Admin Cases-4

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G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations,

and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,

vs.

HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS,

Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED,

respondents.

MARTIN,J.:

This is an original action for certiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to

annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.",which reads as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary

injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents

[petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from

further issuing subpoenas in connection with thefact-findinginvestigations to the petitioner [private

respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under

Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,1

the President of the Philippines

created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.

2Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:

3

b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling

(physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the

government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the

Philippines.

c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and

gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed

wealth ... .

h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts,

conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the

appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee

under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or

subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.4

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando

Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandumcommanding him "to be and appear as

witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare

and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."

Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance

Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorariand/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining or

docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary

injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents

[petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf fro

further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-findinginvestigations to the petitioner [priva

respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]

Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundsubmission that the Order is a patent nullity.6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue su

in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and

analysis of evidence.7

Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and

licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legisla

and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done.8

An admin

agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in

proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may b

9and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inq

into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5

in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the invest11

with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecumor otherwise, subject in all rto the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character."

12Such subpoena power

operates in extensoto all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is n

bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under su

paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one anot

the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious acti

anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudic

functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under

sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinctio

and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established

that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules o f Court13

t

abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon w

and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecumor otherwise shall be "subject i

respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be valid

upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending befo

court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adj

functions 14before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be


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emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essencefrom a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks

of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an

extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean

the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the

relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear.15

Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is

involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown16

and even before the issuance of a complaint.17

It is not necessary, as in

the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to

one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.18

The purpose of the subpoena is to discover

evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies.19

Its obligation

cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized

purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light.20

Because judicial

power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that

an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry.The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get

evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is

not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform

itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.21

In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for

enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is

reasonably relevant.22

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain

public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions23

fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that

the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession,24

is

reasonably relevant to the investigations.

We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to

adversary proceedings.25

In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,26

the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth

against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a

proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching

upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners,27

the same

approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his

privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is

not facing any administrative charge.28

He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of

anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President

of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges.29

Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of

future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.30

Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando

Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.

A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue

subpoena.31

More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority,

Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the

constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes32

cannot be collaterally

impeached.33

Much more when the i ssue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now.34

The

settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent

Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force

effect.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD,petitioners,vs.

THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,respondents.

LAUREL,J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motio

reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the

opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una

determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para

de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell

tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en s us tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fab

cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo f

duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como

consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5

Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un

determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del co

en virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the m

of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY

necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and

unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically

the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.


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such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power

v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6

Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The

statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious

purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the

mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the

administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860;

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;

United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable

flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational

probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison

Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and

disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be

protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty

actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence

and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the

purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.

(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural

dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of

the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may

delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem

necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent

consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a

decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies

coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing

examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our

case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the

parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The

performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement

between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst

for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union,

Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically

discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the

petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National

Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and

functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his

substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be

expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to

the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and

reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the peti

and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better serv

movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence a

relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the res

Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall

remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be

relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-56540 October 31, 1984

COSME LACUESTA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

BARANGAY CASABAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF CABANGAN, PROVINCE OF ZAMBALES, and TEOFILO RONQUILLO, defendant

appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:+.wph!1

This is an appeal certified to us by the then Court of Appeals as involving a pure question of law.

Plaintiff-appellant, Cosme Lacuesta, was the agricultural lessee of a landholding consisting of 1.6610 hectares, situated in

Barangay Casabaan, Cabangan, Zambales. He was devoting a 5,000 square meter portion thereof to the planting of palay.

