Afghanistan Pakistan Task Force

8/14/2019 Afghanistan Pakistan Task Force

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/afghanistan-pakistan-task-force 1/51

A Strategy for Stabilizing

Afghanistan-Pakistan

Back From the Brink?



Back F Bk?

A Strategy for StabilizingAfghanistan-Pakistan

Al 2009

with generous support From:

Tom Freston

Asia Society Trustee

The Rockefeller

Brothers Fund



3

Contents

Foreword 4

Executive Summary 6

Dening Objectives 10

Counterterrorism Objectives 12

Governance and Development Objectives 13

Regional Objectives 16

Public Diplomacy Objectives 18

Policy Recommendations 19

Political Settlement 20

Economic Rescue Package 22

International Military Operations 23

National Security Forces 25

E l e c t i on s and P r e s iden t i a l Succe s s i on 28

Governance, Corruption, and Aid Delivery 31

Counternarcotics 36

Regional Issues 39

Conclusion 44

ask Force Co-Chairs and Members 45

Biographies o Chairmen and Members 46



4

Foreword

There has never been a more crucial time to examine our policies towards Aghanistan

and Pakistan Both countries are struggling to limit the spread o violent insurgencies, curb

losses in public condence, and address major weaknesses in governance while being aced with

a growing economic crisis Although both these countries share undamentally dierent histo-

ries, the menace o terrorism has inextricably linked the uture stability o both As a result, any

examination o Aghanistan needs to involve a critical examination o the cross border issues

in Pakistan Te relative ailure o American and international policies towards Aghanistan,

Pakistan, and the region over recent years have made many o these challenges even more di-

cult to overcome

Clearly, the time has come to set a new path in the region that can do a better job o curbingthe activities o al-Qaida and its allies, providing or long-term development and stabilization

o the region, and ostering ar more meaningul regional cooperation Te policies that will be

implemented in the coming years will not only dene the uture o Aghanistan, Pakistan and

the region, but also play a very important role in determining America’s role in Southwest Asia

or decades to come

Te Asia Society Independent ask Force on Aghanistan-Pakistan came together to help

dene the objectives and the related polices needed to curb al-Qaida activities and stabilize the

region Te report recommends both short and long term policies or a comprehensive strategy

that integrates counter-terrorism, governance, economic development and regional objectives to

achieve lasting stability in the region It is our hope that the recommendations highlighted in

this report lead to a successul engagement with the region that in turn allows or durable peace

and stability to ourish in the years to come

Tis project owes enormous gratitude to ormer Asia Society Chairman, and current US

Special Representative or Aghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard C Holbrooke Am-

bassador Holbrooke’s dedication to the plight o this volatile region was the impetus or the

development o the Asia Society’s Aghanistan Initiative and or this very important and timely

ask Force report Ambassador Holbrooke and ormer ask Force member General James L

Jones, however, both stepped down rom the ask Force ollowing their government appoint-

ments and beore the rst drat o the report was written Tey are thereore not associated inany way with this report or its content

We are also extremely grateul to Ambassador Tomas R Pickering and Dr Barnett R

Rubin who co-chaired this ask Force We would like to especially thank Dr Rubin or the

many hours he contributed to the writing and editing o this report Dr Rubin was tasked with

the most difcult responsibility o not only drating the report but also diligently incorporat-

ing many rounds o comments rom the members to reect the common vision o a group o

diverse and highly opinionated experts We are also extremely grateul to the ask Force mem-

bers themselves (listed at the end o the report), who used their deep knowledge o the region

to contribute substantially to the policy recommendations included in this report Although



5

ask Force members support the arguments and recommendations made in this report, their

signature, o course, does not necessarily imply adherence to every word

In addition, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to Dr Jamie Metzl, Execu-tive Vice President o the Asia Society and Project Director o the ask Force Report, or his

leadership and dedication in moving this critical project to its ruition and to Robert Hsu, or

his superb assistance in managing the process

Tis report could not have been made possible without the generous nancial support o

Asia Society rustee and ask Force Member om Freston, as well as the Rockeeller Brothers

Fund

America and the international community will ace tremendous challenges in Aghani-

stan, Pakistan, and the region in the coming years It is our sincere hope that the recommenda-

tions made in this report, along with the wide range o Asia Society programs and activitiesaddressing this set o issues, can play a meaningul role in helping us all make the best possible

decisions as we work together to address them

Charles R. Kaye

Chairman (interim), Asia Society

Vishakha N. Desai

President, Asia Society



6

Executive Summary

The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are at risk rom a combination o violent

insurgency, loss o public condence, and economic crisis Tese trends threaten not only

the loss o control by the Aghan and Pakistani governments, but also the spread o terrorist

sae havens and, in the most extreme situation, the loss o control over some o Pakistan’s

nuclear weapons or materials

Te policies o the previous administration toward this conict zone ell short Te

administration did not match its proclaimed objectives with the necessary resources and

strategic eort, although resources began to increase in recent years, and it did not develop

a sufciently integrated approach to the two countries and the region Its ideological “war

on terror” mind-set blinded the administration to signicant strategic realities o this region, which led to a undamentally dysunctional relationship with Pakistan that exacerbated

regional tensions, ailed to prevent al-Qaida rom reestablishing a sae haven in Pakistan’s

Federally Administered ribal Agencies (FAA), enabled the aliban to regroup and rearm

rom their strongholds in Quetta and FAA, and oered no signicant response to the

upsurge o the Pakistan aliban movement

Te time has come to change course dramatically Incremental changes alone, such as

more troops or more money, will not be sufcient to address the monumental challenge we

ace In the context o this deteriorating situation, the United States must now dene ar

more clearly the objectives that it and its allies and partners can achieve While this may

appear to involve scaling back goals, in reality, it is only an attempt to match objectives

with capabilities and resources

NAO orces in Aghanistan, including those rom the United States, should work to

deeat al-Qaida, protect the local population, and train and support the national security

orces in Aghanistan and Pakistan or their counterinsurgency and counterterrorism

missions Te military eort will also require changes in detention policies and the legal

status o international orces and contractors

On the political ront, the new policy would encourage the Aghan and Pakistani

governments to seek reconciliation with insurgent elements that break with al-Qaida Tis

distinction between insurgents with a political agenda or local grievances who may beamenable to joining the political process and those who are dedicated to a global jihad is

critical to achieving regional stability and creating conditions or badly needed economic

reconstruction and improved governance

Te United States has an opportunity to recast its policies in this region to promote

political solutions rather than open-ended conict, to work more eectively with local

partners and with allies, and to help Aghanistan and Pakistan achieve greater stability Te

United States and the international community must rely much more on political means

and work ar more closely with the governments and peoples o the region, including many

who have joined insurgencies or a variety o reasons, to dene common interests in ending



7

decades o war and to begin rebuilding their societies and economies

Tis report recommends policies or a comprehensive strategy that integrates

counterterrorism, governance, economic development, and regional objectives to achievelasting stability in the region

Te most important recommendation—a precondition or ensuring that the others

work as intended—is that the US, Aghan, and Pakistani governments, together with

their other international partners, should design an integrated civil-military plan or the

entire operation Tat plan would:

• Explicitly end the rhetorical emphasis on the “war on terror” and dene our enemy as

those who attacked our nation—al-Qaida and its allies

° Change policies on detention and sanctions to treat Aghan and Pakistani insurgents

dierently rom international terrorists, and support the use o Aghan and Pakistanilegal processes and policing to bring appropriate cases against insurgents or criminal

behavior wherever possible

° Strengthen political eorts by the Aghan and Pakistani governments to reconcile

with local insurgents at the expense o global terrorists

• End Operation Enduring Freedom, the counterterrorism command in Aghanistan,

because al-Qaida’s sanctuary is now in Pakistan, not Aghanistan

° Integrate all troops and operations in Aghanistan under a single NAO-ISAF

(International Security Assistance Force) command with a mandate to protect the

population

° Begin negotiations on a Status o Forces Agreement to be concluded ater the next

round o elections in Aghanistan

• Separate unding or Aghanistan, including or security orces, rom Iraq

° Move such unding rom supplemental to continuing appropriations

° Develop long-term international unding mechanisms to enable the Aghan

government to plan or institution building over a multiyear time rame

° Undertake a study in cooperation with the Aghan government to evaluate the size

o security orces needed, the unding necessary to sustain them, and the possibilities

or ensuring these unds over the long term

•

Engage with the Aghan government and the United Nations to ensure an acceptedand legitimate constitutional transition o presidential power and a more eective

government

° Deal directly and condentially with the Aghan government, ending negative press

leaks and unclear messages

• ranser assistance to the Aghanistan Reconstruction rust Fund and security duties

to ofcial institutions, Aghan and international, as soon as possible, consistent with

transparency and duciary oversight

° Consolidate and build on existing national ministry programs designed to increase

ministerial capacity





9

° Supporting civilian institutions and civilian oversight o the military

° Exploring a dialogue to seek a common approach with China and Saudi Arabia, the

other suppliers and supporters o the Pakistan military

° Ensuring oversight o all military assistance by both the United States and Pakistan’s

elected authorities

• Establish regular dialogue and exchanges over Aghanistan and Pakistan with Russia,

China, India, Iran, urkey, the Central Asian states, and Saudi Arabia, seeking a means

o cooperation with all in conjunction with our NAO allies and other international

partners to

° Seek agreement with regional and global powers over the stabilization o

Aghanistan

° Establish mechanisms or ensuring and building condence that no power uses thatcountry against another

° Support the regional economic cooperation initiative that started with the international

conerence hosted by Aghanistan in December 2005 to support cooperation on

power, water, rail, road and air transit, customs reorm, and education

Tis report outlines steps that must be taken in both the short and long term with our

allies in coordination with the government o Aghanistan to prevent urther deterioration

o security, support development, and promote regional engagement or lasting peace and

stability in the region



11

Defning Objectives

By shifting the United States’ strategic foreign policy objectives away rom Iraq,

the Barack Obama administration has already begun to address growing concerns in

Aghanistan and the region In order to address these concerns, the Obama administration

must dene objectives in counterterrorism, governance and development, and regional

diplomacy Tese goals must be integrated into a combined civil-military plan and supported

with public diplomacy eorts that communicate specic goals and desired outcomes to the

people o the region, the US public, and our allies

Te ask Force recommends that the ollowing objectives be pursued:

Counterterrorism Objectives

Te primary objectives o the US war in Aghanistan have been to destroy the sae

haven rom which al-Qaida planned and directed the 9/11 attacks, to eliminate any urther

sae havens in the region, and to prevent the ormation o uture sae havens Preventing the

collapse o state authority in Pakistan and ensuring that its nuclear weapons or materials

do not all into the hands o al-Qaida or similar groups is a high priority, but one or which

war does not appear to oer any solution Even i the United States and its allies are willing

to wage war or these essential security objectives, they should do so only insoar as war,

combined with other policy instruments, is the best means to achieve those objectives, andinsoar as the risks are proportionate to the gains

Narrowing the scope o war aims does not mean abandoning other goals, nor does it

mean abandoning the use o orce when those other goals are opposed by violence Ignoring

medium- to long-term issues leads to recurrence or exacerbation o underlying problems,

as occurred in the atermath o the Soviet withdrawal rom Aghanistan and ollowing the

George W Bush administration’s underresourced intervention in that country But these

are not primarily military challenges, and they cannot be addressed through primarily

military means Nor can they be addressed within the urgent time rame required to

conront terrorist threats

Te US policy o eliminating and preventing the reemergence o terrorist sae havensin this region must be integrated into a coherent global strategy against al-Qaida and similar

movements Te United States should publicly and explicitly end the “war on terror” and

redene its primary counterterrorism objective as deeating those who attacked our nation—al-

Qaida and its allies Such a strategy would use military, law enorcement, and intelligence tools

as required, but would also incorporate the characteristics o a global counterinsurgency policy,

thereby addressing the political opposition to many US policies that has created enabling

conditions or recruitment among al-Qaida and its allies Policies that reduce Muslim hostility

to the United States will contribute to the stabilization o this region, although recommending

such policies or other regions o the world is beyond the mandate o this ask Force



12

An organization without a national, territorial, or ethnic base o support, al-Qaida

depends or its operation on sanctuaries that are secured through alliances with other

groups Te “war on terror” policy o treating in the same way as al-Qaida those groupsthat orm temporary or opportunistic alliances with that organization, or that use violence

in support o some o the same causes as al-Qaida but have no link to that organization, has

united and strengthened rather than divided and weakened our enemies

Without an alliance with the aliban and other locally based insurgent groups (some

o which have been linked to Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Directorate o Inter-

Services Intelligence), al-Qaida would not be able to operate in the Aghanistan-Pakistan

area Breaking that alliance requires dierent approaches in Aghanistan and Pakistan

In Aghanistan, it requires oering political negotiations to insurgents who are willing to

separate themselves rom al-Qaida and enter the political system, recognizing that Aghanpolitical institutions may be altered by legitimate constitutional processes Any political

agreement should recognize the authority o the Aghan government and its security

orces throughout the territory o Aghanistan Such a policy requires that these oers be

reinorced with changes in detention, sanctions, and military policy (discussed later)

