas and a discourse-theoretical approach to

hegemony most influenced by Gramsci and Laclau (Jessop 1988). The distinctive features of his

approach are the emphasis on the dialectic between structure and strategy. This emphasis

appears in the use of concepts such as accumulation regime, forms of state, and historical bloc.

These concepts are complemented by others such as accumulation strategy, state projects and

hegemonic projects (ibid.). The dialectic between structure and strategy is explored in terms of

strategie selectivity of structures and the structurally transforming role of strategies (ibid.).

Jessops emphasis is a typical structuralist response to the problem of integrating class struggle

iota the analysis. Within the framework of the RA, Jessop elaborates Agliettas methodological

assumption that the class struggle produces norms and laws ; that these norms and laws form

the object of a theory of social regulation ; that the class struggle itself is beyond any law

(Aglietta 1979, p. 67).

III. The Notion of Accumulation Strategy

Jessops[3] contribution to the dialectic between structure and strategy attempts to build on,

and to develop, Poulantzass approach in response to its critics. Jessop argues for a

conjunctural (or relational) approach to the relation between the political and the economic,

equating, in its most extreme version, not only struggle with strategy, but, as argued by

Holloway (1988/1991), class struggle with capital strategies. The constitution of social reality, in

Jessop, follows the independent logics of political and ideological domains, forcing the scientific

mind to follow, in descriptive terms, the strategic line of capital in the face of various dilemmas,

risks, uncertainties and complexities, emergent strategies, trial and error techniques etc.

(Jessop et al. 1988, p. 8). As a consequence, complex historical phenomena are best analysed
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as a complex resultant of multiple determinations (ibid., p. 53). Jessop claims that the interplay

of objective laws of capitalist development and the hegemonic struggle of different capital

logics provide mechanisms that melt different social systems together, so permitting a

corresponding social cohesion of ideological, political and economic patterns. These patterns are,

as argued by Bonefeld (1987/1991) and Clarke (1983), of a systematic kind, objectively

unfolding and framed in a voluntarist fashion. As indicated by Psychopeds (1991) Jessop derives

different logics of capital from distinct allocation interests which exist independently from class.

The class struggle is separated from its mode of motion and degenerates into a factor of a

historical development which is bath contingent and relative. The term accumulation strategy is

used as a means of articulating the contingent unit y between the economic and the political.

Since there is no substantive unity to the circuit of capital nor any predetermined pattern of

accumulation (Jessop 1983, p. 91), sustained accumulation requires an extra power in order to

impose regulative mechanisms. This power is the state. The pattern of accumulation is

determined by the accumulation regime adopted by the state.

Jessop advocates the Poulantzarian distinction between a theory of the capitalist mode of

production and the theory of the capitalist state region. Such an approach to the capitalist state

denies an internaI relation between the political and the economic on the basis of the labour

theory of value (as in Jessop 1982). Responding to his critics, Jessop sought to make this good

by supplying a link between the economic and the political [4]. The link is the concept of

accumulation strategy (Jessop 1983). However, Jessops approach becomes eclectic since his

specification of different accumulation strategies ranges from Hitlers Grossraum-wirtschaft to

Japans rich country and strong army and to Germanys Modell Deutschland (ibid., p. 94).

Further, the arbitrariness of choice is intensified by the failure to integrate a list of social

phenomena iota a theoretical concept. The analysis becomes non-binding and, thereby,

relativist. Jessops theorising is part of a tradition which takes for granted the fragmented

character of social existence. The classical example of this tradition is the work of Max Weber,

aIthough Jessop fails to approach the theoretical profundity and reflection which are

characteristic of Webers analysis (Psychopedis 1991, p. 182). Jessops attempt to incorporate

the labour theory of value iota his argument is conspicuous for its eclecticism. An accumulation

strategy is understood as a "subject" which, in Jessops [1983] own words, "must take account"

of the circuit of capital, international conjunctures, the balance of powers and which "must

consider" the relation between the classes, etc. In other words, we have here a reappearance of

the Hegelian idealistic subject so disliked by the structuralists. (Psychopedis 1991, p. 189). A


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successful accumulation strategy stands above class relations because it takes into account

different modes of calculation and gives a particular coherence and political direction to the

multiplicity of forces operating in the real world of competing subjects. An accumulation strategy

articulates multiple determinations of the real world into a specific mode of regulation.

However, no unique accumulation strategy is available to the state, but rather a range of

alternative strategies, expressing different classes and fractional interests and alliances. Any

viable accumulation strategy bas to reconcile the pursuit of sectional interests with the sustained

accumulation of capital. The determination of which accumulation strategy will be adopted by

the state requires an analysis of political conflicts through which strategic issues are resolved

(Jessop 1983). Jessops theory of conflict is based on the relative autonomy of the economic,

political and ideological. The state is, following Poulantzas and Aglietta, seen as being formally

determined as a vehicle for social cohesion. The task is thus to show the unfolding of the states

formaI character in specific historical conjunctures. Jessops politicist understanding of capitalist

reproduction is based on the notion that the state stands above a plurality of competitive and

class struggles and provides the functional integration of a regime of accumulation. The real

movement of capitalism is thus construed in terms of an articulation between different social

systems which stand above the social conflict. Jessop offers his dialectic of structure and

strategy as a means of integrating social relations into the analysis.

IV. The Dialectic between Structure and Strategy

a) The Dualism of Structure and Strategy

Jessops approach is predicated on causal mechanisms and multiple determinations. It is

predicated also on the presupposition of an ideal subject against which he officially proclaims.

This subject is created ex nihilo.Jessops contribution to regulation theory emphasises capital as

an bergreifendes Subjekt.

For Jessop, Marxist theorising is not predicated on the real movement of class antagonism and

the constituting movement of class struggle but, rather, on the contention that the real world is

a world of contingently realised natural necessities (Jessop 1988, p. 8). The notion of

contingency is of vital importance for Jessops attempted Marxist reformulation of neo -

liberalism. It allows him to define a structurally complex world of systems and institutions within

which atomized social subjects pursue their interests. Fundamentally, class antagonism is


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understood in terms of competing social groups. Each of these groups occupies a particular class

position vis-a-vis structure. The dual perspective of structural determination and class position

(Jessop 1985) fails to recognise structures as implicit in the form of class relations. For Jessop,

structures connote a system of causal mechanisms which provide social spaces for human

activities. While these activities are vital for the reproduction of structures, the structural

framework is seen as existing independently from human relations. Human relations appear

merely as attendant upon structural laws.

