Adams, Don_Socrates Polutropos_Apeiron, 43, 1_2010!33!62

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ocrates PolutroposDon Adams

In the Hippias Minor a comparison between Odysseus and Socrates issuggested. Just as Alcibiades compares Socrates to the satyr Marsias inhis ability to bewitch people with words (Symposium 215a6-16a8), and

Meno compares Socrates to the flat ray in his ability to benumb peoplewith his words (Meno 80a4-6), so also I think Hippias subtly comparesSocrates to Odysseus in his ability to mislead people by twisting words.In contrast with Achilles, whom Hippias describes as alethes te kai hap-lous , he describes Odysseus as polutropos te kai pseudes (365b4-5). Bythis contrast, Hippias hopes to capture the deceit (365d8) and kakourgia(e8-9) of Odysseus as compared to the straight-talking Achilles. fterSocrates has refuted him, Hippias is reluctant to continue the conver-sation, and I suspect it is no accident that he uses the word kakourgia— the same word he used to describe Odysseus — to describe how hethinks Socrates has treated him (373b5). On top of that, after Socratesconcludes his first refutation, Hippias immediately throws the blameonto Socrates: you always twist (plekeis) logoi, and seizing the most dif-ficult logos, grabbing hold of the small details, you don t wrestle withthe issue as a whole which is the real point of the logos (369b8-c2). 1 Justas Odysseus twisted (plexamenos, Odyssey 10.168) a make-shift rope tohog-tie a magnificent stag and carry him whither we willed, so alsoHippias charges Socrates with twisting logoi and intentionally missing

1 All translations are my own.

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34 Don dams

the real point to fasten on trivia, and by such disreputable means car-rying Hippias off to the conclusion of Socrates choice. Many recentscholars would agree with such an allegation if the relevant kind of

word-twisting is fallacious argument.2

I disagree. I suspect that Plato wrote the Hippias Minor in part tocombat the image of Socrates polutropos In this paper I hope to showthat our historical distance from Plato has made it more d ifficult thanit should be to see Plato s successful defense of Socrates. In the wakeof European empiricism philosophers increasingly turned to concep-tual, and even linguistic, analysis as a means of solving philosophicalproblems. I f we treat Socrates arguments in the Hippias Minor as exer-

cises in conceptual or linguistic analysis, they will appear far less con-vincing than Plato intended them to be. In addition, no scholar has yetpaid sufficient attention to the range of meanings a Greek intellectualin Plato s day would call to mind when considering Hippias view ofOdysseus as polutropos If we correct for these anachronisms, we willsee that Plato has given Socrates valid arguments for surprising conclu-sions. In the end I will explain two different strategies Plato may havehad in mind for responding to the conclusions, both of which involve arecommendation for further philosophical inquiry into the explanationof human action. In addition, I will argue that Plato portrays Hippias asthe real polutropos who cannot back up his pretensions to wisdom andwho doesn t succeed in saying what he really means. Socrates is theone who turns out to be the straight-talker who helps Hippias to clarifywhat he believes, and who faithfully follows an argument through toits logical conclusion.

II

efore each of Socrates two arguments begins, and when each ends,Plato gives us a formulation of the central issue at stake. These book-end statements tell us what each argument is about. Here are thosestatements.

Here are several who think this, in chronological order: Grote 1865, 1:394; Apelt1912,205; Sprague 1962,67-76; Hoerber 1962; Mulhem, 1968; Gu thrie 1975, 4:195;Levystone 2005,199-208.




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Socrates Polutropos? 35

rst Argument (365d6-9b7)Initial Statement: So Homer thought, as it seems, the alethes man to be

one, and the pseudes to be another, and that the two are not one

and the same man (365c3-4).Concluding Statement: So now do you perceive that the pseudes andthe alethes have been revealed to be one and the same, with theresult that if Odysseus is pseudes he is also alethes, and if Achil-les is alethes he is also pseudes, and the two men are not opposedto one another but are alike (369b3-7).

e ond Argument (373c9-6c6)

Initial Statement: I eagerly desire, Hippias, to consider what was justsaid, namely, which of the two is better ameinous), the willingerrant hekontes ... ham artanontes) or the unwilling (373c6-8).

Concluding Statement: So the willing errant hekon hamartario), thewilling doer of shameful and unjust things, Hippias, if thereis such a person, would be none other than the good man hoagathos, 376b4-6).

In both cases Socrates frames the issue at hand as being a choice be-tween two alternatives, and in both cases Socrates defends the morecounter-intuitive view. In the first case we have a choice between con-tradictories ( they are the same as opposed to they are not the same ),and in the second we have a choice between contraries ( the willing isbetter as opposed to the unwilling is better and also to neither is bet-ter ). Very roughly, Socrates strategy is the following: One view seems

obviously correct, but if you take time to think it through carefully rea-sonable assumptions logically entail that the view which seems obvi-ously incorrect is the correct view. If I m right about this, then Socratesis giving what he thinks to be valid arguments for his conclusions. I willalso consider whether Socrates accepts the reasonable assumptions,and hence whether he also believes his arguments to be sound.

Before we consider the arguments and the assumptions on whichthey rest, I need to sort out what I take to be a confusion that has set

much of the secondary literature on the Hippias Minor off on the wrongfoot. In identifying what the Hippias Minor is about, I ignored almostthe first three Stephanos pages of the dialogue, and I entirely ignoredthe narrative or dramatic frame of the dialogue. I went straight to thearguments and took Socrates at his word when he says what his argu-ments are about. My intent in this is to separate (i) what the topic is,from (ii) how the topic arose. Here is, in outline, how the topic arose.




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perhaps as a result, in his second argument also). As I indicated in Sec-tion 1 above, I think that po lutropia is an important background to thedialogue, and that Plato has a meta-dialogic point in mind regarding

who is the true po lutropos: Socrates or Hippias. However, I think thatpolutropia is not that actual topic — or at least, not the best way of stat-ing the topic — of either of Socrates arguments in the dialogue.

In our eagerness to be faithful to the text, I think we scholars of an-cient philosophy sometimes do not sufficiently distinguish between theorder of the dialogue and the order of the logic. Authors often pres-ent their conclusions first and then give their premises, but a logicalreconstruction will do violence to this order and put the conclusion last,

after setting out the premises in logically proper order. The structure ofthe logic Socrates is trying to get Hippias to see may be very differentfrom the structure of the dialogue by which he gets him to see it. I thinkPlato intentionally set the parallel Tjookends of initial statement andconcluding statement for each argument in order to signal the readerwhat is logically primary as opposed to what is important for movingthe dialogue towards what is logically primary.

Something similar happens at the beginning of the Laches. Initiallythe question put to Socrates is whether Lysimachus should teach hissons to fight in armor (Laches 181c8-9), but Socrates thinks that s not theproper issue with which to begin. He sets that issue aside in order tofocus on the logically prior issue of what courage is (185b6-7). So whenSocrates refutes Laches first definition of courage, he is not arguing fal-laciously by equivocation: he is not equivocating between two issues,he has set one issue aside to deal with a distinct issue. Socrates even

gives an explicit justification for this kind of move: when consideringwhether to apply medicine to eyes, bridle to horse, or in general ÷ fory the primary consideration is y and not ÷ (185c5-dll). That is groundsfor setting ÷ aside for the time being in order to focus on y.