In Pakistan, the United States should support eorts by the government to separate

insurgents rom al-Qaida and other oreign ghters Te United States should work with

the ederal and provincial government to develop a plan to implement the government’s

stated goal o reorming the status o the Federally Administered ribal Agencies (FAA) so

as to integrate the area with the rest o Pakistan Te apparent capture o Swat by militants

points to the need or reorm in the Provincially Administered ribal Agencies (PAA)and in the rest o the North-West Frontier Province Support or such a strategy could

eventually render unnecessary the United States’ reported use o drones to attack al-Qaida

in the area, which has sparked signicant opposition in Pakistan

In neither country is a political settlement with insurgents a quick-x substitute

or other policies Without policy changes implemented by the aliban’s sponsors and

supporters in Pakistan, a political settlement in Aghanistan may not be sustainable Unless

the Pakistan military comes to see its domestic insurgents as a greater threat than India, it

is unlikely to support the plans needed to integrate FAA, close militant bases, and develop

counterinsurgency capacity Insurgents in both Aghanistan and Pakistan, many o whom

are recruited because o unemployment or local political conicts, cannot be reintegratedunless both governments become more credible and eective Reintegration will require

guarantees o security and employment to both ormer insurgents and those who have been

ghting them—a act that the global economic crisis renders even more difcult Tereore,

sustained expansion o both the Aghan and Pakistani economies is a critical step toward

the long-term stability o the region

In Pakistan, perhaps the most urgent priority is to prevent economic collapse, which

could undermine state authority even in major urban areas in the next ew months Such a

collapse could create yet more ungoverned space into which insurgents and terrorist groups

could move



13

To summarize, the United States should redefne counterterrorism objectives to:

1. Distinguish war aims rom other goals o the U.S. commitment to Aghanistan,Pakistan, and the region.

2. End the “war on terror” and redene its primary counterterrorism objective as deeating

al-Qaida and its allies.

3. Support dialogue and negotiations with insurgents who are willing to separate

themselves rom al-Qaida in both Aghanistan and Pakistan, and reinorce these oers

with changes in detention, sanctions, and military policy.

4. Ensure that any political agreement in Aghanistan recognizes the authority o the

Aghan government and its security orces throughout the territory o Aghanistan.

5. Support eorts by the Pakistani government to separate insurgents rom al-Qaida

and other oreign ghters, and assist in the government’s stated goal o reorming the Federally Administered ribal Agencies so as to integrate the area with the rest o

Pakistan.

6. Understand that in neither country is a political settlement with insurgents a quick-x

substitute or other policies.

Governance and Development Objectives

Military eorts combined with political agreements can eliminate the immediate

threat o terrorist sae havens, as has occurred in Aghanistan, though not yet in Pakistan

Preventing the reemergence o these sae havens requires addressing the challenge o

governance and development in both countries, as well as working diplomatically to remove

the actors that have led Pakistan to use armed militants as asymmetrical weapons against

larger regional competitors

Aghanistan is one o a small handul o the poorest countries in the world, and

it has one o the weakest and most corrupt governments Te weakness o the Aghan

government derives not only rom inrastructural and technical gaps, but also rom a

lack o legitimacy connected to political issues Tese weaknesses are not the result o the

actions o any particular leader or regime, but o structural and historical actors that can

be addressed only over a long period o time, with sustained support rom the international

communityAn immediate task in the coming year is to support a legitimate transition o power

at the end o President Hamid Karzai’s current term In this context, “legitimacy” means

agreement that the president and other top leaders exercise their powers lawully, even i

they and their policies are unpopular; now, or instance, Aghans agree that the government

o President Karzai is the legitimate government, even though many judge its perormance

harshly

Strengthening state institutions requires ar more than conducting elections

Aghanistan’s basic institutions o administration, law enorcement, and service delivery

are weak, corrupt, or nonexistent Te weakness o Aghanistan’s government means



14

that stability may require a long-term international security presenceCurrent operations

o international orces, especially the counterterrorism command, Operation Enduring

Freedom, have, unintentionally, eroded Aghan support or such a presence Support orthe international military presence has been decimated by civilian casualties, arbitrary

detention and torture, intrusive house searches, the use o dogs against villagers, and other

practices that dishonor local communities, provoke revenge, and communicate the message

that oreign orces are at war with Aghans rather than protecting and assisting them

US and international assistance has enabled Aghanistan to reestablish its systems

o basic education and health and construct some inrastructure; the way in which

this assistance has been delivered, however, has weakened government institutions and

promoted corruption Te United States should lead international donors in revising the

way in which they deliver aid to Aghanistan so as to build Aghan institutions and link the Aghan people to their own state and government

Both military deployments and assistance programs must be made sustainable over the

long term by restructuring them so that they communicate clearly that the United States

and the international community are in Aghanistan to protect its people and strengthen its

institutions without using its territory as a base against its neighbors Te Aghan National

Security Forces (ANSF) will require sustainable nancing; Aghanistan cannot support

orces o the size now thought to be needed, and the ANSF are currently dependent on

annual supplemental appropriations rom the US Congress Ultimately, the sustainability

o the Aghan state will depend on lowering the threat level that it aces, both by improving

governance and by providing support or regional diplomacy and cooperationStrengthening institutions will depend on long-term programs or the rule o law,

economic development, and employment creation Such programs would also eventually

reduce the relative size o the narcotics industry in the Aghan economy, making it relatively

marginal, as it is in most countries Additional large inrastructure projects or water, power,

and transport, ew o which have been started, could provide employment or young men

who would otherwise join the insurgency, illegal armed groups, or the narcotics industry

Te Aghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) provides a long-term ramework

or such development Such eorts must be moved rom yearly budgets to long-term

commitments, not only to be technically eective, but also to send an essential political

signalBut these measures cannot be articially accelerated to compensate or political ormilitary ailings

Te ANDS was approved by the international community at the Paris Conerence

in June 2008; $214 billion o new pledges were committed or the next two to three

years Tis sum, when added to the remainder o pledges committed at the 2006 London

Conerence and the projected contribution o the Aghan government, totals about $34

billion Tese unds will go a long way toward providing the services that the population

is demanding and meeting some o the basic economic challenges that the country aces

Eective use o these resources, however, requires addressing two concerns: aid coherence

and Aghan capacity



15

Currently, there is inadequate coordination and communication among the donors

and between the donors and the Aghan government About 20 percent to 25 percent o

pledged aid or the period 2002–2008 has been delivered; almost hal o the aid is tied tospecic projects; 67 percent to 80 percent o aid bypasses the government; only 40 percent

o technical assistance is coordinated with the government; an estimated 40 percent o aid

goes back to donor countries; the prot margin on private inrastructure contracts ranges

rom 30 percent to 50 percent; the Aghan government does not receive in a consistent and

timely manner inormation on the type and cost o projects carried out by the donors, and

it is claimed that or comparable projects, the cost is 65 percent to 70 percent higher i it

is carried out by the donor organizations Te distribution o aid has also contributed to

corruption in the country

Te second problem is the lack o capacity in both the public and the private sectorin Aghanistan Capacity must be increased to absorb the needed resources rom abroad,

reorm the institutions o government, meet the needs o the population, and work with the

international community to manage the transormations required or security, governance,

and economic progress Tus ar, attempts to reorm the civil service and build new capacity

have ailed Without building new capacity in the government, as well as in the private

sector, the legitimacy o the government, the reputation o donors, and the eectiveness o

international aid will be adversely aected

Aghanistan and Pakistan are both acing an immediate economic crisis Pakistan has

agreed to a $76 billion rescue package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which

is likely to require cutbacks in subsidies o essential goods or the urban poor, risking riots While southern Aghanistan is wracked by insurgency, northern and central Aghanistan are

suering rom drought and ood shortages, leading to mass emigration and the potential or

instability, including the spread o insurgency Despite the huge resources required by our

own economic crisis, the United States must lead the international community in crating

an emergency rescue package or the economies o both Aghanistan and Pakistan

Despite its present destitution, Aghanistan possesses signicant mineral resources

Priority should be given to analyzing how Aghanistan could use these resources to

enhance government revenue Any such program to develop resource-based industries must

use current best practices to avoid the “resource curse” that has brought corruption and

stagnation to other resource-rich countries

To summarize, with respect to governance and development objectives, the United

States should:

1. Help the Aghan and Pakistani governments address challenges o governance and

development to prevent the reemergence o terrorist sae havens.

2. Mobilize international eorts to prevent rapid economic collapse in both Aghanistan

and Pakistan, which could undermine state authority even in major urban areas in the

course o the next ew months.



16

3. Support a legitimate transition o power in Aghanistan at the end o President Hamid

Karzai’s current term while remaining neutral among presidential candidates.

4. Change the operations o international military orces and aid organizations so that they build rather than erode support or their presence.

5. Lower the threat level that the Aghan state aces by improving civilian governance and

by providing support or regional diplomacy and cooperation.

6. Support the Aghanistan National Development Strategy, which provides a long-term

ramework or development, including measures to gradually marginalize the narcotics

industry.

7. Reorm aid delivery to support the growth o Aghan institutions rather than create

parallel systems that weaken government institutions and promote corruption.

8. Develop a ully coordinated approach to integrating U.S., partner, and international military and civilian eorts to allow or the stabilization o vulnerable provinces and

districts.

9. Focus international eorts on programs that will increase the sustainable revenue o the

Aghan government through natural resource extraction, among other means.

Regional Objectives

For years, Pakistan has been used as a base o international terrorism by al-Qaida

and its allies Since 9/11, al-Qaida has had no bases in Aghanistan, and no international

terrorist attack has been traced to Aghanistan Instead, al-Qaida has established a new

sae haven in the tribal agencies o Pakistan, and most major terrorist attacks since 9/11have been traced to FAA An overriding regional objective is the elimination o that sae

haven

Te use o armed extremist groups or asymmetrical warare to conront threats

rom larger countries has created a military-extremist-industrial complex in Pakistan Te

November 2008 Mumbai attacks appear to have been carried out by organizations that

orm a part o this complex While the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies have lost

many men in the ght against some extremist groups, their continued support or others—

such as the Aghan aliban and ghters in Kashmir—has created an inrastructure that is

used by all o these organizations, including al-Qaida Te expansion o aliban control in

northwest Pakistan is threatening the main NAO and US supply lines to AghanistanTe civilian government o Pakistan, despite its institutional and political weakness, has

tried to articulate a vision o Pakistan’s national interest in which armed extremists constitute

a threat rather than an asset It has supported cooperation rather than conrontation with

neighbors Te United States and the international community, thereore, have an interest

in strengthening civilian institutions in Pakistan and supporting economic development

outside the military-controlled sectors o the economy Such changes could ultimately lead

to a civilian-military pact in Pakistan that would empower the government to dene the

national interest and the country’s security posture Support or such a transormation

should be reinorced by regional eorts to address Pakistan’s security concerns about its



17

borders and territorial integrity, especially through the dialogue processes on outstanding

issues between Pakistan and its neighbors, India and Aghanistan Rightly or wrongly,

Pakistan’s security establishment believes that it aces an existential threat, and it isunlikely to eliminate the means it has developed to counter that threat unless its most basic

concerns—threats to Pakistan’s survival and territorial integrity—are addressed

Such a change would support the strategic objective o establishing an international

consensus on the stabilization o Aghanistan Among the states involved are Pakistan,

Iran, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, and India A consistent diplomatic eort led by the

United States could move the region in that direction, toward the goals o recognition o

territorial integrity, nonintererence in and nonaggression rom Aghanistan, as well as the

stabilization o a Pakistan that abandons the use o armed extremist groups as a tool o

policy and guarantees the security o its nuclear weapons and materialsA precondition or such an outcome is a solution to the long-standing issues surrounding

the status o Pashtuns in both Aghanistan, where they are the largest ethnic group, and

Pakistan, where twice as many live as a minority Al-Qaida has exploited the problems

in Pashtun lands to establish a sae haven among people who do not support its ideology

but whose poverty, isolation, and weak governance leave them vulnerable Resolving these

problems will require working with both governments and their people to reorm the status

o FAA, improve governance and security throughout the North-West Frontier Province,

enable Aghanistan to recognize the Durand Line as an ofcial open border, guarantee

Aghanistan’s access to the port o Karachi, assure ree land transit o Aghan products

across Pakistan to India, and eliminate suspicions o support or separatism or subversionrom either side Such political and diplomatic eorts are necessary to enable the delivery

o aid, so as to provide the people o these areas with alternatives to emigration, smuggling,

the drug trade, and extremism Such eorts must be balanced, especially in Aghanistan,

by measures to assure other ethnic groups that the Pashtuns’ problems will not be resolved

at their expense

Equally important is public opinion among our NAO allies and at home It is useless

to pressure allies into supporting an eort that they nd difcult to justiy to their publics,

which are wary o being dragged into ill-dened and expanding US operations about which

they are not consulted Te Obama administration must consult and discuss objectives in

the region with allies beore announcing them Such joint objectives, aimed at isolating al-Qaida and broadening dialogue and cooperation with the Muslim world, will be easier or

allied governments to mobilize their people to support For many countries whose militaries

are overstretched, nding nonmilitary mechanisms that nonetheless provide signicant

support or the overall eort could be optimal, especially in Europe, where opening up

trade access and acilitating economic development could have a signicant impact on job

creation and thus stability

Tere are potential conicts and trade-os among these objectives Te United States

and its international partners must work with Aghan authorities to develop an integrated

civil-military plan to identiy priorities, sequences, and required resources or these



18

objectives Such a plan would also make it possible to develop a coherent division o labor

among the many actors involved in the stabilization o Aghanistan and Pakistan

To summarize, with respect to regional cooperation, the United States should:

1. Ensure that the overriding regional objective is the elimination o al-Qaida sae

havens in Pakistan. Since 9/11, al-Qaida has had no bases in Aghanistan, and no

international terrorist attack has been traced to Aghanistan.

