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Advancing E-Government: Financing Challenges and OpportunitiesAuthor(s): Yu-Che Chen and Kurt ThurmaierSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), pp. 537-548Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25145631 .
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Yu-Che Chen
Kurt Thurmaier
Northern Illinois University
Advancing E-Government: Financing Challenges and
Opportunities
As e-government evolves into the transactions stage,
governments must grapple with how to finance the
development of e-transactions. The authors argue that the
externalities effects of electronic transactions suggest they are appropriately financed by some combination of public investment and user
charges. We propose a self-financing
model adhering to two basic requirements. A flexible
pricing framework is the core of the self-financing model, as it embodies both the firms and the governments
perspectives. We assess basic assumptions of the pricing
framework using contingent valuation methodology and
a statewide survey of more than 400 firms. The empiri cal estimates we develop of the willingness to pay for e-transactions with state government and the theoretical
discussion about the self-financing model form the basis
for prescribing policy recommendations.
There is general agreement among e-government
scholars that governments are ready
to enter a
transactions-based phase of e-government devel
opment (Reddick 2004; West 2004). A growing body of
empirical work has probed the breadth and depth of
government Web sites available for online transactions
with public agencies (Moon 2002a, 2002b; Norris and
Moon 2005; Stowers 2000; West 2004). It finds that
many public agency Web sites rarely provide more than
"billboard" information. This indicates a large untapped
potential for improved effectiveness and efficiency in
public service delivery?for both users and agencies?if more transactions with government could be conducted
online. For example, online filing of income taxes
reduces costs for both filers and
the revenue agencies
as a result of
reduced paper handling and a
lower number of errors.
Despite the potential gain from
online transactions, the problem
of financing them has been
identified as one of the most
significant barriers to advancing
e-government (Holden, Norris, and Fletcher 2003;
Johnson 2002; Norris and Moon 2005; Robbins and
Miller 2004; Taylor 2003). Local governments have
consistently ranked the lack of financial resources as
the number one or the second most important
reason for the slow development of e-government
(ICMA 2002, 2004). This financing challenge is
reflected in the slow evolution of e-government at
the local level, which has been documented by Norris and Moon (2005) and Ho (2002). For
instance, less than 6 percent of local government
Web sites offer online financial transactions such
as online business license application or renewal
(Norris and Moon 2005, 69).
Although state and federal governments have made
some progress in implementing e-transactions, the
advancement tends to concentrate on one or two
service areas rather than cover a wide range of public services. For instance, Iowa has the nations highest
rate
of e-filing of state income taxes, and firms can now pay
sales and withholding taxes online (Glover 2004). In
the area of reporting, Michigan created an information
system in 2003 to allow permitted facilities to send
their environmental compliance data directly to a state
database (Perlman 2004). At the federal level, the
e-filing of federal income taxes has met a congressional
mandate to reduce costs and increase compliance
(Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 34-35; GAO 2006).
The evolution of e-government services can be signifi
cantly advanced if government can find the needed
financial resources outside general funds, such as user
fees. Citizens and businesses are
likely to pay for online transac
tions if they calculate the relative
costs of the time and resources
required to
complete a tradi
tional transaction with govern
ment. A business case analysis of
Washington State's vehicle tab
renewal system suggests that
there are savings for citizens in
wages and transportation costs for conducting a trans
action online as opposed
to visiting government offices
The evolution of e-government services can be significantly
advanced if government can
find the needed financial resources outside general funds,
such as user fees.
New Perspectives on E-Government
Yu-Che Chen is an assistant professor in
the Division of Public Administration at
Northern Illinois University. His main
research and teaching interests are
electronic government and collaboration.
His current research focuses on the role of
information technology in interorganiza tional collaboration. He has published in
Public Performance and Management Review, Social Science Computer Review, and the International Journal of Electronic
Government Research. He serves on the
Information Technology Committee for the
National Association of Schools of Public
Affairs and Administration.
E-mail: [email protected]
Kurt Thurmaier is a professor of public administration at Northern Illinois
University. His teaching and research
interests include public budgeting and
finance, comparative administration, research methods, and intergovernmental relations. Before joining the academic
community, he was a budget and
management analyst in the budget office
for the state of Wisconsin. His books include
Case Studies in City-County Consolidation
with Suzanne Leland and Policy and Politics in State Budgeting with Katherine
Willoughby. His work has appeared in the
Public Administration Review, Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory, and Public Budgeting and Finance, among others.
E-mail: [email protected]
Advancing E-Government 537
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(Frank 2003, 25). The availability and use of fee-based
online information searches (such as criminal records and
driver s licenses) by businesses on some state Web portals are evidence of such revenue
potential.
Additional opportunities lie in the ability of govern ment to take advantage of an
enterprise model. An
enterprise model treats organizations
as a whole in
both the revenue sharing among various units of the
organization (a financial dimension) and the provision of information technology services for the entire orga
nization to achieve economies of scale (a structural
dimension). In terms of revenue sharing,
an enterprise
(e.g., a state or
city government as a whole) can use
revenue from providing business transactions to build
infrastructure for advanced e-government services for
businesses and citizens alike. An enterprise perspective
that leverages scale economies is likely to bring down
the cost of e-services in the long run.
Savings can
come from building an e-payment infrastructure such
as electronic funds transfer, information security measures
(e.g., use of secured servers), or a master
directory for authentication.