The world of structures is said to be complex because of its division into different regions, each

having its own causal power and liabilities. Further, these regions are said to involve hierarchies,

with some regions emergent from others but reacting back on them. Each region is itself

stratified, comprising not only a level of real causal mechanisms and liabilities but also the levels

on which such powers are actualised and/or- can be empirically examined (Jessop 1988).

Jessops reformulation of the base-superstructure metaphor and of descriptive sociology

associated with Poulantzas takes for granted the separation of social relations into distinctive

structural systems. It also seeks to proliferate these structures by dividing basic structures into

stratified subsystems. These subsystems, as will be shown below, are said to have their own

distinct determinations, logics and laws, subduing and undermining resistance to capitalist

reproduction.

How does Jessop conceptualise, or better, reformulate the Marxian idea of the enchanted and

perverted world of capitalism (Marx) ? Jessop does not deny that there is an inner relation

between different social systems. However, and in contradistinction to approaches predicated

on the notion of an antagonistic constitution of social relations, Jessop thematises this unity in

terms of a positivist social theory. The unity between different systems is founded on the notion

of natural necessities. The sui generis operation of social systems is understood as contingently

realising the natural necessities of capitalism. Jessop avoids providing any answers to the

question as to the constitution of these necessities. The necessities are assumed to be naturaI

necessities. The determination of natural remains unexplained. And yet, the notion of natural

necessities is of crucial importance for what Jessop describes as bis realist ontological approach

(see Jessop 1988) [5]. As will be argued below, Jessops realist ontology is predicated on the

notion that the real defies analysis. Before explaining this further, Jessops dialectic between

structure and strategy needs to be clarified in more detail. Jessop has to account for the fact

that the capitalist system moves. This leads him to introduce, on an empirical level. the notion of

many subjects. We are thus confronted with the notions of, on the one band, a sui


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generis operation of different regions, and, on the other, of a plurality of empirically observable

subjects. The dualism between structural determination and many subjects destroys the Marxian

notion of a contradictory constitution of social relations since human relations are understood as

external from structural determination. The notion of many subjects is incomprehensible

because it is premised on the concept of natural necessities which exist independently from, and

whose development is not limited to, human existence. The positivist concept of natural

necessities connotes a thing-like structure which determines social relations. As a consequence,

the concept of class dissolves into the pluralist notion of interest-groups, each of which relates to

emergent structural ensembles in its own way. Jessops pluralist reformulation of the Marxist

notion of class is not uncommon in the Marxist tradition. In the days of the DIAMA T-style

Marxism of the Stalin years, social development was seen as being determined by technological

development. The irony of Jessops approach is that his updating of Marxism reintroduces an

understanding of history in terms of an adaptation of social relations to the functional

requirements of the productive forces [6]. While Jessop proclaims against such an interpretation

of his views, his dualism between natural necessity and many subjects is complicit in the

reintroduction of old-style orthodoxy.

b) Causal Mechanisms and Social Conflict

If one were to follow Jessops notion of thesui generis operation of different systems founded on

natural necessities, how would one be able to understand the contingent realisation of

capitalist reproduction ? The first answer to this question is that this realisation cannot be

conceptualised because the notion of contingency prohibits any grasp on the real movement of

capitalist development. However, according to Jessop, the scientific mind can, nevertheless,

reveal tendential causal mechanisms whose outcome depends on specific initial conditions as

well as on the contingent interaction among tendencies and countertendencies (Jessop 1988, p.

9). Tendencies, such as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and countertendencies, such as

the countertendencies to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, comprise different,

substantially unconnected mechanisms of the abstract structure of capitalism. These

mechanisms operate within the economic domain. Tendencies and countertendencies, although

externally related to each other, stand to each other in a relation of interdependency, thus

reciprocally transforming their sui generis operation. The articulation as between tendencies and

countertendencies establish the laws of motion of capitalism. The unfolding of these laws

provide causal mechanisms. These mechanisms establish the natural necessities of capitalist


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reproduction in terms of structural moments which define the framework of social actions.

Structural moments are both constraining and facilitating in regard to the interests of social

subjects. The laws themselves are understood to be underdetermined. The results of capitalist

reproduction do not follow the unfolding of these laws because these laws need to be activated

in specific conjunctural conditions. Thus, while there are causal mechanisms, the actual results

of these mechanisms depend on empirical conditions which, as was reported above, defy

conceptualisation. Jessop denies that there is a single objective logic of capitalist development

which transcends all particularities (Jessop 1988/1991). He deduces from this denial the

separation of abstract theory from real results, that is, from empirical data. He insists that the

development of capitalism is always mediated through historically specific institutional forms,

regulatory institutions and norms of conduct, such as the wage relations, forms of competition,

monetary emission, the state, the international commercial and financial system and the norms

of conduct and modes of calculation which correspond to these institutional forms, etc. (Jessop

1988/1991, p. 151). Jessop fails to show how this list can be integrated conceptually and how it

can be applied to concrete analysis. Further, the mediating elements of historical development

are dependent on human agency at the same time as they stand above, and are thus not limited

to, human agency. The upshot is a system of natural structures which define the structural

framework within which social conflict unfolds. The social conflict is construed in terms of its

functionality, that is, as a means of reinforcing the status quo. Conflict is understood as a

creative means of balancing and hence maintaining a society. It helps to create and modify

norms, and assures the continuance of the system of natural necessities under changed

conditions. Thus, the theory of regulation is, for Jessop, concerned with the modus vivendiof a

complex process of mutual adjustment and accomodation within and among different institutions

in empiricaIly observable conjunctures.

c) Rack to the Closure and Positivism of determinist Sociology

Jessops conjunctural reformulation of the notion of the relative autonomy dwells on the idea of

intermediate concepts[7]. These are seen as being necessary if the gap between generic and

specific analysis is to be bridged. What is taken for granted, here, is a dualistic separation of the

generic from the specific, since, otherwise, there would be no gap to bridge. However, the net

resuIt of this reformulation is not sufficient because it merely reproduces the problems of the

base-superstructure metaphor in sociological terms. This is so because the conjuncturaI

approach has to identify key variables, such as technological development from mass assembly


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lines to new technology or shifting articulations of the economy and politics, which make

everything clear. The identification of key variables abuts on to a determinism and by doing so

marginalises class from the analysis. The conjunctural analysis makes a methodological principle

out of the notion of multiple determinations. so permitting a sociological analysis in terms of the

separation of social life into different distinct economic and political features. For example, the

state-system can adopt specifically fascist or authoritarian or bourgeois-liberal or fordist or

post-fordist forms. The idea of form as a species of something more generic has underpinned

both DIAMA T-style conceptions of general laws which have to be applied to specific social

instances and the conjunctional approach which focuses on intermediate concepts to bridge the

gap between the abstract level of general laws and their concrete application. The concrete is

not seen as a mode of existence of social relations but, rather, as a specific articulation of more

general laws of natural necessity. The consequence of this understanding is that the approach

can identify static structures only because human relations appear merely attendent upon

structural laws. Further, the identification of key variables not only reinforces the idea of

structural laws but provides, also, a sociology of interconnected features without being able to

specify the theoretical relationships between the various elements of the supposed concrete

articulation of structures is, for example, the form of Post-Fordism. Theory becomes non-binding

and arbitrary. This is so because the dualist separations of a fetishised world - the separations of

struggle from structure and of one region of society from another are not called into question

but taken for granted, as the principle of social thought. The separation between structure and

struggle entails a deterministic conceptualisation of capital in that capital becomes a structure of

inescapable lines of development, subordinating social practice to predetermined laws.