By virtue of expropriation proceedings against the land-owners instituted by defendant-appellee, Barangay Casabaan (the

Barangay, for short), before the Court of First Instance of Zambales ( the Expropriation Case), the said Barangay was place

possession of the same 5,000 square meter portion. Lacuesta was not a party in that case. The Barangay thereafter starte

converting the area into a public plaza and constructed a basketball court, a rural health center, a barangay hall and a stag

While the Expropriation Case was pending, a claiming that he had been illegally deprived of the right to cultivate the port

expropriated, Lacuesta, litigating as a pauper, filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations of Zambales (CAR, for short), a

Complaint for Reinstatement and Damages against the Barangay, represented by its Captain, Teofilo Ronquillo. Lacuesta c

that the entry of the Barangay into the litigated portion without his consent was illegal as its deprived average annual inc

17.5 cavans of palay or its money equivalent, and that by reason he suffered moral damages of P2,000.00

In its Answer, the Barangay contended that the 5,000 square meter portion was upland, not suited for the planting of pala

corn, but for sugar cane, as shown by the Tax Declaration covering it; that it was awarded possession by virtue of a lawful

Order in the Expropriation Case, and that Lacuesta's claim of an annual palay harvest of 17.5 cavans of palay is unfounded

On July 17, 1980, the CAR rendered judgment dismissing the case essentially on the ground that for reasons of comity, it m

interfere in the acts of another Court of equal rank, and who has first acquired jurisdiction over the expropriation case." T

further held that Lacuesta was not entitled to actual damages since the palay had already been harvested at the time of

expropriation, nor to disturbance comp ensation since dispossession was not due to the causes enumerated in Section 36

Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. No. 3844). 1


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Lacuesta assailed that judgment before the then Court of Appeals claiming that it is the CAR "which has jurisdiction to determine

whether (he) ha(d) the right to be reinstated in the cultivation of the landholding.2He also cited Section 12(n) of P.D. No. 946,

roviding that the Court of Agrarian Relations has original and exclusive jurisdiction over: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

(n) Expropriation proceedings for public purpose of all kinds of tenanted agricultural land, whether

instituted by the State, its political subdivisions and instrumentalities, or corporations and entities

authorized by law to expropriate.

The legal poser is, as between the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), which Court has

jurisdiction over the expropriation of a tenanted landholding?

Although the abovequoted provision of P.D. No. 946 explicitly vests jurisdiction in the CAR, it should be noted that P.D. No. 946became effective only on June 17, 1976 or posterior to the Expropriation Case instituted on October 8, 1975. Jurisdiction,

therefore, vested in the Court of First Instance where we find that no irregularity had been satisfactorily established.

The reinstatement prayed for by Lacuesta is obviously impossible of accomplishment because the public plaza had been

constructed and there is no longer any area he could still cultivate.

On the issue of damages, procedurally, that should have been more properly raised in the Expropriation Case, since it was the case

first instituted and it was the CFI that had first acquired jurisdiction. The Barangay had raised that point in its "Opposition to

Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Issuance of Preliminary Injunction" but it evoked no reaction from Lacuesta. On

the other hand, the Barangay, too, can be faulted for not having included Lacuesta as a party in the Expropriation Case as required

by Section 1, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

But procedural lapses should not prejudice Lacuesta, whose right to security of tenure as a tenant is, in our opinion, also entitled

to protection even where the power of eminent domain is exercised. Although Lacuesta admits that he is not entitled to

disturbance compensation because that is only granted to a tenant-agricultural lessee whose landholding has been converted by

his landowner/lessor for non-agricultural purposes and not where a tenanted farmholding is expropriated, yet, it is our opinion

that Lacuesta should be entitled to some compensation for the deprivation of his farmholding. Since the amount Lacuesta claimedas damages in the Complaint has not been satisfactorily rebutted, he may be awarded 17.5 cavans of palay or its money

equivalent, for a period of five years, applying by analogy the same period granted in cases where payment of disturbance

compensation is warranted.3

Lacuesta is not entitled to the moral damages that he prays for s ince it cannot be said that the Barangay had acted with malice

and in bad faith.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified in that defendants-appellees shall pay plaintiff-appellant damages of 17.5

cavans of palay or its money equivalent in 1975, the year that expropriation took place, for a period of five years. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

November 30, 1963

G.R. No. L-17169

ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL. , respondents.