2. Support the civilian institutions and government o Pakistan.

3. Reinorce the transormation o Pakistan’s view o its national interest by supporting

regional eorts to address Pakistan’s security concerns about its borders, territorial

integrity, and long-term deense needs.

4. Support the strategic objective o establishing an international consensus on the stabilization o Aghanistan, based on promoting conditions or the recognition o

territorial integrity, nonintererence in and nonaggression rom Aghanistan, including

the use o economic incentives.

5. Provide a solution to the long-standing issues surrounding the status o Pashtuns in both

Aghanistan, where they are the largest ethnic group, and Pakistan, where twice as many

live as a minority, as a condition or the oregoing outcome.

Public Diplomacy

High-level policy changes will be required to achieve these objectives, but it is also

essential to ormulate and communicate the objectives in such a way as to mobilize domestic

and international support or them:

• In reormulating objectives and strategy, the United States should consult with the

governments o Aghanistan and Pakistan, as well as with the United Nations (UN),

NAO allies, and other partners, rather than simply announcing unilateral decisions

Te Obama administration’s agreement to include the governments o Aghanistan

and Pakistan in the policy review, and its solicitation o the views o NAO allies or

that review, are welcome

• In addition to announcing the new objectives and policy at the NAO summit

scheduled or April 3–4, 2009, President Obama should also use his planned speechaddressed to the Muslim world to announce the end o the “war on terror” and the

development o policies in this region based on the new approach

• Tere is a dire need to provide public inormation to the Aghan population explaining

the activities o the government and the international community, as well as individual

projects and accomplishments Tere should be a continuous dialogue between

government ofcials and civic leaders using print media and television to explain the

problems and accomplishments o dierent organizations Aghan citizens should be

invited to participate in community development and other ventures Te President

o Aghanistan, its ministers, the heads o the UN, and some ambassadors could

participate in this communication eort



19

Policy Recommendations

Political Settlement to Isolate al-Qaida and Stabilize the RegionCreating conditions or a political settlement requires the credible communication o a

policy o distinguishing Aghan and Pakistani insurgents who are ghting or national or

local goals rom those who are allied with al-Qaida Te United States should clearly com-

municate (publicly or condentially, depending on the circumstances) its support or the

stated principles o the Saudi-sponsored dialogue initiative with the Quetta Shura, which

asks aliban leaders to break with al-Qaida and present an Aghan program as a basis or

discussion with other Aghans All political negotiations with insurgents should be car-

ried out by Aghans Te United States, in ull consultation with the Aghan government,should develop channels o communication with insurgent leaders in order to support those

negotiations and provide a means or clarication o intentions and, eventually, condence-

building measures

Te primary US and international conditions placed on any agreement between

insurgents and other Aghans should be (1) that it exclude al-Qaida and its allies, in accord

with the principles o the Saudi initiative, and (2) that while it may provide or inclusion o

ormer insurgents in the government or security orces, it must recognize the government

ormed under the 2004 constitution (which may be amended) and the security orces o

that government as the sole sovereign authority and national security orces throughout the

territory o Aghanistan Tese principles are necessary to prevent the reestablishment o sae havens

As part o President Obama’s overall review o US detention policies, which aims to

bring these policies into conormity with international and domestic law, the administration

should also review the status o all Aghan detainees, in cooperation with the Aghan

government, with a view toward distinguishing those, i any, who have genuine al-Qaida

afliations, those who are involved only in the aliban government or military actions in

Aghanistan, and others who have been detained without substantial cause Tis review

should extend to all Aghan detainees o the United States, including the remaining Aghan

detainees at Guantánamo (estimated at twenty-six) and the larger number detained atBagram and elsewhere Available unclassied inormation indicates that, at most, six o the

Aghan detainees at Guantánamo were alleged to be members o al-Qaida, and only one is

classied as a High-Value Detainee; none o them held a senior or decision-making position,

and none was associated with activities outside Aghanistan An additional eight detainees

were alleged to be “associated” with al-Qaida, and the rest had no al-Qaida afliation o

the extent possible, Aghan detainees should be returned to Aghan authority Tose who

have been detained wrongully or or relatively trivial causes should be compensated

Both international and US national sanctions regimes dating rom the 1990s subject

members o the aliban and al-Qaida to the same restrictions Tose imposed by resolution



20

o the UN Security Council can be changed only through appropriate multilateral

procedures Tis requires the agreement o all permanent members, including Russia,

which in the past has rejected the delisting o even ormer aliban ofcials not engaged inarmed struggle and living in Kabul under the government’s protection Te United States

should support eorts by the Aghan government to persuade Russia and other nations to

modiy these sanctions in accord with current realities

Te US and Aghan governments should jointly develop a program to guarantee the

security and employment o insurgents and other ormer combatants who agree to lay down

their weapons Te large number o agencies involved in the counterterrorism campaign has

made it difcult to guarantee that insurgents who reconcile with the Aghan government

will also be protected rom US counterterrorism measures In addition, several ormer

aliban ofcials who have laid down their arms have been assassinated, and others areunder threat and need to be ully protected As many join the insurgency and other illegal

armed groups or economic reasons, those who have been reconciled or demobilized must

be integrated into programs that provide or their livelihood and security

A process o dialogue and negotiation with insurgents should aim to isolate al-Qaida,

weaken regional state actors who support insurgency as a tool o policy, and stabilize

Aghanistan and Pakistan—not to realign groups in order to pursue narrow US strategic

objectives Troughout the course o such a dialogue and any negotiations, the Aghan

government, the United States, and other involved parties should seek to involve and keep

inormed other Aghan political groups, including those that are most concerned about a

revival o aliban power, as well as regional powers such as Iran, Russia, and India, whichmay suspect that such a policy is aimed at them or their riends in Aghanistan

Te ramework or seeking a political settlement with Pakistani insurgent groups

is dierent, and the challenges are, i anything, more complex It is possibly even more

important, as Pakistani militants protect al-Qaida’s leadership, as well as training and

logistical acilities or even the most extreme elements o the Aghan insurgency Furthermore,

the security establishment in Pakistan has an ambiguous attitude: It has always considered

both the Aghan aliban and militant groups ghting in Kashmir to be strategic assets

ransxed by what it views as a ar greater Indian threat, it has been reluctant to recognize

that the support structures and networks or these groups have also provided a sae haven or

al-Qaida and groups ghting the Pakistani state under the banner o the Pakistan alibanMovement (ehrik-i aliban-i Pakistan), led by Baitullah Mehsud

Te administrative structure o Pakistan ragments the authorities responsible or

military/police or political actions Many militant groups are based in FAA, the indirect

administration o which answers to the president o Pakistan through the governor o

the North-West Frontier Province, although the Pakistan Army is now the main state

presence there Some o the same groups, as well as others, operate in the “settled” or

administered areas o the North-West Frontier Province, which, in turn, is divided among

administered divisions, Frontier Regions, and the Provincially Administered ribal Areas,

which includes the Malakand Division Te Malakand Division encompasses the district



21

o Swat, which links Aghanistan and FAA to Kashmir and has largely allen under the

control o Pakistani aliban-like groups Many militant groups that were originally active

in Kashmir and based in southern Punjab have recently shited their activities to FAA andincreased their involvement in Aghanistan Southern Punjab is also becoming a base or

militant activity All o these regions have dierent political and administrative authorities

and dierent security orces

It is difcult to provide general policy guidelines or all aspects o this complex situation

But there are several key points to note First o all, the United States should support

Pakistan’s ederal and provincial authorities, under elected leadership, in their eorts to

regain control o their territory, integrate local militant groups politically, and separate

local groups rom al-Qaida and other oreign militants Tese eorts include political

negotiations, but must also encompass credible threats and the use o orce Combinedpolitical and security eorts aimed at solving the problems o the local people will provide

the most sustainable means o isolating al-Qaida and oreign militants and depriving them

o sanctuary

Te United States should also oppose negotiated settlements that are aimed at

displacing insurgent or militant activity rom Pakistan to Aghanistan, or vice versa;

Pakistan, Aghanistan, and their international partners must coordinate eorts to address

the entire regional problem, not to solve one country’s problem at another’s expense Te

United States will also need to provide ull political and nancial backing or eorts to

reorm the administration and develop the economies and social services o FAA and

the North-West Frontier Province, including PAA It is also important to work with thePakistan military and police to train and equip orces or counterinsurgency operations

Tis is not mainly a technical question, as the perception that India poses a greater threat

than armed extremists, and the continued use o armed extremists as assets against India

and Aghanistan, have made the Pakistan military unwilling to integrate counterinsurgency

tactics into its doctrine We address these political challenges under “Regional Issues” in

this report

To summarize, in order to achieve a political settlement to isolate al-Qaida and

stabilize the region, the United States should:

1. Communicate (publicly or condentially, and in consultation with the Aghan

government) ull support or the principles o the Saudi-led dialogue process, which oers

inclusion to the aliban movement i it breaks with al-Qaida and presents an Aghan

program as a basis or discussion with other Aghans.

2. Develop channels o communication with insurgent leaders in order to support the

dialogue among Aghans.

3. Require agreements between the Aghan government and insurgents to exclude al-Qaida

and its allies and to recognize the government and the security orces throughout the

territory o Aghanistan.





23

months, raising the unemployment rate to 12 percent In FAA, per capita income is one-

third that o the rest o Pakistan Remittances and the trucking industry, both mainstays o

the FAA economy, have suered serious declinesExperts estimate that halting this economic deterioration in Pakistan might require a

ve-year package o $40 billion to $50 billion While the United States can help lead this

eort, it will have to be multilateral and coordinated with Pakistan’s existing $76 billion

IMF bailout Creating and unding such an urgent rescue package should be the ocus o

the UN’s Friends o Pakistan group Tis multilateral group rst met during the visit o

President Asi Ali Zardari to the UN General Assembly in September 2008 It has been

moving slowly, but the current crisis provides an opportunity or the US mission to the

UN to mobilize donors around this pressing issue

President Obama should direct the US Departments o State and reasury to conveneinternational working groups, through the Friends o Pakistan and existing coordination

mechanisms or Aghanistan, to urgently design, und, and implement economic rescue

packages or both Aghanistan and Pakistan Tese packages should include immediate

employment creation, humanitarian assistance, and measures to ensure the supply and

availability o ood and energy Either direct budget support with a clear road map o

conditions, and/or a World Bank–administered trust und, should be the instrument o

disbursement

In summary, to ensure economic stability in both Aghanistan and Pakistan, the

United States should:

1. Convene a task orce that involves the U.S. State and reasury departments to launch

a multilateral eort aimed at developing an economic rescue package or the region

that includes immediate employment creation, humanitarian assistance, and measures

to ensure the supply and availability o ood and energy, using additional new unds

or requesting appropriation o unds to maintain programs rom which unds may be

taken.

2. Focus the activities o the UN’s Friends o Pakistan group, Aghanistan’s Joint

Coordination and Monitoring Board, and other multilateral orums on unding and

implementation or such a rescue package.