Public managers and chief information officers at all
levels of government face many challenging financing questions
as they contemplate ways to find resources
for the next stage of e-government development. For
example, should governments charge users for the
convenience of conducting transactions with govern
ment online, even though
access to government
information Web sites is free of access charges? What
price?if any?should government agencies charge users for the ability
to conduct business with govern
ment online? Is there market demand for online
services (e-transactions) with government agencies? If
there is a demand for e-transactions with government,
how are agencies
to fund the development and main
tenance of e-transactions, especially given the severe
constraints on public budgets?
Research to answer these questions has been scarce.
Wang and Rubin (2004) elevate the importance of e-transactions as the integral part of e-government.
Herbst (2001) discusses related issues about using
electronic payments with online transactions. Johnson
(2002) examines state Web portals to provide some
guidelines for financing e-government information
and services. However, there is still a lack of a unifying
framework that prescribes e-transaction pricing policy
based on an analysis of both government (supply) and
service users (demand).
Moreover, little is known about the role of businesses as
a potential
source of e-government revenues. We have
only limited understanding of firms' willingness to pay for services; the last comprehensive study of business
demand was completed in 1999 (Momentum Research
Group, 2000). Business demand for public online
services has implications for developing pricing strate
gies and estimating the revenue generation potential of
e-government services. For instance, close to half of the
U.S. state governments use convenience fees or the sale
of vehicle information as their main source of funding for their state e-government portals (Haid, forthcom
ing). Perhaps many agency heads hesitate to develop services because they dislike being faced with the ques tion from the state budget director: What if we spend a
lot of money on an e-transaction service, and nobody comes? The plethora of questions and dearth of research
suggest the need for an effective financing model for
the development of e-transactions.
This article answers these questions about financing
e-government services by developing a unifying public finance framework with a focus on businesses. A
unifying framework is able to consider the supply and
demand of e-government services in a dynamic
marketplace. Such a framework allows for the develop ment of an
enterprise pricing strategy for e-transactions
for the advance of the online delivery of public services.
The focus on businesses helps examine their role in a
government-wide (enterprise-wide) strategy to over
come barriers to financing e-government services. Inter
net access and capacity are
usually not an issue for
businesses in using these advanced e-transactions. More
importantly, fees associated with e-transactions for
businesses offer a potential
revenue source for develop
ing an e-government infrastructure that will benefit
citizens and other constituents of government.
The next section describes a unifying public finance
framework for e-transactions. This framework forms
the basis for the discussion about a self-financing
enterprise model for e-transactions with businesses.
Using contingent valuation methodology in a state
wide survey of more than 400 firms, we demonstrate a
significant level of business demand for online services
and their willingness to pay. Moreover, Internet access
does not seem to be a barrier to e-services. After re
porting the results, we discuss the policy implications
for our model, including ways that public agencies can improve financial management by channeling resources to
high-impact e-government projects, ex
panding e-transactions to government-to-consumer
applications, and developing financing mechanisms
for sustaining the development of priority projects.
A Unifying Public Finance Framework for
E-Transactions
Classic economic theory suggests that the price for an
e-transaction with a government agency is a function of
the supply and demand for the service. In response, we
develop a unifying market-based framework (see figure 1) for advancing the development of e-government
services by utilizing two theoretical perspectives. The
supply of e-services is examined by analyzing the
externalities attributable to specific e-transactions.
538 Public Administration Review May | June 2008
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SUPPLY I I DEMAND of for
e-transactions e-transactions
Government agencies Firms and individual users
Monopoly suppliers Self-interested Actors
| I Conditioned by / ;
! Externalities \ I Opportunity cost i
| analysis \ / analysis j
/ Government pricing \
( policy ) V for online services
J
Figure 1 Pricing Policy Model for E-Transactions
Externalities analysis suggests the degree to which the
development and maintenance of e-transactions should
be supported by user
charges versus
general appropriations.
The demand for e-transactions
is analyzed using the concept of
opportunity costs. The demand
for e-services suggests which
e-services are preferred by users
and the amount that users are
willing to pay for e-services.
We use these theoretical approaches to
develop a
pricing model for financing e-government services
for businesses.
As noted in figure 1, the supply of e-transactions is a
function of government agencies. The development
and supply of e-services to date has been constrained
by a number of factors. First, the choice of which
service to put online has often been the judgment of
the agency head, without a sufficient amount of infor
mation about the demand for the service. As a result,
the adoption rate of online services can be low when
the online service does not meet the needs of citizens
or businesses. Second, the ability of a department
to
develop an online service has been constrained by the
willingness of legislative bodies (state and local, as well as the U.S. Congress)
to appropriate funds to
develop services. This strategy implies that services will de
velop within each agency to the extent that general
funds are budgeted for that purpose by legislatures in each budget cycle. General fund dollars will also
need to be allocated to maintain the operability of
e-transactions services if this approach is continued.
This option holds e-transactions development hostage
to
the overall general fund budget condition of the govern ment; when funds are
tight, one can expect few dollars
to be available for service development and expansion.
At the federal level, increasing deficits and other pressing
priorities of the federal government are likely
to sup
press appropriations for e-government developments.
Similarly, local governments have had to cope with
reduced state aid to local governments and revenue
slumps. Consequently, general fund revenues for
e-government development are
likely to remain scarce
at all levels of government for the foreseeable future.
An alternative strategy for e-government development
is a self-financing enterprise model funded by
user fees.