,J.:

On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce and

requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from the customs house which were imported without any

allocation or remittance of foreign exchange. Said commodities consisted of 1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which

covered by any Central Bank release certificate. On the same date, the company addressed an identical request to the Sec

Finance who was also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the co

likewise wrote said official urging that authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned concentrates. Not content wit

step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank, urging, the same matter. Then Secretary

Hernandez wrote another letter to Dr. Castillo stating, Senator Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless we have leg

objection, I would like to authorize the withdrawal of the concentrates upon payment of all charges in pesos. Please expe

action.

Almost at the same time, the Import-Export Committee of the Central Bank, thru Mr. Gregorio Licaros, submitted to the M

Board a memorandum on the joint petition of the company and Sabido Law Office for authority to withdraw the concentr

from the customs house stating therein that it sees no objection to the proposal. The Monetary Board, however, failed to

the matter in its meeting of October 12, 1956 for the reason that the transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or f

exchange, and of this decision Mr. L icaros was informed.

Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, on October 13, 1956, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola

Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him the im

release of the concentrates, but this official seeing perhaps that the importation did not carry any release certificate from

Central Bank advised the counsel to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that h

jurisdiction over the case. In the morning of the same day, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, of said Office, wrote a letter addressed to

Collector of Customs stating, among other things, that his office had no objection to the release of the 1,188 units of concbut that it could not take action on the request as the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No -Dollar Import Office w

contemplation of R.A. No. 1410. The counsel already referred to above showed the letter to Collector of Customs Ang -A

upon perusing it still hesitated to grant the release. Instead he suggested that the letter be amended in order to remove t

ambiguity appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating that the same was neither a permit nor a

Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been contacted by telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco read to him the let

which the Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, wh

in doubt as to the propriety of the action suggested, finally authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of t

corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.

When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release of the concentrates in question he immediat

ordered their seizure but only a negli gible portion thereof remained in the warehouse. Whereupon, he filed an administra

complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him with having committed a grave neglect of duty and obser

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the customs service. On the strength of this complaint President Ramon Magsa

constituted an investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco composed of former Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla,

Chairman, and Atty. Arturo A. Alafriz and Lt. Col. Angel A. Salcedo, as members. Together with Collector Ang-Angco, Mr. A

Lopez, was also investigated by the same Committee, who was also charged in a separate complaint with serious miscond


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office or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the State. As a result, Collector Ang-Angco was suspended from office in the

latter part of December, 1956.

After the investigation, the committee submitted to President Magsaysay its report recommending that a suspension of 15 days,

without pay, be imposed upon Ang-Angco chargeable against the period of his suspension. On April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco

was reinstated to his office by Secretary Hernandez, but the decision on the administrative case against him remained pending

until the death of President Magsaysay. After around three years from the termination of the investigation during which period

Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President,

rendered a decision on the case on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco guiltyof conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

service, and considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of

Customs.

Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling

attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him from office had the effect of depriving him of his

statutory right to have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the CivilService Board of Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such decision is in violation of

the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in the civil service against removal or suspension except for

cause in the manner provided by law.

In a letter dated February 16, 1960, Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the request for reconsideration.

Not satisfied with this resolution, Collector Ang-Angco sent a memorandum to President Garcia reiterating once more the same

grounds on which he predicated his request for reconsideration. Again Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, in

letter dated July 1, 1960, denied the appeal. In this instance, Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of

control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the administrative case in

question inasmuch as the provisions of law that would seem to vest final authority in subordinate officers of the executive branch

of the government over administrative matters falling under their jurisdiction cannot divest the President of his power of control

nor diminish the same.

Hence, after exhausting all the administrative remedies available to him to secure his reinstatement to the office from which he

was removed without any valid cause or in violation of his right t o due process of law, Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court

the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a petiti on for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory

injunction. The Court gave due course to the petition, but denied the request for injunction.

The main theme of petitioner i s that respondent Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo in acting on his case by authority of the

President in the sense of considering him as resigned from notice thereof, violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to

officers and employees in the classified service in that he acted in violation of Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which

vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and

employees in the classified service, deprived him of his right of appeal under Section 18 (b) of the same Act to the Civil Service

Board of Appeals whose decision on the matter is final, and removed him from the service without due process in violation of

Section 32 of the same Act which expressly provides that the removal or suspension of any officer or employee from the civil

service shall be accomplished only after due process, and of Section 4, Article XII of our Constitution which provides that No

officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed except for cause as provided for by law. Since petitioner is an officer who

belongs to the classified civil service and is not a presidential appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the

Revised Administrative Code, he cannot be removed from the service by the President in utter disregard of the provisions of the

Civil Service Act of 1959.