In response to his critics, Jessop reasserts that his approach includes the class struggle and that

proper attention is given to its movement. And at the same rime, he insists emphatically that

capital is not class struggle (Jessop 1991). How can one understand these conflicting

statements ? For Jessop, the structure-strategy dialectic does not separate struggle form

structure but shows their complex forms of interaction. The dialectics between structure and

struggle is construed in terms of system theorys conflict theory, so making the disarticulation of

structure and struggle the methodological principle of his approach. For Jessop, the real world of

capitalism is subject to change through the sui generis operation of different regions whose

articulation is dependent on, but not limited to, the action of social subjects. Jessops conception

of social development indicates a degree of voluntarism which, however. is limited by the dualist

conception of structure and struggle : that is. it is restricted by the existence of objective laws


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and thus by an objectively given range of options. The term strategy is based upon the

recognition of structurally-given conditions. Jessop uses the term strategy as a concept with

which to grasp the subjective notion of decision-taking and the importance of subjective action

within history. Jessops voluntarist approach is a product of his disarticulation between structure

and class struggle. This disarticulation leads to a deterministic understanding of social

development in which obeisance may be paid to class struggle, but what really counts is the

inescapable lines of tendency and logic of direction established by the objective laws of capitalist

development. The activation of these laws depends on human subjects operating within a

structurally defined environment. Jessops failure to understand the contradictory unity of

structure and struggle leads him to separate human agency from structure, and conversely,

structure from human agency. This dualism underlies his voluntarist approach to subjective

action within history : voluntarism and determinism have always been happy enough to sec

structures as constraining action and action as, complementarily, the limit of the effectivity of

social structures. As a consequence, there is, in Jessop, a dichotomy between a determinist

conception of capitalist development and a voluntarist conception of social action. Jessop

attempts to resolve this dichotomy by declaring the real results of capitalist development to be

contingent [8]. The positivism, structuralism and voluntarism of Jessops approach is

characterized by an understanding of class struggle as a means of reproducing the

structures [9].

Jessop maintains that the transition from one form, such as Fordism, to another form, such as

Post-Fordism, depends on class struggle. He emphasises, however, there there is no objective

developmental logic of capital that inevitably and painlessly ensures passage from one regime to

another (Jessop 1983). The class struggle seems thus to be separated from its mode of

existence and becomes merely one factor amongst others in the contingent and relative

historical development [10]. This is so because the real is understood to be indeterminable

since the real is the outcome of an infinite number of empirical factors, so making capitalist

development contingent and relative. This, however, means that the real world of social conflict

cannot be conceptualised because of its contingent character and its infinite plurality of

determinations. As a consequence, capitalist exploitation of labour in the real world of

empirically observable facts defies analysis. While the analysis is said to focus on the concrete,

the latters movement cannot be conceptualized. This contradiction that is, the contradiction

between determinism and voluntarism - is resolved by Jessop in an irrational and romantic

fashion. The concrete is seen as being determined by capital as a transhistorical subject. Before
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dwelling on this romantic and irrational conception of capital in more detail, attention is focused

on Jessops destruction of the Marxian notion of class antagonism.

d) Pluralism, Determinism and Sociologism

Jessop understands the Marxian notion of capitalist social relations as a means of articulating

different systems and, on a lower level of abstraction, of articulating different laws of motion.

The distinction between different systems and laws is already problematic since it destroys the

notion of the inner relationship between different phenomena. The inner nature is abstractly

conceived in terms of the obscure concept of natural necessities. The concrete is construed in

terms of a combination of causal mechanisms and natural necessities. Conceptually

mechanisms and natural necessities are not connected with each other. The concrete is the

result of contingent developments based upon a pluralist diversity of social conflicts which are

merely constrained and/or facilitated by the structural selectivity inscribed in structures. The

conditions of the realisation of a mode of articulation remain indeterminate and contingent. As a

consequence, the articulation of different regions cannot be conceptualised because its

realization is a chance discovery(Fundsache). The empiricism of Jessops approach goes hand-

in-hand with its formalism.

Jessops approach is characterized by the attempt to derive social conflict from pre -formed

categories, so subordinating history to structural laws. The historical constitution of these laws is

presupposed in terms of a logical construct.

It is clear that Jessops approach entails a systematic attempt to destroy the conceptual links

which permit an analysis of the mode of existence of class antagonism. The laws of capitalist

accumulation are not conceived of as a mode of existence of class antagonism but, rather, as a

structural framework which determines the empirically observable class conflict in the real world.

However, class conflict is seen as playing an important part in the reproduction of capitalist

development insofar as the activation of the causal mechanisms of capitalist reproduction

requires active human agents.

Jessop argues that capitalist domination is realised through an emergent and impersonal and

quasi-natural network of social connections. This network is reproduced by human agents and,

according to Jessop, could never be understood without referring to their actions. He insists,

however, that it would be wrong to conceive of class struggle as the starting point because class


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struggle is one of the mechanisms in and through which capital accumulation is analysed. The

understanding of the class struggle as a mechanism of capitalist reproduction calls for objective

sociological criteria with which to establish the class relevance of social antagonism (Jessop

1991). The class character of social subjects is defined in terms of their relation to the value

form. For Jessop, the key to deciphering the structural framework of class antagonism is the

concept of surplus value (ibid., p. 148). It is the dominance of the value form in a system of

generalized commodity production which is seen as determining the conceptual identity of

classes, the nature of class relations, the forms of class struggle and the totalizing dynamic of

class struggle and competition within the capitalist mode of production (ibid.).