Similarly, the Meno begins with the question of whether or not vir-tue is teachable, but Socrates sets that issue aside to deal with what hethinks is a prior issue, i.e., what virtue is (Meno 70al-2, 71bl-8). Again,we cannot convict Socrates of committing the fallacy of equivocation

when he refutes Meno. The shift is not an illicit equivocation but anintentional setting aside of one issue in order to focus on a prior issue.

In my view, Socrates is doing something similar in the Hippias Minor.When he says that he doesn t know what Hippias is saying 364e4),he is indicating that the word polutrop taton (and hence polutropos )isn t the real issue, or at least doesn t identify the real issue with suf-ficient clarity, and hence that the discussion ought not proceed as an




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examination of p olutropia. I think that Socrates is right about this, andthat in focusing on the word polutropos Hippias is misrepresenting hisown view. In effect, scholars have taken Hippias at his word in assum-

ing that the topic of the Hippias Minor or at least the first argument) isOdysseus polutropia, and have been suspicious of Socrates Ijookendstatements of what the arguments are about. Quite to the contrary, Iam arguing that we should take Socrates at his word, and treat Hip-pias early statements with suspicion because he c learly hasn t thoughtthrough his own view sufficiently, as Socrates quickly shows.

Our first clue that something is wrong with Hippias view — not withSocrates inquiry — is in the proof text Hippias chooses. To explainto Socrates what he is saying in calling Odysseus polutropos Hippiasquotes Iliad IX 308-314. The problem is that no form of polutropos oc-curs in that passage. Achilles calls Odysseus polumechan . If they aredoing linguistic or conceptual analysis here, Hippias has just made asubstantial and obvious error. Clearly it is not the exact word polutro-pos that matters to Hippias. He himself in his very proof text is willingto substitute a different word in order to identify (a) what it is that both-ers him about Odysseus and b) what forms the basis for his negativeevaluation of Odysseus in relation to Achilles. So the fact that Socratesshifts the dialogue away from the word polutropos is not evidence thatthere is anything suspicious at all in Socrates inquiry: Hippias him-

self is explicitly willing to use other words to identify what he has inmind. Polutropos is just as surely to be associated with Odysseus as menis

is with Achilles because in their respective epics the heroes are de-scribed with those words in the very first line of the very first book(Menin ... Ach ileos, Iliad 11; Andra ... polutropon, Odyssey 11). However,at Odyssey 11, polutropos may very well refer simply to the fact thatOdysseus was much-traveled or much-wandering (especially since

lines 2-3 explicitly mention that he was driven off course many times ).Surely that is not kata ti Odysseus is a worse man than Achilles. Circedescribes Odysseus as polutropos after Odysseus resists the effects ofher potion (Odyssey X 330). Here I think Murray s now-stilted Of readydevice (Homer 1984,369) is probably closer to her meaning than Fagelsman of twists and turns (Homer 1996,240). She is probably remarkingon his resourcefulness which allowed him, unlike everybody else, to




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find the means of resisting her magic. Notice that she does also call him'polumechan at X 504, but there she is allaying his fears about steering acourse safely back from Hades and so probably is referring to his ability

to find some way of landing on his feet safely no matter how difficultthe circumstances. Hence, Murray s many devices (Homer 1984, 381)is probably better than Fagels l^orn for exploits (Homer 1996,246) as atranslation of what she means in calling Odysseus polumechanos. Again,neither of these can be kata ti Odysseus is a worse m an than Achilles.

This is confirmed if we consider another famous individual who isdescribed as 'polutropos': Hermes. Twice in the Homeric Hymn to Hermesthe god is described thus, first by the poet (hymn us ad Me rcurium 13) and

second by Apollo 439).4

But when Apollo addresses him as 'polutrope',he is about to ask Hermes how he got his tortoise-shell kithara. Not bycoincidence, I think, is Hermes invention of the tortoise-shell kitharathe very first story the poet tells of Hermes after calling him 'polutropon'(17, 25-61). Resourceful or inventive, then, would be good transla-tions. Again it is hard to see how being 'polutropos' could be grounds forsaying that Odysseus is a worse man than Achilles.

Ironically, these false leads bring us to the solution. In addition tobeing 'polutropos', or perhaps as a part of being 'polutropos', Odysseusshares with Hermes a facility for putting on a false face. Twice Hermesplays the sweet-innocent-child-bom-only-yesterday routine (273, 376).Playing dumb, he protests under Apollo s interrogation, that he is notto blame fo r the theft of the cattle, whatever cattle might be (277). Thepoet sums up Apollo s interrogation of Hermes by saying,

Apollo spoke unerringly (riemertea) * * * he sought, no t unjustly, tocatch glorious Hermes in the case of the missing cattle. But he, theCyllenian, wished to deceive (exapatan) the god of the silver bow withcunning (techriesin) and wily 5 words (haimulioisi logoisin). And when

4 There is no explicit reference to Hermes or to the Homeric Hymn to Hermes in the

Hippias Minor. I use this text to give us a little more evidence regarding a Greek slinguistic intuitions regarding 'polutropos' and related words. In addition, the Hip-pias Minor is set immediately after a speech by Hippias in which he discoursed notonly on Homer but also o n Other poets 363c2). It is not unreasonable to thinkthat Hippias is fam iliar with Hermes hymn, or that i t occurred to him that bothOdysseus and Hermes are described more than once as 'polutropos.'

5 I think wily is not an acceptable translation of 'polutropos' since I think wily mustbe reserved for 'haimulos' (and hence the Homeric 'haimu lws'). It is with tremen-




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meaning of polutropos is familiar to Plato. We find precisely this use of po lutropos at Politicus 291b2 where it refers to the ability of some ani-mals to camouflage themselves, i.e., to present an appearance as being

something other than they truly are.In other words, when Socrates says that he doesn t know what Hip-pias is saying by describing Odysseus as polutropötaton(364c6-7), he isactually being helpful. He is about to lead Hippias into a clearer under-standing of what bothers him about Odysseus. Recently, Levystone hasargued to the contrary that Socrates is actually exploiting an ambiguityin polutropos for the purpose of confusing Hippias. Regarding the word po lutropos Levystone says, il ne faut pas oubUer que Socrate ne donne

lui-meme aucune definition du terme et qu il suit, mais pour mieux lacritiquer, 1 intuition d Hippias qui le lie au pseudes (Levystone 2005,206). Perhaps it is fair to say that Socrates never gives any definitionof polutropos , but that is because semiotically polutropos is all over themap. As I have just shown, the word has several different meanings;hence defining polutropos is a complex matter and most of the effortwould be wasted because it is only an obscure sense of the word that isrelevant to Hippias condemnation of Odysseus.