An enterprise approach in fund accounting involves
self-financing activities such as water and sewer services;
the government "enterprise" is run like a business enter
prise because revenues generally consist of fees paid by
users instead of tax receipts. Undoubtedly, some will
immediately object that a self-financing model exacer
bates the digital divide, which is an important consider
ation when developing e-government for citizens. Our
immediate focus is a funding model that can
adequately
finance e-government development. While acknow
ledging the digital divide regarding citizen services, we
note that the business community
is much less affected by this di
vide. As we will argue, businesses
are also willing and able to pay for
services that directly benefit their
bottom lines. An initial focus on
the development of e-government
services for firms will provide critical funding for the infrastruc
ture on which e-government services for citizens can be
developed. The argument developed here thus pertains
mainly to e-government services for businesses.
An Externalities Perspective on E-Transactions
Agencies are
monopoly suppliers for government
services,1 hence the traditional pricing model requires
modifications. As a rule, a monopoly is free to set any
price it chooses and will usually set the price that
yields the largest possible profit (Stigler 2006), but that
would be politically unacceptable for an agency. More
over, the recent history of e-government development
suggests the opposite pricing strategy; e-transactions
development has been constrained by the need to seek
general fund appropriation subsidies to develop
ser
vices, pricing services below monopoly cost (i.e., with
out any charge for an e-transaction). We argue that the
public nature of the agency monopoly suggests that
the supply of e-transactions should be conditioned by an externalities analysis associated with the consump
tion and production of specific e-transactions (fig ure 1). This externalities perspective provides guidance to chief information officers regarding which e
services should be subsidized, if any, and at what level.
Externalities arise when the action of an economic
actor (an individual or a firm) affects another actor s
well-being and the whole of the costs and benefits
Classic economic theory suggests that the price for an e-transaction
with a government agency is a
function of the supply and
demand for the service.
Advancing E-Government 539
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associated with that action are not reflected in the
market price. Externalities can be positive or nega
tive.2 Figure 2 presents a continuum of positive con
sumption and production externalities associated with
various e-transactions. For example, the consumption
benefits of customized online database searches accrue
very narrowly to the individual user, with low exter
nality benefits for other firms. Likewise, the produc tion externalities for customized data searches are low
because the service has very little portability to other
services, owing to the specific nature of the data.
An e-procurement service has a higher positive con
sumption externality. An e-procurement system that
builds on an integrated Web-based marketplace
provides many more firms with the information and
opportunity to bid to supply goods and services to government
(Moon 2002b, 14). The benefit accrues not
only to the individual
firm that now has greater oppor
tunity to conduct business with
government; by expanding the
number of potential bidders, the
e-procurement system is also
likely to increase competition for
government business, leading to
lower prices for goods and services
purchased by agencies, as well as better-quality goods and services. The production externalities may range
from low to moderate levels, depending on whether the
e-procurement system is customized to integrate with
the agency's accounting system or is a commercial off
the-shelf application that can be replicated across many
different agencies and governments. The latter has
higher production externalities than the former; higher
production externalities also occur when multiple
agencies or governments cooperate to create a
piggy back system, such as in the Kansas City metropolitan
area, lowering the production costs for multiple govern
ments while giving them access to many more providers
(see MACPP 2006; Thurmaier and Wood 2002).
Online vehicle renewal systems provide both high consumption and high production externalities.
E-renewal systems benefit individuals directly by elimi
nating the time needed to stand in line at a physical
transportation office to renew one's vehicle registration. The consumption externality effects are also significant; fewer people standing
in line at the station reduces
congestion costs for citizens who do not use the online
system, thereby reducing their wait times. The economy
overall benefits as well because all of the savings from
reduced waiting can be reallocated
to more productive economic
uses. The renewal module can be
altered slightly to serve commer
cial or noncommercial vehicles or
other equipment registrations,
providing significant production externalities.3 Moreover, the diver
sion of individuals from station
lines to online systems is likely to
reduce the number of employees
required to staff the renewal
stations, saving agencies money or allowing them to
reallocate staff to more productive
uses.
Our final example is an online license renewal system
for a specific
set of professionals regulated by the state,
such as barbers, dentists, or cosmeticians. The con
sumption externalities are low for any particular license
renewal module because the benefits accrue to the
professional who is now able to continue the privilege
An e-procurement system that
builds on an integrated Web
based marketplace provides many more firms with the information
and opportunity to bid to supply goods and services to government.
<High> Online personal vehicle renewal
E-procurement
Externality in ^^
Consumption S^ 0nline license renewal for
^^ a specific regulated group
<Low> Customized data
retrieval and analysis -
<Low> Externality in the Production of eGov't Services <High>
Figure 2 An Externalities Classification of E-Government Transaction Services
540 Public Administration Review May | June 2008
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of his or her professional practice. Providing the online
renewal option does not increase the number of profes
sionals who can practice; it only
saves the professional costs of physically renewing the license in the tradi
tional licensing system. The production externalities for
a license renewal module, however, are much higher.
The same module can be used for other licenses with
only slight alteration to conform to the requirements of
each specific license. In addition, the online system
should save agencies money by reducing the number of
employees required to process license renewals.