International Military Forces and ObjectivesPresident Obama has approved the deployment o approximately 17,000 additional

troops (two combat brigades plus support troops) to Aghanistan in an attempt to halt the

deterioration o security In addition, ater virtually ignoring the main aliban leadership

in Quetta, Pakistan, or eight years, the outgoing Bush administration recommended to

the Obama administration that it work with Pakistan on operations to disrupt the Quetta

Shura’s operations in Pakistani Baluchistan (As Quetta is a densely populated city, the

operations would have to dier signicantly rom those in FAA) Te primary stated goals



24

o this escalation o military and covert operations are to provide sufcient security or

presidential elections, currently scheduled or August 20, 2009, and to place the Aghan

government and its international backers in a better position or a political settlement withinsurgents

Tis increase in troops is occurring at the same time that rising civilian casualties

caused by international military operations are eroding the Aghan public’s support or the

international military presence, states in the region are demonstrating increased opposition

to that presence, and the Quetta Shura is showing signs o willingness to distance itsel

rom al-Qaida and seek a political settlement

Military operations in Aghanistan should be reorganized to serve the objectives

outlined in the rst section o this report, in particular by protecting the Aghan people and

strengthening Aghan institutions In so doing, the United States should end OperationEnduring Freedom and integrate all US orces (military and others) into the NAO-

ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) command, which has a mandate and rules

o engagement or counterinsurgency, not counterterrorism As there are no international

terrorist bases in Aghanistan, and no international terrorist actions have been traced to

Aghanistan since 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom’s “kill and capture” operations,

which cause the most civilian casualties, should be ended I there is a need to conduct such

operations outside the borders o Aghanistan, appropriate commands and rameworks

should be established or them

In addition, the United States should close the Bagram detention center and other

US detention centers where captured Aghan insurgents are held It is important to treat Aghan insurgents captured in Aghanistan as Aghan nationals who are subject to Aghan

law and jurisdiction and to work with Aghan authorities to create an eective and humane

detention system When it is deemed necessary that an Aghan must be apprehended in

Aghanistan, he or she should be subject to police arrest and prosecution under Aghan

law

Te United States should also begin discussions aimed at negotiating a Status o

Forces Agreement to cover all international orces and contractors in Aghanistan More

than seven years ater the establishment o an Aghan government pursuant to the Bonn

Agreement, it is no longer appropriate or US and other international orces to operate

without an agreement with a government whose sovereignty we claim to recognize and whose institutions it is our policy to strengthen Such an agreement would have to be

approved by the National Assembly o Aghanistan, in accordance with Article 90 o the

Constitution o the Islamic Republic o Aghanistan While such negotiations could not

be concluded until ater the next round o Aghan national elections, discussions with the

Aghan government and the National Assembly should begin immediately as a sign o

goodwill Te Status o Forces Agreement should make clear that the United States and

NAO are ully committed to the stabilization o Aghanistan over the long term, and

that they do not intend to exploit support or such an objective to establish permanent

military bases that could be used against Aghanistan’s neighbors It is important to ensure



25

that additional troop deployments complement rather than undermine eorts to seek a

political solution by developing and strengthening communications with insurgent leaders

Deployments should treat those elements o the insurgency that are engaged in the Saudi-coordinated dialogue track dierently rom those who reuse to participate and are closely

linked to al-Qaida

Tere are no US orces openly deployed in Pakistan Press reports indicate that the

United States carries out attacks on al-Qaida and insurgent leaders in Pakistan using

unmanned drones, primarily in FAA Tese actions have aroused political opposition

within Pakistan and have been denounced by the government o Pakistan, which may

nonetheless discreetly cooperate with them It is difcult or a public task orce to comment

on such a covert program, but we note that, although this program has apparently

succeeded in targeting a number o high-level al-Qaida leaders and disrupting terroristand insurgent operations, it is not a sustainable solution to the problems that have allowed

al-Qaida to nd sanctuary in Pakistan’s border regions Te United States should pursue

close collaboration with the government o Pakistan to develop a comprehensive security,

political, and economic strategy or the border areas, including the resolution o claims

made by Aghanistan, in order to eventually replace the use o remote targeting with a

sustainable strategy

To summarize, with respect to reorienting international military operations in

Aghanistan, the United States should:

1. End Operation Enduring Freedom and integrate all U.S. orces (military and others)

into the NAO-ISAF command in order to end “kill and capture” operations, which

cause the most civilian casualties.

2. ranser the Bagram detention center and other U.S. detention centers where captured

Aghan insurgents are held to Aghan authorities.

3. reat all Aghan insurgents captured in Aghanistan as Aghan nationals who are subject

to Aghan law and jurisdiction.

4. Begin discussions aimed at negotiating a Status o Forces Agreement to cover all

international orces and contractors in Aghanistan.

5. Collaborate with the government o Pakistan to develop a comprehensive security, political, and economic strategy or the border areas in order to eventually replace the

use o remote targeting with a sustainable strategy.

Development of National Security Forces

Current plans call or building an Aghan National Army o 134,000 and an Aghan

National Police o 82,000 Even without an air orce and other enablers that Aghanistan

would need to become reasonably sel-sufcient in security under current threat levels,

the cost o maintaining ANSF o this size greatly exceeds the current and uture scal

capacity o Aghanistan Currently, unding or the ANSF depends almost entirely on



26

US congressional supplemental appropriations or Iraq and Aghanistan, which links

Aghanistan to a very dierent operation and does not allow or long-term planning Te

ask Force recommends the ollowing:

• Funding or the ANSF and other components o assistance to Aghanistan should

be separated rom unding or Iraq It should either be integrated into the omnibus

oreign assistance act or become the subject o independent legislation

• Funding or ANSF, as well as other orms o institution building and long-term

development or Aghanistan, should be moved rom supplemental appropriations

to continuing appropriations in the permanent budget Te United States, NAO,

the UN, and others should also develop mechanisms or long-term, multiyear,

and predictable shared international unding o the ANSF and other Aghan

institutions• Funding or and expenditures by the ANSF should be subject to examination by

the government and the National Assembly o Aghanistan, even i the unds are

appropriated rom oreign assistance, to ensure accountability and civilian oversight o

the security orces

Te long-term goal should be to make Aghanistan sel-sufcient in its security orces

through a combination o threat reduction, restructuring o security orces, and increase

in the scal capacity o the Aghan state Restructuring proposals include moving rom an

all-volunteer orce to one that also includes conscripts and partly changing compensation

rom cash to in-kind, particularly in the orm o housing, education, and amily benetsSome members o the ask Force believe that Aghan security orces need to be

substantially expanded in order to meet the twin goals o securing the population and

allowing the eventual drawdown o oreign military orces Aghanistan has a much

lower ratio o police to population than countries without an insurgency (the US ratio,

or example, is nearly double that o Aghanistan) Te current targets (not yet met) or

building Aghan security orces are one-third o those already ormed in Iraq By any

standard, they are woeully inadequate or the critical task o securing the population in

homes, workplaces, and travel Without a substantial increase, it is unclear how we can

avoid maintaining large international orces that are well beyond the likely limits o US

and Aghan domestic political support Support in NAO nations is already rayingSome members o the ask Force worry about building Aghan orces that are larger

than the country can sustain and pay Others counter that i the war is lost militarily,

there will be no need to worry about long-term sustainability Tereore, the ask Force

recommends the ollowing:

• An immediate and rapid reevaluation o the Aghan orce levels needed to secure the

population against an ongoing and spreading insurgency

• US and international commitment to pay the equipment and recurrent costs necessary

to build whatever expanded orce such an evaluation recommends



27

Tere is considerable debate about proposals to create paramilitary or auxiliary police orces

by organizing or arming communities or tribes, partly inspired by the experience o the

Awakening in Anbar Province, Iraq Aghans are largely opposed to the creation o moreunofcial or quasi-ofcial armed groups, rom which they have suered greatly over the

past several decades, and the Iraqi model cannot simply be transerred to the very dierent

context o Aghanistan Currently, the US and Aghan governments have agreed on a trial

o such a program in Wardak Province or a period o several months We urge careul and

detailed political as well as security evaluations o the results o this trial beore proceeding

urther with such plans

Te challenge o national security orces is dierent in Pakistan, a nuclear power with

a large conventional army, navy, and air orce Pakistan’s deense establishment is trained,

equipped, and deployed almost exclusively or a potential conict with India o conrontthe threat o loss o territorial control to the aliban and other militants, the United States

has oered training and equipment to transorm the Pakistan military into a more eective

counterinsurgency orce, but the Pakistan security establishment has resisted diverting

resources rom its primary anti-Indian mission, and has instead designated the Frontier

Corps, a locally recruited paramilitary body in the North-West Frontier Province and

FAA, or counterinsurgency training

While the United States should continue to oer equipment and training or

counterinsurgency, the main obstacle to the transormation o the Pakistan military is not

technical but political As long as the Pakistan military remains in eective control o its

own nances and doctrine, it, not the government, will dene the national security interestso Pakistan Te US Department o Deense, and in particular CENCOM, has long

become accustomed to direct military-military relations with Pakistan Te $11 billion or

operational unding that the United States has supplied to the Pakistan military since 2001

has gone directly into military coers without monitoring by the United States or oversight

by Pakistani civilian authorities Reorming the way in which the United States deals with

the Pakistan military, with the goal o helping to establish civilian control, would be the

most important contribution we could make to its transormation All US military aid to

Pakistan should be ully transparent to the civilian authorities and subject to monitoring by

both them and the United States

To summarize, or the continued development o the Aghan National Security Forces,

the United States should:

1. Work with other international actors to pay or required increases in the size o the

ANSF, as Aghanistan is not and will not be in a position to do so.

2. Separate unding or the ANSF, as well as other orms o institution building and long-

term development or Aghanistan, rom unding or Iraq, and move the Aghanistan

supplemental appropriations budget to continuing appropriations in the permanent

budget.



28

3. Develop mechanisms or long-term, multiyear, and predictable shared international

unding o the ANSF and other Aghan institutions with NAO, the UN, and other

actors.4. Ensure that this unding is subject to examination by the government and National

Assembly o Aghanistan.

With respect to Pakistan, the United States should:

1. Continue to oer equipment and training or counterinsurgency, recognizing that

the main obstacle to the transormation o the Pakistan military is not technical but

political.

2. Reorm the way in which the United States deals with the Pakistan military so as to

help establish civilian control, and ensure that all U.S. military aid to Pakistan is ully transparent to the civilian authorities and subject to monitoring by both them and the

United States.

Elections and Presidential Succession in Afghanistan

Tis year will test the current state structure in Aghanistan; the rst term o the

president elected under the 2004 constitution will come to an end, and new rounds o

elections will be required this year and the next or the presidency, the National Assembly,

and local bodies Second elections are always a more difcult test than rst elections, and

Aghanistan will be no exception Failure to carry out a legitimate presidential succession

would place the entire system at risk

According to Article 61 o the Aghan constitution, the president’s term ends on the

rst o Jawza o the th year ater his inauguration (May 21, 2009) Presidential elections

must be held thirty to sixty days beore the end o the president’s term—that is, between

March 21 and April 21, 2009 As it is impossible or several reasons to hold the elections as

scheduled, the Independent Electoral Commission has set the date or presidential elections

as August 20, 2009 Many political orces, including the leadership o the National Assembly

and inuential opposition politicians, have taken the position that, even i the elections

are postponed, President Karzai’s term ends on May 21, and some interim arrangement

is necessary Hence, there is a chance that during what will probably be the most violentseason o insurgent violence to date (May–August 2009), the legitimacy and authority o

the president will be contested

An essential international goal in Aghanistan is to ensure that the government retains

its legitimacy until the election and that the presidential transition takes place according

to the constitution so that the government can retain and strengthen its legitimacy Te

election will strengthen the legitimacy o the next president only i the outcome is not

signicantly disputed and does not spark ethnic or actional conict National institutions

in Aghanistan are ar rom strong enough or the counting o votes alone to determine

an enorceable distribution o power I aliban control or intimidation reduces turnout



29

in predominantly Pashtun areas, the outcome may lack legitimacy, and any resulting

government may ail to be recognized by some segments o the population Others are

concerned that seeking to reach ethnic agreement over the elections will undermine eortsto establish good—or at least better—government and reduce corruption, as it could lead

to the distribution o positions by patronage rather than competence and responsibility

o the extent possible, the United States and the international community should not take

sides in these debates, but should stick to certain principles as conditions or providing the

necessary security and nancial assistance to carry out the process

Te transition must respect the rules in the constitution through an agreed-upon

process, including the National Assembly and the judiciary as appropriate Te constitution

contains provisions (legislation, Loya Jirga, state o emergency) to cope legally with all

manner o practical difculties and obstacles Te international community shouldgenerally support eorts by Aghans to reduce the likelihood o ethnic or other conict

over the election outcome, as well as to ensure that the electoral process results in a

more eective government As a stakeholder, though not a voter, in Aghanistan, the

international community should insist on procedures and an oversight role to strengthen

public condence in the honesty and transparency o the elections Te United States, other

international actors, and especially those present at the provincial level, such as Provincial

Reconstruction eams, should monitor attempts by power holders to manipulate election

outcomes (which have already begun in some areas) and should use whatever means they

have at their disposal to promote the airness and reedom o the electoral process

Some political groups demand that any agreement on holding elections ater the endo the president’s term should also include amendments to the constitution to establish

a semipresidential orm o government with a prime minister who is accountable to the

National Assembly While constitutional revision is acceptable and even desirable, it

requires careul preparation and deliberation No constitutional changes should be

hurriedly introduced as part o a political deal; such an agreement could, however, provide

or an appropriate constitutional review o xed duration

In security measures over the coming months, priority must be given to those that

will make it possible to hold elections throughout the country, including those areas where

the insurgency is most active, though some limitations may be inevitable In any dialogue

or negotiations that take place with insurgents beore the elections, nonintererence inelections should gure as a subject o discussion