What remains, then, is to establish that this obscure sense of polu-tropos is (a) accurately captured by pseudes and b) a reasonable basisfor Hippias condemnation of Odysseus. What I am suggesting is thatSocrates two uses of polutropoi at 365e2 are his way of making surethat Hippias is on board with his bracketing polutropos for a clearerexplanation of the respect in which Hippias thinks Achilles is betterthan Odysseus. 6

Begin with what I call synchronic po lutropia . This is the statisticallyobscure sense in which it is used at Politicu s 291b2: the wolf-in-sheep s-clothing phenomenon. The only difficulty in seeing a strong connectionwith pseudes that would be clearly reasonable to Hippias is the sametrouble I have with my Freshmen in explaining to them Aristotle s vir-tue of truthfulness (Nicomachean Ethics IV 7). They think the vice of

Hence I agree with Mulhem when he denies that pseudes is introduced as a meresynonym for polutropos (Mulhem 1968,284). But I disagree with Mulhem s claimthat Socrates is merely stipulating pseudes as the meaning of polutropos . Thiswould amount to gutting a clearer term ( pseudes ) of its natural sense in order togive it all the obscurity of another term ( polutropos ). Socrates has accurately de-tected the sense in which Hippias thinks Odysseus is polutropos , and has helpedHippias to express himself more clearly.




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excess must be lying to give someone a false idea, and that the viceof deficiency must be failing to speak up to correct someone who hasa false idea. It makes no sense to them to say that boastfulness is the

excess and self-deprecation is the deficiency. They associate those viceswith pride and humility, making boastfulness very bad and self-depre-cation not very bad at all. So I have to explain to them that Aristotle sidea of truthfulness might better be expressed by our phrase Tjeinghonest about yourself. Truthful people make accurate representationsof themselves and their abilities. Boastful people put on airs and pres-ent themselves as better than they are or as being capable of things theycan t do: they talk big but when it comes time to follow through, they

let you down. Self-deprecating people sell themselves short and failto assert themselves when they really could and should. You may missout on a lot of great opportunities because you think your friend is in-capable of providing significant help, which they truly could provide.These slippages between appearance and reality could be described as falsifying one s appearance, like a counterfeit coin appears to be butisn t genuine legal currency. Hence it is quite natural in Greek to associ-ate polutropos in this sense with pseudes .

Second, consider diachronic polutropia . This is what A jax discoversin the eponymous Sophoclean tragedy. A fter he has been cheated outof Achilles armor by Odysseus (as he sees it), he explains the lesson hehas learned: have just learned that my enemy is to be hated only somuch, since he may soon be my friend; and the friend I help, I will helponly so much since he may not always remain my friend (Ajax 678-82). This lesson can be given a very positive interpretation, i.e., that we

should take neither friendship nor enmity fo r granted: we can lose ourfriends if we take them fo r granted, and it is possible to turn enemiesinto allies or friends by finding common aims in the pursuit of whichwe may unite with them. But A jax clearly takes this in its worst pos-sible sense, i.e., yo u are a fool if you assume that people who professtheir friendship will stand by your side when the going gets tough, andhence you you rself must stand ready to cross the line and ally yourselfwith those against whom you have professed enmity. In other words,

just as the wolf in sheep s clothing camouflages itself synchronically,Ajax has learned that he lives in a world of diachronic camo uflage: pro-fessed friends will sooner or later prove themselves faithless and willabandon you in your time of need, failing to be the friends they pre-sented themselves as being; and despite our professions of implacableenmity, shifting alliances will eventually force us to unite in friendshipwith those we vowed to destroy. Ajax has learned that he lives in a




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world of false friendship and false enmity. Those who appear now to beyour friends/enemies will later reveal themselves to be your enemies/friends. This is a diachronic slippage between appearance and reality.

Ajax is so disgusted at such a world that he can no longer live in it.This is the proof I need to show that when Socrates shifts the discus-sion with Hippias away from polutropos and towards pseudes he isneither equivocating nor allowing Hippias to be confused. He is in facthelping Hippias more accurately to identify the respect in which hethinks Achilles is a better man than Odysseus: Odysseus is and Achillesis not a falsifier . In Hippias proof text , Achilles twice affirm s that hisdeclarations will be accomplished (Hippias Minor 365a2-3 and b2), and

he expresses enmity for the one who has one thing in mind but sayssomething different (a4-bl). Achilles use of polumechar i to describewhat is objectionable about Odysseus (365al), and Hippias substitu-tion of polutropos for Achilles poluniechanos (a) identifies a reasonablebasis for Hippias condemnation of Odysseus and (b) makes pseudes abetter substitution for poluniechanos . Achilles has in mind a polutropiasimilar to that which disgusts A jax.7 The person who has one thing inmind but says something different is synchronically polutropos, and ifhe fails to do in the future what in the past he said he would do, thenhe is diachonically polutropos, e.g. a false friend ( pseudes philos ) or afalse enemy ( pseudes echthros ). Such a person is a traitor and hence aproper object of condemnation, and such a person may legitimately bedescribed as poluniechanosor polutropos , but is most clearly identifiedas pseudes . There is no equivocation, only clarification.

Hence, when Hippias answers Socrates question about which of thetwo men is better and in what respect the better one is better, his answeris crucially unclear. To say that Achilles is better on the grounds that helacks but Odysseus possesses polutropia is unclear because the adjective polutropos has so many diverse meanings. The specific sense that Hip-pias seems to have in mind, though he said something somewhat dif-ferent, is synchronic and diachronic cam ouflage when there is slippagebetween appearance and reality. Achilles presents himself as a genuineor authentic man, one who — to use a modern expression — says whathe means and means what he says, aptly described by Hippias aletheste kai haplous . Hippias agrees with Achilles portrayal of Odysseus as

Perhaps they are no t identical because Ajax has in mind a diachronic shift betweencontraries (friendship and enmity) and what A chilles says is broader than, thoughinclusive of, this.




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an inauthentic or counterfeit man who is synchronically and/or dia-chronically duplicitous, unclearly indicated by Hippias polutropos tekai pseu des , and clearly expressed by the more accurate chiasm dip-

lous te kai pseudes . The crucial assumption, then, from Socrates point o fview (because he believes it to be a false assumption), is that the aletheste kai haplous man is numerically distinct from the diplous te kai pseudesman. If Hippias insisted, they could continue to use polutropos te kaipseudes , but that would introduce a constant tendency to wander fromthe point, since polutropos is semiotically complex. Hippias indicatesthat he is fine with the clarification.

Notice also that Plato has made Hippias out to be polutropos. There

is a slippage between what he says and what he means. What he sayscannot be taken at face value; his real meaning must still be explored.Moreover, as we are about to see, Plato shows Hippias to be diachronic-ally polutropos in that he fails to defend the claim he sets out to defend.I suspect this irony is intentional on Plato s part: the people who slurSocrates actually don t understand him, and show themselves to be thetrue guilty ones.

IV

In the first stage of his argument (365d6-6c4), Socrates gets Hippiasto agree that the pseudes has dunamis, phroriesis, epistenie and sophia. Iwill lump these together with the acronym DPES. Sprague might ob-ject to my lumping these together because she sees in this sequence asly ambiguity Socrates uses to entrap Hippias in a fallacious argument(Sprague 1962,67-70). In Sprague s view, Hippias agrees to each mem-ber of the list with one thing in mind, i.e., the power and mental capac-ity for wrongdoing, but Socrates plays on the positive connotations ofthe intelligence-related words fallaciously to conclude that the pseudeshas the mental capacity and hence power, for good.