The analysis of externalities provides agencies with
guidelines on the extent to which an online transac
tion should be financed by general funds. The lower
the degree of consumption externalities, the more the
e-transaction narrowly benefits the end user and the
lower the justification for subsidizing the e-transaction
with general taxpayer funds. The consequence is
straightforward: If there is little or no justification for
taxpayer subsidy for an e-transaction service, then the
agency should set a price for the transaction service
that is high enough to recover the full cost of develop
ing and maintaining the e-transaction service. To the
extent that some degree of subsidy is justified because
of externality effects, the price can be lowered.4
An Opportunity Cost Analysis of E-Transactions Demand
It is fine and well to determine a basis for agencies to
charge price X for an e-transaction, but do firms want
to conduct that service online, and are they willing
to
pay price X to do so? It is an important empirical ques tion that has largely been ignored in theory and in
practice. We know of no demand surveys for online
transactions at the time we commenced this study.5
As noted in figure 1, the firms and individual users of
e-transactions are self-interested actors. A well-known
principle in the private
sector is that customers pay for
value (Smith and Nagle 2002). The highest amount
they are
willing to pay for a service is related to the
perceived marginal benefit they receive from using it.
What is the value to a firm of an online option for
licensing or bidding? The rational firm will not pay a
price that exceeds the perceived value of the benefits of
using the online service option instead of going to the
government office or putting the form in the mail. In
effect, the firm must evaluate the opportunity costs asso
ciated with each method of complying with the vehicle
renewal, licensing regulation, or other transactions.
Filing the application online through the agency's Web
site dramatically reduces the time between writing the
application and filing it with the agency and also elimi nates the costs of travel and salary time for the staff to
file the application in person. For example, if an indi
vidual renewing a vehicle license for a firm earns $10
per hour and the wait time alone is 30 minutes, the
firm saves $5 outright by conducting the transaction
online in a minute. In addition, the firm saves the cost
of the employee time spent traveling to and from the
station. From an economic perspective, the firm can
compare the relative price of filing the application online, filing in person, or filing through the mail. The
opportunity cost framework reinforces the proposition
that firms are willing
to pay user charges for online
services, subject to their perception of the value
(marginal benefit) of an e-transaction service option.
A Pricing Policy Framework
Figure 3 is a transactions pricing pyramid that suggests that e-government services that have the highest degree
t/ \ t k Optional Services / \
Transaction Fee: ~] / \
Upper bound negotiated / \ Lwith each firm J / Customized searches \
/Business-related data report\ ?
/ File claims or reports \ ?
/ \ S Convenience / . , \ ?
/ Apply or renew permits \ * Services / \ W
/ Employee-related data searches \ Transaction Fee:
] / \ Set for each
servicej / Bidding and commercial registration \
/ Apply or renew Licenses or certificates \
/_Paying Taxes Online_\ 3
Basic / \ O
Services / General Information Web Sites \
r ~\ / Downloadable Reports and Documents \ L_NoFeeJ / \
Figure 3 E-Government Services Pricing Pyramid Note: We are indebted to John Gillispie, Chief Information Officer for Iowa, for the idea of the transaction pricing pyramid.
Advancing E-Government 541
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of social externalities (e.g., paying taxes online) should
have the highest level of social support?that is, they should be funded with general government appropria tions rather than private user fees. Services with benefits
that accrue exclusively
to an individual firm should be
funded entirely by the users fees for that service. Most
e-government transactions fall into an intermediate
category, in which the benefits largely accrue to the
individual firm, but not without some associated social
externalities. They are most
appropriately financed with
some combination of public investments and user
charges, depending on the degree to which the benefits accrue to the user relative to society
at large. Moreover,
if users are willing
to pay for e-transactions, it is appro
priate for government to charge
user fees to provide
access. An important implication of the pricing pyra
mid is that the different tiers of service imply different
pricing structures for those services.6 We can summarize
the general principles underlying the pricing pyramid as
follows: The more that benefits accrue to a specific firm,
the higher the value to the firm, and the more willing the firm should be to pay a higher charge for the ser
vice. Conversely, the higher the social benefits, the
greater the justification for the infusion of general fund
investments to underwrite at least some portion of the
information communications technology infrastructure
required to deliver the services.
Toward a Self-Financing Model for
E-Transactions with Businesses
Based on the framework just outlined, we propose two
components of a self-financing model for e-transactions.
First, government-to-business (G2B) services should use
a market model that responds to the preferences of firms
and their willingness to pay for services. That is, the
pricing scheme should be based on a joint analysis of the
social externalities associated with a given e-transaction
service and the opportunity cost analysis provided
by a demand survey of firms.
Second, the approach should be
managed with an enterprise-wide
view using an enterprise fund
financial structure to maximize
efficiency and revenue generation.
Adopting a Market Approach A market approach
to service
development is dependent on the
demand for e-transactions by firms
that do business with govern
ments. As such, governments must
be cognizant of firms' preferences
for services. Government should
only develop online services that
firms demand and are willing to
pay for. Governments that develop
e-transactions based on the prefer ences of government agencies risk developing expensive
service options for which there is little or no demand;
the agency staff may be righdy proud of a state-of-the
art Web portal with efficient services, but if the service
provided does not meet user demand, then funds will
not have been used in the most effective manner.
A market approach to e-transaction services provision
defines demand as both a preference and willingness to pay for a service. If there is no
willingness-to-pay
weight on a preference, it is difficult to assess the
relative demand for a service?that is, to determine
which service has the strongest demand from firms.