For Jessop, the value forrn is better understood as a meta-form (ibid.). This notion is founded on

Jessops genus - species distinction. The value meta-form describes the structural framework

within which different forms of value, such as productive, financial, commercial capital, compete

with each other. They compete with each other within the circuit of capital whose structure is

abstractly defined by the value meta-form. Within the circuit of capital we find, according to

Jessop, different logics of capital. These logics connote different accumulation strategies of

competing capital fractions. The value meta-form does not fully determine the course of

accumulation but only the institutional logic and directional dynamic of capitalism, in itself

indeterminate. The value form thus in Jessops view needs to be determined at more concrete

levels of analysis, those of the competitive relation between different capital logics and class

struggle. The value form needs to be overdetermined by an economic class struggle in which

the balance of class forces is moulded by many factors beyond the value form itself (Jessop

1983, p. 90).

The value form is understood not as a process in and through which social relations appear in

the form of relations between things, but as a thing-like structure which determines social

relations. This inversion underlies the empiricism of Jessops approach, according to which it is

contingent institutional forms and political conflicts which determine the development of value

relations and the course of accumulation (Clarke 1991, p. 49 fn 24). The value meta-form

defines the coherence of the capitalist mode of production, a coherence which is achieved, in

practice, through the contingent forces of social conflict in the real world.

The value meta-form is seen merely as constraining, externally, the room for manoeuvre of

different capital logics. The conception of the value form as a value metaform is tautological.

This is so because the determination of the value meta-form in the real world of contesting

social forces presupposes the practical existence of the value meta-form, and vice


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versa. However, according to Jessop, the value meta-form is seen as external to its own

determination. This destruction of the Marxian notion of the inner nature of capital is

complemented by the empiricisrn of Jessops approach. For Jessop what realy counts is the

observable pluralism of the contest over income resources. The category of labour is conceived

of in terms of the wage relation which is founded on nothing but itself. Capitalist exploitative

relations are understood in terms of a pluralist distribution struggle over income between the

working class and different capital logics. However, the understanding of social conflict in terms

of empirically observable facts ofdistributive struggles destroys an understanding ofcapital as

an exploitative social relation. Jessops empiricism is complemented by his technicist reading

ofthe law ofvalue. This law is understood as governing the allocation oflabour-time among

different productive activities. The law ofvalue is understood as standing above the class

struggle.

Jessop destroys an understanding ofthe capital-labour relation as an exploitative relation

because he construes class antagonism as external tothe trajectory dynamic ofcapitalism.

Both capital and labour are conceived as human bearers ofstructural laws which stand above

the social conflict. By putting his argument in this way, Jessop treats capital and labour as both

victims ofstructural laws and as creative powers transforming structural forms within the

framework ofnatural necessity. However, this is not tosay that the notion ofthe real power

ofcompetitive struggle and class conflict is conceived ofin terms merely ofan equilibrium

between the social contestants. The combination ofstructural laws and sites ofcontest

reintroduces capital as a transhistorical subject whose dynamic logic is theoretically

presupposed and whose realisation is empirically observable. Within the relation ofcapital and

labour, the class struggle is subordinated tothe basic forms and dynamics ofcapital as the

dominant force (bergreifende Subjekt) (Jessop 1991. p. 165). What this, however, means is

that the social conflict is understood merely in terms ofa theory ofcapital regulation. As Jessop

puts it, the multification ofinstitutional forms and regulative mechanisms ... actually create

significant barriers to a general attack on the capital relation by fragmenting and disorganizing

opposition and resistance and/or channelling it along particular paths where it threatens legs

harm to the core institutions ofcapitalism (Jessop 1988, p. 43). In sum, class conflict is merely

an essential moment in the expanded reproduction ofcapital. The class conflict does not as such

create the totality of nor does it give rise to [capitalisms] dynamic trajectory (Jessop 1991, p.

154). This is because the conceptual identity ofclasses is given by the capital relation itself

rather than being constrained by classes which shape the capital relation (ibid.). The capital


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relation stands above class relations. For Jessop, it would be more accurate to conclude that

class antagonism arises because ofthe inherent quality ofthe capital-labour relation than that

this relation is antagonistic because ofthe contingent occurence ofclass struggle and/or

competition (Jessop 1991, pp. 1501). Jessop thus insists that capital is not an antagonistic

social relation and that the antagonism ofclasses arises only in the real world ofmultiple

determination. The Marxist notion ofclass antagonism is thus destroyed in favour ofa

sociological conception ofempirically observable modalities ofsocial conflict. What sense can be

made ofJessops concept capital-labour relation? The capital relation defines the natural

necessity ofcapitalism in terms ofabstract structures, causal mechanisms and capital as an

ideal subject. While proclaiming against the notion ofclass subjectivity, Jessop reintroduces

capital as an ideal subject. The understanding ofcapital as an bergreifendes Subjektmeans,

fundamentally, that the articulation ofcausal mechanisms in the real world ofmultiple

determinations is achieved by the subjectivity ofcapital. While the world is conceived as a world

ofcontingently realized natural necessities (Jessop 1988), the notion ofcontingency relates

only tothe ability ofcapital to achieve a sustained reproduction on the basis ofa successful

accumulation strategy. Jessops structuralist and posivist approach finds it difficuIt to explain

how social conflict and structures interrelate. His equation ofclass struggle with capitalist

strategies is a characteristic response tothis problem.

e) Many Subjects and the Return of Idealism

For Jessop, the real world comprises a complex synthesis of multiple determinations. The

synthesis is seen as being achieved through a process without a subject (Jessop

1985,1988/1991). However, for Jessop, this does not mean that there are no active subjects. On

the contrary, the actualization ofthe natural necessity ofcapitalism is achieved through a

plurality ofcontesting forces : any natural necessity ofcapitalism must be reproduced through

social practices which are always (and inevitably) definite social practices, articulated more or

less closely as moments in specific modes of regulation (Jessop 1988. p. 34). Jessop seeks to

resolve the contradiction between the notion of a process without a subject and the subjectivity

of capital (capitalisthe subject: Jessop 1991, p. 150)) by differentiating capital, as mentioned

above, into a series of logics which are defined in terms of different allocation interests.