Influenced I suspect, by twentieth-century philosophical practice,Sprague s error here is in taking Socrates to be asking conceptual ques-tions, not substantial questions. 81 am relying here on the work of TerryPenner. For example, when Socrates asks in the Laches, What is brav-ery? Socrates is not asking a conceptual but a substantive question.

I have very similar objections to the evaluations of the Hippias M inor by Hoerber1962 and Mulhem 1968.




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The general asks this question not out of interest in mapping ourconcepts, but out of a desire to learn something substantial about thehuman psyche. He wants to know what psychological state it is, the im-

parting of which to his men will make them brave. (Penner 1992,164)

Penner compares this with conceptual as opposed to substantive psy-chological questions. The conceptual analysis of hysteria won t find acure for the condition, but the substantive analysis might; prior to Dai-ton, H£) could not have been the correct answer to the conceptualquestion What is water? but it was always the correct answer to thesubstantive question (Penner 164-5). Irwin has defended the same view

of Socrates questions: when Socrates asks for a definition, he is notseeking a nominal but a real definition (Irwin 1995,25-7). Hence, whenSocrates asks Hippias about the pseudes, he is not asking Hippias for aconceptual analysis (I believe I have given that analysis above), he isseeking to understand what makes the pseudes tick, he is looking for apsychological diagnosis of the pseudes. Right of f the bat he contrasts thepseudes with the sick (365d6-7) precisely because he wants to focus Hip-pias on the underlying condition of each. The fact that each word in the

DPES set has many d ifferent senses allows for but does not necessitatethe fallacy of equivocation.

Consider a more recent analogy. We might say that some of the al-leged witches burned after the Salem witch trials suffered from schizo-phrenia, and on the basis of that diagnosis derive some surprisingclaims about them. Our conclusions will not be a result of fallaciousequivocation (e.g., fallaciously inferring claims about dopamine levelsfrom claims about pacts with Satan); they will instead count as scien-tific predictions to be verified, if possible, by collecting more data.

So when Socrates asks Hippias about the pseudes and the a let tes , heis asking whether we are in a caterpillar-butterfly situation in whichthe real essence of one is surprisingly identical to the real essence ofthe other, or in a worm -butterfly situation in which we are dealing withtwo distinct real essences. The logical structure of Socrates argument not to be confused with the dialogic structure of the conversation bywhich Socrates gets Hippias to see the logical structure) that the pseudesand the alethes are one and the same, therefore, looks like this:

1. The real essence of the pseudes is DPES (365d6-6a4).

2. DPES is the real essence o f the alethes 366a8-9a2).

.·. 3. The pseudes and the alethes are one and the same (369a4-b7).




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This is just as valid as the following:

4. The real essence of Hesperus is the planet Venus.

5. The planet Venus is the real essence of Phosphorus..·. 6. Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the same.

and the following:

7. The real essence of the Painted Lady caterpillar is Cynthiacardui.

8. Cynthia cardui is the real essence of the Thistle Butterfly..·. 9. The Painted Lady caterpillar and the Thistle Butterfly are one

and the same.

This argument structure is valid whether we are considering the nu-merical identity of particular individuals or the membership of indi-viduals in a numerically identical class or species. 9 The latter is what isgoing on in the H ippias Minor: Socrates is considering whether Achillesand Odysseus belong in one and the same group when we claim thatthe former is alethes while the latter is pseudes. At first they appear to bein distinct species, but on further analysis, Socrates argues, they sur-prisingly turn out to be members of one and the same species. Look,the one is alethes and the other p seudes obviously they are not one andthe same , can be as misleading as, Look, one has wings and drinksnectar while the other has no wings and eats leaves, so obviously they

are not one and the same . The conceptual difference between butter-flies and caterpillars is irrelevant to their substantive unity.Instead of setting a trap for Hippias by inducing him to accept am-

biguous words, Socrates is instead helping Hippias to examine the is-sue more deeply, precisely and accurately. By bringing in the DPES set,Socrates is helping Hippias to clarify the point that the person he de-scribes as pseudes is the deceitful knave and not the misleading fool.10

9 While I think the comparison with the modem notion of a biological species ishelpful obviously I cannot attribute this notion to Socrates. In fact Socrates isnotoriously cavalier when it comes to species, forms or paradigms (cf. E uthyphro5dl-5,6d9-e6).

10 Hence, although I agree with much of her analysis, Weiss is wrong to make




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Homer says that Odysseus told many false things (pseudea polla, XIX203 to Penelope when he was pretending to be the beggar Aithön andtold her a story of when he met Odysseus on the island of Crete. Pe-

nelope prudently tests Aithön by asking him what Odysseus wore,and he is able to give a detailed and accurate account of Odysseuspurple woolen cloak and gold brooch (225-31). If he had been a mis-leading fool, he would have failed this test. It is only because Odysseusknew the truth that he was able to deceive Penelope so successfully. Orconsider the foolish thief captured by the authorities who tries to lieabout where the loot is hidden, but because he incorrectly takes himselfto know what in fact he does not know (because his partners double-

crossed him), he actually ends up leading the authorities right to theloot he hoped to keep hidden. The deceitful knave and the misleadingfool may appear alike in many cases (both may utter plenty of false-hoods), but psychological conditions which give rise to these similarappearances are importantly distinct. Danaus p lexippus (the Monarchbutterfly and Limenitis archippus (the Viceroy butterfly present verysimilar appearances, but only the former is poisonous.

This is why Mulhem simultaneously asks too much and too littlewhen he distinguishes between merely the possession of an abilityand its typical and regular employment (Mulhern 1968, 285). First,Mulhem is asking too much when he asks about the actual employ-ment of the specifying capacity of the pseudes. Socrates is consistentlyfocused on what capacity is conferred on the pseudes by the DPES set.When Socrates considers specific employments, he does so hypotheti-cally by asking what the pseudes does if he wishes. Mulhern asks aboutactual employment when Socrates is concerned only with hypotheti-cal employment. Second, Mulhern asks too little because he asks onlyabout the typical or regular employment of the specifying capacitiesof the pseudes when Socrates is interested in something more determi-nate. Socrates is not interested in WHAT the pseudes does but in HOWhe does it. In theory you could have a de ceitful knave and a misleadingfool who with equal regularity employ their specifying capacities tosay false things, but Socrates would point out that we should not allowthis appearance to mislead us. Even if they say false things with equal

polutropos = p seudes the first step of the first argument (Weiss 1992, 247); compe-tent Greek speakers cannot think that polutropos and pseudes are synonyms withthe very same meaning (Weiss 246,247).




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regularity, they do so in significantly different ways.11 The misleadingfool says many false things simply because he speaks in ignorance, andthe odds are m at a large portion of what he says will be false, though

he doesn t actually know that most of the false things he says are false.The deceitful knave speaks false things in a very different manner, i.e.,he does so i he w ishes.