Respondents, on their part, do not agree with this theory entertained by petitioner. They admit that if the theory is to be

considered in the light of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the same may be correct, for indeed the Civil Service Law

as it now stands provides that all officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction

of the Commissioner of Civil Service and as such all administrative cases against them shall be indorsed to said official who

decision may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from whose decision no further appeal can be taken. They

admit that petitioner belongs to the classified civil service. But it is their theory that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Se

Law applicable to employees in the cl assified service do not apply to the particular case of petitioner since to hold otherw

would be to deprive the President of his power of control over the officers and employees of the executive branch of the

government. In other words, respondents contend that, whether the officers or employees concerned are presidential ap

or belong to the classified service, if they are all officers and employees in the executive department, they all come under

control of the President and, therefore, his power of removal may be exercised over them directly without distinction. Ind

respondents contend that, if, as held in the case of Negado v. Castro, 55 O.G. 10534, the President may modify or set asid

decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance of the office concerned, or the respondent employee, or may

so motu propio, there would be in the final analysis no logical difference between removing petitioner by direct action of

President and separating him from the service by ul timate action by the President should an appeal be taken from the dec

the Civil Service Board of Appeals to him, or if in his discretion he may motu proprioconsider it necessary to review the Bo

decision. It is contended that this ruling still holds true in spite of the new provision wrought into the law by Republic Act

which eliminated the power of review given to the President because the power of control given by the Constitution to th

President over officers and employees in the executive department can only be limited by the Constitution and not by Cofor to permit Congress to do so would be to diminish the authority conferred on the President by the Constitution which

tantamount to amending the Constitution itself (Hebron v. Reyes, L- 9124, July 28, 1958). Indeed this is the argument invo

respondent Castillo in taking direct action against petitioner instead of following the procedure outlined in the Civil Servic

1959 as may be seen from the following portion of his decision.

In connection with the second ground advanced in support of your petition, it is contended that in deciding the case direc

instead of transmitting it to the Commissioner of Civil Service for original decision, his Office deprived the respondent of h

to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. This contention overlooks the principle that the President may modify or s

a decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance of either the office concerned or the respondent employee

even do so motu proprio(Negado vs. Castro, 55 O.G, No. 51, p. 10534, Dec. 21, 1959). There would therefore be no differ

effect between direct action by the President and ultimate action by him should an appeal be taken from the decision of t

Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The result is that the Presidents direct action would b

final decision that would be reached in case an appeal takes its due course.

Thus, we see that the main issue involved herein is whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case

petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959

Petitioner sustains the negative contending that the contrary view would deprive him of his office without due process ofwhile respondents sustain the affirmative invoking the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over al

and employees, belonging to the executive department.

To begin with, we may state that under Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil Service

original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the classified se rvice for i

section the following is provided: Except as otherwise provided by law, (the Commissioner shall) have final authority to p

the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service a

all matters relating to the employees. The only limitation to this power is that the decision of the Commissioner may be a

to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, i n which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 90 days after the

has been submitted for decision, whose decision in such case shall be final (Section 18, Republic Act 2260). It should be no

the law as it now stands does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given the power to review the decisio

proprio, unlike the provision of the previous law, Commonwealth Act No. 598, which was expressly repealed by the Civil S

Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), which provides that the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals may be reversed or mo

motu proprioby the President. It is, therefore, clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the c

petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the pr

laid down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been deprive

process as guaranteed by said law.


7/46

It must, however, be noted that the removal, separation and suspension of the o fficers and employees of the classified service are

subject to the saving clause Except as otherwise provided by law (Section 16 *i+, Republic Act No. 2260). The question thenmay

be asked: Is the President empowered by any other law to remove officers and employees in the classified civil service?