Different social subjects pursue different interests, the realisation of which depends on the

facilitating framework of structural moments. Each of these logics is in competition with each

other, so permitting a pluralist struggle between different capital interests. There is no logic of


14/26

capital but a series of logics with a family resemblance, corresponding to different modes of

regulation and accumulation regimes (ibid.). The family resemblance mentioned by Jessop

connotes the notion of capital as an bergreifendes Subjekt. Alternative accumulation

strategies connote the activities of different capital subjects seeking to establish a specific

regime of accumulation within the limits of the value form. The term accumulation strategy

indicates a degree of voluntarism which, however, is limited by the dualist conception of

structure and struggle : that is, it is restricted by the existence of objective laws (or : abstract

tendencies) and thus by an objectively given range of options. The term strategy is based upon

the recognition of structurally-given conditions. The dual perspective of structural determination

and class position (Jessop 1985, p. 344) connotes the power of social subjects to modify the

abstract tendencies of capitalism in and through a stable articulation between the invariant

elements of capitalism and the variant elements emergent in different specific forms such as

Fordism and/or Post-Fordism (see Jessop 1988, p. 34). The thing-like structure of the value form

plays the role of an external economic structure which passively defines the limits within which

pluralist social subjects and historical contingency can determine the course of accumulation.

f) Conflict Theory and Empiricism

How does an accumulation strategy succeed ? The term accumulation strategy is founded on

the notion that the social body is incoherent. The segmented parts of this body have no unit y

until they are coordinated into a strategy by a somehow hidden agency of condensation. This

agency cannot be theorized because the result of the dualist movement between structural

determination and class position is said to be contingent. The only indicator as to the character

of this agency is contained in Jessops pluralist conception of social conflict based on the relative

autonomy of the economic, political and ideological domains. For Jessop, the realization of

capitalist development is dependent on the action of different social subjects whose class

positions comprise distinct modes of calculation, patterns of strategic conduct and forms of

struggle. This means that the transition to, for example, Post-Fordism is a resuIt of interactions

on many different terrains and among many different forces. The relative success or failure of a

strategy is seen as depending on unrecognized structural conditions of action [11].

In order to gain purchase on the systemic conditions of action, Jessop distinguishes between

broadly four structural levels. These levels are, first, the empirically observable regularities in

social relations ; second, the basic forms of social relations which together comprise a social

formation ; third, the network of institutions and organisations comprising a social order ; and.


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lastly, the structural constraints and conjuncturaI opportunities provided by structural

development for social actors (Jessop 1988, p. 38). According to Jessop, the first level, i.e. the

empirically observable regularities in social relations, does not offer much purchase on the

systemic conditions of action. This is so because it does not provide direct evidence concerning

the basic structures as they resuIt from changing combinations of real mechanisms and

contingent circumstances. The second level, i.e. the basic forms of social relations is too abstract

to give much purchase on strategic conduct. The third level, i.e. the network of institutions,

gives purchase on strategic conduct but it needs to be specified further so as to bring out its

strategic relevance. It is the fourth level which is crucial. Structures need to be examined

relationally, that is, in terms of their structural constraints and conjuncturaI opportunities which

emerge from the strategic orientation of social forces (ibid.).

The mutual conditioning of strategies and variant structures implies that regulation theory has to

analyse the correspondence between the strategic selectivity inscribed in a given mode of

regulation, including the modes of calculation of strategic conduct adopted by social forces to

sustain and/or to transform a given mode of regulation. The notion of structural selectivity

connotes the objectively given range of options available for acting social subjects seeking to

impose some sort of institutional coherence and direction upon a confusing myriad of competing

interests. This is a pluralist conception of social conflict based upon structurally defined

conjunctural moments. These moments involve such elements which can be altered by a given

agent (or set of agents) following their strategic line. Structural ensembles and conjunctural

moments are seen as complex and changeable. The boundaries and activities of structural

ensembles are defined as unstable and the world of strategies is seen as pluralistic and

conjunctural (Jessop 1988). In order to get a hold on the contingent realization of capitalist

development, Jessop advises us to analyse the complex relationship between structural

selectivity inscribed in structures and the structural transformations produced through strategic

interactions of human agents.

How can one understand the emergence of definite social practices which articulate the

structural selectivity in strategic terms ? According to Jessop, the same structural clement can

operate as a structural constraint for some agent(s) at the same rime as it presents itself to

other agent(s) as a "conjunctural opportunity" (Jessop 1988. p. 38). For Jessop, this means that

a scientist has to concentrate on the need of capital in order to be able to assess the strategic

relevance of atomized social agents or groups of agents. However, the need of capital bas to be

assessed strategically in relation to complex conjonctures rather than formally in terms of an


16/26

abstract, purely economic, circuit of capital (Jessop 1988/1991, p. 155). How can one define the

need of capital in conjunctural terms ? Since the concrete cannot be theorized (see above), the

need of capital can only be assessed in terms ofa pre-formed and functionalist conception of

the natural necessities of the capitalist system. As already discussed, Jessop sees different social

structures as merelyconstraining and facilitating. This notion is bound up with an endorsement

of the natural necessity of capitalism in terms of structural laws. These laws stand above the

class struggle and entail the existence of capital as anbergreifendes Subjekt. Jessops attempt

to gain purchase on the structure-transforming actions of social subjects reintroduces the notion

of capital as an bergreifendes Subjekt. This notion destroys the concept of pluralist social

subjects which was introduced in order to avoid an approach predicated on the notion of a

transhistorical subject. For Jessop, structures are explicit reference points for strategic

calculations and comprise partly recognised and partially unacknowledged sets of structural

constraints and conjunctural opportunities. In order to understand the realisation of capital

reproduction in the real world, Jessop urges us to focus on the need of capital, a need which is

already presupposed abstractly. As a consequence, Jessops notion of the action of social

subjects is not only predicated on a sort of individualistic reformulation of the Marxian notion of

class struggle but also, and as a mater of entirely distinct theorising, on a sort of idealist

reformulation of capital as a transhistorical subject. All social subjects are seen as mere

participants in the global capitalist subject. Social conflicts are thus seen as facilitating forces

which reproduce the capitalist system in the real world of opportunity. Social conflict is thus

construed as a creative force. The structurally transforming action of social subjects is creative

in that it articulates structural opportunities in practical terms, so realizing the dynamic direction

and institutional logic of capital in the real world.

g) Theory : An End in itself

However, even if one were to accept Jessops reformulation of Marxism, it remains still unclear

how the incoherent body of pluralist struggles can be transformed into a definite strategy. In

order to understand how capitalism is reproduced we must examine the structural selectivity

inscribed in structures (Jessop 1988/1991. p. 159). How can one understand structural

selectivity? Jessop tackles this problem by stressing that it would be wrong to reduce a

structural category to, and/or derive it from, a strategic category, and to derive a single strategy

from a given structure (Jessop 1988, p. 41). This is so because structural categories belong to

the realm of the system which is disconnected from the concrete realm of social practices and


17/26

because there are always competing strategies. Further, the relationship between different

structural elements have only a relative unity. Lastly, the outcome of the dialectic between

structure and strategy is always contingent. Still, what constitutes selectivity ? It seems there is

no answer to this question and to the question of how the reciprocal transformation of structures

and strategies is realised in the real world of capitalism. This, however, means that theory loses

its truth criteria. Jessop insists that structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities emerge

from the strategic orientation of social forces (Jessop 1988, p. 38). In turn, however, this means

that structural selectivity is defined by and remains at the mercy of- the contingently emerging

transformation of social reality. This, further, implies that the notion of structural selectivity

defies conceptualization and that it can be observed only empirically. As in Critical Realism (see

Gunn 1991a,b), Jessops argument comprises a vicious circularity of presuppositions. He

presupposes structural selectivity as conditioning the action of social subjects and then he

presupposes that structural constraints emerge from the strategic conduct of social subjects.