Compare, for example, a beginner in Mandarin and an expert in thelanguage. The beginner will make plenty of errors when writing Man-darin characters whether he wishes to make errors or not. The expertwill make plenty of errors i he wishes, and there is a strong correlationbetween his wishing to make errors and his actually making errors (if

he makes them). This strong correlation is secured because it is an ex-planatory relationship: his making errors is explained by his wishingto make errors. There is no such explanatory connection in the actionsof the beginner: we explain his errors by citing his ignorance of thelanguage, not by his wishing to write accurately or inaccurately. Hemight accidentally get it right when he wishes to make an error, andhe might accidentally make an error when he wishes to get it right.What accounts for the explanatory connection between one s linguisticwishes and one s linguistic performance is one s developed capacityfor the language, i.e., one s satisfaction of the DPES set with respect tothe language.

Hippias thinks of Odysseus as a deceitful knave, not a misleadingfool, and Socrates helps him to clarify this point. 12 The pseudes Hippias

11 Mulhem himself equivocates when he defines a tropos as a typical and regularemployment of a dunamis (Mulhem 1968,285), and then relies on tropos in a pure-ly statistical sense of lie regularly or tell the truth regularly on the very nextpage. Neither Hippias nor Socrates is ever interested in a purely statistical senseof polutropos , pseudes or alethes . Hippias is engaging in literary and characteranalysis and it is a textually unsupported anachronism to attribute to Hippias the Em piric or Method school of medicine familiär to Sextus Empiricus (Outlines ofEmpiricism 34), or the modem homeopathism or behaviorism more familiar to us.The dunamis and the tropos are as intimately connected as disease and symptom

(365d6-7). The doctor is not equivocating when he proves to the parents that thechild with a fever and the child with chills are suffering from one and the samedisease. The parents were never concerned about shivering-behavior or sweating-behavior as such, they were concerned about th e child with a fever and a childwith chills understanding that dunamis and tropos are connected. They just falselyassumed that such d ifferent tropoi had to be connected to different dunameis.

12 Hence I object to Zembaty s characterization o f Hippias as trying to make careful,qualified claims while Socrates is trying to strip off those qualifications (Zembaty




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has in mind is not merely someone who utters many things, some falsesome true; he is someone who judiciously uses truths and falsehoodsdepending upon the circumstances. The judicious use of truths and

falsehoods demands facility with both, hence the DPES set. The Odys-sean pseudes is so adept because he knows which claims are true andwhich are false, allowing him reliably, not accidently, to choose fromone or the other category depending on the circumstances. The mis-leading fool, by contrast, might think he is choosing his utterance fromamong the true claims when in fact he is choosing from among the falseclaims, and vice versa. What state of a person explains the facility of thedeceitful knave? The DPES set. This is proven by repeated illustration

in the remainder of Socrates argument.3

Here is where the appeal to a real essence has its surprising result.The DPES set explains the (real, not nominal) defining fact about thepseudes: if he wants boulomai: 366b2-3, b8, c2-3, e5-6, 367a2) to deceivesomeone by affirm ing as true something he knows to be false, or deny-ing as false something he knows to be true, then what he affirm s as trueis in fact false, or what he denies as false is in fact true, i.e., he reliablyselects a true claim to deny or a false claim to affirm. But a moment sreflection reveals that the DPES set also explains the (real, not nomi-nal) defining fact about the alethes: if he wants to inform someone byaffirming as true something he knows to be true, or denying as falsesomething he knows to be false, then what he affirms as true is in facttrue, or what he denies as false is in fact false. A facility for reliablyselecting from among the false claims as opposed to the true claimsentails a facility for reliably selecting from among the true claims asopposed to the false claims. The pseudes and the atetHes really are oneand the same. 14

1989, 55). Socrates is helping Hippias to realize the explanatory priority of theDPES set.

13 I disagree with Aristotle Metaphysics V 29.1025a6-13) and with Robinson who

both characterize much of the arguments in the Hippias Minor as epagogai cf. Rob-inson 1953, 39). I think the many examples Socrates gives should be consideredconfirmation of, not data leading to, a general theory. He has already establishedhis basic claims, in the second part of the dialogue he is showing Hippias how hehas accounted for a wide variety of data.

14 Although my account of Socrates argument is quite different from that of Weiss, Iagree with her basic contention that neither Socrates nor Hippias is to be accusedof equivocation on the grounds that neither of them equivocate between using




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If you insist, like Hippias, that Achilles is 'alethes te kai ha plous', then you

might have something like Spragues response to Socrates argument.You might insist that although someone who is 'haplous' may in somesense be able to affirm as true something he knows to be false, or denyas false something he knows to be true, he never would do such a thingprecisely because he is 'haplous'. Look at the list of passages I just citedwhere Plato uses some form of 'boulomai' and you will see that everysingle instance is in a conditional context. Gomperz takes the HippiasMinor to be a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that cognitive factors alone

account for good action (Gomperz 1920, 296). A facility for accuratelyselecting from among the false claims as opposed to the true claims, orthe true claims as opposed to the fa lse claims, does not (Gomperz mightargue) tell us whether one has a proclivity for selecting the true or thefalse claims. Socrates premises might be true for calculation, arithmeticand so on, but false for behavior like willful deception. Perhaps Plato isconfronting us with this argument intentionally to provoke us to havethis thought. 15 Perhaps Plato intends his readers to distinguish between

(a) 'polutropos' as a 'dwnamz's-concept' referring to a power, capacity orpotentiality, and (b) 'polutropos' as a 'fropos-concept' referring to actual,usual or typical employment of some power. 16

polutrapos as a fropos-concept sometimes and as a dunamis-concept at othertimes (Weiss 1992, 245). I disagree with Weiss when she claims that this leaves

us w ith the dual problems of (a) explaining w hy Hippias identifies the polutroposand the pseudes in the first place, and (b) why Hippias balks at the conclusion o fthe argument. Neither are problems. Hippias pre-reflective identification of thepolutropos and the pseudes derives from pre-reflective assumptions abo ut A chillesand Odysseus: based on Achilles speech at Iliad IX 308-14 Hippias thinks that Od-ysseus has an d Achilles lacks a facility for hiding the truth behind manipulativefalsehoods. 'H o pseudes' and 'ho alettes' seem perfectly good expressions to m arkthis distinction. This also explains why Hippias balks at the conclusion of the argu-m ent: if the pseudes and the alethes are one and the same, then Achilles has exactlythe same fa cility with falsehoods as Odysseus, something Hippias denies.