The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent portion of which

we quote:

(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held b y such removed officials. For

disloyalty to the (United States) Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the Phil ippines may at any time

remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.

The phrase conformably to law is significant. It shows that the President does not have blanket authority move any officer or

employee of the government but his power must still be subject to the law that passed by the legislative body particularly with

regard the procedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons who may be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as above

stated we have such law which governs action to be taken against officers and employees in classified civil service. This law is

binding upon President.

Another provision that may be mentioned is Section (D) of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:

Power to appoint and remove.The Department Head, the recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or office concerned, shall

appoint all subordinate officers and employees appointment is not expressly vested by law in the (Governor-General) President of

the Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance the Civil Service Law.

The phrase in accordance with the Civil Service is also significant. So we may say that even granting for administrative pur poses,

the President of the Philippines is considered as the Department Head of the Civil Service Commission, his power to remove is still

subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959, and we already know with regard to officers and employees who belong to classified

service the finality of the action is given to the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Board of Appeals.

Let us now take up the power of control given to President by the Constitution over all officers and employees in the executive

department which is now in by respondents as justification to override the specific visions of the Civil Service Act. This power of

control couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v.Reyes, supra, had already occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean the power of an officer to alter or modify or

nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the

former for that of the latter,1 to distinguish itfrom the power of general supervision over municipal government, but the

decision does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department.

Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent

himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the

performance of his duties.

That meaning is also the meaning given to the word control as used in administrative law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant

to Section 79(C) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices under his department by virtue of which he may repeal ormodify

decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices, and under Section 74 of the same Code, the Presidents control over the

executive department only refers to matters of general policy. The term policy means a settled or definite course or method

adopted and followed by a government, body, or individual,2 and it cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes

within the meaning of control over a specific policy of government.

But the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and set at naught the beneficient

purpose of the whole civil service system implanted in this jurisdiction, which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those

who belong to the classified service, in derogation of the provisions of our Constitution which provides that No officer or

employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law (Section 4, Article XII,

Constitution).Here, we have two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently in conflict, the power of control by t

President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the protection extended to those who are in the civil service of our

government embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty to reconcile and harmonize these conflicting provisions in a m

that may give to both full force and effect and the only logical, practical and rational way is to interpret them in the mann

it in this decision. As this Court has aptly said in the case of Lacson v. Romero:

To hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing power subject to removal or forced trans

time, would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System and structure. The country

then go back to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections c

so minded, sweep out of office, civil service employees differing in Political color or affiliation from him, and sweep in his

followers and adherents, especially those who have given him help, political or otherwise. (Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740

There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, sor remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not b

the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to ap

(Lacson V. Romero, supra), but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as t

that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that the Congre

by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department (Arti

Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these o fficers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Con

provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civ

Act of 1959.

We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments it m

and restrict power of removal as it seem best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest

appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation t

officers so appointed. The head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to o fficers independen

legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is inc

thereto. (U.S. v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483)

In resume, we may conclude that the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the Prestaking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Se

contrary to law and should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to his office as Collector of Customs for the P

Manila, without prejudice of submitting his case to the Commissioner of Civil Service to be dealt with in accordance with

costs.


8/46

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION,petitioner,

vs.

CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office,respondent.

MONTEMAYOR,J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his

capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for

the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Phili ppines Patent Office, the said

examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, membersof the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said

examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed

by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the

Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in

good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to

practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in

excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve

entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so

that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and

other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; .

. . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or

qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph,

requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the

action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines,

which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a

similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents

to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly

authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the

passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first

time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or

otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the p ractice of law in the Philippi nes1

and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or

quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the

patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pl

and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings

behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all ac

taken for them in matters connected with the lawcorporation services, assessment and condemnation service

contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor

in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate

guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments

the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (

Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).