Te United States, NAO, the UN, and other actors must accelerate the implementation

o plans to provide security and logistical and nancial assistance or the August elections

NAO’s North Atlantic Council promised unding in the all o 2007, but it has not

materialized Tis requires immediate review by the new administration to see where the

eort is alling behind In addition, it is necessary to plan or a possible second round o

presidential elections Aghanistan has adopted the French presidential electoral system,

which requires the winning candidate to gain an absolute majority o the valid votes

cast, and provides or a second round within two weeks i no candidate gains an absolute



30

majority in the rst round In 2004, it took nearly six weeks to certiy the ofcial results o

the election; i similar delays take place this time, the president’s term could end beore the

second round o elections is held Under circumstances o an ethnically tinged insurgency and ethnic candidacies, the period beore the announcement o the results could well be a

time o mass mobilization, charges and countercharges o rigging, and violence that would

make the second round o elections impossible or not credible

Tere has been much speculation in the press, mostly based on anonymous sources

and leaks, that the Obama administration may not support President Karzai in his bid or

reelection and may seek to replace him Te ask Force does not take any position or or

against any candidate, including President Karzai Until the end o his term, Hamid Karzai

is the president o the Islamic Republic o Aghanistan, an important ally o the United

States rustworthy and respectul communication and close cooperation between these

two governments is essential to both Press leaks and whispering campaigns should cease

All messages or the government o Aghanistan, including criticism, should be delivered

directly, respectully, and condentially to that government

Some in the United States have argued that by criticizing US and NAO orces or

civilian casualties, President Karzai is eectively running against the United States and

thereore is less o an ally Te ask Force believes that such criticisms express widespread

public opinion in Aghanistan, as substantiated by polls, and are a legitimate expression o

the democratic process Te United States and others would do better to listen and learn

rom these criticisms, even i some seem erroneous or unair, rather than reject the message

or the messengerPresident Karzai, like any political leader, is subject to legitimate criticism Others

might perorm better as president o Aghanistan Tat is a decision or the voters o

Aghanistan to make Nonetheless, some o the criticisms aimed at President Karzai do

not take into account the inherent limitations on a president who does not control most

o the armed orces or public expenditures in his country and who is constantly subject to

contradictory pressures rom oreign governments on which the country depends

Te most important result o the presidential transition will be the legitimacy—or lack

thereo—o the outcome Any process that is viewed as being manipulated or controlled

by oreigners will weaken the government, regardless o the qualications o the winning

candidate

To summarize, with respect to elections and presidential succession, the United States

should:

1. Insist that the transition respect the constitution through an agreed-upon Aghan process,

including the National Assembly and the judiciary as appropriate.

2. Support eorts by Aghans to reduce the likelihood o ethnic or other conficts over the

election outcome.

3. Insist on procedures and an oversight role to strengthen public condence in the honesty

and transparency o the elections.



31

4. Give priority to security measures that will make it possible to hold elections throughout

the country.

5. Review and accelerate existing plans to provide security and logistical and nancial assistance or the August elections and, i necessary, a second round thereater.

Governance, Corruption, and Aid Delivery in Afghanistan

Te corruption and poor perormance o the Aghan government and international

aid system have become main sources o public discontent Although they may oppose the

aliban, many Aghans nd it difcult, i not impossible, to support or trust the government

Many observers, however, misunderstand the source o Aghanistan’s governance problems

A common misconception is that the United States and the international community

imposed a centralized government on a decentralized Aghanistan and organized their aidprogram around support or that centralized government, resulting in waste, corruption,

and ailure Tereore, some propose that international actors should now engage with

provincial and local leaders rather than with the central government to help Aghans create

a decentralized state that would better meet their needs

Unortunately, terms such as “centralized” or “decentralized” provide only the illusion o

understanding Te administrative and scal structure o the state apparatus in Aghanistan

has been extremely centralized since the reign o Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1879–1901) Tat

centralized state, however, perormed a very limited range o unctions Many o the unctions

handled by governments elsewhere were perormed by communities operating outside the

ramework o the state or were not perormed at all Te centralized state interacted with thisdecentralized and largely sel-governing society through many institutions, including security

orces, courts, mosques, local and national representation and co-optation, and, above all, by

inormal networks o kinship and patronage Te orms o interaction varied among regions,

ethnic groups, and tribes, not all o which had the same relation to the state

Te social and political conicts o the past decades destroyed and transormed much o

the centralized state, the society’s decentralized sel-governing institutions, and the networks

and institutions through which they interacted, resulting in the emergence o a variety o

new orms o authority All governments o the past thirty years, however—communist,

mujahideen, aliban, and the current one—have accepted the centralized administrative

state structure as their de jure ramework When the UN convened the Bonn alks in

November 2001, the aliban had already abandoned Kabul to the Northern Alliance, and

the participants had only eight days to reach agreement It was not possible or a hastily

convened, unrepresentative group o Aghans to restructure the state in eight days, and the

Bonn Agreement reafrmed the existing de jure system, as ormalized in the 1964 constitution

During the constitutional process in 2003 and 2004, the constitutional commission, the

Aghan government, and the Loya Jirga rejected all suggestions or decentralization o the

state oered by international experts and representatives o some Aghan ethnic groups

National programs were the vehicles that provided, within a national ramework o the rule

o law, some decentralization o decision making, including the National Solidarity Program,



32

which decentralized decision making to the village level, empowering communities to make

their own decisions over grants

It is equally misleading to claim that the United States and the international community ocused aid eorts on the central government Te United States and the international

community have implemented their aid programs mainly through international contractors,

agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, not the Aghan government Te pattern

is beginning to change, but too slowly Te Aghan minister o oreign aairs recently

estimated that 80 percent o all international aid is spent directly by donors, not by the

government Tis pattern o aid disbursement has created a ragmented and uncoordinated

internationally run parallel system larger than the state that undermines the latter’s

capacity and authority It has ensured that the Parliament has no eective oversight over

public expenditure Te Provincial Reconstruction eams have created arbitrary provincialaid budgets outside the ramework o the Aghan constitution and legal system that are

unaccountable to Aghan institutions or political processes

Te largest item o oreign assistance has been the Aghan National Army, which, o

course, is part o the central state A large portion o the government expenditures that

are nanced by oreign aid have gone to the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and the

government’s basic package o health services, both o which involve experiments with

decentralized and participatory development and service delivery In an eort to restructure

the administration so as to make it more eective and accountable, the Aghan government

has also established the Independent Directorate or Local Governance (IDLG) in the

Ofce o the President Te IDLG has developed proposals or gradually linking localadministration to elected bodies and providing budgets to local administration through

block grants Various political groups are proposing dierent schemes o decentralization,

including ederalism, and these are the subject o intense discussion All o these proposals

are new to Aghanistan, a country with very limited nancial and human resources that is

currently one o the main theaters o an escalating regional war Te international community

should support the NSP, IDLG, and other eorts by the Aghan government to reorm its

system o administration and service delivery It should allow the Aghan political process

to generate alternatives and make decisions on such complex and oten divisive issues Te

international community should also support eorts to build accountability systems within

each ministry, as epitomized by the National Program system, and institute a system o certication o ministries, through which ministries that meet certain standards can receive

programmatic budget support

Proposals or direct engagement by international actors with provincial or local leaders

to bypass the government and restructure the state on short order cannot possibly succeed

International actors do not have the linguistic, cultural, or political skills required or

such engagement, nor do they possess the political legitimacy to do so Such engagement

would substitute international actors or the Aghan government, making any exit strategy

impossible Te equivalent would be to expect Chinese administrative experts who do not

speak English to engage with US local ofcials to streamline our ederal system



33

Any attempt to engineer the restructuring o the Aghan state as a response to insurgency

will ail Te insurgency poses an immediate security and political problem Aghan and

international experts disagree on how much time would be required to reorm Aghanstate institutions, even i the country were not at war, but it is unrealistic to expect such

complex and major changes to occur quickly and predictably enough to provide a solution

to immediate security threats Te United States and the international community should

engage with Aghanistan over the long term to support such eorts, but restructuring the

Aghan state cannot substitute or the political and military eorts needed to reduce the

level o violent conict over the next ew years

Te immediate ocus in governance should be on helping the existing system, however

awed, to unction better, principally by changing international policies that undermine

that system, and on supporting Aghan programs, such as the NSP and IDLG, thatintroduce gradual modications Te NSP, in particular, through which elected councils

choose and implement internationally unded development projects, can serve as a model

or participatory development within the existing centralized, unitary system

Te NSP is nanced primarily through the Aghanistan Reconstruction rust Fund

(ARF), which is administered by the World Bank Te ARF provides a model and a

mechanism or aid delivery through the Aghan government’s budget Donors contribute

to a common und that pays or programs o the Aghan government Tis model

consolidates oreign aid into a budget that is transparent and can be monitored In this

context, however, “coordination” means holding meetings to agree on policies while leaving

the implementation up to dozens or more agencies that report separately to their donors andparliaments, with no one accountable or the overall results Tere is not even a database

with inormation about how much aid has been spent or what and with what results As

always, lack o accountability breeds waste and corruption

Coordination is a particularly inappropriate model or a country in which oreign

assistance nances nearly all public expenditure In countries where aid nances a ew

discrete projects that supplement the government’s budget, direct implementation by

donors can be coordinated by the government In Aghanistan, where virtually all public

expenditure is nanced by aid, routing assistance outside the government creates massive

aid dependency with little monitoring or accountability—this in an operation in which the

strategic goal has been dened as state buildingTe Obama administration and other donors in Aghanistan should take a resh look

at the mode o delivering assistance to Aghanistan, in particular by examining how to

channel more aid through the ARF or similar mechanisms as quickly as possible in order

to increase transparency and accountability, decrease wasteul overhead and duplication,

and strengthen the legitimacy and capacity o Aghan national institutions Tey should also

overhaul technical assistance—the provision o “international experts” to aid the Aghan

government—which is a major source o waste and corruption Currently, donors decide

which experts to send on which subjects and employ them directly Tere are virtually

no criteria or procedures to evaluate their perormance echnical assistance should be



34

restructured so that the Aghan beneciaries can hire the experts they need and have the

contractual powers required to make them accountable or their perormance

Aid should mainly nance national government programs that are designed toimplement the ANDS, which the Aghan government has integrated with its budgetary

mechanisms Te ANDS calls or making agriculture, energy, and transport high-priority

sectors National programs should be developed or each o these sectors to catalyze the

preparation o accountability systems and projects to adequate standards

While preparing or the transition to this model o aid delivery, several immediate

changes could make the current system more eective USAID stafng should be increased

to manage both province-level contracting to the $100,000 level (could be extended to

$500,000) o individual projects with $10 million per province where AID ofcers are

assigned, as well as increased Aghan and American sta to coordinate national projects atthe local level

Te United States must also be more willing to take bureaucratic risks Approximately

one-third o US small business start-ups ail within two years By seeking a much higher

rate o project success in Aghanistan (where many Aghan nongovernmental organizations

lack the capacity or the business plans and cost analyses required by our current low appetite

or risk), we impose bureaucratic constraints that both slow project implementation and

require us to pay or expensive and wasteul oversight o large oreign contractors We could

do better at the provincial level by allowing greater risk taking and stafng our personnel

on the ground to manage small projects

It is important to identiy a limited number o AID and embassy positions in Kabuland in the provinces that require more expertise than can be gained in one year and or

which personal relations with senior Aghans are particularly important Trough a mix

o two-year tours and repeat tours, we could improve on our current practice o one year’s

experience seven times In addition, it is important to expand AID and embassy stafng to

provide ull-time coverage o Provincial Reconstruction eams With one State Department

and one USAID ofcer per team, the normal leave package alone guarantees that we will

have sta in place only ten months a year, and gaps are oten much longer because o the

timing o transers Tis is not a serious way to deal with a war, and pushes the military to

take on more civilian unctions when positions are vacant or long periods o time

Implementing aid through national government programs rather than donor-operatedprojects would not increase the risk o corruption Donors have ound relatively little

corruption in programs operated by the Aghan government and unded through the

ARF Much o the massive corruption in Aghanistan arises rom interactions between

the international parallel sector and Aghan networks that capture relations with oreigners

Even in cases in which the interactions largely involve only Aghans (as in the corruption in

state land transactions and import licensing), the beneciaries sometimes enjoy international

protection as a result o their role in counterterrorism Tere are ew sources o money in

Aghanistan other than the narcotics industry and international organizations, and these

are the two main sources o unding or corruption



35

In many cases o impunity or corruption, international ofcials claim that Aghan

ofcials have rebued attempts to act against the guilty parties, while Aghan ofcials

claim that oreign ofcials or intelligence agencies have prevented them rom acting We areunable to determine the overall share o responsibility, but we eel condent that much, i

not most, corruption in Aghanistan involves relations between Aghans and internationals,

and that measures to control and prevent it must be a joint venture

International military and aid operations, or instance, have created a lawless sector

o private security companies that compete with and undermine the legal security sector