15 For something like this view see Hoerber 1962,128.

16 This is a philosopher s distinction (Mulhem 1968, 286-7) and not one I find inGreek uses of 'polutropos' (etc.). Hence, 1 think Zembaty should assert not that Hip-pias has both senses in mind, but that he doesn t rule out either (Zembaty 1989,53-4). Hence, contra Zembaty, this does not ruin Weiss account of Socrates firstargument. If Hippias is not ruling out the du«am i's-sense, then by the time Socratesconcludes that the pseudes and alethes are one and the same, he has reached a




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Perhaps. However, this does not ruin the validity of the argument.Socrates has successfully demonstrated a fundamental unity of thealethes and the psuedes. At most what Gomperz showed is the possi-

bility that the alethes and the psuedes are members of distinct speciesof one and the same genus. Socrates has successfully shown that thealethes and the psuedes are at the very least generically one and the same.The knowing ha plous and the knowing diplous, if there are two distinctsuch individuals, will each recognize in the other a fundamental unitywhich separates them from the ignorant haplous and the ignorant dip-lous, whom they pity as ignorant fools in need of instruction. This is justwhat we would expect of someone who believed that the unexamined

life is not worth living for a human being Apology 38a5-6).The implications of this sound strikingly at odds with Greek com-

mon sense. Hippias points out that Athenian law excuses the ignorantpseudes and punishes the knowing pseudes, (372a3-5). 17 The implicationsmay be an even more striking violation of Christian common sense,which might see something innocent or even angelic in the ignoranthaplous, and something degenerate or even demonic in the knowingdiplous.

The following table sums up three ways of ranking the four kinds ofpeople distinguished by Socrates argument, the people who are higherup are better than those who are lower down. Notice that Socrates po-sition on whom to put on the bottom is just what you would expect ofsomeone who believes that, if I unwillingly corrupt someone, it is notappropriate to take such unwilling errants hamartemafön) to court, butto take them aside privately and teach and advise them; for it is clearthat if I learn, I will stop what I unwillingly do Apology 26al-4). 18 But

contradiction with at least part of what Hippias didn t rule out earlier. Hippiasmay then clarify his earlier comments if he wishes, but he seems not to wish to dothat.

17 The Athenian legal conceptual scheme is different from ours, so it is difficult tomake cross-scheme identifications. However, if we follow Aristotle s Magna Mora-

lia, the Athenians did distinguish between willing hekön) and unwilling homicide(though probably not between willing and deliberate homicide, 1188b29-38). Oth-erwise there seems to be nothing in Athenian legal (or religious) practice corre-sponding to our distinction between mens r e and actus reus (cf. MacDowell 1978,113-18).

18 I think Zembaty is correct to see a wedge between the evaluation of humans andthe evaluation of their actions (Zembaty 1989, 58), but this is not a special featureof the Hippias Minor, it is in this passage of the Apology as well.




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hristian ommon

Sense

ignorant haplous

knowing haplous

ignorant diplous

knowing diplous

Pagan ommonSense

knowing haplous

ignorant haplous

ignorant diplous

knowing diplous

Socrates Position

knowing haplous

knowing diplous

ignorant haplous

ignorant diplous

whereas pagan and Christian common sense morally blame those be-low and morally praise the people above the mid-line, Socrates onlymorally praises those above the mid-line. 19 The fact that claims Socratesmakes in the Apology fit the position that results from his first argumentin the Hippias Minor suggests not only that Socrates (correctly) thinkshis argument is valid, but also that he thinks it is sound.

To defend Gomperz' position according to which Plato intends theargument to be unsound (at least when applied to wrong behaviorlike willful deception), and to provoke the reader to uncover the falseassumption (i.e., that there are no non-cognitive factors involved in

19 This is wha t we would expect of someone who sincerely believes what Socrates

says at Protagoras 352bl-c8, i.e., if someone truly knows what is good and what isbad, he will not be mastered by anger, pleasure, pain, love or fear. Knowledge isthe crucial element as usual, Socrates does no t follow the modern penchant fo rtechnical terms, he appears to use episteme and gignöskö interchangeably at 352c4-5). W ithout knowledge, people may do the right thing but they may not; theyproduce just whatever chances ( C r z f o 44d6-10; Penner gets this Crito passage ex-actly right, and I think the same idea underlies Protagoras 352bl-c8 and the Hip-pias M inor; Penner 1997a, 153-5). As I pointed out above, Socrates is not primarilyconcerned with what people do or what they are capable of doing, he is primarilyconcerned with how they do what they do . More specifically, he is concerned withthe difference between people who act with as opposed to without knowledge. Ar-istotle thinks Socrates is right to have this focus, but he thinks that Socrates givesup too quickly: once you have figured out that someone acts with knowledge,Aristotle thinks there is still a further question regarding manner, i.e. how theychoose among alternatives they know (right reason does little good without rightchoice). Virtuous, continent and incontinent people all have knowledge, but allchoose in different manners (cf. Eu demian Ethics 1227bl2-19; I agree with Woodswho argues that Aristotle has Socrates in mind here, Woods 1992,154).




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human action), we would have to say that the examination Socrates hasin mind at Apology 38a5-6, and the instruction he has in mind at Apol-ogy 26al-4, include some sort of non-cognitive training or therapy that

ensures that with knowledge necessarily comes rectitude of will. Bothpremises of Socrates argument, then, will be false when applied to ac-tions like willful deception since in addition to the DPES set, a non-cog-nitive condition must also be included in the real essence of the pseudesand a different non-cognitive condition included in the real essence ofthe atethes. Hence the if he wishes of the alethes says what is false, if hewishes will be nugatory. Socrates can put the knowing diplous abovethe ignorant diplous only if the knowing diplous is diplous in capacity

only, not in actual employment.The problem with this suggestion is that it seems obviously false in

all the cases Socrates considers in his first argument, i.e., calculation,arithmetic, geometry and astronomy. The specifying capacities in-volved seem strictly cognitive. We might further support this with anexample from the Laches. Nicias points out that the doctor s knowledgeextends only to health and sickness, not to good and bad; hence thedoctor knows only how to cure and how to kill, but does not qua doc-tor) know what is better or worse for a given patient Laches 195c7-d2).If the doctor is convinced that it is better for the patient to live, he curesthe patient (non-accidentally); if the doctor is convinced that it is betterfor the patient to die, he kills the patient (non-accidentally). If the geom-eter is convinced that it is better to give a wrong answer, then he givesa wrong answer (non-accidentally); if he is convinced that it is better togive a right answer, then he gives a right answer (non-accidentally).

Gomperz might reply that this is true with all the various crafts hehas considered so far, but that the case is quite different when it comesto virtue. In fact, Gomperz might argue that the Hippias Minor was de-signed by Plato precisely to indicate to readers the limitations of thecraft analogy Socrates repeatedly uses. 20 C raft cognition does not nec-essarily come with craft conation that assures that the one who knowsa craft will always use it to produce the good of the craft; e.g., that theone with medical knowledge will always use that knowledge to cureand never to kill, that the one with geometric knowledge will alwaysuse that knowledge to get right answers and never wrong answers in

20 On the tangled set of issues involved in what Socrates means by comparing arete totechne, and the voluminous secondary literature on this topic, see Roochnick 1992and Irwin 1995,68-77.




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geometrical problems. Perhaps Plato s point in writing the Hippias Mi-nor is to indicate the need to argue that virtue-cognition does necessar-ily come with virtue-conation so that the one who knows the just thing

to do will always do the just thing and never the unjust thing. SinceSocrates explicitly brings injustice into his second argument, let us ex-amine that argument before deciding this issue.