A market approach relies on pricing signals from the
end users to guide decisions about which services to
develop and how much to charge for the use of
e-transactions services. Finally, a market approach is
dependent on the ability to exclude firms from using the service unless they
are willing
to pay for it.7
This market approach rests on the proposition that
there is a demand for e-government services and a
willingness to pay. This proposition is consistent with
the opportunity cost
perspective, which conditions a
firms perception of the value of an e-transaction
service option. We hypothesize that
Hji A firm is willing to pay user charges for
online transactions up to a maximum amount
of opportunity costs that it believes is saved in
the transaction.
Using an Enterprise Strategy The enterprise strategy has two dimensions: structural
and financial. Within the structural dimension, there are two related arguments for developing
e-transaction
services on an enterprise-wide basis rather than agency
by agency. First, governments can use an enterprise-level
approach more
strategically to
develop e-transactions
that meet the highest levels of demand from firms.
An e-government enterprise
that is unencumbered by the
constraints of a particular agency's
general fund allocation is able to
assess the market for e-transaction
services as a whole, not simply for
a single agency. An enterprise
approach increases allocative
efficiency for the government as a
whole because it is able to iden
tify and invest funds in high demand service areas by applying
marginal utility analysis to the list
of potential e-transaction services,
asking which satisfies the highest demand, which the next highest demand, and so on.
A second structural argument is
that this approach can use a single Web portal that
provides integrated interactive services to firms; the
Governments that develop e-transactions based on
preferences of government
agencies risk developing
expensive service options for
which there is little or no
demand; the agency staff may be
rightly proud of a state-of-the-art
Web portal with efficient services,
but if the service provided does
not meet user demand, then
funds will not have been used in
the most effective manner.
542 Public Administration Review May | June 2008
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infrastructure to support the Web portal and
e-transactions can be built with internal enterprise
efficiencies, including economies of scale (as discussed
earlier for various professional licensing modules).
Web portals with supporting infrastructure and appli cations are
key investments that have long-term ben
efits, large initial costs, and require technical planning and maintenance (Johnson 2002). The inefficiency of
duplicated infrastructure in an agency-by-agency
approach can be avoided with a single portal that is
managed by a
single e-government enterprise.
The financial dimension of an enterprise approach
allows the state to reinvest fees from e-transactions
and savings in portal maintenance and development; states can also recover
capital and other costs with an
enterprise approach (Johnson 2002). The enterprise
approach provides a government with flexibility to
build a pricing structure that is consonant with the
preferences of firms while maximizing the revenues
necessary to support development and maintenance of
the e-transaction services. Unencumbered by general
fund rules and politics, the e-government enterprise can build the fees that it must pay for electronic funds
transfer and credit card processing into the overall
prices for e-transaction services.
With a single portal supported by a single infrastruc ture
managed by a
single agency, a firm conducting e-commerce with a government can do so
efficiently,
without making complicated calculations about what
the true or final cost of the transaction will be. Be
hind the portal, transactions can be specific to an
agency service, and fees and other revenues can be
allocated appropriately. For the firm, its business
is with the government's business agent?the
e-government enterprise; for most e-transactions
with government, the mode is business to business
(B2B), not G2B.
The creation of an e-government enterprise would be
consistent with other enterprise functions created by
American governments, such as water and sewer
systems, airport authorities, and golf courses. Public
enterprises use a variety of methods for pricing
ser
vices (Downing 1996; Pierce and Rust 1991). When
the service resembles a market good, the value-of
service method (Petersen and Strachota 1991) is an
appropriate pricing strategy. The primary task is ascer
taining the value of the service to the customer. The
cost cannot exceed the benefit that the firm derives
from using the e-transaction or the firm will use the
traditional paper option.
Unfortunately, markets are often missing in cases of
government goods (such as online G2B services) be
cause of the monopoly position of the government (i.e.,
there are no alternatives for a firm to bid for state con
tracts or pay state licenses and fees), hence the lack
of a market to generate prices for such outcomes.
Governments pioneering in e-transactions have little
market information available from other governments;
few are advancing into the e-transaction
phase of
e-government. Consequently, other market research
techniques are
required, such as the use of a contingent
valuation approach as part of assessing firms' willingness
to pay for online transactions stated in hypothesis 1.
Political Constraints
Developing and financing e-government cannot occur
without heeding political considerations. For example,
paying taxes online presents a
special case
compared to other e-transaction services (figure 3). All firms
must pay taxes; paying taxes has broad social benefits
and minimal consumptive benefits to the firm as a
taxpayer. Given firms' resistance to paying
taxes gener
ally, it is unlikely that legislators will support a sur
charge levied on firms that pay their taxes online. In
addition, Crawford, Johnson & Northcott (1999) found strong resistance among firms to the suggestion
that the e-payment of taxes should involve a surcharge
as well. Thus, a surcharge
on paying
taxes online is
unlikely, even when a state or local government adopts
an e-government enterprise approach.8
Much of the e-government literature focuses on
government-to-citizen (G2C) interaction rather than
government-to-business (G2B) interaction. G2C
interaction is affected by digital divide issues, and
there is reluctance to assess user charges
or create other
barriers that hinder access to e-government by the
poor who may have difficulty accessing the Internet.
Our focus is purposefully on G2B transactions, where
political considerations of social equity are much less
important. This rests on the assumption that there is a
high-level of Internet access among businesses. To test
the assumption, we
hypothesize that
H2: Internet access is widely available among
firms (defined as more than 80 percent having an Internet connection).