Practice of lawunder modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and

no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large v

subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and tr

relations and other affairs.Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings,

always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide

experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These c

functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the co

valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which

advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manif

customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral charac

acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Commen

Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in

Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, op

and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of t

rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and app

of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Paten

well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only

practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as t

existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our P

Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or wel

Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippbefore the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country m

one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more

year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and ac

inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Sect

enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Sec

the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a p

for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Dire

Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from t

the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in t

Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if

demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by r

the patentee's refusal to grant a l icense on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license

purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment o

trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to

health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call

knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.


9/46

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve

questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides

that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to

obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court

from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and

decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the

appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not

the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-

judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any

person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a

patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his

action in awarding or refusing a patent is ajudicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should

decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the

article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar,

because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination

or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the

bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as,

the drawing or technical description of an invention o r machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an

application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of

said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business

before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act

No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an

examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following

provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on

which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in

the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in t he Patent Office under the provisions of

these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a)Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the

highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the

provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the

register of attorneys.

x x x x x x x x x

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to

Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all request

information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good m oral c

and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable h

render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the prese

and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine w

a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfact

proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters mu

submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an exa

may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent O

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is aut

by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and

regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other pa

before his office, and may requireof such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representa

applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, arepos

the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are li

to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applic

other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing

suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person

or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply

said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any

applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person

immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons fo

such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon th

petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the

of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (E

supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reprodu

he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should subm

pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promul

necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law

regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Offi

While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the nec

qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which show

take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this import

point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine th

qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.


10/46


11/46

The majority of the Tribunal believe that it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the present cases, because the resolution of the

majority of the CIR setting aside the decision of Judge Roldan, left the cases without any decision to appeal from, and that said

resolution is in the nature of a mere interlocutory order, which is not subject to appeal.

In view of the foregoing, these petitions for certiorariare hereby denied, and the cases are ordered remanded to the CIR for

further proceedings. No costs.

G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949

JOSE AVELINO,petitioner,

vs.

MARIANO J. CUENCO,respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

In G.R. No. L-2821,Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the petition.

Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain the principal grounds for

the denial.

The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:

In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taadare quested that his right to speak on the next session

day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was

approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator Taada and Senator Prospero Sanidad

filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering theinvestigation thereof.

Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorumwere at the Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00

A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M.

When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy

of the resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read slowly and carefully said

resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.

Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto

who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senator were present.

Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said

motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent

Senator Taada from delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this motion was lik

opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.

Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada repeatedly stood up to clai

right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after

reading of the minutes, Senator Taada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he woul

the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the ac

his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter woul

recognition of Senator Taada.

At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same tim

Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournm

session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.

Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was seconded by hereinrespondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.

Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjourn

and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.

Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by S

David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Mele

Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that i t be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the

the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate

continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.

Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session which su

was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.

Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary, because the Assistan

Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senat

Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the s

was unanimously approved.

With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator

introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and design

Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously app

Senator Cuenco took the oath.

The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines Senate.


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By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines

senate and oust respondent.

The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial points:

a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

c. Should the petition be granted?

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy

(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional

grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by thejudiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged

affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer

affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any timeto choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if,

as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate

Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis,

even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-

abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should

characterized judicial deliberations.

The precedent of Werts vs.Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not where two sets of senators

have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that

there is presently one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected

themselves into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his place in the

same one Philippines Senate.

It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes it advisable, more than

ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.

The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the

session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorumin that session?

Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they

do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four on those sub-

questions.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there i s unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation

of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from

passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been

approved only by ten or less.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the

majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon

say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fo

senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator

Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares th

majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all

members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs.Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a ma

"the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of t he

less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes

furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of th

members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elec

the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three sena

may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senat

Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightfu

President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the sen

the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any

hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion her

quorumand for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could

their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.

G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA,petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEER

AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, R

CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA,petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,respondent.

PUNO,J.:

On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the Presid

leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important eno

more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are man

jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.

First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.


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In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's

adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his

popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend

of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from juetenglords.1

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5,2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate

Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving

some P220 million injuetengmoney from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the

petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Il ocos Sur. The privilege speech was

referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and

the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2

The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative

Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez,

Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement

in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had

lost the moral authority to govern.3Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the

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