Socrates second argument focuses on comparative evaluation: hewants to know which of the two is better (ameinous), the willing errant(hekontes ... ham artanontes) or the unwilling (373c7-8). Erring in non-moral tasks results in non-moral error; erring in moral tasks results inmoral error or perhaps I should say that erring in non-arete tasks re-sults in non-areteic error, and so on). Socrates hamartano is intendedto be general enough to cover both kinds of error: the moral case is justa special case of the more general point Socrates has made. This is areturn to the issue that started the dialogue: Socrates began by asking

whether Hippias agrees with his own father that Achilles is better (amei-riön 363b3-4; am eiriö, cl) than Odysseus. Socrates question at 371e7-8suggests that Hippias is threatened by the following argument:

10. The willing pseudes is better (beltious, 371e8) than the unwillingpseudes.

11. Odysseus is the willing pseudes and Achilles is the unwillingpseudes.

12. Odysseus is better than Achilles.

Hippias insists on 11 (370e5-9,371d8-e3) and recoils at the thought of 10(371e9-372a5). Socrates seems a bit frustrated because he asks, weren tthe willing pseudeis just now (arti) shown to be better than the unwill-ing (371e7-8). Presumably he has in mind 368a8-bl, but this takes a bitof explaining.

The evaluative terminology was introduced at 366c5-d5 where

Socrates connects experience (empeiros, 366c5) in calculation and arith-metic with dunam is and sophia, and then asks whether the person withmost dunamis and sophia in calculation and arithmetic is also the best(aristos) in calculation and arithmetic. Hippias agrees, since he thinkshimself to be dunatötatos, sophötatos and aristos in calculation and arith-metic. Then, at 367c2-d3, Socrates concludes that with respect to calcu-lation and arithmetic the man who is dunatos is one and the same with




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the man who is alethes and also with the man who is agathos. Finally, at368a8-bl Socrates generalizes this to all epistem ai. In effect, he has giventhe following argument for 10.

13. The willing pseudes has, and the unwilling pseudes lacks, bothdunamis and sophia.

14. The one who has both dunamis and sophia is good and is betterthan the one who lacks both dunamis and sophia.

.·. 15. The willing pseudes is good and is better than the unwillingpseudes.

Notice that this also entails the final conclusion of the dialogue (376b4-6) if we assume that the DPES and skill associated with calculation,arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, epistema i generally, running and otherbodily actions generally, wrestling, exercise, singing, archery, medi-cine, lute and flute playing are univocally associated with justice .21 IfSocrates accepts the craft analogy , then for him this association is un-problematic: the willing pseudes of 371e7-8 is one and the same as the

willing errant (hekön hamartand) of 376M-5 if the DPES and skill of thefirst argument apply without equivocation to justice.This final if could be the key to unraveling the second argument.

If Plato wants the reader to call the craft analogy into question, thenhe intends for the reader to balk at precisely the place where Hippiasbalks, i.e., 375dl where Socrates brings in kakourge . If Hippias rejects the craft analogy, then he can reject premise 14: when it comes tovirtue (arete), cognitive development alone is without value (or are-

teic value ) unless it is combined with proper conative development.22

This is reasonable, but there is another way to solve the apparentlyparadoxical conclusion of the dialogue.

21 Hence, I disagree with Weiss who argues that we don t get the evaluative claimsof the second argument in the first argument Weiss 1992, 250-1). Weiss is right

about the specific evaluative claims, but those specific claims are entailed by thegeneral evaluative claims of the first argument. The only things that are new arethe specific applications of the generic claims in the first argument.

22 This is currently one of the most important issues in Socrates scholarship: doesSocrates attempt to account for human action without appealing to no n-rational o rirrational desires i.e., desires that arise independently of, and may conflict with,our knowledge of, or reasoned beliefs about, the good). There is a substantial bodyof work that defends an affirmative answer to that question, including Irwin 1995,




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56 Don Adams

VII

Socrates says that he himself has trouble accepting his own conclusion

S/obS).23

Just as parents might be surprised to learn that the child suf-fering from a fever and the child suffering chills are both suffering fromone and the same disease, it is surprising to learn that willing error/injustice and willing success/justice derive from the same fundamen-tal condition of the soul. The application to arete makes this extremelyproblematic. 24

Socrates is uncomfortable with the conclusion because it is still gov-erned by the issue that got the dialogue going: Hippias believes that

Achilles is a better man than Odysseus. If we add this premise (togetherwith Hippias' other assumptions about Odysseus) to Socrates' argu-ment, then Socrates' ultimate conclusion entails that a deceitful (365d8)man whom Hippias implies is to be associated with people who actuallydo bad and unjust things willingly (371e9-2a5) is a good man. The goodman is the man with the good soul, the man with the good soul is theman whose soul is skillful and has everything on the DPES list; that isthe person who does wrong if he wishes (366a8-b3, e3-7a5), and Odys-seus wishes to do wrong quite often (in Hippias' view). It is paradoxical

68-76; Penner 2000, 164 (see also Penner 1990, 1996 and 1997b); Reshotko 1992.Brickhouse and Smith go so far as to call this the received account of Socratic mo-tivation Brickhouse and Smith 2002,22) But there is growing body of work thatdefends a negative answer to the question, including Devereux 1995; Brickhouse

and Smith 2002,2005; Singpurwalla 2006. While my conclusions here are relevantto this debate, explicitly addressing the thorny interpretive issues is beyond thescope of this paper.

23 Taylor and Shorey think this is the key to avoiding the apparently paradoxicalconclusion of the Hippias Minor Taylor 1937, 37; Shorey 1958, 89). Zem baty sug-gests that on this view we would have to interpret Socrates' final claim that hehimself goes back and forth on this issue 376cl-6) as an 'ironical swipe' at Hippias(Zembaty 1989,63). I disagree. When as in the Hippias Minor , Socrates discussesthe willing errant if there is such a person), he rums out to be the better person

because of his wisdom and power (he knows what is right and hence can know-ingly and intentionally do what is right if he wishes). But when he discusses thewilling errant (as in Gorgias 467b-8e), he turns out to be the worse person becausehis errors demonstrate that he doesn't really know what he is doing, and hencelacks the power to do the right thing knowingly or willingly.

24 Laguna argued that both of Socrates' arguments in the Hippias Minor are sound,but he does not confront the interpretive difficulties that arise from this position cf. Laguna 1920,553,555).




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to say that a good man with a good soul wishes to do, and hence does,wrong things quite often.

W e don t solve the paradox by rejecting Hippias view of Odysseus

because it still seems reasonable that there will in fact be many instanc-es where a man who can do wrong if he wishes (and hence is a goodman according to Socrates argument) will wish to do wrong things,e.g., lie, cheat, steal, murder. We solve the paradox only if we can denythe antecedent of the relevant conditional claim: i f he wishes the goodman does wrong things. If we can prove that the good man does notand cannot wish to do wrong things, then the apparent paradox is noreal trouble.