Another dimension of the digital divide is size. It is
possible that the willingness to pay varies by size of
firm. Such a difference has implications for the adop tion of a flat user
charge for online services regardless of the size of the firm. Larger firms may be more
willing to conduct online business and pay for the
convenience, either because of a greater ability to pay
or due to the higher number of transactions with
government (or both). Hence, we hypothesize that
H3: Larger firms are more willing
to pay user
charges for online transactions than smaller
firms.
After a brief discussion of our methodology,
we report
the results of our hypotheses
tests and estimates
Advancing E-Government 543
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of acceptable user
charges for e-transactions with
government agencies.
Methods and Data
Sample and Data Collection
The project began with a comprehensive review of 46
Iowa state government Web sites to determine a reli
able list of electronic government services currently
offered to Iowa firms. Researchers worked with Iowa
State University's Center for Survey Statistics and
Methodology to
develop a
telephone questionnaire for
the survey. Pilot interviews were conducted with six
local business representatives to
identify any trouble
some items, and adjustments were made to the ques
tionnaire based on the results.9
The survey center randomly selected 1,500 firms from
about 149,000 firms identified using the 2004-05 edition of DirectoriesUSA's Iowa Business Directory to produce a final sample of 800 firms, stratified by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code groups10 and by number of employees,
to be representative of
the business profile in Iowa. Advance letters were sent
to firms identified in the sample to explain the project and to inform them that an interviewer would contact
them shortly. A total of 800 calls were made, resulting in 432 completed telephone surveys, for an overall
response rate of 57 percent. Standard interviewing
protocols were followed by survey center staff
throughout the project. The interviews were 15-20
minutes in length. Reported sample percentages are
statistically valid within ?5 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.
A Contingent Valuation Application We tested the first hypothesis using contingent valua
tion methodology. Although there is no standard
approach to the design of a
contingent valuation
survey, Portney (1994, 5-6) observes that most appli
cations involve a few well-defined elements, including a scenario or a
description of the (hypothetical or real)
policy that the respondent is being asked to value, a
mechanism for eliciting a value or a choice from the
respondent, and information on the socioeconomic
characteristics of the respondents. The elicitation
mechanisms include open-ended questions (e.g.,
What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay for X?) and bidding games (e.g., Would you be
willing to pay X for this program? Would you be
willing to pay X + 1 for this program?), and so on.
Hanemann (1994, 22) also argues that details matter
to ensure reliability of results. The first key is to con
front subjects with a specific and realistic situation
rather than an abstraction in order to capture what
one seeks to value in a plausible and meaningful way.
Early in our survey, we elicited specific transactions
that firms had with state agencies, regardless of
whether they transpired online. We then asked the
firm to identify the top three priorities for conducting transactions online (of the transactions they
were
already conducting with state agencies). Finally,
we
tested hypothesis 1 by presenting the paragraph below to crystallize opportunity
costs the firm might incur
for each of these priority transactions.11
Now please think about (FILL TRANSACTION 1) and the amount of money it currently
costs
your company to conduct this transaction.
That could include costs such as gas and travel
ing time, waiting in line, postage, or mail delay.
The total cost could range from $ 1 for postage to as much as 20 to 30 dollars for a personal office visit, depending
on how your company
handles it.
Hanemann's (1994, 22) second key to appropriate
contingent valuation is to use a closed-ended question
sequence that frames the valuation as voting in a
referendum. The questions below gauge the maximum
amount a firm is willing to pay for an online transac
tion. The sequence was repeated for each of the three
transactions the firm had specified earlier in the
survey.
With this in mind, would you be willing to pay $2 for the convenience of conducting
this transaction online? Yes No
Are you willing to pay $4 (for each online transaction)? Yes No
What is the highest user
fee per transaction that
you would be willing to pay to do this online? $_
We tested the second and third hypotheses using
several questions in the survey. To test hypothesis 2
(regarding Internet connections), we asked whether
the firm had an Internet connection. If so, we asked
how it was connected: by dial-up or broadband (cable,
DSL, T-l). If the firm did not have an Internet access,
what were the reasons for not having one? We estab
lished the independent variable to test the third hy
pothesis (about the influence of firm size) by asking firms about the number of employees the company
had in its Iowa operations.
Results
The demand for a specific online service is measured
both by the desire for a service and by the willingness to pay for that service. In this regard,
we found clear
support for hypothesis 1: Firms are willing to pay a
user charge for an online transaction that is of direct
benefit to them (table 1). The results presented in
table 1 are aggregated from the three most
important
transactions that each firm identified that it wished to
conduct with the state online.
544 Public Administration Review May | June 2008
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Table 1 Share of Firms Willing to Pay for Online G2B Commerce
Percent responding willingness to pay
Apply or renew
Paying corporate File reports Apply or renew licenses or
taxes or claims permits certificates Overall mean
Pay $2 53% 53% 65% 62% 57% Pay $4 44% 18% 54% 40% 40%
Maximum pay: ft) $ 2.30 $ 1.64 $ 3.45 $ 2.47 $ 2.40 (median) $ 1.00 $ 2.00 $ 2.00 $ 2.00
Source: E-Government Business Survey.
Aggregated responses (overall mean) for the firms re
sponding to the payment sequence indicate that about
57 percent of firms would be willing to pay at least $2
per transaction if the commerce they currently conduct
with the state was moved online (table 1). The number
dropped to about 40 percent when firms were asked
whether they would pay $4 for their preferred transac
tion if it were available online. Firms indicated an
overall average of $2.40 per transaction as the highest amount of user fees they would be willing
to pay for an
online service, although there was substantial variation.