Virtually every oreign operation in Aghanistan, military or civilian, relies on private

security companies, not the authorities, or its protection Tese private security companies

are sometimes purely Aghan and sometimes joint ventures with international partners Te

Aghan partners in these ventures are men who lead armed groups—that is, commandersTese were supposed to be demobilized and disarmed, but in many cases, they have simply

been reconstituted as private security companies that could easily revert to warring militias

Te process o contracting with these companies is unaccountable by any public authority

Aghans welcomed Vice President (then Senator) Joseph Biden’s criticism o the

privatization o US deense unctions in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National

Convention According to a US Government Accountability Ofce report (Contingency

Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, GAO-09-19), the Deense and State departments

and USAID together employ approximately 50,000 private contractors in Aghanistan,

at a cost o approximately $55 billion per year Te low quality o data available on these

contractors indicates a low degree o accountability or their perormance Te impact o their perormance on the security situation has not been investigated

Te Obama administration should immediately review the impact o the use o private

contractors or security and other purposes in Aghanistan, as well as all contracts currently

under implementation, and develop a plan or the gradual transer o unctions to the

appropriate Aghan national institutions It is particularly urgent to develop plans or the

demobilization and reintegration o private security companies, which are not covered by

current programs or demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration and disarmament o

illegally armed groups

Te US Government Accountability Ofce, the US Justice Department, and the

Inspector General or Aghan Reconstruction should undertake immediate investigationsand, as appropriate, prosecutions, o US and international corrupt practices in Aghanistan

Such investigations will also identiy Aghan partners in such corrupt practices, and thus

provide a starting point or conronting the endemic corruption in the Aghan government

and administration

Corruption in the Aghan government takes several orms, including the sale o ofces,

especially in the Ministry o the Interior, that enable incumbents to prot rom drug

trafcking; licensing or imports o key commodities such as uel; and transactions in urban

land Strict transparency requirements or all ofcial appointments, licensing, contracting,

and land transactions, including public announcement and postings o all such decisions in



36

mosques and on the Internet, would acilitate anticorruption eorts International donors

could also help Aghans organize and strengthen existing civil society organizations to

monitor and publicize such transactions

To summarize, with respect to governance, corruption, and aid delivery in Aghanistan,

the United States and the international community should:

1. Support long-term Aghan eorts to restructure the Aghan state to meet current and

uture needs, recognizing that restructuring the Aghan state cannot substitute or the

political and military eorts needed to reduce the level o violent confict over the next

ew years.

2. Focus immediate governance eorts on helping the existing system to unction better.

3. Channel more aid through the ARF or similar mechanisms as quickly as possible in order to increase transparency and accountability, decrease wasteul overhead and

duplication, and strengthen the legitimacy and capacity o Aghan national institutions.

4. Develop implementation mechanisms or the use o unding under the ARF, including

a portolio o large inrastructure projects prepared to international standards, and

ensuring that each sector has a National Program whereby donors can be assured

accountability standards are met, institutional capability can be met, and services can be

delivered through harnessing capability o all sectors—state, market and civil society.

5. Remove bureaucratic constraints that both slow project implementation and require

expensive and wasteul oversight o oreign contractors.

6. Immediately review the impact o the use o private contractors or security and other

purposes in Aghanistan and develop a plan or the gradual transer o unctions to the

appropriate Aghan national institutions.

7. Instruct the U.S. Government Accountability Oce, the U.S. Justice Department, and

the Inspector General or Aghan Reconstruction to undertake immediate investigations

and, as appropriate, prosecutions, o U.S. and international (and their Aghan partners)

corrupt practices in Aghanistan.

Counternarcotics

Te production o illicit narcotics, the basis o a global industry supplying a global demand,migrates to areas with the required natural endowments and where the cost o engaging

in illegal activities is least Hence, poppy cultivation and heroin production have become

concentrated in Aghanistan and, within Aghanistan, in the least secure areas Drug

trafcking and its associated corruption, however, aect much larger areas o Aghanistan,

including provinces that have been certied as “poppy ree” (Some poppy-ree provinces

have become centers o cannabis production)

Te US government and the UN Ofce on Drugs and Crime use the wrong metric

to measure progress in counternarcotics: acreage planted with opium poppy Production o

the raw material accounts or less than one-third o the narcotics economy in Aghanistan



37

Processing and trafcking are ar more protable, and these activities are the sources o the

money that corrupts the government and unds the insurgency Te most relevant metric o

success is the proportion o Aghan domestic income derived rom the drug industry Tisgure appears to have remained constant at approximately one-third o the total (Gross

prots o the narcotics industry as estimated by the UN Ofce on Drugs and Crime have

remained close to hal o Aghanistan’s estimated gross domestic product) Tere are ew

signs o the marginalization o this industry, though its spatial organization has changed,

with raw material production now concentrated in a ew areas

Narcotics is the largest industry in Aghanistan’s economy Participation in the

country’s largest industry cannot be considered a deviant activity to be suppressed by

law enorcement Te purpose o counternarcotics policy in Aghanistan is to reduce the

harm done by narcotics-unded insurgency and corruption, while gaining the supporto the millions o people who currently depend on the industry or their employment or

livelihood

Te core tools o counternarcotics policy are crop eradication, interdiction (arrest and

prosecution o trafckers and destruction o heroin labs), and development (alternative

livelihoods) Tese go hand in hand with public inormation and improved governance and

reorm o the justice sector All o these tools are necessary in a coordinated counternarcotics

policy, but they need not be simultaneous Tey must be sequenced to achieve the

right outcome One example, though limited in its applicability, is Tailand, where the

government invested in development or ten years beore introducing eradication Because

the people had condence in the alternatives by then, they accepted eradication o what littlecultivation was let Currently, according to the ormer coordinator or counternarcotics

and rule o law in Aghanistan, Ambassador Tomas Schweich, the United States and the

international community are unable to implement the coordinated policy they claim to

have adopted

Te United States and European Union must open their markets to licit Aghan

products, including cotton and textiles An eective and sustainable counternarcotics

strategy or Aghanistan has to include increased access to regional and global markets

or products made in Aghanistan Investing in production without ensuring markets

will not convince rural communities living in high-risk environments to change their

economic activities Te passage o the Regional Opportunity Zones project that is now beore Congress would be a signicant step in this direction We recommend its immediate

passage

Te United States should work with the UN High Commissioner or Reugees and

regional governments to develop an institutional ramework or labor migration and

transer o remittances, so as to relieve some o the pressures o unemployment that lead

Aghans to participate in the narcotics economy (as well as insurgency)

Within Aghanistan, investment in development—especially inrastructure and

industry development—should increase in all provinces as part o the implementation

o Aghanistan’s provincial development plans Tese programs must target, rst o all,



38

provinces that are not planting poppy or that are reducing production Otherwise, there

will be perverse incentives Simultaneously, the interdiction eort must be enhanced to go

beyond seizing containers rom trafckers It must start at the top, with the destruction o heroin laboratories and the removal o high-level ofcials beneting rom the trade Te

United States and other states and international organizations operating in Aghanistan

should also strive to ensure that none o their contractors, especially private security

contractors, are involved with or benet rom drug trafcking

Te matter o how best to pursue poppy eradication and the relationship o eradication

to counterinsurgency presents the greatest challenge—and controversy—or the United

States, the international community, and the Aghan government Te goal should be

to work with the 98 percent o Aghan poppy cultivators (according to the UN Ofce

on Drugs and Crime) who say they are willing to abandon poppy cultivation i they cancount on earning at least hal as much income rom legal economic activities (not only

crops) Crop eradication should be pursued only in areas where communities have access to

substantial alternative livelihoods

Te United States and international nancial institutions should not impose on Aghan

agriculture a level o deregulation that the United States and other developed countries

reuse or themselves Subsidies, price supports, microloans, guaranteed purchase, and

other orms o insurance or armers will be needed as they make the transition to licit

economic activities It is not necessary to purchase the opium production, as some have

suggested; armers are interested in money, not opium, and they will be even more satised

i they can sell other commercial crops protablyAlternative livelihood programs must provide all o the services that are currently

provided to armers by drug trafckers: nancing and technical assistance (extension

services) Micronance must be made easily available so that poor armers and regions can

avail themselves o new opportunities Such programs have begun implementation in the

last couple o years, but they need to be signicantly enhanced in order to yield returns

and to gain the condence o Aghans A serious eort to develop agriculture and value-

added industries based on agricultural products in Aghanistan is needed to reduce poppy

cultivation Tis requires investment in irrigation, such as building dams and developing

markets and transportation systems A large and serious alternative livelihood program

is needed to address the shit rom illicit to licit cultivation, and to reduce poverty in thecountry

Eorts to accelerate counternarcotics in order to meet security or political goals are

counterproductive and sel-deeating Replacing one-third o the economy o one o the

poorest countries in the world is not a reasonable counterterrorism tactic It will require

well over a decade and cannot be rushed Te state in Aghanistan can be built only by

using the limited orce available in a highly ocused and economical way against hard-core

opponents, while greatly expanding the incentives (where international actors should have

a decisive advantage) to win people over to the side o the government and its international

supporters Counternarcotics, done properly, will remove criminal power holders and bring



39

security and development Done the wrong way, counternarcotics could urther reduce

popular support

To summarize, with respect to counternarcotics, the United States and the interna-

tional community should:

1. Open markets to licit Aghan products, including cotton and textiles.

2. Increase investment in development in all Aghan provinces, including peaceul ones.

3. Provide political and security support or the destruction o heroin laboratories and the

removal o high-level ocials beneting rom the trade.

4. Pursue crop eradication only in areas where communities have substantial alternative

livelihoods.

5. Provide subsidies, price supports, microloans, guaranteed purchase, and other orms o insurance to armers as they make the transition to licit economic activities.

6. Implement alternative livelihood programs that provide all o the services that are

currently provided to armers by drug trackers: nancing and technical assistance

(extension services).

Regional Issues

Since the US presidential election, there has been much discussion o President Obama’s

plan or a “regional approach” to Aghanistan and related issues A regional approach

means a diplomatic initiative that seeks to establish a durable consensus among regional

stakeholders in Aghanistan to support the government and does not use the country’s

territory against others One necessary condition or such a consensus is acceptance by

Pakistan o the political dispensation in Aghanistan and demobilization o the armed

extremist part o the military-extremist-industrial complex in Pakistan, which, in turn,

requires diplomatic work to address some o Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and

regional relationships Tis process will require interlocking eorts—grand bargaining—

rather than any single “grand bargain”

Te civilian government o Pakistan, led by President Asi Ali Zardari, has tried to

articulate a vision o Pakistan’s national interest in which armed militants constitute a

threat rather than an asset Zardari has stated that India poses no threat to Pakistan Hehas also called or a change in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, to one o “no rst use,” which

would remove the nuclear shield against conventional response to asymmetrical warare

A Pakistan with a national interest such as that articulated by Zardari would have no

need to support armed militants, who could only pose threats to its peaceul development

Tereore, the United States and NAO have a strong interest in supporting a civilian-

military pact in Pakistan that empowers the government to dene the national interest and

the country’s security posture

But Pakistan’s civilian institutions are too weak at this point to exert ull control

Hence, engaging with the leadership o the military is equally important It is not likely



40

that the Pakistan military would accept ull civilian control and the demobilization and

reintegration o its militant auxiliaries unless such eorts were accompanied by measures to

address Pakistan’s security and political concernsTe United States should clearly support the civilian government’s authority over the

military and intelligence apparatus, not just in words, but also in the way in which it

manages its relations with the Pakistan military All aid should go through the government

budget with ull transparency to and oversight by the civilian leadership Te United States

can do as much to strengthen civilian institutions in Pakistan by changing how it deals with

the Pakistan military as it can by increasing civilian aid, as provided or in the very welcome

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (commonly called the Biden-Lugar-Obama Act,

now being ollowed up by the Kerry-Lugar Act)

ogether with the civilian government o Pakistan, the United States, NAO, andothers should convey a clear message to the military and to the Directorate o Inter-Services

Intelligence that maintaining the militant auxiliaries o the military—Aghan, Pakistani,

and other—is no longer acceptable Tis requires intelligence about the actual relationships

Tis approach must be combined with a clear message o support or Pakistan’s territorial

integrity and measures to address its political and security concerns

Te United States and NAO should continue to develop alternative logistical and

supply routes to Aghanistan in order to lessen that nation’s dependence on Pakistan In

addition to recently concluded agreements with Russia and the Central Asian states, the

United States and NAO should also explore the use o the transport corridor that was

jointly developed by India and Iran to link the Persian Gul port o Chahar Bahar tothe Aghan ring road While US–Iran relations are unlikely to reach the stage anytime

soon where the United States can transport military equipment through Iran, transit o

nonlethal supplies and supplies or NAO members with normal relations with Iran should

be easible starting points

Te United States should ask the Pakistani government to develop concrete plans to

implement the political and administrative integration o FAA into the “mainstream” o

Pakistan, a plank in the platorm o the ruling parties in both the national and North-West