To clarify what we need, allow me to use a Kantian distinction.25

Kant distinguishes between problematical and assertoric hypotheti-cal imperatives. 26 What distinguishes them is that problematical imper-atives are grounded on contingent ends that a rational being may haveor lack while assertoric imperatives are grounded on ends that rationalbeings have and cannot lack, i.e., ends that are necessarily attributableto all rational beings. For Kant, happiness is the end that is attributableto all rational beings, and so is the ground for the assertoric impera-tives of prudence. Any theory that accepts assertoric imperatives mustalso accept what I call nugatory imperatives , i.e., imperatives that aregrounded on ends no rational being may have. If we can say that lying,cheating, stealing, murdering and so on can form the apodosis only ofnugatory hypothetical imperatives, then we can dissolve the paradox atthe end of the Hippias Minor.

Kant points the way. If happiness is the ground for assertoric impera-tives, then the contrary of happiness will ground nugatory imperatives. If you want to be unhappy, then ö will always constitute a nugatoryhypothetical imperative. We might call Kant a rational eudaimonistbecause he thinks that, as Allen Wood says, it belongs to the essence ofrationality that a rational being is bound to form the idea of its happi-ness and make that happiness an end (Wood 1999, 66). Hence, anyone

25 I have complained about anachronism in the interpretation of ancient Greek phi-losophy in my critique of Sprague above. I believe tha t my use of Kant is notanachronistic because I think that the relevant distinctions drawn by Kant suggestwhat we might look for in Socrates if we want a solution to the argument at theend of the H ippias Minor different from that of Gomperz. W e may or may not findthe elements of a Ka ntian solution.

26 I follow Wood s analysis of Kant s distinction (Wood 1999,65-70)




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who actually obeys a nugatory imperative will be irrational. Since ra-tional eudaimonism does not entail psychological eudaimonism, Kantcan accept that people obey nugatory imperatives, and hence behave ir-

rationally, quite often. If he were a psychological eudaimonist he couldsay that although it is logically possible for a rational agent to obey anugatory imperative, it is psychologically impossible, so you will neveractually find any instance of obedience to a nugatory imperative (atleast not by a sane person).

Finally, notice that if you add to psychological eudaimonism ethical eudaimonism, the result is precisely what we need to dissolve theparadox at the end of the Hippies M inor. If the only way unjust, immoral

or vicious actions can be commanded is via an imperative which be-gins, If you want to be unhappy , — i.e., if ethical eudaimonism is true— and if no one can actually satisfy that antecedent — i.e., if psycho-logical eudaimonism is true — then the good man will never in fact doanything wrong, even though in some sense he can. Socrates conspicu-ous if in fact there is such a man (376b5-6) might be taken as an invita-tion to consider the principles of human action, and such considerationmight lead us to accept psychological and ethical eudaimonism. Irwinhas argued that in fact Socratic investigations lead precisely to theseconclusions (Irwin 1995, 61-3, 72-6).

So now we have two ways of solving the apparent paradox at theend of the Hippias Minor: (1) that of Irwin and (2) that which I ve at-tributed to Gomperz. Notice that both of these solutions point us in thesame direction, i.e., the philosophy of human action. Need we distin-guish between cognitive and conative elements in the explanation ofhuman action, or does our pursuit of euda imonia sufficiently account forwhat we do? Centuries of philosophy since Socrates ve rify that theseare indeed important questions to answer if we hope with any confi-dence to make the kinds of evaluative judgments important to Hippias.Socrates has not woven a web of deceit to confound Hippias, instead hehas introduced him to sober reflection on human action and human life.Socrates has introduced Hippias to the examined life and, as a result,Hippias may lead it, i he wishes.27

Notice, finally, that Plato has shown Hippias to be polutropos bothsynchronically and diachronically. Achilles portrays himself as a man

27 I am in fundam ental agreement with Garcia-Baro 2000 who argues that in the Hippias Minor Plato is, among other things, intentionally displaying what it is to pur-sue philosophy seriously.




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who says what he means and means what he says and on this basiscontrasts himself with Odysseus. Hippias turns out to be more like Od-ysseus than Achilles on this count. Like the synchronic polutropos, there

is significant slippage between appearance and reality when it comesto claims Hippias explicitly affirms and claims he genuinely believes.Although he explicitly f rames his belief in terms of who is and who isnot polutropos , Socrates shows that what Hippias really has in mind ismore accurately described in terms of alethes and pseudes . Socrates isthe one who consistently makes an effort to be sure that he and Hippiassay clearly what it is they truly believe. Also, like the diachronic polu-tropos, there is failure over time on the part of Hippias to stand by his

earlier protestations. Hippias affirms Socrates premises, the validityof his arguments, and hence his general conclusions, but then when itcomes to applying those general conclusions to specific claims Hippiasfinds an embarrassment to himself, he betrays the logic. Socrates is theone who consistently abides by the claims he and Hippias have agreedto, even if that entails something embarrassing for him. Socrates refusesto betray the logic of the arguments. If, as I suspect, Plato was awarethat some people had compared Socrates to Odysseus in the respect ofbeing polutropos, then in the Hippias Minor Plato put that allegation torest.

Philosophy DepartmentCentral Connecticut State University

New Britain, CT 06050U.S.A.

[email protected]

or s ited

Apelt, K. 1912. Platonische Aufsätze. Leipzig.

Brickhouse, Thtmas C. and Nicholas D. Smith. 2002. Incurable Souls in Socratic Psychol-ogy . Anaent Philosophy 22:21-36.

Devereux, Danel T. 1995. Socrates Kantian Conception of Virtue . Journal of the HistoryofPhilosaihy 33: 381̂ 08.

Garcia-Baro, Mguiel. 2000. Hipias menor, que el hombre se diria que es malo par su bondad.Daimm 2:39-54.

Gomperz, T. 1910. G reek Thinkers. Vol. 2 trans. L. Magnus. London.

Grote, G . 1865. lato and the Other Companions ofSokrates. 4 vols. London.




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Guthrie, W.K.C. 1975. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol.4. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.

Hoerber, R.G. 1962 Plato's Lesser Hippies. Phronesis 7:121-31.

Homer. 1984. The Odyssey. Translated by AT. Murray Cambridge, Massachusetts: Har-vard University Press. First published 1919.

. 1996. The Odyssey. Translated by Robert Fagles. New York. Penguin Books.

Irwin, Terence. 1995. P lato s Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Laguna, Theodore. 1920. T he Lesser Hippias. The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17:550-556.

Levystone, David. 2005. 'La figure dTJlysse chez les Socratiques: Socrate p olutropos . Phronesis 50:181-214.

Mulhem, ].}. 1968. Tropos and Polytropia in Plato's Hippias M inor . Pheonii 22:283-288.

Penner, Terry. 1990. 'Plato and Davidson: Parts of the Soul and Weakness of the Will'. InD. Copp, ed., Canadian Philosophers: Celebrating Twenty Years of th e Canadian Journalo Philosophy (Supplementary Volume 16 of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy), 35-72.

. 1992. The Unity of Virtue'. In Hugh H. Benson, ed., Essays on the Philosophy of

Socrates, 242-262. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally appeared in Philo-sophical Review 82 (1973) 35-68).

. 1996. 'Knowledge vs. True Belief in the Socraac Psychology of Action'. Apeiron29:199-229.

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