Responding directly to each of three specific
transac
tions that the firm would like to conduct online, the
average maximum acceptable charge ranged from $3.45
to $ 1.64 per transaction (the median is reported for
each transaction in table 1). About 20 percent of firms
indicated a zero dollar fee as the highest amount that
they would be willing to pay for online transactions.
We have confidence in these estimates because of the
mixed format of closed- and open-ended questions in
the contingent valuation question sequence. Hanemann
notes that "[w]ith the open-ended format. . . . there
are strategic
reasons for stating less than one's full
value?a theoretical result strongly supported by
experimental evidence. This is not so with a closed
ended format" (1994, 23). Though the exact amount
of transaction savings to break even was unknown to
the firm at the point of the question, the responses to
the fixed points of $2 and $4 reinforce the mean and median responses to the open-ended questions. Taken
together, the responses of firms indicate a willingness
to pay a modest service charge, between $2 and $4, for an online service option with the state.
There is also a large latent de
mand for more G2B online
services. Across various types of
transactions that the firms cur
rently have with state govern
ment, survey results suggest that
an average of only 30 percent are conducted online.
About 80 percent of the firms that currently do not
conduct transactions online said that they would like
to do so in the future. That means the state could
serve another 56 percent of its firms with new
electronic government services?in addition to the
30 percent currently served; that represents a potential
market of 86 percent of all state firms (Chen and
Thurmaier 2005).
Limited access to the Internet does not seem to be an
issue for Iowa firms, supporting hypothesis 2. The
survey found that 84.5 percent of firms were online at
the time of the survey. Another 4 percent expected to
connect to the Internet by the end of 2005, bringing the penetration
rate close to 90 percent and effectively
mitigating digital divide issues with respect to business services by
state agencies. Furthermore, a broadband
connection was used by 76 percent of the firms that were online at the time of the survey. As expected,
larger firms are more likely
to be connected online
and use broadband services than smaller firms. For the
small percentage of the firms not connected, the study
suggests that lack of need?not cost?is the main
barrier (Chen and Thurmaier 2005). If governments are able to
provide more convenient and lower-cost
services, these firms are still unlikely to use them.
We must reject hypothesis 3. Survey analysis indicates
that size does not affect the amount that firms are
willing to pay for e-transactions. There is no
significant correlation between the size of a firm (measured by the
number of employees) and the maximum amount that
it is willing to pay for online transactions. Future
research could employ a research design
to carefully
test other hypotheses regarding variation in willingness
to pay by type of firm. Our sam
ple size is not large enough
to
allow us to have a meaningful
investigation into each SIC in
dustry group. For some industries
(e.g., agriculture, wholesale, and
construction), we have only a
small number of observations.
This is the result of achieving a
stratified sample that is represen
tative of all businesses in the state of Iowa; perhaps
surprisingly, agriculture constitutes only 3 percent of
all businesses and wholesale accounts for only 6 per cent. A different sampling strategy may find significant
About 80 percent of the firms
that currently do not conduct
transactions online said that
they would like to do so in the future.
Advancing E-Government 545
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differences by type of business, advancing our knowl
edge about the demand for G2B services even further.
The Enterprise Approach as an
E-Government Policy These results should encourage policy makers to
adopt a market-based approach
to G2B commerce and to
create an e-government enterprise for the develop ment and management of online transactions. Our
analysis suggests that there is a market demand for
online services for businesses. First, firms are able to
access online services and interact with state agencies
online, often with high-speed Internet connections,
mitigating concern about a digital divide problem. Second, the results suggest that firm size does not
affecting the willingness to pay to conduct transac
tions online.
Third, firms are willing
to pay for the convenience of
online service options from state government. Survey
results suggest firms are amenable to a service fee in
the range of $2-$4 for transactions they currently
conduct in traditional modes but would rather con
duct online. This means firms will not be discouraged
by being charged a few dollars to conduct transactions
online because traveling and waiting in line are likely to cost them even more. These results suggest that
marketing campaigns that carefully and accurately
frame the opportunity costs can encourage firms to
pay a service charge for an online transaction because
they perceive it will actually save them money, even
after paying a service charge. Note that the term "ser
vice charge" itself is a word choice that mimics the
private sector and should increase acceptability.
An enterprise fund approach might take the form of an e-government enterprise authority that is quasi
governmental and free from many of the pricing
constraints associated with general fund financing.
Using a market approach, the e-government enterprise
authority would conduct market research to identify
the online preferences of firms and their willingness to
pay for them. Pricing structures for services would
adopt business sector practices and roll costs of doing
business into product pricing. In that vein, govern
ments would do well to develop
an e-government
enterprise authority as a
long-term financing structure
that will enable them to develop a broad range of
G2B commerce. The scope of authority for the
e-government enterprise authority should span the
breadth of state government so that it can act on
behalf of all state agencies and be self-financing from
multiple revenue streams.12
This strategy can address the issue of accountability in
making structural and financial decisions in two ways.
First, a technology governance board can oversee a
central e-government authority in making decisions
on which online services to deploy and the proper mix
of general fund and user fees for financing them.
Representation from various government agencies
involved in online transactions can help strike a
proper balance in making agency-specific decisions
that have enterprise-wide ramifications. Second, the
decisions on user fees will follow a thorough market
and externalities analysis, as
suggested earlier, to avoid
any potential abuse of coercive power that an agency
has in the marketplace of online government services.