Frontier provincial governments It should also request such a blueprint or the stabilization

o PAA, including Swat, and the rest o the border areas, and oer both technical and

nancial assistance or the implementation o such plans, including economic developmento the border region When Pakistan signals a clear intention to extend the direct security

responsibilities o the Pakistani state up to the Durand Line, the United States should

explore with Kabul how the Aghan government can nally recognize that line as an open

international border at the center o a zone o cooperation

In working with Pakistan, the United States should collaborate with NAO, the

Friends o Pakistan, and other multilateral orums to develop a consistent international

approach to the country It is particularly important or the United States to actively engage

with China and Saudi Arabia Along with the United States, these two countries provide

unding and technical support to the Pakistan military While both have been close and



41

consistent allies o Pakistan, especially the military, both have recently developed serious

concerns about the inroads made by al-Qaida and the aliban in Pakistan, the danger o

urther deterioration o security or economic collapse, and the threat o war with Indiaprovoked by terrorist attacks such as the one in Mumbai

o signal support or the needs o the Pakistani people, the United States should

lead the international community in developing a multiyear economic rescue package

or the country President Obama could start by asking Richard Holbrooke, his special

representative or Aghanistan and Pakistan, to convene a joint task orce o the US State

and reasury departments Tis would also be an appropriate subject or the work o the

Friends o Pakistan Te United States should open its markets to Pakistani textiles, a long-

standing demand that might prove more benecial than oreign aid Te deeper engagement

created by such a program will provide opportunities to strengthen civilian institutions andpromote regional economic cooperation as an antidote to conrontation

Te United States should continue to encourage Pakistan and India to build on their

existing composite dialogue to normalize their relations, including their behind-the-scenes

eorts to deescalate tensions over Kashmir and nd a lasting settlement to this dispute

Tese eorts are especially important given the history o three wars and several crises

between these two nuclear weapons states Moreover, Kashmir has provided the rationale

or decades or support o guerrilla and terrorist operations by groups based in Pakistan that

have escaped the control o the state apparatus that established and protected them

Te United States should seek out ways to incorporate Pakistan into the global nuclear

nonprolieration regime Te ask Force took note o a 2005 statement by International Atomic Energy Agency director Mohamed ElBaradei that “India, Pakistan and Israel, in

my view, are not going to come to the NP [Nuclear Non-Prolieration reaty] through

the normal route” ElBaradei suggested accepting that India and Pakistan are declared

nuclear weapons states as a act and endorsed the US–India civilian nuclear agreement as a

way to bring a declared nuclear state closer to the Nuclear Non-Prolieration reaty Under

existing circumstances (especially given concerns over terrorism and prolieration), it is not

possible to duplicate that agreement with Pakistan, but it is worth starting a dialogue with

Pakistan to explore what might be possible, and under what conditions, to acknowledge

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status, provide assistance to ensure the saety and security o its

nuclear assets, and bring Pakistan into greater conormity and closer cooperation with theglobal nonprolieration regime

An opening to Iran, perhaps starting with counternarcotics, strategic dialogue over al-

Qaida and the aliban, economic cooperation, and discussions o the use o that country as

a logistical route or some supplies to Aghanistan, could both provide condence-building

measures or other aspects o the US–Iran relationship and impress on the Pakistan military

that it has no permanent logistical monopoly on access to Aghanistan Some signals indicate

Iranian interest in reviving a proposal rom 2005: Ater the Joint Declaration o the US–

Aghanistan Strategic Partnership in May o that year, Iran proposed such an agreement

between itsel and Aghanistan, providing, among other things, that Aghanistan would not



42

permit its territory to be used against Iran Iranian intentions are unclear; does that nation

seek a security guarantee, largely rom the United States, or does it want uture leverage

over the Aghan government in order to demand limitations on where ISAF can operate within Aghanistan? Te current administration should examine whether direct US–Iran

contacts or even an agreement could reduce Iranian concerns Such moves would build on

the policies ollowed by the United States until 2003, when it halted cooperation with Iran

in Aghanistan, which had been essential to the original military and political gains One

cautionary note is that cooperation on Aghanistan should not provide Iran with a stalling

technique over other policies o concern Te recent invitation or Iran to join the UN-

chaired international conerence on Aghanistan in the Netherlands on March 31, 2009, is

a promising avenue or the United States to open a diplomatic channel to Iran concerning

issues related to AghanistanTe United States should continue to enhance cooperation with Russia and the Central

Asian states in Aghanistan Tese nations have already agreed on using ormer Soviet

territory to deliver nonlethal supplies to NAO in Aghanistan Russia’s main concern is

the expansion o NAO to all o its borders—while it supports the ght against the aliban

and al-Qaida, Russia also sees the expansion o NAO into Central Asia in support o that

mission as a serious long-term threat Expanding US–Russia cooperation in Aghanistan

and taking Russia into condence on issues about which it has strong reservations,

such as reconciliation with the aliban, would help dispel some suspicions So could

opening discussions about a possible role in Aghanistan or the Shanghai Cooperation

OrganizationTe United States must establish and maintain a consistent, high-level dialogue with

China on security and stability concerns in Aghanistan and Pakistan In addition to its

close relationship to the Pakistan military, China is the largest oreign investor in Pakistan

and is poised to become the largest oreign investor in Aghanistan, starting with a $35

billion copper mine project in Logar Province south o Kabul, a commitment o $55 billion

or a railroad, and about $3 billion or a power plant and other acilities

India is an indispensable regional actor Te United States should undertake to relieve

Pakistan’s anxiety about the Indian consulates in Aghanistan (which, contrary to what

Pakistan says, do have legitimate consular unctions) by encouraging transparency and

dialogue between the two countries in Aghanistan Specically, the United States shouldencourage Pakistan and India to speak directly about their mutual suspicions toward

each other’s interests in Aghanistan India will argue that it has legitimate interests in

Aghanistan and that it is a major donor to the international eort to rebuild that country

Pakistan will charge that India is running operations out o its consulates in Aghanistan

in order to stir up trouble across the border Pakistan sees itsel as caught in a vice between

its western and eastern neighbors But these long-standing concerns are now being trumped

by a new reality—the need or India and Pakistan to look beyond their traditional rivalries

and to agree on a joint strategy to conront the extremists operating along the Pakistan–

Aghanistan border and in their respective countries



43

Te central strategic objective or Aghanistan is to reconstitute the type o international

consensus that enabled the country to enjoy a century o relative stability (1878–1978) Such

an objective is ar more demanding under current conditions, where there are many moreactors and Aghanistan is ar more integrated into international economic, political, and

social networks Aghanistan would now have to become a connector between its neighboring

regions rather than an isolated buer state At the initiative o Kabul and with the support

o the G8, the Aghan government and its neighbors have convened a series o conerences

on regional cooperation in support o the reconstruction o Aghanistan While such policies

are necessary and deserve ull US support, their success depends on resolving the security

issues around Aghanistan’s status so that neighboring countries do not ear such cooperation

will strengthen their enemies Some have suggested an international process o negotiation

and consultation that would culminate in a conerence adopting a declaration or treaty onnonintererence in and nonaggression rom Aghanistan Such a conerence, or the process

leading to such a conerence, could provide a context in which Aghanistan could recognize

its border with Pakistan, and Pakistan could take measures to ensure that its government

could prevent the subversion o Aghanistan, including rom the territories now in FAA

Te advancement o Pakistan–India détente would certainly make a positive contribution

to this overall eort A multilateral ramework might enable the countries o the region to

address their interrelated problems without the explicit quid pro quos that they reject

To summarize, with respect to Pakistan, the United States should

1. Support the authority o Pakistan’s civilian government over the military and

intelligence apparatus, not just in words, but also in the way in which it manages its

relations with the Pakistan military.

2. Convey to the military that maintaining its militant auxiliaries is no longer acceptable.

3. In conjunction with NAO, continue to develop alternative logistical and supply

routes to Aghanistan, including transit through Iran, in order to lessen that nation’s

dependence on Pakistan.

4. Ask the Pakistani government to develop concrete plans to implement the political and

administrative integration o FAA into the “mainstream” o Pakistan; request such a

blueprint or the stabilization o PAA, including Swat, and the rest o the border areas;and oer technical and nancial assistance or the implementation o such plans.

5. Explore with Kabul how the Aghan government can nally recognize the Durand Line

as an open international border, perhaps through a process that rst makes it the center

o a zone o economic cooperation.

6. Support the existing composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, which is currently

on hold, to normalize their relations and to address the most dicult issues dividing

them, especially Kashmir, and inorm Pakistan that active support and engagement or

this process will depend on its concrete action against the perpetrators o the Mumbai

attacks and similar events.



44

7. Start a dialogue with Pakistan to explore what might be possible, and under what

conditions, to acknowledge Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status, provide assistance to

better ensure the saety and security o its nuclear assets, and bring Pakistan into greater conormity and closer cooperation with the global nonprolieration regime.

With other regional actors, the United States should:

1. Actively engage with China and Saudi Arabia to share views on the Pakistan military,

especially support or militants.

2. Signal willingness to support an Aghanistan–Iran agreement that neither government

will permit its territory to be used against the other, and open direct discussions with

Iran over the issues in Pakistan and Aghanistan, perhaps starting with counternarcotics,

a strategic dialogue over al-Qaida and the aliban, economic cooperation, and discussions o use o Iran as a logistical route or supplies to Aghanistan.

3. Enhance cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian states in Aghanistan, discussing

in particular a role or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Conclusion

American interests and objectives in Aghanistan, Pakistan, and the region are critical

to our security and the threat we ace rom al-Qaida and its allies Moving orward, our

policies in the region must be ar better dened, well resourced, and grounded in a realistic

understanding o what is achievable It is time or a new look at our policy goals, and time

to work with the Aghan and Pakistani governments in coordination with our international

partners to develop a comprehensive plan to achieve those goals Te United States has an

opportunity to recast its policies in this region in ways that promote political solutions

rather than open-ended conict, to work more eectively with local partners and with

allies, and to help Aghanistan and Pakistan achieve greater stability Denying sae haven

to al-Qaida, as well as to members o the aliban and other local groups who are allied with

that organization, must be our primary ocus and our highest priority Achieving this goal

will require a ocused military eort, and a series o political and economic steps that will

lay the oundation or long-term stability and a regional dialogue to ensure our chances or

success in creating lasting peace and stability in the region



45

Task Force Co-Chairs and Members

Co-Chairs

Ambassador Tomas R. Pickering Dr. Barnett Rubin

Vice Chairman Director o Studies and Senior Fellow

Hills & Company Center or International Cooperation, NYU

Project Director

Dr. Jamie F. Metzl

Executive Vice President, Asia Society

Members

Mr. Peter Bergen

Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation

Mr. Tomas E. Freston

Principal, Firey3 and Asia Society rustee

Ambassador Karl F. Inderurth

John O Rankin ProessorElliot School o International Aairs, George Washington University

Ms. Ellen Laipson

President and Chie Executive Ofcer, Henry L Stimson Center

Ms. Clare Lockhart

Co-ounder and Director, Institute or State Eectiveness

Dr. M. Ishaq Nadiri

Jay Gould Proessor o Economics, New York University

Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann

President, American Academy o Diplomacy

Mr. Ahmed Rashid

Pakistani Journalist and Author

Ambassador eresita Schafer

Director, South Asia Program, Center or Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Rory Stewart

Director o the Carr Center or Human Rights Policy, Harvard University



46

Biographies of Chairmen and Members

Peter Bergen is a print and television journalist He is the author o Holy War, Inc.:

Inside the Secret World o Osama bin Laden (2001), which has been translated into

eighteen languages, and Te Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History o Al Qaeda’s

Leader (2006) Both books were named among the best nonction books o the year

by the Washington Post , and documentaries based on them were nominated or Emmy

Awards in 2002 and 2007 Mr Bergen is CNN’s National Security Analyst and a Fellow

at New York University’s Center on Law and Security He has written or the New York

imes , Washington Post , Vanity Fair , New Republic , Los Angeles imes , Wall Street Journal ,

International Herald ribune , and Foreign Aairs , and has testied on Capitol Hill Hehas also worked as a correspondent or National Geographic elevision and the Discovery

Channel In 2008, he was an Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School o Government

at Harvard University Mr Bergen holds a master’s degree in modern history rom New

College, Oxord University As a Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation,

Mr Bergen researches and writes on the al-Qaida network and on the problem o global

terrorism

Tomas E. Freston is a Principal o Firey3, an investment and consultancy rm ocusing

on the media and entertainment industries He is the ormer Chie Executive Ofcer o

Viacom Inc, where he also served as Chie Operating Ofcer For seventeen years, Mr

Freston was Chairman and Chie Executive Ofcer o MV Networks (including MV,

Nickelodeon, VH1, Comedy Central, and other networks) Prior to that, Mr Freston

ran a textile business in Aghanistan and India Currently, he is Chairman o the ONE