Each is supposed to make sense of the other. In other words, the real world lies outside theorys

grasp. Jessops realist ontologyturns against itself as much as, therefore, it offers no concept

of the real. The upshot of Jessops attempt to reformulate Marxism is a nominalist and

normative theory. Jessops (1986a, 1990) flirtation with Luhmann is logically conclusive as it

faciliates the destruction of Marxist theory in favour of a descriptive sociology concerned with

system maintenance.

If one were to follow Jessop, all theory would be able to achieve is to say that the real world is

changing within a framework of structurally defined parameters whose concrete implications

defy conceptualisation. According to Jessop we know that there are different subjects who se

activities are more or less coordinated, whose activities meet more or less resistance from other

forces, and whose strategies are pursued within a structural context which is both constraining

and facilitating (Jessop 1988, p. 43). We know also that there are signifiant barriers to a general

attack on the capital relation (ibid.), that there is a real scope for class struggle and that the

success of the nth strategy depends on its complementarity to all other relevant strategies

within the overall structural ensemble (ibid. pp. 42,43). This body of knowledge, however, is

insubstantial because of the complex web of cont ingencies. Any conceptualisation of the real is

doomed to failure because the real world is a world of discovery and of contingently emergent

realities. Regulation is, consequently, defined as a study of the complex process of mutual

adjustment and accomodation within and among different institutions (Jessop 1988/1991, p.

152). The research project of regulation theory degenerates iota a merely empirical study of


18/26

institutional intersections ; and a research project lacking a conceptual framework is a

contradiction in terms.

h) The Retum of the State

On the assomption that the only purchase on the real world is some sort of empiricist

descriptive sociology, how is it possible to comprehend, despite the complex jungle of multiple

social forces, a definite accumulation strategy ? Jessop insists that there are a number of

alternative accumulation strategies expressing different fractional interests and alliances. There

is thus a need for an external power to impose regulative mechanisms upon the plurality of

contesting capital logics. This power is the state. Jessop brings the state back in as the

totalizing regulative institution. For Jessop (1983), the pattern of accumulation is uItmately

determined by the accumulation strategy adopted by the state. However, there is no unique

accumulation strategy available to the state but, rather, a range of alternative strategies. Does

the state therefore simply take an arbitrary decision ? To understand which accumulation

strategy is adopted by the state requires an analysis of political conflicts through which strategic

issues are resolved (see Jessop 1983). The political conflicts between different accumulation

strategies is discussed in terms of different hegemonic projects (Jessop 1983,1985). Jessop

claims that the interplay between structural development and hegemonic strategies provide

mechanisms that melt different social systems together, so permitting a corresponding social

cohesion of ideological, political and economic patterns.

V. Multiple Determinations and Thatcherism

Jessop understood Thatcherism as a hegomonic project which breaks with the past by

developing towards Post-Fordism (see Jessop 1986b). Thatcherism was seen as an interplay of

trial-and-error policies which concide with relative autonomous forces of the market (ibid., p.

8). Jessops approach replays the determinist-voluntarist dichotomy so typical of structuralist

approaches. Social reality is, in Jessop, constituted by the independent logics of political and

ideological domains, forcing the scientific mind to follow, in descriptive terms, the strategic line

of capital in the face of various dilemmas, risks, uncertainties and complexities, emergent

strategies, trial and error techniques etc. (Jessop et al. 1988, p. 8). The articulation between

different complex determinations was achieved by Thatcherism. As a consequence "Thatcherism"

was reified as a subject which stands above class relations. This is, given the insistence that


19/26

complex historical phenomena are best analysed as a complex resultant of multiple

determinations (ibid., p. 53), a surprising move. Thatcherism was said to have known

instinctively that there could be no way back to the old Keynesian welfare state (Jessop 1986b,

p. 8). How did Thatcherism "know" ?

Jessop (et al. 1988) emphasized the development and specifity of the emergent strategic line

pursued by Thatcher (p. 8). His work focused on actual strategies and policies and their ad hoc

emergent character (p. 8). Since Thatcherism was a strategic line (p. 9) and since there is no

single causal mechanism determining social development (p. 53), political events need to be

seen as a complex product of many different causes and circumstances (p. 29). In order to

understand what happens, an adequate account which searches for deeper significances of

historical development must establish the mediations between underlying and more immediate

causes (p. 29). What needs to be done ? Since the theory is deemed to be correct, Jessop

asserted that there are many Thatcherisms (p. 9). This deeper knowledge derived both from a

priori theoretical arguments and from our post hoc reflections on changes in the strategic line

adopted by Thatcherism (p. 9). The notion of Thatcherism was thus based on the idea that the

real cannot be determined since there are many causes and an infinite number of factors.

However, Jessop destroys the interesting notion of many Thatcherisms by declaring that

Thatcherism has adopted a strategic line. If there were many Thatcherisms, how, then, could

one depict Thatcherisms strategic line ? A strategic line evolved from the strategic vision of

Thatcherism (p. 11). This vision had given direction and coherence to policies in the face of

structural dilemmas, political failures, emerging contradictions and resistance. The notion of a

multiplicity of diverse factors was further undermined by Jessops economic determinism. He

argued that Thatcherisms vision was determined economically. This is so because one needs to

have an understanding of the decisive economic nucleus of hegemony in order to sec the

structural source of power (p. 16). Did Thatcherism "know" because it expressed the functionally

presupposed need of capital ?

Jessop supplies a theoretical maze. On the one band, there is no single cause, whilst, on the

other, the economic is determining. On the one band, Jessop isolates different phenomena from

the social whole, and, on the other, he seeks to reconnect phenomena in an external way. On

the one hand, Jessop proposes the separation of social existence into different structural

regions, and, on the other, he seeks to articulate the specific interconnections ofthese regions.