Basing decisions on the results of the analysis will
instill accountability and avoid decision-making
distortion.
The e-government enterprise authority market model
provides longer-term social benefits beyond those
already mentioned. If governments can successfully
build the e-transactions infrastructure required for
G2B commerce using mostly service fees from the
business sector, they will have provided much of the
investment funding necessary for G2C transactions.
Policy makers are rightly concerned about the digital divide related to G2C interactions. Anything that
raises the cost of access to online government services
for citizens will tend to exacerbate the digital divide.
These social equity concerns suggest that development
of G2C services is most appropriately financed with
general fund revenues rather than transaction sur
charges, yet general fund financing is problematic at
all levels of government. This is why we have focused our attention on the development of G2B commerce.
An initial focus on developing G2B services lowers the
overall?and long-term?costs of building the infor
mation communications technology infrastructure for
G2C services, enhancing the ability of governments to
develop G2C services with fewer general fund dollars.
This strategy effectively lowers the marginal cost of
developing G2C services over the longer term, reduc
ing the overall costs to government and diminishing some of the cost issues associated with the digital
divide.
We expect that the opportunity cost analysis?as
well as our model for an enterprise fund approach
to
G2B financing?is relevant to U.S. state and local
governments beyond Iowa. We expect that our sam
ple profile of 90 percent business connectivity mir
rors that in other states; perhaps it is even
higher in
more populous and less rural states, enhancing the
generalizability of the results. State and local govern
ments need to creatively
structure the financing for
e-government if it is to develop further. The analysis
and model we have presented here suggest an ap
proach that minimizes general fund investments
while also providing online services that benefit the
firms that are willing
to pay for them. An e-government
enterprise approach could be a prominent instru
ment for state and local governments to confidently
move into the next stage of e-government
development.
546 Public Administration Review May | June 2008
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Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank John Gillispie and James
Douglas for their helpful ideas and comments and
Bronwyn Beatty-Hansen for her helpful assistance.
We also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for
their very helpful suggestions. This research was made
possible with an award from the IowAccess Advisory Council, Iowa Department of Administrative Services.
The information in this paper does not necessarily
reflect the views or opinions of the Department of
Administrative Services or the IowAccess Advisory
Council. An earlier version of this paper was presented
at the 2005 conference of the Association for Budget
ing and Financial Management.
Notes 1. It does not matter whether they provide it di
rectly or contract with a vendor.
2. An example of a positive externality is when a
child is educated. What the child learns provides
him or her with direct benefits, and the child will
be able to earn a better living with more educa
tion. In addition, society benefits from what the
child learns because an educated child becomes
an educated adult who is capable of participating
in the political and economic life of the polity.
Hence, some of the benefits of the child's con
sumption of education are external to the child,
providing a rationale for subsidizing the child's
K-12 education with general taxes instead of
forcing the child (or the child's parents) to pay
the full cost of the education. The production of
education also has externalities, often viewed as
economies of scale. The child's education can be
provided by a tutor or by a teacher in a school
where the child learns alongside many other
children. The production of education by a tutor
has a low degree of externalities because the tutor
can only teach one child at a time and the educa
tion is tailored to the child and not easily repli
cated for other children. Alternatively, a school
setting uses economies of scale, where one teacher
can educate multiple children, and the techniques
for teaching one fifth-grade math class can be
replicated (with minor variation) across multiple
fifth-grade math classrooms.
3. Note that the consumption externalities for online
commercial vehicle renewals will be lower than
those for noncommercial renewals because of the
much smaller universe of such vehicles and the
general practice of having special lines at vehicle
registration stations for commercial customers.
4. Higher degrees of production externalities do not
automatically suggest grounds for increasing
general fund subsidies for a specific online ser
vice; they merely point to opportunities for
agencies to recoup online development costs and
reallocate agency operations to increase operating
efficiency. Indeed, developing a common module
that can be used in applications for multiple
agencies can be a central feature of an
enterprise-wide approach to the development of
e-government services.
5. The International City/County Management
Association's biennial e-government survey asks
local governments whether they ask demand
questions in citizen surveys, but there do not
seem to be any systematic treatments in the results.
6. The price of e-transaction services is limited only
by the value of the commodity or service to the
firm, but at a minimum, it can be set to equal the
extra cost to the agency staff of providing the
customized service. The price of e-transaction
services is conditioned on a firm's willingness to
pay the fee, a decision that is affected by how the
firm values the e-transaction option. This is an
issue of opportunity costs.
7. We will discuss political constraints later; for now,
we note that firms retain the traditional "brick
and-mortar" option to comply with regulations.
Firms are not compelled to use the e-transaction
service for licensing, bidding, or other transactions
with governments; if they use the e-transactions
option, it is because they choose to do so.
8. Note that private tax preparation firms and
software programs can charge for e-filing taxes
without the same resistance met by a government
attempt to do so.
9. A complete description of the methodology and
the survey instrument is available from the
authors upon request.
10. The industries surveyed include agriculture,
construction, manufacturing, transportation,
wholesale and retail trade, and various services.
11. We randomly selected half of the firms in our
survey to answer the following sequence of
questions that focused on user charges as an
additional cost of online commerce. The other
half of the firms were randomly assigned to an
alternative sequence of questions that focused on
saving money by using online commerce. We only
report the results of firms asked about costs here.
12. For a more complete discussion of the scope of
authority issue, see Chen and Thurmaier (2005b).
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