Campaign, an advocacy organization or global poverty issues, and serves on the boards

o the American Museum o Natural History, DreamWorks Animation, Product (RED),

and Emerson College Mr Freston consults with Oprah Winrey and others in the media

and entertainment industries He also serves as a trustee o the Asia Society

Ambassador Karl F. Inderurth is currently a John O Rankin Proessor at the ElliotSchool o International Aairs, George Washington University He has served as Assistant

Secretary o State or South Asian Aairs (1997–2001), Special Representative o the

President and Secretary o State or Global Humanitarian Demining (1997–1998), and

US Representative or Special Political Aairs to the United Nations, with ambassadorial

rank, where he also served as Deputy US Representative on the UN Security Council

(1993–1997) Ambassador Inderurth has worked as a National Security and Moscow

Correspondent or ABC News (1981–1991) and received an Emmy Award in 1983 He

has also served on the stas o the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees

and the National Security Council He coauthored Fateul Decisions: Inside the National



47

Security Council (2004), along with Proessor Loch K Johnson He is member o the

Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute or Strategic Studies, and

serves on the board o the Asia Foundation

Ellen Laipson is President and Chie Executive Ofcer o the Henry L Stimson Center,

having joined that organization in 2002 ater twenty-ve years o government service She

served as Vice Chair o the National Intelligence Council (NIC) (1997–2002) and Special

Assistant to the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1995–1997)

At the NIC, Laipson co-managed the interdisciplinary study Global rends 2015 and

directed outreach to think tanks and research organizations on national security topics

Her government career ocused on analysis and policy making on Middle East and South

Asian issues She was Director o Near East and South Asian Aairs or the NationalSecurity Council (1993–1995), National Intelligence Ofcer or Near and South Asia

(1990–1993), a member o the State Department’s policy planning sta (1986–1987), and

a specialist in Middle East aairs or the Congressional Research Service At the Stimson

Center, Ms Laipson directs the Southwest Asia Project She is a member o the Council

on Foreign Relations, International Institute o Strategic Studies, Middle East Institute,

and Middle East Studies Association, and a board member o the Asia Foundation and

Education and Employment Foundation Ms Laipson holds a master’s degree rom the

School o Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and a bachelor’s

degree rom Cornell University

Clare Lockhart is Coounder and Director o the Institute or State Eectiveness,

established in 2005 to rene approaches to institution building and state building She

and her colleagues advise on the design and implementation o transitions rom instability

to stability From 2001 to 2005, she lived and worked in Aghanistan, rst as a member

o the United Nations team designing and negotiating the Bonn Agreement, then in

Aghanistan working to establish the UN role, and supporting the establishment o

the Aghan cabinet and development ramework She was then seconded to the Aghan

government to advise on the establishment o the government’s reconstruction agency

and the Aghan budget process and coordination systems In 2006–2007, she returned

to Aghanistan as an advisor to General Richards, commander o ISAF/NAO, andserved on General Petraeus’s Commander’s Assessment eam Prior to this, Ms Lockhart

managed a program on Institutions and Organizations at the World Bank, and practiced

human rights and public law at the English Bar She holds degrees rom Oxord University,

Harvard University, and the Inns o Court School o Law She is the coauthor, with Ashra

Ghani, o Fixing Failed States (2008) She contributes requently to the media on state

unctionality, accountability, and Aghanistan in particular



48

Jamie F. Metzl is Executive Vice President o the Asia Society He is responsible or

overseeing the institution’s strategic directions and overall program activities globally

An expert on Southeast Asian history and politics, Dr Metzl has extensive governmentexperience His appointments have included Deputy Sta Director and Senior Counselor

o the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senior Coordinator or International Public

Inormation and Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary or Public Diplomacy and Public

Aairs at the Department o State, and Director or Multilateral and Humanitarian Aairs

on the National Security Council At the White House, he coordinated US government

international public inormation campaigns or Iraq, Kosovo, and other crises He was a

Human Rights Ofcer or the United Nations ransitional Authority in Cambodia rom

1991 to 1993, where he helped establish a nationwide human rights investigation and

monitoring unit In 2004, he ran unsuccessully or US Congress rom the Fith Districto Missouri in Kansas City Dr Metzl is a member o the Council on Foreign Relations,

a Founder and Co-Chair o the Board o the Partnership or a Secure America, a ormer

White House Fellow, and a ormer Aspen Institute Crown Fellow He holds a PhD in

Southeast Asian History rom Oxord University, a juris doctorate rom Harvard Law

School, and is a magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate o Brown University

Proessor M. Ishaq Nadiri emigrated rom Aghanistan to the United States at the age

o nineteen He received a bachelor’s degree rom the University o Nebraska, and master’s

and doctoral degrees rom the University o Caliornia, Berkeley He has taught at UC

Berkeley, Northwestern University, the University o Chicago, and Columbia UniversityHe joined New York University in 1970 and has been Chair o the Economics Department

and Director o the C V Starr Center or Applied Economics He was named a Jay Gould

Proessor o Economics in 1975 Proessor Nadiri has been actively involved with the

National Bureau o Economic Research, where he is currently a member o the Program

in Productivity He is also a member o the Council on Foreign Relations, American

Economics Association, C V Starr Center or Applied Economics, Center or Japan–

US Business and Economic Studies, and Committee or Economic Development His

elds o specialization are the economics o technical change and productivity growth,

investment theory and modeling, monetary economics, and quantitative analysis and

applied economics He has served as a consultant to the Ford Foundation, UnitedNations Conerence on rade and Development, several government agencies and oreign

governments, and the United Nations Agencies Association Proessor Nadiri is presently

a Senior Economic Advisor to the government o the Islamic Republic o Aghanistan



49

Ronald E. Neumann is currently President o the American Academy o Diplomacy He

has served as Ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and the Islamic Republic o Aghanistan

Previously, Mr Neumann, a career member o the Senior Foreign Service, served inBaghdad with the Coalition Provisional Authority and then as Embassy Baghdad’s principal

interlocutor with the Multinational Command, where he helped coordinate the political

end o military operations in Fallujah, Naja, and other areas Prior to working in Iraq, he

was Chie o Mission in Manama, Bahrain (2001–2004) and Deputy Assistant Secretary

in the Bureau o Near East Aairs (1997–2000), where he directed the organization o

the rst separately unded NEA democracy programs Beore that assignment, he was

Ambassador to Algeria (1994–1997) and Director o the Ofce o Northern Gul Aairs

(Iran and Iraq, 1991–1994) Earlier in his career, he was Deputy Chie o Mission in Abu

Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, and in Sanaa, Yemen; Principal Ofcer in abriz, Iran; andEconomic/Commercial Ofcer in Dakar, Senegal His previous Washington assignments

include service as Jordan Desk Ofcer, Sta Assistant in the Middle East Bureau, and

Political Ofcer in the Ofce o Southern European Aairs He served as an army inantry

ofcer in Vietnam and holds a Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal, and Combat

Inantry Badge In Baghdad, he was awarded the Army Outstanding Civilian Service

Medal He earned a bachelor’s degree in history and a master’s degree in political science

rom the University o Caliornia, Riverside

Ambassador Tomas Pickering is Vice Chairman o Hills & Company, an international

consulting rm that provides advice to US businesses on investment, trade, and risk assessment issues abroad, particularly in emerging market economies He retired in

2006 as Senior Vice President o International Relations or Boeing He has had a career

spanning ve decades as a US diplomat, serving as Undersecretary o State or Political

Aairs, Ambassador to the United Nations, and Ambassador to Russia, India, Israel,

Nigeria, Jordan, and El Salvador He also served on assignments in Zanzibar and Dar

es Salaam, anzania He holds the personal rank o Career Ambassador, the highest in

the US Foreign Service He has held numerous other positions at the State Department,

including Executive Secretary and Special Assistant to Secretaries William Pierce Rogers

and Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary or the Bureau o Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientic Aairs He is based in Washington, DC

Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist and writer He is the author o the best-selling

aliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (2001), Jihad: Te Rise o

Militant Islam in Central Asia (2002), and Descent into Chaos: U.S. Policy and the Failure o

Nation Building in Aghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia (2008) He writes or the BBC,

the Daily elegraph, Washington Post , El Mundo, International Herald ribune , New York

Review o Books , and Pakistani newspapers He has been covering the wars in Aghanistan

since 1979 He is a member o the advisory board o Eurasia Net o the Soros Foundation, a



50

scholar o the Davos World Economic Forum, a ellow at the Pacic Council on International

Policy, and a consultant or Human Rights Watch In 2004, he was appointed to the board

o advisers to the International Committee o the Red Cross At the invitation o Secretary General Ko Annan, he was the rst journalist to address the UN General Assembly in

2002 and the rst journalist to address NAO ambassadors in 2003 Ater the 2001 war in

Aghanistan, he donated one-third o his book earnings to set up the Open Media Fund or

Aghanistan, which has handed out nearly $400,000 in start-up unds or newspapers and

magazines in Aghan languages In 2001, he won the Nisar Osmani Courage in Journalism

Award, given by the Human Rights Society o Pakistan He was born in Rawalpindi and

lives in Lahore with his amily

Dr. Barnett R. Rubin is Director o Studies and Senior Fellow in the Center on InternationalCooperation at New York University, where he directs the program on the Reconstruction

o Aghanistan During 1994–2000, he was Director o the Center or Preventive Action

and Director o Peace and Conict Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations Rubin

was Associate Proessor o Political Science and Director o the Center or the Study o

Central Asia at Columbia University rom 1990 to 1996 Previously, he was a Jennings

Randolph Peace Fellow at the United States Institute o Peace and Assistant Proessor

o Political Science at Yale University In 2001, he served as Special Advisor to the UN

Special Representative o the Secretary General or Aghanistan during the negotiations

that produced the Bonn Agreement He advised the United Nations on the drating o

the constitution o Aghanistan, the Aghanistan Compact, and the Aghanistan NationalDevelopment Strategy Dr Rubin is currently Chair o the Conict Prevention and Peace

Forum, a member o the executive board o Human Rights Watch/Asia, and a board

member o the Open Society Institute’s Central Eurasia Project During 1996–1998, he

served on the Secretary o State’s Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad Dr

Rubin is the author o several books, including Te Search or Peace in Aghanistan: From

Buer State to Failed State (1995), Te Fragmentation o Aghanistan: State Formation and

Collapse in the International System (1995, 2002), and Blood on the Doorstep: Te Politics o

Preventing Violent Confict (2002)

Ambassador eresita Schafer joined the Center or Strategic and International Studies in1998 ater a thirty-year career in the US Foreign Service She devoted most o her career

to international economic issues and to South Asia, on which she was one o the State

Department’s principal experts From 1989 to 1992, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary

o State or South Asia, at that time the senior South Asia position in the department; rom

1992 to 1995, she was the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka; and rom 1995 to 1997, she served

as Director o the Foreign Service Institute Her earlier posts included el Aviv, Islamabad,



51

New Delhi, and Dhaka, as well as a tour as Director o the Ofce o International rade in

the State Department She spent a year as a consultant on business issues relating to South

Asia ater retiring rom the Foreign Service Her publications include Rising India and U.S.Policy Options in Asia (2002), Pakistan’s Future and U.S. Policy Options (2004), Kashmir:

Te Economics o Peace Building (2005), and several reports on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in

India Schaer has taught at Georgetown University and American University She speaks

French, Swedish, German, Italian, Hebrew, Hindi, and Urdu, and has studied Bangla and

Sinhala

Rory Stewart is the Ryan Proessor o Human Rights at the Harvard’s Kennedy School and

the Director o the Carr Center or Human Rights Policy and o its Aghanistan-Pakistan

program He is also the Executive Chairman o the urquoise Mountain Foundation, anonprot, nongovernmental organization specializing in urban regeneration, business

development, and education in traditional arts and architecture in Aghanistan Mr Stewart

previously served as coalition deputy governor o Maysan and Dhi Qar, two provinces in

southern Iraq, an experience that is described in his book Te Prince o the Marshes: And

Other Occupational Hazards o a Year in Iraq Between 2000 and 2002, he walked on

oot across Pakistan, Iran, Aghanistan, India, and Nepal, a journey o 6,000 miles His

book Te Places in Between chronicles his walk across Aghanistan shortly ater the US

invasion Mr Stewart was born in Hong Kong and grew up in Malaysia He served briey

as an ofcer in the British Army (the Black Watch) and has also worked or the British

Diplomatic Service, serving in the British embassy in Indonesia and, in the atermath o the Kosovo campaign, as the British representative in Montenegro



Recently Released Asia Society

Task Force Reports

A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation

on Energy and Climate Change

Putting the World in World-Class Education –

A National Policy Statement

Delivering on the Promise:Advancing US Relations with India

Preparing Asians and Americans for a Shared Future

Asia Society is the leading global and pan-Asian organization working to strengthen

relationships and promote understanding among the people, leaders and institutions

of Asia and the United States.

We seek to increase knowledge and enhance dialogue, encourage creative expres-

sion, and generate new ideas across the elds of policy, business, education, arts

Documents

Afghanistan Pakistan Task Force