On the one band, Jessop claims that there are underlying laws ofmotion, and, on the other, he

introduces subjective mechanisms for these laws actualization. Jessop urges that the real is


20/26

indeterminable since it is mediated by an infinite number of factors. At the same time, he

introduces a subject (Thatcherism) which leads the UK towards Post-Fordism. Jessops

assessment of the need of capital is not only based upon a theoretical maze but also on a

tautological description ofsocial reality. First of all the outward appearance of reality is taken for

granted (multiple causes), and then it is in the light of this outward appearance of reality that

social development is assessed. By attempting to grasp the development of the British state in

this way, his analysis of Thatcherism proliferates structures which are not only static and

fetishized but who se theoretical status remains unclear.

Given this, what sense can be attached to the notion of a left alternative to the (thatcherist)

transition to Post-Fordism ? In general terms, an alternative strategy must take into account the

constraining and facilitating selectivity of structures. Different calculating subjects are differently

located in relation to structural constraint and opportunity and they calculate their strategies

over different time horizons and/or spatial boundaries (Jessop 1988, p. 42). A left alternative

must learn from Thatcherism because it must take into account current changes and adapt its

strategy to them (Jessop 1988/1991, p. 163). Further, the viability of alternative strategies

depends on their strategic conduct over a more or legs extensive social terrain, embracing

various fields of action. Any viable alternative strategy has to enter into different types of

alliances with other social forces (Jessop 1988, p. 42). The upshot is a left hegemonic project,

installating an accumulation regime based on party spirit (ibid., p. 50). The party is the place in

which social forces acquire consciousness, thereby transcending individualism and the corporate

interests of specific groups. It is through the parties that classes become the state [12]. He

affirms the view of Haeusler/Hirsch (1987), according to which the party system plays a key

role in mediating between the state and individuals and institutions in society (Jessop 1988, pp.

50-1). However, the aggregation of man y pluralistic, antagonistic interests in society and

pressures of electoral competition involves that the parties of government both facilitate and

legitimate relatively coherent state actions concerned with societal reproduction (ibid. p. 51).

What needs to be done ? In the absence of a revolutionary party, revolution has to be

postponed sine dei(see Holloway 1991,1992). By implication, Marxist theory has to

accommodate to the conjuncturaI opportunities created by structural selectivity. Marxist theory

has to become a more sophisticated theory of capitalist regulation so as to effect a leftist

refashioning of the real world of capitalism. Unfortunately, given the complexities and

contingencies of the real world and the systemic constraints on action, Jessop and his co-authors

refrain from providing detailed recommendations for the Labour Party or the Left. Their concern


21/26

is rather to outline the broad issues that any successful left strategy must confront (Jessop et al.

1987). Altogether this outline is restricted to the parameters of existing reality. The Left has to

confront the existing post-fordist realities in order to articulate a viable hegemonic project and to

ensure its popular appeal so as to reform the institutions of social administration in a fair and

just way. In sum, the political implications of Jessops reformulation of regulation theory are that

Marxism has to refrain from the scholarly work of negation [13] in favour of advising political

groups as to the development of norms, modes of ca1culation and procedures which could gain

popular support Marxism has to supply sociological knowledge concerning the conjunctural

opportunities already inscribed in structural development. Marxism needs to assume the role of

a political adviser. The political implication of Jessops approach is that of an opportunist politics

of the conjuncture, aiming at effecting a leftist activation of natural necessities.

VI. Conclusion

Approaches such as Jessops, which are predicated on the disarticulation of structure and

struggle, involve no internal connection between the political and the economic on the basis of

the constitutive power of labour. The central methodological misunderstanding of such

approaches is the separation of the social whole into different regions each of which is seen as

having its formaI structure, its own laws and logic. Such approaches cannot take account of

fundamental historical developments in and through the constitutive power of labour because

labour plays no role in the internal logic of the different regions. Labour is separated from capital

and is reduced to merely an empirical factor of a historical development which is both contingent

and relative. Instead of investigating the constitution and forms of social materiality, such

approaches raise the formal aspect of social existence (i.e. the fragmented character of society)

to the level of an methodological principle. At the same time, these approaches are forced to

introduce subjective notions, such as accumulation strategy or hegemonic project, so as to

provide a link between perceived modalities of the states concrete existence (e.g. the fordist

state) and its formal structure. These subjective notions are, in turn, constrained by the

systemic rules and "natural necessities" of capitalism.

Jessops approach is a typical response to the methodological misunderstanding of structuralism.

He aims at giving greater weight to historical analysis by combining abstract theory with a

theory of historical developments. The combination of the concrete with an abstract theoretical

structure implies the modelling of social phenomena on to pre-formed concepts which for their

part are placed at the mercy of the historical contingency they seek to render intelligible. In


22/26

other words the concepts stand above historical developments. An analysis which takes the

fragmented character of bourgeois society for granted and which seeks to trace the causal

interconnections of such fragments can not grasp their historical development because it refuses

to risk the methodic assertion of the real in and through abstraction.

An approach such as Jessops, turning as it does upon structural integration, is an approach

which is complicit in the fetishisation of human relations as relations of things. Further, such an

approach runs the risk of conceptual collapse. Thisis so because such an approach can not

justify its concepts. For example, the assumption that the real world is divided into different

regions raises the question of the interdependence, that is, the structural adequacy of different

regions such as the political. Firstly, to what is the political adequate ; secondly, what

determines the adequacy of the political ; thirdly, what is the criterion with which to define

adequacy ? Only three solutions are possible. Firstly, the adequacy of the political is measured in

terms of its output concerning the requirements of the economic. Such a solution opens the way

for an economistic Marxism, the political superstructure arising from it however sophisticated a

fashion the economic base. Such a view concentrates on the economic as the determining

structure, thug making the political merely attendant upon the inescapable lines of economic

development. The second solution is to introduce a new set of concepts with which to justify the

first level of concepts. However, the new set of concepts needs to be justified itself, leading to

the introduction of new concepts and so on. This solution reproduces the problem it claims to

resolve through an infinite regress of metatheories (see Gunn 1989). The third solution is to

abnegate a conceptual understanding in favour of a descriptive sociology of corresponding

features among different subsystems. Such a solution sees the economic and the political as

autonomous systems which generate causal interrelations through asui generis operation of

their internal laws. As a consequence, theory must identify reciprocal elements which exist in

different subsystems (e.g. mass production and demand management and the ideology of social

consensus). No explanation can be given of how a reciprocal matrix of mutually supporting

elements develops. The only possible explanation is to declare such a matrix to be a contingent

articulation among different autonomous systems. This solution interprets historical development

in terms of its more or legs close approximation to a model whose elements are not

conceptualised but, rather, presupposed. The problem of justifying concepts is thereby avoided

only because the historical development is understood to be contingent, thus allowing the

concepts to be contingent and arbitrary themselves. Further the concepts can be readily justified

on the basis of the real: it is what it is. Since, for example, we can observe the hegemonic


23/26


24/26

Aglietta 1979,A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, Verso : London.

Agnoli 1990, Die Destruktion aIs Bestimmung des Gelehrten in drftiger Zeit, Konkret1/1990.

Bonefeld 1987/1991, Reformulation of State Theory,Capital&Class n 33. reprinted in

Bonefeld/Holloway (eds.) 1991.

Bonefeld 1992, Social Constitution and the Form of the Capitalist State in Bonefeld / Gunn /

Psychopedis 1992a. Bonefeld / Holloway (eds.) 1991. Post-Fordism and Social Form :A Marxist

Dedate on the Post-Fordist State Macmillan : London.

Bonefeld / Gunni (eds.) 1992a, Open Marxism Vol 1 : History and Dialectics, Psychopedis, Pluto

Press : London.

Bonefeld / Gunn (eds.) 1992b, Open Marxism Vol. II : Theory and Practice, Psychopedis, Pluto

Press : London.

Clarke 1983, Comments on Jessop,Kapitalistate 10/11, Berkeley.

Clarke 1988 / 1991. Overaccumulation, Class Struggle and the Regulation

Approach. Capital&Class, n 36, reprinted in Bonefeld / Holloway (ed.) 1991.

Clarke 1990. New utopias for old : Fordist dreams and Post-Fordist

fantasies. Capital&Class, n 42.

Clarke 1991, Introduction to The State Debate, edited by Clarke, Macmillan : London 1991.

Elster 1987, Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge University Press : Cambridge.

Gunn 1989, Marxism and philosophy.Capital&Class. n037.

Gunn 1991a. Reclaiming Experience,Science as Culture n 11.

Gunn 1991 b. Marxism, Metatheory and Critique, in Bonefeld / Holloway 1991.

Hall / Jaques (eds.) 1989, New Times, Lawrence and Wishart : London.

Haeusler / Hirsch 1987, Regulation und Parteien im bergang zum "Post-Fordismus",Das

Argument, n 165. Holloway 1988/1991, The Great Bear : Post-Fordism and Class

Struggle,Capital&Class, n 36, reprinted in Bonefeld / Holloway (eds.) 1991.

Holloway 1991, Capitalis Class Struggle, in Bonefeld / Holloway (eds.) 1991.

Holloway 1992 Crisis, Fetishism, Class Composition, in Bonefeld / Gunn / Psychopedis (eds.)

1992b.

Jessop 1982, The Capitalist Store, Martin-Robertson : Oxford. Jessop 1983, Accumulation

Strategies, State Forms and Hegemonie Projects,Kapitalistllte, n 10/11.

Jessop 1985, Nicos Poulantzas : Marxist Theory and Political Strategy, Macmillan : London 1985.

Jessop 1986a, The Economy, the State and the Law : Theories of Relative Autonomy and

Autopoietic Closure,European University Institute, Florence 1986.


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Jessop 1986b, Warum es keinen Kohlismus gibt,Links, 1/1986.

Jessop 1988, Regulation Theories in Retrospect and Prospect,Staatsaufgaben, University of

Bielefeld, Zentrum fur interdisziplinare Forschung, n 1, Bielefeld.

Jessop 1988/1991, Regulation Theory, Post-Fordism and the State : More than a reply to

Werner Bonefeld,Capital&Class, n 34, reprinted in Bonefeld/Holloway (eds.) 1991.

Jessop 1991, Polar Bears and Class Struggle : Less than a Self-Criticism, in Bonefeld / Holloway

(eds.) 1991.

Jessop et al. 1987, Popular Capitalism, Flexible Accumulation and Lef1 Strategy,New Left

Review. N 165. Jessop et al. 1988, Thatcherism, Polity : London.

Jessop 1990, State Theory, Polity : Cambridge. Migliaro/Misurace 1982, The Theory of Modern

Bureaucracy, in Sasson (ed.),Approaches to Gramsci, Writers and Readers, London.

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Determinism,Science as Culture, n 8 ; reprinted in Bonefeld / Holloway (eds.) 1991.

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(eds.) 1991.

Sasson 1987, Gral11scis Politics.Hutchingson : London

[1] There is no distinctive British regulation school. in Britain, the only theoretical contribution to

the RA has come from Bob Jessop. A popularisation of post-fordist ideas could be found in the

pages of Marxism Today (see the collection of articles edited by Hall/Jaques 1989).

[2] See the collection of articles edited by Bonefeld/Holloway 1991.

[3] See Jessop 1983, 1985, 1986a, 1988, 1988/1991

[4] The following part is heavily dependent on Clarke (1991) and. especially, Psychopedis

(1991).

[5] The notion of realist ontology is taken from R Bhaskar. Bhaskar insists to reassert the basic

Marxist principle according to which the world is materialist and subject to change through the

operation of economic, political and social structures which are dependent upon, but not limited

to, human agency. Bhaskars jumble sale of ideas has been criticized by R. Gunn (1989, 1991).

[6] On the connection between technological determinism and the post-fordist debate see

Palaez/Holloway 1990/1991 and Clarke 1990.
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26/26

[7] The following section is taken from the introduction to Bonefeld/Gunn/Psychopedis (eds.)

1992a.

[8] Voluntarism and determinism are theoretically complementary, bath expressions of the

separation between class struggle and capital (Holloway 1991, p. 170/1 ; see also Bonefeld

1987/1991, 1992 ; Clarke 1983.1991).

[9] See Clarkes (1991) critique of Jessop.

[10] See Psychopedis 1991.

[11] As in Rational Choice Marxism (see Elster 1987, esp. ch. 1), subjects operate and calculate

rationally and individually within a framework of unreeogniszed rules which they seek to

transform through strategic conduct so as to maximize their fortunes.

[12] Jessop (1988) refers affirmatively to the work of Migliaro and Misuraca (1982) and Sasson

(1987).

[13] Scholarly work is seen here, following Agnoli (1990), as a negative task.

[14] See the contributions to the collection of articles edited by Bonefeld/Gunn/Psychopedis

Open Marxism Vol 1 : History and Dialectics and Open Marxism Vol II : Theory and Practice.

Pluto Press : London 1992.
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